THE LAND SPACE AND CYBERSPACE NEXUS EVOLUTION OF THE OLDEST MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE NEWEST MILITARY DOMAINS U S ARMY WAR COLLEGE Jeffrey L Caton a 901 RATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE 4 The United States Army War College The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application of Landpower The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers Concurrently it is our duty to the U S Army to also act as a think factory for commanders and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage in discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving national security objectives The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national security and strategic research and analysis to influence policy debate and bridge the gap between military and academia CENTER for STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP U S ARMY WAR COLLEGE The Center for Strategic Leadership contributes to the education of world class senior leaders develops expert knowledge and provides solutions to strategic Army issues affecting the national security community The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute provides subject matter expertise technical review and writing expertise to agencies that develop stability operations concepts and doctrines The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom grounded in mastery of the profession of arms and by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in the analysis evaluation and refinement of professional expertise in war strategy operations national security resource management and responsible command The U S Army Heritage and Education Center acquires conserves and exhibits historical materials for use to support the U S Army educate an international audience and honor Soldiers--past and present i STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE The Strategic Studies Institute SSI is part of the U S Army War College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related to national security and military strategy with emphasis on geostrategic analysis The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct strategic studies that develop policy recommendations on o Strategy planning and policy for joint and combined employment of military forces o Regional strategic appraisals o The nature of land warfare o Matters affecting the Army's future o The concepts philosophy and theory of strategy and o Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern topics having strategic implications for the Army the Department of Defense and the larger national security community In addition to its studies SSI publishes special reports on topics of special or immediate interest These include edited proceedings of conferences and topically oriented roundtables expanded trip reports and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army participation in national security policy formulation iii Strategic Studies Institute and U S Army War College Press THE LAND SPACE AND CYBERSPACE NEXUS EVOLUTION OF THE OLDEST MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE NEWEST MILITARY DOMAINS Jeffrey L Caton March 2018 The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army the Department of Defense or the U S Government Authors of Strategic Studies Institute SSI and U S Army War College USAWC Press publications enjoy full academic freedom provided they do not disclose classified information jeopardize operations security or misrepresent official U S policy Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues This report is cleared for public release distribution is unlimited This publication is subject to Title 17 United States Code Sections 101 and 105 It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted v Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to Director Strategic Studies Institute and U S Army War College Press U S Army War College 47 Ashburn Drive Carlisle PA 17013-5010 This manuscript was funded by the U S Army War College External Research Associates Program Information on this program is available on our website ssi armywarcollege edu at the Opportunities tab All Strategic Studies Institute SSI and U S Army War College USAWC Press publications may be downloaded free of charge from the SSI website Hard copies of certain reports may also be obtained free of charge while supplies last by placing an order on the SSI website Check the website for availability SSI publications may be quoted or reprinted in part or in full with permission and appropriate credit given to the U S Army Strategic Studies Institute and U S Army War College Press U S Army War College Carlisle PA Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address ssi armywarcollege edu The Strategic Studies Institute and U S Army War College Press publishes a quarterly email newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts recent and forthcoming publications and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts If you are interested in receiving this newsletter please subscribe on the SSI website at the following address ssi armywarcollege edu newsletter ISBN 1-58487-779-0 vi FOREWORD The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations predicts that space and cyberspace will become increasingly important to joint operations and will become both precursor to and integral part of armed combat in the land maritime and air domains 1 How are U S military operations in the newest domains of space and cyberspace being integrated with operations in the traditional domain of land In this monograph Mr Jeffrey Caton explores various aspects of this question by examining existing doctrine operations in multiple domains and future operations His work was completed before the April 2017 release of the U S Army Field Manual FM 3-12 Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations He argues that the current state of military doctrine in the relatively new domains of space and cyberspace includes adequate means to support land-based joint operations Further he contends that knowledge of the nature of these new domains is not intuitive and understanding their unique characteristics and capabilities is still a challenge for the military force writ large To address some of the challenges facing cross-domain operations Mr Caton provides recommendations in the areas of domain definitions command relationships and military theory This monograph should inform the current work of the Army and Marine Corps in their exploration of the multi-domain battle concept DOUGLAS C LOVELACE JR Director Strategic Studies Institute and U S Army War College Press vii ENDNOTES - FOREWORD 1 Joint Chiefs of Staff Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Joint Force 2020 Washington DC Department of Defense September 10 2012 p 2 viii ABOUT THE AUTHOR JEFFREY L CATON is President of Kepler Strategies LLC Carlisle Pennsylvania a veteran-owned small business specializing in national security cyberspace theory and aerospace technology He is also an Intermittent Professor of Program Management with Defense Acquisition University From 2007 to 2012 Mr Caton served on the U S Army War College USAWC faculty including Associate Professor of Cyberspace Operations and Defense Transformation Chair Over the past 7 years he has presented lectures on cyberspace and space issues related to international security in the United States Sweden the United Kingdom Estonia Kazakhstan and the Czech Republic supporting programs such as the Partnership for Peace Consortium and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence His current work includes research on the nexus of cyberspace space and landpower doctrine issues as part of the External Research Associates Program of the Strategic Studies Institute SSI Mr Caton is also a member of the Editorial Board for Parameters magazine He served 28 years in the U S Air Force working in engineering space operations joint operations and foreign military sales including command at the squadron and group level Mr Caton holds a bachelor's degree in chemical engineering from the University of Virginia a master's degree in aeronautical engineering from the Air Force Institute of Technology and a master's degree in strategic studies from the Air War College ix SUMMARY Over the last century the domains of air space and cyberspace have joined the traditional warfighting domains of land and sea While the doctrine for land operations is relatively mature the doctrine for space and cyberspace continue to evolve often in an unstructured manner This monograph examines the relationships among these domains and how they apply to U S Army and joint warfighting It concentrates on the central question How are U S military operations in the newest domains of space and cyberspace being integrated with operations in the traditional domain of land This inquiry is divided into three major sections o Existing Doctrine This section explores the current state of joint and U S Army doctrinal development for each of the domains of land space and cyberspace The discussion assumes the reader is familiar with the doctrine of land operations and thus it focuses more on the newer and lesser-known domains of space and cyberspace o Operations in Multiple Domains This section explores the concept of cross-domain synergy and its ability to enhance globally integrated operations It also examines the existing processes and entities defined in doctrine that provide expertise and support to joint force commanders o Future Operations This section explores probable future operating environments as well as the resulting implications for U S Army and joint force development It also identifies operational challenges that cut across all domains It includes recommendations for policymakers xi and senior leaders regarding the future development and integration of space and cyberspace doctrine The scope of this monograph extends from current doctrine toward the anticipated operational environment over the next 20 years Material considered and presented here is limited to unclassified and open source information therefore any classified discussion must occur via another venue This monograph provides cursory summaries and observations of over a thousand pages of official joint and service documentation Thus it serves as a synopsis with analysis of the important issues related to joint operations in land space and cyberspace This information should allow senior policymakers decision makers military leaders and their respective staffs to gain common understanding and professional appreciation for the wide array of frameworks and concepts as well as their interconnections Of course the reader should always defer to the full text for details and context xii THE LAND SPACE AND CYBERSPACE NEXUS EVOLUTION OF THE OLDEST MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE NEWEST MILITARY DOMAINS Over the last century the domains of air space and cyberspace have joined the traditional warfighting domains of land and sea While the doctrine for land operations is relatively mature the doctrine for space and cyberspace continue to evolve often in an unstructured manner This monograph examines the relationships among these domains and how they apply to U S Army and joint warfighting It concentrates on the central question How are U S military operations in the newest domains of space and cyberspace being integrated with operations in the traditional domain of land This inquiry is divided into three major sections examination of existing doctrine in the three domains analysis of operations in multiple domains and analysis of the anticipated future joint operating environment JOE and the resulting implications for Army and joint operations and force development EXISTING DOCTRINE joint doctrine--Fundamental principles that guide the employment of United States military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective and may include terms tactics techniques and procedures emphasis added 1 In January 2012 President Barack Obama and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta endorsed new strategic guidance for 21st-century defense priorities Operations in cyberspace and space were among the 10 mission areas explicitly identified for additional 1 investment as the guidance asserted Modern armed forces cannot conduct high-tempo effective operations without reliable information and communication networks and assured access to cyberspace and space 2 Put simply doctrine documents the best way to conduct military operations based on experience of the past capabilities of the present and expectations of the future This section explores the current state of doctrinal development for each of the domains of land space and cyberspace First it identifies the foundations for current joint operational doctrine Next it focuses on the domain-specific joint doctrine publica- tions and finally it considers U S Army doctrine for the domains The discussion assumes the reader is familiar with the doctrine of land operations and thus it focuses more content and details on the newer and lesser-known domains of space and cyberspace Let us begin with a look at the overarching tenets of joint doctrine Joint Doctrine for Operations in Traditional Domains Joint operations are military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each other which of themselves do not establish joint forces emphasis in original 3 Military doctrine has been evolving for centuries During most of this time military forces consisted of armies and navies but within the last century U S military forces have formally adopted a construct that added three new domains--air space and cyberspace--to those of land and sea With the establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff following World War II 2 doctrine has become increasingly complex to address coordinated operations in multiple domains that may include actions from other U S Government entities as well as those of other nations 4 At the top of the current doctrine hierarchy is the capstone document Joint Publication JP 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States which provides the theory and foundation for subsequent doctrine publication 5 Inspired by scholars such as Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu JP 1 places joint operations within the larger context of the nature of war that involves many potential instruments of national power as well as introduces the enduring principles of war and joint functions that are covered in greater detail in capstone publications 6 It also introduces the joint force structure with dedicated components for land air maritime and special operations components as well as outlines command and control C2 structures and authorities 7 As its title implies the final chapter of JP 1 addresses joint force development which includes the fundamentals of joint concepts doctrine education and training It is interesting to note that in JP 1 cyberspace is not listed as a domain but rather as part of the information environment In fact JP 1 refers to physical domain s only three times and it fails to explicitly identify these domains in the document 8 The next level in the joint doctrine hierarchy is the keystone publications that include JP 3-0 Joint Operations In addition to describing the fundamentals and art of joint operations it devotes a chapter to the six functions grouped together to help JFCs joint force commanders integrate synchronize and direct joint operations C2 intelligence fires movement and maneuver protection and sustainment emphasis in original 9 3 JP 3-0 also discusses the nine enduring principles of war identified in JP 1--objective offensive mass maneuver economy of force unity of command security surprise and simplicity--plus the three additional ones of restraint perseverance and legitimacy 10 Like JP 1 JP 3-0 lists cyberspace as part of the information environment rather than in the list of domains which it specifies as air land maritime and space 11 Potentially adding to the confusion in discussing joint operations is the fact that domain is not defined in joint doctrine Doctrine publications comprise the final level of the joint hierarchy and these include documents that address the C2 for the joint operations of land maritime and air forces 12 These are the most mature doctrine in terms of compiled experience and they each have firm foundations in military theory such as those of Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini for land Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Stafford Corbett for maritime and Hugh Trenchard and William Mitchell for air Space and cyberspace operations CO each have joint publications as well but generally lack the benefit of developed military theory as their foundation and often devolve to technical descriptions of their operation Let us now examine how well space and cyberspace are incorporated into the current doctrine for land operations Joint Doctrine for Operations in the Land Domain land domain The area of the Earth's surface ending at the high water mark and overlapping with the maritime domain in the landward segment of the littorals emphasis in original 13 4 JP 3-31 Command and Control for Joint Land Operations is centered on the concept of the joint force land component commander JFLCC as key link between the JFC and the C2 of joint land operations Assigning a JFLCC provides the JFC with the ability to enhance synchronization of operations not only between US ground and component forces but also with multinational land forces emphasis in original 14 The current JP 3-31 February 2014 identifies five major forms of land operations that the JFLCC may accomplish offensive defensive stability homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities It also discusses how the six joint functions apply to land operations JP 3-31 finishes with three appendices that provide additional details on the organization and planning of a JFLCC 15 To tackle complex operational and threat environments JP 3-31 states up front commanders at all levels should consider how space cyberspace and EMS electromagnetic spectrum capabilities enhance the effectiveness and execution of joint land operations 16 Appendix I of this monograph provides verbatim excerpts of space- and cyberspace-related material contained in JP 3-31 but several items merit discussion here Space operations can provide the JFLCC with ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance missile tracking launch detection environmental monitoring satellite communications SATCOM position navigation and timing and navigation warfare 17 JP 3-31 emphasizes the benefits of global positioning system GPS and satellite imagery that provide valuable terrain information and personnel situational awareness for land-based operations as well as the communications that may provide a critical link in the C2 architecture 18 It is interesting to note that the JFLCC may also serve as the space 5 coordinating authority SCA but would most likely delegate this responsibility to the senior space officer on their staff 19 The SCA will be covered in more detail under space doctrine discussions With regard to CO JP 3-31 asserts that many advances in joint land operations have been realized through the use of cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum EMS which has enabled the US military and allies to communicate and reach across geographic and geopolitical boundaries 20 The JP advises the JFLCC to fully integrate CO capabilities into their plans with the purpose to conduct CO to retain freedom of maneuver in cyberspace accomplish objectives deny freedom of action to adversaries and enable other operational activities 21 The C2 for such CO is accomplished via the JFC's Joint Cyberspace Center JCC which should include a JFLCC representative In its chapter on operations JP 3-31 explicitly distinguishes between CO information operations IO and communications synchronization The inclusion of space and CO into JFLCC doctrine thus far appears to be appropriate especially considering how recent the joint doctrine was introduced for cyberspace 12 months prior and updated for space 8 months prior The JFLCC notional headquarters includes both space and cyberspace sections aligned under the J-33 current operations Also the notional joint land operation plan explicitly includes these capabilities in its annexes--appendix 16 to annex C Operations covers CO annex K Communication Systems includes cyberspace defense and annex N focuses on space operations Finally a cursory review of the current doctrine for the joint force air and maritime component commanders joint force air component commander via JP 3-30 and joint force maritime component commander via 3-32 reveals that they contain 6 much less detail when compared to JFLCC doctrine with regard to how space and CO are integrated in the other traditional domains The joint doctrine for special operations JP 3-05 which includes details on the C2 accomplished by the joint force special operations component commander's incorporation of space and CO is on par with that of JP 3-31 Joint Doctrine for Operations in the Space Domain Space is a domain enabling many joint force-essential capabilities These capabilities derive from exploitation of the unique characteristics of space among which include a global perspective and lack of overflight restrictions as well as the speed and persistence afforded by satellites 22 JP 3-14 Space Operations was first released in August 2002 and it addressed space operations focused on the combatant command CCMD of U S Space Command USSPACECOM that was established in 1985 Ironically after 17 years of waiting for joint space doctrine large portions of JP 3-14 were obsolete only months later when USSPACECOM was disestablished and its missions moved under the new U S Strategic Command USSTRATCOM under changes mandated by the 2002 Unified Command Plan UCP 23 JP 3-14 was updated in 2009 to reflect the new organization of space forces under USSTRATCOM and updated to its current version in May 2013 From the start the JP 3-14 portrays space as a domain to support operations in the terrestrial domains noting space capabilities have proven to be significant force multipliers when integrated into military operations emphasis added 24 It emphasizes that space capabilities are sought by friendly nations and adversaries as well as commercial entities making the space domain a congested contested and competitive environment 25 JP 3-14 asserts four unique characteristics of 7 the space domain no geographical boundaries orbital mechanics environmental considerations of space weather and orbital debris and EMS dependency While it claims international law does not extend a nation's territorial sovereignty up to Earth orbit JP 3-14 also includes a section on critical legal considerations regarding obligations to international law for U S space operations 26 However the publication does not mention the crucial role of the United Nation's UN International Telecommunication Union ITU in allocating SATCOM orbits and radio spectrum 27 The current JP 3-14 identifies five joint space mission areas space situational awareness added in this revision space force enhancement space support space control and space force application The mission of space force enhancement provides the most direct benefits to forces in other domains by providing intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance missile tracking launch detection environmental monitoring SATCOM positioning navigation and timing and navigation warfare 28 Since the 2002 UCP change joint space operations are conducted by USSTRATCOM with the bulk of daily activities managed by the Joint Functional Component Commander for Space JFCC SPACE who provides unity of command and unity of effort in the unimpeded delivery of joint space capabilities to supported commanders and when directed to deny the benefits of space to adversaries 29 Two other authorities of interest in JP 3-14 are the designation of U S Cyber Command USCYBERCOM as the supported command for SATCOM and Defense Information Systems Agency DISA as the only authorized provider of SATCOM for the Department of Defense DoD 30 8 For joint operations the space coordinating authority SCA has the responsibility for planning and integrating space capabilities The SCA may be delegated to the JFC for a specific operation who in turn may designate a component command or other individual to serve as the SCA 31 For land operations JP 3-14 states that the U S Army integrates space capabilities into their units using space support elements SSEs which coordinate with the SCA 32 All space operations integration into joint planning includes the use of Annex N of a standard operational plan to describe space forces and capabilities relevant to the specific nature of the plan JP 3-14 emphasizes that planners need to grasp the high-demand low-density nature of some space capabilities as well as the challenges of space force augmentation or reconstitution 33 To provide overt connections to the joint tenets JP 3-14 includes an overview of the 12 principles of joint operations from the perspectives of employing and enabling operations in the space domain offering examples but no in-depth discussion 34 Finally to improve awareness of these limited resources almost one-third of JP 3-14 is in the form of appendices that provide further detail into certain space capabilities as well as the technical rocket science nature of space operations 35 Although it got off to a slow start the publication of joint space doctrine has evolved steadily since its introduction in 2002 However there is still no widely accepted theory for military space operations and no definition for the space domain codified in joint doctrine Both of these situations will be addressed in more detail later in this monograph 9 Joint Doctrine for Operations in the Cyberspace Domain cyberspace A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data including the Internet telecommunications networks computer systems and embedded processors and controllers emphasis in original 36 Although military operations in cyberspace have been occurring for decades it was not until 2010 that the DoD publicly codified cyberspace as relevant a man-made domain for DoD activities as the naturally occurring domains of land sea air and space 37 In July 2011 this pronouncement was further clarified as the inaugural DoD cyberspace strategy made its first of five strategic initiatives to treat cyberspace as an operational domain to organize train and equip so that DoD can take full advantage of cyberspace's potential 38 This strategy followed 6 months after the establishment of the initial operational capability of USCYBERCOM Initially released in February 2013 as a secret document JP 3-12 Cyberspace Operations was published in its current unclassified format as JP 3-12 R in October 2014 39 The publication establishes a conceptual framework of cyberspace as three layers a physical network layer that enables a logical network layer upon which operations are initiated by entities in the cyber-persona layer 40 The intent of CO is to enhance operational effectiveness and leverage various capabilities from physical domains to create effects which may span multiple geographic combatant commanders' GCCs' AOR area of responsibility 41 10 As with space operations the Commander U S Strategic Command CDRUSSTRATCOM has overall responsibility for CO most of which are carried out by the sub-unified USCYBERCOM The JP identifies three types of CO missions offensive CO OCO defensive CO DCO and DoD Information Network DODIN operations it also defines related cyberspace actions that may be employed to accomplish the CO missions 42 To help clarify these missions and actions JP 3-14 R discusses in considerable detail how the six joint functions apply to CO 43 With regard to authorities roles and responsibilities JP 3-12 R includes not only the U S Code Title 10 duties for joint cyberspace forces but also potential support to other U S Government departments for national responses to cyberspace incidents as well as the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources CIKR 44 The publication identifies cyberspace support elements CSEs as the deployed units that integrate USCYBERCOM capabilities to CCMDs CSEs help to achieve situational awareness in cyberspace as well as to develop target lists and synchronize joint fires in part through their coordination with the CCMD JCC see Appendix II of this monograph for depiction of cyberspace C2 structure 45 Finally JP 3-12 R considers how joint operations in cyberspace should mesh with joint interorganizational and international planning and coordination It makes a crucial caveat regarding the complexity of cyberspace noting second and higher order effects in and through cyberspace can be more difficult to predict necessitating more branches and sequels in plans 46 For the integration and synchronization of joint fires use of cyberspace capabilities will follow an existing coordination apparatus such as working 11 groups and prioritized target lists Importantly the JP clarifies that cyberspace capabilities may be not only a viable option for engaging joint targets but also may be the best choice 47 Compared to joint space doctrine the publication of the first joint cyberspace doctrine came soon after its designation as a warfighting domain As with space there is no widely accepted theory for military CO yet and there remain significant uncertainties regarding how CO relates or should relate to IO and EMS constructs 48 Table 1 summarizes the major missions areas identified in joint publications for land space and CO It also indicates whether a joint publication addressed the joint functions and principle of joint operations Given this basic understanding of the key elements of the joint doctrine for these domains let us now examine how U S Army doctrine treats them 12 Principles of War Joint Operations Addressed Joint Functions Addressed Joint Doctrine and Operational Missions Specified Therein Domain Land JP 3-31 February 2014 o Offensive operations o Defensive operations o Stability operations o Homeland defense o Defense support of civil authorities Yes No Space JP 3-14 May 2013 o Space situational awareness o Space force enhancement o Space support o Space control o Space force application No Yes Cyberspace JP 3-12 February 2013 o OCO o DCO o DODIN operations Yes No Table 1 Comparison of Land Space and Cyberspace Joint Operations Doctrine 49 Army Land Operations Doctrine Following the establishment of the Army Training and Doctrine Command TRADOC doctrine for Landpower has evolved from the venerable Field Manual FM 100-5 Operations 1976 1982 1986 1993 versions to the new designation of FM 3-0 Operations 2001 2008 versions and finally to the current Army Doctrine Publication ADP No 3-0 Unified Land Operations 50 Published in October 2011 as part of the Doctrine 2015 initiative ADP 3-0 is the latest evolution of the capstone document that provides a 13 common operational concept for U S Army forces that must operate across the range of military operations integrating their actions with joint interagency and multinational partners as part of a larger effort 51 The main focus of U S Army units in this team effort is to seize retain and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations to create conditions for favorable conflict resolution 52 ADP 3-0 recognizes that the dynamic operational environment includes interactions with other domains It identifies the foundations of unified land operations as initiative decisive action U S Army core competencies combined arms maneuver and wide area security and mission command It also presents the tenets of unified land operations as flexibility integration lethality adaptability depth and synchronization ADP 3-0 discusses six warfighting functions consistent with those of joint doctrine except that the U S Army replaces C2 with mission command A concise document by design ADP 3-0 refers to space and cyberspace as domains in the operational environment but does not include any other specific details with regard to how the domains affect land operations 53 Army Space Operations Doctrine In 2006 TRADOC published Pamphlet 525-74 Space Operations Concept Capability Plan CCP in part to Systematically and deliberately evolve Army space support operations over time to provide dedicated responsive theater focused support to operational and tactical commanders 54 The CCP stresses the joint interdependency of military operations and asserts that space operations are inherently joint and joint interdependence is essential for the conduct of 14 all space operations 55 Pamphlet 525-7-4 identifies the Army Space and Missile Defense Command Army Forces Strategic Command as the Army Service component to joint space operations that provides support for SATCOM theater missile warning blue force tracking and situational awareness 56 The CCP uses a detailed operational vignette to demonstrate how space capabilities would support the Army Modular Force construct and concludes space power must be viewed in the larger construct of joint operations Army space operations depend on the successful Army and joint transformation and exploitation of the space domain 57 The U S Army published the first FM 3-14 Space Support to Army Operations in 2005 which superseded FM 100-18 1995 under the older doctrine system FM 3-14 was updated in 2010 and again updated in August 2014 to its current version Army Space Operations 58 This latest version added a distribution restriction therefore its content cannot be discussed in detail herein 59 In general terms FM 3-14 remains very consistent with the content of JP 3-14 echoing the five joint mission areas for space FM 3-14 also discusses how the foundations and tenets of unified land operations from ADP 3-0 apply to space operations It then provides details regarding how the U S Army organizes space units as well as how SSEs support different U S Army echelons For practical application FM 3-14 includes an appendix that provides a detailed template for Annex N to joint plans and orders U S Army Cyberspace Operations CO Doctrine In February 2010 TRADOC released the Cyberspace Operations Concept Capabilities Plan Pamphlet 525-7-8 with its central idea of 15 prevailing in the cyber-electromagnetic contest means making progress at the same time along three lines of effort gaining advantage protecting that advantage and placing adversaries at a disadvantage 60 Pamphlet 525-7-8 emphasizes the interrelated nature of cyberspace operations CyberOps or CO electronic warfare EW and IO and proposes that the U S Army address these complex notions at three levels a psychological contest of wills a strategic engagement and a cyber-electromagnetic contest 61 The Cyberspace Operations CCP offers a CyberOps framework comprised of four components cyber situational awareness CyberSA cyber network operations CyNetOps cyber warfare CyWar and cyber support CySpt 62 The pamphlet appendices use three operational vignettes to help identify and propose many required capabilities for CyberOps As intended the CCP provides the conceptual foundation upon which subsequent U S Army cyberspace doctrine--FM 3-38 and FM 3-12--is built Published in February 2014 FM 3-38 Cyber Electromagnetic Activities is the first attempt by the U S Army to produce an FM focused on integration and synchronizing of the new concept of cyber electromagnetic activities CEMA 63 FM 3-38 provides an overview of the CEMA concept and the commander's role in CEMA operations see Appendix III of this monograph for a graphic depiction of the CEMA concept It then dedicates a chapter to the tactics and procedures for three areas CO EW and spectrum management operations The FM closes with discussion on how CEMA is planned integrated and executed in unified land operations FM 3-38 was released a year after the release of the classified JP 3-12 and its description of CO are consistent with details of the releasable version of JP 3-12 16 R that followed 8 months later The FM echoes the three-layer depiction of cyberspace physical logical cyber-persona as well as the three missions of cyberspace forces OCO DCO and DODIN and Cyberspace Operational Preparation of the Environment C-OPE It also provides details on the interfaces between CEMA and LandWarNet the U S Army's portion of the DODIN in CO and DODIN planning and operations There are many favorable aspects of the content in FM 3-38 First the FM embraces the cross-domain nature of cyberspace Next it explicitly spells out the soldier's role in CEMA to help them better understand the relationship between cyberspace and the EMS and maintain the necessary protection measures when using devices that leverage this relationship between capabilities 64 The FM presents the CEMA element as the part of a commander's staff that integrates CEMA into the operations process from theater Army through brigade 65 as well as a CEMA working group to coordinate with internal and external units and centers 66 Finally FM 3-38 provides a practical and detailed template for documenting CEMA as appendix 12 to annex C Operations in a standard joint operations plan or order Attempts to develop U S Army cyberspace doctrine have been in work for years but the proposed FM 3-12 Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations had not yet been published at the conclusion of the research for this monograph 67 Despite the delay in the completion of this FM the U S Army is doing well with incorporating space and cyberspace into traditional land operations To apply this information to the education of its senior leaders the U S Army War College's Center for Strategic Leadership released a Strategic Cyberspace Operations Guide in June 2016 68 However there 17 remains much to do as land-based operations adapt to space and cyberspace domains that continue to evolve and grow in their significance to operations across multiple domains OPERATIONS IN MULTIPLE DOMAINS Having reviewed the basic joint and U S Army doctrine for land space and cyberspace let us now explore how operations in the domains interact This section explores the concept of cross-domain synergy and its ability to enhance globally integrated operations It also examines the existing processes and entities defined in doctrine that provide expertise and support to JFCs Do joint forces in these three domains have existing means available to facilitate cross-domain synergy Capstone Concept for Joint Operations CCJO To support the President's and Secretary of Defense's 21st-century defense priorities the Joint Chiefs of Staff published the new Capstone Concept for Joint Operations for Joint Force 2020 CCJO in September 2014 Its central concept is globally integrated operations that embody eight key elements 69 The CCJO predicts that space and cyberspace will become increasingly important to joint operations and will become both precursor to and integral part of armed combat in the land maritime and air domains 70 Space and cyberspace forces also present flexible low-signature or small-footprint capabilities that are rapidly deployable largely able to operate independently from logistically intensive forces have operational reach and can be persistent Perhaps most significantly their 18 use does not always constitute an irreversible policy commitment 71 The CCJO also asserts that cyberspace capabilities enable global agility necessary to support swift and adaptable military responses 72 Further it considers that adversaries may also find such operational advantages attractive and opt to attack exclusively in cyberspace 73 In its prognosis of future threat environments the CCJO expects adversaries to obtain advanced capabilities that can be applied across multiple domains To help posture joint forces for success the globally integrated operations concept includes the key element of cross-domain synergy that will allow an integrated joint force to exploit even small advantages in one domain to create or increase advantages in others compounding those mutually reinforcing advantages until they overwhelm an enemy 74 Cross-Domain Operations In January 2016 the Joint Staff J-7 published the Cross-Domain Synergy in Joint Operations Planner's Guide in part to address this element of the CCJO's goal of globally integrated operations The guide defines cross-domain synergy as the complementary vice merely additive employment of capabilities in different domains such that each enhances the effectiveness and compensates for the vulnerabilities of others 75 The Planner's Guide stresses that cross-domain synergy is not an end in itself but a by-product of effective joint planning 76 It avers that the major challenge of achieving such synergy is for the JFC to access and utilize diverse domain expertise hence the guide provides a brief primer of how existing support and liaison elements can provide support within the joint 19 operation planning process JOPP 77 In turn effective joint planning is dependent in part upon the planners' knowledge of each domain's strengths and vulnerabilities While cross-domain operations have been an integral part of U S military operations for decades the incorporation by planners of capabilities from the new domains of space and cyberspace is in its infancy Unique Domain Characteristics and Capabilities The Planner's Guide provides an overview of capabilities characteristics and operations for each of the traditional domains plus space and cyberspace It is useful to explore how the guide views the individual domains before looking at how it discusses cross-domain operations Much of the guide's material appears in joint doctrine but it includes some new commentary as well Let us examine how the guide portrays the domains for land space and cyberspace Land Domain Table 2 presents an analysis of aspects of the land domain presented as unique by the Planner's Guide Although the proposed traits may be consistent with joint doctrine collectively they are misleading Certainly land is not the only domain to have significant operational environment variations--all domains have such factors that help define the domain itself Also noncombatants are present in all physical domains and their safety must be a consideration in joint operations The two most distinctive characteristics of the land domain are the ability to assemble large supply stores for sustained operations and the slower movement of forces across land when compared to movement in other domains 20 Land Domain Proposed Unique Characteristic or Capability Critical Assessment a Extreme variations in climate and terrain--urban forest desert jungle mountain and arctic--present dramatically different operational environments a Not unique Climate and topography also have significant implications for the design and operation of maritime air and space forces b Presence of people especially b Not unique Although the vast non-combatants effects options for use majority of Earth's population lives of military force on land people are present in the sea domain for extended periods of time as well Also the presence of non-combatants must be considered in all domains c The ability to sustain operations over c Unique One can argue that long periods of time extended sea and air operations ultimately depend upon landbased assets through ports and airfields for long-duration sustainment d The speed and duration of move- d Unique on average Movement on land is slower and more ardu- ment of large land forces over unous than movement by air and sea familiar terrain may be a limiting factor of a given operation e With respect to non-lethal effects only land forces have directly useful capability that can be precisely applied in complex human terrain Non-lethal effects work through example and the potential threat of violence rather than the execution of that threat Although all services have the ability to affect their counterparts through security assistance activities only land forces can achieve the position close to the population dispersed in complex land clutter and duration persistence that permits sustained non-lethal effect e Inaccurate The topic of this paragraph is unclear but it contains several elements that are not necessarily tied to land One can argue that cyberspace can also have long-term and persistent contact with dispersed populations to achieve non-lethal effects using means such as social media Note The text from this column is from the Cross-Domain Synergy in Joint Operations Planner's Guide 78 Table 2 Assessment of Land Characteristics and Capabilities 21 Space Domain Table 3 shows the assessment of how the space domain is depicted in the Planner's Guide Upon examination none of the characteristics or capabilities listed is truly unique Indeed operations in all domains must consider the environment utilize EMS and obey the laws of physics The Planner's Guide defines space as a medium like the land sea and air within which military activities shall be conducted to achieve US national security objectives 79 however this definition in not included in official joint doctrine Despite the lack of a clear demarcation for space by the United States and many other countries there are still many international treaties and conventions that attempt to govern its use 80 Space Domain Proposed Unique Characteristic or Capability Critical Assessment a There are no geographical boundaries in space As a Global Commons space overcomes the international law aspect of a nation's territorial sovereignty emphasis in original a Not unique One can argue that geosynchronous orbit spots have some equivalence to sovereignty based on the location and frequency use of the satellite b Satellites are subject to the laws b Not unique All physical doof orbital mechanics Adjustments to mains are subject to the laws of orbits expend fuel and reduce asset physics life span c Environmental considerations place demands on satellites' characteristics to include size weight and power further hindering the spacecraft's performance and life span c Not unique Recall that the land domain section also tried to claim the environment as its unique trait see Table 2 Again each domain must consider environmental factors in operational planning d Though space is infinite in expanse certain altitudes and orbital patterns are advantageous These portions of space are becoming crowded d Not a characteristic or capability The statement is an observation about the current construct and population of space objects Table 3 Assessment of Space Characteristics and Capabilities 22 e Electromagnetic spectrum access is vital to space operations because it is the sole medium for space-based assets to transmit and receive information and or signals emphasis in original Therefore JFCs must sufficiently control the EMS to interact with space systems e Not unique Certainly use of the EMS enables space operations but the EMS supports operations in all domains this will be discussed in more detail in the implications section of this monograph f Space is no longer a domain exclusively transited by state actors Many non-state actors maintain assets in orbit and often military capabilities Iridium satellite phones Virgin space tourism etc employ these non-state assets f Not unique Space has been used by nonstate actors since 1961 4 years after Sputnik 1 The evolution and proliferation of commercial and other nonstate space assets has evolved with military use Notes The text from this column is from the Cross-Domain Synergy in Joint Operations Planner's Guide 81 For more on this topic see Iulia-Diana Galeriu's 'Paper satellites' and the free use of outer space 82 Table 3 Assessment of Space Characteristics and Capabilities cont Cyberspace Domain Table 4 summarizes the analysis of how the cyberspace domain is described in the Planner's Guide Like the descriptions of land and space the portrayal of cyberspace is fraught with inaccuracies the most egregious of which are those that infer that activities in cyberspace are almost magic in that they are not subject to the limitations of time and space In fact the transmission of information must comply with the laws of physics albeit on a much smaller scale than those of the traditional domains The Planner's Guide includes a table taken from a scholarly work that compares Cyberspace vs Traditional Warfare Domain Characteristic but the table contents do not match those in the guide's text 83 Curiously the guide omits the one unique aspect of cyberspace 23 explicitly noted in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report The man-made nature of cyberspace distinguishes it from other domains in which the U S armed forces operate The Administration will continue to explore the implications of cyberspace's unique attributes for policies regarding operations within it 84 FM 3-38 provides a much better rendering of cyberspace for those unfamiliar with the domain The manual's discussion on the characteristics of the cyberspace domain includes many concepts that merit attention such as cyberspace as a system of systems its dynamic and evolving nature its lack of confinement to a physical site and the continued maintenance required for its existence 85 FM 3-38 also includes an alternative definition that may provide better insight to planners Cyberspace is an environment created and maintained for the purpose of facilitating the use and exploitation of information human interaction and intercommunication 86 24 Cyberspace Domain Proposed Unique Characteristic or Critical Assessment a Cyberspace is a global enabler for expedient dynamic information exchange impacting all aspects of life emphasis in original It allows instantaneous information flow across the globe for financial transactions as well as the movement and tracking of products and goods However it also allows adversaries to access this information and disrupt vital operations from any location Cyberspace is difficult to regulate due to ease of accessibility From a military perspective cyberspace activities rarely require movement of forces allowing engagement from extended stand-off ranges It also enables the influence of populations that are inaccessible through the other domains a Inaccurate These characteristics appear to be more appropriate for describing a commons rather than a domain Also the use of instantaneous information flow is misleading since transmission of data through cyberspace takes a finite amount of time that has great relevance on the scale of timing for CO b Can be reverse engineered Unlike munitions which are normally destroyed upon use cyberspace activities include code that can be saved analyzed and recoded for use against allies or friendly nations emphasis in original Planners must account for the possibility of a boomerang effect in which cyber activities are turned against the originator through reverse engineering b Inaccurate This proposed trait confuses the domain of cyberspace with the potential weapons used therein It may not be possible to recreate all aspects of cyberspace for forensics or reserve engineering due to the nature of complex adaptive systems Also physical weapons may not detonate as intended and may be used in an improvised manner by an adversary or may leave behind remnants that are subject to forensics Capability c No Single National International c Not unique No single nation or Ownership While someone owns each entity owns all of the land maritime physical component of cyberspace the air or space domains either whole of cyberspace is not under any single nations' or entities' complete control emphasis in original The infrastructure is a disparate combination of public and private networks without standardized security or access controls This arrangement enables free information flow but the lack of controls hinders global accountability standardization and security Table 4 Assessment of Cyberspace Characteristics and Capabilities 25 Cyberspace Domain d Lack of Cooperation Collaboration The lack of international laws and regulations governing the environment complicates responses to actions in this domain emphasis in original The difficulty in tracing the source of a cyberattack makes them easily deniable especially if conducted by individual hackers Further hindering collaboration is the tendency to deny that a cyberspace attack has occurred to prevent loss of trust in an organization's cyber security measures d Inaccurate While the processes are far from perfect there is significant cooperation and collaboration in cyberspace through such organizations as the UN European Union International Criminal Police Organization and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO In fact one could argue that the Internet would not exist and function without ongoing cooperation and collaboration in cyberspace e Low Cost Cyberspace is the most affordable domain through which to attack the United States emphasis in original Viruses malicious code and training are readily available over the Internet at no cost Adversaries can develop edit and reuse current tools for network attacks Inexpensive tools and training allow an adversary to compete without costly ships aircraft or missiles Furthermore an adversary can impose significant financial burdens on nations that rely heavily on cyberspace by forcing them to invest in cyberspace defense Currently military-grade cyberspace capabilities remain too expensive for most malign actors but they can buy relatively inexpensive services of professional hackers e Inaccurate This characteristic would benefit from a more complete context As stated it reflects popular beliefs that readily available computer code can rival the power of sophisticated weapons systems The concept of affordability here is misleading in that low-cost access to cyberspace does not equal capabilities of a nation state One could argue that given the same analogy perhaps an assassin's rifle is equal to the power of an army f Volatile Successful cyberspace attacks depend on vulnerabilities within the adversary's network emphasis in original Identifying these vulnerabilities and creating cyberspace capabilities sometimes require great expense If an adversary discovers the targeted network's vulnerability and closes it the cyberspace attack technique is rendered immediately and unexpectedly useless despite the development expense For this reason great care must be taken to prevent alerting adversaries to vulnerabilities in their networks f Inaccurate The term volatile may apply to activities in cyberspace but one can argue that such volatility also exists in land operations e g the fog and friction of war Perhaps a more useful characterization would be to model cyberspace as a complex adaptive system It is interesting to note that there seems to be conflicting perspectives promulgated within this entry f and previous entry e regarding the cost of cyberspace attacks Table 4 Assessment of Cyberspace Characteristics and Capabilities cont 26 Cyberspace Domain g Speed Cyberspace operations CO occur quickly emphasis in original However preparation for those operations is often extensive An intense study of the adversary's network may be required to learn system specifications and understand patterns of life Therefore a cyberspace unit operating on one adversary's networks may not be able to shift focus to another target without substantial preparation g Inaccurate and not unique This entry mingles speed of operations operations tempo and C-OPE Operations in other domains may also occur quickly after extended ISR and planning As with characteristic entry a use of the word quickly is vague and of little use without a time scale for CO h Unintentional cascading effects Another unique characteristic of cyberspace is the potential for unintended cascading effects emphasis in original Capabilities and munitions in the natural domains lose momentum the greater distance from impact However physical distance means very little in cyberspace While cyberspace capabilities are developed and evaluated in computer labs and cyberspace ranges there can never be complete assurances as to how a capability will behave or where it might spread when introduced to the great expanse of cyberspace h Not unique and inaccurate Physical weapons may also experience unintended cascading effects Also the assertion that physical distance in cyberspace means very little propagates an ignorance of the timescales of cyberspace activity Information traveling through cyberspace is still subject to finite speeds that may affect their integration and synchronization with other operations i Layers Cyberspace consists of three layers Physical Network Logical Network and Cyber-Persona emphasis in original Adversaries might attack any of these layers to disrupt degrade or destroy cyberspace capability Conversely each of these layers presents a means to attack adversaries' use of cyberspace emphasis in original i Inaccurate While this is useful information it is one of many artificial constructs used to analyze cyberspace rather than an intrinsic characteristic Notes The text from this column is from the Cross-Domain Synergy in Joint Operations Planner's Guide 87 For more on this topic see the Internet Traffic Report 88 For more on this topic see the U S Government Accountability Office GAO Report 10-606 89 For more on this topic see the Planner's Guide 90 Table 4 Assessment of Cyberspace Characteristics and Capabilities cont 27 Some readers may find the assessments in Tables 2 to 4 to be a bit pedantic however accuracy matters in the quest to equip joint planners with a full and common understanding of what a domain of military operations comprises As an inaugural document to encourage cross-domain synergy the Planner's Guide has considerable merit It is reasonable to assume that the sections for specific domains were written or influenced by practitioners who may unwittingly advocate their domain vice merely describe it Perhaps such bias may be addressed in future versions by comparing an impartial set of characteristics amongst the domains vice trying to argue for unique attributes Surely the development and acknowledgment of basic theory for military operations in space and cyberspace could provide the necessary foundation upon which to build better doctrine Support Relationships Among Domains Having assessed the individual domain interpretations for land space and cyberspace let us now consider how doctrine incorporates the means advocated in the Planner's Guide to achieve cross-domain synergy Table 5 is a composite of excerpts from doctrine covered in the first section of this monograph that are organized to illustrate how these three domains support each other's missions Note that this is not to be confused with a discussion of roles for supported versus supporting commanders Clearly there are ample examples in existing doctrine to demonstrate how the domains enable or enhance joint operations Most of these examples would remain the same if sea or air substituted for land 28 Domain with Supporting Capabilities Domain with Supported Capabilities Land Land Space Cyberspace Plan for and provide force protection for space infrastructure and forces assigned deployed and operating in their CCMD AOR 91 Operations in cyberspace rely on the links and nodes that exist in the natural domains Operations in the other domains create effects in and through cyberspace by affecting the EMS the data or the physical infrastructure 92 GPS plays a key role in military operations by enabling precise location and navigation in all four physical domains land maritime air and space 94 Space provides a key global connectivity option for CO 93 The inherent precision of GPS allows precise site surveys emplacement of artillery target acquisition and navigation GPS establishes a common reference grid within the operational area enables a common time helps establish common direction and facilitates synchronized operations 96 T he linkages between space and cyberspace are of particular importance as space provides a global connectivity option for CO 95 Space The space support element SSE Supports the G-2 S-2 during intelligence preparation of the battlefield 98 Space capabilities provide cyberspace with a global reach 97 GPS plays a key role in military operations by providing precise timing in cyberspace 99 The space support element SSE Provides space-based expertise and services that enhance CEMA Integrates space-related capabilities into CEMA planning Analyzes and recommends the potential employment of additional space-related capabilities to support CEMA 100 Table 5 Mutual Support Relationships Among Land Space and Cyberspace 29 Cyberspace The physical domains air land maritime and space and information environment rely on cyberspace for instant communications 102 CO provide a means by which space support is executed 101 O perations in cyberspace enable freedom of action for operations in the four natural domains and the EMS 103 C yberspace provides the means by which space control and transmission of space sensor data are conducted 104 Using OCO commanders can mass effects through the employment of lethal and nonlethal actions leveraging all capabilities available to gain advantages in cyberspace that support objectives on land 106 Operations in the space domain depend on cyberspace and the EMS to execute space support 105 Mutual Space and Cyberspace The relationship between space and cyberspace is unique in that virtually all space operations depend on cyberspace and a critical portion of cyberspace can only be provided via space operations These interrelationships are important considerations across the spectrum of CO and particularly when conducting targeting in cyberspace 107 These interrelationships are critical and the linkages must be addressed during all phases of joint operation planning 108 The cyberspace and space domains are uniquely interrelated primarily because of their current role in telecommunications and networks These interrelationships are important considerations when planning for CEMA 109 CO produces NAVWAR navigation warfare effects by assuring friendly access and or denying enemy access to positioning navigation and timing information transmitted by global navigation satellite system GNSS or other radio navigation aid signals Creation of global and theater NAVWAR effects is attained through the coordinated employment of CO EW and space operations 110 Table 5 Mutual Support Relationships Among Land Space and Cyberspace cont The bottom portion of Table 5 focuses on areas of operational interdependence between space and cyberspace most of which deal with signal transmission Further JP 3-12 R provides insight into the complex interactions between space cyberspace and the EMS as well as the effects they can collectively realize 30 Domain Overlap CO enhance operational effectiveness and leverage various capabilities from physical domains to create effects which may span multiple GCCs AOR Some of the capabilities the JFC may employ in conjunction with or to enable CO include significant portions of electronic warfare EW EMS management C2 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance ISR navigation warfare NAVWAR and some space mission areas Advancements in technology have created an increasingly complex OE operational environment CO space operations and EW operations can be conducted against targets using portions of the EMS They can be integrated with other information related capabilities as part of IO CO space operations and EW operations are often conducted under specific authorities Likewise some information-related capabilities supported by CO such as MISO military information support operations MILDEC military deception and special technical operations STO have their own execution approval process emphasis in original 111 The evolving interplay of space cyberspace information and EMS operations at times resembles a doctrinal Gordian Knot that can frustrate planners and warfighters pursuing mission command necessary to conduct unified land operations 112 What support elements are available to help the JFLCC cope with this situation Domain Support to JFLCC Table 6 recaps the key elements of space and cyberspace forces from joint doctrine and organizes them by the type of integration they may provide for the JFLCC to achieve cross-domain synergy If properly implemented the existing arrangements appear to provide an acceptable framework for integrating and synchronizing space and CO into the JFLCC As per the routine development of doctrine the tactical details from actual experience should be captured and documented 31 in media such as joint and service lessons learned and tactics techniques and procedures Integration Means Space Depiction of notional organizational structure No Link to JOPP plans and orders Annex N Annex C Appendix 16 and Annex K Enduring support element SSE CSE Operational support elements Cyberspace Yes JP 3-12 R Figure IV-1 o Space Operations Section in J-33 Current Operations o Cyberspace Operations Section in J-33 Current Operations o Space Tasking Order o Cyberspace Cell in J-5 o Missile Warning Support Request o Joint Cyberspace Center JCC o Cyberspace Effects Request Form Notes The Missile Warning Support Request 113 Cyberspace Effects Request Form 114 Table 6 Space and Cyberspace Cross-Domain Elements in JFLCC Doctrine Joint force development and the refinement of doctrine also require the consideration of new concepts driven by strategic insights from DoD and the joint staff 115 Having now explored the cross-domain tenets and nominal applications of land space and cyberspace means to achieve synergy in JFLCC operations let us now investigate two derivative documents of 32 the CCJO that further address the future challenges of operational access to domains Operational Access In January 2012 the DoD released the Joint Operational Access Concept JOAC to describe how joint forces will operate in response to emerging antiaccess and area-denial security challenges 116 It focuses on a central theme of cross-domain synergy and it envisions a greater degree and more flexible integration of space and cyberspace operations CO into traditional air-sea-land battlespace than ever before 117 The concept argues that one of the three key trends affecting future joint force projection is the emergence of space and cyberspace as increasingly important and contested domains 118 The JOAC supposes that operations in these new domains will precede those in the traditional domains perhaps even to the degree that even in the absence of open conflict operations to gain and maintain cyberspace superiority and space control will be continuous requirements 119 To guide the planning of joint access operations the JOAC proposes 11 Operational Access Precepts the last of which is to protect friendly space and cyber assets while attacking the enemy's space and cyber capabilities since these domains are now essential to all joint force projection 120 Further the JOAC infers that the success of space and CO may leverage the combat power from the traditional domains 121 In general this shift to focus on space and cyberspace is a theme throughout the JOAC Several of the precepts favor reduced use of land forces that is offset in many cases by increased space and CO One precept specifically cautions against over-committing forces into 33 hostile territory especially major land forces 122 The precept to seize the initiative by deploying and operating on multiple independent lines of operations predicts a reduced presence in the land domain as it suggests smaller units and platforms that are rapidly deployable yet lethal 123 Also the precept aimed at disrupting enemy anti-access area denial A2 AD capabilities notes that large land forces generally will be the last to penetrate within range of an enemy's antiaccess and area-denial weapons because of the potential for catastrophic loss 124 Finally with regard to basing options the JOAC suggests a minimized dependence on forward bases with more dependence on capabilities such as long-range strike cyberspace space and EW 125 The JOAC avers that space and cyberspace capabilities may be used in advance of other forces to facilitate operational access 126 In addition the JOAC alleges that cyberspace capabilities may help to maximize operational surprise and complicate enemy targeting processes 127 Entry Operations In April 2014 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey released the Joint Concept for Entry Operations JCEO as his vision for how joint forces will enter onto foreign territory and immediately employ capabilities to accomplish assigned missions 128 The JCEO was written to support the JOAC with a central idea of full integration of force capabilities across domains 129 The concept calls for the use of mission-tailored joint forces that are organized trained and equipped with unique capabilities 130 The JCEO lists seven operational characteristics that are mostly enduring considerations with the exception of the relatively new characteristic of social media 34 cultural factors and commercial capabilities which has ties to CO and IO 131 Consistent with JOAC the JCEO calls for earlier use of cyberspace capabilities and explicitly calls for pre-crisis activities to include C-OPE that is clearly integrated and synchronized with operations in other domains 132 Cyberspace may also be used to enable operational deception efforts to gain surprise complicate the enemy's targeting process and reduce collateral damage 133 Also space and cyberspace can enable joint fires as well as enhance joint and allied C2 interoperability for cyberspace 134 Finally the JCEO contends that properly integrated cyberspace and space capabilities may enhance land maneuver 135 It appears that the inculcation of cross-domain synergy into the joint force remains a work in progress Fortunately existing concepts and doctrine provide the necessary foundation upon which to build and hone joint capabilities that span domains as required by circumstance Joint concepts such as the CCJO JOAC and JCEO anticipate increased contributions from capabilities in the space and cyberspace domain to enable the success of future military operations especially those faced with A2 AD challenges How will this future unfold for the joint force FUTURE OPERATIONS Armed with knowledge of how activities in the individual domains of land space and cyberspace may intersect and integrate to enhance joint force operations let us now explore how such operations may change in the future This section explores probable future operating environments as well as the resulting implications for the U S Army and joint force 35 development It also identifies operational challenges that cut across all domains and makes recommendations to help prepare for the envisioned future Future Environment Joint Operating Environment JOE In July 2016 the joint staff released Joint Operating Environment JOE 2035 The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World to convey future security contexts and implications to aid the joint force development In its view of the evolving world order JOE 2035 contends that regional powers will pursue competitive space and cyberspace capabilities that enable their global reach 136 These capabilities may be enhanced by the proliferation of technologies such as high-powered radio frequency HPRF weapons and non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse EMP weapons that may counter U S strengths in space and cyberspace 137 JOE 2035 weaves this trend into two of its six Contexts of Future Conflict The context of Disrupted Global Commons centers on the denial or compulsion in spaces and places available to all but owned by none 138 The context assumes an enduring land-centric nature of conflict noting that much of the conflict in commons is intended to influence events on land 139 Also this context predicts very intense rivalry for EMS usage as well as increasingly fierce military activities in the space domain that may include intentional interference from other satellites or ground-based systems as well as anti-satellite weapons ASAT 140 The JOE 2035 purposefully excludes cyberspace from the global commons context instead giving it an exclusive context on A Conflict for Cyberspace 36 where it suggests conflict and war are likely to occur as states struggle to define and credibly protect sovereignty in cyberspace 141 In addition to direct military conflict at the tactical and operational levels as well as attacks on homeland critical infrastructure JOE 2035 foresees the conflict expanding to all elements of national power noting that the competition may involve disrupting data networks and the physical systems of competitors to gain economic military and political advantages 142 Finally this context infers that cyberspace capabilities are paradoxical in that the strengths provided by the vast and complex connectivity of the domain may also introduce substantial weaknesses Where land and naval power intersect in two dimensions air and space in three cyberspace intersects with other domains in thousands or even millions of ways This presents many new vulnerable points through which weapons systems and the circuitry and software upon which they rely will be directly engaged 143 To address such threats and challenges JOE 2035 proposes a series of 24 evolving joint missions organized by 4 groups of enduring military tasks While all of these missions may utilize support from space and cyberspace capabilities the missions connected with the two contexts described above have explicit and significant expectations for space and cyberspace forces Table 7 provides some excerpts from JOE 2035 in each of these mission areas to provide the reader with an appreciation for the depth and diversity of capabilities required for the joint force should these projections come to fruition 37 Enduring Military Tasks Shape or contain to assist the United States with coping and adapting to changed international security conditions emphasis in original Deter or deny to manage the antagonistic behavior of competitors or to impose costs on competitors or adversaries taking aggressive action emphasis in original Space and Cyberspace-Related Missions Freedom of Navigation and Overflight Specifically the Joint Force may conduct ambiguous actions and deception operations with low-signature assets to avoid direct confrontation with a competitor while still demonstrating U S resolve to use and keep open the commons for military and civilian purposes emphasis in original Military Support to Cyber Resiliency This mission will require cyber support to U S Government and civilian organizations allied nations and other international partners that credibly reinforces the resilience of cyber-dependent systems and infrastructure This includes a capacity to reliably communicate compute store and retrieve critical data that outpaces adversary efforts to deny these capabilities emphasis in original Global Commons Stabilization Joint Force must be capable of protecting national objectives in the global commons despite the use of asymmetric unconventional and hybrid approaches by competitors to assert new claims and exercise more control in the commons This will require operations that impose costs on adversaries who impede free use of the commons such as targeted electromagnetic and space denial measures the enforcement of sanctions or the establishment of electromagnetic exclusion zones emphasis in original Network Defense These missions will require steady-state information operations IO in support of national cyber deterrence strategies that communicate the resiliency of critical U S systems and infrastructure while protecting their vulnerabilities Key actions may include the development of a Department of Defense DoD cyber umbrella the creation of a national 'cyber border patrol ' more comprehensive intelligence sharing efforts contributions to national level cyber exercises the development of hardened networks and reinforced coordination with domestic law enforcement emphasis in original Table 7 Evolving Joint Missions for Space and Cyberspace from JOE 2035 144 38 Enduring Military Tasks Disrupt or degrade to punish aggressive action by an adversary or to force an adversary to retreat from previous gains emphasis in original Compel or destroy to impose desired changes to the international security environment and subsequently enforce those outcomes emphasis in original Space and Cyberspace-Related Missions Global Commons Defense the Joint Force must maintain the ability to conduct targeted command and control C2 warfare counter ISR operations and discriminate sensor interdiction and spoofing in all commons Furthermore the Joint Force should be capable of responding to the threat of adversaries creating debris fields in important orbits emphasis in original Cyberspace Disruption Additionally the Joint Force may conduct proportional cross-domain operations to physically damage an adversary's cyber infrastructure using weapons operating in other domains to suppress enemy cyber defenses and specifically strike their critical cyber infrastructure Furthermore these operations should be coupled with defensive cyber efforts to block adversary responses and might include the use of autonomous or semi-autonomous cyber defense systems or the activation of war reserve networks when peacetime networks are unavailable emphasis in original Global Commons Exclusion This will likely include multi-domain offensive operations using coordinated and simultaneous electronic cyber space and kinetic actions to eradicate adversary capabilities that can influence or affect the commons emphasis in original Cyberspace Control Cyberspace control operations will frequently integrate cyber and non-cyber capabilities In coordination with law enforcement agencies offensive operations may be required to identify target and capture or kill adversary cyber operatives Offensive operations will also be used to eradicate an adversary's cyber infrastructure and capabilities which might include an array of kinetic strikes combined with simultaneous electronic cyber and space warfare actions emphasis in original Table 7 Evolving Joint Missions for Space and Cyberspace from JOE 2035 cont 39 A complete evaluation of JOE 2035 is beyond the scope of this monograph but clearly in it the joint staff foresees military roles and cross-domain operations for the space and cyberspace domains that far exceed those of the present day But is this view shared by other similar examinations of the future 145 Global Risks 2035 The Atlantic Council report Global Risks 2035 The Search for a New Normal echoes many of the themes of the JOE 2035 also through the perspective of changing demographics international governance and technology advancement 146 For the global commons of space the commentary envisions increased dependence and competition for space systems that may tempt state and nonstate actors to disrupt space operations Escalation of conflict may occur and if an arms race in space does get under way among the United States China Russia India Brazil Japan and other countries these countries are likely to employ symmetric and asymmetric measures to counter the threats in space and coming from space 147 The study treats cyberspace issues with more imminent concern The author lists the task to Stop the slide towards a segmented internet There is sic needs to be rules governing offensive cyber as part of 11 items in a recommended 100-Day Checklist for the New Administration 148 From a global commons framework the report projects that cybersecurity costs may eventually outweigh the benefits for advanced economic countries like the United States 149 From a domain framework the author asserts Cyber is now transforming the nature of conflict and war 150 Expanding on this theme the study warns against possible disruption by cyberattacks without warning 40 from a variety of state and nonstate actors However the discussion focuses on critical infrastructure attacks and crime in cyberspace the report does not address any roles of cyberspace in warfare Implications for the Army and the Joint Force Anticipated future trends favor the decreased emphasis on traditional large-scale land operations and increased frequency and intensity of conflict in space and cyberspace What are the implications and challenges that may result from these trends LandCyber The U S Army's concept for achieving its cross-domain synergy is LandCyber a transformational convergence of land and CO similar to the U S Army's AirLand Battle concepts to address challenges in the European theater in the 1980s The central idea of LandCyber is for the U S Army to think globally and act locally in the cyberspace domain in conjunction with land forces to shape the physical and virtual security-related behavior of humans and their machines to gain opportunity and advantage 151 The path to achieve LandCyber is described in a September 2013 white paper from the Army Cyber Proponent of U S Army Cyber Command ARCY 2nd U S Army It identifies eight aspects of convergence and nine guiding principles as the foundation for LandCyber 152 The white paper provides an overview of the U S Army roles and responsibilities in cyberspace that include C-OPE critical infrastructure protection integration into exercises and CCMD support It also gives near mid and long-term projections of cyberspace 41 evolution 153 Although it discusses emerging CO similar to joint cyberspace doctrine the LandCyber white paper lists U S Army mission areas as cyberspace control cyberspace forces enhancement cyberspace support and cyberspace force application--a mission set similar to that in joint space doctrine 154 The white paper includes an insightful discussion of how the LandCyber capabilities are related to the traditional warfighting functions 155 Overall the LandCyber concept adopts an approach that is holistic and forward leaning in scope FM 3-38 appears to embody many of the tenets of LandCyber although there the FM contains no reference to the concept At the conclusion of the research for this monograph the highly anticipated U S Army document FM 3-12 Cyberspace and EW Operations was not complete 156 Recent status briefings indicate that FM 3-12 will include fundamentals of cyberspace and EW operations as well as CEMA considerations It may also tackle the issue of addressing the relationships that cyberspace operations have on space operations IO intelligence and targeting Finally it should include appendices that cover organization for CO cyberspace information required for operations orders and standard formats for cyber effects or EA requests 157 Joint Force Development When considering the type of cross-domain operations that the United States may encounter in the near future it is important to note that potential adversaries may be working along similar lines of effort Although a detailed exploration of potential adversaries is beyond the scope of this monograph the vignette from the cross-domain Planner's Guide on Russian actions 42 in Georgia August 2008 captures the realm of the possible The war between Georgia Russia and the Russianbacked self-proclaimed republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia saw some 35 000-40 000 Russian and allied forces augmented by significant air and naval forces confront some 12 000-15 000 Georgian forces with little air and minimal naval capability Although a short and limited conflict it was historic and precedent setting This appears to be the first coordinated cyberspace attacks synchronized with major combat actions in the other warfighting domains primarily land and air In summary Russian planners tightly integrated CO with their kinetic diplomatic and strategic messaging operations The Russo-Georgian war provides a case study for joint planners preparing for a future conflict involving the new domain of cyberspace 158 The CCJO identifies 23 explicit force development implications to enable globally integrated operations Five of these implications directly address force development required for space and cyberspace forces in the joint functional areas of C2 fires movement and maneuver and protection see Table 8 The JOAC and JCEO provide more detailed force development goals focused on capabilities to enhance entry operations these include significant requirements for space and cyberspace capabilities see Appendix IV of this monograph 43 Command and Control Enhance our ability to operate effectively in degraded environment Given dramatic increases in the ability of adversaries to disrupt degrade or destroy cyberspace and space systems it is essential that Joint Forces be able to operate effectively despite degradation to those systems Greater resilience must be built in to technical architectures and the force must regularly train to operate in worst case degraded environments emphasis in original Fires Provide fire support coordination capability that integrates all fires including cyber Key to maximizing cross-domain synergy will be fielding system for planning requesting and directing all available fires so any element of Joint Force can access the most appropriate supporting arm In particular realizing the global potential of Joint Forces will require that previously niche capabilities such as offensive cyber weapons are available to Joint Force commanders emphasis in original Movement and Maneuver Rapidly employable on global scale As nation with global responsibilities the forces of the United States must be able to operate effectively anywhere in the world on short notice This can be achieved through multiple means Massed force deployed to the scene is certainly one way Low-signature and low-footprint capabilities such as cyber and global strike n also project force quickly Versatility too plays role Forces suitable for variety of missions if smartly positioned maximize the chance of being prepared for crisis emphasis in original Protection Improve cyber defense capabilities Given the heavy reliance of Joint Forces on military computer networks and civilian critical infrastructure it is essential that Joint Forces be able to defend key systems and ensure the continuity of critical network functions in the face of disruption emphasis in original Continue to improve defensive space capabilities Given the heavy reliance of Joint Forces on space systems and the rapidly increasing proliferation of counterspace systems it is essential that Joint Forces be able to protect friendly space capabilities including defensive space control and space situational awareness capabilities emphasis in original Table 8 Force Development Priorities for Space and Cyberspace from CCJO 159 44 The efforts described in Table 8 reflect the premise that space and cyberspace will be hotly contested domains and thus their defenses must be improved Also the CCJO makes it clear that other force development efforts should carefully deliberate over their dependence on space and cyberspace capabilities as well as ponder how to compensate for disruption of activities in these domains Finally some of these force development efforts may push beyond the limits of technical feasibility and affordability 160 Other Operational Challenges There are several themes of operational challenges common to many of the documents examined in this monograph While beyond the scope herein to explore these themes they merit serious study and incorporation into the general dialogue of future joint forces Dealing with Disruption The CCJO and JOE 2035 stress that commanders should be prepared to deal with disrupted and degraded space and cyberspace capabilities that may be attacked using advanced weapons HPRF and EMP Such disruptions should be studied not only for tactical and operational impacts but also for strategic implications For example interfering with certain on-orbit assets such as GPS and missile warning satellites may evoke greater consequences than the local SATCOM jamming Cross-domain Deterrence The refinement of cross-domain synergy can help to clarify the intentions of deterrence measures as well as enhance their effectiveness The traditional strategic deterrence anchored with nuclear weapons may evolve to incorporate space and cyberspace means due to their growing utility and value 161 45 The Leadership Dimension Concepts such as LandCyber that are enabled by space and cyberspace means hope to provide unprecedented situational awareness and connectivity at the lowest echelons While such a construct offers great promise for enhancing unified land operations it also creates challenges for effective mission command such as the increased potential for commanders to micromanage their troops 162 Autonomous Systems The JOE 2035 addresses the evolution of autonomous and robotic technologies and weapon systems Such capabilities have the potential to enhance joint operations but they will likely be used by adversaries as well for applications in the battlespace and against the U S homeland 163 For current operations the legality and ethics surrounding remotely-operated weapon systems are contentious issues in international venues such as the UN 164 Electromagnetic Spectrum Within U S military doctrine EMS is generally viewed as a critical enabler to operations in all domains 165 Current U S Army doctrine provides useful codification of EMS within its CEMA construct However the status of EMS within the body of doctrine remains muddled as do related terms such as EW and EA 166 Many practitioners and scholars argue that EMS is worthy of being named as the sixth warfighting domain this remains an open dialogue 167 Recommendations Physical Limitations in Cyberspace Time and Distance in Cyberspace Recommend that the parameters of time and distance be considered as significant parameters for CO and that the transfer 46 of information never be characterized as being instantaneous Rather they are governed by the laws of physics and therefore cyberspace capabilities are affected by the distance that they traverse despite to JOAC's assertion to the contrary 168 Many large U S brokerage firms have applied this fact to their economic advantage by locating their servers as close as possible to the Wall Street servers to reduce the transmission times of their high-speed trading In addition to the distance traveled planners should note the existence and potential effects of cyberspace weather traffic in the commons that may impede the delivery of cyber payloads Like terrestrial weather these phenomena may be difficult to predict in such cases as the flood of social media surrounding unforeseen events such as the death of Michael Jackson or Prince Limits of Human Cognition in Cyberspace Current concepts and doctrine infer that human operations can exercise effective C2 in the cyberspace domain However much of the activity in cyberspace occurs at speeds well beyond the human ability to comprehend Recommend that the joint community add the realm of ultra-tactical operations to the traditional tactical-operational-strategic spectrum 169 This concept could also be of great utility for applications of artificial intelligence and autonomous weapon systems Command Relationships USCYBERCOM as CCMD Recommend that USCYBERCOM remain as a sub-unified command The vision of future operations articulated in the JOAC and JOE 2035 support the wisdom of consolidating the global-reaching capabilities such as strategic nuclear strike missile defense forces and cyberspace forces under the unified command of USSTRATCOM 47 Historians will recall the push in the late 20th century for the unified command of space to be elevated to its own service Its reduction from CCMD to the JFCC under USSTRATCOM did not significantly hamper joint space operations Space C2 Structure Recommend that the next version of JP 3-14 Space Operations clarify the notional C2 relationships between USSTRATCOM CCMD and its service components and combat support agencies by adding a diagram and supporting text Figure IV-1 of JP 3-12 R should serve as the model thus enhancing cohesion between the two JPs Domain Definitions Define Domain Recommend that the DoD and the joint staff develop an official definition of military domain Common usage in joint doctrine may infer the ability to apply sovereignty or the ability to achieve dominance or local superiority or it may merely refer to physical characteristics Regardless theory and doctrine should include the establishment of precise language that can eliminate pedantic arguments and facilitate intellectual dialogue on such topics The definition could include a set of parameters common in concept but not in application For example domain parameters such as boundaries seams with other domains and environmental disruptors may be useful for comparison and enhancing cross-domain operations Also representation of land space and cyberspace domains should be refined in future versions of the Cross-Domain Planner's Guide to address issues identified in Tables 2 through 4 of this monograph Domain versus Commons In many joint documents the term commons or global commons is 48 used interchangeably with certain domains In addition to codifying a definition for domain recommend that the DoD and the joint staff not only provide a definition for commons or global commons but also provide discussion for when it is appropriate to use the term A starting point may be the JOAC description of a global commons as areas of air sea space and cyberspace that belong to no one state 170 A suggested distinction to consider and refine is for domain to be used for applications focused on military activities e g organize train equip and operate and for commons to be used for applications that explicitly include other instruments of national power e g diplomatic and economic Define the Space Domain Recommend that the DoD and the joint staff develop an official definition for the space domain Granted the seam between air and space domains may not be significant to current cross-domain operations However future space operations may include more routine traversing of vehicles to and from space as well as more airborne systems operating at extremely high altitudes Discuss Domain-Specific Terrain Recommend future versions of domain-specific joint doctrine publications include a discussion on the notion of key terrain in the domain Such discussion could address whether the terrain is transient enduring or a mixture how it can be influenced by blue or red forces what lines of communication and choke points exist and what factors influence movement in and through the given domain 49 Supported and Supporting Roles Space and Cyberspace in the Lead Current joint doctrine makes mention of the possibility that space or CO may be designated as the supported activities but does not address how this might occur Recommend future joint doctrine include examples of how the supporting efforts in traditional domains may support main efforts in the space or cyberspace domains Priorities for Cyberspace Resources The CCJO and JOE 2035 set high expectations for future U S military cyberspace forces with little regard of the feasibility of these forces to be able to cover all the tasks In turn this may foster unrealistic expectations for U S Government commercial and international entities with regard to the support they may receive for cyber resiliency efforts 171 Recommend that future DoD and joint staff publications strive to emphasize the high-demand low-density aspects of cyberspace capabilities as well as a realistic evaluation of military cyberspace support outside of military operations during periods of intense and widespread conflict Enduring Military Theory Discussion of Joint Functions and Principles Recommend that future versions of joint doctrine publications for domain operations include a brief discussion on the 12 principles of joint operations as well as the 8 joint functions This will enhance understanding of how common theories and principles of military operations apply to specific domains as well as provide a common lexicon and topics for comparison amongst domains The use of vignettes in these discussions may enhance understanding for the joint community Military Theory for Space and Cyberspace One can argue that military activities in space and 50 cyberspace are the least intuitive to comprehend and the least understood by military planners and operators Recommend that the DoD and the joint staff actively support the development of military theory to help provide a foundation for increased knowledge in the joint force Such efforts should be promulgated throughout the spectrum of military professional education Summary By their very nature military doctrine and operations are works in progress In general the current state of military doctrine in the relatively new domains of space and cyberspace include adequate means to support land-based joint operations However knowledge of the nature of these new domains is not intu- itive and understanding their unique characteristics and capabilities is still a challenge for the military force writ large Anticipated future trends favor the decreased emphasis on traditional large-scale land operations and increased frequency and intensity of conflict in space and cyberspace perhaps even where these newer domains may become preeminent for a given operation The joint staff's pursuit of achieving cross-domain synergy in planning and operations offers a credible method to face some of the challenges of the future joint force but this will likely remain an evolutionary vice revolutionary endeavor ENDNOTES 1 Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication JP 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms Washington DC Joint Chiefs of Staff as of August 2017 p 123 available from http www jcs mil Portals 36 Documents Doctrine pubs dictionary pdf accessed February 12 2018 51 2 Department of Defense DoD Sustaining U S Global Leadership Priorities for 21st Century Defense Washington DC U S Department of Defense January 2012 p 5 available from http archive defense gov news Defense_Strategic_Guidance pdf accessed November 7 2016 The full text regarding this mission area is Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space Modern armed forces cannot conduct high-tempo effective operations without reliable information and communication networks and assured access to cyberspace and space Today space systems and their supporting infrastructure face a range of threats that may degrade disrupt or destroy assets Accordingly DoD will continue to work with domestic and international allies and partners and invest in advanced capabilities to defend its networks operational capability and resiliency in cyberspace and space emphasis in original 3 Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-0 Joint Operations Washington DC Joint Chiefs of Staff January 17 2011 p I-1 available from http www jcs mil Portals 36 Documents Doctrine pubs jp3_0_20170117 pdf accessed September 19 2016 4 Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Military Operations Historical Collection Washington DC Joint Chiefs of Staff July 15 1997 p v-vi available from http www jcs mil Portals 36 Documents History Monographs JMO pdf accessed November 3 2016 5 Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Doctrine Hierarchy Chart February 6 2016 Washington DC Joint Chiefs of Staff available from http www jcs mil Doctrine Hierarchy-Chart accessed February 12 2018 6 Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States Washington DC Joint Chiefs of Staff March 25 2013 Incorp Change 1 July 12 2017 pp I-3 I-17-I-19 available from http www jcs mil Portals 36 Documents Doctrine pubs jp1_ ch1 pdf ver 2017-12-23-160207-587 accessed September 19 2016 7 Ibid p IV-3 In JP 1 Figure IV-1 Possible Components in a Joint Force depicts the notional relation of the joint force components to the joint force commander JFC Chapter V describes in detail the command relationships and command and control C2 of joint forces 8 Ibid pp x I-5 and IV-4 52 9 Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-0 p III-1 10 Ibid Appendix A 11 Ibid p IV-1 12 The following joint publications are available on the Joint Electronic Library Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-30 Command and Control of Joint Air Operations Washington DC Joint Chiefs of Staff February 10 2014 available from http www jcs mil Portals 36 Documents Doctrine pubs jp3_30 pdf Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-31 Command and Control for Joint Land Operations Washington DC Joint Chiefs of Staff February 24 2014 p GL-6 available from http www jcs mil Portals 36 Documents Doctrine pubs jp3_31 pdf Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-32 Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations Washington DC Joint Chiefs of Staff August 7 2013 available from http www jcs mil Portals 36 Documents Doctrine pubs jp3_32 pdf 13 Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-31 p GL-6 14 Ibid p II-1 15 Ibid JP 3-31 Chapter IV describes the forms of land operations as well as the six joint functions that apply to them The topics of the appendices are Appendix A Notional Headquarters Organization Appendix B Theater-Level Land Component Planning Considerations and Appendix C Joint Land Operation Plan and Order Development 16 Ibid p I-4 17 Ibid p IV-10 18 Ibid pp IV-10-V-11 19 Ibid p II-3 20 Ibid p I-3-I-4 21 Ibid p IV-28 22 Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-14 Space Operations Washington DC Joint Chiefs of Staff May 29 2013 p G-1 available from http www jcs mil Portals 36 Documents Doctrine pubs jp3_14 pdf 53 23 DoD Department of Defense Key Officials 1947-2014 Wash- ington DC Historical Office Office of the Secretary of Defense June 2014 pp 22 106 USSPACECOM was disestablished on October 1 2002 24 Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-14 p I-1 25 Ibid p I-1 See also DoD National Security Space Strategy Unclassified Summary Washington DC Department of Defense and Office of the Director of National Intelligence January 2011 p 1 The description of space as congested contested and competitive first appeared in this document 26 Ibid p I-8 27 International Telecommunication Union ITU About International Telecommunication Union ITU n d available from https www itu int en about Pages default aspx The website describes ITU as ITU is the United Nations UNs specialized agency for information and communication technologies--ICTs emphasis in original We allocate global radio spectrum and satellite orbits develop the technical standards that ensure networks and technologies seamlessly interconnect and strive to improve access to ICTs to underserved communities worldwide ITU is committed to connecting all the world's people-- wherever they live and whatever their means emphasis in original Through our work we protect and support everyone's fundamental right to communicate 28 Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-14 p II-6 29 Ibid p IV-3 30 Ibid pp IV-4 IV-9 31 Ibid p III-2 Per this joint publication the space coordinating authority SCA roles and responsibilities are 1 Integrating space capabilities 54 2 Planning coordinating and synchronizing space operations in the operational area and ensuring inputs from the joint force staff and components are incorporated 3 Maintaining situational awareness of theater space operations and coordinating with the CCMD combatant command SCA or Commander JFCC SPACE Joint Functional Component Commander for Space to integrate theater space operations into DOD space operations 4 Providing consolidated space requirements through the JFC for coordination as required 32 Ibid pp III-3-III-4 The joint publication's description of the space support elements SSEs follows The Army integrates space capabilities at the army corps division special forces groups and fires brigade levels using space support elements SSEs SSE organic space experts are resident on the headquarters staff as an integral part of the staff and are directly involved in the staff planning process from the beginning The element is responsible for identifying opportunities to employ space force enhancement or space control and then coordinating the required support When deployed the SSE establishes and maintains contact with the SCA It also coordinates with the SCA on procedures for space support requests and reachback support The SSE participates in the conduct of mission analysis to determine which space-based capabilities are applicable to the particular operation and then coordinates and makes recommendations for the allocation and use of space services and capabilities The mission analysis performed by the SSE forms the basis of the staff's space running estimate as well as annex N Space Operations for all orders and plans 33 Ibid p V-5 Challenges facing the space planner include Space presents unique planning and operational considerations that affect friendly adversary and neutral space forces alike Space capabilities require extensive and advanced planning Space assets are sufficiently capable and robust however operational planners must understand the limited number of resources available and the distinct challenges with space force reconstitution Numerous resource and 55 legal considerations impact planning and affect mission success 34 Ibid pp I-3-I-6 35 Ibid pp A-1-G-8 The subjects of the seven appendices are A Space-Based Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance B Missile Warning C Space-Based Environmental Monitoring Capability D Satellite Communications SATCOM E Space-Based Positioning Navigation and Timing F Operationally Responsive Space and G Space Fundamentals 36 Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-12 R Cyberspace Operations Washington DC Joint Chiefs of Staff original release February 5 2013 updated unclassified October 21 2014 p GL-4 available from http www jcs mil Portals 36 Documents Doctrine pubs jp3_12R pdf accessed February 14 2018 37 DoD Quadrennial Defense Review Report Washington DC U S Government Printing Office February 2010 p 37 38 DoD Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace Washington DC Department of Defense July 2011 p 37 39 Joint Doctrine Analysis Division Compendium of Key Joint Doctrine Publications Washington DC Deputy Directorate Joint Staff J-7 January 3 2014 p iii 40 Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-12 R pp v-vi and I-2-I-4 states that Cyberspace can be described in terms of three layers physical network logical network and cyber-persona and is summarized as The physical network layer of cyberspace is comprised of the geographic component and the physical network components It is the medium where the data travel The logical network layer consists of those elements of the network that are related to one another in a way that is abstracted from the physical network i e the form or relationships are not tied to an individual specific path or node A simple example is any Web site that is hosted on servers in multiple physical locations where all content can be accessed through a single uniform resource locator The cyber-persona layer represents yet a higher level of 56 abstraction of the logical network in cyberspace it uses the rules that apply in the logical network layer to develop a digital representation of an individual or entity identity in cyberspace The cyber-persona layer consists of the people actually on the network emphasis in original 41 Ibid p vii 42 Ibid pp II-2-II-5 JP 3-12 R distinguishes between cyberspace operations CO missions and cyberspace actions as follows e Cyberspace Actions While the JFC's military missions in cyberspace OCO offensive CO DCO defensive CO and DODIN DoD Information Network operations are categorized by intent as described above these missions will require the employment of various capabilities to create specific effects in cyberspace To plan for authorize and assess these actions it is important the JFC and staff understand how they are distinguished from one another Cyberspace actions include cyberspace defense cyberspace intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance ISR cyberspace operational preparation of the environment C-OPE and cyberspace attack 43 Ibid pp II-6-II-12 44 Ibid p III-3 Figure III-1 of this publication summarizes the roles in cyberspace for six major sections of U S law as follows Title 6 Domestic Security Role Security of US cyberspace Title 10 Armed Forces Role Man train and equip US forces for military operations in cyberspace Title 18 Crimes and Criminal Procedure Role Crime prevention apprehension and prosecution of criminals operating in cyberspace Title 32 National Guard Role Domestic consequence management if activated for federal service the National Guard is integrated into Title 10 U S Code Armed Forces Title 40 Public Buildings Property and Works Role Establish and enforce standards for acquisition and security of information technologies Title 50 War and National Defense Role Secure US interests by conducting military and foreign intelligence operations in cyberspace emphasis in original 57 45 Ibid p III-6 Cyberspace support element CSE deployed to CCMDs provide the following CSEs are organized from USCYBERCOM forces and deployed to CCMDs for full integration into their staffs CSEs resources are provided by USCYBERCOM to provide the CCMDs with joint CO planners and other subject matter experts on CO These personnel facilitate development of cyberspace requirements and coordinate integrate and deconflict CO into the command's planning process 1 The CSE provides CCMDs an interface and reachback capability to USCYBERCOM to synchronize cyberspace fires with the commander's scheme of maneuver develop SA and facilitate acquiring timely threat information 2 USCYBERCOM retains operational control OPCON of the CSE and the CSE is in direct support to the JCC Joint Cyberspace Center 46 Ibid p IV-1 47 Ibid p IV-3 With regard to joint targeting the publication notes that However three aspects of CO should be included in the JFC's targeting processes recognizing that cyberspace capabilities are a viable option for engaging designated joint targets understanding that a CO option may be preferable in some cases and first second and third order effects on joint targets may involve or affect elements of the DODIN 48 For a discussion of potential elements of a military cyberspace theory including how the principles of joint operations apply to cyberspace see Jeffrey L Caton On the Theory of Cyberspace in J Boone Bartholomees Jr ed U S Army War College Guide to National Security Issues Volume I Theory of War and Strategy 5th Ed Carlisle PA Strategic Studies Institute U S Army War College June 2012 pp 325-343 49 For the land domain see Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-31 pp IV-1-IV-7 For the space domain see Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-14 In this publication Chapter I includes a discussion of how the principles of joint operations apply to the space domain Chapter 58 II addresses the Space Mission Areas For the cyberspace domain see Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-12 R 50 Benjamin King Victory Starts Here A Short 40-Year History of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command Fort Leavenworth KS Combat Studies Institute Press May 2013 pp 31-37 available from https usacac army mil Cac2 cgsc carl download csipubs VictoryStartsHere_40yr pdf accessed November 11 2016 51 Department of the Army Army Doctrine Publication ADP No 3-0 Unified Land Operations Washington DC Headquarters Department of the Army October 2011 Foreword available from https www army mil e2 rv5_downloads info references ADP_3-0_ ULO_Oct_2011_APD pdf accessed February 13 2018 52 Ibid p iii 53 Ibid p 2 54 Department of the Army Training and Doctrine Command TRADOC Pamphlet 525-7-4 The United States Army's Concept Capability Plan CCP Space Operations 2015-2024 Version 1 0 Fort Monroe VA Training and Doctrine Command Headquarters Department of the Army November 15 2006 p ii The other imperatives of this CCP are o o o Facilitate the integration of space capabilities across the full spectrum of Army and joint operations Improve the Army's ability to exploit existing space capabilities Deliver space capabilities that address Army needs capability requirements and priorities by influencing the design of space-based systems and payloads 55 Ibid p 15 56 Ibid p 16 57 Ibid p 37 58 Headquarters Department of the Army Field Manual FM 3-14 Army Space Operations Washington DC Department of the Army August 2014 Although this document is unclassified its distribution is limited to DoD and DoD contractors in 59 order to protect certain technical data Thus details of its contents are not included in this monograph 59 For a detailed examination of Army space capabilities see Jeffrey L Caton Evolving Army Needs for Space-Based Support Carlisle PA Strategic Studies Institute U S Army War College April 2015 See also Institute of Land Warfare U S Army Space Capabilities Enabling the Force of Decisive Action Torchbearer National Security Report Arlington VA Association of the United States Army May 2012 available from https www ausa org sites default files TBNSR-2012-US-Army-Space-Capabilities-Enabling-the-Forceof-Decisive-Action pdf 60 Department of the Army TRADOC Pamphlet 525-7-8 The United States Army's Cyberspace Operations Concept Capability Plan 2016-2028 Fort Monroe VA Training and Doctrine Command Headquarters Department of the Army February 22 2010 p 16 61 Ibid pp 15-18 The three dimensions of cyber electronic warfare EW and information operations IO are described as a First dimension The first dimension is the psychological contest of wills against implacable foes warring factions criminal groups and potential adversaries This dimension involves influencing desperate and creative people to do what they really don't want to do and requires an acute understanding of human behavior b Second dimension The second dimension is strategic engagement and involves keeping friends at home gaining allies abroad and generating support or empathy for the mission in the area of operations This dimension includes the general public key actors and third party validators who are the ultimate arbiters of success or failure of military operations in the current operational environment Gaining and maintaining their support or empathy for the mission is an imperative of 21st century operations c Third dimension The third dimension is the cyberelectromagnetic contest Trends in wired wireless and optical technologies are setting conditions for the convergence 60 of computer and telecommunication networks A significant advantage will go to the side that is able to gain protect and exploit advantages in the highly contested cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrums EMS Footnote for this paragraph The use of the term cyber-electromagnetic is not meant to equate the terms cyberspace and EMS but rather to highlight there is significant overlap between the two and future technological development is likely to increase this convergence 62 Ibid Descriptions of the four elements of CyberOps include CyberSA is the immediate knowledge of friendly adversary and other relevant information regarding activities in and through cyberspace and the EMS electromagnetic spectrum It is gained from a combination of intelligence and operational activity in cyberspace the EMS and in the other domains both unilaterally and through collaboration with unified action and public-private partners Discrimination between natural and manmade threats is a critical piece of this analysis p 18 CyNetOps is the component of CyberOps that establishes operates manages protects defends and commands and controls the LandWarNet critical infrastructure and key resources CIKR and other specified cyberspace CyNetOps consists of three core elements Cyber enterprise management CyEM cyber content management CyCM and cyber defense CyD including information assurance computer network defense to include response actions and critical infrastructure protection CyNetOps uses CyEM CyCM and CyD in a mutually supporting and supported relationship with CyberWar and CyberSpt p 19 CyberWar is the component of CyberOps that extends cyber power beyond the defensive boundaries of the GIG global information grid to detect deter deny and defeat adversaries CyberWar capabilities target computer and telecommunication networks and embedded processors and controllers in equipment systems and infrastructure CyberWar uses cyber exploitation CyE cyber attack CyA and dynamic cyber defense DCyD in a mutually supporting and supported relationship with CyNetOps and CyberSpt p 21 61 CyberSpt is a diverse collection of supporting activities which are generated and employed to specifically enable both CyNetOps and CyberWar These activities are called-out in this unifying category due to their unique and expensive nature as high-skilled low-density time-sensitive intensive activities requiring specialized training processes and policy Additionally several of these activities also require specialized coordination synchronization and integration to address legal and operational considerations It is because of these considerations and their overall importance that these activities are addressed as a CyberOps core component p 22 63 Department of Army FM 3-38 Cyber Electromagnetic Activities Washington DC Headquarters Department of Army February 2014 p v For additional background and history of the U S Army CO see Jeffrey L Caton Army Support of Military Cyberspace Operations Joint Contexts and Global Escalation Implications Carlisle PA Strategic Studies Institute U S Army War College January 2015 64 Department of Army FM 3-38 pp 2-8-2-9 The full context of the Soldier's role in cyber electromagnetic activities CEMA is Routine uses of cyberspace such as sending e-mail using the Internet to complete an online training course and developing a briefing document may occur in cyberspace but they do not amount to what is defined as CO However it is through these routine uses of cyberspace that most of the vulnerabilities on U S networks are exposed to and exploited by adversaries This includes communications that enter the EMS By following accepted operations security procedures every Soldier contributes to CEMA Commanders leaders and non-commissioned officers educate Soldiers on threats in cyberspace and the EMS Soldiers understand the relationship between cyberspace and the EMS and maintain the necessary protection measures when using devices that leverage this relationship between capabilities 65 Ibid p 2-2 66 Ibid p 2-7 With regard to CEMA coordination FM 3-38 notes 62 The CEMA element collaborates internally with subordinate units and externally with supported supporting and adjacent units and centers The CEMA element neither owns nor controls any of the unit's CO or EW assets but it must coordinate with many who do Therefore CEMA staff personnel cannot support the element's mission by themselves To plan integrate and synchronize successfully the CEMA element in coordination with the G-2 S-2 collaborates via several means both internally to its unit and externally to its supporting units The organization's knowledge management section can assist in establishing mechanisms to facilitate collaboration and reachback See table 2-1 on page 2-8 Note table 2-1 is titled Functions of the cyber electromagnetic activities working group 67 The new version of FM 3-12 was released 5 months after the research for this monograph was concluded See Headquarters Department of the Army FM 3-12 Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations Washington DC Headquarters Department of Army April 11 2017 available from http armypubs army mil epubs DR_pubs DR_a pdf web ARN3089_FM%203-12%20 FINAL%20WEB%201 pdf accessed February 19 2018 68 U S Army War College Strategic Cyberspace Operations Guide Carlisle Barracks PA Center for Strategic Leadership U S Army War College June 1 2016 available from https archive org details USAWCStrategicCyberOpsGuide accessed November 14 2016 69 Joint Chiefs of Staff Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Joint Force 2020 Washington DC Joint Chiefs of Staff September 10 2012 p 4 The elements of globally integrated operations are o o o o o o o o Mission command Seize retain and exploit the initiative Global agility Partnering Flexibility in establishing Joint Forces Cross-domain synergy Use of flexible low-signature capabilities Increasingly discriminate to minimize unintended consequences 70 Ibid p 2 63 71 Ibid p 7 The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations CCJO includes special operations global strike and ISR as part of flexible low-signature or small-footprint capabilities 72 Ibid p 5 73 Ibid p 2 74 Ibid p 7 75 Joint Staff Joint Force Development J7 Cross-Domain Synergy in Joint Operations Planner's Guide Washington DC Joint Chiefs of Staff January 14 2016 p 1 available from http www jcs mil Portals 36 Documents Doctrine concepts cross_domain_ planning_guide pdf ver 2017-12-28-161956-230 accessed February 14 2018 76 Ibid p 1 77 Ibid Chapters 2 and 3 78 Ibid pp 37-38 The text for Proposed Unique Characteristics and Capabilities in Table 2 are verbatim from this reference 79 Ibid p 5 The Planner's Guide cites JP 1-02 as the source for its definition of space but there is no definition of space in the current version August 2017 of JP 1-02 80 See Air Command and Staff College Space Research Electives Seminars AU-18 Space Primer 2nd Ed Maxwell Air Force Base AL Air Command and Staff College September 2009 Chapter 3 addresses Current Space Law and Policy 81 Joint Staff Joint Force Development J7 pp 46-47 The text for Proposed Unique Characteristics and Capabilities in Table 3 are verbatim from this reference 82 Iulia-Diana Galeriu 'Paper satellites' and the free use of outer space New York New York University School of Law January February 2015 available from http www nyulawglobal org globalex Paper_satellites_free_use_outer_space html accessed February 14 2018 This paper examines the claims by nations and commercial entities for specific space orbit positions 64 Abstract The International Telecommunication Union herein after ITU is the United Nations UNs specialized agency for information and communications technologies that allocates global radio spectrum and satellites orbits and develops the technical standards which ensure that networks and technologies seamlessly interconnect 1 As the satellite industry is the most profitable space business at the moment the demand for slots in the geostationary orbit herein after GSO has been growing and the mandated institution to allocate these slots amongst States is the ITU Due to the high value of the orbital positions and their scarcity the GSO is slowly becoming saturated despite the fact that many States have not yet placed a satellite into orbit due to technological or economic constrictions This impairment of the States in their capability to participate has triggered a speculative phenomenon known as 'overfiling' Overfiling consists of registering unneeded uses of orbit resources and has the effect of foreclosing others who have near-term needs from achieving access and conflict-free registrations As a consequence of this practice some States risk being denied their right to use outer space freely a right which has been generally recognized in the international space legislation 83 Joint Staff Joint Force Development J7 p 52 Table TIV-2 of the Planner's Guide is taken from Table 1 of Sean Brandes The Newest Warfighting Domain Cyberspace Synesis A Journal of Science Technology Ethics and Policy Vol 4 2013 pp G 90-G 95 84 DoD Quadrennial Defense Review Report p 37 85 Department of Army FM 3-38 p 1-5 FM 3-38 lists the characteristics of the cyberspace domain as 1-13 Cyberspace has characteristics that significantly differ from the land air maritime and space domains Cyberspace is a system of systems in that many small and diverse systems comprise the structure as a whole These systems exist throughout each of the four natural domains Changes in cyberspace are often driven by private industry research and development making the domain dynamic and continually evolving as information technology capabilities continue to expand and evolve Because cyberspace is man-made it is only through continued attention and maintenance that cyberspace persists 65 1-14 Cyberspace reinforces the fact that an operational framework is not confined to a physical place Traditional battlefields were confined to physical space While the repercussions of what happens on the traditional battlefield can create social and political effects around the world the actual physical impact is limited to the physical battlefield The inclusion of cyberspace and the EMS greatly expands and complicates the operational framework transforming a limited physical battlefield to a global battlefield A computer virus executed in cyberspace may strike its intended target and also indiscriminately strike other systems in several nations around the world including the United States U S Collateral damage from this type of attack is not always predictable 1-15 Cyberspace is an environment created and maintained for the purpose of facilitating the use and exploitation of information human interaction and intercommunication This domain co-exists with the EMS through telecommunications systems These systems utilize the EMS and have converged into a worldwide network to create cyberspace Effective CO holistically address the physical infrastructure data networks and the EMS 86 Ibid p 1-5 87 Joint Staff Joint Force Development J7 pp 50-51 The text for Unique Characteristics and Capabilities in Table 4 are verbatim for this reference 88 Internet Traffic Report continuously updating available from http internettrafficreport com accessed November 28 2016 This website monitors the flow of data around the world It then displays a value between zero and 100 Higher values indicate faster and more reliable connections It also provides statistics on the average response times for information package to traverse servers in the continents of Asia Australia Europe North America and South America These values varied between 39 to 137 milliseconds on the day of access for this endnote For more discussion on physical factors in cyberspace see Caton in Bartholomees Jr ed pp 333-334 89 U S Government Accountability Office GAO United States Faces Challenges in Addressing Global Cybersecurity and 66 Governance GAO Report 10-606 Washington DC U S Government Accountability Office July 2010 Figure 1 of this report U S Government Involvement in Key Entities and Efforts Addressing Global Cyberspace Security and Governance includes 24 different fora with which U S Government departments participate e g Departments of State Defense Homeland Security Justice and Commerce 90 Joint Staff Joint Force Development J7 The description of the three layers of cyberspace in the Planner's Guide--originally from Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-12 R --is included on p 52 The physical layer includes all hardware assets--computers servers routers satellite links etc --enabling the movement of information in and through cyberspace Related to the physical layer is cyberspace's reliance on the electromagnetic spectrum EMS where much of cyberspace's code moves and is therefore vulnerable to jamming or manipulation The logical layer is the abstract portion of the physical layer This layer reflects information represented and accessible in multiple locations through Internet Protocol and uniform resource locator URLs The cyber-persona layer is an extension of the logical layer and represents the users entities and organizations on the network This layer applies the same rules that govern the logical layer emphasis in original 91 Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-14 p IV-2 92 Department of Army FM 3-38 pp 1-4-1-5 93 Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-12 R p I-2 94 Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-14 p E-2 95 Ibid p IV-18 96 Ibid p E-1 97 Department of Army FM 3-38 p 1-5 98 Ibid p 2-7 99 Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-14 p E-2 67 100 Department of Army FM 3-38 p 2-7 101 Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-12 R p I-2 102 Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-14 p IV-18 103 Department of Army FM 3-38 pp 1-4-1-5 104 Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-14 p IV-18 105 Department of Army FM 3-38 p 1-5 106 Ibid p 3-3 FM 3-38 provides an example of CO support to opposing land commanders For example cyberspace capabilities and other informationrelated capabilities may be directed at an enemy weapons system consisting of the targeted platform and its operators The cyberspace capability could create degrading effects on the platform while an information-related capability influences disrupts corrupts or usurps the decisionmaking of the operator 107 Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-12 R p I-2 108 Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-14 p IV-18 109 Department of Army FM 3-38 p 1-5 110 Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-12 R p IV-12 111 Ibid p II-1 112 Department of the Army ADP No 3-0 p 13 Mission Command is described as 62 The mission command warfighting function develops and integrates those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control This fundamental philosophy of command places people rather than technology or systems at the center Under this philosophy commanders drive the operations process through their activities of understand visualize describe direct lead and assess 68 113 For details see Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-14 p B-2 Figure B-1 Missile Warning and Support Request Procedures 114 Department of Army FM 3-38 p 3-12 The Cyberspace Effects Request Form is described as follows 3-50 The cyber effects request format is a format used to request effects in support of CO The cyber effects request format contains baseline information for coordinating and integrating cyberspace capabilities and associated authorities to create effects outside and inside of the DODIN including LandWarNet Commanders and staffs ensure cyber effects request formats are developed and submitted throughout the operations process to facilitate planning Also the cyber effects request format facilitates the achievement of operational and tactical objectives by leveraging the employment of cyberspace capabilities 115 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3010 02D Guidance for Development and Implementation of Joint Concepts Washington DC Joint Chiefs of Staff November 22 2013 p A-3 While concepts indirectly guide the other elements of force development the relationship between concepts and doctrine is more direct both concepts and doctrine focus on ideas for how the Joint Force should operate As concepts gain institutional acceptance and requisite capabilities are developed validated elements of the concepts may b incorporated in doctrine 116 DoD Joint Operational Access Concept JOAC Version 1 0 Washington DC U S Department of Defense January 17 2012 Foreword available from https www defense gov Portals 1 Documents pubs JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed pdf accessed November 3 2016 117 Ibid Foreword 118 Ibid p 12 The other two trends are dramatic improvement and proliferation of weapons and other technologies capable of denying access to or freedom of action within an operational area p 9 and the changing U S overseas defense posture emphasis in original resulting from decreased support abroad severely contracting resources and force protection 69 119 Ibid p 12 120 Ibid p 26 121 Ibid p 27 The JOAC vision includes the use of traditional domain forces to support space and CO Gaining space and cyberspace superiority when and where needed is not necessarily a symmetrical effort--that is cyberspace operations CO to gain cyberspace superiority and space operations to gain space superiority--but often can be achieved more effectively like superiority in the other domains through the cross-domain application of combat power 122 Ibid p 18 Operational Access Precept number 1 Conduct operations to gain access based on the requirements of the broader mission while also designing subsequent operations to lessen access challenges considers a reduced use of land forces Since operational access does not exist for its own sake joint forces should conduct access operations in accordance with the broader objectives and ideally in conjunction with the other elements of national power Importantly a joint force commander JFC should avoid over-committing forces or projecting combat power deeper into hostile territory than is required by the objective This is especially true of major land forces which can be difficult to withdraw once committed 123 Ibid pp 20-21 124 Ibid p 22 125 Ibid pp 19-20 Operational Access Precept number 3 Consider a variety of basing options emphasis in original includes use of space and cyberspace capabilities to help offset forward-based forces One other option is to emphasize capabilities with minimal dependence on forward bases such as amphibious longrange strike cyber electronic or space capabilities either in primary or supporting roles 126 Ibid pp 18-19 Operational Access Precept number 2 Prepare the operational area in advance to facilitate access 70 emphasis in original emphasizes the early use of operations in the space and cyberspace domains Operations in space cyberspace and across the electromagnetic spectrum EMS likewise will be continuous to ensure that support to navigation command and control C2 targeting sustainment and intelligence are in place when needed Moreover computer network operations NETOPS both offensive and defensive likely will commence long before lethal combat begins and even before combat forces begin to deploy Operational Access Precept number 5 Exploit advantages in one or more domains to disrupt enemy antiaccess area-denial capabilities in others emphasis in original pp 21-22 also calls early space and CO The decision on which domains to operate in initially will depend on the mission and the enemy's capabilities and vulnerabilities in the various domains there is no universal sequence That said joint force projection almost always will include the early conduct of information operations IO and operations in space and cyberspace since freedom of action in those latter domains is increasingly important to all joint operations Moreover those operations rarely require the additional risks incurred in deploying forces to the operational area In fact information space and cyberspace operations CO generally should commence well before the need for combat as part of efforts to shape the operational area 127 Ibid p 25 Operational Access Precept number 10 Maximize surprise through deception stealth and ambiguity to complicate enemy targeting emphasis in original includes In the context of future opposed access forms of deception that could prove especially useful include electromagnetic deception and cyber deception which could provide intentionally erroneous information on the location and activities of deploying joint forces to enemy intelligence networks 128 Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Concept for Entry Operations Washington DC Joint Chiefs of Staff April 7 2014 p iii available 71 from http www jcs mil Portals 36 Documents Doctrine concepts jceo pdf ver 2017-12-28-162000-837 accessed February 13 2018 129 Ibid p vi The purpose of the Joint Concept for Entry Operations JCEO is summarized in this passage as The idea is to employ opportunistic unpredictable maneuver in and across multiple domains in conjunction with the ability to attain local superiority at multiple entry points to gain entry and achieve desired objectives 130 Ibid p vii 131 Ibid p 6 The other six operational characteristics are o o o o o o Purposes for entry operations Geographic and infrastructure challenges Capacity for entry operations Evolving threats Whole-of-government approach Multinational and coalition interface and interoperability 132 Ibid pp 11-12 133 Ibid pp 12-13 Regarding the use of cyberspace and space to support military deception MILDEC operations against enemy forces the JCEO includes One method the Joint Force may use to confound the enemy is to create either a dearth or overabundance of targets for the enemy to process Social media and other cyber-enabled deception methods may be valuable contributors to gaining surprise Where surprise is not possible due to the nature of the operating area or the duration of the operation the Joint Force will seek to overwhelm the enemy's targeting capability This could be done for example through a combination of cyberspace efforts and the use of numerous autonomous decoys employed in one or more of the other domains Regarding the use of cyberspace and space support of MILDEC operation to reduce collateral damage the JCEO states 72 Additionally information operations IO including those enabled by cyberspace employed in either a clandestine or overt manner may be able to move populations away from potential points of entry in order to minimize collateral damage concerns 134 Ibid pp 13 15 With regard to joint fires the JCEO suggests In a hostile environment fires will be mutually supporting across all domains to develop local superiority by suppressing threats to air and maritime operations For example information operations IO cyberspace and space operations may be used to help a special operations unit to target track and conduct a direct action strike on an adversary's anti-ship system permitting naval surface fires to engage enemy air defense assets In turn this engagement would allow global strike assets to eliminate key short range area denial assets that would otherwise impede the entry force 135 Ibid p 20 The JCEO notes how maneuver is enhanced by space and cyberspace capabilities Regardless of the type of maneuver mobility and flexibility are critical and enhanced when fully integrated with cyberspace and space capabilities Entry operations require the ability to build up capabilities as quickly as possible Forces must be able to disperse to seize key terrain or for self-preservation and to concentrate rapidly to exploit opportunity 136 Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Operating Environment JOE 2035 The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World Washington DC Joint Chiefs of Staff July 14 2016 p 7 available from http www jcs mil Portals 36 Documents Doctrine concepts joe_2035_july16 pdf ver 2017-12-28-162059-917 accessed September 19 2016 The Joint Operating Environment JOE suggests regional power trends that include Emergence of new spacefaring nations and military competition in space Many capabilities previously reserved to superpowers are now available to other states on a commercial basis to include Earth observation optical 73 sensing space-based Internet and communications services A range of anti-satellite weapons ASAT able to disrupt or destroy the space electromagnetic and ground segments of these constellations will also become more common Growth of state-sponsored cyber forces and capabilities The next decades will see the further emergence of statesponsored actors and associated organizations with more advanced cyber warfare capabilities Like strategic airpower before it state-based cyber advocates will develop strategies that attempt to leap over traditional U S military forces and directly influence the decision calculations of political and military leadership 137 Ibid p 17 138 Ibid pp 21 30-33 139 Ibid pp 30 33 140 Ibid pp 32-33 JOE 2035 predicts a potentially hostile space domain Competition in orbit even during peacetime will be intense highlighted by satellites maneuvering to hinder the operations of other satellites co-orbital jamming and the use of ground-based lasers to dazzle or destroy imaging sensors Future adversaries will also have the capability to deploy blockers and grapplers to impede the free operation of commercial and military satellites and they will use ASAT weapons launched at space assets from the ground as well as from other satellites Ultimately this may generate space debris leading to a runaway chain reaction which destroys other satellites and threatens the integrity of many important orbits 141 Ibid p 34 142 Ibid p 35 The context of conflict in cyberspace includes A growing number of states will have extensive offensive cyber forces at their disposal to disrupt the smooth and efficient functioning of cyber-connected systems In the future state military and security organizations will increasingly use cross-border network and web-site 74 disruptions to cause social unrest Attacks will work to undermine the trust and data integrity that are central to advanced societies particularly financial legal and technical infrastructure This competition may also feature strategic surveillance as well as industrial and scientific espionage 143 Ibid p 36 144 Ibid pp 40-50 145 For additional reports on future security environments see National Intelligence Council Global Trends 2030 Alternative Worlds Report NIC 2012-001 Washington DC Office of the Director of National Intelligence available from https www dni gov files documents GlobalTrends_2030 pdf accessed November 18 2016 For additional views on the need for space and cyberspace capabilities to address increasing anti-access area denial A2 AD challenges see Jason D Ellis Seizing the Initiative Competitive Strategies and Modern U S Defense Policy Report LLNL-TR-680128 Livermore CA Center for Global Security Research Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory January 2016 available from https cgsr llnl gov content assets docs J_Ellis_Seizing_the_Initiative_1_16 pdf accessed November 18 2016 To explore challenges presented by China's increased military forces see Peter Dombrowski America's Third Offset Strategy New Military Technologies and Implications for the Asia Pacific Policy Report Singapore S Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University June 2015 available from https www rsis edu sg wp-content uploads 2015 06 PR150608_Americas-Third-Offset-Strategy pdf accessed November 18 2016 146 Mathew J Burrrows Global Risks 2035 The Search for a New Normal Wash-ington DC Atlantic Council September 2016 available from http www atlanticcouncil org publications reports global-risks-2035 accessed October 6 2016 The report is organized into nine chapters that address changing demographics international governance and technology advancement Ch 1 Individual Empowerment with More Unintended Consequences Ch 2 Growing Demographic Crunch for Everybody Except Sub-Saharan Africa Ch 3 A Malthusian World of Scarcities Increasingly Likely for the Poorest Ch 4 Technology with Downsides Ch 5 Conflict Risk Increasing Ch 6 Middles East High Risk of Continuing Conflict Ch 7 China's linchpin in the Global Order 75 Ch 8 The Difficult Transition to a Post-Western Order and Ch 9 The Big Picture 147 Ibid p 40 Regarding a future contested space environment the report projects that The space powers will continue to develop quantitative and qualitative space-based missile attack early warning systems intelligence navigation communications and broadcasting and military command-and-control systems The likelihood of space incidents such as the collision of Russian and US satellites in 2009 might increase Such incidents also include the possibility that authoritarian and irresponsible regimes will attempt to disrupt the operation of space systems with unpredictable socioeconomic and military consequences The only way to prevent an arms race in space would be to improve the legal basis for activity in outer space particularly by expanding restrictions and bans on weapons deployment in orbit and development of land- air- and sea-based means of destroying objects in space 148 Ibid p ii 149 Ibid p 8 The original source of this information was cited as Atlantic Council Frederick S Pardee Center for International Futures and Zurich Risk Nexus Overcome by Cyber Risks Economic Benefits and Costs of Alternate Cyber Futures Washington DC Atlantic Council September 2015 available from http publications atlanticcouncil org cyberrisks risk-nexus-september2015-overcome-by-cyber-risks pdf accessed November 4 2016 The original reports consider this cost-benefit inflection to be an ongoing global phenomena A future where the annual costs of being connected outweigh the benefits is not only possible it is happening now According to our project models annual cybersecurity costs in high-income economies like the U S have already begun to outweigh the annual economic benefits arising from global connectivity 76 For all economies the inversion of costs and benefits is expected to occur within the next five years In Latin America it is expected before the year 2030 as the region bridges the digital divide In the Asia-Pacific region the inversion is expected sometime after that p 2 150 Burrrows p 29 151 Army Cyber Proponent The U S Army LandCyber White Paper 2018-2030 Fort George G Meade MD U S Army Cyber Command 2nd U S Army September 9 2013 p 9 available from http dtic mil dtic tr fulltext u2 a592724 pdf accessed November 6 2013 152 Ibid p viii The foundation of the LandCyber concept includes Eight Aspects of Convergence 1 Time and space 2 Threat and technology 3 Land and cyber domains 4 Cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum EMS 5 Defensive and offensive cyber operations 6 Information environment and cyberspace domain 7 Information management and knowledge management 8 Operational and institutional Nine Guiding Principles 1 Unified cyberspace operations CO 2 Integration 3 Localized cyberspace effects to the tactical edge 4 Enhanced understanding 5 All networks are operational warfighting platforms and functions 6 Combined arms approach 7 Achieve cyberspace domain superiority 8 Ensure mission command 9 Empowered LandCyber units and Soldiers 153 Ibid p 4-6 Per the white paper the following are the Army's roles and responsibilities in cyberspace as an operating force 1 Support prevent shape and win roles with cyberspace capabilities This requires supporting intelligence operations and conducting cyberspace operational preparation of the environment OPE sic to plan and prepare for military operations Building operating and defending all Army 77 networks as an end-to-end enterprise ensures its availability to the Army 2 Provide critical infrastructure protection for the Army and U S Northern Command national systems and provide Army-wide indications and warning against threats and attacks 3 Integrate cyberspace operations CO capabilities into joint and Army planning and exercises facilitate security cooperation to create defense in depth under the direction of COCOMs combatant command-command authority and subject to the limitations of National Foreign Disclosure Policy develop shared indications and warning and leverage combined cyberspace operations CO strengths Plan and integrate world-class cyber opposing forces WCCO in concert with USCYBERCOM and provide representative adversary command control and networked systems into training testing experiments and exercises This integration develops Army forces that can detect and respond to adversary cyber attacks and operate in a degraded cyberspace environment 4 Integrate cyberspace operations CO into combatant command CCMD planning and targeting processes to broaden the range of options Deliver offensive and defensive cyber effects if approved and directed planned and integrated through cyber electromagnetic activities CEMA Conduct information operations IO in or through the cyberspace domain for the Army and support inform and influence activities IIA in or through the cyberspace domain 154 Ibid pp 13-14 155 Ibid pp 17-22 156 The new version of FM 3-12 was released 5 months after the research for this monograph was concluded See Headquarters Department of the Army FM 3-12 157 Malcom Martin Cyber Support to Corps and Below - Concepts and Doctrine briefing at the TechNet Augusta 2016 conference sponsored by the Armed Forces Communications 78 and Electronics Association Fort Gordon GA U S Army Cyber Center of Excellence August 2 2016 158 Joint Staff Joint Force Development J7 p 4 159 The excerpts in Table 8 are verbatim from Joint Chiefs of Staff Capstone Concept for Joint Operations pp 8-12 160 Ibid p 14 The CCJO addresses the practical realities of force development The pursuit of advanced technology may prove unaffordable This concept envisions Joint Forces enabled by advanced technologies in global communications networked operations space cyberspace robotics platforms and lift Such technologies especially in time of restricted budgets may prove prohibitively expensive to develop and deploy 161 See R J Vince Cross-Domain Deterrence Seminar Summary Notes report LLNL-ABS-670206 Livermore CA Center for Global Security Research Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory May 1 2015 p 2 available from https cgsr llnl gov content assets docs SummaryNotes pdf accessed November 18 2016 This report defines cross-domain deterrence as The act of deterring an action in one domain with a threat in another domain where the domains are defined as land under the land at sea under the sea in the air in space and in cyberspace and may use economic sanctions and other diplomatic and political tools 162 See John L Rafferty Jr LandCyber Operations A Double Edged Sword or a Dream Team Strategy Research Project Carlisle Barracks PA U S Army War College March 2013 abstract this Strategy Research Project explores the questions Will LandCyber enable micro-managing leaders to be the 'wet blanket' of mission command Or will it open new doors for more effective maneuver and influence operations 163 Joint Chiefs of Staff JOE 2035 pp 17-20 26-27 Regarding potential adversary use of autonomous systems the JOE notes The development of small smart cheap autonomous longrange and highly-capable systems operating in the air land 79 sea and undersea environments may further complicate the homeland defense mission by providing relatively cheap strategic attack options to both state and non-state actors pp 26-27 164 See Jeffrey L Caton Autonomous Weapon Systems A Brief Survey of Development Operational Legal and Ethical Issues Carlisle PA Strategic Studies Institute U S Army War College December 2015 165 Joint Staff Joint Force Development J7 pp 46 52 For details of the space and cyberspace references to EMS see Tables 3 and 4 of this monograph 166 Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-12 R p IV-9 An example of a potentially confusing interaction between cyberspace space EMS and EA electronic attack Planners should maintain awareness of the EMS and its impact on mobile devices and wireless networks including cellular wireless local area network Global Positioning System and other commercial and military uses of the EMS CO and EA to include offensive space control must be deconflicted Uncoordinated EA may significantly impact OCO utilizing the EMS Depending upon power levels the terrain in which they are used and the nature of the system being targeted unintended effects of EA can also occur outside of a local commander's AOR just as second order effects of CO may occur outside the AOR 167 Sydney J Freedberg Jr DoD CIO Says Spectrum May Become Warfighting Domain Breaking Defense December 9 2015 available from https breakingdefense com 2015 12 dod-ciosays-spectrum-may-become-warfighting-domain accessed October 28 2016 The article includes the text of a statement by DoD Chief Information Officer CIO Terry Halvorsen The Department understands that EMS Superiority is a crucial enabler to achieving superiority in all other domains and must be considered a prerequisite to all successful operations In response to the pressing need to implement both the DoD EMS Strategy and JCEMSO Joint Concept for Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations the Department has taken steps that strive to establish policy and assign 80 responsibilities to achieve EMS Superiority through efficient and effective Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations EMSO which will enable the optimization of EMS access and use maneuver throughout the full range of military operations and defines EMSO as all spectrum dependent SD activities occurring within the EMS As part of this guidance the Department will investigate all requirements and ramifications of its enactment to include the potential recognition of the EMS as a domain As the EMS transcends all domains the Department must systematically evolve its capabilities to ensure effective EMS operations As the Primary Staff Assistant PSA to the Secretary of Defense for spectrum the Office of the DoD Chief Information Officer CIO will be the Departmental lead for these efforts in close cooperation and coordination with the all appropriate DoD Components Also see Martin C Libicki Cyberspace Is Not a Warfighting Domain I S A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society Vol 8 No 2 Fall 2012 pp 325-340 available from https www rand org pubs external_publications EP51077 html accessed October 28 2016 Libicki states that the argument for cyberspace as a domain should also apply to EMS p 366 168 DoD JOAC p 7 The JOAC inaccurately asserts that Advances in airpower and long-range weapons have mitigated the degrading effects of distance to some extent but have not eliminated them while cyber capabilities are unaffected by distance 169 For details on the concept of ultra-tactical operations see Jeffrey L Caton Complexity and Emergence in Ultra-Tactical Cyberspace Operations in Karlis Podins Jan Stinissen and Markus Maybaum eds Proceeding of 5th International Conference in Cyber Conflict Tallinn Estonia North Atlantic Treaty Organization Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence Publications June 2013 pp 299-312 170 DoD JOAC p 1 171 Joint Chiefs of Staff JOE 2035 p 43 With regard to cyber resiliency JOE 2035 includes 81 The future security environment will continue to feature a range of adversaries attempting to shape political behavior by conducting damaging or disruptive cyber-attacks The Joint Force must minimize the consequences of threatened or successful cyberattacks against the United States its allies and partners by conducting Military Support to Cyber Resiliency Furthermore the Joint Force should develop the capacity to work with a range of nontraditional partners such as private companies or cyber activists to offset adversary operations in cyberspace for example by identifying and interdicting adversary cyber operatives 82 ACRONYMS A2 AD anti-access area denial ADCON administrative control ADP Army Doctrine Publication AFCY Air Forces Cyber Command AOR area of responsibility ARCY Army Cyber Command ASAT anti-satellite weapons C2 command and control CBRN chemical biological radiological and nuclear CCDR combatant commander CCJO Capstone Concept for Joint Operations CCMD combatant command CCP Concept Capability Plan CDRUSSTRATCOM Commander U S Strategic Command CEMA cyber electromagnetic activities CF Conventional Forces CIKR critical infrastructure and key resources CIO chief information officer CO cyberspace operations COCOM combatant command-command authority C-OPE cyberspace operational preparation of the environment CSE cyberspace support element CyEM cyber enterprise management DAL defended asset list DCO defensive cyberspace operations or defensive CO DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DISA Defense Information Systems Agency DNC DISA network center 83 DoD Department of Defense DODIN DoD Information Network EA electronic attack EMP electromagnetic pulse EMS electromagnetic spectrum EMSO electromagnetic spectrum operations EW electronic warfare FLTCY Fleet Cyber Command FM Field Manual GAO Government Accountability Office GCC geographic combatant commander GIG global information grid GPS global positioning system GSO geostationary orbit HPRF high-powered radio frequency IADS integrated air defense systems IIA inform and influence activities IO information operations ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance ITU International Telecommunication Union JCC Joint Cyberspace Center JCEMSO Joint Concept for Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations JCEO Joint Concept for Entry Operations JFC joint force commander JFCC SPACE Joint Functional Component Commander for Space JFLCC joint force land component commander JNCC joint network operations control center JOAC Joint Operational Access Concept JOE Joint Operating Environment JOPP joint operation planning process 84 JP Joint Publication MAR4CY Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command MILDEC military deception MISO military information support operations NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NAVWAR navigation warfare NETOPS network operations NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency NOSC network operations and security center NSA National Security Agency OCO offensive CO OE operational environment OPCON operational control OPE operational preparation of the environment PED processing exploitation and dissemination PNT position-navigation-timing PSA primary staff assistant SAM surface-to-air missiles SATCOM satellite communications SCA space coordinating authority SD spectrum dependent SOF Special Operations Forces SSE space support element STO special technical operations TACON tactical control TNC theater network center TNCC theater network coordination center TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command UCP Unified Command Plan UN United Nations 85 USCYBERCOM U S Cyber Command USSPACECOM U S Space Command USSTRATCOM U S Strategic Command WCCO world-class cyber opposing forces WMD weapons of mass destruction 86 APPENDIX I SUMMARY OF SPACE- AND CYBERSPACE-RELATED EXCERPTS FROM JOINT PUBLICATION JP 3-31 JP 3-31 excerpts related to the space domain 2 Joint Land Operations f It is important to understand that in today's complex operational environment OE adversary actions can be delivered on from within and outside of the operational area all with potentially global impacts and influence To negate those threats commanders at all levels should consider how space cyberspace and EMS electromagnetic spectrum capabilities enhance the effectiveness and execution of joint land operations Furthermore joint staffs should seek out experts who and capabilities that can enhance the effectiveness of land operations 1 2 Roles and Responsibility u Performing the duties of the space coordinating authority SCA if designated The individual designated to be the JFLCC joint force land component commander may also be designated to be the SCA within a joint force to coordinate joint space operations and integrate space capabilities The SCA has primary responsibility for joint space operations planning to include ascertaining space requirements within the joint force The SCA gathers operational requirements that may be satisfied by space capabilities and facilitates the use of established processes by joint force staffs to plan and conduct space operations 2 8 Command and Control C2 f Space Capabilities for C2 1 Space systems may be employed to monitor land areas before friendly forces are established If the individual designated to be the JFLCC is also designated to be the SCA he will normally designate a senior space officer who facilitates coordination integration and staffing activities for space operations on a daily basis 2 Space systems provide ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance missile tracking launch detection environmental monitoring satellite communications SATCOM position navigation and timing and navigation warfare NAVWAR Considering the difficulties in communications in and around land areas space systems offers the JFLCC the ability to exchange information inside the operational area between elements of the joint force and also facilitates intertheater and intratheater communications Space systems may form a critical link in the C2 architecture that rapidly passes data and information This can enable taskings and warnings to forces as well as critical situational awareness and location information Space systems face simultaneous demands from many users and require prioritization 87 3 The space-based Global Positioning System GPS provides a critical capability during joint land operations GPS can provide position location and velocity for weapon accuracy ingress and egress location silent rendezvous coordination and improved personnel situational awareness The ability of space systems to provide real time terrain information that enhanced by imagery data can be used by all components of the joint force is especially crucial to the success of ground forces 3 11 Movement and Manuever c The JFLCC makes recommendations to the JFC joint force commander on the following 9 Space support to the land force 4 Figure A-4 Notional Joint Force Land Component Operations Staff Directorate 5 JP 3-31 excerpts related to the cyberspace domain 2 Joint Land Operations a In the 20th century joint and multinational operations have encompassed the full diversity of air land maritime and space forces operating throughout the operational area Advances in capabilities among all forces and the ability to communicate over great distances have made the application of military power in the 21st century more dependent on the ability of commanders to synchronize and integrate joint land operations with other components' operations Many of these advances have been realized through the use of cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum EMS which has enabled the US military and allies to communicate and reach across geographic and geopolitical boundaries However these advances have also led to increased vulnerabilities and a critical dependence on cyberspace and the EMS for the US and its allies 6 f see excerpt in space domain section above in this table 2 Roles and Responsibility p Integrating cyberspace operations CO into plans Offensive cyberspace operations OCO will typically be conducted in direct support of the JFC The JFLCC conducts defensive cyberspace operations DCO and DODIN DoD Information Network operations throughout all phases of the operation 7 Figure II-5 Joint Force Land Component Commander JFLCC Interface with Other Joint Force Command and Control C2 Mechanisms This figure includes the following information about CO 8 88 C2 Mechanism Role Function JFLCC Interface JFC's Joint Cyberspace Center JCC Combines input from United States Cyber Command and combatant commands CCMD to provide a regional functional cyberspace situation awareness common operational picture Facilitates the coordination and deconfliction of combatant commander CCDR directed cyberspace operations CO JFLCC's representative participates to provide request cyberspace operations CO products 11 Cross-Functional Staff Organizations c Operations 4 The IO information operations cell and cyberspace support element CSE works with the JFLCC and key components of the JFLCC's staff to determine the cyberspace component of the JFLCC's defended asset list DAL Once the DAL has been determined the IO cell and cyberspace support element CSE focuses available capabilities to safeguard DAL assets 9 14 Communications Support Systems The CCDR through the JFC and functional service components ensures effective reliable and secure communications system and cyberspace defense services are consistent with the overall joint campaign plan As driven by the mission the foundation of the communications system is laid by the C2 organization of forces assigned to the JFC 10 Figure III-1 Joint Force Land Component Commander JFLCC Joint Planning Group Representation 11 8 Command and Control C2 e Communications 2 Joint network operations NETOPS are the means by which communications are established and maintained throughout the DODIN Commander United States Strategic Command CDRUSSTRATCOM is the supported commander for global CO to secure operate and defend DODIN CDRUSSTRATCOM cyberspace efforts are coordinated by US Cyber Command who in turn coordinates with the GCC geographic combatant commander at the GCC's joint cyberspace center JCC As the JFLCC's single control agency for the management and operational direction of the joint communications network the joint network operations control center JNCC must be knowledgeable concerning the requirements of communications in the land environment especially in the specific operational area The JNCC should be aware of the capabilities present in the urban area their potential use and any problems associated with that use Vital to communications management is the need to support planning and execution to include information exchange requirements radio frequency spectrum allocation communications equipment dispersion and assessment of communications effectiveness 12 89 12 Protection h DODIN Operations and DCO DODIN operations are operations to design build configure secure operate maintain and sustain DOD Department of Defense networks to create and preserve information assurance on the DODIN and DCO are passive and active CO intended to preserve the ability to utilize friendly cyberspace capabilities and protect DOD data networks and capabilities and other designated systems 13 15 Cyberspace Operations CO CO are conducted across the range of military operations and CO capabilities should be considered during JOPP joint operation planning process integrated into plans and synchronized with other operations during execution Commanders conduct CO to retain freedom of maneuver in cyberspace accomplish objectives deny freedom of action to adversaries and enable other operational activities The importance of CO support in all military operations has grown as the joint force increasingly relies on cyberspace for C2 and other critical operations and logistics functions 14 Figure A-4 Notional Joint Force Land Component Operations Staff Directorate 15 8 Communications Systems Staff Section The J-6 staff coordinates voice video data and message connectivity cyberspace defense and DODIN operations supporting JFLCC operations and gives needed guidance to ensure synchronization between all components and or subordinate commands A notional J-6 staff organization is depicted in Figure A-7 The following actions are the responsibility of the J-6 aa Conducts information assurance and NETOPS as part of cyberspace defense support of JFLCC networks ee Develops a list of critical cyberspace assets so that they can be properly protected to support JFLCC operations 16 5 Command and Control C2 b Communications Systems annex K Communications and cyberspace defense procedures and priorities such as location of key nodes spectrum management communications-electronics operating instructions codes and interface with joint or multinational forces 17 ENDNOTES - APPENDIX I 1 Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication JP 3-31 Command and Control for Joint Land Operations Washington DC Joint Chiefs of Staff February 24 2014 p I-4 available from http www jcs mil Portals 36 Documents Doctrine pubs jp3_31 pdf 90 2 Ibid p II-3 3 Ibid pp IV-10-IV-11 4 Ibid pp IV-18-IV-19 5 Ibid p A-5 The figure includes a Space Operations section aligned under J-33 Current Operations 6 Ibid pp I-3-I-4 7 Ibid p II-3 8 Ibid p II-20 9 Ibid pp II-17-II-21 10 Ibid p II-25 11 Ibid p III-6 The figure includes a Cyberspace representative for the Cyberspace Cell included in the J-5 planning group It also includes an electromagnetic spectrum EMS representative for the EMS Cell as well as the J-39 information operations IO Officer for the IO Cell 12 Ibid pp IV-8-IV-10 13 Ibid pp IV-20-IV-23 14 Ibid p IV-28 15 The figure includes a Cyberspace Operations CO section that is aligned under J-33 Current Operations Ibid p A-5 16 Ibid pp A-9-A-11 17 Ibid pp C-6-C-7 91 APPENDIX II CYBERSPACE COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRUCT PER JOINT PUBLICATION 3-12 R 1 Cyberspace Command and Control Organizational Construct Global Steady-State USS7RATCOM USCYBERCOM Service Cyberspace Components ARCY AFCY FLTCY MAR4CY 2nd Army 24th 10th Air Fleet MAR4CY Force Combat Support Agencies CCDR and Headquarters Staff DIA NSA NGA etc CCMD Joint Cyberspace Center Components Cyberspace Support Element TNCC DISA DNC TNC Services NOSC Services Contingency Joint Task Force Representational of JCC's relationship with DISA's sub-element Legend ADCON administrative control AFCY Air Forces Cyber Command ARCY Army Cyber Command CCDR combatant commander CCMD combatant command COCOM combatant command command authority DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DISA Defense Information Systems Agency DNC DISA network center FLTCY Fleet Cyber Command JCC joint cyberspace center MAR4CY Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency NOSC TNCC NSA OPCON TACON TNC USCYBERCOM USSTRATCOM network operations and security center theater network coordination center National Security Agency operational control tactical control theater network center United States Cyberspace Command United States Strategic Command COCOM OPCON TACON ADCON supporting direct support ENDNOTES - APPENDIX II 1 Image modified from Figure IV-1 Cyberspace Command and Control Organization Construct in Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication JP 3-12 R Cyberspace Operations Washington DC 93 Joint Chiefs of Staff original release February 5 2013 updated unclassified October 21 2014 p IV-8 available from http www jcs mil Portals 36 Documents Doctrine pubs jp3_12R pdf accessed February 14 2018 94 APPENDIX III CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES CONSTRUCT PER FIELD MANUAL 3-381 ENDNOTES - APPENDIX III 1 Image from Figure 1-1 Cyber electromagnetic activities in Department of Army Field Manual FM 3-38 Cyber Electromagnetic Activities Washington DC Headquarters Department of Army February 2014 p 1-2 95 APPENDIX IV SUMMARY OF SPACE- AND CYBERSPACE-RELATED FORCE DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS FROM SELECTED JOINT CONCEPT DOCUMENTS Excerpts from Joint Operational Access Concept JOAC 1 Command and Control C2 JOA-004 The ability to integrate cross-domain operations to include at lower echelons with the full integration of space and cyberspace operations CO Intelligence JOA-006 The ability of operational forces to detect and respond to hostile computer network attack in an opposed access situation Fires JOA-011 The ability to conduct electronic attack EA and computer network attack against hostile antiaccess area-denial A2 AD capabilities Movement and Maneuver JOA-014 The ability to maneuver in cyberspace to gain entry into hostile digital networks Protection JOA-022 The ability to protect friendly space forces while disrupting enemy space operations JOA-023 The ability to conduct cyber defense in the context of opposed access Excerpts from Joint Concept for Entry Operations JCEO 2 Command and Control C2 Required Capability 3 The ability to command and control C2 forces in austere or degraded environments including communications intelligence cyberspace and space force enhancement degraded environments b Develop procedures for operating without some or all Space Force Enhancement capabilities combat support operations and force multiplying capabilities delivered from space or with degraded capabilities for extended periods Space Force Enhancement capabilities may include ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance launch detection missile tracking environmental monitoring satellite communications SATCOM and position-navigation-timing capabilities PNT 97 c The ability to maintain operational access to key portions of the electro-magnetic spectrum during entry operations d Develop procedures for rapidly identifying operating during and recovering from significant cyberspace attacks Effects of some attacks such as denial of service may be more obvious than others f The ability to provide operationally responsive space capabilities to augment or reconstitute existing space capabilities Required Capability 4 The ability to execute effective and complementary Special Operations Forces SOF and Conventional Forces CF integration where SOF or CF can be the supported force depending on the nature of the entry operation e Consider expanding the integration and synchronization of space cyberspace and electronic warfare EW capabilities that CF and SOF units can leverage across the spectrum of operations Intelligence Required Capability 7 The ability to provide Processing Exploitation and Dissemination PED intelligence capabilities in degraded or austere environments during entry operations a Space-enhancement based and reachback PED capabilities must be able to support or be augmented in order to sufficiently meet entry operations' intelligence requirements en route during initial entry and even under degraded or austere conditions b When space-based and reachback support is interdicted entry forces must be able to carry with themselves tailored PED capabilities sufficient to support intelligence requirements in such communications denied environments 98 c Ensure all data dissemination methods and voice communications required by PED activities are sufficiently interoperable between services and allocated with sufficient redundancies to ensure continuation of data dissemination in contested environments including loss of space-enhancement or reduced access to the electromagnetic spectrum EMS Fires Required Capability 10 The ability to continue to operate against A2 AD threats such as increasingly capable enemy subsurface and surface maritime threats surface-to-air missiles SAMs and integrated air defense systems IADS capabilities precision guided ballistic missiles anti-ship cruise missiles small boat swarms landmines and maritime mines complex obstacles WMD weapons of mass destruction and related CBRN chemical biological radiological and nuclear materials and enemy aerial systems c The ability to deny an enemy's access to space d The ability to create denial effects within an enemy's networks e T he ability to fully integrate offensive reactive and defensive cyberspace capabilities to protect and project force in support of entry operations f Ensure the joint force has the mechanism to employ appropriately delegated authority to use all non-kinetic fires assets to include cyberspace capabilities ENDNOTES - APPENDIX IV 1 DoD Joint Operational Access Concept JOAC Version 1 0 Washington DC U S Department of Defense January 17 2012 pp 33-35 available from https www defense gov Portals 1 Documents pubs JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed pdf accessed November 3 2016 2 Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Concept for Entry Operations Washington DC Joint Chiefs of Staff April 7 2014 pp 23-33 available from http www jcs mil Portals 36 Documents Doctrine concepts jceo pdf ver 2017-12-28-162000-837 accessed February 13 2018 99 U S ARMY WAR COLLEGE Major General John S Kem Commandant STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE AND U S ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS Director Professor Douglas C Lovelace Jr Director of Research Dr Steven K Metz Author Mr Jeffrey L Caton Editor for Production Dr James G Pierce Publications Assistant Ms Denise J Kersting Composition Mrs Jennifer E Nevil U S AHMY TIIF Ier-Tnn STATES A MY FOR THIS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS VISIT US AT I SBN 1-58487-779-0 9 781584 877790 armywarcollege edu E Wehsile - - SSI Wehsile Egg- 1 l- Ef e-J This Puhlicaliun This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu