CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE 0N BISARMAMEHT 8 February 1963 ENGLISH FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND SINK-THIRD MEETING held at the Palais des Nations Geneva on Thurs ay 8 February 1968 at 10 30 am M Mr A 2m Ethiopia GE DECLASSIFIED Aumoritym mt Elmo PU 363 2 PRESENT AT THE TABLE Mr J A de ARAUJO CASTRO Mr LA de EDUZA SILVA Mr E PDREIRA HOSANNAH Mr A d3 COSTA GUIHARAES M Mr K CHRISTOV Mr B Burma am Mr E L M BURNS _Mr LG am Mr J VAJNAR Mr K STRASIK Eugpia 'Mr A Mr B mar-mu lag Mr N KRISHNAN Mr 1m JAIN Mr R CARACCIOID Mr G P mzzou Mr E FRANCO Mr F SIDED Mr A GOMEZ ROBLEDO Mr A CARRANGO AVILA Mr 3 0 TONHE DECLASSIFIED Authority MAID 363 Sweden Lnion of Soviet Socialist Eula-alga gited Arab Republic Egg-Jed Kingdom LLnited Stateq of merica 523012 Representative of the Secretary-General eruty Special Representative of the Secretary-Gener a1 3 DECLASSIFIED Authority M lp 73' 072 Mr M BLUSZTAJN Mr E STANIEWSKI Mr S DABROWA Mr N ECOBESOO Mr O IONESCO Mr C GEORGESCO Mr A COROIANU Mrs A MXRDAL Mr A EDELSTAM Mr R BOMAN Mr J PRAWITZ Mr 0 A GRINEVSKY Mr V V SHUSTOV Mr V B TOULINOV Mr H KHALLAF Mr O SIRRY Mr M SHAKER Mr I F PORTER Mr R I T CROMARTIE Mr S Mr L D WEILER Mr C G BREAM Mr A F NEIDLE Mr D PROTITCH Mr W EPSTEIN sum H 363 4 1- The CHAIRMAN EthiOpia I declare open the 363rd plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament 2 Hrs HERBAL Sweden The Swedish delegation wishes to associate itself with the previous speakers in this Committee who have all hailed the presentation by the ce-Chairmen of identical revised texts of a complete draft non proliferation treaty l93 Hcv l with expressions of relief and satisfaction We are also deeply conscious of the fact that this agreement between the co Chairman has been arrived at only after long and difficult negotiations and that it rests on a delicate balance between different parts of the draft treaty text Under these circumstances it must be considered imperative that preposals for formal changes in it which other delegations may feel compelled to put forward be few and well ce ordinated with the rest of the treaty text 3 Another important consideration influencing the character of our statements in this Committee is the knowledge that we are still at a stage where we are negotiathg on the best possible formulation of a treaty draft The final position of our Governments with regard to the treaty as such belongs to a later stage That was clearly indicated by the representative of the United States when he presented the revised draft treaty Mr Fisher said As was the situation in the case of the initial draft treaty presented in August the revised treaty draft is a recommendation for discussion and negotiation in this Committee and for the consideration of all governments gape Pv 357 para 43 Mr Fisher went on to say we could not of course expect governments to be committed to this draft at this point since we shall all want to discuss this draft in the session of this Committee which lies ahead ibid para 4 Guided by these considerations ms delegation has during the past few weeks been studying with the utmost care the revised treaty draft He recognize that the co Chairmen have Come a con iderable by taking into account some of the well argucd and well justified suggestions for changes amendments to their earlier texts presented during the Committee's last session by several of the delegations around this table On other points the co-Chairmcn have apparently on their own found reasons to suggest changes Finally they have presented to us for the Authorilyw Lar'np 37 DECLASSIFIED Authority M10 78 072 363 5 Mrs MWrdal gSweden firSt time a Proposal for the wording of a draft article dealing with the control arrangements 5- In Several respects we are therefore faced with a much better basis for our deliberations now than last autumn Mindful as we are of the need for self-discipline 03 the Part Of delegations and of the waste of time entailed in suggesting changes which we understand are doomed to be unacceptable the Swedish delegation still finds that the revised text could greatly benefit from some further improvements on a few Chosen points On other points we must ask the authors of the draft for some clarifications hoping that the answers will alleviate some if not all of our preoccupations 6 In order not to tax the patience of the Committee with too long a speech I intend in my presentation today to deal only with those amendments which refer to general problems of the treaty structure I also wish to raise some questions relating to article on the controls Next week I wish to deal with some remaining points clustered around the very important desideratum of a systematic coherence both substantially and constitutionally between that partial nuclear disarmament measure which is now being discussed the non-proliferation treaty and those which are to be covered by ensuing treaties or are already covered by existing ones -- above all the Moscow Treaty on a partial test ban 7 None of the few formalized suggestions for changes in the text presented today in document or the few others to follow do I think interfere with any of the basic regulations contained in the present draft On one or two points they rather emphasize the main principles All together they should strengthen the treaty text both in its acceptability and in its durabi1ity 8 The one preoccupation overshadowing in importance all other ones as so many sneakers both here and in the United Nations have reiterated is of course the one which can most simply be embodied in the question Where do we go from here How certain can we be that effective measures to stop the nuclear arms race now escalating in a fearful spiral will really be undertaken at an early date How can we the non nuclear-weapon States v be expected to enter into an interminable oblfration to remain non nuclerr if the nuclear-weapon States are engaged in an interm nable nuclear escalation This question is really not one as has sometimes bucn said rather reproachfully of seeking any quid pro quo It is a question of the whol atmosphere of perspective and it cannot be concealed that the atmosphere of confidbncu was greater two years ago than it is today 363 6 Mrs Myrdal weden 9 It should be fully understood that the purpose of the Swedish initiative is not to stall our work in this Committee not to counteract the endeavours to reach a ban on the spread of nuclear weapons which we find desirable or as but on the one hand as I have said to assist in improving the present treaty text as much as possible and on the other hand to work relentlessly for those further agreements which would ensure nuclear disarmament l0 The present text does represent an improvement on the earlier one Other representatives have already before me expressed their satisfaction with the inclusion in the new draft treaty text of an article number VI dealing specifically with the need to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures regarding cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control If however we compare that wording with the preposals made on this very matter last year by Mex co arse 196 Romania sane 199 and Brazil with the support 'cf other delegations both non aligned and others we must recognize that the obligations incumbent on the nuclearnweapon States are considerably weaker in the present draft From the Mexican preposal article IVAC has been deleted the notion that the negotiations shall be pursued with all speed and perseverance and further the clear undertaking to arrive at further agreements Finally the reference in the Mexican proposal to the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests has been emitted a similar weakening oi the text can easily be noted if one compares the present wording with the proposals made by Romania and Brazil 11 Despite the fact that what corresponds to my Government's position would indicate the need for a much stronger commitment nn the part of the nuclear weapon Powers that they should proceed without further delay to steps of effective nuclear disarmament 1 am mindful of the difficulties involved As has been stated it would hardly be feasible in legal terms to enter into obligations to arrive at agreements Further to enumerate some specific measures might be counterproductive as agreements on certain other scores may come to present opportunities for earlier implementation i2 For those reasons the Swedish delegation today will restrict to two its suggested amendments to article VI both being of such a nature that they are not expected to create any difficulties in regard to the substance we simply propose the in-Jusien of the words at an early data thus introducing once more the sense of j I 1 w fhivl DEC LASSIF IED Authority 77 072 I Mrs Mdal Sweden urgency which we all feel presses for further measures to halt the nuclear arms race we also propose for the sake of making clear the main goal of these negotiations the insertion of the word nuclear before the word disarmamentable to keep the amendment of article VI to such very modest dimensions it practically presupposes some strengthening of the preamble In the present wording of the preamble there are three paragraphs -- the last ones which deal with further disarmament measures Even if it can be surmised that the comprehensive test ban is one of the measures implicit in the reference to the cessation of the nuclear arms race we urge that this important measure of disarmament be Spelt out specifibally somewhere in the treaty This is all the more justified as we can rest this particular case on a previouslyaaccepted commitment As I said in my intervention on the non proliferation issue on 3 October last year the preamble would give a much greater emphasis to the need for an uninterrupted sequence in the disarmament negotiations and to their urgency if a new paragraph were introduced in connexion with the declaration of intent on cessation of the nuclear arms race para 25 It is sufficient to remind the parties of the pledge made in the preamble to the partial test-ban Treaty that is to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to that end An amendment to that effect will be found in document 14 I now turn to article that article to be an improvement on the earlier text even if it must be recognized that amendments to the treaty when it is once finalized and brought into effect A certain easing of a very tight situation We have found the new version of paragraph 2 of will indeed be very difficult to obtain could be achieved by offering an Opportunity to review the situation not only once after five years but periodically in order that the parties may be able to assure that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized themselve to paragraph 3 of article dealing with review it will be noted 15 With regar from our document that we suggest a simple addition to the present text to the effect that a majority of the parties to the treaty may decide that further such conferences shall be convened at intervals of five years 3 Mrs Myrdal Sweden 16 In this connexion I wish to support very strongly the amendment to this paragraph put forward once again by the United Kingdom delegation on 23 January The representative of the United Kingdom Mr Halley then upheld the view he had earlier expressed in a formal amendment to the effect that not only the purposes and provisions of the treaty but also the purposes of the preamble should be reviewed after five years para 26 17 An open question remains namely what action is supposed to follow if the verdict of a review turns out to be unsatisfactory It would seem reasonable that if it is manifest at a review conference that the intentions of the treaty to achieve cessation of the nuclear arms race and to obtain nuclear disarmament have in reality been blatant1y disrcgarded parties to the treaty may come to regard this as an extraordinary event jeopardizing their own supreme interests as mentioned in paragraph 1 of article X 18 With those last few words I have already turned the corner from Specific amendments to a set of questions on which I am certain most delegations are eager to obtain clarification The majority of my queries and the most technical of them refer to article on that crucial matter of controls My delegation has certainly noted with satisfaction that the co Chairmen have finally been able to on a common proposal in this central sector He especially appreciate that Ere has been given the over-all responsibility the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA for all treaty verification while at the same time provisions are foreseen that would enable the utilization of the experience an international safeguard machinery We trust that this compromise will be made water tight and tenable That would give all safeguard activities the necessary credibility and would also remove from the safeguard field a large element of the commercial discrimination which exists today 19 with our sense of satisfaction however is mingled a sincere disappointment that some important aspects of the control article proposed by my delegation in August 1967 have not been accepted by the co Chairmcn Two basic principles embodied in our proposal have not been retained They the organizational arrangements of other of great importance which were both concern the question of mutual obligations on the part of both nuclear_wuapon and non-nuclear-wuapon States I will deal with both of them briefly in order to demonstrate what the non nuc1-ar woapon States have lost in the process of agreement between the two leading nuclear-weapon status Authority 313 0 72 Lamp 32 3 I DECLASSIFIEDU DECLASSIFIED DC guess l-trs hmdal Sweden 20 Th0 propagal did not eat usintcined that as long as nuclear azilsh a full Sharing of obligationa- 6 ac forbidden only the non-nuclear- vities for P111130SOB are n t B pon States could be obliged under our formula as all as er the of the co Chaim ir nuclear energy activities That i an to accept IAEA safeguards on all a sheer logic- According to our text the nuclearb unapon a as were however to undertak ti to co-operate in facilitating the gradual applica on IAEA Safeguards also to th air own peaceful nuclear energy activities- In a form such 1 a a of the draft a 5588 is now to be found in the fifth preambular ar 032 in 3 text where it is said that the parties undertake to - c1 co ating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguar on peaceful nuclear activities we should of course have much preferred to have this undertaking included in the control article itself and with a specific reference to the nuclear-weapon states 21- W9 have duly registered as two major steps forward the unilateral undertakings made last December by the GOVernments of the United States and the United Kingdom 207 which in fact will vastly increase the amount of nuclear activities under safeguards and undoubtedly facilitate considerably international trade in the nuclear field The question remains how complete will be the coverage of this pledge voluntarily to place nuclear activities under international safeguards in the countries mentioned and in other nuclear-weapon States A similar pledge on the part of the Government of the third nuclear-weapon country present in this Committee the Soviet Union would naturally be of immense value as a proof of the sincere willingness 'of all States to apply international safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities 'and to wipe out this quite unnecessary lack of equal treatment in regard to controls 22 The Swedish proposal further contained a rule according to which no transfers of source or special fissionable material to any other State could take place unless Such a clause would have a definite the material were subject to IAEA safeguards sarmament effect as imports into nuclear weapon States of fissionable material weapon purposes would be forbidden 23- That ambition to increase the non discriminatory element in the treatment behmmn the two categories of States has not been shared by tho co Chairmcn dTaft article contains no conditions on the export to the nuclear-weapon States fiissienabl' material and so an far thcir military or Poacerl nuclear 5 4 Their Intgramme we maintain that that 15's serious limitation in the scepe of the treaty s 363 10 Mrs Mug Sweden in fact it is '3 1 0P-hole by which non nuclear weapon States may without even knowing it themselves be 3-1de a military nuclear programs We might even pose the question whether the treaty language of paragraph 1 of article which requires Controls to follow all nuclear activities of non nuclear weapon States does not 311 an interpretation at least as far as intentions are concerned that to such activities belong also exports that is that material once controlled should never be diverted' from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons in one's own or another country 21 In real life the situation is somewhat more hopeful because the supply policy of several States including Sweden already serves to some extent to close the loop-hole it might be extended to do so completely by a policy requesting exclusively peaceful use and control as a condition for supply to nuclear-weapon States also There are strong reasons for the suppliers to continue such a policy It can easily be done by resorting to provisions for what is called a continuation of safeguards in accordance with paragraph 16 of the 1mm safeguards systan of 1965 and by including such provisions in the agreements which are to be concluded between IAEA and the non nuclear weapon States signatories to the treaty 25 We very much regret that it turned out to be impossible to include in the draft article a'fomalisation of such supply policies already established by several States However lacking such a provision we think it will be of fundamental importance for States which recognize the necessity of continuing those policies in the interest of discussant to keep in informal contact with each other in order to standardize their policies and to remove any possible fear that safeguards will be commercially negotiable because if that could happen the whole scheme would quickly degenerate The draft article before us in combination with the unilateral undertamngs by nuclear weapon States and with an informal code of ethics observed by an supplier nations -- which are preemnably unwilling to be connected with a nuclear weapon production programe through 811 Generation of SpeCial fissionable material originating from than -- would but only under those conditions come rather close to what we intended to achieve by our previously-proposed wording of the control article 26 Let me raise a final query in regard to article The time-table suggested in paragraph 4 seen together with the rules for the entering into force of the treaty DECLASSIFIED waves- DECLASSIFIED Authoriumn l ' 363 1 1 W contained in Paragraph 3 of article IX causes rather serious anxiGtY- It 1' obvious that a considerable time will pass before the safeguards became universally applicable Is there not a definite risk in the fact that during an interval hiCh may extend to several years some countries may be 81113390t to control and others not All the present apprehensions both political and commercial in nature will persist for that period 27 Furthermore there seems to be a hiatus between paragraphs 2 and 4 in article In I According to paragraph 2 no source or special fissionable material or Special ' dui mcnt may be provided to non-nuclear-wcapon States unless the IAEA B feguarda are applied Thus for part or for the whole of the interim period when these new agreements are being negotiated a general standstill in the transfers of Such material must be feared A clarification on that point by the co-Chairmen be most welcome 28 The discrepancy in the timing between the entering into force of the treaty as such and the entering into force of control arrangements may entail a further risk We must all realize how attentively some States will and must follow what control rules are going to be applied to certain other States Is there not a risk that that may cause a retardation of the decisive act of ratification too many States watching the actions of others At least we should from this very moment encourage States to enter immediately into the preliminary negotiations with' Esra so that the finallyaensuing patterns of control can be clearly discernible as early as possible 29 I have a final question referring to article II where we as probably many other delegations are quite concerned about how its regulations will work out in practice According to the present wording the treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear-weapon States signatories to the treaty and by forty other States likewise signatories to the treaty This formula does not however I take into account the special importance which some prospective parties to the treaty may attach to the more or less simultaneous adherence by another State or Regional preoccupations may come to play an important role several other States ell as fears of uneven commercial competition in this process of decisionemaking as if some States adhere and some not some under an inspection agreement already settled and some with that issue still open 12 Mrs al Sweden 30 The problem was touched upon by the Swiss Government in its thoughtful aide- m moire to this Committee of 24 November 1967 There it was said Switzerland could only be a party to the treaty if most of the Powers likely to possess nuclear weapons acceded to it So long as that condition is not fulfilled the treaty will contain a gap endangering the security of the small States on which it would be binding Moreover the non accession of important industrial Powers might be economically prejudicial to the competitive capacity of the atomic industry of the signatory States The question that naturally poses itself is whether this problem could be taken care of by allowing a State to make a reservation in its instrument of ratification to the effect that the treaty shall not enter into force or remain in force for its part until and unless it enters into force and remains in force for another State or States which will then have to be specified in the same document The possibility of reservation would undoubtedly increase the speed of the ratification process in a number of countries of special importance as parties to the treaty Speaking for my own country I am sure my Government will look very carefully at the attitude of our more important neighbour countries as well as that of other industrial States weighing this as one of the elements when deciding on its position in regard to the treaty as such 31 In summing up I have no hesitation in expressing on behalf of the Swedish delegation our appreciation of the great Powers' having achieved a remarkable result in agreeing on a complete treaty text for barring the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries Still this is certainly only one and a woefully short step forward on the road to disarmament History and we who presently live in this epoch of history cannot fail to note that simultaneously giant steps towards rearmament are being taken Many upward turns of the nuclear armament Spiral are occurring this very year When and how shall we be able to place in true perspective the real impact on the one hand of the proposed non-proliferation treaty and on the other hand of the terrifying reality of nuclear escalation symbolized by the modern shibboleths of am FOBS MIRV and probably still further horrors which we can as yet not even name DECLASSIFIED Authority aub 01 Law zamh h a- - This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu