SECRET Authority 7 2 DEPARTMENT OF Chairman Policy Planning Council Washington DECLASSIFIED April 5 1967 TO The Secretary THROUGH FROM SIP - Henry Owenv SUBJECT New Proposals 53 8ecuring Non-Nuclear Countries _Adherence to a Non-Proliferation Treaty ACTION MEMORANDUM 1 Purpose The attached memorandum suggests actions not now in train which we might take in order to enhance our chances of getting an NPT in such_a way as to promote our long-run objectives including non-proliferation in India Japan Germany and Italy 2 Clearance These prOposals cut across the reaponsi- bilities not only of ACDA but of several areas of the Department I have discussed them with Ambassador Kohler's office and others but have notsought clearance - in line with your urging that we give you new ideas in their unvarnished state Recommendation That you assign reaponsibility for reviewing these proposals in light of ACDA and Bureau comments and for co-ordinating State's role in any_ needed follow-up action to one of your 7th floor colleagues 7 1 Approve Assignment to at Disapprove I in I I The Under Secretary Mr Rostow Hr Bowie - Mr Kohler U 03 ll SECRET I I DECLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM - Additional Action that Might Be Taken to Meet Concerns of NPT Signatories 1 Introduct%on This memorandum deals with actions not now in train which might help to meet key concerns of nuclear-capable countries and thus to persuade them to sign an NPT It treats actions to meet three major categories of these countries' concerns _ 1 concerns over civil uses of nuclear technology concerns over security 0 concerns over second class'Status I Concerns Over Civil Uses 2 Technology The fear of losing technological ground through not having access to civil data secured through military nuclear research exists in Germany Italy and to a lesser extent Japan - Progosal To meet this concern the US and UK should offer to join others in creating an international corporation which would make available to all its members peaceful technology deve10ped through military nuclear programs of any member 2 undertake to supply all peaceful knowledge acquired through their national nuclear programs to EURATOM thus giving new life to that ailing organization and ii providing it with compensation for the pain which it is being 'caused on other fronts by the NPT EURATOM already acts 4 5 1 It does not therefore deal with such issues as safe-JqE guards and an international agency to perform peaceful explosions which are already under active consideration Hyi f 2 In the US AEC makes this technology available only tot i American industry - which might well howl at losing this exclusive privilege - SECRET m hme- r f r- Authority 7 2 SECRET 2 - as a clearing house for information among its members and thus should be able easily to handle an extension of this function 3 Fuel The FRG has Sought and other nuclear capable countries will probably seek assurances of a continued supply of fissionable material v - -- ProEosal The US should make another public multi-year pledge of nuclear fuel to IAEA and offer a further increase in that pledge if the Soviets will match it Even though the IAEA does not now face a fuel shortage this new and large offer would help to reassure non nuclear countries for the future - The US should offer to join an IAEA study of the possibility of building an internationally owned nuclear fuel facility in the US to meet other countries' future needs for nuclear fuel if these are judged likely to exceed presently projected production Other countries may not take up this offer preferring to build national or EURATOM production facilities on their own territory but the mere fact of the offer might earn us some points II Security Concerns Guarantees Guarantees are a Special problem for non- aligned India Japan Germany and Italy are covered by existing treaties India is now seeking Soviet assurances Regardless of how this comes out there will remain the problem of what if anything the US should do to make its own October 1964 assurances more persuasive - Fraposalz We should offer to hold private US-Indian discussions of possible contingencies involving ChiCom nuclear blackmail as recommended in the interagency paper which NBA and submitted to the Secretary in December 1966 on The Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem and endorsed ' SECRET r n 0 We sow 1 DECLASSIFIED Authority Mm SECRET r 3 recently by Embassy Delhi This would not be a guarantee but it would meet some Indian concerns To take this action we would need either to overcome JCS reservations or to get SecDef who did not take a position on the paper 5 to override these reservations 5 Nuclear Role The Japanese do not have the equi- 'valent of the NATO Special Nuclear Committee They are not ready politically for such an ambitious measure some Japanese officials may however see this as the next step after presently envisaged security consultations get underway Proposal We should inform the Japanese that we would be ready to join them in creating a bilateral US-Japanese nuclear consultation mechanism whenever they might wish Second Class Status 6 Problem The most basic of the nuclear-capable coun tries' concerns is their fear of being frozen indefinitely into second class status This concern has been reflected 5' in suggestions or comments by the non-nuclear countries I regarding the duration of the treaty I the nuclear powers' commitment to disarmament the Special status of the UK 1 Each of these is treated below - - - 7 Duration - The Italians Germans and some Japanese officials have suggested that the NPT have a fixed duration Japanese 1 planners report this to be the Indian View Senator Gore has proposed a non-proliferation agreement with a definite'o y time span -- say ten years -- subject at the andhof this period to renegotiation or renewal SECRET dependent upon the nuclear countries taking some action to redress 'duration to progress on-disarmament will probably grow - result from a treaty with a fixed duration and the strains 9' ww- $6 ECLASSIFIED t0 345SECRET President Chatenet of EURATOM has suggested that the same object be achieved by the non nuclear powers making clear how they proposed to interpret the treaty The non-nuclear say that they were making a contribution to non-dissemination through accepting the treaty but that this was a concession limited in time and the balance The FRG has preposed that the withdrawal clause be changed to provide that any non-nuclear country may withdraw ifuits sovereign rights and interests are violated or threate gd by a nuclear weapon state - Pressure for thus liberalizing the withdrawal clause or limiting the duration of the treaty or linking that' The ACDA March 17 memo points out that a major confrontation between the nuclear and non nuclear pOWerS over this issue is apt to emerge in the sharpest terms during the course of further negotiations Proposal If future negotiations indicate that an NPT cannot be secured without some major action to meet the non- nuclear countries' concerns r _permanent second class status we should suggest that a loose withdrawal clause would present fewer difficulties than the proposals outlined under and above 'r Such a withdrawal clause might be modeled after the outer space treaty which permits a country to withdraw with one year's notice without giving cause - a This would avoid both the deadline problem which would- that would be caused if the non-nuclear and nuclear countrid _ were to interpret treaty language in different ways i Nor is it clear that the effective life of an NPT y'f would be shortened by our acquiescing in such a withdrawal 1 SECRET mmnurse Lt Ago DECLASSIFIED Author wa I SECRET - 5 clause No NPT can be counted on to restrain the key nuclear- capable powers over the longer term unless it is followed by disarmament or other changes which mitigate their sense of discrimination Indeed by implicitly recognizing this fact a 1005a withdrawal clause might actually put some heat on the USSR to get on with disarmament 8 Disarmament The nuclear-capable countries would in any event find it easier to sign an NPT if there were Isome evidence of the nuclear countries' intent to move seriously toward disarmament l Proposal In addition to strengthening the NPT preambular language on disarmament the President should indicate as NPT negotiations move forward that he intends to ask ACDA's General Advisory Panel to undertake a searching review of-past US disarmament positions to see whether new US proposals can be deve10ped in light of continuing technological advances A small Executive Committee of that Panel made up of members-who could devote substantial time to the enterprise might be asked to tackle this job as a matter of urgency It's been some time since we reviewed our disarmament position except for issues involved in the current ABM talks a new hard look at our past positions in light of changing technology might be rewarding - If ABM missile talks with the Soviets prove useful this review could surface proposals to throw into that hopper If the talks don't get anywhere such a publicized US review could pave the way for eventual wider negotiationSJ' Quite aside from the effect of such a Presidential announcement on nuclear-capable countries'uattitudes toward the NPT public Opinion in the US and elsewhre would welcome this evidence of US desire to move on from budding US-Soviet agreement on NPT to wider disarmament qp 4 II In the long run of course this progress will I have to include China if India and Japan are to be - impressed rrlr I Fri Q5 Marian a m m sates - 5 - 9 UK Status The non-nuclear countries' concern over second class status is accentuated by Japanese and Contin ental resentment of the UK's special status as a nuclear power These medium-sized powers find it even harder to accept discrimination from one of their own ilk than at the hands of the super-powers -Pro osal we should encourage Prime Minister Wilson to indicate in line with his pre-election position that he does not favor indefinite maintenance of the UK's separate national nuclear program and hopes that progress toward either disarmament or a politically unified EurOpe will eventuall' make it possible to phase out that program This position which would as the London Economist points out also brighten HMG's image on the Common Market front would be the more credible if the UK desisted from going on to the next round in the arms race Poseidon's and MIRV's We should bear this in mind in fixing the US position if we are asked to sell these advanced weapons to the UK IV Conclusion 10 Presidential Speech The Japanese Indian German and Italian concerns 3 NPT discussed in this memo are shared by public Opinion as well as governments in these countries Actions to meet these concerns will need therefore to be understood by public opinion as well as governments if they are to yield the desired result A Presidential speech 3 might be useful to this end if it had enough new substance so that it did not appear to be simply arm-twisting ProEosal If some of the suggestions outlined above prosper - notably those for a special US disarmament study new arrangements for sharing of nuclear technology and assurances regarding future supply of nuclear fuel they should be' surfaced in a major Presidential address on non-proliferation and disarmament I wgu r an 9-3 5 17 l T thJn This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu