amm2iLhi 7 44M I COPY LBJ LIBRARY MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON April 4 1968 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD Subject 584th NSC Meeting 1 00 pm Wednesday March 27 1968 The President stated that he had asked General Abrams to join the meeting so that he and General Wheeler could report on the situation in Vietnam before the Council turned to the problem of the Non-Proliferation Treaty He asked General Wheeler to summarize his report on his recent trip to Vietnam General Wheeler stated that the situation in Vietnam was very difficult to assess The Vietnamese government had not been broken by the powerful attacks during the Tet offensive but had been frozen in a de- fensive posture The reason for this was that the VC had established a stranglehold around the cities General Westmoreland had told President Thieu that one could not afford to defend a city from the inside and had to go out after the enemy Thieu however was hesitant to have his forces leave the cities since he felt the government simply could not afford another Tet offensive However Thieu was now beginning to push out again from the cities For example the current offensive around Saigon was not simply a US operation but was made up of 12 ARVN and 6 US batallions Westmoreland told him that he believed the ARVN had in general performed well had maintained high morale and was now regaining the initiative While he expected further hard fighting Westmoreland had no fear of a general defeat However the enemy does have the capability of further local victories which can be blown up for prOpaganda purposes Westinore- land estimates that the NVA can bring in two more divisions in the next '30 to 45 days and that there are now some 8 000 to 10 000 NVA troops coming down from North Vietnam Khe Sanh appears to have served the NVA's purpose Earlier there were two NVA divisions surrounding Khe Sanh with an additional division in reserve Now one division has moved to the south and the reserve division has moved east The enemy seems primarily interested now in Hue and Saigon and Westmoreland believes that the enemy s near-term efforts will be to continue harassments and strangulation of these two cities In conclusion he stated that General Westmoreland had no concern that we would suffer a major defeat in South Vietnam W- DECLASSIFIED BAuthontyIUlJ' rel waders 153 mm NARA DRE 3- Eva COPY LBJ LIBRARY -4- Amb Foster reported that two weeks previously the US and Soviet Union had jointly submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee ENDC in Geneva identical drafts of a complete NPT They had also agreed upon a draft resolution on security assurances for the UN Security Council The US USSR and the UK had also agreed on essentially identical declarations that they would each make in connection with the Security Council resolution He emphasized that the security assurances did not constitute a new commit ment for the United States but rather gave promise of action by reaffirming our existing commitments under the UN Charter He reported that the ENDC had now submitted to the UN its report forwarding the draft text of the treaty and Security Council resolution A Special Session of the UNGA on the NPT will begin sometime between April 17 and 24 He noted that we still had problems and that India and Brazil had indicated their reserva- tions about the treaty He stated that we shared with the Soviet Union a desire to convey the feeling that the present draft was 312 text of the NPT and not simply a proposal subject to general amendments At the same time however we did not wish to join the Soviet Union in an attempt to railroad the treaty through the Special Session of the UNGA He believed that it was important to give everyone an opportunity to talk the issue out completely If the treaty did not run into serious problems in the Special Session it could then be opened for signature later this spring He reported that Ambassadors Goldberg and Malik were working out the tactics for the Special Session and that we were working on India Brazil the PEG etc through regular diplomatic channels in an attempt to overcome their reserva tions There is no question that there would be an effort by some countries to delay action on the NPT in the Special Session by to return it to the ENDC for further consideration or to defer it to the next session of the UNGA He noted that if the Special Session goes well we sign and the Senate approves we will then have to decide on the basis of the existing situation whether to ratify and deposit the treaty imrne diater or to defer this action He noted that even if we have problems in the UNGA we could still open the treaty for signature since there would in any case be very large support for it Amb Foster then raised the question as to what would happen after the NPT since it calls on the nuclear weapons states to negotiate in good faith to- ward nuclear disarmament He noted that we had already made several major proposals -- the comprehensive test ban cut-off of production of nuclear materials for weapons and the freeze on offensive-defensive strategic weapons systems A new proposal is now being considered within the Government concerning the control of the seabed In this connection COPY LBJ LIBRARY -5- the Soviet Union the previous week had formally made a pr0posal to prohibit use of the seabed for military purposes beyond the lZ-mile limit He thought therefore that we should quickly develop a forthcoming position on this issue He noted that our poliCy was to support a comprehensive test ban provided there was adequate on-site inspection and that we had a forthcoming posi- tion on the nuclear cut-off As for the freeze on offensive defensive strategic Systems we were still waiting for a Soviet reSponse In response to the President's question as to his views on the status of the NPT Under Secretary Katzenbach stated that he had nothing Specific to add except the thought that bad things happen quickly and good things happen much mOre slowly He thought that while the prospects for the NPT were favorable there were still many problems ahead Amb Goldberg stated that the NPT would be the most momentous achieve- ment for peace since the Limited Test Ban Treaty The President and Amb Foster deserve the most credit for this accomplishment The full significance and effect of the treaty had not yet fully sunk in with the public With regard to the scenario he stated that it now looked as though the Special Session would begin on April 24 although we had originally wanted to meet earlier He would be conferring with the Soviets on tactics during the next few days In general it appeared we believed in a softer sell than the Soviets There were clearly problem spots such as Italy however he thought these problems could be resolved He thought the biggest prob- lem would be the effort by opponents to delay action on the treaty until after the caucus of the non nuclear states in August so that the debate could be resumed in the next session of the UNGA next September With regard to the location of the signing he favored independent signing in the three capitals Washington London and Moscow With regard to follow-on measures he noted that the seabed problem was a very complex sensitive subject He would propose to send it back to the ENDC for full debate to avoid any premature commitments in the Special Session of the UNGA He stated that while he was not as Optimistic about the outcome of the NPT as Amb Fo ster he thought it could be accomplished but emphasized that this would require hard work He estimated that the Special Session would last about five weeks If the treaty were then opened for signature there would still be time to permit its submission to the Senate before adjourn- ment The President asked what the status of the seabed proposal actually was h ut-u-UIIf-oO-H COPY LBJ LIBRARY achieved so far on the NPT and congratulated Ambassadors Foster and -6- Amb Foster replied that ACDA was now circulating a specific prOposal at the working level and that a final version would shortly be sent to the Committee of Principals He agreed that the ENDC was the right forum He observed that the introduction 6f this new proposal would take some of the pressure off of us on the c bmprehensive test ban issue The President asked about India's position on the NPT Amb Foster replied that the measure was now before the Indian Cabinet and had not yet been decided In the end however he believed that India may well sign He noted that arrangements had been made for Dr Jerome Wiesner to meet in Geneva with Dr Sarabhai head of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission who has emerged as the principal Indian opponent of the NPT in order to try to persuade him to modify his views 'Amb Goldberg said he thought the Indian problem would be more difficult than this and he had encountered outright opposition from their representa- tives in New York The President asked what other countries presented problems Amb Foster replied that Italy had been quite difficult However the Italian Parliament was definitely in favor of the NPT and it would be diffi- cult for the Italian government to oppose it Brazil opposes the treaty on the grounds that it wants to be able to develop independently nuclear ex- plosives for peaceful purposes in order to help its economy He stated however that such an exception would completely undermine the treaty since peaceful nuclear explosives suitable for peaceful purposes were equivalent to the most advanced nuclear weapons He noted that Brazil's position might change since some strong counterforces were deveIOping there on this issue With regard to the PRC he was very hOpeful that they would' support the treaty He noted that in the course of the long negotiations with our allies the PRC had written half of the treaty The President expressed his pleasure with the success that had been Fisher for their accomplishments He then adjourned the meeting 2' 77 7 30 43 a 57 I - s p n -Ea M I swam This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu