DECLASSIFIED 1 Authority 19 I '71 OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State 5 E'El f m m 5 CONFIDENTIAL 5 Classification 3 WW ACTION USMission GENEVA PRIORITY 2 a i INFO USMission NATO PRIORITY I USUN NEW YORK Amembassy MOSCOW Amembassy LONDON Amembassy TOKYO Amembassy ROME Amembassy OTTAWA Amembassy Amembassy VIENNA J i k J STATE SUBJECT Wrap Up on NPT Amendments On assumption Soviets will accept amendments we have suggested to them you should inform Soviet Co-Chairman that US wishes to present final NPT text to ENDC on February 29 to enable conference a to proceed with consideration of its report to UNGA We assume 91 NA Soviets may insist on following previous practice of presenting separate but identical drafts However we believe that now would be an appropriate time to make joint drafts a single one Nevertheless we will continue to defer to Soviet wishes on this SEQ point which we do not consider of substantive importance to US 1 51 or Dated In 1 lul Eat bloat-plug lunamiu on Ind 4 teenzaow 2762 The Secretary eib-Mr 315co th a ACDA-Mr A1exander A5493 xx i CONFIDENTIAL _s s - Classification FORM Ms 05-322 DEC LASSIFIED Authority 13 i GENEVA CONFIDENTIAL Classification You should say that we have carefully weighed various suggestions of our allies as well as of non-aligned delegations at ENDC regarding Jan 18 texts We have concluded that NPT would be most broadly acceptable if it included periodic review clause pursuant to language Specified in STATE 11605 We believe that this provision should include phrase purposes of the preamble as suggested by UK and Italian Delega- tions This addition is important to answer critics of previous NPT drafts that they did not reflect sufficient balance of obligations You should reiterate importance of Soviet agreement to incorporate Feb 8 Swedish proposals on CTB preambular reference with minor change and on Article VI You should say that we do not rule out minor language changes in course of GA discussion of NPT However we believe that in drafting treaty broad spectrum of views of international community has effectively been taken into account and that treaty will prove to reflect consensus of that community We envisage no further substantive changes in text We suppose that Soviets will still wish to keep depositary states blank filling this in shortly prior to signature You can agree to this or alternatively agree to fill in US UK and USSR at this stage You should press Soviet Co Chairman again on achieving as much mm CONFIDENTIAL 9 53 Cla ssificaffon CONTIN UATION SHEET DECLASSIFIED AuthoriV-YMM Page 3 of telegram to__ GENEVA CONFIDENTIAL Classification r_identity of language as possible in declarations on security assurances 1 and on reaching agreement on language for resolution contained in your prior instructions We recognize that most of discussion of security assurances necessarily will have to take place in New York in context of re3umed You should say that we do not consider it essential that security assurances package be presented to ENDC on Feb 29 But in our judgment presenting this package together with completed NPT text would serve our joint interests since ENDC has been led to expect that Co-Chairmen agreement on security assurances would be forthcoming If Roshchin does not have authority to agree on security assurances package you should ask his agreement to state in ENDC on Feb 29 that Co Chairmen will present their agreed solution to this problem before or during resumed UNGA session We believe there is merit to informal suggestion by Soviet Deloff Geneva 2676 of using exact language of declarations in describing them at least on key points when resolution presented to ENDC However declarations should not be quoted in entirety since they are not negotiable with non-nuclear states and we would not wish to make public our declaration in final form until it is formally issued CONFIDENTIAL Ciassx'ffcaticl osazzA 5 63 CONTINUATION SHEET US NATO You should inform NAC on Feb 28 of above You should FOR s-aa DECLASSIFIED AuthoritY NP im 4 1 4 of telegram to GENEVA CONFIDENTIAL Classification tell NAG that you will circulate final version of security assurances resolution and declarations after a Soviet agreement is obtained and that declarations should be held in confidence At your discretion and after coordination with your UK colleague NAG might be informed of UK participation in tripartite talks on security assurances in Geneva You should say that security assurances package is best result we were able to achieve with Soviets in meeting desire of some to include provision dealing with nuclear blackmail We were unable to include preambular or operative provision in NPT text because of Soviet commitment to Kosygin formula which would exclude many of our allies from benefit of non-use provision You should say that while we recognize that allied governments may not be ready to commit themselves publicly to completed NPT draft we hope that as many of them as possible will support it in public prior to resumed UNGA session You should note that draft represents and result of fruitful allied consultations and is best that we were able to achieve in Co-Chairmen negotiations FOR TOKYO You should make similar approach to FonOff as made to NAC You should stress to Japanese that periodic review provision which was originally Japanese suggestion and in which Japanese have continued to CONFIDENTIAL Classification CONTINUATION Authority 3 'bage 5 DsazzA 3-63 CONTINUATION SHEET of telegram to GENEVA Classification agreement to present to ENDC END Classifimrion show particular interest included in package we seeking Soviet RUSK This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu