LandCyber Operations A Double Edged Sword or a Dream Team by Lieutenant Colonel John L Rafferty Jr United States Army United States Army War College Class of 2013 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A Approved for Public Release Distribution is Unlimited This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army Department of Defense or the U S Government The U S Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools 3624 Market Street Philadelphia PA 19104 215 662-5606 The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U S Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation Form Approved OMB No 0704-0188 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE The public reporting 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SUBTITLE LandCyber Operations A Double Edged Sword or a Dream Team 5a CONTRACT NUMBER 5b GRANT NUMBER 5c PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6 AUTHOR S 5d PROJECT NUMBER Lieutenant Colonel John L Rafferty Jr United States Army 5e TASK NUMBER 5f WORK UNIT NUMBER 7 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME S AND ADDRESS ES 8 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER Colonel Charles J Tulaney Department of Military Strategy Planning and Operations 9 SPONSORING MONITORING AGENCY NAME S AND ADDRESS ES 10 SPONSOR MONITOR'S ACRONYM S U S Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle PA 17013 11 SPONSOR MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER S 12 DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A Approved for Public Release Distribution is Unlimited 13 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Word Count 6 145 14 ABSTRACT Recognizing the inseparability of the land and cyberspace domains as well as the requirement to dominate both the Army has developed the LandCyber operations strategy which goes beyond crossdomain operations and proposes a partnership that seeks to unify the effects created through cyberspace and land dominance This monograph describes LandCyber in theory and then in action through the lens of the Army's Prevent Shape Win operating construct At first glance the LandCyber strategy looks like a dream team for commanders but further examination reveals its threat as a double edged sword Will LandCyber enable micro-managing leaders to be the wet blanket of mission command Or will it open new doors for more effective maneuver and influence operations The Army should embrace the LandCyber strategy as an approach for operations in the current and future environment 15 SUBJECT TERMS Cyberspace Mission Command LandWarNet 16 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF a REPORT UU b ABSTRACT UU 17 LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT c THIS PAGE UU UU 18 NUMBER OF PAGES 34 19a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON 19b TELEPHONE NUMBER Include area code Standard Form 298 Rev 8 98 Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39 18 USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT LandCyber Operations A Double Edged Sword or a Dream Team by Lieutenant Colonel John L Rafferty Jr United States Army Colonel Charles J Tulaney Department of Military Strategy Planning and Operations Project Adviser This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree The U S Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools 3624 Market Street Philadelphia PA 19104 215 662-5606 The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U S Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army Department of Defense or the U S Government U S Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS PENNSYLVANIA 17013 Abstract Title LandCyber Operations A Double Edged Sword or a Dream Team Report Date March 2013 Page Count 34 Word Count 6 145 Key Terms Cyberspace Mission Command LandWarNet Classification Unclassified Recognizing the inseparability of the land and cyberspace domains as well as the requirement to dominate both the Army has developed the LandCyber operations strategy which goes beyond cross-domain operations and proposes a partnership that seeks to unify the effects created through cyberspace and land dominance This monograph describes LandCyber in theory and then in action through the lens of the Army's Prevent Shape Win operating construct At first glance the LandCyber strategy looks like a dream team for commanders but further examination reveals its threat as a double edged sword Will LandCyber enable micro-managing leaders to be the wet blanket of mission command Or will it open new doors for more effective maneuver and influence operations The Army should embrace the LandCyber strategy as an approach for operations in the current and future environment LandCyber Operations A Double Edged Sword or a Dream Team Perhaps it is best to see the Internet and cyber attack as the latest in a long line of technologies that have changed warfare and provided new military capabilities --James Andrew Lewis1 The US Army Cyber Command's strategy for LandCyber operations provides a window from which one might peer into the future and see a network centric force that has harnessed technology and information to achieve advantage in the land and cyberspace domains by establishing unity of command While on one hand the LandCyber strategy is a good start in terms of conceptualizing how the Army will operate in an increasingly networked manner on the other hand one might be concerned that the Army's reliance on a network will make it more vulnerable to an attack through cyberspace Protecting the network however will be a core competency of future cyber forces and demonstrates commitment to mitigating that risk As Army units operate at the end of a long tether in an increasingly complex and distributed land and cyber environment the Army's network will provide opportunities for incredible access to information gathered from both the land and cyber domains which will then be shared vertically and horizontally This is where both opportunity and vulnerability lie Will the Army use LandCyber delivered enhanced situational awareness and access to information to improve its capability to Prevent Shape and Win the nation's wars or will it allow technology to be the wet blanket of mission command Will LandCyber be a double-edged sword that is ultimately self defeating or a dream team of complementary capabilities The land and cyberspace domains are inseparable and the Army must embrace the LandCyber strategy as an approach for operating in the current and future operating environment The Department of Defense DoD 2011 Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace states that cyberspace is a defining feature of modern life in which billions of people connect socialize and organize themselves 2 Ever increasing access to and reliance upon information delivered through cyberspace has elevated cyberspace's recognition to that of a domain of military operations The 2010 DOD Quadrennial Defense Review justified the designation by stating that cyberspace is now as relevant a domain for DoD activities as the naturally occurring domains of land sea air and space The US Army's LandCyber White Paper 2013-2020 takes it a step further in describing the cyberspace domain as terrain for the information environment 3 Even a cursory study of the relative short history of cyberspace specifically the internet very clearly illustrates its vulnerability to attack hacking criminal activity espionage and cyber war Cyberspace is a truly contested domain But in spite of the obvious risk reliance on cyberspace for information continues to grow for both the US Army and the world The US Army must be able to protect itself and exploit advantages in the cyberspace domain Land perhaps a more tangible and familiar domain of military operations is also a contested domain US interests will continue to be threatened across the globe Competition for natural resources clashes of culture and religion grasps for political power economic tension and overpopulation are but a few of the underlying conditions that will foment conflict in the 21st century History has not proven an effective road map for determining the location of the next conflict but it has shown its likelihood America's Army must remain ready to win decisively and dominate the land domain 2 If thoroughly grasped by commanders LandCyber has great potential for units to achieve effects in the cyberspace domain that will contribute directly to decisive effects in the land domain The unified effects will enable commanders to attacks less tangible centers of gravity such as political will through the cyberspace domain Cross domain effects will complement and support each other to achieve far more decisive effects in the operational environment The 2012 Army Posture Statement addresses the land and cyber domains by proposing even closer cooperation as a requirement for the future As demonstrated in the last decade the information environment has changed the way we fight Military and cyberspace operations have converged This requires the Army to be dominant in both the land and cyberspace domains 4 Building on this idea the 2d US Army Army Cyber Command ARCYBER has developed a concept for LandCyber unified operations This concept goes beyond cross-domain operations and proposes a partnership that seeks to unify the effects created through cyberspace and land dominance This partnership relies on the successful employment of LandWarNet the Army's portion of the global information grid GIG and will be enabled through the mission command warfighting function The Commanding General of ARCYBER LTG Rhett A Hernandez describes this concept as an opportunity for the Army to dominate in LandCyber We're focused on integrating at all levels in order to ensure mission command in the conduct of unified operations This all about maintaining our freedom to operate while taking it away from the enemy 5 The Army should embrace the LandCyber strategy as an approach for operations in the current and future environment 3 Israeli Defense Force Example When examining the Israeli Defense Forces IDF execution of Operation Pillar of Defense against Hamas in Gaza during the second half of 2012 one can see a future in which land and cyberspace operations become more closely aligned in order to achieve cross domain synergy The IDF has a well established cyber enabled precision guided weapon capability to destroy adversary infrastructure and kill adversary leadership When compared to dramatic kinetic success against Egyptian forces in previous wars IDF efforts to kill and destroy irregular force targets were not as decisive in Lebanon Gaza or the West Bank While achieving some military success Israel was largely condemned in the international community and the Palestinian and Lebanese populations In September 2006 the IDF conducted a very sophisticated offensive cyber attack to disrupt state-of-the-art Syrian air defenses followed by a successful precision guided bomb attack that destroyed a nuclear facility 6 While effective in eliminating a perceived threat Israel failed to exploit their success in the information environment On the contrary they never admitted to it nor justified their actions As expected during Operation Pillar of Defense the IDF conducted offensive cyber operations to disrupt enemy command and control and precision guided attacks and intelligence driven maneuver operations to kill enemy combatants -all impressive applications of cyber power to enable kinetic operations What was not expected was the IDF's use of cyber power in the battle for ideas The IDF conducted an aggressive social media campaign to compete in the information environment through messages that provided accurate real-time conflict justification warnings successes and situation reports to a wide variety of audiences friend and foe alike 7 Even if the long term 4 effects of these new efforts are not yet known the point is well taken - the cyberspace domain is about more than computer network attack and precision guided munitions it lends itself to domination of the information environment LandCyber The Army's LandCyber White Paper states that LandCyber is a strategy to apply unified force Land and Cyber under a single mission commander to establish optimal combination of effects to influence the threat before it can impact friendly forces and operations 8 To some the introduction of cyber capabilities may seem revolutionary but no more than an airplane dropping bombs in World War I or Army amphibious operations in World War II or even Counterinsurgency operations in Iraq As in the case of the previous examples LandCyber is an evolution of the combined arms concept and the Army is well suited to integrate cyber capabilities into existing formations to achieve even greater effects ARCYBER forces exercise five operational functions in cyberspace domain Build the network Operate the network Defend the network Exploit networks Attack networks 9 Most Army units are able to construct tactical networks and operate them effectively but as the networks grow in size and complexity so does their vulnerability and thus each BCT will require a more sophisticated ability to build operate and defend the network than currently exists with assigned signal personnel and current equipment Army Cyberspace Operations are comprised of three distinct missions Defense Information Network Operations DINO Defensive Cyberspace Operations DCO and Offensive Cyberspace Operations OCO DINO refers to the functions required to build access and sustain the Army cyberspace network Eventually this network will 5 be the LandWarNet which will be discussed later in this paper DCO refers to the passive and active operations to preserve the ability to utilize friendly cyberspace capabilities and protect networks and net-centric capabilities 10 OCO refers to the set of functions that enable Army commanders to achieve effects in the cyberspace and land domains 11 ARCYBER developed Cyberspace Mission Areas as a framework for operationalizing the cyberspace missions 12 A description of these mission areas will help understand the advantages they offer to Unified Land Operations ULO These mission areas are Cyberspace Mission Control Area Cyberspace Force Enhancement Mission Area Cyberspace Support Mission Area and Cyberspace Force Application Area 13 The mission control area includes necessary actions to operate and defend the network These include passive and active measures such as cyber network hunting and incident response The force enhancement area includes the functions that provide for situational awareness and knowledge while the support mission area refers to the operations that support the LandWarNet The force application mission area includes exploit attack and influence operations Understanding the Army's cyberspace potential in operational terms is essential to grasping the LandCyber strategy While LandCyber is dependent on the Army's future network LandWarNet the LandCyber strategy must be broad enough to convince commanders that considering the cyberspace domain and taking advantage of cyber capabilities is not just about more computers and cyber attack With the possible exception of the Army's most specialized formations computer network attack CNA and computer network exploitation CNE are competencies which are not currently resident in Army general 6 purpose forces and focusing on those two capabilities will only serve to frustrate and mislead commanders In fact the authorities for these operations are complicated and contain interagency legal issues that are out of bounds for Army units who do not possess the skill sets or equipment ARCBYER is developing a process and capability that would serve as a call for fire of sorts to request effects by with or through the cyberspace domain 14 The Army must provide clarity to the LandCyber strategy by presenting it as a concept that will deliver and maintain situational awareness to an extent not previously experienced which will enable decisive maneuver and effective information operations to assist commanders in achieving their mission LandWarNet Army units at every level need reliable access to information technology that helps sift through the data to gain knowledge through the cyberspace environment enabling decisive maneuver and an ability to conduct influence operations in a more efficient and timely manner LandCyber operations enabled by LandWarNet and brought to life through the mission command warfighting function will provide unprecedented access to information and the technology and staff functions that will lead to gaining knowledge The Army Posture Statement for 2012 states The Army network must be dynamic to give Soldiers civilian and partners information and services when and where needed The embodiment of that vision will be LandWarNet LandWarNet is the US Army's effort to create the enterprise-level network that will enable warfighters and leaders around the world to achieve information superiority There are 5 major goals for the program First the program seeks to operationalize LandWarNet through efforts to 7 enable warfighters at the tactical level The Joint Tactical Radio System JTRS and the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical WIN-T are examples of on-going efforts to get secure voice data and video on the move capabilities into the operational force 15 Second LandWarNet must improve the Army's cybersecurity position Moving information and computing functions to the cloud will dramatically reduce the network's vulnerability 16 The third objective is to improve operational effectiveness while gaining efficiencies across the network The Network Integration Evaluation NIE is a proactive collaboration with industry to ensure technological development is compatible with the network BEFORE it becomes available on the shelf 17 Fourth LandWarNet must enable joint and partner collaboration and will do this through clear standardization efforts for the Common Information Environment and everything over internet protocol EoIP network procedures And finally the LandWarNet community must attract and retain talented Soldiers and civilians 18 It is a long term equipment modernization and force structure program designed to deliver a significantly enhanced capability for the Army of 2020 while still improving the Army's existing information network along the way In fact the Army will begin to field 8 LandWarNet integrated capability sets to brigades beginning in 2013 19 These sets will introduce emerging network technology improvements to the operational force in stride Tactical and operational use by mainstream units will provide feedback to the LandWarNet community for continued improvements Through unit testing and the NIE the Army will be able to refine the network architecture to create an end to end solution for warfighters with a data strategy for Army wide common products and services Mobile devices made user 8 friendly by Apps 4 the Army A4A will ensure the network is available to users in need - the warfighter at the tactical edge 20 LandWarNet contributes directly to the LandCyber concept through the mission command warfighting function LandWarNet's overarching purpose is to deliver a deployable network enabled mission command capability as the cornerstone of the Army's expeditionary force capability 21 This is absolutely critical to the LandCyber concept which relies entirely upon increased access to the network As the warfighting function responsible for integration the mission command warfighting function will provide the framework for integrating Cyber capability in support of ULO Mission Command - the warfighting function Army Warfighting Functions WfF are groups of tasks and systems people organizations information and processes united by common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions 22 The Army WfFs are movement and maneuver intelligence fires sustainment protection and mission command Under the LandCyber concept ULO requires action in both the land and cyberspace domains which happens to span all seven WfFs According to ADRP 6-0 the mission command warfighting function integrates the other warfighting functions into a coherent whole it provides purpose and direction to the other warfighting functions 23 The ARCYBER concept for LandCyber operations seeks to utilize the Mission Command Warfighting Function WfF to bring the land and cyberspace domains together and gain synergy from complementary cross domain activities to achieve decisive effects on land The Mission Command Center of Excellence MCCoE is the Army's center for developing and integrating mission command Doctrine Organization Training 9 Manning Leader Development Programs and Facility requirements and solutions across the six warfighting functions Of the MCCoE's ten priorities three are clearly pointed at LandWarNet and Cyber efforts which demonstrate the close nature of the LandWarNet cyberspace and mission command relationship The MCCoE is involved in the Agile Process NIE for materiel solutions the Improve Mission Command Initiative to create better command post and information technology as well as partnering with Army Cyber to ensure mission command 24 Mission command serves as both a WfF for balancing the art of command with the science of control as well as a guiding principle for how to lead In terms of leading mission command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders 25 These mission type orders are based on trust and shared understanding of the situation which is where the technology aspect comes into play Shared understanding comes from information technology delivered friendly force tracking devices common pictures of the environment enemy and terrain as well as communication systems that enable routine reporting The MCCoE must ensure that the LandWarNet solutions for the mission command WfF serve the master of the mission command principle of leadership The LandCyber strategy should be a guiding principle for commanders similar to combined arms and mission command The Army doesn't do combined arms but we operate in a combined arms fashion The Army does not do mission command yet seeks to operate in a mission command fashion The Army will never do LandCyber operations yet LandCyber will enable combined arms mission command and create opportunities for the Army to compete in the battle for ideas 10 Influencing People The Army Cyberspace Force Application framework outlines three capabilities that deliver effects to commanders on the battlefield - Exploit Attack and Influence 26 Exploit and attack are too complex for near term serious application in traditional Army formations Cyberspace influence operations offers commanders the greatest opportunity for increased near term capabilities Unleashing the potential of influence and influence activities IIA through cyberspace may finally provide commanders the opportunity to properly match actions and message and to compete effectively in the battle for ideas These ideas form the basis for desired human behavior Whether that behavior is hostile to United States interests or merely supportive of hostile actors the US Army must compete for those ideas The world is more connected than ever and increasingly its people get their information from cyber sources - internet sites and social media Hostile actors may require kinetic activity to change their behavior but most people's behavior can be altered through the use of information One could argue that information is the central theme in current and future conflict Using the Clausewitzian trinity model that features an influencing idea policy at the top chance military competitors and emotion the people as the legs of the triangle it becomes clear that information is central to the very concept of conflict If one were to truly use Clausewitz' position with regard to a center of gravity then one would not target an adversary's strength but rather the focal point where that strength is distributed where that strength gains power 27 Building on that position if an idea is the unifying theme that supports conflict then information might be defined as the idea's strength and so the focal point the point of distribution might be the internet or 11 cyberspace To place this in the context of the Global War on Terrorism which undeniably is a contest of ideas - religious extremism centered on hatred of the west is the motivating idea Information from various antagonistic sources can provide the idea's strength but the means by which the information is distributed and the place where it gathers strength the focal point often lies in the infinite reaches of cyberspace Contrary to popular sentiment this center of gravity for ideas is not necessarily the place where one strikes for victory but rather it is the place where one must compete and if centers of gravity exist at multiple levels of war then LandCyber offers commanders at all levels new capabilities to identify capabilities and exploit vulnerabilities Globalization's tsunami effect on the information environment shows very clearly the requirement for the Army to compete in the cyberspace domain 28 In order to do so the Army needs to execute IIA with speed agility mass and resilience Speed of information flow requires the Army to engage in a continuous fashion - proactively reactively and as a matter of course Agility requires the Army to react quickly to changes in the environment operational adjustments friendly or enemy action - agility made possible through enhanced situational awareness Mass refers to the requirement to carpet bomb the information environment In this context precision refers to information engagements done in person while resilience is the requirement for Army networks - well defended from attack and robust enough for huge servings of information When high volume timely and responsive information operations to inform and influence target audiences are coupled with kinetic and non-kinetic operations that match the information objectives commanders will have created the opportunity to 12 affect the unifying idea and ultimately change behavior Since information is central to the motivating idea and thus central to conflict the Army must adopt the LandCyber strategy as a way to more effectively compete for the ideas of people Over the course of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan information operations have been hindered by restrictions that prevented BCT level units from conducting effective and timely information operations In most cases these restrictions were based on historical information fratricide or a fear of information fratricide based on routinely lousy situational awareness In some cases it has been a lack of trust that subordinate units would make the correct decisions with regard to information operations based on current conditions they had encountered It is counter intuitive that the Army tends to trust more when the stakes are high with respect to loss of human life or mission accomplishment in extreme conditions Little Groups of Paratroopers LGOPs is an example of that trust or risk acceptance Once Paratroopers exit an aircraft they are on their own to link up in small groups before they make contact with their parent units LGOPs then operate without direct supervision basing their actions solely on their understanding of the operation and their commitment to accomplishing the commander's intent The Army tends to entrust Soldiers and leaders with where to drop a bomb who to shoot in a firefight or when to turn in a tank because leaders are familiar with the environment which enables them to understand and measure the risk Some Army leaders cannot extend trust when operating in unfamiliar territory because human nature influences leaders to unnecessarily control or restrict what they don't really understand Cyberspace and the information environment is an example of that unfamiliar terrain Cyberspace 13 operations will make that environment more familiar to all personnel while technology enabled mission command will enhance situational awareness for commanders Perhaps then will commanders extend their trust into IIA Current Situation The mainstreaming of Cyberspace operations into unified operations has already started The Army recently moved to formalize cyber-electromagnetic activities CEMA into doctrine 29 However this move potentially boxes cyber activities into a dark corner of a Tactical Operations Center if a less enlightened commander refuses to acknowledge the potential of LandCyber strategy There are three distinct lines of operation for CEMA cyberspace operations electronic warfare EW and electromagnetic support operations EMSO Cyberspace operations employ capabilities to create effects in or through cyberspace through the employment of offensive cyber defensive cyber or global information grid operations 30 EW controls or denies the electromagnetic spectrum through electronic attack and electronic protection whereas EMSO coordinates electromagnetic spectrum operations and prevents frequency fratricide 31 While this definition is potentially confusing given the EW and EMSO additions it recognizes their unique relationship and captures the basic operational functions defined by ARCYBER and gets cyber into the fight Much as the development of the network is a long term project so is the integration of CEMA into staff processes and operations ARCYBER and the MCCoE are co-leads in the Army's effort to determine how best to accomplish CEMA integration for the long term 32 In the interim units will create CEM working groups in order to bring together the WfFs and the integrating cells Plans Operations Future Operations 14 LandCyber in Context The 2012 Army Posture Statement states that the role of the Army is to prevent shape and win the nation's wars Just as no war has been won without boots on the ground no future conflict will be exclusive of the cyberspace domain 33 The next portion of this monograph explores examples of LandCyber operations in the prevent shape and win construct Prevent Preventing future conflict involves demonstrating credible military options that serve to dissuade a potential adversary - regardless of the domain or domains in question Prevention actions with respect to LandCyber operations include manning and training the force preparing for future conflict as well as defending the Army's network from attack Army formations will continue to cycle through the Army's Force Generation ARFORGEN process during which they will be manned equipped and trained to high levels of readiness As discussed earlier Army BCTs will begin to receive portions of the LandWarNet program in the next year as well as stand up CEM cells The new 35Q military occupational specialty cryptologic network specialist is being aggressively recruited by the Army 34 As LandWarNet matures and gets fielded incrementally to Army units cryptologic specialists will fill the ranks of units to help deliver enhanced capabilities to commanders Additionally the 780th Military Intelligence Brigade has been activated as the BCT of cyber with the mission of defending military networks and potentially addressing the cyber call for fire requirement 35 Many units will complete their training cycles with challenging rotations at one of the Army's three training centers The training centers will feature a World 15 Class Cyber Opposing Force from the 1st Information Operations Command to create a realistic multi domain training environment 36 This initiative will challenge units generally BCTs as they create and defend networks If able to defend their network these BCTs will enable mission command achieve shared situational understanding and compete in the informational environment Through the NIE Agile Process the Army will deliver materiel solutions that will enhance command post capability with respect to communications analysis and situational awareness A powerful example of anticipated capabilities involves common social network analysis and social media analysis programs on common hardware working off the cloud where the network is the computer 37 Through the cyber domain land force CEM intelligence targeting and operations personnel will be manned equipped and trained to understand human behavior of particular groups The full complement of LandCyber possibilities will be tested against an adversary in the land and cyberspace domains Between the purpose built 780th MI Brigade and the enhanced BCTs the Army will demonstrate a remarkable capability - a force that is ready for deployment and prepared to dominate in the land and cyberspace domains Shape Shaping the international environment involves activities to assure our friends and contain our enemies 38 The regionally aligned force concept is designed to provide a wide range of Army capabilities to Combatant Commanders in support of theater security objectives 39 The Army Deputy Chief of Staff G3 5 7 described the concept as being all about providing the Combatant Commander with the right force at the right time to better shape the region maybe preventing something like an Iraq or 16 Afghanistan 40 Though regions partners and objectives vary considerably one can easily speculate that theater security objectives might include building partner capacity in cyberspace practices and cyberspace defense BCTs and other units operating in Africa for example may be forced to build operate and defend their own networks in order to operate successfully from distributed locations Partner nations who are able to operate alongside the Army in the land and cyber domains may prove to be more capable partners in the future The Commanding General of US Army Africa envisions regionally aligned Army units operating in distributed locations across the continent who may not necessarily intervene in local conflicts but who would help train and equip local forces and assist host nation governments 41 Building partners with traditional security related capabilities who can defend their networks and information systems will create partners who are interoperable on our networks More reliable partners on a trusted effective network will result in increased situational understanding for all parties - both deployed and at home station preparing for future operations The regional immersion will give CEMA operators and opportunity for a network and information environment reconnaissance aided by local partner guides CEM intelligence and targeting personnel from a regionally aligned force deployed will gain an understanding of the information environment perhaps aided by a local cyber guide and access to information for social media and social network analysis Using open source information units will be able to determine valuable information through the use of mainstream analysis programs that contain algorithms which determine relationships between people and organizations based on a wide variety of variablescommunications location contact finances etc 42 The information sharing 17 opportunities for units working through the ARFORGEN cycle will result in regionally aligned forces that will actually be regionally aware Using the ARFORGEN and regionally aligned force concept as one unit is regionally deployed another unit will be preparing to deploy even as another is resetting from deployment LandWarNet will connect all units to the network regardless of their place in the ARFORGEN cycle and offers incredible opportunities for real time collaboration and learning Using a simple knowledge model - Oblivious Ambiguous Inquisitive Facilitative- one can easily understand the advantage a future force will possess 43 A deploying force with little to no understanding of the environment would be categorized using this construct as Oblivious After a period of immersion the unit would reach the level of Ambiguous aware but uncertain Eventually the unit would reach levels of Inquisitive asking the right questions and later attain the level of Facilitative doing the right things With the additional information access enabled by LandWarNet the possibility exists for units to attain the level of Inquisitive before deployment Another powerful shaping capability delivered by deployed regionally aligned force will be their IIA actions which will demonstrate to the local and international community the strength of local forces the mutually shared interests and values as well as the matched up messages and actions Through this combination of activities in the land and cyberspace domains the Army will be able shape the security environment - better partners informed audiences more prepared forces more connected and stronger networks better intelligence and overall higher levels of readiness 18 Win Using a forcible entry and introduction of a follow on force scenario one will be able to see the value of the LandCyber concept during decisive operations - the win portion of the construct The Army maintains an airborne BCT as part of the Global Response Force for the large scale airborne assault and airfield seizure portion of the joint forcible entry mission Based on the IDF cyber attack against Syrian air defenses one could imagine how offensive cyber at the strategic level could enable a forcible entry mission to penetrate hostile airspace Currently airborne forces have very little situational awareness en route to the drop zone short of that which they gained during the mission analysis and rehearsal process While current mission command systems such as Command Post of the Future CPOF intelligence systems and E-mail are integral to large Tactical Operations Center provided power and networks airborne forces are almost completely reliant upon analog mission command systems With maps and line of sight radios the airborne force works through traditional battle tracking After the airfield is seized and the runways cleared the initial aircraft land with vehicles which brings limited digital mission command systems and then requires battalions and the BCT to go through the process of converting from analog to digital mission command - laboriously entering data into Blue Force Tracker devices laptop computers and other devices in an effort to establish situational awareness horizontally across the BCT and then vertically up to the joint task force commander 44 Once the airfield is ready to receive airplanes to deliver the decisive force speed is essential The airfield can become a target rich environment full of taxiing airplanes and slow moving vehicles The optimal course of action would be for combat units to link up and 19 move straight from the airfield to follow on positions - immediately employing decisive combat power Unfortunately a digital hand-off means does not currently exist Units do not have a way to share situational awareness which slows down the transition and the expansion of the lodgment - increasing risk 45 The LandCyber strategy offers the potential to change this archaic process Using the previous example of shaping operations imagine the situational awareness that the entire joint task force would have based on shared information from a regionally aligned force's experience Beginning an operation with information like a social media network diagram or a social network diagram would give the forcible entry and decisive forces a decided advantage - they would start from a position of advantage in the learning model because they will understand the information environment as well as the terrain The entire joint task force would have a common understanding of how to conduct traditional and IIA operations to change the behavior of the adversary without alienating the local populace With a real-time common operational picture of the land and cyberspace domains and a real plan for IIA operations lower level units will be able to operate in a permissive information environment based on the local conditions they encounter 46 Current conflict has demonstrated reluctance to allow initiative inspired IIA operations at lower levels because of the threat of information fratricide 47 The CEM cells will be able to advise the commander on actions to take in the cyber electromagnetic spectrum with respect to protecting his network and shutting down the adversary's information access The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has been testing tablet computers with transformative smart phone applications in Afghanistan which are delivering mapping networking and individual identification capabilities at the platoon 20 level conducting combat operations 48 Mainstream delivery of this type of device as part of the LandWarNet A4A program will significantly increase the situational awareness of the airborne assault force while providing the same level of information to the follow on force - simultaneously Approaching LandCyber strategy and embracing cyber capabilities organized to deliver effects by with and through the cyberspace domain in a combined arms manner will clearly make the Army more effective along the prevent shape win mission construct Concerns While the scenarios provided in the previous section illustrate the possibilities offered by LandCyber the Army cannot afford to fall victim to the attractive siren of technology and ignore the possible risks Cyber enabled information in the form of a common operational picture network diagram or on-line profile regardless of their level of detail have never adequately described reality and usually beg for more information 49 Situations will exist in which platoon leaders brigade commanders and division commanders will have the same common operational picture yet different ideas of what actions should be taken In the future as in the present some commanders will practice mission command by empowering and enabling subordinates with intent while others will micro-manage subordinate commanders with specific instructions and overbearing supervision But in a network enabled force micro-managing commanders will be able to cast a wider net and potentially paralyze an entire organization If LandCyber cuts twice as a double edged sword it will surely strike a fatal blow to mission command 21 However if LandCyber is a dream team the future of mission command has never been brighter Commanders are not the only cause of mission command failure often it is the inexperienced subordinate who lacks the intuitive ability to see opportunities even in the best of mission command circumstances With common situational awareness and reliable voice and data communications a more experienced commander can act as a coach in the ear of a platoon leader to guide him in the right direction while remaining within the spirit of mission command With the recent emergence of machine learning that offers applications for analyzing human behavior and decision making language translation and pattern recognition it is not much of a stretch to imagine a platoon leader with a learning machine on his forearm which can make recommendations for action based on months of input data and shared situational awareness 50 That kind of capability would surely meet the goal of LandCyber - to ensure mission command in the conduct of unified land operations The right kind of leader with the right kind of technology - that is a dream team Conclusion A century ago armies discovered that technology could be the key to victory Since then there has been a steady stream of new weapons new technologies and new ways to attack 51 This monograph proposed that unified land and cyberspace operations as an operating concept is the next step in the evolution of combined arms and the continued effort to harness technology The Army's operating concept of Prevent Shape and Win is well supported by the LandCyber operations approach at all levels in order to achieve strategic effects A more full examination of cyber operating functions through each element of the Prevent Shape Win construct will help 22 commanders to understand how the LandCyber approach will enable them to orchestrate complementary effects in both domains LandCyber implementation should parallel LandWarNet Each deliverable from the LandWarNet program that improves the Army's network capability ought to be accompanied by an incremental increase in commander effectiveness in achieving cross domain synergy Further development of the cyber attack calls for fire to higher level cyber units will allow the Army to realize that potential when it becomes available Given the emphasis by the Army's most senior leaders on mission command almost to the point of promising that type of leadership environment to junior leaders the Army cannot allow LandCyber to renege on that promise Further study must examine the impact of LandCyber operations on mission command As for the Army's LandCyber strategy it's a good place to start 23 Endnotes 1 James Andrew Lewis Cyber Attacks Real or Imagined and Cyber War Center for Strategic and International Studies July 11 2011 http csis org publication cyber-attacks-realor-imagined-and-cyber-war accessed January 11 2012 2 U S Department of Defense Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace Washington DC U S Department of Defense July 2011 1 3 U S Department of the Army Army LandCyber White Paper 2013-2030 pre-decisional draft Washington DC US Department of the Army December 20 2012 10 4 John M McHugh and Raymond T Odierno The Nation's Force of Decisive Action 2012 US Army Posture Statement to the 112th Congress 2nd Session Washington DC U S Department of the Army 2012 3 5 LTG Rhett Hernandez Tactical and Operations Cyberspace Modernization The CEM Element Briefing Slides Baltimore MD AFCEA Land Forces East Meeting August 16 2012 2 6 Sally Adee The Hunt for the Kill Switch IEEE Spectrum May 2008 12 7 Brian Fung Inside Israel's Social-Media Command Center The Atlantic Monthly November 25 2012 14 8 U S Department of the Army Army LandCyber White Paper 2013-2030 18 9 LTG Rhett Hernandez Tactical and Operations Cyberspace Modernization 9 10 U S Department of the Army Army LandCyber White Paper 2013-2030 23 11 Ibid 24 12 Ibid 13 Ibid 14 Joe Gould ARCYBER goes on attack on paper and in training The Army Times December 17 2012 15 Association of the United States Army Modernizing LandWarNet Empowering America's Army Torchbearer National Security Report Arlington VA Institute of Land Warfare May 2012 3 16 Ibid 4 24 17 Ibid 18 Ibid 3 19 LTG Susan G Lawrence U S Army Chief Information Officer Appendix 2 to Annex M LandWarNet to the U S Army Campaign Plan 2012 Washington DC M-2-3 20 LTG Susan G Lawrence U S Army Chief Information Officer Appendix 1 to Annex M LandWarNet to the U S Army Campaign Plan 2012 Washington DC M-1-1 21 LTG Susan G Lawrence U S Army Chief Information Officer Appendix 2 to Annex M LandWarNet to the U S Army Campaign Plan 2012 Washington DC M-2-1 22 U S Department of the Army Unified Land Operations Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 3-0 Washington DC U S Department of the Army May 16 2012 3-2 23 U S Department of the Army Mission Command Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 6-0 Washington DC U S Department of the Army May 17 2012 1-4 24 Mission Command Center of Excellence Trifold Enabling Commanders and Leaders Ft Leavenworth KS U S Army Combined Arms Center June 1 2012 25 U S Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Operations Joint Publication 3-0 Washington DC U S Joint Chiefs of Staff August 11 2011 3 26 U S Department of the Army Army LandCyber White Paper 2013-2030 25 27 Antulio J Echevarria II Globalization and the Nature of War Strategic Studies Institute Monograph Carlisle Barracks PA US Army War College 17 28 Ibid 1 29 Wayne A Grigsby et al CEMA A Key to Success in Unified Land Operations ARMY June 2012 43 30 Ibid 44 31 Ibid 32 Ibid 33 John M McHugh and Raymond T Odierno The Nation's Force of Decisive Action 5 34 Joe Gould Proactive Cyber Soldiers Make up Brigade New MOS The Army Times December 17 2012 35 Ibid 36 Joe Gould ARCYBER Goes on Attack on Paper and in Training The Army Times December 17 2012 25 37 Enrique J Reyna and Dennis J Castellanos Exploiting Weakness An approach to counter cartel strategies Monograph submitted to the Naval Postgraduate School Monterey CA U S Naval Postgraduate School December 2011 77 38 John M McHugh and Raymond T Odierno The Nation's Force of Decisive Action 6 39 Association of the United States Army Regionally Aligned Forces Offer a New Army Model for Global Involvement http www ausa org meetings 2012 annualmeeting Pages AMStory_Regional aspx October 2012 accessed January 11 2013 40 David Vergun Guard Reserve to Strengthen Regionally Aligned Brigades www army mil article 89685 October 31 2012 accessed January 11 2013 41 Association of the United States Army Regionally Aligned Forces Offer a New Army Model for Global Involvement 42 Enrique J Reyna and Dennis J Castellanos Exploiting Weakness An approach to counter cartel strategies 82 43 William J Polania Leveraging Social Networking Technologies Monograph submitted to the Naval Postgraduate School Monterey CA U S Naval Postgraduate School September 2010 82 44 Curtis A Buzzard Map Board to CPOF An Airborne Infantry Battalion at JRTC and the Challenges to Providing Situational Awareness during an FSO Rotation Infantry April May 2011 12 45 Ibid 13 46 Eric V Larsen et al Understanding Commanders' Information Needs for Influence Operations Santa Monica CA Rand Corporation 2009 58 47 Ibid 59 48 Spencer E Ante Military Takes Apps to War Wall Street Journal September 4 2012 49 Zadie Smith Generation Why New York Review of Books November 25 2010 50 Rachel Ehrenberg Software Scientist With a little data Eureqa generates fundamental laws of nature Science News January 14 2012 46 51 James Andrew Lewis Cyber Attacks Real or Imagined and Cyber War Center for Strategic and International Studies July 11 2011 http csis org publication cyber-attacks-realor-imagined-and-cyber-war accessed January 11 2012 26 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu