REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD 1981 SUMMER STUDY PANEL ON TECHNOLOGY BASE NOVEMBER 1981 OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFEN$E FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING WASHINGTON o D C 20301 Thf s report has been prepared for 11m1ted rel ease by deleting security classified supporting detail appearing 1n the full report of the Defense Science Board to the Secretary of Defense These deletions when substantial are identified 1n the text They do not affect general structure of the document or its findings and recommendations Q-pG -J o 90 a ' G t e S-C e_ CsL ll 1Ei il c u 5 O 3 4 1- 2- oc P-' Q c - 111111 can cs U 9 os c sucnt Ptga arc uls Tut 111 r tnl Man o Ot1te1 o cqscs ts ft i I a j111o1At o nt ba rferrsd ts PRIIFRPE'Rrnt Rt flt 1911 11 hfagoes D C 3010' Vmil o otif l -W 'i' l i oo - o t s - o - 1 - i - ilir w o _ i X o41 -t t a ' l'Jo f' ' 3ir'li' z it' fHV' ooo 4' l Jo'Zliol'J oo -Mll'Jlt-4 i- gi J o to tt ili l1f J o1ilt-7 ' k tll _ o I' 1 - o-o Jo 1 o 'l' '1' lilfr - o o C- t-wrur H i m- u v 1 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON D C ZOJOI 28 December 1981 NEMORAlmUM l'OR SECRETARY OJ' DEFENSE J EPU'l'Y SECRE1'ARY OF DEFENSE alAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF THROUGH mtI ER SECRETARY 01' J EJ'ENSE FOR RESEARCH ARD ENGINEERING SUBJEC'l' Report of Defense Science Board Summer Study on the oclmolo y Base 'be attachea final report of the l efenae Science Boara S D'Rmer Study on the TechnoloOY Base was prepared under the chairmanship of Dr George H Heilmeier The study addresses the following issues What tecbnolo ies are critical to future 1990-2000 defense capabilities Is the investment in the Technology Base adequate Ia the process of transition from technology base to weapon systems adequate Are the universities able to support national security requirements Are the available scientific and engineering peraonnel resources adequate to support defense technology requirements 'the principal fi11dings of the atudy are that 1 2 There is no strong consistent DoD-wide linkage between technology base investment strate ies and the requirements of future combat Certain very high potent al payoff technol09ies are not being ade ately pursued in the current DoD technology oo program 3 'there is insufficient fun41ng for technology demonatrations which are an essential part of efficient technology transition The university research base relatina to defense preparedness is in need of considerable enhancement in the areas of faculty equip t facilities and support S The DoD laboratories and DARPA afforcl a number of opportunities for in re aed effectiveness Specific recommendations are made by th study panel to address theae critical areas many of these recommendations I view to be eapeoially imaginative ana particularly promio inq of payoff o iii JD o ummazy thia DSB report focuaes attention on one of 1 he aationoo moat important assets its technology base But 'this ia only an initial step which we o trongly feel must be sustained at tbe highest level if improvements are to be made We are olvln aecUcate4 attention to ooo1otino in implementing the recmmllendations contained in the report I recommend you review the Bxecuti ve Smnmary R A tine Chairman Iv OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON D C 20301 2 October 1981 OEF'ENKICISNCI ll0ARD Mr Hon1an R Augustine Cha1nnan Defense Science Board Room 301034 1 The Pentagon Washington D C 20301 Dear Mr o August1ne Enclosed you w111 find the f1na1 report of the Defense Science Board Summer Study of the Technology Base It treats in some depth all of the questions proposed for our consideration by Or Oelauer and will in my opinion make an important contribution to OoD's effort to upgrade the technology base I thin you will find the recanmendat1ons are to the point ind can be implemented 1f given proper support As you can see frc wn the report we not only treated the topics assigned but also 1cc1J11plfshed something which may be of great value to DoD Out of necessity we were forced to create our own methodology for making decisions about the technology base - what to support how to support it The methodology can be characterized as a otop aown approach given certain assumpttons about the nature of future war wit specific linkage of technology to systems and oper1t1onal concepts Criter_ia of relevance were established through a figure of anerft designed to show priority based on a balancing of opportunity and risk Some of these factors are no doubt used by decision makers 1n DoD but what does not seem to be accomplished 1s the 1ntegratfon of all of these elements 1nto a total package a structured planning process which both provides the appropriate guidance and the necessary feedback OSD and the Services have to take the inittative in implementing uch n enterprise We rec1J11mend that DoD adopt such a structured methodology for fts decision making Whether or not the figure of merit or the criteria are exactly adopted 1s not the point What 1s important is that decision makers at all levels should ask the questions which are summarized fn the investment strategy catechism o What are we try1 ng to do o How 1s 1t don today and what are the limitations of current practice o What is new fn my approach and why do I think I can be successful o Assuming success what difference w111 1t make to the user or in a mission area context o How long wfl 1 it take how much-_ w1l 1 it cost what ire the midtenno and ofinalo exams The answers to these questions should be of great value 1n the resource 111ocatton process V As you can see we used this methodology to identify the top 17 technologies which Ille terwed the oorder of magnitudeo technologies We reiterate that we ire not sa ying that these are the only ones worthy of support There ire certainly other technologies 11111th should be supported by DoO But we do feel that any technology should be able to stand up to scrutiny as a contributor to DoD's o1ss1on The Task Force also emphasized the critical problems of technology transition within the DoO A number of barriers were 1dent1f1ed which Ne believe inhibit the successful transition of technology into systems There 1s little incentive to exploit new technology due to discontinuity of funding indecision and the short tenn orfentat1on of many key decision makers organizational and spatial separation of technology base and systems people and fnsufffc1ent emphasis on technology demonstrations A champion on the user side or user support is I key factor In order to help DoD focus on this issue the panel retCJfflll nded several actions including the creation of an advanced projects agency staffed by Service personnel However even 1f the agency 1s not fonned there are important elements of this agency 111ch should be undertaken Subsystem or system experiments to quantify the matur1 ty risk and cos_t of FSEO of emerging technology test marketing experiments fenced funding for this purpose The Task Force assessed that the i 11versfty research base for defense preparedness is fn need of upgrading in faculty equipment fac111t1es and support It fs a problem broader than Do but DoO has a specific interest and respon- sibility A number of recanmendations were made in this area In addressing the above questions we found that the status of DoD's laboratory system and the function of DARPA wre frequently a factor There was unanimous expression of the need for fn-house laboratories but great fear that their prospects for improvement are bleak It was 11s0 ftlt that DARPA's technology base programs have exceeded the capab111tfes of 1ts staff to manage and that there is no comprehensive coordination of its progrllltS with Service programs nor is there adequate dissemination of results A number of recOIMlendatfons were also made to address these problems The Task Force 111embers 1re grat1f1ed with the positive response of DoD to the findings 1nd with the 1ctions th1t are currently under inwstigatfon by DoD to implement the reconmendat1ons It fs evident that _we have tackled a sensitive topic 1t I critical time I would like to tak e this opportunity to express 11 Y 1pprecfatfon for the dedication and contribution of 111 of the Task Force aen ers cc E G Fubfn1 w o attachme it vi IMPLEMENTATION PLAN SUBJECT AREA TECHNOLOGY Reconmendat1ons 1 The ASD R T fonnulate vertically integrated technology base programs with fenced funding similar to YHSIC 1n the following areas machfne intelligence advanced software algorithm technology hfgh power microwave technology advanced materials rapfd solid1f1cat1on technology advanced canpos1tes and computer afded training v1a personal electronics Responsible Office DUSO RIAT 2 The USDRE direct the m111tary departments and DARPA to use the investment strategy catechism 1n 111 future technology base planning and POM guidance Responsible Offfce DUSD R AT 3 The USDRE allocate resources to the Services and all levels of the technology base on a consistent scenario oriented basts Recognize organizational excellence-by ev1lu1tfon of their matching of resources prfor1tfes strategies to the scenarios Responsible Office ASD R T 4 The ASD R T adopt I technology pr1or1t1zat1on and investment strategy approach based on the figure of merit used 1n this study o Responsible Office DUSD R AT 5 The ASD R T increase funding 1n the following areas 1 machine fnte111gen ei 2 1dvanced software fast algorithms 3 short wavelength lasersi 4 hardening of advanced electronfcs 5 microprocessor-based personal tra1n1ng afds and 6 faul tolerant f 11 safe self-polfcing electronics Responsible Office DUSD RIAT USDRE review general areas of 1ct1vtty suitable for deemphasis duplfcatfon w1th NASA over expansion of the DA PA program 1 e 1 forward swept wing 2 VLSI 3 fiber optics nonproductive duplication of the generic technology base by the three Services 1nd fn-house executton of the basic research program 6 1 Responsible Office ASD RIT Vii SUBJECT AREA TRANS-I Tl ON Reconnendattons 1 Create an ad vanced projects agency to develop subsystem or system experiments to quantify the maturity rfsk and cost of FSED of emerging technology to conduct otest marketingo experiments and to be populated by personnel 1n the Servtces Responstble Offf ce USDRE 2 The USDRE require technology 1nsert1on plans and not 1s an afterthought Responstble Offfce DUSD RIAT SUBJECT AREA UNIVERSITY Reconnendattons 1 The USDRE direct the Services to increase 1 1 basic research performed by unhers1ttes by 251 tn real growth over the next three years but be selective Responsible Offtce DUSD RIAT 2 The USDRE direct the DAR Committee to revtsi current procurement polfc1es and regulations to allow additional JR D - o ss over present cet11ng - for industry support of untvers1ty R D treatmtRt- of university indirect costs s1m11ar ta that used by U S Dept of Health and Human Services HHS stmp11f1ed research procurement fran un1ven1tfts Responsfble Office DUSD AM 3 The USDRE establtsh wtth the un1verstttes an accommodat1on and basis for the 1mp1emantat1on of current export controls on 1nformat1on relating to o un1t1ons 11st technologies Responsible Office DUSD IPT 4 _The ASD R T dfrect the Servtc1s to create a DoD thrust to upgrade equipment 1n un1vers1ttes Focus on equipment th1t can 1mp1ct the technology thruits requiring university research of highest DoD leverage software design automation machine lnte111genc e etc the upgrading of computer resources 1s the highest prtortty based on this algorithm and DoD should support SF efforts to upgrade generally equipment 1n unfversitfes Respons1 1e Off1co DUSD RIAT vii I SUBJECT AREA GENERAL Laboratory DARPA Reconwnindatfons l - 1 To help the hiring and retention of the skills necessary for a viable laboratory structure USDRE direct that the highly exc1tfng and effective personnel experiment presently being conducted at NOSC and MIC be implemented for DoD Laborator1es The most exc1tfng features of this experfment are 1 greater latitude 1n job class1f1cat1on 2 reduces paperwork 3 makes performance the foremost criteria for salary increases retention promotion etc and 4 flextb111ty faster dec1s1ons o Responsible Office DUSD R AT 2 USDRE designate lead laboratories 1n generic technology base areas Candidates include 1 space systems related technology components ha dening etc 2 airborne radar technology 3 11rborne electronic warfare technologyi 4 electron devices and 5 infrared technology Responsible Offfce DUSD RIAT 3 US RE authorize the Services to each establish 100 graduate fellowships per year fn areas of interest to DoD $20K year part to the university compet1t1ve - awarded by Congressmen and must work one year 1n DoD Laboratories for each yeir of fellowship support Responsible Office DUSD RIAT 4 The ASD R T establish I mechanism to ensure coordination of system technology base programs such 1s BMDATC wfth the rest of the DoD technology base activity Insure that system req 1rements are included fn the development of the technology-base investment strategy ' Responsible Off1c DUSD RIAT 5 USO RE direct the Services to rev tew DARPA programs over $30M for potential o future mtlttary 1pp11cat1ons operational needs and transition plans Responsible Office ASD RIT ix DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD SUMMER STUDY ON TECHNOLOGY BASE TABLE OF CONTENTS I II EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo 1-1 INTRODUCTIONoo ooooooooooooooooooo oooooooooooooooooooooo o I-1 A The Decline of the U S Technology Base oooooooooooooooo B Tasks oo o o o oooo o oo ooo o oo oooo C Perspective - No Illusionsoooooo o oo o ooo o oo D Caveats ooooooooooooooooooo ooooooooooooooo o oo o ooo o o o o o o o E Orgahfzation of the Report ooo ooooooooooooooooooooooooo I-5 1-7 IDENTIFICATION OF THE ORDER OF MAGNITUOE'1 TECHNOLOGIES oooo 11-1 I-1 t-4 I-5 A Methodologyooooooooooooo oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo 11-1 B Post 1990s Scenariosoooo oo oooooooo o o oo oooo II-2 C Identfffcat1on and Ranking of Technologies with an Order of Magnitude Impact on Future Capab11 ity ooooooo 11-2 D Investment Strategy for Top 11 17 o oo oo oo oo oooooo o 11-17 III EVALUATION OF CURRENT TECHNOLOGY BASE INVESTMENTooooooooooo III-1 A Technology Base Investmentooooo oo oooooooo ooooooooooo III-1 B 11 Gameboard 11 Approach to Reviewing Investment Strategy oo - 111-4 C Analysis of Asymmetries in Gameboard oooooooo o o ooooo III-4 D Adequacy of the Total Level of Technology Base Funding III-11 IV TECHNOLOG y TRANSITION oooooooooo I oooo Ii o I oooooooo I oo o ooooo I oo The Problem of Adopting Innovation ooooooooooooooooooooo Nature of Innovation oooooo o o oo oo o o oo o o c The Transition Process ooooo o o oooooooooooooooooo D Test-Marketing A New Approach oooooooooooooooooooooooo E Summary ooo ooo o oooooooooo o o o ooo o o oo o A B Y THE UNIVERSITY CONNECTION ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo IV-1 IV-2 IV-3 IV-7 IV-11 IV-14 V-1 DOD LABORATORIES AND DARPA oooo -o oooooooooooooooooooooooooooo VI-1 -A Laboratory Managemen Task Force ooooooo ooooooo ooooo B OSC NWC Demonstration Project oooooooooooooooooo_ooooooo C Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency DARPA oooooo VI-3 VJ t SUMMARY - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS o ooooooooooooooooooo VIl-1 VI A VI-2 Vl -4 Technologies That Could Make an Order of Magnitude Difference oooooooooooooo ooooooooooo ooooooooooooooooooo VI I-1 e Technology Transi t1on oooo oooo ooooooooooooooooooooooooo VII-4 C The University Connection o oooooooooooooooooooooooooooo VII-5 D 'General Fi d1ngs and Rec mendations ooooooooooooooooooo VII-6 xf TABLE OF coNTENTS Continued APPENDICES A DSB Technology Base Sunner Study Tenns of Reference B Review of Past Studies C Ftgure of Merit Assessments D Background Papers on Order of Magnitude Technologies E SCFte Alternative Figure of Merit Calculations -A Note of Caution F Description of the NOSC Exper1ment G Example of a Vertically Integrated Program -- The U S Department of Defense Program for Development of Very High Speed Integrated Circuits H Recommendations from the DoD Laboratory Management Task Force I Reference Materials xll 0 ol I I'll - - HI I EXECUTIVE ISUHMARV EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The ofntenance of I lead over potential adversaries fn crtttcal mf11tary technologies fs a major factor 1n u s national defense The U S has been able to offset the numerically supertor forces of the Sovtet Un1on w1th a highly leveraged qua11tat1ve arms supertor1ty emanating fram technology achievements derived from 1ts industry government laboratortes and academtc tnstttut1ons The lead over th u s s R however 1s raptdly eroding for a variety of reasons _ I L o DoD fundfng of RID fn tenns of real dollars 1s decltn1ng o the u s 1s 1n the process of losing 1ts campettt1ve edge 1n man techno1 ogy areas 1 the academic canmunity 1s faced with problems whfch may result fn an 1n1btlfty to provide a robust core of scientists and engineers to meet u s defense needs In the soviet Union the trend 1s exactly the opposite They are producing several times the number of engineers per year as the U S and are training a whole generation of technologically literate people with I general education curriculum which ts oriented toward science and technology Thfs trend can have a profound influence on the relative technology base 1n each country Concern for the llealth of the U S defense technology base w1thfn and outside the government motivated the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Eng1neerfnf io convene a Defense Science Board DSB Summer Study on Technology Base he study addressed the following and related questtons 1 What technologies are crtt1ca1 to future 1990-2000 defense capabflttfes How are these technologies 1dent1fted1 Are the Soviets ga1nfng ground Is the investment tn the Technology Base of less than 21 of the total defense budget adequate 2 Is the process of transition fram technology base to weapon systems adequate 3 An the un1verstttes responsive to nattonal security requirements 4 Are the DoD relattonsh1ps with the basic research canwnun1ty creative individuals and small 1nnovattve f1nns adequate 5 Are the 1v1tl1ble sctenttftc and eng1neer1ng personnel resources adequate to meet the requtrements of the defense technology cammerc1al or government _oorder of Magnitudeo Technolo91es o After revf ewtng the technology base planning strategies employed by- the Services and DARPA consistent DoD-wfde linkage 1t was found that there was no ' t-1 between investment strategies and the requ1 reinents of future canbat To answer the questfons posed above the DSB panel was required to adopt its own structured approach to technology assessment and technology base planning ldltch can be characterized as follows o Scenario projection - determine or project what the possible n1tures of warfare wtll be tn the post-1990 environment 1n atr land sea and space o Systems 1nd oper1t1on1l concepts - cfetenn1ne what w111 be required to meet the demands of these scenarios and the tmplfed threat o Identify technologies - determine what impact new and 1nnovotive technology will have on systems P rojected for the future o o Rank technologies - develop crtterta for ranking technology tn order of pr1or1ty o Campare t e technology 11st with the DoD resource allocation o Determine the requ1s1te technology base investment strategy In the course of applying this scenario based planning approach to the current DoD echnology base program the panel took tnto accou t 111 of the key elements of I comprehensive investment strategy for technology development the oc1tech1 sm o What 1s 1t What 1s this effort trying to accomplish defining the toch ology sufficiently well to d1scrfm1nate 1t from other stm11ar technologies o Why is it important Assuming success what difference can ft make to the user or 1n a m1sston area context t1kin1 into account the nature and 1m1t1t1on for current practice o What 1s the current status What 11 the oo0 program What should 1t be What ts new about the proposed effort and why will this ap roach be successful o How 1ong will 1t take How much will 1t cost What are the measureso of success The-panel recommends that the USDRE dfrect the Services and DARPA to incorporate such an 1ppro1eh 1n 111 future technology base planning and 1n POM guidance so that technologies funded through the-allocation process would be more explicitly and consistently related to future operational needs In its tdent1f1catton and analysis of the oorder of 1111gnituc1eo technologies the DSB panel attempted to balance opportunity with r1-sk by means of a Figure of Merit FON see Chapter II for o ore details 1-2 The panel also recommends that ASD R T adopt the oFigure of Merit technique or its equivalent as a basis for prtor1ttz1ng technology From thfs assessment the panel selected 17 technologies as being the most important for vigorous pursuit withfn DoD o 1 o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o Very High Speed Integrated Circuits Stealth Advanced Software Algorithm Dev elopment Microprocessor-Based Personal Learning Aids F111-Soft F1ult Tolerant Electronicso Rapfd Soltd1f1catfon Technology Machine Intelligence Supercamputers Advanced Canpos1tes High Density Mono11th1c Focal Planf Arrays Radiation Hardened Advanced Electronicso Space Nuclear Power High Power Microwave Generators arge Space Structures Optoelectronics Space Based Radar Short Wavelength Lasers Base on a comparison of the above 11st of technologies with the current DoD fnvestment 1 1 number of technologies were 1dent1f1ed for funding increases These technologies are noted with an asterisk lt should be noted that the vast majority of the oorder-of-magnitudeo technolog1es 11e 1n the electronics area Currently the electronics area canmands a relatively low percentage of the total budget There 1s a need to reorder funding priorities w1thfn the Technology Base to correct thfs imbalance The pane1 a1s0 felt that there are deficiencies 1n the way DoD has managed the technology investment for certain of these technologtes These programs could benefit from a vertically integrated program structure similar to the YHSIC Program See 1tems above marked with Key elements of a vertically 1n egrated program are o Centralized management and coord1nat1on of the tot1l Tr1-Servfce program with fenced funding to ensure accountabt11ty o The incl u s1on under one industrial organization of 111 aspects of a technology's development and transition fnto military systems e g processes desfgn materials o Continuity of the 1ndustr11l team s from early technology development through trans1tton to system 1pp11cat1ons A1though no effort was made to recommend s pec1 ft c progrlfflS whf ch shou 1d he deleted several c1tegor1es of actfv1ty were highlighted for deemphasis o reas o _ duplicatfon with NASA e - - remote sensing propulsion 1-3 o erexpanston of DARPA programs into areas '11ch overlap with other oofo oJor DoD Servtce programs forward swept wing VLSI fiber o oPtfcs Nonproducttve duplic1t1on of the generic technology base three Servtces o In-house execution of the basfc research program 6 1 by the The overall level of fundtng 2S of the DaD budget was judged to be adequate 1f effectively organized and managed The panel has concluded that th1s ideal cannot be achieved unless the decision making and allocation process within DoD fs restructured to reflect the planning methodology out11ned 1n t f s report Technology Trans1tfon A number of barriers were 1denttfted which 1nh1b1t the successful transition of tethnology fnto systems o There 1s little incentive to exploit or respond to new technology owing to o Dtscont1nu1ty of funding 1ndec1s1on and the short tenn or1entat1Qn of many key decision cakers o The organ1zet1ona1 and spatial separation of technology b1se and systems people o Very 11ttle emphasis on technology demonstrations tlich 1ccuritely portray risk reduction payoff and cost factors for later stage production o Very 11tt1e emphasis on otest marketing o A champion on the operational user side or user support ts often not present o In order to better focus DoD reso rces on the transition issue the panel recommends that the USDRE d1rect the creation of an advanced projects agency staffed by Serv1te personnel 1 to develop subsystem or system experiments to quantffy the Nturtty risk and cost of FSED of emerging technology 2 to conduct otest marketing 1xperfments and 3 to fence the funding for the above described expertments ts not fonned tt 1s very _important that the Services apportion and fence I larger G 3A element for conducting these experiments However even tf the agency The panel ilso found that the DoD does not plan well for successful technology trJnsttton throughout the life of I system Such plans are often 1njected only as an afterthought It recammended that the USDRE r qu1re technology tnsertfon plans 1s a basic and fundamental part of program planning t-4 Untverstty Connection The un1vers1ty research base related to defense preparedness 1s fn need of upgrading in-faculty equipment fac11tt1es and support If the current trends persist the unfversftfes may no longer be able to provide for the training of oworld-classo technical talent or perfonnance of world-classn sc1ent1f1c research tn areas key to our m11ttary and econam1ca1 security The key tssues 1dent1 fiecl are I Obsolescence of equipment and fac11ft1es o Shortages of faculty especially tn some engineering fields and computer science o Short1ges 1n disciplines outside of science and technology e g oo fore19n lanugages crtt1ca1 to cammun1catfon and 1nte1 ltgence J o The increasing percentage of foretgn graduate students fn science and engineering departments of 111ny 1111jor un1vers1t1es o Certain DoD procurement policies The DoD and the country face a crts1s 1n the 1v111ab111ty of technfcal personnel It 1s a problem broader than DoD but DoD has I specific interest and respons1b111ty A number of specific recommendations were made with regard to these problems 1 The USDRE dfrect the servtces to increase 6 1 basic research performed by un1versit1es by 2511n real growth over th next three years 2 USDRE authorize each of the services to award 100 S E graduate fellowships annually o In areas of DoD interest - itmflar to those of the DoD laboratories o $20K year to continue unttl completion of degree but not to exceed 3 years part to students and part to unherstty o Competitive -- awarded by Congressmen o ftlst work one year 1n DoD lab for each year of fellowship support granted 3 The USDRE direct the DAR Committee to revise current procurement poltctes and regulations to ollow o o Add1t1o a1 IRID -- o S against negotiated base over present ce111ng --- for tndustry support of university RID 1-5 o Treatment of un1vers1ty indirect costs sfmfl1r to that used by U S Dept of Kealth and Human Services HHS o Sio p11f1catfon of research procurement -from un1vers1t1es The USDRE establish with the un1vers1tfes an accommodation end basis for the implementation of current export controls on fnfonnatfon relating to munitions 11st technologies 4 5 The ASD R T direct the services to create a OoD thrust via the OSR's to upgrade equipment fn universities This focus should be on equfp nent that can impact university research of highest DoD leverage software design automation machine 1nte111gence etc o The upgrading of ccmputer resources 1s the highest priority based on this algorithm o Generally DoD shouJd support NSF efforts to upgrade equipment 1n universities The theflle of the above recanmendatfons fs to increase the level of investo w ent for 6 1 basfc rese1rch performed 1n universities by a total of 25S 1n real growth over the next three years A recommendation was made for an in-depth study tn order to answer the House Armed Services Committee's questions with regard to ouniversity Responsiveness to Nationa1 Security Requirements o DoO laboratories and DARPA In addressing the above questions the status of DoD's laboratory sysThere was unanimous expression of the need for in-house laboratories but great fear that the1r prospects for improvement are poor tem and the- function of DARPA were frequently a factor o There is an impending crisis in personnel and fac111ties 1n the DoD laboratories that will _seriously degrade the defense posture in a ver- Y few years o The present DoD laboratory base is weak fragmented and duplicative 1n key areas e g oo computer science machine intelligence software- VLSI and signal processing o Too often the laboratories conduct R D 1n treas ot their expertise instead -of in areas of the greatest military need o o In the case of DARPA - T e growth fn the DARPA technology base program has greatly exceeded the capab111ty of the stafr to properly execute the program 'oo o r _ - There appears to be no canprehensfve filtering of DARPA programs versus on gofng Service efforts and the DARPA results are not widely d1ssemf nated and therefore not suff1ctently cr1tfqued Based on these findings the followfng recommendations were o 1d1 o To help the hfrfng and retention of the skills necessary foro viable laboratory structure USDRE direct that the highly exciting and effective personnel experfment being conducted at NOSC and NWC or its equivalent be implemented for DoD laboratories o USDRE 1n conjunction with Service technology base managers designate lead laboratories fn generic technology base 1re1s withfo each Service Candidate technology areas include Space systems related technology components hardening etc airborne radar technology airborne electronic warfare technologyi electron devices and infrared technology o USDRE direct that Services revfew DARPA programs over $30M total program costs -- not annual from the point of view of potential future m11itary applfcat1ons operational needs ind transition plans and establish mechanism to ensure eoord1- nation of system technology base programs such as BMDATC and ABRES with the rest of the DoD technology base activity to ensure that multiple system requirements are included in the development of the technology base investment strategy 1-7 1 I'll CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 0 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION A THE DECLINE OF THE U S TECHNOLOGY BASE t The technology base is a crftfcal factor fn national defense particularly in the present context In recent years the U S has been able fn most cases to offset the numerically superior forces of the Soviet Union wfth a highly leveraged qualitative arms superiority The u s has been able to achieve thfs leverage because ft possesses I superior technology base 1n U S industry fn governmental laborator1est and fn our academic institutions The U S technology lead over the u s s R oo however ts eroding in critical military technologies and this decline fs being felt 1n many areas of technology see Figure I-1 for recent tr nds DoD funding of research and development fn terms of real dollars has declined in advanced technology areas U S industry has lost its competitive edge in many areas of high technology as many u s corporations pursue strategies of short term gain at the expense of long term growth Foreign firms are investing greater percentages of profits fn R DJ 1n new factories and other capital equipment and in advanced manufacturing methods For a variety of reasons the academic community during the 1970's has not provided a robust basfc core of scientific and engineering talent to meet America's defense needs Institutions at both the secondary and university levels are retreatfng from the commitment to science and technology developed during the post-Sputnik era Weaker currfcula are resfdent tn many schools and students fn greater numbers are avofdfng the hard sciences Al hough engineering enrollments are now increasing only recently have doctoral enrollo ments returned to the levels of the early 1970's Moreover our increasing fraction of science and engineering graduate students are foreign the fraction approaeh1ng 501 in selected fields In the Soviet Unfon the trend fs exactly the opposite sae Figure I-2 They are producing several times the number of engineers per year as the U S and are training a whole generation of technologically literate people with a general education curriculum whfch 1s oriented toward science and technology This trend can have a profound influence on the relative technology base fn each country Even granting the hfstor1ca1 1nefffcfenc1es fn the Soviet system fn fts economic and industrial output thefr push toward technology equivalence with the West w111 have important mflttary effects It 1s even being aided by a wholesale technology transfer from the West thro gh licensing agreements to Bloc countries training of foreign nationals 1n un1vers1tfes 1 and a conttnufng flow of current and militarily relevant information transferred through international sc1 nt1f1c meetings and t e open t chn1ca1 literature It would be presumptuous to assume that the technology gap will continue to exist assuming that ft exists today and n 1ve to expect that the U S J-1 FIGURE I-1 RELATIVE U S USSR STANDING IN THE 20 MOST IMPORTANT BASIC TECHNOLOGY AREAS U S SUPHIOI BASIC TECHNOLOGIES u s -uua EQUAi I Acrod -wnlalf'luid D i n1mia 2 Au1oma1ecl Ccmtral X X J ConYmllonal Wuhclld X lnc111din1 Qemical Eaplod -a Coms uur X J Dlrcacd Encru X x- 6 Elcc r prlcaJ Semor oo ussa SUPUIOlt lnchadlnt1R Guidance and Navfpdoa x- Microdeclronic Materials and X ln1qr11cd Cifi uil Manufactura t Nlid Warbcad X x- 10 Opdca 11 Powar Soured Mobile X 12 Pradactian1M11111ract11rma X x- Propulsioa Aerospace xx- RadarSa scr IS Sipal PrOffllUII It Sotlwate X l7 S callh Sipwurc leclucdoa Tccbnolop x ' -x II SCrvccurlJ M11mals llala oclall1 h_lp nffllllb x- It SullmariM DaCC'lkla liichrdlq Stcndq 20 Tclccoma1 111cadaat X of o I T1tt lbl In 1a rp i wia IClffled win 1n objcctlq pron ln a valid bale for comparlna o Yffllll U S and usn krk l11Chnoloa The cccbnoloaia wert spcclfkaU ftOt ctosca 10 compare lCdlnotoa 11 11 llll CIN'fC1dlJ deployed nsnillr IJlllftll TM ml b fQ 1tphabellcll atda 2 The tedlnoJoalcs actcctcd tla t tht po1mdal for 1lplftcantJr man1ln1 11M mllharJ bal Me In IM MU 10 to 20 u t TIie wchtaolo1ia lrt no11111lc 1hq are lm na ar have the potential for 1f1niflca11 lmproYCID ftU J TIie nOWI 1h11 lhc cladvc tccllnolog 1cval Is chan1ln1 1lplt'laad1 ia IM dincaioft indicaltd o Thc juqJMt'III rcpraml avcrqa within ads basic tcchnolou atta I-2 FIGURE 1-2 1000 o o 900 II HDIoo u s s 1t o - I 900 It I c o It w 'J - -o - c 700 I ' 0 f a 500 I 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1971 1978 1979 Year Figure o Scientists and Engtnee E111ployt d fn Research and Develop111ent tn thi Unfted States and the u s s R 1965 to 1979 Source o Depar-t111ent of COIIIM rce qualttative advantage w111 persist given the_present trend The U S edge 1n key technologies can be lost and 1n fact w111 be lost without attention to 1 the health of the continuing technology base wfthfn the in-house RID ca1111un1ty- the academic community and industry 2 the transition of innovative technology 1nto credible and deployable 11111 tary systems and 3 the evolution of creative m111tary operational concepts which exploit U S strengths and or Soviet Unfon vulnerabilities B TASKS Accordingly on 2 July 1981 the Under Secretary of Defense for Research 1 and Engineering U_SDR E chartered the Defense Science Board DSB to undertake a Summer Study to assess the health of the U S national defense technology base within and outside the government Specific questions to be addressed by the DSB were o What technologies are critical to future 1990-2000 defense capab111ty What are those technologies that would contribute to roughly an order of magnitude i_mprovement 1n system perfonnance cost etc How are these technologies 1denttf1ed Are the Soviets gaining ground Is the 1nvestme t in the technology base of less than 21 of the total defen se budget adequate If not WIit 1s I reasonable level of expenditure and what should be the management and investment s rategy wfthfn the technology base o Is the process of transition fran technology base to weapon systens adequate If not Nhat changes are needed tcr occelerate the process of transition o Are t he un1versftfes responsive to nat1 onal security requf rements If not 11at actions should be taken to improve the responsiveness of un1vers1tfes7 1 Is the OoD relat onshfp with the bastc research ccmmunfty creative 1ndtv1dua1s and small innovative 11rms adequate If not what changes should be made to improve the DoD uttlizatfon of these resources o Are the sc1ent1f1c eng1neertng personnel resources adequate to neet the requirements of defense technology commercfal or governnent What actions should be taken to eliminate critical personnel shortages Priority was assigned to the first two quesi1ons 2 The DSB held two preliminary meetings tn Washington D c oo du 1ng June and July 1981 1 and then met during the period 2-1 August 1981 at the Naval Ocean Systems Center San Diego Ca11fornfa The Panel was chaired by Dr George H Heilmeter Vice President Corporate Research Develor ment and Engineering Texas Instruments Inc and included as members science and engineering leaders fran tndustry 1 untvers1ttes defense- agenc1 es and 1-4 the independent research canmun1ty The Board's charter ts contaf ned 1n Append1 A Figure 1-3 lfsts the total ment ershtp of the Technology Base Panel C PERSPECTIVE o NO ILLUSIONS Over the last decade there have been literally dozens of reports study panels and oa1ue Ribbono committees dedicated efther directly or indirectly to the problem of the technology base Generally speaking the recommendations made 1n a maJor1ty of these efforts have largely been ignored by DoD tnst1tut1onally Pert of this may be the result of the oblue sky nature of some of the reccmmendat1ons But I more serious problem exists when the institution fails to recognize and implement recanmend1tions which ire on target See Appendix B for I review of past studfos The DSB panel aimed at recommendations mich are practical and which can be implemented within the DoD Even though they may require a strong and deliberate effort and are aimed at breaking strong h1storfca1 patterns we believe they are 1n the realm of the possible We also are conscious of the fact that a panel such as this meetfng for only o short time cannot hope to solve problems of a detailed nature and therefore focuses on broad issues and takes I broad approach to DoD-wtde problems It 1s noted however that a panel such 1s this the members of lilhich have long 1ssoc1atfons wfth technology assessment a d planning lends perspective and objectfv1ty to the process of DoD self-examination Those few panels which fn the past have made a major impact have done so because the time was right for change It ts believed that such ts the case with technology base planning at this time sfnce the current shortfalls are now reaching dangerous proportions D CAVEATS 1 For purposes of thfs study the DoD t chnology base w1s defined as the total research 6 1 and exploratory developmnt 6 2 effort plus a portion of the advanced development 6 3A program Collectfvely these elements represent an FY 1981 budget of $3 2 b1111on supporting baste research expl or atory development and some advanced development performed by universft1es industry DoD l1bor1tor1es end Federal Contract Research Centers FCRC 2 The DSB panel recognized the lack of methodology pr1or1ty or relat1onsh1p between desired future oper1tfonal capab111tfes end technology and therefore consciously concentrated on tecbnologies which could have an oorder of magnitude impact on military capabf11ty in sorre crftfcal attribute perfonnance re11 ab11 fty s ifflJ 11cf ty etc Thts focus was selected 1n order to ensure that they receive adequate support and focus fn the years to come However technologies Nhtch can make an oorder of magn1tudeo difference are not the only ones worthy of support Often systems derhed fran less exotic technology can outperfonn systems ofo more-advanced technology lffitn the support tra1ning and maintenance demanded by the latter have been allowed to lag and _are therefore insufficient for proper deployment and operation I- FIIURE i-3 MEMBERSHIP DSB SUMMER STUDY ON TECHNOLOGY BASE Presint Pos1tfon- Ch1fr1111n Dr llorge H H1t1ofer Ytce Pres Corp RD E Texas Instruments Inc 1ct Cta11r1111n Mr Donald J Looft Ytc1_Pre1 I General Mgr E 0 fv Magnavox Executfve Secretary Dr Samuel A Staff Sp1cf1itst for EV I Target Acqu1stt1on OUSDRE 11111 Members Mr Richard Alberts Dro Ivan L Bennett Mgr RID Poltcy I Plans Research Triangle Inst Jr Exec YP Health Affafri NYU Provost I Dean NY Med Ctn Dr Arden L lament Ytce Pr11 Tech Resources TRw Inc Dr Roberts Cooper D1rtctor DARPA ASD Res I Tech Destgn e Dr Edward T lrry Dr Nonaan H1ct1rman Proooo W J o Schafer Assoc Pru Rtce Un1vers1ty Dr Bernard A Kulp Ch Scfenttst Dir of Labs AFSC I Dr Reuven Leopold Chmn of Board NKF Engrg Inc Mr Charles H Mckinley VP Msl Dev Engrg oo Vought Corp o MGen Enanett Pafge Jr USA Cammander 1 u s Anny Electronfcs RID Command Dr Herbert Rab1n DASN Res Applfed Space Tech Dr Prtnc1pa1 Baoz Allin I Hamtlton Sayre Stevens Dr Gerald F T1pe Bien_ Br1 en D Vard o Spec Asst to Pr11tdent AUI us NIJor Assistance Mr Bradford L - Sm1th 1 Jr Dr Patrick P McDermott and Ms Jo Mar1o Dtamond Dt rector of L1b1 8-K Dyn111tcs In '1- 1 AFSC 3 An in-depth treatment of any one area 1s beyond the scope of this study Because of the duration of the study tt was often necessary to make qualitative assertions about technology since accurate quantitative analyses were not available j 4 Outside of those areas indicated tn Figure I-1 there was no attempt made by the DSB panel to assess relative u s -u s S R technology levels in the oorder of magnftudeN technologies This lead lag assessment 1s an important element of the defense planning process however fn view of the U S dependence on maintaining a qualitative anns superiority as an offset to Soviet quantitative superiority 1n certain technical areas Although 1t could be improved with more input from the RID community the technology National Intelligence Estimate NIE Figure I-1 fs becoming an important tool for assessing the long tenn u s u s s R military balance Technology lead does not translate directly into m11ftary superforfty since there is a s1gn1f1cant lag tn the introduction of new technology into systems If the Soviets accelerate this transition fnto systems they may be able to close the qualitative gap which now exists in many technology areas Nonetheless this concept of lead lag based on a technology NIE 1s an important consideration for DoD long range planning The process could be improved considerably 1n the NIE or a parallel effort attempted to interpret the military s1gn1f1cance of the assessed lead lag and or incorporated some measure of operational impact a sort of 11technol ogy threshol d11 for 15sess1 ng ope rat 1onal s1gniffc1nce E ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT 1 To facilitate review the report of the Technology Base Summer Study has been organ1zed fnto a series of chapters which generally parallel the major areas of investigation identified 1n the DSB initiating charter o Spec1f1ca11y o o Chapter II addresses the range of issues assQciated with the 1dentif1catfon of order of magnitude' - technologies Chapter III evaluates the total technology base investnent o Chapter IY focuses on the process of transition frcxn technology o Chapter V deals with the question of the responsiveness of universities to national security requirements o Chapter VI treats the issues associated with the DoD laboratorfes and th Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency DARPA o Chapter VII provides a composite summary of DSB f1nd1ngs and recanmendations 2 The methodology 1es applied within each se tion are explained and documented as appropriate 1n the body of the eport and ltilere necessary additional explanation fs provf ded in an appendix 1o7 CHAPTER II mammcmon or THE OF manual TECHNOLOGIES - mm-u CHAPTER JI IDENTIFICATION OF THE oORDER OF MAGNITUDEo TECHNOLOGIES A METHOOOLOGY It was the intent of those 1nvo1 ed fn the study to generate ind test 1 methodology for technology base planning to be used 11 1 model for OSD and the mflftary departments This action was necessitated by the f1ct that there is no uniform structured methodology or process within DoD for identifying or pr1or1t1zfng cr1t1ca1 technology areas the approach adopted can be characterized as follows o Scenario projection - detenn1ne or project what w111 be the nature of warfare 1n the post-1990 1 1 environment in o 1tr land sea and spacei define the mission requirements such warfare w111 place on future m111tary s1stems o Systems and oper1tion1l concepts - determine what system functions w111 be required to meet the demands of these scenarios and the implied threat o Identify technologies - determine what impact new and innovative technology will have on systems projected for the future o Rank technologies - develop cr1terfa far r1nkfng technology f n order of prf or1 ty o Compare technology 11st v1th DoD resource 11Tocat1on o match lfni 1tem the dollars befng spent for technology development wtth list of technologies considerlt t crucial 1n the future context identify wh1ch of the top ranked technologies are underfnvested look for areas of overinvestment by o Determine technology base tnvestment strategy This chapter 1s organized fn a manner which 111ustretes the methodology outlined above fncludfng 1 the delineation of the post-1990's scenarfos based on a synthesis of Service long range plans 2 descrtpt1on of the technical requirements derived from such scenarfos especta11y those which penneate the future scenarios 3 1dent1ffcat1on and rankfng of technologfes with an oorder of magnitudeo impact an the defined future system requ1rementsi and 4 definition of investment strategies for technology development of the top techno1og1es 1nclud1ng 1n ev1lu1tio of the current technology base programs tn these technologies - Jl-1 8 POST 1990s SCENARIOS These factors are described in detailed scenario descriptions and are contained 1n the classified version of this report Scenarios we e broad 1n scope dealing with projected functfonal attributes of land warfare air warfare naval warfare and strateqic and space warfare Based upon the above definition of the 1990's environment the panel memhers performed an assessment of the critical technical requirements needed to achieve success fn each specified warfare scenario The results of this assessment are summarized in Table 11-1 In the course of defining these technical requi rements a series of integrating factors were identified which permea e the future scenarios representing needs which are pervasive to a wide range of critical future operations These factors are o o o o t t o o o o Sustained Operations Continuous Threat Location Track Real-Time Information Management Counter Threat Target Acquisition Integrate Eyeball and Trf gger Secure Jam-Resistant Mobile Communications Dispersed Small Units Transparent Complexity Equipment Avaflabi11ty Reliabil1ty Operations in Extreme Environments 11 Each of these factors fs described in more detail in the classfffed version of this report C IDENTIFICATION AND RANKING OF TECHNOLOGIES WITH AN ORDER OF MAGNITUDE IMPACT ON FUTURE CAPABILITY I o As mentioned earl fer in this report this OSB su1 1Tier study focused exclusively on technologies which can make an order of magnitude difference in terms of deployahle operational capability This section of the report delineates the sufllllary assessment of these technologies and develops a rank ordering for the most critical technologies o In its identification and analysis of the order of magnitude technologies the DSB panel attempted to isolate which technologies would be important for s-uccess in the scenarios outlined earlier and then to evaluate the relative contribution of each In order to accomplish this the DSB panel developed certain criteria for assessing opportonftylf and risk Y o oo o o II-2 J TABLE II-1 Scenario Driven Technical Requirements an vo ut STAID4'F o IMITIZI Cit StAY AT NM JICltum 1011 CF STNl IFF ll'WOIS - Long ranp a1f' or o ls111o dt1 of gu1ded lll nvc1eat lftdo lro I ti 10ftl 1111 oo Longer rintt defe111t1 191tn1t wapon carriers - Atr defense 1re1 1upPN11too oo Oef1n1tn s ne1 to - ASCII dlfenH o dttact 1011 1nd Reutrolluttoft or ltll oo P1atfo a 11p1tur1 red 'ttN or repltutto11 -- let11I of tlrtetffll au far 1an9-r1n91 IJ'lt - Urptf and SLCN 11 r1t1 prepar1t1oe r Nbtle around forces oo Yery 1Dlfo1ea lfr dtfens Of 111111 11 o 11N tar91t1 SMU IIIIT ACTIOII oo Jatesr1tt ng of 11 untt apu1tton1 C1 - Agt11t1 and r1p1d 1110btltt1 WORl DWHE IEA TIM DACIJIG NCD TARfl TlNG II MAJ0l SutFACI -- D1t1 ooo awat11btlf - Dtcentralt td procust 'I of COMIATMTS c1111p1u dlh oo ICCN oo Spooftng or tllllltng af 1p1ce cl 1urt1111Hco systto -- lnt19r11 dlfll'ISU Alf o LDNG ltMCI Llr ALJZATJOII FJNDJNI THE tMENT SEUNI DEEP oo Mabt1e V1'Dlffld-1upporl Dptr1t1on1 oo Mlrd1nld 1tr control oo -o -oo -o Use ot' 1Dlllr-grNe atrfte1dl oo lo lor ft9o ASII atrtlr 1 NOIJl tl ON STULTM 1ACTJC i 5E CF SPACE FOi oo Naar conthtulkll 1urnt11lnm of 1111cttd oo ltptd Htrch of l1r 1 lrlH oo Fusion of data for tnt 1119111 1 and e1pon1 1711o1 oo Cower 1nd dte1pttoa -- ltp1d res 01111 tn 1t1n11 frtquenc nd pul n foN - $ Hilb DJS'iltSll lASI OPEUTIOIS fact'1tt11 Jl'ltnOlftlfll oo Awo1dan of 11rpr1tt b 1tt11U llW ltAL tltct NRT INTEaA110N 41' TAAGtt ACO lSlTlDN AHD SlltllCt o Auton011GU1 on-board pro ctss1ng 1i n11 dlU o V1r1 hi prec slon locatfon r1f1renc IUCII II PS - TfiSMI o Nill da 11 fus ton 111d 1trtk1 pr1paro t1011 1fCRtASID 1ACTJCM USE o Sp1co -b11ed 11trY11111nce 11nsors w1 tll 111tonanou1 processing oo Surwiw1b1e unj11U11bloo contlnuou111 1w1t1lble location r1ferenct - Sunh1bf1t y of sensor 17st11111 111 f of Itta Ind NC1t1r erwtro nt oo ECX-restst1nt 1ur tw1b11 oco fd1-b1nd COMSAIS - Space-bun Jamnwn 191fn1t trouncl 1ftd space t1rg1t1 - ND11-nuc11ar ontt-11t1111h weapons o- Operat1on af IF 111to1 tn o oIVo broad 1 -ct _ ft0111 emfroffllln - Coflcia1- nt of ECCN oppro1dlla fncludtng agU1ty - SfavltlfttOUI ECN and SUIIIT eap1 otU 1ot1 1'1r1111t t ni CK sources o Loo-c01t IF equt nt - um Ytt1 11t1h- awr equtpaen an1 VARFMI CIIUISE NJSSJL S TS IWCIIO NAVAL AJI FIii STIUII llln' ralATD ICICI UI QI MD ICII OP UTIONS oo Spar butd 1urnt11o nc1 of 1erod 'fttotc tflr1ot1 oo Jnt11r1tton of _rtlt dttKo Uan 1nd dlf1n1 he nsponso -- Surw1t111nce dltodtoft 1nd oo Sv1t1tnld ciper1tfons 1n 1r1a dented b1 rwcltar 1 us CV w1pon1 o CV dttect1on ond dlfen11 t c1u tng 1ow-1ere1 11owo1cttn1 HlpoftH ogent Spaco taooact nd 1pace- 1 v tld - Notse-ftllod IF oM1ronntnt oo Dttect1on cance111111t1t of to counter ftrst use or nv 1e1r CN oweo VUY LONG-IAHEo LONG-DDLRANCE AIR SUtVEILL lfCE CR QIC to THE TACT ICM CCIOWlll I oo ono Stau1UfttaUI ttN Ind by t11ue -- S1nsor1 1 proce11tnt 111111 IAffL EFltLD lDAIISJON IN IIP1'N tnta- v1ttnt - ait ewohe fros 111 tacfl o E1fofa1tfa11 ef crtttc11 ftald f1ctlt1t11 IH d1p1oya nt IIOdel WO KARFAIE - Super-1ccw1te non-nucle1r Wlpclfto wtttl t111or9d efftcU tow-1eat rate ATIN 1tr dtfeMH o 41 t1 t1 of 1tatttd ertent - ooo COll'e ts for r aupp1J oo v CONIIIIUOUS CPUA1'1DNS -o Sust1tntn1 tauaan perfo -nco o KtghtottN a 1r1ttans - Enw1ro nt11 protect10ft ' areas dt1111d bl CII and Sr GJlff 11plott111Dt1 oo Acce1er1ted J1Rle1r CII procldwr11 oo PII fOIW 1wa1l1t t1tly t I 1111 - t1rafa1t1 ooooo ports 1tr r 111uppl1 nades ttc IIUC1Hr tfft tl IMPRAc TICA ITY fl 11GCIP COICHTUTIDI oo lnt19r1t1011 of SNl 1 llfttt o eraUOftl wttll 1Urwh1bl1 ca- nd and control 11101 ICI UVIIO IU1' - and strtbl MVAL IIAIFAII -- St1t1ttt techM1CID' - Kto conttpts vr air defense o fttw 111111111 S f h Stp 1tun 1vppr111tot1 ASW ltnll dtsruptton ASII woons IYOldlftCI o lnt119rat1on of 1oca1111ttoa -- Disrupting dtsperud _ CClllllllnd and CDfttl'01 - tt 191Hty nqu1rld far 1111t1tnld ftro paar oPP1 tc1tto11 o Decantr11tr111011 and oflttto of current'1 noNID IUa flQcl f1ct1 ttfe1 ooIoo nuc1Hf w1poft sur111 o1nun1nca ooo mamnc AND SPACE IWIFME SLITAIJCID STU THSC OIEUTIONS o- Oper1t1cm 111 - rldt1ttaR en t rol'llllftt o Dt sperslld force f en tttn cl Matssnr DEWELOPIClff EFFltTlWI 111D -- Spac dt NCtlCI ene u 19 rt1l M_ pa7off oo i r s potnt defooo ruclHr kt11 Ind MIMIUC1Hr tt11J o Surwe1T1ince tupUat to co111ter netr1tto at o talLITY MILlff MD FIIPMI SMII AS A MIFMI DCIWI oo o1ot1o dltecl1Dft ant re ponH to fluttng 1f9htt1111 of r oncentr1ttan1 - l1ptd obtltt of llflh flrapo119r 1 st- oo CofNttN r 1 fntarca torl 1N1 '1ractadl enerw wapou oo llted for s1te1ltte 111tot oren11 II-3 oo Sp ace-11unmtd 111tt1r 'llft toett1 CM- OPPORTUNITIES RISKS Impact or Opportunity Technical Rfiks 1 Mtss1on Value 2 Technology Impact on M1sston System 3 P1rv11tv1n1ss 4 Nature of Impact s Leverage Exploits Asymmetry l Stmpltcfty 6 7 Cost a u s -u s s R 1 Maturity of Technology 2 T1chnol ogy Base 3 Innovation Potentta1 Sy1tem Oper1tton11 Concept Risks 1 Mission System Related Risks 2 Palfttc11 Bureaucratfc Environment 3 Ltve1 of Operational Support Impact Existence of Altern1ttv11 9 Duration of lml lct RID Costs 1 Manufacturing Base 2 Uniqueness of Military R D What follows 1s a d1scu ss1an of these c r1ter1a and I methodology for value wt1ghtfng or ranking the various technologtts according ta a figure of merit Deftn1t1on of Criteria Impact or Opportunity 1 Mission Value Technologies which support crft1ca1 o issfons wfll 11ways be assigned the highest rating Strategic forces for example have h1 s tortca11y received the highest pr1orfty tn both the u s and u s s R space fs another 1re1 of vary h1gh_mfss to v11u1 ' 2 I act on s stem Mtss1on Some techno1og1es 1r1 absolutely essent a or certa n c1p1 tes ooIoo nuclear power for SSBNs large very high speed computers for IMD The closer a technology 1s to creot- 1ng ar sustaining the mission capab11tty the more ovalueo 1t contains 3 Pervasiveness If I technology contrtbutes some value to I wfdt variety of systems or m1sston-s it has o emulative impact 1ch 11 very htgh Certainly camputers and VHSIC would fall 1nto thts category 4 Nature of Impact If the tmpact of a technology 11 fmmtd11t1 then tt has higher v1iu1 than on1 1ch produces gradual or 1vo1ut1on1ry change s levero e Ex 1o1ts u s oou s s R As etr Succ111 tn wrf1re often resu ts ram exp o1t1ng wea ness ofto 1dv1rs1r ' or the explottatton of oneoo owm strength Any technology tatcb exploit 1symmetri11 tn force balance w1111utom1t1cally be of very htgh value The tto 1ng of this fmpact 11 1110 crucial T1chnologt1s 11tch explOft such 11ymmetr1ts 1n tfle near t enn are of 9r11ter value tflan those ldltcb-wt11 tmpact 1 n thelong term II-4 o S1mp11cfty Sfmp11c1ty adds value since 1t adds utflfty systens which are overly complex when used fn a battlefield situation tend to be more vulnerable and unreliable S1mp1fc1ty tn this context does not imply 1 lack of soph1st1cat1on The modern microprocessor 1s I highly complex item lfh1ch adds s1mp11ctty because ft can be packaged tn a very small volume and use lfttle power i- t 7 Cost A technology which radically lowers cost 1s of great mflitary value since many aspects of warfare require the deploynent of high numbers of systems Affordabi 11 ty often becomes I major driver 1n decisions on deployment of certain operational systems 8 Existence of Alternatives A technology his hfgh value if there are no alternatives As an example 1 technology lllflfch offers no alternatives 1s the mi-croprocessor when used to perform very camplex computations fn 1 constrained missile guidance unit I Duration of r eact Warfare and the preparatfons for it are iterative processes 1 one side builds I superior weapon then the other sfde must be expected to respond This response requires I certain amount of time The length of time required for the adversary to respond becanes the ovalue addedo for the technology Tecfln1ca1 Risks 1 Maturfty of Technoloff Emerging technologies are inherently I high risk because of themfted experience 1n thetr app11catfon A weapon des1gnerwt11 always at some pofnt try to ut111ze I mature technology 1f he can afford 1t 2 Technology Base The weapon or system destgner prefers to use technology which 1s practiced within the DoD techni al community Such technologies have less risk than those t1chnologfes llllhfch must be develope or imported 3 Innovation Potential An important element of rfsk ldlen considering investment 1s the avaflab111ty of ogood 1deaso to pursue If industry 11 fully exploiting the range of o otlable options DoD investments IIIIY add little SYstem Operat1ona1 Concept Rtsks 1 Mission S stem Related Risk Atechnology's rtsk can 1110 be directly o t e newness o t e system concept wht ch ft supports If the concept 1s new then there 1s more risk even 1f the technology re ate requtred to support the concept 11 not 1n itself risky There ire many factors 1n add1tton to technology lfh1ch aust be constdered when implementing a new concept Il-5 2 PoHt1ca1 Bureaucrattc Envfronment Jn1tftutton11 1nert1a 11 a fact or Hte Ir a new concept uses technology tn o new way Illich competes with established s1sterns infrastructures or fnternattonal agreements then_ 1t wtll entatl mre rfsk to employ o 3 Level of Operational Support If new systens or new use of technology results tn unique sktl I requirements fac1 1ft1es or support tnfr11tructure the risk of successful operattonal deployment ts raised Costs 1 Manufactur1nl Base lf the deployment of I new technology requires the est16 11 ment of a complete manufoctur1ng c1p1b111ty the cost of advanced technologies can be capital tntenstve Not only are the costs higher tn this cfrcumst1nc1 but the deployment will tn 111 1fkel1hood require a longer tfmet1bl1 2 Unfgueness of Mf11tary RID If technology ts primarily cammerc1al the bob may rely heavily on RID already underway within cammercfal enterprises If not DoD must itself became the developer of the technology Thts technology must then bear the full cost and rtsk of evolving the required know-how Again there 111n 1mplted rtsk tn bearing such R D expense o ' Figure of -rtt The figure of rner1t developed by the DSB panel ts c11cu11ted by dfvfd1ng opportunity by risk Panel members wre asked to examine 11ch technology by the above crtterf1 ind to judge whether the opportunfty rtsk was hfgh medium or low for each crft1rion This judgmentoo then quanttfted tn the following manner High Rtsk o 9 High Opportun1 ty o t Moderate Rfsk o 4 Moderate Opportunityo 4 Low Rfsk o 1 Low Opportunityo 1 A logartthmtc spread 9 4 1 o n2 where n o 3 2 1 was used f nst11d of 1 linear spread 3 2 1 1n order to sharpen and 1cc1ntu1t1 differences among the three levels htgh medium 1nd low See Appendtx for an analysis of the Figure of Merit using other weightings 3 2 11nd 27 8 1 o n3 -1Chere n o 3 2 1 The figure of 1111r1t is determined by summing the dtvtd1ng by theo of the rtsk factors o Ft gure o Mtrt t o opportunity factors and S portuntttes i sks Table U-2 s-hows a sample ftgure of merit c1lcul1tf II-6 II llltf' o ootooJ o ' 5 o -flJI IHI llJl- o 911 fUf RJI- o ct liij iliiilShiiij Cl Pls HIL li Slid'i iii 1au111u11_ IIUtll ldllH l o Utlll ti IOtld II UIIIIII Jillbllt fl II Cl iiillill4 Hi it161ij Cl iiij IA ido 111 Cl J IrJM n 1 Hlj JI IIIZllq willl fll ms '' Cl iilSS IRIS fl rilHllllr lllHR a o 1 n 1n111 fl c 1111111111113 fS Pm 1HII ''1819r fl liit Wliiil fl NOI V10l1Vl I83W JO 3H09I 31dWYS 2-II 318Y1 Order of M19nftude T1chnolo91 1s In sorttng out the order of magnitude ttchnologfes the DSB panel began wtth a 11rger 11st of candidate technologtes and technology tntensfve mfss1on areas ind pruned down the 11st usfng the crtterta and the figure of mertt see Table 11-3 Ltst of Technology Candidates Th111st of '17 technologtes llfltch an1rged from thts process ts shown tn Table 11-4 Table IJ-4 11sts the technologies tn order of priority according to the ffgur1 of mertt opportuntty rtsk column and fndtc1tes the nature of impact from I systo or 1pp11cat1on point of view Table 11o4 also lfsts the tnv1stment status of the technology Nhtch wtll be discussed 1n greater clet1t1 f n the foll ow1 ng 11ctf on The DSB panel ricogn1zes that the ffgure of mertt fs only one of many devices ldl1ch could have been used to quantify what fs 1ssentt1lly I judgment about the rellttvt wo'rth The value of-the figure of merit however lies 1n the fact that 1t forces the dectston maker or the analyst to consider 1 full spectrum of issues embedded 1n the cr1terta C1r1 must be taken 1n tnt1rpr1t1ng the figure of fferit tn certain cases where rtst 11 very low 1 very small denominator can overdr1ve the FOM Tablt Il-5 shows for 1x1mple 1 that the top 10 of 17 ttchnologfes change if one considers only opportuntty higher numbers or risk lower numbers or FOM the ratio of tho t numbers An tmportani aspect of planning 1s the window of opi ortunfty risk 1n technqlogy ut111zat1on Table II- sho-s the technologfes lllfch 1n the opinion of the DSB panel cauld have near term 5 years impact II-8 TABLE 11-3 LIST OF TECHNOLOGY CANDIDATES DIRECTED ENERGY Short Wavelength Laiers Compact Efficient Chemtcal Lasers Large Soace Structures Adaptive Optics High Gradient Electron Accel Pulsed Powr High Power Microwaves Neutral Particle Beams X-Ray lasers RADAR TECHNOLOGY Space Based Radar Solid State Microwave Components RECTRO-OJ$TICS TECHNOLOGY High Density Monolith EO IR Sensor Systems On-Board Dita Processing Clutter Suppression i Active EO-AO Filters Space Coolers CCMPUT R SCIENCE Supercomputers fncludfng Advanced Algorftfl ls Advanced Software Techniques Machine Intelligence v1sfon speech understanding inference and deduction knowledge bases natural languages Education Technology Optical Computers Microprocessors Based Personal Training Aids Distributed Data Bases COfftJNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY Secure Survivable Conmun1catfons D1strtbuted Corrmunfcat1ons Integrated Data Text and Yofce Networks Packet SW1tch1ng MICROELECTRONICS VHSIC Nan-Yolat11e Solid State Memor1eSi Gracefully Degradable Chip Architectures Optoelectronics POWER AND PROPULSION Adfabattc Turbo-Compound Engtnes Homopolar Electric Drive Systems Adiabatic Turbofan Engines Superconduct1ve Machinery and Switch-Gear Laser Propu1s1oni Electromagnetic Propulsion Space Power PRODUCTION AND REPAIR TECHNOLOGY MUttary Robotics CNJ CM CAT Flexible Mfg Technology Distributed Information Process Control Quantitative Nondestructive Evaluation Net-Shape Proces tng Space Fabrication Techniques BIOCHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY Genetic Engineerfng M1croencapsu1at1an MATERIALS Advanced Ccmposite Materials Toughened Cera ics Rapid So11diffcatfon Technology Compound Sem1conductars Mu1t1phasfc and Layered Compounds Opt1Cl1 Cerami CS SURVIVABILITY ENHANCEMENTS kthe and Passive Stealth EOI Technology Satellite S1stem Harden ng Electronics Low Cost INS A Non-acoustic ASW Acoustic Arrays Clear Day FOSS Active Sonar Autonomous Subnersfbles SPACE WARFARE tflV Ant1ground Spice Wea on STRATEGIC OFFENSE Tennfnal y Guided RVs II-9 TABLE 11-4 Order of Magnitude Technologies ooooooooooooooo J S GJ m _______ - _ eio rlu lzl o---------- oo oo liii '------- _ Systw Appl tcattons 1 YEii HIGH SPEED IIITECRATED CIICUITS _ _ o - - o o - - - - - - - - - - o o o ao o aa o o o o oooo o Sensor Processt19 o A I C lc1ttae o Distributed Preeesstag I Mapttn llriptto and llltdlace z an AND MSSIIE STEM 111 13 13 5 4 7 - - - - - o - - - - - - - - - o -- o o Self Test and lepato lncrustkl Proce11t111 _ -o o a oooo o oo oo o Troop Tntnt111 o pracedurn - otnteMace o wapoa 1a t 1- ro emen o Order Jlagnttude I Adequately Funded to Exploit Deaotlstr1tltn 1 a111o1e Opporttl_ltttes o llelnt111fol a anstnttoo W 1711 o o o - o o o o o o oooooooooo lldly Underfunded lt a 11 raa o Nat11tenanceo o Poorly Coordl111ted and C C Io o Fr1g11111ttd I lelltnd Stitt of Ille Art to lllrdNln o flipllasts on IIISIC Needs Ttdlno111r 1 -tto I o Less bpeestw Altuuttves oo o o Portabl 1lty of Sofbflre o Fistir Sofbart De1t11t1TottD1 I aooooo aooo o o o o o o o o o o o - o o - - - - o o - - - - - ooooooooo-oooo s 4 Nl IASID PaSOML WINI AIDS aa o Hea1tlly o Aggresstn 71 29 1 1 4 t oo Sil Ill oooooo tt - o - o o o o o o- ooo II aad Ytst tltty SUnet11 Japrovad SUntw1bt1 - Decepttono ' 0 DDWl'IDT r ao lnvestaent 1llre1t Capabt1tttaso o laproved Transparencyo to bdar Ent _b o LPI llldlr lftll C-tcaltas J ADIMCED sm 11MU M IOll1111 o o Cost Deereased Stze oo _ r per Function o transparent Ccap1ex1t a - - --------------------o Destab11 tze EM111 High- - o SW 1Yllat11tf ta Ntlh 11nat Status of lpcto 65 5 22 o 3 D ------ --- Nature l11p1ct Potential 41 17 o 2 4 o oo o _____________________ _____ ______ - - - - - - o o Collpress Tratintng Tto o fftlhel' Skt11 Levels o lr1tntng Cost flextbtltt o Ext s Jlanpowr Pool o ------o---- - - - - o o - - -o - - Opportunity Funding Reeded 1411 o--- Dnlntnt -o Divelopaent of TNtat111 Son re far Persona 1 C Uten o An bpert111nt Progro of Sufffctent Size to Jud Effectiveness TABLE 11-4 Cont'd Order of Magnitude Technologie --- h 1 9r ___________Qe r rZB k ____________1 - _n -_ _ _ _ __ I 5 S rsteins Appltcatfons FAfl SOFT FAULT TOLERANT osnF POUCIHGo ELECTitONiCS Nature of J-eact Status S 55 5 25 o 2 2 Qt no central progro -------------------------------- ----------------- ------------------- o ------------------------- ---llo Coht M nt Progro Focvs t Electronic Systet11 AYaflabtltty t Pe astve l1111 1ct on S ste AHtlabiltty 5 RAPID SOLIDIFICATION TECHNOI OGY and Re11abf1ttyo o Ltfe Cycle Costs o Sf111 1 l ft d Test 46 21 o 2 2 o Poor Transition of p fstn Technology alternattqs S20tt ---------- -- ------------ -- ------------------------- ---- ------------------------------- - - - - - o H1gh Thre1t Wefght Jet ngtnes t Adequately Funded o Jncrea_sed Superalloy Teaperature o 'High Specific Stiffness Alrfroo and Space Structures I o 1 and Marine Platfol IIIS Advanced Magnets and S C Araored Hath1nery II SUPERCIJU'UmlS Capability o I-proved Specific Stiffness o life Extension Under utreae Envirol'IIM ntso o Reductton of Strategic Katert1ls Tri-Service Plus DARPA Coordinated Progra111 o Needs Industry COlllllibneftt to Processing SC ale-up 1 52 5 24 5 o 2 1 S9M o o--o-o---o------oo--oo--oooooo-oooao--- Acoustic Array Processors o IMO Radar o Adoanced Hydrod nMtc and 1 Aet-od natc Mocfellfng o Cryptography Jntelltgence Order of Hagnftude l111Provenent HtghR l tt - - ------ o o j d R -All rtt -- o o Broad-Band Stgnal Processtng o Htgh COll p ltattonal Throughputo o Aut01111ttc Progr11111ln9o o large Scale Sl111t 1l1ttons Hald1strlbuted Congressional fkndate not fn best interest of the country o Need Techntca11y Balanced Prag 1 TABLE 11-4 Cont'd Order of Magnitude Technologies _______ ___ o Lliin i _ ___ r n1tv llsi fechnolm Sntw App1 tat tans Nature of lapact stosn _______________________________ t ADVMI CCIIPOSITES 43 21 3 o 2_ a - - - - - -------------- ____ o High Spectftc Sttffaesl o Ltghbletght Fighters l51GL o Near-zero Then11l Eapanstwt 1 Large Space Structures _ ta o o lladlr DE lleapaas I ICllls SLINI I N C C Caaposttes Nore o Inds lore Datgllll' lawl t 11 46 o 1 3 strategic -o--o-o------o --------- -----o-oo-o----o--u-o-o-o - -oo ---- - -DAIPA SIO ---------o Early DetectlOII o 111 91ttt119 DIIIIII Asses_ o Laundl-W r-Attack letarg1tt111 o Theater ud Oceu s nen laaca o o o Tec11Rtca1 Jntelltgenca o fin ud Forget Tacttcal N111t1n II IADIATIIII IIAl DEIDo _AIICED o o o o laproftCI Senstttwtty _ o leso1uttGRo Real 11o Processl o Clutter leJecttoo NTI Process1ng9 o Lock oa After l lwa l11ereased Pk o Increased surwt lbtltt If F1rer - -- -------- ---- -- - - o _ astwa llplCI o s nt ontt e o All Stratetlc Space - 1 - 1 Snnra - o Stll Cl -----ooo ooo ooooon ooo o Current Vork_ ts Fn -alN e Need ras-111 o o Central U SPACE IIUCLUII POll I I a Pawr lletgllto o Cost per Deltwered Effort of $11 SIN R 34 o 1 5 ----o-o o-o--o-oo-o-oo-o-oo-oo-o-oo-- -- ooooo a o r rtZ T C t of Sellsor lllrdeat111 iJ MwlllCICI Space Win and DI Energy Mupon1 I 11111 ti-purpose II llt le llulgme11t Systeas Pnvo Collststs o S sto leffl Proof af o Concepts for Space App1tcattllil o TecllMlogy tntto Pheloeologr a uarcll o Fmltq l nel Adeqllate 43 25 o 1 1 D ECTIOIIICS --o-oo-----o-o-o Naehtner 111111 45 25 5 o 1 8 tacttcal -o--oo--o o oo tow-o -llltllt oo o o----oo-o---Wiatt- o ottoo Oren11 Fundt r hasts lleeded fer lleh1-Nltrta and C C taaposttes for NIP-T lln o ter -H1gh Teaper1taN Clpablltt o lletpt 1tec1uct1o IO lilllMIEIISlffo IDll 1111C FDCAL IUllt MIAYS -na- o WPP an - o oo aao AZ aa -o---o--ooaa o aa I o I I ooo e Nh1loI Effort Gntelot at I ASL o Need SIGN Ataed at - t n t l N TABLE 11-4 Cont 1 d Order of Magnitude Technologies __________ T h 2 291_____________ 222r tZ8 ------ -- Sntens App11cat1ons 13 HIGH POWER MICROWAVE GENERATORS lnnsWnt V -------------ooooooooo oo Status Nature of ll lf acto 56 40 l o 1 4 --------- --------------------------- - --------------------------------- - - -------- -----------------o m-Wave Radar o Lb11 ts J11tpact of 0 11111-WaYe PGft' s o Nny Dtrected Energy Progro 1 lPt Cocmun1cat1ons 111t-Wave o AnttoSt 11sor Antt-Electron1cs Weapons o Antt-Penonnel Weapons Htgh Multiple Shot C1pab111tyo o Power Perfonaance gyrotrons wave FR o 1 S6M DOD $18 NASA 58 2 44 o 1 3 14 LARGE SPACE STRUCTURES - 0 6M $5-lOH Needed to Address T11'9' t Yulnerabt11ty and Hardening o Seriously Underfunded to Exploit Anti-Sensor and Anti-Personnel Weapons t ------------------- --------------- - ---------------- --- -------- --------- - ----- -------------------o Htgh IR Resolution and Senstt1Y1tyo o Totol Progr1111 Inadequate to 1 SAME AS FOCAL PlANE ARRAYS AND SPACE WED W APONS I o High Gtino o Lorge Sune111ance Coverage o lorge oJnstantaneauso Lethal Rangeo w 15 OPTOnECTROfUCS Address Efficient Erection o DoD Progra Ataed Prt11artly at Adaptive Optics t NASA Prvgr111S Aimed Pr1M11'11y at Buildfng Ltghtwetght Structures ff'Ofll '1eta111c R1bbo s o DoD-NASA Coordtnatton Reeded to Define Down-Streu oe onstr1ttons 37 28 25 o 1 3 J1SH Includes Cofflb1ned Device ---- ----------- ------- --------------- ------------- --- - ------ - ----- ------------------------ o COllhined Yoice Dita and o Protection fro11 Ml 8'1' and o Hostly F1bt r Opttcs Y1deo Comuntcattons Al IIOte Ytston and Sensors o Bro dblnd Hore SV hable Data Links o Ord r or Hagnttude Improv@ment Ground loopso ' ' o Htgh beta Rates o lfetght and Yolllll Reduction o Cost Reduction 1 I Technology and several str1tton Projects Funding Adequate IJellOn -o -- - TABLE 11-4 Cont'd Order of Magnitude Technologies oor o tW tsiiiinr o 4 ' - aca am 11a1m _ ' - liffl IJ o U Z 14 o 1 1 ooo o o oooo' 4 oo ooooo' ' --oo-ooo oooo--ooooooooo oo _-o I ' LU ff lllff@fjl Ill - ntt1 t o111stu IMIOlis Letllll o Sutaitrt_ MIVlft o 1111tllt 111 o t tto I ---o-to Fa r S1o Dteo o '91ttf1e SIIII ea Mllt nes@ Shbd o 11 o 1 o srr ooo o Order of lllgntlude o -oo--t It-- 1 d o e UndertwtN 111 11111 tewe -111 Arel Slier llnel Htp Power Lann o Fudtftl o t l J DMM La a anstratto 11 1111 are C 1tratat11 ooomr d lnearclll I o TABLE 11-5 TOP 10 TECHNOLOGY ORDERING BY OPPORTUNITY HIGH BY RISK LOW BY FOM HIGH Very High Speed Integrated Al gor1thms Very High Speed Integrated Circuits Circuits Stealth Stealth Microprocessor-Based Personal Learning Aids Machine Intelligence Advanced Software Algorithms Rapid So11d1ftcatfon Technology Short Wavelength Lasers Microprocessor-Based Personal Learning Aids Advanced Composites Very High Speed IC Fail Safe Fault Tolerant Technology Stealth Large Space Structures Rapid So11d1ficatton Technology Super Computers High Density FPAs Machine Intelligence Advanced Software Fafl Safe Fault Tolerant Technology High Power Microwaves Fa11 Safe Fault Tolerant Technology Super Computers Satellite System Hardening Advanced Composites Super Computers High Density Monolithic Focal Plane Arrays Tact 1ca1 -- u_-is Density Monolithic Focal Plane Arrays Tactical Hfgh Optoelectronics TABLE 11-fi ORrER CF NAGNITUIE TECHNOLOGIES THAT COULD HAVE NEAR-TERM 5 YEARS IMPACT FON 4 7 Very High Speed-Integrated Cfrcufts 4 2 Packet Swftcbfng 4 2 Integrated Data Text and Voice Networks 3 0 Stealt h 2 a Distributed Data Bases 2 Adiabatic Turbo-Ccxnpound Engines 2 4 2 4 o Advanced Software Algorithm-Development Microprocessor-Based Personal Learning Atds 2 4 Space Coolers 2 2 R1p d-Soltdffic1tion Teehnology -2 1 Super _ Compu ters 2 0 ' Advanced tomposi-tes -1 o a Ho1h--- Power -Mtcrowave --Gene aton -II l 6 _ JNVES1MENT STRATEGY FOR TOP o17A D The DSB panel examined the nature and quantity of resources befng dedf cited by DoD to development applfcat1on of the Top o11 In performfng this evaluatfon the panel asked a series of questions which could be considered 1n retrospect as an tnvestnent ocatechismo o What ts 1t What fs this effort trying to accomplish definfng the technology sufficiently well to dfscrfm1nate ft from other similar technologies t Why 1s 1t important Assuming success at difference can ft make to the user or tn a mission area context taking into account the nature and 11mft1tfon for current practice o What 1s the current status What 1s the Don program What should ft be What fs new about the proposed effort and why w111 this approach be successful o How long wfll ft take How much w111 tt cost What are the measures of success Appendix C of thfs report answers these questions 1n some det111 for each of the tech olog1es 1dent1ffed the 1nformat1on 1s also summarized fn Table II-4 Some of these technologies are being adequately funded but some are not It should be noted that the vast majority of the oorder of magnitudeo technologies lie fn the electronics area Currently the electronics area commands a relatively low percentage of the total budget There 1s I need to reorder fundfng prtorftfes w1thfn the Technology Base to correct this imbalance Table II-7 lists those technologies Nhfch tn the opfn1on of the pinel are under-invested and suggests more 1ppropr11te funding levels and areas of emphas1 s The total annual level of the 1ddftfonal funding required to support these new tn1t1atfves 1s 1pproxfmately $75M These efforts ire 1pproprf1tely Exploratory Development efforts Recommendations regarding increases tn 1 and 6 3A efforts ire treated elsewhere tn this report The panel felt that there were not only deffcfenctes fn fundtng b t fn certain 1r11s deftcfencfes tn the way DoD has managed technology funding Certain programs could benefit from the vertically integrated program structure of the YHSIC Program managed by DoD K- elements of th1s program summarized at length f n Appendix 8 are o Centralized management and coordfnatfon of the total Trt-Servfce progrm wfth fenced funding to nsure 1ccount1b111ty o The tnclusfon under one fndustrfal organ1zatfon of 111 aspects of a technology's development a d transition into mt11t1ry systems e g oo processes desfgni material etc o Cont1nu1ty of the industrial team s fran early technologf developme t through _transftfon t -system ap pttcattons II-17 TABLE 11-7 Underinvested Technologies that Could Make an Order of Magnitude Difference USHNQJJIY CURRENT RECOfiiMENDED - - 'YJ J G FYGJ G 1 AIDlllM 30 STATUS MD IEDED Etl'IIAIII lloifflAfflES THIN FAST ALGORITHNS AND AUl'OMTED PROGIWltlN 0 111-MSED LEARNING AIDS a fl J 9 15 t PIALDISTRIBUTED 13 2 20 m r ' I ClO MQIINE IIQEU IGENCE 1 ltAD1ATION HARDENED Ml'IANCO w crROIIC$ U 7 o ' SPACE NUCLEAR PGIB U 7 - NIii POIIEII ICDAVE GENERATOR$ Q fl 5 7 15 SPACE STRUCTURES U 1 SHORT lfAYElD6TH LASERS 1 i o LARGE SCALE fl DB LING HWKISFRA6 NTED ADVANCED ElltTIIONIC 1 ' - o FIELD APPLICATIOII EXPERIIBTS 1 o 10 5 6 DOD 12 l NASA a 3 15 1 50-100 Klla CfflPAa NUCLEAR IIEACTO$ I ANTI1 1 TECHftOLOGY INTEGRATION AND DBI NASA DOD COORDINATION CRUCIAL o NEV CONCEPTS 18 5 FY82 27 FY82 t ar1PLETE CRITICAL DalONSTRATIONS The pane1 1derit1ftld cert1fn of these oorder of magn1tudea technologies as sufted for I management structure v1sfb111ty and htgh level attention 11mf11r to that of the VHSIC program o o o o o Machine 1nte111gence Advanced software algorithm technology High power microwave generation Advanced materials rapid so1fd1f1catfon advanced canposftesJ Microprocessor-based personal learning 11ds Scenarfo-Based T echnolopy Planning Tables lI-8 and IJ-9 fn a sense close the loop on the planning process suggested 1n this chapter by correlating fn matrix fashion the top 17 technologies with the post-1990 scenarios and the 1ntegr1ttng factors Table 11-8 illustrates the correlation with the integrating fa tors end Table Il-9 the correlation with the scenar1o-drfven technical requtrements sunrnar1z1d 1n Table II-1 The process of course fs not 1s ocut end dryo as tt appears here 1n its summary form The scenario sel1ctfon 1 for example 1s an iterative process One cannot select I scenario without having some fdea of the systems and operational concepts which are going to be employed In other words technology drives the scenarios to I certafn extent since new technology may provide I new approach to warfare and change the original scenario One must also keep fn the forefront that the dfsc1p1fne entitled in the Ftgure of Mertt methodology 1s more important than the numbers Thfs discipline 1s what gives the Order of Magn1tudea technologies Jfst 1ts credib111ty The FOM suffers from the inherent problems 1ssocfated with any scheme to put numbers on dissimilar factors and then attempt to measure r1l1t1ve importance by adding up the numbers Inherent 1n such I technique 1s the fmp11c1t assumptfon that the d1ss1m11ar factors considered ere 111 of equa1 relative t portance sfnce the numerfc1l scale 1s being applied to each one Obvfous11 thfs fs not necessarily so end the FOM approach makes no allowance for such varfation 1n relative importance of either the oopportunityo factors or the or1sto factors Care must be taken that one or I few of the factors gfven I ratfng do not 1n a sense control the opportunf tyo or or1sto Jn Tables JJ-8 and IJ-9 for example the matrices illustrate the pervasive nature of certain technologies like YHSIC fa11-safe fault-tolerant electronics mchtne 1nte111gence and electro-optics Short wavelength 1asers on the other hand have I cr1tfca1 but rather narrQw app11cat1on 1n spice This app11cat1on alone however would be important enough to place ft higher on the 11st than 1t achieved through the FOM calculatfon A m1ss1on ratfng of ogu may be too small tn thfs instance and thus became 1 ocontrollingo factor fn I negatfve sense because the technology has narrow 1ppltc1t1on and would get low scores 1n other categories L1tew1se among the orisko factors there could very possibly be some controllingo factors Jn the example the risk 1s moderate to low except for the oPo1ft1ca1 Bur1aucr1tic Enviroment II-19 CD o o o I i i 1 i JI I e I 5 -- I o 1 I II Cf bit I I I11j II i s1 n aJ 'I I ts I ii J -J a I ' ot1i Ii - 1 1 i i i I IHI o a - - _ 's ' _ - _ _ - -- - _ _ Iii o t o o o o o o o o o o o o ' o o o o -- o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o II o o - - o o - -o o o o o o - o -- o o - -- - - - o - - - o o - - -- -o o -- - o -- - - o o - - - - - - - -- o -- - -- - - - o o o o o I - 1 - - - -- - - - - - o - - o I I to i J o ldi II j 4fl d I f l JI P 11 1 I I II - 1 1 JdJi I J IIiii 11 I I ti Ii I I Ji lI I I 11 - ' o IJ 11-21 l Tht s factor gets a o1o apparently because 1t requires I ch1nge to -tnt1rnatfonal or arms control 1gr11ments It 111ntirely possible that such I change would be so sens1t1ve 1nd create so much tnternattonal c_ontroversy as to be totally fmpractfcal to it tempt In such I s1tuat1on 1t does not matter how low the rtsk fs on the other factors 1f thfs factor alone m1k1s the concept totally 1mpr1ctfc1ble 1 then the total rfsk factor should reflect such influence So long 11 tt ts recognfzed that 111 of these factors tn the FOM are not necessartly of equal relative importance and that one or soffl of them may be contro111ng then the approach can be extramely useful In further development of the FOM for p11nnfng purposes some othod should be dfvised for t1kfng into 1ccount the r1l1ttve importance of various factors under p1rtfcul1r c1rcumst1nc1s Such 1 othod must recogntze the potential for ocontrollingo factors lI-22 CHAPTER 111 EVALUATION OF CURRENT TECHNOLOGY BASE INVESTMENT o o oo o o o CHAPTER III EVALUATION OF CURRENT TECHNOLOGY BASE INVESTMENT A TECHNOLOGY BASE INVESTMENT In the course of its evaluation of the Top 17 cr1tfca1 technologies the DSB Panel attempted to o Ascertain the overall technology base investment strategies of OSD and the Services o Develop I structure for co11ecttvely dfsplayfng these diverse s rategtes 1n terms of FY 1981 resource 111ocat1ons o Provide I broad perspective on the nature of currint technology base investment strategy Representatives from OSD and the Services provided the Panel with briefings on their respective strategies the major elements of which are summarized below 1 DoD Technology Base Investment Strategy OSD provides an assessment of the overall DoD t chnology base investThe hfgh11ghts of such strategy are documented 1n the Technology Area Descr1pt1ons TAD These TADs include ment strategy Baste program descr1pt1on o - Broad objectives - o Ffscal sunmary Representative program thrusts Program analysis - correlatton of program 1th technology needs of mi ss1on area summary - Major technological oportunittes Accamplfshments techn1ca1 and management - -Technology o change and fntetlfgence assessment - Program strengths and weakn sses o Management strategy o Technical g als Long range trends IJl-1 o ' ' The technologies htgh11ghted at the OSD level o o o o o o 11 being more 1mportant are Very h1 gh speed fntegrattd c1rcu1ts VHS-IC Manufacturing technology Precision guided munfttons 1n I battlefield envfronnent Advanced materials Directed- energy Chemfc1l warfare 2 U S Navy Technoloqy Base ln estment Stratep The Navy 6 1 and fi 2 which ts under one commander the CNR CND formulates fts technology base thrusts on the basts of near and long tenn naval needs emanating from the Chief of Naval Operationso deficiency and need statements Mission and Technical Area Strategies are then developed 1n response to these needs for the exploratory development phases The planned overall technology base investment strategy ts 6 2 6 1 251 Basic research closely associated with potent a1 application 331 Generic technologies new emerging state of the art advanceant 751 Evolutionary r search across the spectrum of disciplines 1 5 high rtsk h1gh payoff 671 Focused technology work which addresses spectffc operational needs The following technology areas- have been identified by the CNO tn concert unusu l promise for tho Navy for the next 10 or 15 with the CRN CND as holding years Electronic Devices Materials Art1f1ctal Intelligence-and Robot Comput1 ng Mn Hmeter Mtcrowave Sensor Sources Fiber- Optfcs tnclud1nt sen-sorsl Surveillance and Gutdance Spaca Technalogy Stgnature Reduction 01 rectefl Energy lnsansith _Expt 0tfv11 - In an effort to emphasize programs 1n these and ther areas the Na vi has established a series of 6 1 and - Special Focus Progr ms For example some of the most s1gn11 cant new 1n1ttat1Yes in FYsz include Advancedo C o on Intercept Missile 111-2 i - o I i Broadband Passive Sonar Processtng CW BW Defense High Perfonnance Undersea Weapon Warhead Large Aperture Submarine External Array Marginal Ice Zone Masking surface Ship Noise Solid D1electr1cs Space guard Strategic Sea Strafts VLSI Architecture 3 A1r Force Technology Base Investment Strategy The Air Force investment strategy results from several diverse but related act1vit1es namely o Development of a long range technology strategy Director of Plans Air Force Staff o The A1r Force Systems Command AFsc -analysis and planning effort under Project Vanguard which - by the analyzes the future threat to mi ss1on effectiveness and the nature of projected syste deficiencies provides recommendations on system development priorities o Analysis and investment strategy efforts of the Director of Ai r Force laboratories whf ch rely heavily on technical foputs from the Air Force laboratories 4 u s Army Technology Base Investment Strategy The Army's investment strategy evolves through the interactions occurring fn 1ts established Research Development and Acqufsft1on Process A key element inserted into this process 1s the Airland Battle 2000 concept which projects twenty years into the future and was developed to guide inter alia future material acquisitions and to ensure a concept-based requirements system This concept provides a basis for additional more detailed mission area analyses which in turn identifies specific deficiencies vis-a-vis the threat defines and prioritizes material operational needs and develop funding goals which are then addressed by the development community in science and technology plans developed for each mission area Based upon analys1 s to date the following technologtes ire the highest priority for Anny investment o __ Annor anti-arrrior technology reactive- armor active armor advanced materials test bad prototypes fmproved conventional armament systems HAW MAW hypervelocity rocket top attack weapons tank gun ammo improvements III-3 o fcroelectronfcs very hfgh_spe tn eg ated c1rcu1ts spec1a1 purpose LSI VLSI ultra high frequency circuits o Electro-optics technology far infrared focal planes automated sensors low energy 1a$ers opttcal EO CCM 1 EO models special purpose sensors o o 8 M4 wove technology _ MM wave components radar PGM 1 m1sstle guidance EW demonstrations Conl 1Un1cat1ons_ Chemical warfare technology individual protection CB detection and warning decontam1natfon co11ect1 ve protection tratn1ng chemical deterrence smokeoobscurat1on MGAMEBOARDo APPROACH TO REVIEWING INVESTMENT STRATEGY As 1s evident the DoD technology base investment is very complex In its attempt to under tand the total DoD fnvestr aent the DSB Panel 1dent1ffed two different kinds of risk assoc1oted with technology development 1 Technology Risk - 1 measure of the difficulty of 1ch1ev1ng pe formance thresholds necessary for success fn a mtlttary apptfcatton and 2 S steml Mission Risk - a measure of the fnstftut1ona1 dtff1cult1es of transit on1ng a technology fnto an-operational system due to the impact on doctrine and operations To gain a perspective on how t e DaD 1s actually a11ocat1ng its technology base resources 1n terms of these risks the panel created a table which treats these types of risk as separate variables the liGamebaardN Table III-1 o This type of assessment was not intended as a method for developing the technology base plan but rather as a retrospective review of the plan The OSD and DARPA program managers were given this table and asked to distribute their FY 1981 program ar iong the quadrant Table III-2 sur marfzes the results of this effort These results are-qu 1te 1ntere1t1ng They show that DoD invests heavily 1n two quadrants 1 the h1gh technology rf-sk high mission risk quadrant e g oo programs such as DARPA's Directed Energy Program and 2 the evolutionary quadrant programs such as aerodynamics and nav1gat1on The most 1mportint r sult of looking at the DoD technology base investment using this approach 1s th 1dent1ffcat1on of the very low emphasis placed on the upper left-hand quadrant the low technology risk high mission risk area C ANALYSIS OF-ASYMMETRIES IN GAMEBOARD When one views the dollars allocated- by the DoD to the majo techn logy areas fTable IIl-3 some question could arise as to th balance or co sfstency of the fund1 ng- 1eve1 based on future need The Panel sought to exam1 ne the dtstributton of-dollars on the 11 ga111eboard 11 see Table III-4 as a means of gaintng insight into the-way the OoD f nds technology The fo11ow1ng comments are me-ant to h1glll1ght what appears to be some of the consistencies and inconsistencies n funding patterns 1n terms-of _general technol gy areas UI-4 I o 1 f I TABLE III-1 TECHNOLOGY BASE oGAMEBOARD '11V SYSTEM FlnCTHII NJSSION IHICI 111k I ElTEISlDI CF CURIPCT SYSTIIIS MISSION MRROII NISSION ocus t M EXISTING SYSTEM lllSSlOK E s N1111on S St o Tecta1101ogy lfld 1111110ft Syato 111k - - E 01uttoa1ry CURl NT SYSTIK MISSION As 1so MORI MD IEffll r THE SANEo COST IEDUmON SHNJFtCMT IIRFOINFCE llll COfCEPT ADVAIICI 'IECHNOUIIY IISI o o o A - A o - -- TABLE I I I-2 FY81 TECHNOLOGY BASE PROGRAM t oo I BITSfflf PUICTIDI o _ lllm 111DSIOI IIF CUIIIIT SIITIIIS IIJSSJOIIJ II IIISSJON FOCUS CF M a DISTIii SISTBI IIISSJON aum m1111 NISSIOI w-1s ooo au ss z oo SJ07 IN SIU DI Slit ZN SU Ill Slo 111 Sl43 7N $415 111 1177 M aa a 1112 111 m _ CUfCEPT o r ' Ill I TABLE 111o3 DOLLAR ILLfCATION BY MAJOR TECHNOLOGY AREA -i 1 Computero Networks and Software L 2 Materials 111 1 3 Dtracted Energy 127 2 4 M1croelectronfcs and E11ctrontc Dev1 es 133 4 i s Commun 1c1Uon1 75 2 Navtgattan 8u1dance and Con rol 75 0 7 N1crawave Devfces 30 0 a Vthfcular T1chnology oo Optics 10 Sensors 299 3 11 Power and Propulsion 248 0 12 M1111t1ons 233 5 13 Ant1-Submartn1 Warfare 180 2 14 Education T1chnology 15 Manuf1cturfr19 Technology 16 Chemtc1l W1rf1re 8fologfc1l Warfare 17 Electran1c Warfare 35 5 18 Bfochem1c1l Technology and Genetic Engfneer1ng 94 4 19 Other j $110 3M 359 0 5 3 48 174 7 1 4 234 0 The programs directly tfed to ASW 1 g undersea 1cau1tfc11nd non-acoustic are shown here certain other technologfes have 1n-tmp1ct on ASW e g oo sensors III-7 J r TABLE Ul-4 o ISTRIBUTION OF DOD FY81 TECHNOI O Y BASE BY MAJOR TECHNQLOGY AREA 11111 SYSTEJI FUICTIOI NISSJOI Io -nff oo111111oo--oo o-- -roo Illo l1C1111 ICl1Nlll__ fuao11 11 1n1_IQI GIIJ I I NHo CIU 11 CIIooo I o I ffll 111 1111 oo S TWHI IUIU IJ0 21f_ 11aa ooo -nint J o F 'ca tm'fflr 211' a a lo t o o oi1tl 1c li 11C1 tbn111111 I USO GR 1a1 lntc111 a1 1 ClalLIH lltloIIU o 11 Cfl t1 uu l lf J --1m rfflr 10 llCII 1111 oo M-Mt B oan ftft 8' IH ocn ms 11 n EITEIISIGI IF CUIIIEII' acrftl 11111 f IIJSSlGI SYSTEN IIARROI MISSION FOCUS C AN 11STINI SYSTEM MISSION -oo oo rUI o Coon11oooo J1C11 11 cut Gil Io ooo1W l lu1111c1 oo Io IR fllfllLI 12J at 'ho ICIIL I I o NISSIOI oas 15a Conoo 0121o111 wu IHLIIN ClllloCIIU OJ_fll NY o CIUo _ 19 o CUARENT SYSTDI ooooo I UI l r 11' 111111 CIHoo - NUtln I IIY C o lltPIIIICII ' f1aJNLC1 IIIITIC 1 oNORE AND BITTEi' a THE SM1o COST IMTIGI- -rll ' 'o ua 1111 oo ' I o 11a 111e - u r w sar 11 ICTINICI 1 onooocaffJ'H ooo fi l o11o 'g--ot 1au 1 f1caa11 ICI CN4 IIU o CIH o2IU f19 9'JlJZ o t n at no1c o o 111 111 SIHIFICAn PERFOIIWIC TICHIIDUJU 1111 III-8 mo 111 ADVAIICI NEIi- CONCEPT 1 t 2 con uter and Networks o Dfstrfbuted fairly evenly among quadrants o Conwnerctal industry has doA1nant technology RID dr1vei and leads in app11catton Th1s lead argues for a s1gn1f1cant emphasis on the Mfssfon System-based rfsk area Such emphasis does not exist M1terf1ls t 3 The d1strfbut1on w1thfn the gameboard seems appropriate Directed Energy o Thts techno-logy area 1s by far the largest single area fn any one quadrant The 1ssue here 1s payoff risks versus 1arge dollar 1eve1s requ1 red o 4 Mfcroelectronfcs and Electronic Devices o s COfflrllun1cat1ons Technology o 6 o ' Navigation guidance and control efforts are dfstrfbuted 1n two quadrants Evolutionary Technology and System-based risk ' The h1 h r fsk effort seems too high given the maturf'ty of many key technologies of the_ probable 9ayoff Microwave Devices o 8 11 The balance seems appropriate Navtgatfon Guidance and Control o 7 The relative distribution among the quadrants seems out of 11ne Stnce corrrnerctal R D 1s an important RID driver there should be more emphasis 1n the mfsston systern-based risk areas No low risk entries are shown on the gameboard It seems that there should be some support in the system mfssfon-based risk area for new concepts n EW etc Vehicular Technology Power and Propulsion o o The overall dollar levels seem h1gh 1n light of the probable payoff espectally fn comparison with sensor computer and soft-ware technologies The d1ff1cutty in brtngfng thfs number down 1s that platform cos t R D ts very h1 gh III-9 o 9 0Dt1cs o 10 Optics 1s 1n rtght quadrant high risks but totals only $5 3M This may be adequate sfnce the real oo rder of magnttude 11 optics adapttve opt1cs 1s covered under other tftles Sensors Thts technology area seem to have too lfttle 1n comparison with other-quadrants 1n the Mfssfon System-based risks quadrant o 12 Munitions o 13 There should be some 1n esttgatton of the low technical risk hfgh mission system rfsk quadrant 1n th1s technology area There ts no effort identified ASW o o 14 ASW 1s weJl dtstrfbuted in quadrants but the resource level seems low The 1fm1tat1on 1s probably one f too few technical opportunities Education Technology oo 15 Education technology should be less evolutionary since this ts commercially driven and more oriented toward overcmfng mission system-based risk Manufacturing TechnologY o 16 It 1s interesting there 1s no funding 1n Mission Systemfor manufacturing tec nology DoD should be looking at new but low rfsk manufacturing technology for quantum jumps in m1 ss1on capab11tty based risk quadrant CW BW o 18 o This area 1s underfunded ff one considers the extent of the Soviet threat B1ochem1ca1 and Bfomed1ca1 Technology and Genetic En91neerin9 o Mo$t of the emphasis 1s on biomedical and little on genetic engi- neering Indus ry push 1s on he use of genetic engineering for drug b1ochem1ca1 productfon an ts sufftc1ent to move the technology DoD needs to emphasize m111t ry appltcat1on$ fncludfng preventive medicine The above d1scussfon ts not intended to be a conclusive evaluation with regard to the current investment st ateqy The DSB panel did however find the 11 gameboard 11 analysis to be a useful exercise and recommends that ASD R T and the Service technology base managers consider using 1t in their own planning strateg1 es as a means af balancing risk and opportun-ity in their pur uft fa coherent fnv stment p lfcy Itl-10 D ADEQUACY OF THE TOTAL LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGY BASE FUNDING The DSB summer study panel found no ratfonale for judgin the total magnitude of the DoD technology base investment as too little or too much The focus of criticism concerning the DoD's pro ram is the organfzat1on and management of this program The DSB panel felt that major gains could be had 1n the actual output f the technology base program throu9h o Greater usage of vertically integrated programs See Appendix H o 1 Elimination of redundancy of efforts among the Services and 1n areas of common interest with NASA e g oo remote sensing propulsion Reduction of the in-house execution of the basic research program 6 1 111-11 1v TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION - CHAPTER IV ' ' o a TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION The question of technology base can be viewed at different levels and from var1 ous pot nts of v1 ew o o o Maintenance of an adequate technology base for supporttng a broad spectrum of mi lttary needs Ident1ffcat1on of new and 1nnovatfve technology for military systems Successful transition of new technology 1nto the m11ttary systems Th1 s 1ater aspect 1s of primary importance and yet fs often one of the biggest barriers 1n providing U S farces with capable systems at affordable cost Jn the context of the military balance in tenns of lead and lag the length of the technology transition period fs crucial The DSB panel tdent1f1ed a number of barriers to the successful transition of techno1ogy o Part1t1ontng the research _ development and product ton process tnto separate organizations and contractors o Lack of involvement of potential users 1n the est1b11shmant of requirements and the resulting programs o Lack of fenced budgets to allow the product actfvft1es to fund transition of desired technology o The fatlure t a meet an oopportunity windowo o The o Existence of a mature hardware option lack of a risk reward system Adopting a ne 1de1 or concept 1s at the heart of the ffllttar but 1t has been difficult for both governnent and industry altke to otnst1tutiana11zea the process of 1nnovat1on Some would assert that industry is more successful at 1nnovat1on because it 1s driven by different forces What follows 1s I discussion of the problems of adopting innovations the nature of fnnovatfon the nature of the transition process and how goverrvnent and industry differ 1n their approaches to 1nnovatfoni 1nd suggestions as to how DoD mfght better handle the process of technology trans1t1on through the use of a new approach 11 Test Market1ng a JV-1 A THE PROBLEM OF ADOPTING INNOVATION For the purposes of thf s discussion t he process of 1nnov1tton was characterized as follows 1nvent1on the generation of the fd11 devoloe nt tho reduction to practice adaption the 1mplementat1on of tho 1dea ffusion the w1do acceptance of deployment In syste111S All four are required 1r technology tnnovatton 1s to succeed It ts fnterest1ng to note differences and sone stmtlartttes tn the way industry or cammerctal enterprise and government handle the question of technology tnnovat1on 1 Nature of the Government Process Idea 3eneratton 1n the area of technology for nat1ona1 defense 1s found both in fn ustry and 1n various in-house government efforts DARPA Service Laboratories with 6 1 6 2 and independent rasearch and development IRID type funding support Programs are usually small wfth low v1s1bt11ty ind not m ch bu e1ucr1ttc 1nterf rence AS an fdea ts developed or l'educed to fractfce there fs a larger fnfus1on of resources and resistance 11 innovat on begins to butld Whether development takes place fn I governnent laboratory or 1n fndustry 6 3 IRID funding the 1nnovat1on by nature threatens other competing and or extsttng systems and thus may requ1 re I strong ousero endorsement Adoption 1n the government case usually requires I good relat1onsh1p between the technologist and the user ind 1n most cases 1 person to champion the cause of tnnovatfon since the acqu1s1tfon onagement structure will _generally oppose tnnov1t1on 2 Nature of the Industry Process ' In the case of industry 1d11 fnerat1on can came at any level R D engineering marketing Sfnce RFor government contracts 1r111mtted 1 there11 ts more control exerc1 sed and perhaps I stronger 1ncenttve to come up with wf nners o Reduction to practice engages the eng1nnr1ng and advanced syitems sectors of industry wiih higher levels of resources but also with tougher scrutiny since the fdea must now stand up to return-on-investment ROI ond market factors A chafll fon wfthfn industry ts usually required at this point to move- ahead with the innovation Adoption involves customer acceptance and parttc1pat1on tn funding of the idea 9ere campet1t1on 1s cnacf al sf nee industry o ust consider canpany prof1tab111ty payback per1 od and share of the market generated by the innovation Thei_new technology at thfs stage may continue to require 1 '-champfon and everr - polf tf cal allhnces to move it along - - - IY-2 D1 fferences 3 ' Industry 11 rfwn not only by 1ts own RID org1ntz1tton1 but also by 1t1 perceptt on of usor need tho ortet value of the innovation the market share tt 11ner1t11 and other constderattons 11k ROI and payback period ovtrnont on the other hand 11 aott vated d1 ff1r1ntly It mst 1cc1pt 1deas frcn tts awn in-house efforts or fran tndustry but the internal polftfcs tltch dOllfnate dlc1s1an 111k1ng are shielded in I way from market forces Tll1r1 ts I strong_ 1ncent1ve to pursue low rtsk options 4 S1mtlartt11s Both industry and govemnent share certain tendencies which 1nhfb1t 1nnov1tton As large organ1uttons they share I natural resistance to change 1nd usua1Jy allocate a dtsproporttonate amount of resources to ma1ntafn1nG the status quo There ts I structured approach to the 111ocat1on of RID funds lllh1ch may not be rasponstve to change tn the env1 ronnent The tta constant for dlange tn 1ny large organt tton ts long MTIIRE OF INNOVATION B Table IV-1 lists seven observations ldltch cauld be made about the nature of technology tnnovat1on and factors Illich contribute to or retard the adoption Innovation as d1sttnct fram 1nventton refers to the actual applfcatton of I new device system or nethod of operation Understandf ng 1nnovat1on 1n the defense context ts complicated by the fact that DoD does not keep good 1rch1vi1 records that part1cfp1nts tn the process have strong bi Hes and f1na11y that tt 1s dt fftcult to assess through unobtrus-1ve measui-ement tbe status and worth of 1nnovat1ons 1 Innovation 1s a Po11tfca1 Process It 11 not possible to understand the mechanism by lillfltch dec1s1ons are arrived at without resorting to a po11t1ca1 perspective While econan1c ftnanc1a1 and tech 1ca1 cons1deratfons impose constraints the decisions thanselves are the result of intergroup bargaining -- tn short 1 poltttcal process In the case of concepts or equipments 411ch have yet to be adopted both technical and econan1c analyses 1ccanp1ny1ng the presentation to the dec1s1on authority are largely based on assumptions Thus the decision maker 11 seldcm faced wfth black and oh1tt dectstons As I result and be ause tnvarfably any technologtcal change has tts tmpact on the power structure of an organ1zatton decisions on adoptions of tnnovat1ons are driven not by the seemingly accurate techntcal or economic analyses but by the 1nv1s1ble underlying po11ttca1 forces In essence the act1v1ty from whf ch dectsf ons emerge 1s ch1racterfzed by comprani1se accanmodat1on and b1rg11nfng among groups with diverse interests so that the result 1s not necessarily chosen 1s 1 solution to I problm but I resu1t of campromtse and possibly even confusion IY-3 TABLE IY-1 o INNOVATION ADOPTION - THE HYPOTHESIS ' o A IIATIJRI OP TIii PROCESS I OICAlllZAUON STRUCTUD A-1 1ho prac eoo of I _ vatiOII adoption lo o polttlcol proceooo 1-1 'lhe greater the dlwrettr of an oramaiutlan the oolier _the proportion f propoaetl innooattono llhlch vlll h C toLtCIIS MID IIECULAflOHS C-J 'lho -atltr of UD flllMlllla 1o aot neeoooorll tlle decSo tft factos Ill tw _ tloll doptlOD adopted flle e dotenee of other wlalele n4 tec baoloat- ullJ otun haahian opclona t a one of the t poverful ta110 atlo retorooroo A- 111o lack of an ta vatlon chaapion o tron11J Jrotor4o lnnowcton' a4 Jptloa o2 Separate ehalno of eoaoncl for the R D _ deatgn ar1aaiutto patiallJ eepantetl aml lacking effective t11te1ratlon ochalaaa hlnden lnnowatloa adoption C-2 fenODHl pollelea ich create ootl rtak tala1 laeanttv for ti o o 111tar euautlooo teao to cetaal _ ration adoption Vao btn1toa 2 Mature Hardware Options Retard Innovation lncrement11 1mprovement 1s one of the biggest enemies of fnnovatfon Even when an tnnovatfon 1s technically mature enough for adoption and offers potentta1 for superior performance when compared wtth already accepted options tts acceptance can be retarded by the mere fact that already accepted options could provide sufficient performance without the rfst of ounknowns o Most 1nnovattons are faced wfth a number of hardware system competitors many well entrenched s1nce they have provided the function up to that tfme o Operators are famflfar with the characterfstfcs of equipments and are set up to mafntafn and repair them wfth vast organfzatfons - In add1t1on manufacturers have a large capital investment fn facilities and tools for producing the current generation of weapons In short the old method of operation h1s a well-established infrastructure Furthermore ff the new produet does not completely replace the old but merely provides another option to perfonn the same general functions then ft wfll have I more difficult tfme being accepted 3 The Chag ton 1s Essential A strong advocate 1s required tn order to prcanote 1nnov1tton sfnce the po11tfca1 process and the existence of alternates are potent obstacles to change The system as 1t presently exists has strong bu11t-fn fncentives agafnst the emergence of champions although such champions have emerged hfstortc1lly within programs where 1nnov1t1on was adopted e g oo Admiral Rickover and nuclear propulsion Y Dav1s 1n othe Politics of Innovationo identfffed four d1stfnct character1sttcs of an fnnovatfon champion fn each of three naval case studies he investigated a He b He c He d He fs a man from the broad middle ranks fs not the inventor of the innovation he promotes 1s a passionate zealot does not pay attention to possible consequence far h1s career 4 Dfversfty and Organ1z1tion1l Structure Impact Innovatton The greater the dfvers1ty of an organ1zat1on the smaller the proportion of proposed innovations wich will be adopted Researchers studying the 1nnovat1on process have recognized that tnnovatfon 1s not an instantaneous act it fs a process which occurs over a period of time and consists of a sertes of 1ctfons The more complex the organfzat1ona1 framework the more complex will be the decision making process The consequences of innovation 1doptfon affect many members of the organization o Davis voo oThe Politics or Innovation o Graduate School of Internitfonal Studies Un1veri1ty of' l enver Vol 4 Monograph 3 1966-1967 IY-5 With 1n organization the stze and canplex1ty of the DoD and the Military Departments tt is no surprise that 1nnovat1on adoption 1s a cont1nu1rrg problem Different organtzat1ons within the org n1zation are campit1ng for funds saaettmes w1th differing or opposing interests Innovation can effectively be stopped by being postponed 5 Clear Lines of Communfcat1on are the Key to Success Separate chains of command for the RID and design organizations spacfally separated and lacking effective fntegrat1on mechanisms hinder adoption To develop new products wfthin a large corporate structure the RID organization must gather process and transmit tnfonnation to perform the baste problem solving and cQOrd1natfng requirements of its component areas Ccmmun1catfon flow 1s the primary mechanism for effecting this 1nformatton transfer AT T and other large corporations have found that a flow of tnfonnatfon and fe bi k 1s essential 1n trans1tton1ng innovation technology fran Basic Research ta Appl 1ed Research to Development and Design to Engf neer1ng and ultimately to manufacturtng The process can be 1nh1b1ted tf spatial and or organtzat1ona1 barriers impede the flow of 1nfonnatfon In the case of AT T it was necessary to create a spatial bond bet en organ1zat1ona11y separate ent1t1e s by moving Bell Laboratories Development and Design Group into the premises of the Western Electric where it could 1nteraet wfth the Engineering Group Ref Leopold Roo Innovation Adoption tn Naval Ship Design Naval Ship Engfneerf ng Centeri May 1977 Many laboratories within DoD and the services are not only spatially and organizationally separate but are even competitive and antagonistic tn cooper at1ve ventures and work at cross purposes This _hinders the transition of innovative technology tnto systems The laboratory competition 1th industry fs also a s1gn1f1cant hindrance to the transition of n e w ideas 6 The Quantity of RID Funding 1s not Decisive There 1s a canmon fallacy that the level af innovation 1s a strong function of the RID resources expended o This fallacy 1s so pervasive that certain industries' innovative image 1s Judged on the percentage of sales contributed to R D assuming that the higher the percentage the more 1nnov1t1ve the firm The sarm factor 1s frequently used 1n canpar1ng innovativeness of world m111tary powers who spend s1gn1f1cant sums on R D Innovation 1n many m11ftary systems ts often not the product of in-house lab developments but rather adoption of cammerctal or foreign defense RID Innovation 1s found not only in big firms but tn some small but creative high technology firms computers microprocessors g netfc enginee tng It 1s -_clear that technology innovation ts only partly related to the level of investment 1n r search IV-6 7 Personnel Policies In government unlike private industry where the existence of a viable business may depend on successful fnnovat1on there seems to be no negative consequences for those who fa fl to adopt sens ib 1e f nnovat f ons o There are however definite consequences for the 1nnovat1on advocate who loses Champions do emerge but they do so at some peril to their career The system tends to -reward those who keep their organizations out of trouble The frequent rotation of military offices may 1n ftself be an inhibftor to innovation because it does not allow for the maturing of an innovation champion within the system When an 1nnovat1on 1s proposed resfstance usually builds within various segments of the organization followed by a fight in which a winner emerges Even though the battle is lost o the war for innovation fs not lost But as a new military executive arrives the opposition forces reopen the case and the battle 1s regained A winner again emerges the cycle 1s repeated innovation is postponed C THE TRANSITION PROCESS The DoD could create conditions conducive to innovative adoption in government by t Transferring some of the system design function to industry t Creating stronger 1ntegrat1ng mechanisms between R D and design commun1t1es o Introducing organ1zatfonal and environmental changes to encourage the emergence of innovation advocates o Dfmfn1sh1ng the hold of the acquisition manager the in-house design technology man ger by strengthening The link between the developer and the user 1s very important If the customer fs a participant in the selection of technologies to be used for systems the chances are high that he will accept that technology as a solution to their needs This does not mean that all technology base work should be lfmfted to those items or areas where strong customer support is evident but it does point to the need for a strong alliance between user and technologists 1 Deffn1t1on of Requirements A clear def1n1tion of the user requirements is essential ff the development community 1s to meet actual operational needs It should be clear that the_user community is not as technologically soph1st1cated as the R O community and the burden 1s therefore on the R D canmunity to explain and even -se11- the technology poss1b1lftfes The requirements detenninatfon stage should have the following attributes IV-7 4- o Tht thre1t is well-defined and raa11st1c 1nc1ud1ft9 ICJlqu1te treatont of feasible thre1t response to U S d1v1lop11ents o 1s 1va11ab l t with what rhlt and at 1m1t cost adequacy of o Technology ISSessments are nbject1vo what stat1-of-th 1rt industrial base to support wartime surge o System def1n1t1on des1gn fs a goQd balance of - Cost Technical R1 sk Ab111ty to Counter Perceived Threat perhaps explo1t1ng asynwetries fn U S and adv1rs1ry operational 1nd technical capab111t1es -- gualitativell - adequate operational capab111ty and quantitative y sufffcfent numbers deployed -- growth potentfal - Preplanned Product Improvement and or Hultimission Capab111ty An extremely difficult but necessary element of the requirement detennfnatfon process 1s the ab11fty of program managers and staff to interface and 1n_te grate new or evolving operational concepts NTop-Down Approacho wfth technical opportunities or risks which may support or lfmft a particular system design oBott011t-Up Approacho 2 linking Operational Concepts to Technology Innovation The figure below depicts the fnteract1ve nature of tfl1 process which relates a range of operatfonal needs and concepts to th range o f technologfcal -possibilities The shaded area illustrates the narrowing of focus to a specific system design TECHNOLOQY ASSESSMENT OPERATJOMI N EDSiCOJCEPT o Fut11re Nfufons 1nd Tttr11t1 o Dtft nft1on of Oper1tton1l Environment o Ev1lu1tton of Oper1tton1l Concepts 1nd s11tau o o on P1rfonunc1 ojMr1tfon1l perfona nce ltvtl versus ttchnol09 Y ltvtl o Ttdlnfc1l OpportunfttH lfus 1nd Costs for Ach1tvf111 P1rforunc1 eo 11 I Av1fl1btltt of AcftqUltt Ttdlnol091 oooo Nnuf1cturtng 1 f1cflttft1 sktlls o Ttdlnol09tc11 Aspects of Prob-able Thr11t Response CM C a11 t --Quanttt un lowtr _perforunc1 systas rersus o few hfgh r - En91geont Efftcttv1ne1s Analysts Thro at Rospans o tM AsHIU nt of Ttchnolo y I J tct IV-8- 3 Advanced Development and Production The problem of transitfon1ng technology to production may lie less in the early development of the technology itself and more in the area of desfgn and engineering the later phases of the process specifically oo o inadequate effort 1n early design and test phase 1nsuff1cfent incentives for quality fragile bases of supply Budget profile manufacturing technology and quality assurance have a large impact on the success of transition Production 1s often i litiated witho out -a sufficient understanding of either the technology or the app11catfon If advanced development is underfunded as it often is the real cost can escalate dramatically 1n later stages to overcome a bad design In hfgh technology areas DoD has had both successes and failures 1n transitioning technology Table IV-2 lists four groups of technologies drawn from the _space program 111ustrating both the good and the bad a Success - These are the numerous new products and materials which successfully transition into military space systems b Not Yet Ready - These technologies still show promise but have not made it out of the laboratory yet for full scale productfon c Looked Good on Paper - They failed because the space environment induced unexpected reactions d Have Not Really Made It Yet - Oldn technologies whose failure meco hanisms were either never understood or where quality assurance was and is inadequate 4 Need for Quality Over seven years ago a study called Electronics-X showed that there was a linear relationship between product cost and failure rate The constant that related the two variables depended on product type e g oo avionics in military aircraft and management method e g oo DoD standard procurement practices In today's tenns the study showed there would be an average of one failure per hour per $10M unit cost A $SM aircraft radar in other words would fail about every two hours Certain systems like spacecraft do not follow thfs law Project managers cannot afford failures in space so many more resources are concentr ted in the eng1neerfng d e sign advanced development and testing stages just where they should be The quality 1s built in fr001 the beginning and the result 1s a system which works with high reliability Ironically the present trend toward cheaper systems with older technology may end up costing more fn the long run In order to save the RDT E budget IV-9 TABLE IY-2 DOD TECHNOLOGY TRANSITIONS -o SUCCESSES AND FAILlRES FOi SPACE SYSTEMS LOOKS GOOD ON PAPER BUT FAILED iN SPACE tNvlAoNM RT SUCCESS Graphtte-epoxy canposfte antennas Rocket nozzles ustng carbon-carbon ond s11 ica phenolic matet1a1 s Elastomers for conta1 nment of hydrazine Ablative heat shf-elds Laser beacons and low-power lasers Solid-state detectors for nuclear particle detection HgCdTe long wavelength sensors Kipton f nsulato r Graphite-epoxy -- outgassfng tn space Teflon coatong -- cold fl ow Spacecraft coatings -- Discolored Astroquartz -- unexpected charging in orbit Alumintzed flb'lar f11m -- became brittle 1n space SSI MSI LSI AND VLSI -- Cosmic ray effects soft errors and latch up Star Sensors -- became noisy after exp9sure to radiation Frequency synthesizers Stainless Steel -- fan at cryogenic Voltage control ind crystal oscillators temperatures Etoctroi1e control systems Cl'l S -- techniques to increase yield High-temperature ceramtc mult1-11yer also decreased hardness boards Solid-state electronics and mfcroe1ectron1cs Inertial guidance NOT YET READY Metal matrix composites Pyrolytic graphite rocket chambers Atomic clock Hfgh perfonnance PbS Detectors Ga111um-Arsen1de field effect transistors Lasers high power Yutlleumfer YM refrigerators HgCdTe IR detectors Spectral filters Electron-beam welding of integrated cf rcutt boards oeemno lead technology for mfcroel ectroa1cs Drawn HA VE NOT REALL 'f MADE JT YET Travelling-wave tubes Batteries Rubidium atomic clocks PbS polycrystalline IR detectors 'High-voltage electrical wfre Parachute rec ove ry ha wa re a-nuts 1n space-system plumbing Ball-bearing retainer 1nstab111ty Degradation of thermal control surface 1n geo-synchronous orbit S11p-r1ngs B1-metallfc thennal swftches Polycarbonate capacitors Relay$ Electronic bond c1e1r1d1t1on purple plague frcm Cormnents on the Trans1-t1on from the Technolop Bise to Production ' E Recht1n - - IV-10 r is shaved The hfgh quality product cannot compete in I cost manufacturing b1dd1ng contest Yet fronfcally high-quality systems like spacecraft canprised of thousands of piece parts are less costly to build and operate than those of 1ow qua1f ty s Problems of-Mechanics and Timing of the Transition Process Transition tine and overall program costs cannot be reduced by reducing engineering development Delayed engfneer1ng results in increased program cost and larger transition time as illustrated in Table IY-3 In some programs the transition to production 1s complicated by the disruption of the normal process of research then exploratory development then advanced development then eng1neer1ng development then preproduction and production SOIIW t1mes phases lfke advanced development or engineering development are anitted altogether because of budgeting or tfme constraints Sometimes gaps appear fn the process so that the project grinds to a halt temporarily w1th subsequent disruption of personnel and production scheduling Table IY-4 illustrates how a successful program was carried through -- the ground TOW mf ssne program This program was characterized by the following important factors the U S Government was cammftted to the program 111 of the transition steps were included and there was cont1nufty of funding and manpower 6 Impact of Decision Makfng Process Corrplexfty A significant deterrent to 1nnov1tfon fs the complexity of the dec1sionmak1ng process Experience within spac systems has shown the followfng functional relationship between the time to gain approv1l for a certain proposal and the number of approving signatures required Time Days o 2n-2 n o number of approval signatures Ref Recht1n E i Canments on the Transition from the Technology Base to Produc 1on DSB Summer Study August 1981 D TEST MARKETING A NEW APPROACH The DoD maintains a vigorous program tn supporting new ideas and technology programs but does not plan adequately for the transition of maturing technology There is a gap 1n planning and support to insure maturing technology programs are adequately funded and supported through the final critical phases of adequate demonstration prior to betan1ng candidates for FSED This 1s caused by differences of opinion or what level of risks still remain 1n using the new technology Other considerations include the large investment associated w1_th such demonstrations and other compet1 ng ew ideas that requt re fund1 ng IYoll TABLE IV-3 DELAYED ENGINEERING RESULTS IN INCREASED PROGRAM COST AND LONGER TRANSITION TIME - --- - HUGHES 1 I o t ooooooooooooooooooJ ' - N t I AND TIME v co$T ' I --' ------ II I _ENGINEERING o ----PRODuc TIQN ---noe--- --- TABLE IV-4 1980 1181 1tNIZ 1913 1984 w RDIARCN IXPLORATORY DEV -- - o----- --- -- rooooooooooooooooooo i HUGHES I _ GROUND TOW MISSILE PROGRAM t I I ---- - - - 1117 1981 1911 1970 1171 1172 1173 1174 I DEMO I ADVANCED DEV I APE ENClo RRINCI DIV MDIIDDUCrlON - 0 I LIMITED PRODUCTION I I t auoun- oo Befare the new product developer wf11 utf11 e I new technology the risks must be Judged reasonable requ1r1ng I thorough demonstration of the new tech nology fn the real env1 ro11111nt The DoD needs to recognize this essential step to rtsk reduction payoff and cost assessment prfor to FSED and production Not enough resources and programs are allocated to the ftnal and necessary step of transition to new technology Another technique for enh1nc1ng technology trans1tfon 1s 1 otest marketN approach This approach would allow technology base developed hardware to be placed 1n operational or test unit for use and ev1lu1tfon This testing would provide direct feedback on equipment performance and allow the user to evaluate equipment ut11fty nd future need This techntque would enhance the commun1cat1on betoe1t'the user both operators and trainers and technology developers on character1 sties and usefulness of equf pment It would also remove uncerta1 nty in the requ1r1111Bnt and technical approach durtng decisions for new 1yitems E SUMMARY In s1111111ry the characteristics of successful transtt1on oro 1 Clear user def1ntt1on of requirement o Customer 1ccept1nce and strong sponsorship o Customer parttc1 patton 1n select1 n of technologies to be implemented o Clear devel aper evidence that technology fs ready and able to satisfy requirement 1 Technology developments are clearly needed b user These condfttons do not exist wtth1n the DoD transtt1on process W1thfn the DoD the following are barriers to the trans tt1on of technology tnto operational systems 1 Partitioning the research development and production 1 Lack of involvement of potential users 1n the establishment-of requirements and the resulting programs o Lack of fenced budgets to allow the product acttvtttes to fund trans1t10Jl of desired technology o Th failure to meet 1n oopportunity wfndCMo o The lack of_ a rtsk reward system o Existence ofo mature hardware option process -1nto separate- organizations and contractors 1v-1o The DoD as a total 1nstftut1on does not address wel 1 the polftfcal nature of this process e g bargaining negotiation Further DoD does not plan sufficiently for success e g few otechnology fnsertfono plans dove1oped along _ rth major wapons systems There fs very lfttle emphasis on technology demonstrations which accurately portray rtsk reduction payoff cost offset and later stage production The system bas little fncentfve to exploft or respond to new technologfcal capab111t1es The organ1zatfan and spatial separation of technfca1 and systems people 1nhtb1t transition Dfscont1nu1ty of funding fndecfs1on and the short-term or1entat1on of many key decfsfon authorities heighten this problem IV-15 mun- - un-ocn o _ a -0 oauu n u - 0 CHAPTER THE UNIVERSITY CONNECTION CHAPTER Y THE UNIVERSITY CONNECTION t- There exists a long hfstory oof DoD-unfvers1ty 1nt1r1ctfon It was gfven 1 strong thrust by the Offfce of Naval Research ONR fn the post-World War II period during which tfme research endeavors 1n un1versfty departments working 1n areas of general and specific national security interest were supported These interactions expanded with particfpation by all Services The postSputnik era provided another thrust with its emphasis on technology and the need for scienttsts and engineers The relatfonshfp was seriously eroded during the Vietnam era and although the environment for coopertatfve undertakings 1s much improved today 1ts past history and 1nf11t1on have been factors fnhibftfng realfzatfon of sfgnfffcant improvement The opportunity for strengthfng the un1vers1ty connectton 1s present today the DoD needs to make use of university resources that can contribute to our national defense posture the unfversft1es need the DoO to assfst fn enhancing thefr capab11it1es 1n both education and research What the DoD needs and expects from un1vers1ties The DoD relfes on the unfversitfes almost exclusively for trained scientists and engineers at the bachelor and graduate levels The source of such personnel for the DoD itself both civilian and military for the defense industry and for future university staff is the universities In a second broad category university faculty meet a DoD need as perfonners of research thus giving rise to new ideas and results for expert consultants on OoD projects and as a source of independent advice All of the needs w111 be better served by top-flight faculty and students 1n areas pertinent to national security needs The universities thus need to be able to hire and retain such faculty to have them engaged fn s1gn1fi- cant forefront research 1n the more advanced fields of science and engineering and to provide them with equipment facilities and support necessary to be productive Both incentives and support are required At the same time the DoD must recognize the university mode of operation its po11cfes and processes that over time have proven successful in carrying out educational act1v1t1es and on-campus research Present Status President Edward J Blouste1n of Rutgers University fn Congressional testimony approved by the American Council of Education the Assoc1at1on of Amer1 an Universities and the National Association of State Un1vers1t1es and landgrant colleges stated wooooo ft 1s our sense that the university research basa for defense preparedness is in some considerable d1srepa1r In particular we are concerned that the national expenditures V l for research hive decreased 111rkedly t11 recent decades that there ts serious shortage of trained research personnel that our research equipment and f1c111tfes is 1n I deplorable state of t n1cfequa cy and that fed era 1 support for f oret gn language and international studies 1s totally 1ncanmensur1t1 with our nation's needs oo Three other unfverstty presidents and one tndustrtal representa f ve elaborated on these issues Ffndfngs o The Panel focused tts attention on major items that 1n 1ts opinton could 111ke a difference in fncreasfng tbe contr1butfons to the natton's security through greater university involvement with DoD The Report of the 1976 DSB Summer Study on Fundamental Research tn Universities see Appendix B Item K noted that a major source for new Innovative ideas for future defense needs resides 1n the untverstty can11umity and urged that DoD reestablish and stimulate tts relationship wfth that community The conclusions of that study remain generally valt4 and were not reassessed tn detail If current trends persist the DoO and the country face a cr1sfs 1n 1v111ab111ty of technical personnel There are sever11 f1ctors tnvolved starting at the secondary school level and extending to market place pressures for employment More spec1f1ca11y these factors include mottvat1on 1cademtc preparation 1nd future job satisfactfon 1nc1udtng remuner1tton The cr1s1s ts most apparent in the un1vers1t1es themselves and the DoD While the supply of trained personnel fs reasonably matched fn most fields there are cr1t1ca1 shortages fn the most advanced technologtes such 1s electro-optics and computer sciences A furt er disturbing factor 1s the decreasing output of u s citizen doctoral graduates The total number of doctoral degrees awarded annually in engineering has decreased about 251 tn the past decade at the same time the fraction of fore19n nationals has 1 creased from about 251 to almo$t sos see Figure V-1 Thfs has substantfally reduced the pool of graduates able to parttc1p1te 1n sensitive DoO RID Over the long run the un1versft1es and DoD wfll have to respond to market pressures 1n upgrading their science and engtneerfng staffs However _many top f11g t 1nd1vtdua1s respond favorably to opportunity and environment o -The DoO can assist the untvers1ttes s1gn1f1cantly in creating better research environments through prov1s1on of greater RID opportunities upgraded on-campus equipment ind stmplif1ed polictes and procedures for execution of on-campus RID o While ft concentrated on science and technology the Panel wis alerted to the fact that training in the certain aspects of the socfal sciences human interfaces training and 1n foreign languages intelligence inter acitons wfth -a111es and others 1s an area of DoD interest that also needs support o Reference Testimony by Edward J Blouste1n before the House of Representat-1ves Armed Serv 1ces Ccxnm1ttee Subcamm1ttee on Research and Development Aprtl 3 1981 Y-2 FIGURE V-1 NllllER OF U S ENGINEERING DOCTORATE RECl IENTS 4000 I ' ' I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ' I Ill 113000 o u GJ a I w _a 2000 I I I' U a i 1 tl'Zl JIS f u 0 8 1000 o 0 rz 60 1 1 o 65 I 111 1 70 1 oooJoooI 75 80 The DoD c1n not alone solve natton1l problems o Def1c11ncie1 1n support other 1genctes of related programs how1ver have 1n impact on Doo and DoD should lend 1ts support to those 1genctes for the common good F r by example from-196 8 to 1980 tn the u s RID 111 fra tton of the federal budget decreased 3ft RID 1s a_fractton of the GNP decreased 191 Sc1ent1sts and Engineers engaged tn R D 1s a fraction of the labor force decreased 91 o o o -_ o - o Contrast the above w1 th other nations U S RaD as I fraction of GNP dropped 191 while 1t went up 141 tn the Soviet Unton l I fn the Federal Republic of Gennany and 191 tn Jap_an I o U S scfenttsts and engineers engaged 1n RID as a fraction o of the labor force dropped 9S whtle tt went up 621 tn the - - - --Sovt1t Union 75S 1n F R G 1-nd 701 fn Japan o 'oo It 1s 1ncumbent on 111 1genctes of government help rectify these trends o o o o oo o ' o ooo o o oo o to ooo The Panel's recommendatfons have focused on encouraging DoD to renew 1ts commitment to basic research 1n the un1verstt1as and at the same ttme to clearly enunctat11ts needs and RID prtortties In doing so it must also recognize th1 neods of the untvers1t1es and continue to work with them to seek mutually sat tsfactory arrangements 1n such diverse areas 1s o St fmulat1ng increased enrollments and quality of students 1n fields of D D pr1or1t1es o o Implementing mutuany satisfactory controls on the export of 1nf rmation relating to munitions' 11st technologfes o o Seeking s1mp11f1ed and more appropriate contracting reporting and 1ud1t1ng po11cfes and procedures ' - The greatest fmpact w111 of course resu1t fram fncr11sed funding and opportun1tfes for RID for faculty and gr1duate students Thts funding stimulus 1s directed principally at OoD priority RID activities at equipment o 1 q jsttton 1 and at graduate fellowships Spec1f1ca11y the Panel reconmends - ' Jsi fncrease r il growth 1n 1 funding of research 1 untvers1t1es over a three-year pirfod The rationale 1s simple t he opportun1t1es and needs would undoubtedly support a larger increase however orderly well thought out programs 1n basic research tend to be limited tc growths of around lOS per year Furthermore a growth program should be reviewed pertodtcally and three years 1s an appropriate interval - - --------- o -o - o o o I Reference ' Testimony by Richard Atkinson before t e House of Representatives Armed Services Committee Subccmmtttee on Research and Development April 3 1981 i University testimony before Congress has 1ndfcated annual equipment needs equ1l to 25S of related R D funds The Panel strongly supports the need for o odern upgraded equipment in the universities It has been noted that the average age of research equipment in universities 1s approximately twice that of industry a factor that not only makes unfversfty researchers less competitive but also results fn a-deffcfency in graduate student training The Panel has not selected a doll ar or a percentage ffgure rather ft prefers to emphasize a thrust that will provide equfpment that can make a major difference one that will have high leverage or that will serve multiple interests This does not exclude acquisition of general or specialized equipment for specific projects but reflects priority DoD should be encouraged to support strongly NSF 1n its program of upgrading university equipment and general facility capability C Jllputer resources are of the highest priority based on this algorithm Strengthening the university-indust y interaction 1n R D programs of DoD interest will benefit all three parties - DoD industry and the univers1t1es Several incentives are possible to encourage industry to obtain both specific produetsw from the un1versit1es and to winvestu 1n their futures The Panel recommends that industry be encouraged to support work at universities through the IR D route Specifically OoD should authorfze an addition of o ss to the negotiated base against which IR D ceilings are established for each contractor Concern was expressed that certain DoD procurement po11c1es make life df f ficult for universities particularly the treatment of 1ndfrect costs Although CftB circular A-21 defines standards for accounting for indirect costs there are differences between agencies The U S Department of Health and Human Science H HS syste s for treatment of'1ndirect costs was suggested as an easier system under whfch universities can operate The H HS concept 1s to calculate indirect costs centrally thus removing the requirements for negotiation on each individual grant After approval of the indirect cost package the grantee institution will receive grand awards showing only direct costs In general a simplified r search procurement process 1s important to facilitate university participation e g the short form contract developed by ONR DoD could foster a stronger relationship with the universities by reestablishing and strengthening support for research and training in the fundamental sciences through scholarships traineesh1ps and fellowships to graduate students and by support to the faculty through equipment grants There was also concern that the statutory controls over the export of critical military technology could strain the DoD-university relationship Do0 must take the initiative to define and implement mutually satisfactory measures to accommodate both DoD and university needs FinallYii the OoD has been charged by the House Anned Services Committee with preparing a report on Unfvers1ty Responsiveness to National Securfty Requirement The present Technology Base Sumer Study has touched on only a few of the topics that must be addressed fn the response to HASC The Panel recommends that DSB be requested to establish a Task Force to carry out the more comprehensive study It is anticipated that the pertinent recommendations contained in this Panel's report would be seriously considered 11 V-5 - - - --- ---- ----- '- -- I I CHAPTER VI DOB LABORATORIES AND DARPA CHAPTER YI DOD LABORATORIES AND DARPA t I By way of preface the members of the DSB Technology Base Panel want to aff1nn at the outset the vital role played by the DoD 1aborator1es fn maint11nfng a lead 1n cr1tfca1 military technologtes and fn ach1evfng qualitative anns superfor1ty over the Soviet Union It fs cr1tfcal that DoD maintain a htgh level of competence expertise and dedication within tts laboratory community The Board also recognizes however the problems that have plagued the 1aborator1es far I number of years and have underscored fn thfs report - ot tt co11ect1 vely Y1 ews as the most press1 ng requf rements for enhancing the status product1vfty and output of t e laboratories The DoD 1aborator1es have been studied a number of times Each study has rov1ded sound recommendations which by and large have not been implemented see Appendix H The lack of effective response has 1ed to a hefghten1ng of the problems 1n the laboratory base The many bureaucratic restrictions some by DoD others Congressional imposed on the laboratories have led to an 1nabiltty to compete effectively in the job marketplace for young highly qualified eng1 neers and an 1ncreas1ngly older work force 1n the laboratory structure The average age of sc1ent1f1c and engineering personnel now stands at 44 It 1s likely that this work force has not been able to remain completely current with today's state-of-the-art technology Attempts to circumvent these problems by raising grade levels and fncreasfng pay have only led to inflated posft1on descriptions and cost and have not really addressed the root causes What 1s oneeded 1s I revolutionary change fn personnel management polfcfes concurrent with new and 1n ovat1ve research and development thrusts The technology base must be tied to DoD needs and mission requirements as opposed to what one 1nd1v1dua1 or group wants to do or has the skill to do If the R D 1s not needed 1t should not' be done Laboratory effectiveness and product1vfty are closely associated not only with-the quality of the scient1st engfneer but also the flexfb111ty of the budget and procurement processes The procurement process negatively impacting the effectiveness and product1v1ty of DoD laboratories In fact the procurement process 1s dr1v1ng many customers particularly small businesses away from our laboratories What 1s needed 1s recognition that the present procurement methods are not cost effective it requires 200 plus days to process $200 000 00 contracts The problem ts cr1t1ca1 since 80 percent of Air Force laboratory contracts are less than $500 000 00 A revision of the DAR is needed to enable the necessary changes allowing contracts up to $500 000 00 to be processed within 90 days e g w1th a short contract fonn 1 Two important programs are now underway l tlfch may posft1ve1y impact laboratory situation These are 1 the ongoing act1v1ty establishment DoD Laboratory Management Task Force wh1 h includes partictpatton by OSD Mf11tary Departments and 2l personnel experiments 1n the management of f1c and engfneertng personnel b ing conducted at NOSC and NWC YI-1 the OoD of the and the scfentf- A LABORATORY MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE The Llboratory_Management Task Force LMTF was set up following the 1978 Laboratory Dfrectors Conference wt aere concern was expressed over the alarming deterioration fn the laboratorfes The LMTF has fssued two reports and bas already made same important recommend1t1ons Past studies have found that although the 11boratortes are v1t1l to defense R DA their contrfbutfon ts seriously constrained by inhibiting internal procedures inadequate pay for staff particularly 1n highly compettt1ve areas of science and technology aging fac11ft1es and mismatch of workload ond manpower Thest studies have recommended 1 n general more flextbtltty and authority for the laboratory leadership better fac11tt1es and staff with particular emphasis on the quality of technical leadershfp and management Some positive 1ctfons have occurred but the cont1nufng trend 1s down ward fueled by constraints on resources the shortage of qualified scientists and engineers and finally the weakening of management authority by c1v11 service procedures and the layered dects1on-mak1ng structure within DoD The in-house l boratory effort ts th o 73 Laboratories- 111 s1rvfce-man1ged t 60 00Q people- SOI ctvflfan Medical and A1r Force laboratories -501 c1v111an 1 SS 2 b1111on annual progro o 401 tn-ho se overall 3 b1111on RDTIE effort wftb SOI in-house 1 Phys 1ca1 1nvestment $4 b1111 on 50 50 real property equipment I o Small and large some with fewer than 100 prafesstonals and somi w1th greater than 4000 o Phystc 11 science 11 fe science and person el RID o Act1vtty spanntng from basic research through the full RDl' I spect nm Nearly two-th1rd s of the annual cash- flow 1s RDTIE money About one-half of the RID funds are contracted to unt ers1ttes and fndustry the other half is retained by the laboratories to carry out roles requ1rtng tn-house personnel including extensive a t1vft1es necessa y to monitor and support contract work DoD laboratories are supposed to provide tn-house functions o1ch are not easily obtained from outside sources namely o To maintain technical expertise to identify evaluate and exp oft new technology and to avoid techn 1cal surpr1 ses o v1-2 I To support Do0 as a sophisticated buyer and monitor for contractst and to provide system support o To provide a corporate technical memory and under-take activftfes having extraordinary risk or requiring qufck react ion The LMTF found that there were s1gn1ficant barriers to perfonnfng these ro7es due to inadequacy 1n management stafft facilfties and equipment and has made very specific recommendations concerning personnel and manpower facilities and equipment procurement and acqufsition see Appendix H In summary the DSB Summer Study Panel has found that previous studies 1nclud1ng the LMTF study have 1dent1f1ed important areas of def1c1ency but corrective advf ce 1s not often heeded The present Do0 laboratory base is fragmented and duplfcatfve 1n key area e g o computer science software very large-scale integrated VLSI circuits and sfgnal processing Further too often the technology base 1s pursued for its own sake and not in response to mission needs Finally the panel recognfzes that personnel problems are acute and that grade rafs1ng or pay increases wfthout other reforms will not provide the cure B NOSC NWC DEMONSTRATION PROJECT NOSC and NWC established demonstration projects in 1980 under the Civil Service Refonn Act aimed at ach1ev1ng a more responsive and flexible personnel system On July 13 1980 all scfent1sts engineers and technical specialists as well as all other GS 13-15 employees were converted from their present positions to canparable ones under the experimental system Appendix F provides a more detailed descr1pt1on of this project The demonstration project as approved by the Office of Personnel Management waives a number of existing federal personnel regulations -1n these areas and substitutes revisions geared to the experimental system The new approach simplifies the classification system tmplements an appraisal process lfnk1ng pay and perfonnance and provides a mechanism for recognfz1ng perfonnance as the primary criterion of retention see Appendix F for details Table VI-1 1s an 111 ustrat1o n of the new scheme This demonstration project allows employees the opportunity to advance t efr careers at a faster pace than under the existing system Another important feature 1s that it recognizes dual career ladders such that technical personnel may continue working 1n their spe 1f1c discip11ne ff they wish rather than being forced_ f nto management for advancement The Incentive Pay System IPS within th1s demonstration project fs designed to reward hfgh performances provide 1n-1eve1 salary growth as pe ople mature and deny pay increases to low performers Employees who meet perfcir- mance objectives will parallel the General Schedule GS pay system but higher performers will receive positive incentfves through cont1nufng salary fncreases This d1 ffers significantly fran the traditional GS pay system where pay increases within each grade are largely a function of seniority VI-3 The pay fonwu11 has been divelopad to provide m11nfngful tncenttve-pay to high performers by redfstr1but1ng funds obtained from either grade 1ncrea_ es 111r1t awards and in-level promotions Money not awarded to low performers B or_N on Figure IV-1 wtll b1 included 1n the center's Employees rated M met objectives w111 rapidly achieve the m1dpo1nt salary level which ts camparabl1 to salartes paid fn fndustry- Jo receiveo salary increase above 1n ustry equfv1lency an employee would be expected to demonstrate superior perfonnance and receive ratings paypool of E and o The new system 1s expected to enhance rec 1tment of quality personnel High performers advance by perfonnance appraisal and promotions between levels whfle law perfonuers incrementally retreat through performance appraisal process to level of competence actual perfonnance Tb 1s could elfminate some hf gh- grade alfgnment problems and reduce problems wfth GS level prestige and aid tn retention - J'h'9 demonstration project w111 be evaluated tntern111y at NOSC and NWC by members of the faculty at the School of Public Admfntstratfon Untvers1ty of Southern Ca11forn1a Deta11ed evaluatton results are not yet available The DSB panel was impressed by the nature and scope of the NOSC NWC personnel experiment and recommends that this plan or 1ts equivalent be seriously considered for 111 DoD labor1tortes 1n order to recruit hire motivate and retatn quality scfenttsts and engineers Panel members felt that the most exciting features of this experiment were o Greater latitude ht job clas 1ffcatfon o Reduced level of paperwork more flextb 111ty and potential for faster dec1s1on-mak1ng o _A focus ff perfonnance a the foremost criterion for salary -increases p omotfon and retention C DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY DARPA As wtth the DoD laboratory base the state of DARPA was I recurring issue of dtscuss-1on o The DSB panel belfaves that the DARPA- technology base program has exceeded the size wttfcb can be effectively managed by the relatively small DARPA staff An adversary ralatfonsh1p has developed between DARPA and the Services because o DARPA competes with Services for-technology base funds 1nd o Large DARPA technology programs are not we11-coord1nited with se fce object ves and plans There appears to be no comprehensive ftltertng of DARPA programs and the DARPA results are not widely disseminated or sufficiently critiqued In add1tfon the growth of the large technology demonstr1tton effo_rts within DARPA 1P recent yea s has hurt the ability of DARPA o reac vigorously ta new ideas 1n the exploratory technology_ arena - VI-4 Whtle such large technology demonstr1tfons may be necessary-because of the cross-serv1ce mission areas involved a method must be developed for ensuring that the important DARPA flexfb111ty tn exploratory development can be preserved The current problem 1s that wfth both major demonstrations and smaller exploratory programs managed out of the same offtce program expansion and overruns by the demonstration programs can too easily claim funding ortginally planned for I balanced exploratory development program I The Ba11fst1c Missile Defense Advanced Technology Center BMDATC and Advanced Ba111stfc Re-Entry Systems ABRES technology base programs have suffered the same problem as those of DARPA Expansion of demonstration programs w1th1n a constrafned budget has forced major cutback tn the longer range technology programs There are some areas where BMDATC has 1 strong position fn part1cular software and architecture for real-time data processing Because their fundtng ts 6 3 money there fs no fonnal mechanism for coord1nattng these 1ctfvfties with the rest of the DoD technology base programs Vl-5 TABLE VI-1 DDIJNSTRATION PROJECT AT NOSC AND MIC BASIC TECHNICAL PROFESSIONAL PAY LEVELS AND CLASSIFICATION LEVELS Old S to u-s 11-1 as-1 15o101 ISoU as-12 a-u as-14 GS-H as-11 I 15 17 IS-181 PL Lwet 1 A11t1tlll rofo11aa11 Leval JI Level Ill LEVEL IY LEYEL Assoc11t1 Proft11tona1 lllllba Prof1111on11 ION StS y Senfor Prof111ton11 oo s LEVEL Ill FIYE SS 12-13 -AY lEVELS ANNUALLY DJYJDED e INTO FIVE Jr ENTIVE _ PAY GROUPS _ _ _ _ _ 111 b c OUTSTAHDINS EJCEEDED tlJECTIVES 4 MET OIJECTJYES 4 lftcltwtdu1 Perfonunce s nag nt Cl Jo ctins Tr111111t1Cf To lftdhf dv11 Act1ou o IELCII oact1vrs NEEDS UIPROVblENT Pa onunce CltJ1ctfn1 I e PDFOIIIWICI DIRECTLY AFFECtS PAY o IEIJEIIS AT 1-NDNTN JNTDYALS o tRAlllo AID CORR CTIYE ACTIONS IIIJENTIFIED o PAr ADJUSTID ANNUALLY VI-6 o f o CHAPTER VI'I SUMMARY - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS o i o r I I I ' t f _ '1 f T CHAPTER VII SUMMARY - FINDINGS AND R COMrENDATIOHS A T CHNOLOGI S THAT COULD MAKE AN ORDER OF MAGNITUDE DIFFEftEHCE 1 Relating Scenarios and Technology Prfor1ty to Investment Decfsfons Findings In revfewfng the planning processes wfthin the Services there was no consistently applied linkage between scenarios technical opportunities o and risks to investment decisions 1n the technology bast Further there 1s no formalize pr1oritiz1tfon process for technologies outside of that implicit in the technology base budget In fact the work of diverse elements of the Services often incorporates I different set of sc1narfos The figure of merit inethod used herein w1s derived due to the lack of 1 unifonn structured process within the Services I I ' Rec01T1T1endatfons The USDRE allocate resources to the Services and 111 levels technology base on I consistent scenario-oriented 1sfs o or the U Recognize organizational excellence by 1valuatfon of the matching of resources and technology pr1or1t1es with the scenarios The ASO R T adapt a prioritization and investment 1tr1t gy approach based on the figure of sner1t used 1n th1s study 2 Investment Status - Underinvestment Findings Based on a ccmparison of the technology evaluation herein with the current DoD investment a number of oorder of Magnitudeo technologies were identified which require more aggressive funding o o o o o o Machi ne lntell 1gence Advanced Software Fast Algorithms Short Wavelength Lasers Hardening of Advanced Electronics Mfcroprocessor-Based Personal Learning Aids Fault Tolerant Fail-Soft Self-Policing Electronics Recommend a u ons The ASD R T increase funding n these areas as outlined 1n Chapter II report of this VII-1 J lnYeStlllnt St1tu1 - o 1rtnve1tment Ffndin1s Although no effort was o 1dt to rteGlllllllnd specfffc pr09r1ms ldl1ch should be deleted 11v1r1l c1te1or11s of 1ct1v1t were hfghltghted for deemphasis o Are11 of dup11catfon wttb MSA propulston ooooo ramote 1en1fng 1 o Overtxpanston of DARPA programs into 1rt1s which overlap wtth other oJor D oD Strv1c1 programs e g o forward swept w1 ng o VLSI ff ber opt1 cs o lfonproductfvo dup11catton of the gentrfc technology base by the three S1rvic11 o In-house tiecutton of the baste rese1rcfl progro 1 1 Recomend1ttons The ASD RIT un ert1ke a thorough rtvfew of thesi 1r111 with the goal of 111mfnatfng dupltc1t1on 1nd reducing investments tn these 1re1s 4 Investment Strategy f1nd1nas A revfew of _the process by which each of the Services develops its investment strategy was conducted Although 11ch S1rvtce h11 o structured approach to technology base pl1nntng there appears to bo 1 failure to come to grfps consistently wtth the full range of questions necessary to develop a well founded investment strategy oc1techt1mo 1 o o What 1s tt7 Wh1t 1s thfs effort trying to 1cccnpltsh deffnfng the technology_sufftcfently_we11 to dtscrto fnat11t frcn other stmtlir techno1ogfes 7 Why f s it t11port1ntf Assuming success what df fference can ft 111ke- to the user or 1n I mfs11on 1r11 context taking fnto account the n1tur1 1nd 11m1t1t1on of current pr1cttce What -1s the current status What fs the DaD progrer What should ft be What 1s new about the proposed effort and why wfl 1 thts approach be uccessful o How t on g wf n 1t take How much o111 1t cast Whit I re the measures f success Yll-2 RecG111111nd1tton1 The USDRIE should direct the m11ftary departments and DARPA to use this investment strategy catech1smN 1 111 future technology bast pl1nntng S POM guidance f ' ' L t 5 Management of the oorder of Magnitude Technologies Findings There fs a diffusion of the DoD effort fn many of Norder of magnitude technologies throughout DARPA and the Services This diffusion appears to lead to many subcr1tfca1 efforts without the impact of a more focused approach Reconmendat1ons The ASD RIT fonnulate vertically integrated technology ooo programs with fenced funding s1m11ar to VHSIC fn the following areas 6 o Machine Intelligence o Advanced Software Algor1ttrn Technology o High Power Micro ave o Advanced Materials Rapid So11 tf1catfon Technology Advinced Compos1t1es o Microprocessor-Based Personal Learning A1ds Overall Level of Funding of the Technology Base Findings The overall level of funding fn the technology base 1s assessed as being adequate If properly organized and managed 2S of the DoD budget the current level 1s probably adequate Thfs fdeal cannot be achieved unless the dectston making and allocation process within DoD fs restructured to reflect th planning methodology outlined 1n thfs report Recomnend1tions None VU-3 8 TECHll LO Y TRANSITION 1 B1rrfers to Transttton Ffridfn9s The following barriers to the ransit1on of technology fnto operat1ana1 systems are hf ghltghted o P1rtftion1ng the research d1v1lop1111nt and production process fnto separate org1nfz1tfons and contractors o Lack of involvement of potential users in tho establtshment of requtrements and the result1ng_progrllllS o Lick of fenced budgets to allow the product 1ct1v1tf1s to fund transition of desfred technology o The fi11 ure to meet an oopportunity wt ndowo o The lack of a rtsk reward system o Existence of a mature hord--re options ooo as I whole does not adequately address these barriers There 1s very little emphasis on technology demonstrations tmfch accurately portray risk reduction payoff and cost offset and liter stage production or to conduct otest marketing experiments The systan has little incentive to exploit or respond to new technologtcal c1p1b111ttes The organtzat1on and spatial ieparatfon of technical and systos people tnhtb1t trans1tton D1scont1nu1ty of funding 1ndec1sion and the short terrrt- ortentatfon of many key decision authorities he1ghten th1s problem' A champion on the user side 1s often not present Reconmendations In order to better focus DoD resources on the transttton tssue that the USDRE direct the creation of an advanced projects agency charged as follows o To develop subsystem or systo experiments to quantify the maturity r1 k and cost of FSED of emerg1n technology o To conduct otest marketingo experiments o To be- populated by pe ple 1n the Services- However 1f a new agency 1s not fonned the DoD should not tennt nate DARPA act1vtt1as 1n this area The function 1s too important not to focus OSDattention on it Also the Services should fence a large 3A budget for conducting the n eded demonstrations VII-4 I I I I I Ii I 2 TICIIM INY lllllrt M Ftnd1ffl The DoD does not plan adequately for successfu1 technology transition throughout the 11fe ot i system Such plans are often 1nJected only 1s 1n aftertllouP t f I ' ' I Recommendations The USDRE require technology insertion plans as a baste and fundamental part of progru planning il C THE UNJVERSITY CONNECTION F1nd1n9s I iI i The un1vers1t1es and DoD need each other DoD needs the sc1enttsts and 1ngfneers tr11ned by the un1versities 1t needs the faculty pool of sc1entf sts and engf neers workf ng tn the DoD area 1s generators of new 1deas ind results 1s expert consultants and as advisors The university research base for defense preparedness 1s in consider1ble disrepair and therefore 1n need of upgrading 1n faculty equtpment f1c11ttfes end support It 1s a problem broader than DoD but DoD has I specfffc interest and res pons t b111 ty Mechanisms are needed to stimulate quantity end qualfty fn the tra1nfng of scientists and engineers 1n defense-related subjects especf111y fn advanced technologies to encourage their employment tn the un1versttfes and DoD act1v1ttes ' In the brooder tenns the stfmulatton can be provided by tncreased support -- government and industry -- of RID tn the un1vers1tfes by fellowships for graduate training in spectaltzed ftelds and by equipment acquisitions that will have an fmp1ct on rese1rch of htgh DoD leverage In addition there are numerous DoD 1dmintstr1t1ve polfc1es 1nd procedures that are detr1me to1 to the ability of the unfvers1ttes to carry out these 1ctfv1t1es and need mutual discussion and resolution for example export controls on fnformat1on and the DoD procuranent procejs Finally the DoD must respond to the House Anned Services Committee for I study on ouniversity Responsiveness to National Security Requirements The DoD response wtll require greater in-depth study than was provided by this DSB Panel o Recommendations Based on these findings the following recanrnendat1ons were mad 1 fonned The USDRE direct the services to tncrease 6 1 baste research perunfv rs1t1es by 2511n real growth over the next three years by 2 USDRE authorize each of the services to award 100 SIE graduate fellowship annually o II I areas of DoD interest - s1m111r to those of the DoD 1aboratories VIJ-5 $20IC ye1r to continue until cc aplet1on of eegree but not to o exceed 3 years part to students ind part to university o Collpet1t1ve -- awarded 1 Nust work ont year fn DoD lab for Heh year of fellowship support gr1nt1d by CongresSNn 3 The USDRE direct the DAR Camm1ttee to revise current procurement po11c1es and regul1t1ons to allow o Add1t1on1l IRID -- O SS against negotiated base over present ce11 ng o for industry support of un1vers1ty R D o Treatment of university indirect costs similar to that used by U S Dept of Health and Hu1111n Services HHS o S111plific1tfon of research procurament fr0111 un1vers1t1es The USDRE 1st1b11sh with the un1vers1t111 1n accommodation and bis1s for the f plementation of current export conirols on 1nfonnatfon relating to unit1ons list technologies 4 o 5 The ASD R T direct the services to create a DoD thrust via the OSR's to upgrade equipment in universities This focus should be on equfpment that c1n h1pact university research of highest DoD leverage software design 1ut01111tfon machine 1nte111gence etc o The upgrading of computer resources is the highest prfor1ty based on this algorithm o Generally DoD should support NSF efforts to upgrade equf pment 1n un1vers 1t1 s I D GENERAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Findings As -o result of addressing the three previous questions The oorder of Magnttudeo Techno1ogios Technology Transition and Tht University Connection o 1 number of recurring themes arose wfth regard to the state of OoO 1n-house laboratories OoD S E personnel and DARPA The o fo11ow1ng findings draw themes together - DoO laboratory prospects for improvement are poor given the1 r current 1t1te and the constraints that aff11ct them Of pa rticul ar concern is the weak fragmented and duplfcat1ve effort in key areas e g oo computer science machine 1ntel 11gence software VSLI and signal processing Yll-6 o Over the years there have been a number of studies by varf ous of the DoD laboratories ooo good advice which ts rarely heeded o There 1s an impending cr1s1s fn personnel and f1c111t1es 1n the DoD 1aborator1es that wfll seriously degrade the defense-posture 1n a very few years groups - The average age of c1v111an S E fs 44 years - Because of the inability to competitively hire highly qualified 1ndfvfduals at lower levels GSS-7-9 the work force 1s continuing to age o - The primary skills of thfs aging work force are becanfng outdated - Because of attrition and personnel ceilings the quality of personnel may be eroding - 111s1ng grade levels or 1ncreas1ng pay without other refonns will not solve these problems fn the highest leverage areas I DARPA - The growth in the DARPA technology base program has greatly exceeded the capability of the staff to properly execute the program - There appears to be no canprehens1ve filtering of DARPA programs versus on-going service efforts Further DARPA results are not o widely d1ssemfnated and therefore not sufficiently critiqued ' - There is no clear organ1zat1ona1 d1v1sfon w1thtn DARPA of r spons1b11tty for the exploratory development programs 6 2 and large scale technology demonstrations 6 3A In fact the budgets for these two classes of R D are often mixed Recommendations Based on these findings the following recommendations re made 1 To help the hiring and retention of the skills necessary for a viable laboratory structure USDRE direct that the highly exciting and effective personnel experiment being conducted at NOSC and NWC or fts equivalent be implemented for DoD laboratories The most exciting features of this experf nt o e - Reduces paperwork - Makes perfonnance the foremost crfterfa for salary increases retention promotion etc - Enhances flex1b111ty and allows faster decisions VIJ-7 2 USDRE tn conjunction wfth Service technology base managers destgnate lead laboratartn 1n generic technology base 1re1s within each Service Candidate technology ro11 include Space systos re11ted technology camponents hardening etc - Airborne radar technology - Airborne electrontc warfare tec nology - Electron devices - Infrared technology USDRE 3 o I dtrect that the Services review DARPA programs over $30M total program costs -- not annual from the point of view of potential future m111tary app11cattons operational needs and trans1t1on plans o establish a michan1sm to ensure coordfnatton of system technology base programs such IS BMDATC o d ABRES with the rest of the DoD technol base activity_ to ensure that multiple system requ1 reme ts are 1 ncluded 1n the development of the tecllnology base investment strategy vrl I - APPENDIX A 088 TECHNOLOGY BASE SUMMER STUDY TERMS OF- REFEREECE THE UNDCR SCCRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON D C ZOJOI 2 JUL 1981 t1 11AIICH AND Et-GINE'EIIING MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD SUBJECT Defense Science Board Summer Study Technology Base You are requested to uncertake a summer Study to assess he health of the U S national defense tecbnolo base within and outside the government Estimates of Soviet military research and development show that tbe Soviets have steadily increased their outlays for milita ry RDT E over time and are now spending roughly twice that of tbe United States To date the United States has maintained leadership in most of the basic technologies critical to defense partl1o because of a focus on critical technpl o y edg and tho momentum in defense technology built up during the 1960s However it appears that the United States may be losing the lead in some key technologies 'rbe Unitea States strategy for dealing with the Soviet military challenge is cri ically dependent on the effective defense expioitation of the broad based u s technology This stucy should addres _tbe following questions 1 What technologies are critical to future 1990-2000 defense capability What are those technolo ies that would contribute to rougbly an order of magnitude improverne t in system performance- cost etc How are these technologies identified Are tbe Soviets gaining ground Is the investment the Technology Base of less than 21 of the total defense budget adequate If not what is a reasonable level of expenditure and what should be the management and invest ent s rategy within the technology on base 2 Is the process of transition from technology base to weapon systems adequate If not what changes are needed to accelerate the process of transition 3 Are the universities responsive to national security requirements If not what actions should be taken to_ improve the responsiveness of universities 4 Is the DoD relationship with the basic research community creative individuals and small innovative firms adequate If not what changes should be mada to improve tho DoD utilization of these resources A-1 5 rB the scientific engineering personnel-rcsourcea aaequata to meot the requirements of t11e defense technology commercial or ovornment What actions should be taken to eliminate critical personnel shortages Items 3 4 and Sare to be considered provided sufficient time and resources are available to the Summer Study This Summer Study topic is sponsored by Dr George P Millburn Acti ng Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Res arch and Engineering Research and Advanced Technology Dr George H Heilmeier bas agreed to serve es Chairman 'l'he Executive Secretary will be Dr Sam el A Musa OU DRE R AT o o 'o -- A-t APPENDIX REVIEW OF PAST STUDIES APPENDIX B REVIEW OF PAST STIJDIL S RELATED TO THE DOD LABORATORY UNI VERSITY ISSUE 1 Make the overall research strategy less vulnerable to changing environmental influences e g o Congressional mood swings Reports where these recanmendat1ons appeared A coo E G 1 I oo K s o 2 Improve ccmrrun1cat1on cooperat1on between DoD in-house laboratories and the general research conmunfty Reports 1ere these reccmmendat1ons appear C 1 D E 1 G 1 H J M I s K 3 Shift the ratio of intramural to extramural research toward outside contracts and or increase the percentage of unfvers1ty sma11 business basic research Reports where these recommendations appeared B coo F K M T 4 Increase block funding to basic research programs both out- 1n-house 1n order to maxfmfze tnnovatfon and pennit flexibtlfty Reports where these recommendations appeared B C Foo G K s T 5 Establish a review mechanism for university contractor and tn-house research programs that bases further funding on the quality productivity and impact of the research Reports where these reccmmendat1ons appeared A M T c G H I K 6 Remove the albatrosso of relevancy fran the necks of researchers both intramural and extramural 1n order to free sc1ent1 sts engfneers from the 11m1tfng effects of such constraints Make the criteria of relevancy apply to broadly defined fields and d1scfp11nes rather than to an indtvfdual program area Reports where these recanmendattons appeared c D G H K M 1 T 7 Overcome the Mfnert1a to changen evident fn some DoD fn-house laboratories which tnhfbfts progress towards more advanced technologies by s1mplffyfng the canp11cated tayered management structure Reports where these reccmmendattons appeared A B S T See key on se ond page for report references B-1 coo F 1 G o H I JC oo 8 Enhance the qualt of the research tn tn-house laboratortos the pasttton of fn-haa o sctenttftc personnel ooo by taprov1ng Mike ul1ry beneftt1 cmpettt1ve wfth fndustry Mite career options aore prom1s1ng 1ttble Do not 1ubJ1ct qualtty tedln1ca1 personnel to the vagaries of budget 111n1gement nor to the publtc d1sclatm accordlcl 111 c1v11 service workers Reports oore these recaaunendat1ons 1ppe1red A c E o ff oo I oo J Loo T 9 Avotd the trend toward ov1rob'-rd1n1d overly comprehensive full spectrum tn-house 11bor1torf11 Consolfd1t1 and focus the research 1nd etto inate dtvers1ftcat1on at the l1bor1tor es and or FCRC 1s Reports llllere tlllse reccmendattons 1ppe1r1CJ Aoo aoo aoo Doo F H T 10 Ineroooo the imount and ttmelfness of DoD fmpl11111nt1t1on of hfgh quality frant-lfne capital equipment at fac111ttes both out- tn-hou11 Reports where these recoanendattons appeared c - H koo L KEY The corresponding blckground sunmar1es follow tn the rtm1fnder of the appendix A Report of the Ad Hoc COmm1 ttee on 1'1-House Laboratorieso Army Scf enU ffc Advt sory Panel ASAP Decllftbtr 1963 page B-4 a Management of Federal Contract Research Center DDRIE June 1976 page B-6 c --- Proceed1ngs of an MAS Symposf11111 on oHow _Much Does the 'Defense Department Advance Sctence o J1nuar1 HBO - page B-7 D Requt rtd In-House Capab111t1es for DoD Research Development Test and Evaluatfon OUSDRE October 1980 page B-9 E Ad Hoc Group on Sc1ant1ftc Personnel ASAP Aprt 1914 page B-11 F Report of the DSB Task Force on Technology 8111 Strategy October 1176 page B-13 G Report of the Panel on Research and Exploratory Development DSB-IBS July 1967 page B-16 H Report of the Science Advisor's Panel on Baste Research tn the Departaent of Defense OSTP o June 1971 o page B-18 I Hhtor1ca1 Perspecttvos fn Long-Range Plannfng 1n the Nivy _ NRAC Study Septemer 1980 page B-19 8-2 J Ttchnology Planning for Future Fteldad Syst1ms Ari ' Science Board 1979 S r Study July 1980 page B-21 IC Fundamental Research 1n Unfvers1tfes ose summer Study October 1976 page B-22 L Man-Nachtne Technology 1n the Navy NRAC Study December 1980 page B-24 ' M DoD Small Business Advanced Technology Program DESAT 1981-82 page B-26 I N took Forward 20 Years Volume I AFSC March 198D o Ad Hoc Revfew of the 1974 Army page B-31 Sumner Study Review ASAP October 1975 page B-33 P Anny Sctenttf1c Panel Summer Study 1974 page B-36 Q ArD1Y Science Advisory Board Summer Study 6 Volumes 1976 page B-37 R Army Atr Force Jotnt Summer Study U S Atr Force Academy 1976 S Project Hindsight DDDRE October 1969 page B-53 T DoD Laboratory Utt11ut1on Study 1975 page B-55 B-3 page B-47 _ A REPORT Oft THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON IN-HOUSE LABORATORIES ARMY SCXENTIFIC ADVISORY PANEL OECEMB R 1963 Goals 1 To strengthen the Anny in-house research and exploratory development act1vtt1es by analyzing funding to the Anny laboratories How can Anny labs be provided with the resources necessary to carr v-out sound long range research programs 2 To 1dent1fy and analyze problems related to funding tncludf ng organ1zat1on research objectives personnel and fac111t1es Methodoloay The study utilized interviews and or questionnaires to obtain first-hand data from Anny in-house personnel They also gathered ftscal data mission statements and utilized other studies as supporting documentation Results The pan l results tall into two major areas 1 Those relating to planning organizing and controlling the effort 2 Those relating to proper allocatton of funds to ensure maximum efficiency and produce R D results that warrant annual investment Reconmendat 1ons 1 Reassess the long-tenn research-exploratory development objectives and plans 1n order to identify broad areas of technical interest to future Anny mission needs 2 clarify the Anny mission espee1 a11y that of fts laboratories fn light of other Service missions and RDT E Redefine and 3 Reorganize and toughen Army_RDT E management to prevent dtvts1on of 6 1 6 2 funds or reprogramnfng of funds wtthin 1 6 2 away from important areas 4 Make 6 1 6 2 budget arguments less vulnerable t changes 1n funding methods and congressional mood swings Protect research freedom 5 Stress the importance of consoltdat1on of those labs producing state-of-the-art front-line research 6 Ensure that Anny ROT and management and ASA R D are involved o - where any budget diversion or reprogranntng of funds greater o _ ' o'o than twenty percent 1s suggestecr tor the 6 1 6 _2 budgets B-4 CHAPT ER VI DOD LABORATORIES ANO DARPA By way of preface the members of the DSB Technology Base Pane1 want to affinn at the outset the vital role played by the DoD laborator1e s fn mafnta1nfng a lead in cr1tfcal mflitary technologfes and fn ach1ev1ng qualitative anns superiority over the Soviet Union It 1s critical that DoD maintain a high level of competence expertise and dedication withfn its laboratory community The Board also recognizes however the problems that have plagued the laboratories for a number of years and have underscored in this report what 1t collecthely views as the most pressing requirements for enhancing the status product1v1ty and output of t e laboratories The DoD laboratories have been studied a number of times Each study has provided sound recommendations which by and large have not been implemented see Appendix H The lack of effective response has ltd to a heightening of the problems 1n the 1aboratory base The many bureaucratic restr1ctfons some by DoD others Congressional imposed on the laboratories have led to an fnab1lity to compete effectively in the job marketplace for young highly qualified engineers and an 1ncreas1ng1y older work force 1n the laboratory structure The average age of sc1ent1f1c and engineering personnel now stands at 44 It 1s likely that th1s work force has not been able to remain completely current with today's state-of-the-art technology Attempts to circumvent these problems by raising grade levels and increas fng pay have only led to inflated position descriptions and cost and have not really addressed the root causes What 1s -needed 1s a revolutionary change 1n personnel management policies concurrent with new and innovative research and development thrusts The technology base must be tied to 0oD needs and miss1on requirements 1s opposed to what one 1nd1v1dua1 or group wants to do or has the sk i1 l to do If the R D is not needed 1t should not' be done Laboratory effectfveness and product1v1ty are closely associated not on1y with -the quality of the scientfst engfneer but also the flex1b111ty of the budget and procurement processes The procurement process i negatively impacting the effectiveness and productivity of DoD laboratories In fact the procurement process 1s driving many customers particularly small businesses away from our laboratories What 1s needed 1s recogn1tfon that the present procurement methods are not cost effective it requires 200 plus days to process $200 000 00 contracts The problem 1s critical since 80 percent of Air Force laboratory contracts are less than $500 000 00 A revision of the DAR is needed to enable the necessary changes allowing contracts up to $500 000 00 to be processed within 90 days e g oo w1th a short contract fonn Two 1mportant programs are now underway wtifch may posftfvely impact laboratory situation These are 1 the ongoing activity establishment DoD Laboratory Management Task Force which includes participation by 0SD M111tary Departments and 2 personnel experiments in the management of fic and eng1nee rf ng personnel being conducted at N0SC and NWC vr-1 the 090 of the and the sc1entf- A LABORATORY MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE The Llboratory_Management Task Force LMTF was set up following the 1978 Laboratory Dfrectors Conference wt aere concern was expressed over the alarming deterioratton 1n the laboratories The LMTF has issued two reports 1nd bas already made some important recommendattons Past studies have found that although the 11bor1tortes are v1t1l to defense RIDA thefr contr1b t1on ts serfously constrained by 1nh1bit1ng internal procedures inadequate pay for staff particularly 1n highly campettttve areas of science and technology aging fac11ft1es and mismatch of workload ond manpower These studies have recanmended 1 n general more flexfbtltty and authority for the laboratory leadership better fac111t1es and staff with parttcular emphasis on the quality of technical leadershfp and management Same positive actions have occurred but the cont1nufng trend 1s downward fueled by constraints on resources the shortage of qualified sc1entfsts and engfneers and ftnally the weakening of management authority by c1v11 service procedures and the layered dects1on-maktng structure within DoD The in-house l boratory effort ts Bllffll Dth o 73 Laboratorieso 111 s1rvfce-rnan1ged t 60 0OQ people- 801 ctvflfan Medical and Atr Force laboratories -501 c1vt11an 1 SS 2 b1111on annual progrant o 40S tn-ho se overall - 3 bt111on RDTIE effort wfth SOI tn-house 1 Physical investment $4 b1111on 50 50 real property equf pment t o o Small and large some with fewer than 100 professtonals and somi w1th greater than 4000 o Phystc 11 science 11 fe science and person el RID o Act1vtty spann1ng frcm basic research through the full RD a spect rum Nearly two-thirds of the annual cash flc - 1s RDT E money About one-halt of the RID funds ire contracted to untversittes and industry the other half ts retained by the laboratories to carry out roles requtrtng tn-house personnel including extensive a ttvft1es necessa y to monitor and support contract work DoD laboratories are supposed to provide tn hou o functions Which are not easily obtained froni outside sources namely o To maintain technical expertise to tdenttfy evaluate and exploit new technology and to avoid techn 1c 1 surprises o VI-2 I To support Do0 as a sophisticated buyer and monitor for contracts and to provide system support o To provide a corporate technical memory and under-take act1v1tfes having extraordinary risk or requiring qufck react ion The LMTF found that there were sfgnfficant barriers to performing these roles due to inadequacy 1n management -staff facilities and equipment and has made very specific recommendations concerning personnel and manpower facilities and equipment procurement and acqufsition see Appendix H In summary the OSB Summer Study Panel has found that previous studies 1nclud1ng the LMTF study have 1dent1ffed important areas of deficiency but correct 1ve adv1 ce 1s not often heeded Th-e present Do0 1ab oratory base 1s fragmented and duplicative in key area e g computer science software very large-scale integrated VLSI circuits and signal processing Further too often the technology base 1s p ursued for its own sake and not in response to mfssi on needs Finally the panel recognizes that personnel problems are acute and that grade raising or pay increases without other reforms will not provide the cure B NOSC NWC DEMONSTRATION PROJECT NOSC and NWC established demonstrat1on projects in 1980 under the Civil Servfce Refonn Act aimed at ach1ev1ng a more responsive and flexible personnel system On July 13 1980 all scfent1sts engineers and technical specialists as well as all other GS 13-15 employees were converted from their present positions to ccmparable ones under the experimental system Appendix F provfdes a more detailed description of this project The demonstration project as approved by the Office of Personnel Management waives a number of existing federal personnel regulations -1n these areas and substitutes revisions geared to the experimental system The new approach s1mpl1ffes the classification system Implements an appraisal process linking pay and perfonnance and provides a mechanism for recognizing perfonnance as the primary criterion of retention see Appendix F for details Table VI-1 1s an 111 ustratio n of the new scheme Th1s demonstration project allows employees the opportunity to advance t eir careers at a faster pace than under the existing system Another important feature fs that it recognizes dual career ladders such that technical personnel may continue working 1n their spe 1f1c d1sc1p11ne ff they wish rather than being forced_into management for advancement The Incentive Pay System IPS w1th1n th1s demonstration project fs desfgned to reward hfgh perfonnances provfde 1n-level salary growth as pe ople mature and deny pay 1ncreases to low performers Employees who meet perfcir- mance objectives will parallel the General Schedule GS pay system but higher performers will receive positive incentives through continufng salary increases This differs s1gn1f1cantly frcrn the traditional GS pay system where pay increases within each grade are largely a function of seniority VI-3 The pay fo u11 h1s been developed to provfde me1nfngful fncentfv - pay to high performers by red1str1butfng funds obtained fr011 either grade increases inerit awards and in-level prt11totions Money not awarded to low performers B or Hon Figure IV-1 will b1 included 1n the center's paypool Employees rated H met objectives w111 rapidly achieve the midpoint salary level which is comparable to salaries paid in fndustry Jo receive a salary increase above industry equivalency an employee would be expected to demonstrate superior perfonnance and receive ratings of E and O The new system 1s expected to enhance recruitment of quality personnel and aid fn retention Hfgh performers advance by perfonnance appraisal and promotions between levels while low perfonners incrementally retreat through performance appraisal process to level of competence actual per fonnance This could el fminate some higho grade al 1gnment problems and reduce problems wfth GS level prestige - _ - Tll demonstration project w111 be evaluated 1nterna1 ly at NOSC and NWC by members of the faculty at the School of Public Admfn1strat1on University of Southern California Deta11td evaluation results are not yet available The DSB panel was impressed by the nature and scope of the NOSC NWC personnel experiment and recommends that this plan or its equivalent be seriously considered for all OoD laboratories 1n order to recruit hire mothat e and retain quality scientists and engineers Panel members felt that the most exciting features of this experiment were o Greater latitude 1n job c1ass1fication o Reduced level of paperwork more flexib 111ty and potential for faster decision-making o A focus on perfonnance as- the foremost criterion for salary I o 1ncrea-s es promotion and retention C DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY DARPA As with the DoD laboratory base the state of DARPA was a recurring issue of discuss-ion The DSB panel believes that the DARPA technology base program has _exceeded the sfze which can be effectively managed by the relatively small DARPA staff An adversary relationship has developed between- DARPA and the Services because o DARPA competes with Services for technology base funds and o Large DARPA technology programs are not well-coord1nited with service objectives and plans There appear s to be no comprehensive filtering of DARPA pro grams and the DARPA results are not widely disseminated or sufficiently critiqued In add1tfon the growth of the large technology demonstration efforts within DARPA 1n recent years has hurt the ability of DARPA to react vigorously to new ideas fn the exploratory technology arena VI-4 Whtte such large technology demonstr1tfons may be necessary-because of the cross-service mfssfon areas involved 1 method must be developed for ensuring that the important DARPA flexfb11tty tn exploratory development can be preserved The current problem 1s that with both major demonstrations and smaller exploratory programs managed out of the same office program expansion and overruns by the demonstration programs can too easily claim funding originally planned for I balanced exploratory development program The Ballfsttc Missile Defense Advanced Technology Center BMDATC and Advanced Ballfst1c Re-Entry Systems ABRES technology base programs have suffered the same problem as those of DARPA Expansion of demonstration programs within a constrained budget has forced major cutback in the longer range technology programs There are some areas where BMDATC has 1 strong posft1on in particular software and architecture for real-time data processing Because their fundtng ts 6 3 money there is no formal mechanism for coord1nattng these 1ct1v1ties with the rest of the D0D technology base programs Yl-5 TABLE VI-1 DDIJNSTRATION PROJECT AT-NOSC ANO MIC BASIC TECHNICAL PROFESSIONAL PAY LEVELS AND CLASSIFICATION LEVELS Old S 1o 15 5 IISoI IS-10 ISoll 8S-1Z as-ul - 1cl as -1sj as 1 o-111 ISol81 PL o L9 t I A11t1to Profftl1Gllll lllllblr Leval 11 Levol Ill LEVEL IY Alloc11tl Profnstona1 Nlllber Profe11ion11 Sentor rofe11ton11 Mlllbtr LEVEi V IOff SES llaslber s r LEYEL Ill FIVE 6$ 12-13 -AY UVELS OUTSTANDlia ANNUALLY DIVIDED INTO FIVE Jr ENTJVE - c JC ED D CIJECTIYES PAY atDUPS _ _ _ m b c NET GIJECTIYES c IELCII OIJECTJVES o NEEDS JHPROVbl NT ftlllMftt lndtlfldtaal Perfo nce s o atJecthu - Trans11tld To Jftdt tdu11 Act1ou o Pe o1111nca CltJtct 1ftl ' e POFGIIWG DIIECTLY AFFECtS PAY o IEYJEIIS AT 1-NONJN lffllYALS o TWIIo AIID CORl CTIYE ACTIONS lflllNTIFJED o PAr ADJUSTED MHUALU VI-6 1 T i o CHAPTER VU SUMMARY - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS i o 'I ' I t t o1 CHA OTER VII SU RY - FINDINGS AND RECOMfiENDATIONS A TECHNOLOGJES THAT COULD MAKE AH ORDER OF MAGNITUDE DIFFERENCE 1 Relating Scenarios and Technology Priority to Investment Detfsfons Findings o I In revtewf ng the planning processes w1th1n the Services there was no consistently applied linkage between scen1r1os technical opportunities o and risks to investment decfstons tn the technology base Further there fs no formalfzea pr1orft1zat1on process fer technologies outside of that 1mp11c1t fn the technology base budget Jn fact the work of diverse elements of the Servfces often fncorpor1tes I different set of 1c1narfos The figure of merit 111thod used herein was derived due to the lack of 1 un1fonn structured process Within the Services Reconnendatfons The USDRE 1lloc1te resources to the Servtces and 111 levels technology base on I conststent 1cen1rto-or1ented oasfs o or the U Recognize organ1zatfona1 excellence by evaluation of the matching of resources and technology pr1or1tfes wfth the scenarios The ASD R T adapt I prfortt1z1tf on and 1nvest nt itr1tegy approach based on the figure of mertt used tn thts study 2 Investment Status o Underinvestment F1nd1n9s Based on I ccmp1r1son of the technology evaluation herein wtth the current DoD investment a number of oorder of Magnftudeo technologies were fdentiffed wfch require more aggressive funding o Machf ne lntell f gene o o Short Wavelength Lasers Hardening of Advanced Electrontcs o o o Advanced Software Fast Algorithms Mfcroprocessor-Based Personal Learning Atds Fault Tolerant Fafl-Soft Self-Polfctng E1ectron1cs Recommend 1t f ons The ASD R T increase funding n the$e areas 1s outlined fn Chapter II of this report Vll-1 lnYHtlllnt St1tu1 - Overtnvestment 3 Ffndfn91 Although no effort was made to rtcCllllllnd 1pecfftc pr09r1ms Whfch should be deleted 11v1r1l categortts of act1v1t were hfghltghted for deemphasis o Are11 of dupltcatfon wttb NASA ooooo r1110t11en1tng 1 propuls on o Overupansfon of DARPA programs into 1r111 whtch ov1rl1p wtth other aaJor D0D S1rvtc1 progr1111s e g oo forward swept w1 ng o VLSI ff ber optt cs o Nonprociucttv1 dup11catton of the gentrfc technology base by the three S1rv1cts o In-house 1x1cutfon of the baste research progro S 1 Recomnend1tfons The ASD R T undertake a thorough r1vfaw of theso 1r111 wfth the goal of 111mfnatfng dup1fcat1on and reducing 1nvestunts tn these 1re1s 4 Investment Str1te91 Findings A revtew of _the process by wtch each of the Services develops 1ts investment strategy was conducted Although 11ch S1rvtce h111 structured approach to technology base planning there appears to bo o failure to come to grips consistently wtth the full range of questions necessary to develop a well founded investment strategy oc1techt1mo 1 o o o What 1s tt What ts thfs effort trying to 1cccnplfsh deffn1ng the technology sufftcfently_well to dfscr1o 1nat1 it frcn other statlir technologfes 7 WIiy 1s 1t t11port1nt Assumtng success whit dt fference can ft uke- to the user or 1n I m1sston area context taking tnto account the n1tur1 1nd 11m1t1tton of current pr1cttce What -1s the current status llh1t ts the DoD progru What should ft be7 What f s new about the propostcl effort and Idly w111 thts approach be uccestful How tong wfll 1t tate HON measures f success much 11111 ft Yll-2 cast What are the Recanm1nd1tton1 o I The USDR E should direct the m11ftary departments anct DARPA to use this investment strategy catechtsmo tn 111 future technology bast planntng POM guidance -I f '' L t 5 Management of the oorder of Magnitude Technologies Findings There 1s a d1ffusfon of the DoD effort 1n many of Norder of magnitude technologies throughout DARPA and the Services This diffusion appears to lead to m1ny subcr1t1ca1 efforts without the impact of a more focused approach Reconrnendations The ASD R T fonnulate verttc1lly integrated technology ooo programs with fenced funding s1m111r to YHSIC in the following areas 6 o Machine Intelligence o Advanced Software Algorithm Technology o High Power Micro ave o Advanced _Materials Rapid So11 fficatfon Technology Adv nced Composit1es o Microprocessor-B1sed Personal Learning Aids Overall Level of Funding of the Technology Base Findings The overall level of funding fn the technology base ts assessed as be1 ng adequate If properly organized and managed 2S of the DoD budget the current level is probably adequate Thfs tdeal cannot be achieved unless the dectston making and allocation process within DoD is restructured to reflect th planning methodology outlined 1n this report Reconmendat1ons None VII-3 8 TECHIDLOIY TRANSITION 1 Barrfors to Transft1on F1rid1n9s The fQllowlng barriers to the rans1tfon of technology fnto aper1ttan1t systems are hf ghltghted o Partft1on1ng the research dev1lop111nt and production process tnto separate org1nfz1tions and contractors o Lack of involvement of potential users 1n tho est1b11shment of requtrements and the resultfng_programs o Lack of fenced budgets to allow the product 1ctfvtti1s to fund transition of desired technology o The fitl ure to meet an oopportunity w1 ndowo o The lack of I risk reward systo o Existence of a mature h1rdwore options ooo as a whole does not adequately address these barriers There 1s very lfttle emphasis on technology demonstrations wtlfch accurately portray rfsk reduction payoff and cost offset and later stage production or to conduct Ntest marketing experiments The systan has little 1ncentfve to exploit or respond to new technological c1p1b111ttes The org1ntz1t1on and spatial ieparatfon of technical and systes people tnh1bft trans1t1on D1scontfnu1ty of funding fndec1s1on and the short tenn- orfentatfon of many key dec1s1on authorities he1ghten th1s problltn' A champion on the user side 1s often not present Rec011111endatfons In order to better focus DoD resources on the transttton tssue that the USDRE direct the creation of an advanced projects agency charged as follows o To develop subsystem or syste experiments to quantify the maturity ri k and cost of FSED of emergfn technology o To conduct otest marketing experiments o To be- populated by pe ple 1n the Services However 1 f I new agency 1s not fonnad the DoD should not tennt nate DARPA actfvtties tn this area The function 1s too fmportant not to focus 0SDattentfon on it Also the Services should fence a large 3A budget f r conducting the needed demonstrations Yil-4 2 Tecftno IPI ' lhSlrtMn F1ndtnp The DoD does not plan adequately for successful technology transition throughout the life of a system Such plans are often injected only as an afterttlou t Recommendations I' I The USDRE requ1re technology insertion plans as a basic and fundamental part of program planning C THE UNIVERSITY CONNECTION Findings The universittes and OoD need each other DoD needs the scientists and engineers trained by the un1vers1t1es 1t needs the faculty pool of scientists 1nd engineers working in the DoD area u generators of new 1deas ind results as expert consultants and as advisors The un1vers1ty research base for defense preparedness 1s fn considerable disrepair and therefore in need of upgrading 1n faculty equfpment facilities and support It 1s I problem broader than DoD but DoD has a specific interest and responsfb111ty Mechanisms are needed to stimulate quantity and quality in the training of scientists and engineers 1n defense-related subjects especfally in advanced technologies to encourage their employment in the un1versfties and DoO activities ' In the broader tenns the stimulation can be provided by increased support -- government and industry -- of R D in the un1vers1tfes by fellowships for graduate training in specialized fields and by equipment acquisitions that wfll have an impact on research of high DoD leverage In addition there are numerous DoD administrative policies and procedures that are detrimental to the ability of the unfversftfes to carry out these activities and need mutual discussion and resolution for example export controls on fnfonnat1on and the DoD procurement process Finally the DoD must respond to the House Anned Services Committee for a study on University Responsiveness to National Security Requirements The DoD response will require greater in-depth study than was provided by this OSB Panel Recommendations Based on these findings the following _recommendations were mad 1 The USDRE direct the services to increase 6 1 basic research perfonned by unfv rsit1es by 251 in real growth over the next three years 2 USDRE authorize each of the services to award 100 S E graduate fe11 owsh1 ps annually o I areas of OoD interest - 51m11ar to those of the DoO laboretories VII-5 o SZo year to conttnN untn C1111Plet1on of ptrn but not to uc ed part to students ind ptrt to untversfty o C petttfve -- 1w1rdld 1 111st work ORI year fn DoD lab for each yaar of fe11 owshtp sups ort gr1ntld 31oo o by Congres-n 3 The USDRE direct the DAR Committee to po11c1es and regul1ttons to all ow r1v111 current procurement Adclft1on1l IRID -- 0 51 against negott1tld base over present ce111ng o for industry support of un1vers1ty RID o o Tre1t1111nt of un1verstty tnd1rect costs similar to that used by U S Dept of Health and Human Servtcis HHS o S1ap1tftcat1on of research procurament fr un1vers1ttes The USDRE nt1blfsh with the unfvers1tt11 an 1ccommod1t1on and bis1s for the 1rip1eaentat1on of current export conirols on 1nform1t1on 4 relating to auntttons 11st technologtes s The ASD RIT direct the sen1ces to create a DoD thrust vta the OSR's to upgrade equipment 1n un1vers1t1es This focus should be on equ1pont that can t o pact un1vers1ty research of highest DoD leverage software destgn 1ut11111tton 1 odlfne 1nte111genc1 etc The upgr1dfng of camputer resources 1s the highest prtor1ty based on th1s 11gor1ttn ' 6enera11y DoD - should support NSF efforts to upgrade equf pment tn un1vers-1t1n o o - D GENERAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS F1ncHnp As-o result ot addressing the three prevtous quest1ons The oorder of M gnttudeo Technologies Technology Transition and The Untverstty Connactfon o 1 nUlllber of recurring themes arose-with regard to the state of DoO in-house 1aborator1es DaD SIE personnel and DARPA The following - - findings draw themes together 1 poor gt ven the1 r current state and the constraints that afflict hem Of pa_rt1cu1ar concern 1 s the weak fragmented and dup11cat1ve effort 1n key areas e g oo eanputer se 1ence 111ch1ne 1nte11tgence so tw1re VSLI Ind DoD 1aboratory prospects for 1mprovlfflltlt are s1gna 1 - process1ng Yll-1 o Over the years there have been I number of studies by varf ous groups of the DoD l1boratar1es ooo good advice which fs rarely heeded o There 1s an 1mpendfng crisis fn personnel and f1c111tfes 1n the DoD 1aborator1es that will seriously degrade the defense-posture 1n 1 very few years - The average age of c1v1111n S E fs 44 years - Because of the inability to ccmpet1t1vely hire highly qualified 1ndfvfduals at lower levels GSS-7-9 the work force is continuing to age - The primary skills of thfs aging work force are becanfng outdated - Because of attrition and personnel ceflfngs the quality of personnel may be eroding - Ra1sfng grade levels or 1ncreasfng pay without other refonns will not solve these problems fn the highest leverage areas 1 DARPA ' - The growth in the DARPA technology base program has greatly exceeded the capability of the staff to properly execute the program ' - There appears to be no canprehens1ve filtering of DARPA programs versus on-going service efforts Further DARPA results are not o widely disseminated and therefore not sufficiently critiqued - There is no clear organizational d1v1sfon within DARPA of r spons1bflfty for the exploratory development programs 6 2 and large scale technology demonstrations 6 3A In fact the budgets far these two classes of R D are often mixed Recommendations Based on these findings the following recommendations re made 1 To help the hiring and retention of the skills necessary for a viable laboratory structure USDRE direct that the highly exciting and effective personnel experiment being conducted at NOSC and NWC or tts equivalent be implemented for DoD laborato_ries The most exciting features of this expert nt a e - Reduces paperwork - Makes perfonnance the foremost crfteria for salary increases retention promotion etc - Enhances flexibility and allows faster decisions VII-7 2 USDRE 1n conjunction wtth Service technology base managers designate technology base areas within 11ch Service Candidate technology ro1s include lead laboratarf n 1n generic Space systos related technology components hardening etc - Airborne radar technology - Airborne electron1c warfare technology - Electron devices - Infrared technology USDRE 3 o I dtrect that the Services review DARPA programs over $30M total program costs -- not annual from the point of vfew of potential future m111tary applications operational needs and transition plans o establish a michan1sm to ensure coord1nat1on of system technology base programs such IS BMDATC o d AIRES wtth the rest of the DoD technol base 1ct1vtty_to ensure that multiple system requirements are 1 nc luded tn the development of the technology base investment strategy v rl I APPENDIX A 053 TECHNOLOGY BASE SUMMER STUDY TERMS OF REFERENCE THE UNOCR SC CRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 0 C ZOlOI 2 JUL 1981 flEIEA CH AND t4GINt' 1UNC MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN DEFENSE SCIENCE BOAnD SUBJECT Defense Science Board Summer Study Technology Base You re requested to undertake a Summer Study to assess the health of the U S national defense technolo JY base within and outside the qovernment Estimates of Soviet military research and development show that the Soviets have steadily increased their outlays for milita ry RDT E over time and are now spending roughly twice that of the United States To date the United States has maintained leadership in most of the basic technologies critical to defense partll because of a focus on critical techn9loc n edge and tha momentum in defense technology built up durinq the 1950s How ever i t appears that the United States may be losing the lead in some key technologies The United States strategy for dealing ith the Soviet military challenge is critically dependent on the effective defense exploitation of the b oad based U S technolo y This stucy should address the following questions 1 What technologies are critical to future 1990-2000 defense capability What are those technologies that would contribute to roughly an order of magr itude improve ent in syste performance cost etc How are t hese technologies identified Are the Soviets gaining ground Is the inve trn nt the Technology Base of less than 2 of the total defense budget adequate If not what is a reasonable level of expenditure and what shoulc be the management and investment strategy within the technology on base 2 Is the process of transition from technology base to weapon systems adequate ' If not what changes are need d to accelerate the process of transition 3 Are the universities responsive to national security requirements If not what actions should be taken to_ improve the responsiveness of universities 4 Is the DoD relationship with the basic research community _c reative individuals and small innovative firms adequate If not what changes should be made to improve th DoD utilization of these resources A-1 5 re be scientific engineering personnel-resources adequate to meot the requirements of t11a defense technology commercial or ovornment What actions should be taken to eliminate critical personnel shortages Items 3 4 and 5 are to be considered provided sufficient time and resources are available to the Summer Study Thia Summer Study topic is sponsored by Dr George P Millburn Acti ng Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for ResC arch ana Engineering Research and Advanced Technology o Dr -George Heilmeier bas agreea to s rve as Chairman will t e Dr Sam el A Musa OU DRE R AT o _ o - i o Al - A-t e The Executive Secretary APPENDIX 0F PAST STUDIES APPENDIX B REVIEW OF PAST S1 JDI S RELATED TO THE DOD LABORATORY UNIVERSITY ISSUE 1 Make the overall research strategy less vulnerable to changing environmental influences e g 1 Congressional mood swings Reports ldlere these recanmendations appeared A coo Eoo G I Koo S 2 Improve ccmsrunfcatton cooperatfon between DoD in-house laboratorfes and the general research conrnun1ty Reports 1mere these reccmmendat1ons K C D E G H 1 J 1ppe1rl d M S 3 Shift the ratio of intramural to extramural research toward outside contracts and or increase the percentage of unfversfty small business basic research Reports where these reccmmendatfons appeared B C F K M T 4 Increase block funding to basic research programs both out- 1n-house 1n order to maxfmfze tnnovatfon and pennit flexfbtlity Reports where these recommendations appeared B coo F G K s T 5 Establish I review mechanism for unfvers1ty contractor and in-house research programs that bases further funding on the quality productivity and fmpact of the research Reports where these recanmendattons appeared A M T c oo G H I oo Koo 6 Remove the 11 11 batrosso of relevancy frcm the necks of researchers both intramural and extramural f n order to free sc1entf sts engf nee rs from the limiting effects of such constraints Make the criteria of relevancy apply to broadly defined fields and disciplines rather than to an individual program area c Reports where these recanmendat1ons appeared D G H 1 Koo M T 7 Overcome the Mfnertfa to changeA evident fn some DoD tn-house 11borator1es whtch tnhibfts progress towards more advanced technologies by s1mpltfytng the ccmp11cated layered management structure Reports where these recC1I1mend1t1ons appeared Aoo B o Coo F 1 Goo H I K S T See key on second page for report references B-1 8 Enhance the qua1tty of the re111rch tn tn-house l1boratortes tlle postt1on of tn-hau o sc1entfffc personnel o o o by taprov1ng Mitt u11ry beneftt1 CC11pettttv1 wfth tndustry Nike career options aore pramfstng stlble Do not subject qualtty techn1ca1 personnel to the vagaries of budget on1111111nt nor to the publtc dfsclafm accordtcl 111 c1vt1 11rvtc1 workers Reports taere these rtcC11111tnd1t1ons appeared A coo E Hoo I J L T I Avotd the trend toward over-b rcfenad overly camprehenst e full spec- trum in-house 11bor1torfes Consolidate and focus the research ind ett o fnate dtvers1f1Clt1on at the 11bor1tor es and or FCRC's Reports lllltre tbese recamDtndat1ons 1ppe1r ld Aoo aoo Doo F aoo H T ID lncr1111 the imount and t1o11ness of DoD fmp1ementat1on of high qu111t frant-11ne capital equipment at f1c11ft111 both out- 1n-llou11 Reports where these recoanendatfons appeared coo H K L KEY The corresponding background summaries follow tn the appendix remafnder of the Laboratortes o Army Scf entt ff c page B-4 A Report of the Ad Hoc Comm1 ttee on 1 -Hause Advisory Panel ASAP December 1963 B Management of Federal Contract Research Center DORIE June 117 page B-6 c oceed1ngs of an AMS Sympos111111 on oHow _Much Does the 'Defense Department Advance Science o January 1980 page 8-7 D Requ1 rtd In-House Capab11tt1es for DoD Research Evaluation 0USDR October 1980 page B-9 Development Test and E Ad Hoc Group on Sc1enttftc Persorlnol ASAP Aprtl 1964 page B-11 F Report of the DSB Task Force on Technology 8111 Strategy October 1976 page B-13 G Report of the Panel on Research and Exploratory Development DSB-NBS July 196 7 page B-16 H Report of the Sc11nc1 Advt1or 11 Panel on Baste Research 1n th1 Dep1rt11ent of Defense OSTP June 1971 page B-18 I Htstor1ca1 Perspectives fn Long-Range Planning tn the Nivy _ NRAC Study Septent er 1980 page B-19 B-2 J Technology Pl1nnfng for Future Fielded Syst1111s Anny Science Board 1979 S r Study July 1980 page B-21 K Fundamental Research fn Un1vers1tfes L osa summer Stud ' October 1976 Mln-Nachtne Technology tn the Navy NRAC Study December 1980 page B-22 page B-24 ' M DoD Small Business Advanced Technology Program DESAT 1981-82 page B-26 I w look Forward 20 Years Volume I AFSC March 1980 o Ad Hoc Revfew of the 1974 Army Sumer Study Revtew ASAP October 1975 page B-33 P Anny Sc1enttf1c Panel Summer Study 1974 page B-31 page B-36 Q Anv Science Advisory Board Summer Study 6 Volumes 1976 page B-37 R Army Air Force Jofnt s r Study U S Atr Force Academ y 1976 S Project Hindsight ODDRE October 1969 page B-53 T DoD Laboratory utt11zatton Study 1975 page B-55 9 3 page B-47 - A REPORT ort THE AO HOC COMMITTEE ON IN-HOUSE LABORATORIES ARNY SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY PANEL DECEMB R 1963 Goals 1 To strengthen the Anny in-house research and exploratory development activities by analyzing funding to the Anny laboratories How can Army labs be provided with the resources necessary to carry-out sound long range research programs 2 To identify and analyze problems related to funding including organization research objectives personnel and facilities Met hodo1ogy The study ut111zed interviews and or questionnaires to obtain first-hand data from Anny in-house personnel They also gathered fiscal data mission statements and utilized other studies as supporting documentation Results The pan l results fall into two major areas 1 Those relating to planning organizing and controlling the effort 2 Those relating to proper allocation of funds to ensure max11111 1m efficiency and produce R D results that warrant annual investment RecOl'f11lendations 1 Reassess the long-term research-exploratory development objectives and plans in order to identify broad areas of technical interest to future Army mission needs 2 Redefine and clarify the Anny mission especially that of its laboratories in light of other Service missions and ROT E 3 Reorganfze and toughen Anny_RDT E management to prevent division of 6 1 6 2 funds or reprogranming of funds within 6 1 6 2 away from important areas 4 Make 6 1 6 2 budget arguments less vulnerable t'o changes 1n funding methods and congressional mood swings Protect research freedom 5 Stress the importance of consolidation of those lab producing state-of-the-art front-line research 6 Ensure that Anny ROT and management and ASA R D are involved _ _ __ where any budget divers ion or reprogra111ni ng of funds greater _ - o than twenty percent is suggestecf for the 6 1 6 2 budgets B-4 A 7 There 1s 1n overall awareness of the need to protect the freedom and quality of research and exploratory development This awareness extends to the recognition that only by stringent forceful management and documentation of R D activities can a vital technolog1c1l base be maintained 8 Secondary recommendations deal with personnel management maintenance of facilities and practical organization The recommendations include steps to improve the morale of in-house lab personnel and to increase the efficiency of ma1ntafnfng the lab fac111t1es 8-5 B MANA6 11 NT CF THE FEDERAL CONTRACf RESEARCH CENTERS F'CRC DDR E JUNE 197 A management report based on a DSB Task Force Study on FCRC ut111zat1on February 1976 This task force surveyed previous studies on FCRC's and interfaced with the FCRC coornunttfes 1n order to review FCRC policy Goals 1 Evaluate the existing FCRC's in light of how and why DoD uses them Consider specifically whether the special relationship of the FCRC's to DoD continues to provide the quality specialized services for which they were engendered 2 -Revfew the present fiscal ceiling concept for managing the FCRC's in light of the contention that such ce111ngs lead to technical stagnation and low personnel morale 3 Suggest alternative management strategies for the FCRC's particularly the Study and Analysts and System Eng1neer1ng Techn1cal Dfrectfon FCRC's Reconvnendat1ons The FCRC s should be retained because their unique relat1onshfp with DoD enables high q4a11ty technfcally intensive and tff1c1ent services to the DoD Mission DOR E and DSB recommended the following specific actions to nhance FCRC management performance 1 1 Discontinue FCRC status for some faci11t1es e g APL Johns Hopkins Anser ARL Penn State ' 2 Continue some FCRC's with manpower or ce111ng controls e g oo CNA IDA HIT Lincoln Lab 3 Make MITRE Bedford the OoD c3 FCRC e11mfnate d1vers1f1catfon MITRE Washington becomes a non-FCRC corporation 4 Aerospace continues as AF Space S_ystems FCRC eliminate d1vers1ficat1on 5 Split Project RAND from RAND corporation Redesignate Project RAND as Project Air Force The remainder of RAND beccrnes a non-FCRC corporation C PROCEEDINGS OF AN AAAS SVMPqSI ltl oHOW MUCH DOES THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ADVANCE SCIENC 7N 8 JANUARY '1980 i I 011s l Review DoD's overall contribution to the advancement of science 1n light of its programs designed to foster basic research Include a historical perspect he o I I 2 Consider the recent allegations that DoO gives too much support to those research programs Nhich are or1e ted towards solutions to applied problems 3 Has DoD funding enhanced or unduly influenced academic research 4 Assess the impact of the Mansfield Amendment relevancy on DoDos ab111ty to fund basfc reseorch 5 Does military secrecy affect academic science 6 Detennine the reasons underlying DoD's drop from first to fifth plac in agency support of basic research and revfew the effect thfs drop has on the advancement of scienc e and protection of national security 7 ' Review futur poss1b111t1es for DoD support of basic research Methodoloqy The form for this review was a week long symposium at the AAAS annual meeting Five speakers wfth varied relationships to DoD-supported research gave lectures on the following subjectsi o The National Value of DoD-Sponsored Research George G1mot1 Department of Defense o DoD In-House Basic Research Alan-Bennan Naval Research Laboratory o History of Dooos support of Se1enee Edward Salkov1tz ONR o A Broad View of DoD and Science Edward Teller cuntvers1ty of C1ltfornfa 1 Lawrence Livermore Laboratory o Science Sponsorship_ by the Department of Defe nse George Wald Harvird University A d1scus ion was held after the lectures were completed B-7 C Results 1 DoD_has revised an tlllb1l1nc11n the fundtng fractton of support to u 1versfty res11 rch by emphastzfng and 1ncreas1ng tho allotment to academic 1nst1tut1ons tn I generally enhanced research budgat Over the 11st three years the av1r111 bas1c research budget h11 fncreased by 30 percent untvers1ty support has increased by nearly 10 percent _ _-2 In the same thna year frame DoD has substantf ally f ilcreased 1ts support of block or cluster programs at untvers1t1es This 1ctfon ts oriented toward m1x1mfzfng tnnovat1on and flex1bf11ty qual1f1cattons for award of such support include good management 1ct1'1 pursuit of the university government synergism and I le1dlrsh1p base 3 DoD ts 1ncreas1ng the capital equipment expenditures for fts r1111rchers The goal would enable the use of at least ten percent of contr1ctu1l funding for equfpment purchases 4 In order to tmorove DoD cGn111un1eat1on wfth tht research ccanun1ty 1 o series of 12 bi-monthly research topical reviews was 1mplemonttd 1n the fall of 1979 devoted to I specific d1sctpl1ne and open to the public 5 DoD has established a department-wide un1fonn one-page research contract to reduce paperwork and red tape 6 The dedicated campetent and superior quality sctenttsts and engineers 1n OoD in-house laboratories should not be subjected to the public disclaim accorded to all who work for the U S goverrrnent Their professtonal pos1t1on should riot be cut without relation to the mission of l1bor1tor11s grades should not be arbttrartly frozen and the number of senfor positions should not be rfg1dly limited 7 M1ss1on of DoD tn-house laboratories 1 To provide dedicated technical staff who gtve continuitycorporate memory to the system's acqu1sft1on process and - - I - ' To provide competent and knowledgeable techntc1l 1ssfst1nce 1n the design development and procurement of new mfltt1ry systems -- 1n shorto to ' Ilko the 11111tary servf ces smart buyers o o To provide advice and consultation durtng the tntroductfon of new 111tary systems fnto service use _ o To be responsive to the opp rtun1t1es to improve m111tary systen capab11fty through aw sc1ent1f1c d1scovertes and by o o new developments of t1chnol 1o To maintain a research b1s1 1n those reas of science and technology which are only of interest to DoD To couple wfth and contrtbute to the general scfence and technology effort to the nation o 8-8 UNCLASSIFIED D OUSDRE REQUIRED IN-HOUSE CAPABILITIES FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT TEST AND VALUATION 1 OCTOBER 1980 2 l To describe the capab111tfes of the Defense Department's RDT E programs at in-house fac111tfes fn 11ght of the fundamental responsibility of the depart- ment Results Clpab111t1es of DoD In-House Fac111t1es J Major Functf ons 1 Basic sc1ent1f1c research 2 Applied research exploratory development 3 Advanced development 4 Assessment of science and technology base 5 Mission analysis 6 Concept exploration and syst demo stratiQn va11dat1on 7 Full-scale engineering development 8 Engineering support of production 9 Test and evaluation I 10 Major ROT and fac111t1es ll User services and support of op rating forces including product improvement JI Supporting Respons1b111t1es 1 Making DoD a smart buye_r 1n support of deci_s1 an making 1n a iechn1ca11y soph1st1cated marketplace ' 11 2 ROT program project management 3 Techn1 ca1 1nte111 gene ssessment o 4 Providf g -op 1 ons fo_r 5 Prov1d1_ng RDT E_ 1n areas of 11m1 ted-fndustr1o1 or academic 1n erest t thnicil expertise for mt11tary_plann1ng proces future - ystems _ defuse contractor access to artinent Data 8-9 D Exp1o1to 1on of naw tedlnologtcal apportun1t1es 7 Understanding of and fntaract1on with t o m11ttary user 8 Independent research 1nd development program evaluation 9 Contractor proposal 1nd performance ev1lu1t1on 10 Providing qutck reaction to oper1tfon1l proble1115 11 Interf1c1ng with sc1enttf1c and engineering community 12 Cooperative RID wtth allies 13 Int ot1ng 1og1st1cs support 14 Re1fab111ty and rna1nta1nab111ty 15 Mob111zat1on requirement 16 Producib111ty 17 Des1gn to-cost 111n1gement 18 Hu111n engineering and manpower constderat1ons in system design nd operation 19 Opera_tf onal system safety 20 _ Examples of special areas -of technology a medical RID b -manufacturing-' technology c envf-ronmenta 1 1ssess111nt -a -10 E AD HOC GROUP ON SCIENTIFIC P RSONHEL ARMY SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY PANEL APRIL 1964 Goals I i The panel was tasked to assess the Ant1Y'S effort to mafntafn and improve the effectiveness of scientific personnel 1n Army laboratories Two questions fonned the basis of the 1nqu1ry a Is the Army taking full advantage of av1flable fe1sfble me1ns to improve the effectiveness of its scientific personnel b What should be done to enhance the prestfge of scfent1f1c personnel f n Anny laboratorf es Recommendations A To attract scientists of quality 1 The Anny must with other services increase the 1nftial salaries offered to entry levels BS MS PhD scientists to match industry's offerso especially 1n the phys1c engineer1ng field 2 Step-up summer help work-study programs allot more spaces exempt them fran manpower uthor1ty 3 Adopt th e Sk1 fter committee see ASAP Nov 63 Ill recC1nrnendatf on which modifies personnel procedures to keep staff at optimum levels and attract quality personnel 4 Use ASAP to recruit senior staff B To increase effective ut111zat1on of Army scfent1sts fn R D programs especially to upgrade competence assist professfonal development and enhance prestige 1 Management position applicants should have a proven solid research ccmpetence as well as a good management record _2 Make manpower authority more flexible enhance career mobility 3 Increase cammun1cItfon between Anny s 1ent 1sts the Army and the general sc1ent1ffc community 4 Improve relationship between cfvflfan anny sc1entff1c personnel see ASAP Skffter report Nov 63 5 Make the career program for m111tary offfcers more attractive so as _to enhance the c1v111a -mf11tary R D team B-11 I Ffnd oons to increase 1ncent1ves to sutor R D staff 7 Headquarters Army ID Staff should 1st1b11sh a sc1entfffc personnel el1111nt to review mon1to r and reccmmend 1ctfons to strengthen the A - 's sc1enttf1c personnel programs o c Assess effecttveness of the effort to tncrease quality of sctent1sts recru1ted retatned by Army RID organ1zat1on 1 Keep data on all aspects of sc1entff1 personnel poJfcfes methods to Judge trends 1n quality of technfcal personnel 2 The ASA should review this problem f n 18 months to 2 years - B-12 o Develop F REPORT OF THE DSB TASK FORCE ON TECHNOLOGY BASE STRATEGY OCTOBER 1976 -Goal Provide DDR E with an independent assessment on how well funding resources were allocated among the many technical areas of the base Consider specifically those areas where an increase or decrease of current 1lloc1t1ons seem appropr11te and where opportunities for focus or integration f effort appear to offer better returns 3 Panels were formed - Environmental Life Science Electronics Engineering Technology Strengths 1n the general Technology Base o Technology Base 1s recognized an an important defense activity by DoD management o Technology Base efforts continue to pay off especially yearly incremental advances over 10-20 year per ods o There 1 s a presence of I qufck-actfon high risk high payoff technology operation DARPA's role ' Reasonable allocation level for the broad sc1ent1f1c technology areas comprising the base o Problem areas with Technology Base all of which have been noted 1n previous reviews o DoD in-house laboratories are hampered 1n the qualfty of their contribution to the Technology Base by a campltcated layered management structure o The Technology Base 1s subject to an o_1nert1i to change 11 stemming in part from the management structure Over time this trend - I protects investment in low priority endeavor does not encourage orderly shifts to new higher potential payoff areas o Fields of endeavor are frigmented between many different org n1z tional units 8-13 o F o Technology Base tends to be isolated from system develope and 1s not sens1tfve to ap1r1t1on1l needs Some wort has been done on these long-standing problem areas o o Select1Ye use of block fun 1ng to laboratory technical management for Technology Base work Increased contract to in-house ratto for Technology Base work o Army's plans to set-up integrated Development Centers to include laboratory Technology Base work o Studies e g oo Navy ostrike-Warfare Exercise o AF Technology Base Investment Strategy Exarc1 se are better assessments of impact and cost-effectiveness of investment tn specific Technology Base areas 0 Opportunities for Funding Increases o o o o o o o o o Training R D e g oo use of simulators Software Cost Reduction Gas Turbine Development Eov1rorrnenta1 Factors Affecting Weapons System Perfonnance Cl for Tactical Field Cormnanders Digital Controls for Power Plants Peacetime EnY1ronmenta1 Quality Adaptive Acoustic Arrays Substitutes for Critical Materials Opportunities for Funding Decreases o o o o o Surface Effect Ships RF 1 eci ront c Systems Special Computers and LSI Personnel Classtf1c1t1on Selection and Assignment Advanced Fighter Technology Integration Opportunities for I tegrat1o and Focus o o o o o RF Electronic System Fuztng Combat Casuality Care Systems Material and Devices for Electronic Systems Gun Technology F The TaJk Force concludes that while actual Technology Base funding 1s implemented through budget element allotment DoD should continue to use the independent perspective offered 1n the Technology Coordfnating Papers in order to ensure against duplicated effort or oversights of-important areas The directed trend towards larger contract to fn-house ratios implies a revit111zat1on of industrial and university-based defense research It also implies 1 healthy trend for the nation and 1s contributory to an innovative and creative Technology Base Prfor1t1zatfon of Technology Base effort perfonns reasonably overall Senior levels must be alert to trends toward misplaced investment because of the narrowly-focused hardware-based budget process All types of Technology Base investment must be explored 1nd has been to a certain extent 1n the Air Force ind DARPA B-15 G REPORT OF PANE ON RESEARCH AND EXPt ORATORY DEVEl OPMENT DSB-NAS JULY 1967 Goals Assess both qua11tatfvely and quantitatively the impact of increased budget reductions on the 6 1 research and 6 2 exploratory development programs Issues include ' 1 osellingo the long-range benefits that 6 1 6 2 programs have on a strong m1ssfon-supportfng technology base tn terms of tradittonal cast-effectiveness 2 Clarifying the vital relationship between education and'research in light of funding cutbacks to universities Understand why cutbacks were suggested 3 Indicating as concretely as possible the impact of budget restrictions on in-house labs the defense 1ndustr1a1 R D base and small business 4 Developing methods to detennine the optimum funding level of 6 1 6 2 and to allocate resources to various fields 5 Exploring ways to influence and estimate future Congressional moods Methodology The DSB addressed the task issues through analysis organized into the following groups 1 Impact of Budget Funds 2 Approaches to Determination of 6 1 and 6 2 Funding Levels a Comparison with Industry b Comparison with Potential Adversaries c Health of Fields Underlyi g Defense d Production of Technically Trained People 3 Working with Congress Resu 1ts 1 Expand the managerial support and staff allocated to the planning and interpretation of 6 1 and 6 2 programs 1n order to _ o Move trend away from system or1entat1on back towards discipline orientation o B-11 G o Prepare I quantitative analysis of RDT E expenditure in DoD and industry -- give credible basis of comparison for R D funding o Improve quantitative rationale for funding 6 1 and 6 2 2 Develop better interaction 1th services and technical c01M1un1ty to rank order promising disciplines for DoD support 3 Strengthen po 1t1on of I i ooxr advanced research program managers 4 Develop c ore contracts to strengthen research in fields of DoD interest as a way to harvestg the output of universities researchers and consultants 5 Give more stress to long-range relevance in 6 1 funding 6 Establish a planning committee to review improve the performance of FCRC 1 s 7 Support consolidation and efficiency improvement for service in-house 1aborator1eso 8 9 Impress upon Congress the value of long-tenn payoffs from research through tighter rationales aggressive and techntcally oriented arguments and greater interaction with Congressional supporters Emphasize and argue the importance of un1vers ity research and funding to hfgh quality graduate and or undergraduate 8-17 study o H REPORT OF THE SCIENCE ADVISOR'S PANEL ON BASIC RES AACH IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OSTP o 22 JUNE 1978 This report was given to an OSTP Steering Committee on Basic Research _in Ntss1on Agencies Goals l Review the policies and practices of the bis1c research program 1n the Department of Defense 2 Assess the recent OoD policy and methodl to reverse the decline of D0Dsupported fundamental research and to increase the DoD basic research budget in constant 4o11ars 3 Examine the tnst1tut1ona1 nature of the Do0 basic research program Reconrnendations 1 DoD must support an extensive vigorous and high-quality basic research effort 2 Affirm the critical importance of basic research to DoD and clarify the policy for support of such research at the Secretarial level 3 OoD must continue tts substantial increases fn the level of basic research funding but must ensure that the implementation achieves the intended objectives of such increases 4 Apply the criteria of relevance primarily to b oadly-deffned fields and subfields of science rather than 1ndtvtdua1 programs 5 Utilize basfc research fac111ties universities in-house labs industry and non-profit organizations 1n I manner which maximizes quality and acknowledges the distinct contribution each can make 6 Explore the channels through which connunfcat1on between DoD and the basic research c ommun1ty can be effectively increased 7 Improve the DoD management of-basic research through o Appointing of an off1c 1a1 to provide fu11-t1me broad oversight fo basic research o Increasing awareness of the existence of gaps in basic knowledge of certain fields within OoD research programs Actions should be taken to connect such deficiencies e g in software iii human factors o Ensuring_tha when DARPA supports basic research ft employs arrange_ments which provide the stabt11ty needed for productive programs o Making DoD management and bust ness practices 1 n this area compatible wtth those of_ the basic research community B-18 I NRAC STUDY HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES IN LONG-RANGE PLANNING IN THE NAVY SEPTEMBER 1980 't' Goals 1 Review some of the Navy's past studies of future seapower needs particularly ones that served as bases for public justification of major programs 2 Detennfne how well these studies were able to account for factors whith became important one to three decades thereafter 3 If important factors were slighted suggest reasons why those oversights occured 4 Allow current planning efforts to be informed by knowledge of the past Results 1 From 1945 there has been no truly systematic process for doing longrange planning in the Navy 2 Reasons for the above conclusion include a Methods for systematic long range planning were not developed nor used by industry until 1950's and I960's The Navy adopts business methods more slowly and in 1ts own way ' b The Navy did not urgently need long-range 1 planning 1n the period from 1945 to the mid 1960os By the 1960 s 1nd Viet Nam shQrtand mid-range shipbuilding was more important than long-range planning c Historically the Navy's internal structure the nature of naval warfare will not permit the organizational structure necessary for systematic long-range planning Naval Officers first specialists second d The larger political environment 1n which the Navy has operated since WWII has severely fnhfbtted active performance 1mplementatfon of the necessary long-range planning The question that requires further investigation 1s given changing defense organ1zat1on could the Navy have better adopted and thus better undertaken crucial long-range plannin e Without adequate accest to the documentation of 1nd1v1dui1 polfcy makers the influence of such key individuals on Navy l9ng-range planning and the long-range planning process as I whole annot be complete_ EJ-19 I 3 Observations of the long-range planning process as practiced by the Navy 1n t st dted period include oo A centralfzed long-range planning office ts useful to the Navy even though ft may not 1ccomp11sh systematic long-range planning because tt allows the Navy to focus and coordinate efforts toward proJecttng 1ts long_ tenn needs b Such a planning organ1zat1on 1s most successful when there ts a personal ccmm1tment to long-range planning on the part of the CNO and or the Secretary of the Navy c That canmitrnent cannot however allow the LRP group to be so tightly controlled as to 1dent 1fy fts process wtth I single policy maker d A Long-Range Planning organization must be highly placed enough within the Navy to permit fts independent operation despite the demands for ongoing oper1tfonal and short-tenn planning e Although qr1ented toward long-term needs LRP organization cannot be isolated fran current Navy problems Note OP-93's review of current polfcy developments 1n the 1950's 1n light of their possible impact on long-tenn Navy objectives f The Long Range Planning group must be considered fmportant enough by high policy makers so 1ts studies w111 tmpact on Navy poltcy and operations To achieve this prestige the LRP Offtce must ensure that policy makers are o sensitive to the uncirtafnt1es of attempts to predict the future o aware that efforts to quantify planning studies undermines the1 r efficacy and mrale a_nd o cognizant that the good work of broadly experienced high caltber and well-timed planning personnel must be acknowledged and rewarded 4 Although the study covered LRP work to 1979 the canm1ttee reviewed work done 1n 1980 and found that altho_ugh the ut111ty of Admiral Hayward s Long-Range Planning group remains _to be seen ft has aga n accorded such pl annf ng 1ts propo pl ace 1n- Navy oper1t1 ons o 1 -20 J ARMY SCIENCE BOARD 1979 SLIH' R STUDY oTECHNOLOGY PLANNING FOR FUTURE FIELDED SYSTEMS 20 JULY 1980 Assess Army Technological Status and Plans for future fielded systems in order to attain A Technologica1 Equivalence to Soviet Fielded Systems by 1985 B Technological Superiority to Soviet Fielded Systems by 1990 o o I Rec01T111endat1ons For A above 1 Fully fund major systems now in engineering development and fn procurement Otherwise equivalence will not be achfeved by 1985 2 Insist on more cooperation among deve1opers testers trainers users and DA to fi eld systems quickly smoothly and at a high level of maturity and performance 3 Improve system performance with lock II Product Improvement Programs PIPos by inserting newer technology at appropriate tfmes Include PIPos fn fnit1al production For B above 1 Develop and ma1ntafn a stable long range plJn for functional needs which a projects goals doctrines envf ronment op'eratfonal concepts organization and system needs as well as budgetary constraf nts b addresses timing of specific programs compares RDT E requirements procurement funds against ava11abf11ty of funds 2 Use ad hoc conmfttees to review goals and mature the development of advanced systems concepts and superior technology 3 Retain competent technical teams to provide competitive work and utilize the unique capabilities of private and government labs 4 Mandate even more cooperation among all actors in the process for superiority goals than for equ1va1ence goals 5 Shorten the time to field a system Identffy the adverse actions of others to those who can correct them 6 Mature systems in the field for 1990 project systems 1s well as Block II and Block III PIP programs B-21 K- DSB SUMfiER SlUDY IROUP FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH IN UNIVERSITIES OCTOBER 1976 Goals 1 Explore ways to rekindle and sttmulatt the interests science connun1ty fn problems of national defense of the unfversfty 2 Determine the obstacles to mutually ben1f1cfa1 DoD-Un1vers1ty relat1onshtps and develop ways to o o Improve the quality and long-range character of DoDUn1vers1ty relat1on_shtps Assure the competence of DoD-supported researchers espect11ly younger investigators o Make DoD support more attractive to university researchers and their fnstttutfons o Address the problem of orelevance o particularly the Mansfield syndrome 1n order to m1n1m1ze tts fnterferenc e with DoD-Un1versfty relattonsh1ps o Implement recommended changes or new f n1 tilt1ves rapidly and maxfmfze their credible v1s1bilfty Reasons for Regenerating the Do0-Un1vers1ty Rel1ttonshtp 1 The strength of u s fundamental research resides predominantly 1n un1vers1t1es DoD must re-engage this strength to ensure a fundamental long-range component 1n DoD research to balance the trend toward shorter-range applied science 2 The DoD research strategy should include support for disciplines and study that does not seem 1fflffled1ately relevant to the DoD mission such as 1 Fields tri which DoD must have a Nwfndawo on sctenttf1c progress b Fields of interest pr1mar11y because of the superlative competence of 1nd1vf dual - 1nvol ved-o Reconwnendat1ons DDR E should take advantage of the favorable climate- for fundamental research and seek to secure phased new funding up to an annual program 1evel of $100 000 000 dur1ng com1ng budget cycles B-22 K In answer to the problem of relevancy DoD 1111st o Continue to emphasize the importance and relevance of supporting fundamental research o Not demand that a scientist demonstrate the relevance of his research project or program o Raise the issue of relevance frG111nd1vfdual program levels to the relevance of a-field or discipline o Demonstrate at the level of field or d1sc1p11ne to Congress 0MB and the public the relevance of fundamental research to the DoB mfssf-on Polfcies concerning fields and disciplines must be developed with consideration of the involved sc1entif1c canrnunity coordtnat1on with the services and other governnerit agencies and Judgments made on the b1s1s of quality The policy for review and selection of proposals for research should utilize some fonn of peer review mechanism be developed by or for the service OXR's and that mechanism should be explained to academic scientists o Suggested mechan1s1ms for management and faculty include - new funds might be administered d1rec ly from w1thfn DDR E - new money could be allocated to OXR's or another DoD agency with uniform specific and enforceable guidelines Ways to improve the attract1veness v1stbi11ty of new programs ' - Award large departmental or multi departmental contracts Fund the research of I selected number of icadem1c scientists for five years with I distinctive title such as Awards for Fundamental Science o - Implement some fonn of Ntnstitutfonal general research granto similar to NIH Ge eral Support Research Programs - Modify present arrangements for DoD payment of overhead of gran_ts an contracts so as not to penalize the researcher - Gt ve h1gh pr1 or1 t v to ne w equf pment o nd 1nst rurnent1t1 on with a realistic Ntotal costo approach - Push for a rapid instrumentation of the declared policy to estab11 sh the ratio of intramural to extramural research at 30 70 8o23 L NRAC STUDY MAN-MACHINE TECHNOLOGY IN THE NAVY DEC 1980 Given present trends the Navy will find ftself unable to operate and maintain its systems 1n either the short or long tenn with the numbers of skilled personnel necessary for e fective mission The set of circumstances that have created this cond1t1on tnclude Jncreises 1n external threats o I Expanded mission respons1b111t1es o o o o o Rapid advances tn technology R1s1ng costs Declining 1v11l1btlfty of human resources Changes 1n societal attitude and values Non-competitive military pay and benefits - - o To develop methods 11hereby the Navy can correct the m-1-smatched condition o o of 1ts personnel and its advanced sensors weapons and command-control systems Recommendations 1 Enforce the dev lopment and app11cat1on of man-machine technology in and acquiring new systems early in the acqu1s1t1on phase o Destgntng o Retrofitting current operational systems 2 Establish an organ1zat1on to lead the evelopment 1ncorporat1on of manmachine technology 1nt the des tgn of jobs equipment and systems for the surface Navy 3 Increase the use of standard equipments modules and conffgurations tn the Navy 4 Reduce caniplex1ty of operator and ma1nta1ner tasks o B-24 o L - 5 Develop and apply performance crfterfa and methods for predicting and measurf ng t ask camplexity Close the gap between approval authority for software changes the fleet authority for software changes and the fleet elements conceived 1n order to expedite changes 7 Consider increased use of distributed computer technology standard hardware mo ules and modular software 8 Develop a program to improve productivity aboard ships by applicatfon of labor-saving methods end automation of selected functions such as o fac111t1es matntenance o shfp 1dmtn1str1t1on o materials handling o systems operations o consistency of Condition I III watchstanding requirements 9 Infonn1t1on on the mental and physical attributes of Naval personnel must flow to system designers so that enhanced man-machine interfaces and system rafn1ng requirements can develop 10 Prev1de tnereased c1p1b111tfes for fleet units to conduct effective post-school training 1ndfvfdual and t1ctfcal team Adjust training strategies and pipelines to acconmodate these c1pab11tttes B-25 M DOD $MALL BUSINESS ADVANCED T ECHNOLO Y O iRAM DESAT 1981-82 Goal -Outlfnes the D0D program to encourage small business f1r ns which have stro 9 o o research o d development capab111t1es and experience 1n high technology se ence o eng1neer1 g o The program seeks to prcmote innovative solutions to important sctent1f1c and technical ques ions facing the defense comnun1ty by ut1'11z1ng t e resources of small sctence and technology-based finns tn DoD R D 1 The program 1s d s1gned to augment existing acqu1s1t1on processes and to inform research officers more effectively of the tJchnolog1cal potential of the small business caamun1ty DoD Results The program ts organized into three phases Feasfb-111ty Research and Development Principal Research and Development and Follow-on Development or Production Awards are consecutive 1n nature with a finn's receipt of Phase II or Phase III contracts cQnttngent on the performance and promise of the Phase I effort The content of proposals for all Phases can be found 1n Sections IV V an VI of the document In Section 111 each Military department and DARPA describes areas Which include specific scientific or technological problems 1n neecl of i nnovative approaches toward solutions The outline of these descriptions follows Department of the Army 1 Chem1ca1 Defense a Real-ttme chemical agent detector b Use of advanced sensor for 'detect ton c New-mater tals for protect he clotb1ng d Decontam1nants 1nd contamtnants fac11tt1es capable of n utra11 1ng 2 a range of chem teal agents Combat Equipment and Mater1a-ls a Technolog1 es that w111 al low Ann y equipment to operate on a variety of fuels as they become available B-26 o C -- - o M b More efficient ut111zat1on of fuel fn lfght trucks and off-road vehicles c Portable electrical generating equipment fuel cells and batteries for field use d oLightweighto materials with improved annor c1p1bflfty o Critical material substitutes e g chrome free stafnless steels improved powder s1nterfng f Rugged r1df1tion detector for field use g Remote minefield detection system h Rapid means for water qu111 ty 1n11ys1 s 3 Medical Support a Prevention and treatment of mf11tar11y important diseases e g dysent1ry b Rapid assessment of rfsk of disease to treated casualties c The care and management of mass combat casualties d Technological aids for research on max111ofac1al fnjury and dental diseases e The medical aspects of chemical defense 4 Human Factors a New computer-aided measurement techniques for quantifying perfonnance of m111 tary unfts b Novel techniques for predftt1on of personnel which utilize bath verbal and non-verbal means 5 Communications a Improved noise suppressant equipment designed to eliminate certain background noises and at he same time permft effective ccmmun1cat1on b Techniques for effec fve communication fn an action electronic warfare situation B-27 M Department of NIYY 1 Target Detection and Loca11zatton oo Superconducttng quantum tnt1rfer1nce devtces SQUID acoustic transducers s ensors b Special c Electramagnet1cs and broadband antinnas ID 1 Frequency coverage especially low cost wide band-width purpose and d Theoretical and experimental tools with ws1ch to detect aod classify nuclear surf1ce 11r bursts at sea e g oo portable shipboard aircraft systems for tactical deployment 2 Ocean Phystcs and Engineering Research a New oc11nograph1c tnstrumentatton b Ocean science research techn1 ques c Remote sens 1ng d Ocean volume reverberation modeling e Acoustic response of the ocean bottom 3 Computers and Software Engineering a ' Inexpensive photoltthography techniques for microcircuit fabrications b Portable inexpensive less than $3k microprocessor with graphic capab11tty c Modulation and Demoduht 1on MODEM hardwire and software 4 Human Factors and Personnel a Personnel microwave sensor dev1c s similar to r1d1ation detection badges b M1croeJectrode sensors c Product1v1ty measurement techniques d Perso a11zed interactive display and analysis system B-28 M 5 Materials 1 Physics of semiconductor crystal growth and processing b Physics of mult1-1ayer macroperiod1c solid state structures c Optical quality blue-green laser crystals o d Removal of coatings and preparing surfaces for recording e Non-destructive evaluation of materials and structures f Bearfng 1ubr1cant performance Department of the Air Force 1 F_uel Efficient Aircraft Design a Fr1ct1on and fonn drag reduction b Aerodynamics of large excursion c High frequency active controls 2 Low Speed Take-Off and Landing a Fluid mechanics of thrust augmented 1ft b Propulsion system$ ' 3 Manufacturing Processes a Opt1 a1 recognition b Computer vision c Robotic controls d Optical metrology e Non-destructive evaluation 4 Weapons- Systems Automation a Interact 1ng 1nte111gent systems b Stochastic p_ro e s es in art1ffcfa1 intelligence _ c Cont rol system dynam1 _s and pattern recognition ll JQ' M 5 Defense Against Chem1 al Agents oo Detect ion and Analys1 s b Chemical Characterization c Interfacial phenomena d Pharmocology toxicology DARPA 1 Advanced Solar Electro-Chem1cal Power Sources oo High temperature cell matrix material b Catalyst 2 Advanced Optical Coatings and Long-Life SW1ttheso 3 Innovative Controls nd Displays for Military Flight Vehicles 4 Solid Lubrication Concepts in Element Bearings 5 Electro-Optical Radar and Electromagnetic Sfgnal Intercept Fields B-30 i ll N LOOK FORWARD 20 YEARS VOLUME I AFSC MARCH 1980 Goal A look into the future with a goal of predicting the technologies of the 21st century In an attempt to look at technologies ra her than systems of the future the panels were divided into the following groups - Basic Science Aeronautical Systems Communications -- ECM-ECCM Computers Weapons Space Operations and Support Results and Recommendations A Space Based Surveillance Thrusts 1 2 3 4 5 6 Large Aperture Surveillance Spacecraft Energy Systems Spacecraft Environment Interactfon Technology Laser Hardened Optics Monolithic IR Sensitive Focal Plane Arrays Integrated Passive Damping B Military Man 1n Space Thrusts 1 Manned Military Space Vehicle Technology 2 Predictive Toxological Testing 3 Optimum Man-Machine Decision Making Architecture for Space Systems 4 Simulation of Integrated Technologies for Space Systems C Recommendations to Improve Space System Technology Management o o o Establish a Joint Director of Science and Technology SP CC review of 6 3 6 4 programs Create an on-site c1v111an m111tary contfngent at headquarters SD as a DC detachment FonJl an ad hoc g ro up to perfonn semi-annual 1n-depth roadmappi ng of 6 3 6 4 p 1or- to POM BE subom ssi_on d'- - s1on pofnts o B-31 D Other Specific Recommendations Point Defense As an absolute minimum the Afr Staff AFSC sh'ould establish a focal point for planning for the defense of our air bases This plan 1ng should encanpass the nec es-sary technology base and system programs to guarantee survival of air bases in intense environments such as Europe Chemf cal Warfare Establish an A1r Force technology base program 1n Chemfcal Warfare to fnvest1gate and develop defensive and offensive concepts and capab111ties unique to the requirements of the A1r Force A rea11stfc start within 6 2 program funds would be more responsive to needs and direction than massive defensive offensive CW programs Logistics Establish an AF management activity provide dedicated resources and appoint appropriate authorities to be responsible for the conduct of 1ogfst1cs research development and app11ca tfon O E arena The logistics research activity should be a joint AFSC AFCC offfce with jofnt manning fran both commands for model - see PRAMPO Fully exploit using c lfflmand representatives and knowledge gained by FTD activities AFHRC should have a full-time place in the activity to conduct manpower effectiveness analysis and to fnterfa c e with supporting AFHRC act1vftfes Detennfne through detailed analysis the most effective organizational structure to accomplish logistics research ' ' Personnel Productivity To improve wartime productivity and peacetime efficiency of personnel o Establish HRC programs to investigate - The personnel factors 1n a combat effective work force Combat surrogate trainf ng for increased readiness Combat effective maintenance organizations Weapon system design for personnel productivity o ' Establish an organization 1n human resources to Identify research requirements Plan new systems Implement new technology B-32 0 ASAP AD HOC REVIEW OF THE 1974 ARMY SUMMER STUDY REVIEW OCTOBER 1975 -Goal To review the actions resulting from the Anny's 1974 Summer Study which addressed two major areas Mission Area Deficiencies and Opportunities and Ballistic Missile Defense Spec f1ca11y o Revfew the 1974 Summer Study Findings and Recommendations and determine the status of their current validity and implementation by the Anny o If needed make further recommendations Make recommendations regarding possible study areas for the 1976 Summer Study Recormtendatfons The committee reviewed each sub area of the two major assessment dfv1s1ons and subsequently reaff1rmed most of the recommendations made by the 1974 group both in tenns of their interpretation and implementation The use of a system that would allow all elements of the Anny to operate 1n a common electronic grid with the _Air Force and Marines and the importance of valid 1dent1ficat1on warrants more concern and action 1n TRADOC Re-emphasize the importance of EW training and use ' The following firepower areas are suggested for further analysis 1 2 3 4 5 Light Airlifted D1v1sfon Combat in Urban Areas Fire Effectiveness Assessment Real-time tactical Tac-Fire Revisited Keep r qu1rements consistent in order to cut R D spans get weapons out of R D earlier lessons-learned Re-evaluate overall concept of tennfnally guided weapons rather than just prob 1ems the hardware Consider the use of lightweight vehicles to carry lightweight weapons Operational concept tasks need a much stricter analytical back-up before the tests are designed _ _ Assess field CC111puters in light of their place in total tactical_ firepower as well as hardware development B-33 - _ _ __ n - __ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ 0 Develop I clear concise production policy to decide m1ch 20 mm an4 40 mm programs to pursue Discover why the recmnnendatfons of the Mob111ty Enhancement and Denial subgroup have not been acted upon perhaps wh1th an eye towards better deftn1t1on by TACOM of 1ts R D activ1tfes The recomnendatfons for mine dete tton and neutralization were very sound and were particularly ingenious for the related area of barriers Renew efforts to establish a centralized respons1b11fty for camouflage and ba111st1c cw and EW environment threat surv1vab11tty especially the development of potent1 al c onfl 1ct scenarf os and v gorous tes t and evaluatf on No response was g 1ven to the following ASAP recommendations Afr Defense o o o on Field Army A call for an air defense plan not an air defense m1ssi'le plan The issues of 1nte111gence collectfon Development and f1eld ng fa new all-weather 11r defense gun system The Affl Y spends a great deal of money on Ffeld Army Air Defense but gains little capability fran 1t The committee found the foilowing areas both well-directed and in-line with he Surmner Study recommendations o o 1 o Gap Crossing Earth Mov1 ng POL Conta1 ne r1 zat 1on Study the integration of all of the Command Post Services from i standpoint of mobility to allow the canmand Post to set up or tear down in a m1n1mum amount of time o Specific Recomrneridations for the l976 Stunwner Study 1 Topic- of Study should be more specific than 1974 o 2 limit the number -of groups 3 E11m1nat weekend even1ng meetings months 4 Assign pane_l members 1n ad_vance two cs Consider npre-br1efingsM on background concurrent studies so osnot to intrude on Summer Study time 6 Organize the Study to keep briefings 1n the early part of the assessment to allow time for creative and pro duct 1ve ef-forts 8-34 0 7 A follow-up for each Study Group one or two months after the Summer Study would produce more Anny activity than an Ad Hoc Review Group Sub ect Possibilities for 1976 Sunrner Stu L 1 Army systems and long-range plans 2 The use of the spotter 3 The use of the tactical computer 4 The reduction of weight 8-35 o o -------- -- thte' oo 1 ft - t p ARMY SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY PANEL ASAP SUMMER STUDY 197 2 The 1974 Anny Sc1ent1fic Advisory Panel ASAP Sunner Study was convened to address two area of primary concern to the Anny 1 Opportunities for Technology Solutions to Mission Area Def1c1encfes and 2 Ballistic Missile Defense 1n the Post Treaty World Mission Area Def1c1enc1es and Opportunities MADO had six sub-areas 1 Battlefield Surveillance and Target Acquisition 2 Intelligence Command and Control and Communications 3 Firepower 4 Mobility Enhancement and Denial 5 Surv1vab111ty 1n Conventional CBR and EW Environments and- 6 Field Anny Air Defense Ballistic Missile Defense BMD had two sub-areas 1 S1te Defense Follow-On After Prototype Demonstrations and 2 Technology Methodology - a h group reviewed -current and projected Anny needs questioned operational officers development personnel and analysts 1n an effort to find areas wher suggestions or guidance might help the Anny devise more productive R D programs Results The panel offered mostly operations-oriented recommendations concerning def1c1encfes 1mprovements in present or projected Army systems very detailed and specff1c with less emphasis on technology base No overall summary is included RecQfflffl8ndat1ons ranged from the phUosophical the Army should reassess the complexity scope and ambitions of Firepower concepts TACFIRE FADAC to system specific the Army should perform a comprehensive set pf tests and analyses on various system conffgu rat1ons tnvo lving different data base and processor distributions using TOSZ and the then new a vanced developl 1ent QC's terminals before finalizing the TOS design B-36 Q ASAP SUMMER STUDY 1976 - VOLUME 1 OF 6 ARMAMENT SYSTEMS SUBGROUP REPORT Goals I Review the Science and Technology Objectives Guide STOG for fiscal year 77 i oo 2 Assess the quality of laboratory plans by examining the degree to which near tenn 11 system objectives of the technology base are supported Reconmendations 1 Automatic Cannon for Ant1-Annor Use o o o Continue support Eva1uate rapid fire medfum caliber guns systems for tactical utility when used to compl ment guided missile anti-tank $YStems Solve the problem of fabrication of high density penetrators with a technology plan 2 Smoke and Observation o o o o o Detennine canmon requirements for Services DARPA 1n smoke development and ffeld testfng Assess the feasibility of alternate methods to produce smoke for the 8-14 mfcron band Es tab 1i sh use requ1 rements for smoke protect 1on Explore the use of pay loads or fuel-air explosives to disperse smoke Develop instrumentation for field testing of smoke and dust 3 Indirect Fire Response Line t o o Reduce artillery response tfme clarify system program objectives Include new target acquisition systems e g SOTAS fn the definition of new artillery systems Focus the ragmented approach of the effort 4 Line to Hit Direct Fire o o o Unburden the development of guided projectiles e11m1nat1ng arbitrary cost constraints while providing feas1b111ty examine trade-offs Deffne the battlefield conditions under which guidance must function effectively Integrate Direct Fire schemes with existing or planned tank fire control systems B-37 by o 5 Scatterable Mines o t o o Continue development of a new family of mines Emphasize techniques for hardening mines against CM's Develop a high priority technology base mine program to assure active pursuit of new ideas Use tactical employment studies to develop user gu1dan a 6 Surv1vab111ty of Friendly Artillery o Define a program to improve artillery surv1vab111ty against Soviet threat 7 Art111ery Against Point Targets t t 8 Study priority battlefield targets e g oo air defense artillery as possible system concepts Extend the exper_1menta1 program afmed at the critical technical problems of the SADARM concept e g o target acquisition Forward Area Defen$ e Gun Systems _ Accept th eapab111tfes- of the best off-the-shelf guns _ o ammc rada r -etc to eplace the inadequate arsenal since ROC of the above system cannot meet the requested 1 deadline Detenn1ne missions for AD systems 1 n 1990's configure programs based o current technolog y base programs 9 39 Q STUDY 1976 o voLUME 2 OF 6 VOLUMES AVIATION SYSTEMS SUBGROUP ASAP SUMfi R The subgroup addressed four areas of sfgnff1cance o o o 1 L AMRDL and its Flight Research Simulator RPV Program Human Factors Behavorfal Sciences Helicopter Weapons System Design Integration General Recommendation A center of cmpetenceo should be established for the purpose of Weapons System Inte ratfon This coordinated eff rt woul be expected to focus the atte tfon o the weapons systems design community the airframe designers the avionics c011111un1ty and those conceived with human factors or system problems now inadequately addressed Specific Reeonrnendat1ons Flight S1111l1tor Move target date for a flight simulator facf11ty to optimize the na -of-the earth NOE misston helicopter and its associated system to 1979 from 1981 RPV Programs Funding and the schedule of this program grossly inadequate 1n relation to program objectives To remedy this s1tuat1on 1 Increase or reprogram funding of Aquila program o o to ensure a sufffc1ently relt1ble system to develop an fn-depth program to detenntne RPY mission effectiveness 2 Allow AVSCOM more time to test the re11ab111ty of Aqutla systems prtor to transition to user 3 Have RPV omponent development programs address spec1ffe cr1tfcal needs ear hed during tn1t1a1 testing phases 4 Terminate transfer to other line elements all RPV payload development ff ft does not directly support day or night target acquisition o or desfgn1tfon Human Factors A un1fy1ng structure 1s necessary to review human factors assign such respons1b111ty B-39 Q SUMMER STUDY 1976 - VOLUME 3 OF 6 ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS SUBGROUPS ASAP Recommendations 1 i' - s T O G and User Requirements o o o o - Encourage interaction between user laboratories to provide joint input to future STOGs User agencies should study fyture system concepts with assistance from laboratories Avoid tendency to over specify 1 STOG do emphasize operational requirements o ' o 2 3 Command and Control C2 o Use 6 1 6 2 and joint DARCOM laboratories TRADOC stud es to explore new concepts far c2 centralized versus de-centralized systems - Consi-der _the inter-relationship of Anny c2 system must examine the need for information exchange EW Warfare Deleted for security reasons - o ' 4 ADP Automatic Data Processing __ - _- - _o -o o S rength n interaction between TRADOC planners and ECOM ADP Xi ' t f-- 91 - ee_i s ' - - _ - _ _- - 1 -- tVJ fop i strong ECOM and BMD ADP liaison o 1_ _ -- -_ o E i b-ii s DP System Engineerinq in ECOM 1 s laboratories o Seek a more flexible oncept for Fourth Generation Military Computer Family to allow substitution of hardware modules fo r software modules ' Jff L __ o 8-40 - ' Q o 5 Tactical Cmnmun1catfons o Several recommendations relate to requirements to improve electronic vulnerab11fty and flexibility of specific systems and cannot be provided because of security class1f1cat1on 1 Compare techn1ca1 tact1ca1 capab111t1es of newer and older beyond-line-of-sight connectivity at moderate ranges mm wave laser atmospheric scattering satellites artificial ionosphere airborne relay 8-41 04 ASAP SUMMER STUDY 1976 o VOLUME 4 of 6 MISSILE SYSTEMS SUBGROUP RE PORT o o Findings 1 MICOM plan generally agrees with STOG elements 2 The technology base supports all STOG elements for MICOM plan except for addressing the all-weather and fire-and-forget technology These requirements 1n MICOM prior to STOG publication are incompatible with weight constraint employed in the system concept Recommendations for Further Emphasis - o Close Combat es ec1a11y battlefield v1s1bJ11ty 2 Fire Support re9arding WP artillery which outrages outnumbers NATO art111ery 3 Air Mob111ty- reduce time required for target acquisition 4 Air Defense No program was identified as being underemphasized Good Quality High Relevance but not directly supported by STOG 1 Software development for complex weapons systems 2 Investiga ion of KE kill by missiles need_ for fea-sfb111ty study ' Carrying an eye-ball with an RCM to an area of interest has been evaluated as feasible -- explore use 1n anti-tank indirect fire 3 - Work Not Being Done Deleted due-to security classification Discontinue Work o Discontinue reduce fn favor of other programs o Advanced Multipurpose - Missile Program Use medium range anti-tank missile instead o Two Radar Programs 1n Air Defense Hemispheric Dorie Quiet Radar D not go past prototype o B-42 Q-5 ASAP SUMMER STUDY 1976 - VOLUME 5 oF 6 MOBILITY SUBGROUP Methodology Subgroup #5 adopted the Quadr1partile Objective QO for Tactical Mobility STOG 77 Only ground aspects of Air Mob1lfty were considered The study was divided 1nto MERADCOM TARADCOM and the Army Corps of Engineers programs Reconmendat1ons 1 The following program should be cancelled o Surface preparation to support heavy vehicles 2 The following programs are adequate and in accordance with STOG 77 an need no additional funds o o o o o o o Specialty products for combat forces Far-forward terrain survey Fuels lubricants Electric power Modeling and simulation for combat and tactfcal support vehicle systems Test bed vehicles Infinitely variable transmissions 3 The foll wfng mobility programs meet STOG 77 objectives but need additional funding to eet systems development goals t o o o o o o o t o o o o Barriers to enemy movement Route and gap-crossing Map productfon and dissemination Terrain data updating Counter-mine Barriers for combat mobil ty support Bridging for mobility enhancement Contafners mater1als handling Fuels handling equipment Hfgh temper ture h1gh ef fic1ency engines External self-contained suspensionsTracks and wheels Active and passive pro ection R-4 2 - - o -- oo- - - -------- Q-5 4 The following programs need a new STOG review as well as addft1anal funding o o o o o Improvements 1n Anny Mobility Model AMMl Modifications of AMM for tactical use Combat engineer equ pment model Logistics over the shore Environmental control Advanced systems concepts far combat and tactical vehicle system Fuels for vehicle mobility o 1 5 The following mobility Technology Base programs are adequately funded but need a re-vamped STOG o tamoufl1ge counter-surve111ance - o _ Materials for vehicle mobility enhancement - _ o Combiistlon for mobility improvements o Heat transfers and dynamics of veh1c1 e mob11 ity - I o o o - o Q-6 ASAP SUMMER STUDY 1976 - VOLUME 6 of 6 o SOLDIER SUPPORT SYSTEMS SUBGROUP Findings and Recommendations Overall the STOG-77 lacks guidance as to when a capability 1s needed Some STOG-77 items are so broad that almost any program can be considered respons ve It is recommended that STOG-78 items be sharpened in tenns of time frame and specificity Specific Recommendations A Human Resources and Personnel Administration l Establish a program to meet future manpowe r concerns o o changing population distributions impacts of changing economic conditions on recruitment retention of personnel 2 Measure unft effectiveness 1n terms of leadership and management techniques B Training 1 Add o o o o o 2 technica1 sc1ent_ific support to the follo ing crit1 al training areas Retention Technology base for training devices and simulators Large unit combat simulation Technology base for field technical manual preparation Modes of presentation other than the printed page Increase support to simulation technology C Medical Dental and Life Support Systems 1 Incorporate more detailed STOG's 1n the biomedicine and health capability category 2 Emphasize these chemical boio gica_l warfare concerns o o o o effects of chemi ca 1 bfo 1ogi ca1 agents diagnosis of CB effects potential vaccf ne protection potent1al drug protection and or tneraov B-45 Q-6 D Human Engtneer1n9 and Performance Enhancement 1o Upgrade STPG to reflect the detailed and cQherent human eng1neer1ng program the Army needs 2 Use human factors 1nfonnat1on much earlier in the system design and development cycle E f occt and water o _ L Addres the technology base aspects war and peacetime of subsistence and food service systems 2 Give higher _priority to water purification supply and distribution 1n STOG's o - F - Cl ot h- ng anct Individual Equ1 pment - o 1 The nuclear-bfological-chemical NBC threat to the individual soldier must receive more detailed attention 1n the STOG 2 The program that deals with the NBC aspects of soldier support mu t address o Individual clothing and equf pment protection 1 Decon am1natton equipment and procedures G Air Drop l Start efforts on equipment locatf on and assembly- aids 2 Consider stand-off 11 d 11very systems - H Nuclear B1olag1cal and Chemical Wnfare Protect10 f 1 Incorporate NBC protection features-- 1n new designs- equipment o clothing and shelters 2 Develop a simple water kit to test for the possible presence of chemical agents I Soldier Support Engineering__ 1 Establish and fund a 6 1 _program for camouflage 2 - - Include NBC protection-as an'integrated part of environmental control systems where applicable R ARMY AIR FORCE JOINT SUMMER STUDY U S AIR FORCE ACADEMY 1978 Address four topics identified by Tactical Air Command TAC and Training and Doctrine Command TRADOC as high-priority ftems for combined Air Force Anny attention 1 o Reliable IFF of aircraft by ground-based MJ syster as Improved capability to provide supporting firepower systems of either Service-using target acquisition means of either Service by o Effectfve capability to interdict enemy ccrnmand and -control o Accurate location and reliable classification by type or identification by specific unit of enemy AD syste s METHOD the Four task groups aligned to the specific goals and looking to both near term up to 1983 and longer term after 1983 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Each of the Task Groups addresed thefr topic ar a in term_s of Allied Operations in the NATO Central Arena Task Group I NATO Air Defense Environment for Aircraft Identif1cat1on Task Group I findings and recommendations are deleted due to security classification Task Group II Supporting Fire for Friendly Forces Task Group II findings and recommendations are de eted due to security classification Task Group III Interdic ion of Enemy Command Control Task Group III finding$ and _reco_minenci atJoos c 1 assi fi cc1t ion o are deleted due to security R Task Group IV Templat1ng and Countering Sov1 et Defense on the Batt1 ef1e1 d Task Group IV findings and rec endat1ons _are deleted due to secur 1ty class1ftcat1on Overall Recomnendat1ons of Envfron111ent Deleted due to security ' ' -- - the Joint Study on c3 class1f1cat1on 1n the NATO European s ODORE PROJECT HINDSimtT OCT BER 1969 Goals 1 Detenn1ne wh ch management factors are important to o Making research and development programs more productive o Ensuring ut111zat1on of technology base program results 2 Measure the overall increase in cost-effectiveness for current generation weapon sys tems that can be traced to any part of the DoD t nvestment 1n science and technology research 3 The strategies adopted to achieve these goals involved o Detennfning the extent to which new weapon systems are actually depe ndent upon recent advances in science and technology for the1 r - increase 1n decrease in increase in predecessor system effectiveness cost cost-effectiveness compared to a system Detennfn1ng the proportion of a_ny new techn ology required for attaining the above system improvements that was a result of o DoD-f1nanced research in science and technology o Determining those s1gnif1cant management and environmental factors as seen by the S E research ccrnmun1ty that 1ead to hfgh utilization of research results o fact- a strong reliance on new science and techI value - cost index which measures the return on investment research This quantitative me sure should be in tenns of the enhanced c st-effect1veness made possible by the If there is in nolo_gy devising purcha ed kno led F-indfngs For each strategy For Strates 1 Markedly improved weapons systems result fran skillfully combining a considerable number of _s ient1f c and techno 1og1ca1 advances o s 49 S For Strategy 2 More than ass percent of new science and technology utilized tn weapon systems resulted from DoD financed programs For Strateqy 3 The ut111zat1on factor 1s 1nsensit1ve to the classic policy management differences between U S industry DoD in-house laboratories and university associated science and technology centers It may however be sensitive to the differences 1n these types of organization and the classic academic organization structure of universities Most new technology utilized comes from research programs und rtaken 1n response to recognized Defense problems The scientist provides phenomenological explanations to the engineer who uses unified scientific theory and codified scfent1f1c 1nformati on Research programs oriented toward specific types of equipment have been p rt1cularly successful 1n generati'ng utilized knowledge Attainment of both I higher combined inventiveness a d utilizat1on rate is dependent on oo the recognition of need a source of ideas in the fonn of an educated talent pool o capital resources and an adequate commun1eat1on path to potential users o - o o o Fo Strateqy 4 Sever1 1 factors refute the poss 1bf11ty of a simple or 11 near relationship between cost of research and value received including oo o 1 t oo Pervasive use of one technology if used 1n our systems throughout many other systems ' Improved weapon-systems or end-item equipments tend to be synerg1 stic rather than cumulative consequences f the several embodied science and technology idvances The relative amount of new sc1ent1f1c or technological knowledge required o achieve greater effectiven ss lower cost o r improved cost-effectiveness of a new system increases with the technical complexity of a predecessor system o Therefo re any c rude approximation of measured value versus research expenditure 1s delusory Return or investment will always appear greater where an improvement 1s made-to a simple system 8-50 T DOD LABORATORY UTILIZATION STUDY 1975 Goals 1 Detenn1ne requirements fo r DoD laboratories 2 Assess the capability of the laboratories to meet these requirements 3 ldent1 fy excess capacityo overlapping capabiHt1es shortfalls or 1nstances where RID could be contracted to 1ndustry at a sav1 ng 4 Define I program to upgrade the quality of the laboratories Spec1f1c Rec011111endations Anny t Restructure laboratories 1nto a smaller number of development centers o Reorganize part of Army Material Command to simplify reporting chain for commodity command laboratories o Fonnulate and document a system for financial control qn size of laboratories o Document the technology base program planning and approval authority o Enhance military R D career pattern Navy o Reduce the redundancy 1n functions platfonn assignments and interlab competition for funds o Change technology base management to correct fragmentation uneven quality and ineffective technology transfer o Improve ut 11 f zati on of Nava1 pe rso nne_l o Air Force 1 Increase 6 1 con_tract research progtam o Increa e 1a oratory 1nvolveimnt 1n devel_opment through demonstration of end item feasf bfl 1ty o al gamate la bs intQ centers li1ed with product d1vis1ons o B-51 T o Establish controls on -labs 1n-house contra_ct rat1 o o Increase focus on Conclusions and c3 Reconmendatfons There 1s a vital role for the laboratories not satisfactorily available from industry un1vers1tfes FCRC's systems canmands etc 1 _ o _ _-_ _- - formal laboratory comment on the technical rfsks of any new program should be required 1n the DCP DSARC process o Laboratories should- be operated by spec1 fy1ng only their maximum allowable level of fn-house funding-and leaving decfs1ons on the m1x and number of personnel to l boratory d1 rector o o There 1s excessive in-house effort fn the areas of materials and - structures electronics- and weapons tn both the Anny and Navy and 1n the research area 1n the Anny and Afr Force Number of -tn-house personnel working 1n the technology base should be reduced by 101 to 151 o _ - oooo 4 B-52 ' APPENDIX C FIGURE OF MERIT ASSESSMENTS This appendix serves as an audit tra1i of the Figure of Merit calculations for all of the technologies considered by the panel A 11st of these technologies and a sample Figure of Merit assessment fonnat precedes a tabulation of the results These numbers are the basis for the determination of the Order of Magnitude Technologies shown in the main rep rt I 'i o o 1 ' ORDER OF MAGNITUDE TECHNOLOGIES CANDIDATES CONSIDERED lfan1 9ttl laMt I t tfftctlllt a-teal LIHf'I 5 -ee Stt taou Mi tt Opttcs Ht t llrlllltent Elec tro1t Acceh Pllhed Pwff1 111111 _ IHc wn llllltrl1 Pttttclo lffm1 loIIIY Llsen w Dlll tltD tlEllf MOM ttalUOGJ Spice llsed bdar1 SoUd State lttc s- e C anut1 llECTIIO-OPTICS T Clla 06Y Htgll Deltstty lllono1tttt 8 11o SeMor Systasa _ Dita _ 11111 C11ftter Suppreisfon Acttn EO-MJ Ftltena s Coolars Supetc oapa 1 ffl 1nc1 tnt Ad wed AltJOl'ftJmh MYIMed Tadlnt -e i flldttN lntellf ence his1o o oPNCh nclerstand11'19 iRferettee lflll dNltcttoa bRledge Mses Mtwa1 ml'UIEI -SCIEIICt languages E duc att Tecllllolc v Optical Atdsi Dlstrtlluted Dita lases 111croprocesson Penoftal Tn111t111 talUIICATtONS ttCINJl OG'fr S C trnhable r - icaUClllSI Dtstrt W ec-tcat1ons llltefrltad Data Tut and Voice Networks Pacl et s ttchlft I nI lffC111JO C'IIIDNICS Mita 'lrJlt-Yol1tt1e Soltd State -'ies Snah117 0ettoo1e t ptoelectrontcs a t llrddtecblres1 Ad1abattc T lftttMS _ _ 1ectrtc Drift System Adl11battc llllctllM ry 111d SwttclMiffr Uset' Propuhto u 1ecttONgnettc PropulsIon Space Powr PUIEl MD PIIOPUI SIOII Turbofan fngtnesi t t w e PIIOUUCTIIII MD IO'AIII 'fttHIII OG'f Rtlttary lobottcs CNJ CM CAT F1ntt 1e Nft Tedinologr btstrt lnfo tfot1 rocess t t 1 QN ltftattvo llloMtestr11Ctt Enlottoa lletoShape Processt- FabrtcatiOII TedtlltqNS IIOCHOIICM ltCHNOlOGY Cenettc 119111ff1'11t9 1croac apsul1tfe111 MTDIIAU MYlnced eoa ostte Naterta1ss Tougha ied een tes ltapto Soltdtflcatto Tedlftolot C111111ao Smlc onductors Ni Jttphaslc and laYffN Callipounds Opttcel Cer tcs SUIIYIYAlft hY EIIWICOErTS Actt and Passfff Stealths mt TechMIO IJ Slte11tta Systea Natdetltng ASV aectronfcsJ l G f Cost INS b-acousttc MW Acoustic Arrays Clear bay FOSS Acttve Sonar SPACE IMRFME lllff Anttground S ce Weapon SIVTrGIC OFFTIISE Te 1na11y GufdH RYs - itoa 1bles SAM LE FIGURE OF MERIT FORMAT u 11111o r 111 2 BIMntlMI SJ 11u11111111 rillHdL u s I IJRI I 1eict IIBHl'1 llri H1 111111 111 7 '8lt IJ lftllllif1B I ldlH M 1o 1 z o o oo o - o 1Fifll'll u ft m r U JICIIBJ MY l at JJ IMA CIJIAI PAJIU'II u 1m H4m J u r eueoe lJ fteRfKIMI II her AWIILUI I 1111 I___ __ LIi o 11 11 -0111 CINIIBIAL IU CIIT _ -a-tll-4--1 111utMarw111ILIIY llCUOMl - -' _ _ IJl l IUU ----- -o-11n_ _1o_1 _ _ fllll i'f- atll1III lfii o u - m am 11m 1ar so11 11 fatAI f11o1 If IIHlf -- C-2 - ORDER OF MAGNITUDE TECHNOLOGIES -- - i Ji 1 I - o D ao o amJIITT I ' ' IJ Tedi l11P1Cl 11t Nt 11lolt 5J1t S PaNast 11 trJ I Sta 1 lclt JI n I w Cost I hht co d Alteruttwes t Dlratto ar 1- ct toTII GPfOltlllln TtCIIJICAL alSI lllturtt of TechMlcw u t 9 t Ir a i- - c ili ffi ' I I t I 9 t t I 6 2 o 9 t o 4 P 25 a 9 ' I t J o o- 4 I HI 4 I 4 I o I 4 9 4 I ZS 6 2 I ZS 6 25 i1 t Z o o o 4 9 l 4 4 1 o I 1 I I 4 l 2 2 1 4 I I I t 251 1 1 2 81 4 I TOUL IISIC of Nert t I I I I o 4 oo 6 oo LI o 1 2 l I 4 4 l 4 4 l I 4 I 4 I t I 6 Z o ' I 4 4 r I 2 d 9 2 251 I f 9 - l 4 I o I I 9 9 4 4 o 4 t I I 4 IJ f '1 5 t 4 9 125 9 l o I o ij_ m o 4 l t 43 0 $2 0 56 0 51 25 37 0 43 G p 29 l 4 o 'I o1 1o1o o t o 4 I i e aJ i i o __ _f__ _t oo o o I 1 o sz s o3 o se o s o Lflel _ U rattnal Support l11p1ct 4 9 4 lolr1111111t 4 o 4 usr ii 4 I LL I o I 4 I V t t I 4 I 4 i1 4 5 5 l 9 ili ffi 2 2s i10 1s ss s u o 6 o- e LC I 1111 L 1-o l o I IID COSTS l J fllofactwt111 laso UltfqsaeH or Nntt1r IID 4 4 71 0 i i I SwsmtSMUAfl CCIIICtPT IISl If llhston S 1111 blatN attlt I Pe1ttkat a rHICrattc K' l 4 ' 65 5 ' I i - o i o j - -9 I u u 1 25 9 1 25 IJ 1 1111olat JJ l1HIOlat tN '9lttttl o I IJ ' 4 o o o of S ct I Lewer119 E- lettl US USSI I u _ f' l I - t IC t- -_ e ' I i f LV o C c o X- r lll'JCI o - ii lu ' 'I UD me Q s c 1 1 us 9 1 9 I 4 2 25 4 4 '4 I 'o o ' o o 4 4 g 4 4 o ' o o oo 4 I 4 I 1 o 'o l I 4 I I 1 zsl o o o I 2 o ' 9 ll 50 122 0 '29 75117 0 I is o tzo 7 131 751 H 5 I Zt 251 t6 0 124 S 125 0I34 0140 251 tt O 12e 25' Jl 2 s- o 4 7 I J o I Z 4 I z 1 I z z I 2 221 2 od 2 11 2 021 1 2 1 a a I 1 721 1 s 1 1 391 1 J I 1 I 1 3 J 1 2 APPENDIX D- BACKGROUND PAPERS 0 ORDER OF TECHNOLOGIES 1 TECHNOLOGY Very High Speed Integrated Cfrcuits VHSIC What ts 1t Thfs development 1re1 covers technologies supporting design and 1rch1tecture methods for laying out chips with up to 100 000 gates providing the advances 1n lithography and processfng necessary for 1 25 to subm1cron 11newfdths 1n fabricating such chips and demonstratfng signal processing functions at the brassboard level Why ts 1t important What difference can it make Such devices w111 enable a wide r ange of revolutionary military capabilities through their 100-fold increase 1n signal processing speed greatly reduced cost per function and lowered sfze weight and power A surmtary of selected signal process1ng 1ppltc1tions follows o Autonomous I adaptive sate111te sensor and RPV senso r pr essing IR ESM and radar o Antt-J1m communications and r1d1r systems with very wide 1nst1nt1neous bandwidths o Surv1v1ble 1 intelligent distributed processing o Adaptive missile guidance with fmproved 1ccur1cy recognttfon capability and ECCM o Rea 1-t1me advanced acoustic array processfng and rapid correlation and screening of multi1rr11 data o Adaptive navigation and guidance VHSIC technology offers greatly improved capabilftfes tn self-test and repafr and offers s1mp11f1ed operation transparent canplextty ' What fs the current status The program has demonstrated the processing and lithography capab1l1ty for 1 25p features for sfltcon dev ces What 1s the current DoD program The VHSIC program ts I vertfcally integrated trf-service effort with FY 81 funding of $40M DARPA also funds related teehnology and research VLSI $21 M What should the DoD pro r1m be Although the VHSIC program 1s an aggressive effort aimed at end app ications there 1s a need foro mor-e aggressive plan for early 6 3A demonstration to aid 1n the transition problem What are the measures of success The YHSJC program should have three major criteria applied 1 Tech nolog1ca1 feature size l 25 to submfcron gates per chfp 1D 5 radfat1on tolerance design flexibility 2 Processing power 1D0-fold tncrease 1n throughput rate 5 x 1011 gate-Hz cm2 3 Early technology insertfon fn tey applfcat1ons e g A-J ccnmunfcations 1n three years n_ 2 TECHNOLOGY Active and Passive Stealth What 1s it Stealth technology includes a range of techniques for reducing the signature of a vehicle or sensor to radar and optical surveillance systems These technfques 1ncl ude active and passive methods radar absorb1 ng materials and structures advanced designs shapes optical absorbers techniques for reducing the emitted signature and repeaters transponders Why 1s it important What difference can 1t make Active and passive Stealth techniques are critical to successful penetration of advanced defenses for str1 ke or su rvefl lance missions either strategic or tactical Stealth enables survivable operation of high value platfonns in I high threat environment Such techniques are also crucial to cruise missile penetrat1on and effectiveness Stealth techniques have the inherent capability to counter high investme t threat defensive surveillance capabflit1es What is the current status Techniques have been developed for effectively reducing the s1ghature of a strategic aircraft-sized platfonn for operation against advanced defense surveillance systems Other techniques are being pursued for further red uctions and for application to other systems e g cruise missiles What is the current DoD program Deleted -due to security c lass1 f1- cation What should the DoD program be The current program is adequate to exploit available technical opportunities A greater emphasis is needed on early 6 JA demonstrat ons 6 3 11 Technology Insertion demonstration For example a full scale demonstration of a large Stealth aircraft could preclude too early a comm tment to a strategic bomber based on the availability of Stealth techniques Further such a demonstration wquld defin the effectiveness of U S air defenses to the Soviet deployment of Stealth te hniq es What are the measures of success The most credible measure of success fs actual measurement data of a signature collected on a full-scale aircraft or mock-up A successful program would reduce the s fgnature of a bomber-sized aircraft si n1f1cantly across a wide spect_rum of RF frequencies - D-2 o 'o - 3 TECHNOLOGY Advanced Software What is it This technology covers advanced software engineering techniques 1nc1ud1ng software development tools advanced hfgher level languages and operating environments non-procedural languages speech processing and recognition and fast algorithms Why is it important What difference can it make The importance of software technology will increase as computers proliferate throughout the military and as microprocessing architectures become more complex Software costs have risen to command 80-90% of the investment and life cycle costs of deployed canputer systems and are projected to increase still further Advanced software techniques can have an order of magnitude impact on such costs Such advances w-i 11 impact future capabil i ti s for sustained operations for nea r-rea1-t1me integration of the targeting and strike functf ons for effective operation in heavy ECM envf ronments for complex battle management and for tactical integration of space surveillance and targeting data Co t effective s f ware technology 1s crucial for o o o o o Assuring software portability including operating systems Fast software design assembly testing and maintenance Growth over time expansion adaptation Computational robustness and fault tolerance Automated programming Order of magnitude impact is projected for all of these perfonnance attributes What is the current status Software is early in its development as an engineering discipline ADA a tandard language has been developed for use throughout DoD A wide variety of software devel9pment too s has been developed within industry No standard operating sys em yet exists There is as yet no coordinated effective tri-Service program pursu1ngohighleverage-software advancements What is the current DoD program The current DoD program in advanced software is est 1mated at $7M The bulk of this effo rt is centered at DARPA Most Service programs emphasize instruction set architectures and stereotype software applications In nearly every case embedded software developments are lagging hardware vulopments What should the DoD program bet Becau se of ft$ pervasive impact on future capability in all areas of warfa e this technology should be org nized sfm11 arly to the VHSIC program Further the DoD program should be to $30M to address- the following promisfn_g opportunity areas expanded o ooo o oo I Fast algorithms development Efficient software portability Standard operati_ng sys ems Su vivable networking Echelons of computing Signal characterization for -real-timJ interpretation speech recognit-io_n n cfo 1er s t andi g Advanced life cycle management- tools D-3 This program should be vertically integrated managed by ASD R T and crft1ca11y coordinated among the Services The creation of a separate line 1tem to fence the funding may be approprfate What are the measures of success The success criteria which should be used in measuring the evolution of advanced software and new faster algorithms should be l Programmer productivity order of magnitude impact within three to five years 2 Software re11abf11ty and rob stness 3 Software -development costs noticeable shift from the 901 costs embedded fn m111tary computer systems 4 Enhanced processing throughput for widely used functions e g Fourier transfonn and multipath correlations o ta 11 ed ccxnpartson standards_ should be developed as an early effort under this new program emphasis also a plan for system app11catfon demonstration should _be developed wfth certain applications being demonstrated as part of a vertically integrated program D-4 4 TECHNOLOGY Microprocessor-Based PersQnal Learning Aids What 1s it and the available to individualized ments within this Thfs technology covers the applfcat1on of microprocessors commercial education and game software base e g Plato military personnel training The technology base developtechnology are of two kinds 1 Development of relevant applications software 2 Conducting training experiments of sufficient size to judge effectiveness Why is ft 1m ortant What differenc can it make This tech ology can become a cruc al part of troop training o The U S military has a serious problem recru1tfng technically literate personnel to operate advanced weapon systems t The present generation of Americans has been raised in an acad_emic envf ronment with a declining emphasis on science and mathematics On the other hand this generation fs exposed to a culture with greatly enhanced receptivity to canputer training e 9 1 great exposure to television personal calculators and computers arcade games smart games etc se1e cted experiments fn the commer_c1al markets show order of magnitude results 1n use of micr processo_rs for learning o In future warfare the premium is on flex1 f11ty whe e rapid retraining of personnel wf 11 be crucial The criticality of this technology is high for training_ of military personnel for operations in advanced warfare environments novel operating procedure advanced maintenance techniques new concepts for weapon employment employment of EW Countenneasures and continued operation in CBR and EW environments In the EW area the inadequacy of training has been detrimental both in tenns of operational readiness and in terms of providing an increased understanding of the long ter n ro1 of EW 1n warfare The latter factor has been a major hindrance to the coherent evolution of EW Success in this technology an lead to s1gnfficant redu ction fn training time where such techniques are often the only real1st1c-methods for training a significant reduction trainin g epsts and the achievement of higher skill 1e vels are What is the current stafus There a number of personal trainfng aids nd games now being marketed commer cially e g o o Plato No similar set exists wi-thi'n the ooD D-5- What fs the current DoD program Although there is an aggressive technology base program 1n the general area of education technology there 1s no identified support of microprocessor-based personal training The focus of the current program 1s on large scale s_tmulat1ons for training in high skill areas There is no program specifically aimed at the explo1tat1on of mfcroprocessors for trainf ng a 11 Speak and Spell II for the military What should the DoD program be What 1s needed 1s to find a way of pushing inexpensive microprocessors for training into the field The DoD program should 1n1t1ate experiments with new software and emphasize situations where quiek results are very apparent It 1s important not to get bogged down with large statistically relevant studies with large control groups etc A program of $4M 1s r commended to initiate this effort What are the measures of success The key measure of success for this technology base effort 1s transitions to widespread use throughout various sectors of the military A detailed plan of the targeted applications should be developed early 1n this recommended program In the short term identify learning acceleration 1n a wide variety of field and laboratory experiments one to three years In the long tenn perfonn more controlled experiments with cost analysis of training effectiveness three to five years - 5 TECHNOLOGY Fa11-Safe 1 Fault Tolerant Electronfcs What 1s 1t This technology covers electronic sensors ccxnputer sys tems max1 m1n1 or micro and network techniques enabling continued operation w1th one or more functional components inoperative Continued operation is accomplished by incorporating additional subsystems components and or algorithms which without external stimulus or resistance ensure that occurrences of erroneous internal states do not result 1n internal failures The techniques included provide a 11 self-po1fcing 11 capability Why 1s it- fmportant There 1s and will continue to be a pervasive use of advanced electronics systems throughout military warfare sensors computers and networks The complexity of operation of these systems and their poor reliability fn the field have impacted their value 1n an operational environment Techniques covered herein provfde o o o Increases in electronic system availability and relfab111ty particularly in rugged environments Greatly reduced life cycle costs Sfmp11ffed test and repair Such techniques can have a significant impact on operational readiness What 1s the current status A range of technfques have evolved through commercial and university R D T ere is a significant c011111ercial drive to develop such techniques for both microprocessors and complex computer systems and networks Some techniques hav evolved-into milfta-ry electronics What 1s the current DoD program There 1s no central program in this technology especially for the fu11 range of tactical systems The Afr Force has a program in fault tolerant networks and electronics which emphasizes software techniques An estimated $SM is being invested 1n fault tolerant techniques spread throughout a large number of programs includ1-ng the supporting technology phase of VHSIC What should the DoD program be A central 12 ed vertfoally f ntegrated program is _nec essary to fully exploit the potential of this technology As with software a VHSIC-11ke program can evolve a full range of systems wUh fafl soft fault tolerant c aracterfstics for- tactic al and strategic applications A $10M program which emphasizes tacUcal applications should be established The key areas for work are fn inodel ing nd an lysis of networks and systems techniques for automatic control or adaptive selection of degraded modes of opera ion and n ar-rea1- t1 me utamat1c reconff_gurat1on What are the measures of success Tactical demoristratfons of such techniques whh wide appJicab i1ity should be elected Detailed measure of Sl4Ccess for such demonstrations shaul d be deve-1 oped - o Equf P D llt 1vilt1 '11bilf a ci o Degradation as a funct 1Qn o o o o - re ab t 1ty 1n th field of n mber _ D-7 of tQnponent o failures -6 TECHNOLOGY Rapid Solfd1ffcation Technology What ts it Rapid so11d1f1cat1on includes process technolog19s for producing powders which have been solidified at rates greater than 10'J C sec and which are suitable for consolfdatfon into practical structural shapes Research requirements include alloy development dessaturat1on and property measurement Rapid sol1d1f1cation as a technology would also include incremental solidification of a metal deposit powder or wire-fed on a substrate using laser or electron beam heating Laser or electron beam heating can also be used for producing a melt pool on a surface fo generating a self-quenched surface layer Rapid solidification also includes melt spinning a process which withdraws a rapidly-cooled filament or strip from a molten pool Why 1s it important What difference can it make Military applications of powder metallurgy include infantry armament electrical distribution systems more-durable jet engine higher-thrust light engines and airframes for increased thrust-to-weight ratios and lighter-weight land vehicles Materials made with rapidly-solidified powders are improved 1n almost every engineering property -- strength toughness fatigue elevated temperature capability and corrosion resistance The ability to_ produce cmnponents exhibiting such properties at lower cost decreased strategic material input and greatly improved durability is extremely critical to the overall perfonnance of various military systems The technology can be applied to most classes of materials to include superalloys alloys of iron aluminum and titanium refractory metals ceramics and metal-matrix composites What 1s the current status The U S has a worldwide lead fn the manufacturing scale processing of rap dly-solid1f1ed powders and powder products However there are a number of major -sci ent 1fie and_ techn ica 1 quest ions that need to be resolved before large investments for commercial use of this technology can be made Furthennore 1 a data base must be generated to satisfy designer needs o What is the current DoD roaram The total DoD program Services and DARPA 6 1 6 2 6 3A 1s Sz -2 Other u s agencies contribute around $6M more to this technology for a variety of potential non DoD applications What should the DoD program be This technology requires a major long range commitment by DoD and an effort to transition thfs technology to industry The technology has an extremely high-payoff across-the-board for military equipment An overall investment of approx1mately $200M over the next five years may be required to establish commercial sources of supply of RSR superalloys aluminum alloys and ferrous alloys currently under development ' - What are the measures of success This program will be successful if the following near-term 5-10 years and far term 10 years goals are achieved Near Term e A 150 f increase in the turbine-inlet-tamper-atur@ capability of turbine blade superalloys is achieved D-8 o I o o A 501 reduction in cobalt content of jet-engine hot-core materials fs demonstrated to be feasfble o A 251 increase 1n the specific ioughness and specific strength of airframe aluminum alloys can be achieved by RSR technology compared with current 2000 series alloys o A 100 F temperature capability of RSR aluminum alloys or current 2000 series alloys is demonstrated Long Tenn o A factor of two or better life extension will be demonstrated through RSR technology 1n the fellowing hardware categorf es Jet engine turbine and compression blades High perfonnance bearings Reciprocating and diesel engine components Airframe structures Critical ferrous alloy structure exposed to erosive and corrosive environments o Superalloy turbine blades which will withstand turbine inlet temperatures of 3000 F or higher I D-9 7 TECHNOLOGY Math1ne Inte111ge ce What is tt This technology 1s the know-how for heuristic prograrrm1ng and _focuses on advanced computer-based systems hav1np adaptive decision- making charactertst1cs including techniques for data filtering multisensor correlation and integration and automatic adaptation to unanticipated situat ons This technology can furnish system with-broad knowledge of acts and strategies for dealing with any specific problem or with a class of problems This general approach can lead to systems with far greater adaptability flexibility and surv1vab111ty than can be achieved with more conventional designs It also provides for a more natural man machine and man software nteraction Why is ft important What difference can it make Machine intelligence offers the promise of a wide range of mf11tary capabtl1t1es including o c2 and Crises Manayement - Self-adapting software systems are able to makes gn1f1cant changes in their internal processing logfc 1n response to user commands or based on past demands-wh ch have been placed on the system Coupled with speech processing a canmander can interrogate in ordinary English a set of distributed computerized data bases to form an assessment of hts own assets or to test the feasibility of a contingency plan o Autonomous Weapon - A cru1se miss11e torpedo or mine incorporating machine- intelligence can accomplish some of the functions nonnally perfonned by manned systems A smart RPV for example can make adjustments in the prosecution of fts mission based on an iterative process of sensor updates and dec s1on points integrated into its computer logfc Such an autonomous weapon can be made impervf ous to conventional jamming o Automatic Programmin - Computer software 1s a multibfllion dollar expense in de e se procurements Ind operations It should be pos s ible within the next 20 years to make quantum improvements in verifying the consistency of programs with specifi_cations based on a machine intelligence methodology The cost savings can be enormous o Expert Qata Bases - The use of expert' data bases 1n tact ica 1 operations can prov de revolutionary tmp_rovement tn the effec - theness of decision making 1n high s res environments What 1s the current status Machine intelligence as a scfence is at a ery early stage of development There are currently only 250 qualified scientists and engineers in the country with approximately 25 project leaders Training 1s centered in three premier universities MIT Standford and Carnegie Mellon with 12 second-tier universities producing 10-20 PhDs annually _ The industry DoD demand is greater than the supply of expertise and the situation 1s getting worse D-10 What is the current DoD 'rogram DoD agencies sponsor some $13 2M annually for contract work with negl1g 61e in-house work The focus of this work is on basic research with little emphasis on the military applications NPG in Monterey ffers a course in machine intelligence methods What should the DoD cro ram be The DoD program should be increased to a total of $2SM including t e o11owing reorientation 1 Concentrate on a few technical areas - modeling generic expert systems cooperative and distributed systems and large data base management systems 2 Focus applications - tactical assessment distributed weapons control software ver1f1catfon 3 Manpower and training - trafn military personnel for machine 1ntellfgence development and application through in-service programs and university training Develop management-level and c and-level seminars 4 Focal point for machine intelligence center - create a synergistic mecha fsm for exploiting machine intelligence for military use managed by OSD What are the measures of success This program would be successful 1f at least one significant new defense applfcatfon of machine intelligence per year can be achieved after 1985 and if the number of defense personnel trained in machine intelligence methodology doubles every three years after 1983 Significant Service involvement is required at the outset to focus the early dernon trat1on on the most important applications D-11 - 8 TECHNOLOGY Supercanputers What-is 1t7 This technology covers advanced processor developments including pipeline parallel and multiprocessors Although advanced devices such as optical and cryogenic provide significant improvements 1n canputer perfonnance they are not included under thfs category The critical technology 1rieluded 1s fn ar hitecture development The most important architectures are those which incorporate VLSI VHSIC hardware and which include solution to problems of timing part1t1on1ng of functions and interfaces for systems with a throughput greater than 100 MIPS Why 1s it important What difference can 1t make Advanced computer architectures permit revolutionary improvements 1n computer system ind or performance across a wide range of mf11tar y systems both strategic and tactical o Advanced towed acoustic array processor o BMD radar o Advanced hydrodynamic and aerodynamic modeling o Advanced cryptography and intelligence exploftatton techniques o Large-scale simulations The perfonnance impact fn the above systems wfll include higher computational throughput broadband high resolution signal processing compactness for a given computer capability and automatic progranmfng o I o What 1s the current stat us The S-1 uniprocessor has been conpleted and a demonstrat to have a throughput of 10 MIPS A 4x4 multiprocessor w111 be demonstrated within two years wfth throughput of up to 400 MIPS ' What is the current DoD proRram The only supercomputer program outside v SIC program sponsored by DoD 1s the S-1 program of those which evolve from the $9M What should-the DoD program be Due to the 1mportan c e of the impact of supercomputer technology on future U S capability an aggressive program fs needed to capitalize on the available technical opportunities The current S-1 program moves 1n that d1rectfon but 1s not represent t1ve of potential revolutionary technical improvements needed fo r t e cr1t1ca1 m111 tary applications A wider range of techn1q es should be- spo sored A total program of $15M is needed for this effort The Congressionally mandated S-1 program fs focusing only on one set of techniques This focus 1s not 1n the best 1 nter es t of the cou ltry What are the measures of success Three demonstration efforts should evolve from this program wit in two ta three years 0-12 o Larg e scale modeling and simulation demonstration 400 MIPS o Cryptography demonstration x 100 better than current computer systems 1 ASW inter-array processing 10 Giga IPS o BMD radar processor x 10 faster canputation of key functions o D-13 o o - o ' ooI o o o o 9 TECHNOLOGY Advanced Composite Material o What 1s tt Advanced composite materials include graphite-reinforced organic matrix carbon-carbon metal matrix and ceramic matrix composites These materials are comprised of high modulus low density high strength filaments embedded 1n a compatible matrix imparting mechanical continuity and compat1b111ty The fibers can include boron carbon polymers silicon carbide alum1na -etc Matrix materials include polymers epoxy phenolic nylon polym1de etc metals Al Mg Ti Pb etc carbon and ceramics Why 1s it important What difference can it make - - 1 Organic-Matrix Composites in Airframes and Missiles - Organic composites will revolutionize theoairframe industry Weight savings translate directly into increased range maneuverability and payload The AY-88 which contains a higher amount of compos tes than the AV-BA can carry two to three times the payload and have two to three times the probability of kill on most missions Composites are found in tactical aircraft TRIDENT Minuteman and the IUS There are also numerous potential applications 1n tact cal veh1cles mar1ne platforms and materials handling systems 2 Carbon-Carbon - These materials are used fn re-entry vehicle nose tips and ICBM rocket nozzles Materials performance strongly affects the re-entry accuracy of strategic offensive missiles Technology-base-developed fine weave carbon-carbon materials are prime candidates for the next generation of RVs 3 Metal Matrix Composites - These materials will f1 nd wide application in aircraft missiles spacecraft armaments and ordnance Major weight savings and dimensional stability are provided by MMC Large structures in space wil 1 be highly dependent on MMC developments What 1s the current status Organic matrix fs finding wide application 1n industry Lear Aviation has developed an all composite aircraft Carbon-carbon and metal matrix are military-dominant technologies These composites have been Y o- --demons trated in a number of strategic app11catfons o o ' -- _ _o 'o - o oo r ooo o 1 - - - wh at is-'the current DoD program Organic matrfx funding 1s $34M carboncarbon 1s-$13 JM and metal matrix ts $19 7M The total 1s $67 0M What should the DoD program be Technology base funding for organic matrix 1s a major portion of ttie total bob advanced composites program This effort may be too high for 6 1 6 2 since such composites are f1nd1ng wide app11cat1 on fn military and commercial aircraft _Some portion of this RID should be included wfth1n the various airframe programs In carbon-carbon continued development of advanced nose tips and heat shields will probably lead to s1gn1f1cant RV accuracy improvement Technology base funding 1s adequate for carbon-carbon For metal matrix feasi_bi11ty of aiorhga1ns in military capability has been demonstrated in the laboratory bu ee nology base funding 1s tight A greater level of effort 1n manufactur1ng technology 1s esse t1a1 o -14 ' - What ire tho oosures of success TIie following n11r-t1na goals should H obti1n1d o Clrbon-Clrban Campos1tes - Demonstr1ted thenul protictfon for MX and D-5 MK-500 Maneuvering Re-Entry Yehfcle - Damonstr1ted 111-weather RY c1p1bflft1 i j o Metal Natrfx Composites - Demonstrated performance fmprovements weight savings di mensfonal 1t1bt11ty f1tfgue ch1r1cterf1ttcst hfgher temperature oper1tton no contotnatton improved r1di1tfon 1urvtv1bf11ty as out1fned below 1o Mtssne components 30l weight 11vfngs tn upper 1t1ges whfch provtde fncre1sed r1nge tn strategic o fss11es t1ct1ca1 o 1sstle components with hfgher temperature operation extended r1nge pa lo1d o 1ss11e ffns w1th IOI wefght rlductfon 2o Mlterfals for o tnes and torpedoes wfth deeper depth c1pab111t1 lOS fncrease 1n depth c1p1b11ty 3 Aeropropu1s1on components wfth higher operating temperatures 1nd tip speeds IOI thrust weight improvement 4 Weight savings 1nd dtrnens1onal st1b111t1 1n tmportant structures sp1cecr1ft 11rframe shipborne and spaceborne antennas 11ser o 1rror substrates lOOI improvement 1n beam c1p11 f 1tty D-15 10 TECHNOLOGY High Density Mono11thic Focal Plane Arrays FPA's U What 1s it This technology covers Mosaic sensor arrays for optical through JR operation where the detectors first stage sfgnal processor multiplexer and output preamp11ffers are within a monolithic structure The technology includes extrinsic silicon hybrid InSb-S1 and HgCdTe arrays Advanced coolers for space app11cat1ons are also covered within this technology Why 1s ft-important What d1fferen e can it make The combination of EO IR FPA's with monQl1thfc devices for detection and processing enables dramatic improvements 1n sensor perfonnance real time onboard adaptive processfng of data for 106 FPA elements allowing high sensftivity high resolution and coverage over large areas 1n a single sensor o Strategic Attack Assessment Early detection for maximum response time provide targeting data on RV impact points for hand-off to defense o Launch-Under-Attack Retargetfng Post-attack assessment and retarget1ng for hand-off to 1nf11ght ICBM SLBM o Very High Resolution Space Surveillance o Spacebased Real-Time Targeting of Hfg Altitude Strategic Aircraft with future potential to detect low altitude aircraft and perhaps cruise missiles o Near-Real-Time Theatre and Ocean Surveillance Targeting o A wide array of tactical EO IR capabilities e g passive search cru1se_m1ss11e guidance Mono11th1c FPA 1 s also provide real-tfme effective clutter rejection and MTI capabflftfes This technology is crucial 1n future tactical scenarios which requf re long range surve11 lance seef ng deep near-real-time 1nte_grat1on of target acquisition and strike tactical use of space and sustained warfare 72 hours What 1s the current status Status deleted due to security classification What is the current DoD rrogram The current program is $102M mostly under the DARPA STO program 77M of 6 2 in the DARPA and Services and _ $25M in 6 1 The program consists of system level proof of concepts in space application technology demonstrations Si-X HgC Te arrays and phenomenology research target backgrounds What should the DoO program be No change in the program is needed Continue with the current high magnitude program to ensure success in the planned demonstration programs D-16 What re the measures of success 1 System Demonstrations Details deleted due to security class1f1cat1on 2 Technology Demonstrations Details deleted due to security class1f1cat1on 3 Phenomenology Details deleted due to security classification D-17 11 TECHNOLOGY Radiation Hardened Advanced Electronics What 1s 1t This technology covers materials processing and special destgn considerations for hardening electronic canponents 1 subsystems and systems against natural e g oo space or arttftcfal e g radfation EMP environmental effects This technology also includes the necessary test facilities and instruments for meas urfng vulnerab111ty Whf 1s 1t important What difference can tt make This technology is cri ica for m111tary system surv1va6111ty in current and expected future military operations particularly 1n nuclear warfare or tn scenarios involving directed energy weapons Satellite and other space systems an increasingly important element of military operations -are particularly soft Similarly the trend toward wide exploitation of VHSIC technology presents a significant challenge to hardening designers The expected reliance on VHSIC raises the importance of hardening know-how What is 1ts current status Details deleted due to security class1f1cat1on What 1s the current DoD program The current DoD program for hardening of advanced electronics 1s fragmented and spread among many efforts AFML NRL NSWC etc The EMP radiation laser and microwave vulnerability and hardening efforts are handled under separate programs What should the OoD program bl Amuch greater emphasis on advanced sensor processor hardening 1s needed Further 1 central focal point assigned the responsibility tor coordinating the work of all three Service and DARPA 1s essential for such an effort to preclude unproductive redundancy This program should be 1n1t1at at a level of $15M What are the measures of success The key measure of success 1s a demon- strated increase n hardness sufficient to meet the JCS requirements for o Spaceborne IR sensor o Space s radar o o Spaceb ased commun1catf ons navf gatf on VHSIC tactical processor D-18 12 TECHNOLOGY Space Nuclear Power What fs 1t This technology covers reactor techniques necessary for achieving power levels greater then SPKW or greater Such techniques include but are not limited to those incorporated 1n the LASL space reactor system Why 1s it important What difference can ft make Many future mf11ta ry space systems require h1gh power 50KW and greater survfvab111ty than currently available oo oo Spacebased radar Dfrected energy weapons Man 1n space for military missions Multipurpose IR battle management systems o Nuclear reactor technology 1s inherently s rong 1n both 1ttrfbutes It provfdes an order of magnitude advantage over competing solar tech iques in the cost of deHvered spacecraft power above SOKW and 1s s1gntf1cant1 y harder agafnst the expected radiation environment What fs its current status Details deleted due to security classification _ What 1s the current DoD program There fs no DoD program in this technology bot is supporting work 1t LASL 1t I mi-nfmal level of effort This work supports the development of advanced _heat fuses and hfgh efficiency thermo-electric conversion techniques particular emphasis on materials R D What should the DoD program be A meaningful demonstration program 1s needed for a So-loOKW reactor to ensure the avaflabflfty of the necessary power for essentf al future space capabil f tes The level of effprt and tfmfng for suth a program are uncertain What are the measures of success The key measure of success 1s the full stale demonstration of a space reactor of 50-lOOKW within five years D-19 13 TECHNOLOGY High Power Microwaves- What is ft High power microwave generator technology covers methods for generatfon and focusing of intense RF power pulsed or CW at high frequencies an-mm Wave as well as the phenomenology of interaction of intense microwave radiation with materials sensors and electronics The key source technologies are gyrotrons relativistic magnettons and free electron lasers operating at RF frequencies Why 1s it 1m ortant What difference can it make The high radiance levels ma e possi le by recent advance$ 1n high power short wavelength microwave generators will likely enable effective mobile tactical microwave weapons as well as significant extensions of more conventional applications 5 o The potential for sensor and electronics damage at useful operational ranges systems _hardened to practical lfmits are believed to be engaged at ranges on the order of 15-20 km o Unconventional anti-personnel weapon o- Conventional jammf g at greatly increased standoff ranges 1 Longer range mm wave radar capability with h1gh resolution low multipath clutter low probability of intercept and resistance to jamming_ What 1s its current status Almost no vulnerability data exist for tactical missiles and electronics at the high frequencies and power densities of interest The effectiveness of various hardening techniques ts likewise unknown Developmental devices have achieved g1aawatt peak powers and lOO's of Kw average power at cm to mm Wave frequencies l What fs current DoD program There 1s no DoD program pursuing Tactical Microwave Directed Energy Weapons The DoO program for high power microwave generators is embodied 1n the advanced microwave jammer program $20M In addition the Navy has a $0 6M directed energy weapons program o o What should the DoD rogram be Due to the high potential of high power short wavelength m crowave generators as an anti-sensor electronics and anti-personnel system and the need to understand the vulnerability of u s sensors and'electronics greater emphasis 1s needed on the directed energy applications A program of $5-lOM fs needed to rapidly address target vulnerability and hardening techniques The devices them selves are adequately supported at the present time What are the measures of success The major uncertainty for this technology is the vulnerability of various systems at the high frequencies adn the effectiveness of hard'ening techniques These questions should be answered experimentally for representative targets within three years and the results generalized to broader classes of targets and representative a0plicat1on scenarios to assess effectiveness D-20 14 TECHNOLOGY Large Structures in Space What 1s ft Large-scale deployable and erectable space structures will requfre highly 1nnovatfve structural design and materials New engineering concepts are needed to satisfy an increasingly complex mix of requirements for maximum r1 g1dity and minimum weight control of structural thermal and environmental loads high survivability against nuclear laser and particle beam threats elimination of creep and relaxation during storage and ease of space erection joining and proof testing Optimal structural design concepts for zero gravity are likely to be dramatically different than those employed on earth New methods for employing stored energy and memory materials reversibly transfonnable will be sought to ease the space erection burden Active structures wfth sensing and feedback are needed for advanced optf cal and radar systerns Active structures and adaptive optics technology are included within this technology Adapt he optics technology co vers all methods of compensation for non-unifonn1t1es or turbulence within an optical train These techniques can compensate for atmospheric turbulence for optics defonnation or for poor beam quality Why is it important What difference can 1t make 1 Directed Energy - Particle beam and high energy lasers in space require relatively large structures to accommodate focusing devices and in the case of high energy laser large sensors High dimensional stability is required for pointing and tracking Adapt ve optics techniques can provide an order of magnitude improvement in capability for a space-based high energy laser system or for optical sensors ground-based EO IR sensors for detection and location of targets within the atmosphere Several orders of magnitude improvement 1s projected 1n resolution or fn energy on target For a space-based high energy laser weapon system the 1mprovement in energy on target has a significant impact on the size of the total $ystem a major cost factor 1 2 Radar - With the advent of the shuttle 1t 1s conceivable that very large radar system can be deployed in space_ in monostatic and bistatic modes Such radars can be used for a variety of functions o o o Detection Track Radar for Land and Ocean Surveillance Multf-Miss1on Radar Multistatic Missile Detection Radar 3 Surve111ance E-O - Explo1tfng the sensitivity of the mosaic focal plane arrays requires large optics Possible future systems include o o o ICBM Detection and Tracking System High Altitude Air Vehicle Detecti n System The tre and Ocean Surveillance System D-21 What ts the current status As discussed above adaptive optics techniques can be critical to such capab111t1es A number of technical assessments end preliminary design studies have been conducted No major demonstration projects are underway The adaptive optics techniques under development are emphastz1ng tho laser weapon app11catfons There have been laboratory demonstratf ns of an order of magnitude improvement tn energy on target through atmospheric turbulence up to a fundamental 1tm1t What fs current DoD program There are no DoD programs aimed specifically at thfs technology outside of adaptive optics Many other programs are supportive e g metal matrix composites NASA has programs aimed at building lightweight structures from metallic ribbons The NASA program 1s $18M The estimated size of the current DoD effort fn adaptive optics 1s S M o What should the DoD profram be The Current adaptive optics program fs of adequate size to expio t available technical opportunities Some work 1s needed to emphasize sensor app11cat1ons in addition to laser weapons app11catfons In other large structure areas the DoD program fs not adequate There 1s a need to define a series of demonstrattons for future joint NASA DOD undertaking What are the measures of success -The adaptive optics program must provide credible perfonnance demonstrations fn time to be integrated with IR monolithic FPA demonstration 1nd wfth hfgh energy laser demonstrations A key area of concern is the ava11ab111ty of the ecessary space transpor- tation capabt11ty A well thought-out plan for the evolution of such structures should be prepared within DoD six month effort D-22 15 TECHNOLOGY Optoelectronics What is it Optoelectronics often tenned integrated optfcs 1s the technology for integrating optical sources switches waveguides modulators multiplexers lenses beam deflectors and couplers on a single chip The two basic material systems for emitters and detectors are III-V compound semiconductors and dielectric crystals such as L1Nb03 and LiTa03 Waveguide materials include CO2 glass polymer and canpound semiconductors Why fs it important What difference can 1t make Optoelectronics provide a number of clear advantages for m1lftary commun1catfons and signal processing o o o Very hfgh data and switching rates I11111unity fran EMI EMP ground loops Rugged compact and low cost evices For military canmun1cat1ons optoelectron1cs provides optical switch rates and throughput for data buses computer LSI interconnections and networks In signal processi_ng optoelectronfcs enables a very broadband high resolution acoustic ESM and spectrum analysis capability high speed A to D conversion broadband correlators and delay lines program able filters and laser gyro interferometers Due to their ruggedness cost and sfze such devices are mission enabling 1n satellites missiles and aircraft What 1s its current status An RF spectrum analyzer using an optoelectronics de 1ce has demonstrated a 30 db dynamic range and 400 MHz bandwidth What 1s current OoD rogram The current program includes both device technology efforts and severa demonstration projects ESM A to D convers1on The total budget 1s contained within the Fiber Optics Program which 1s estimated at $15M What should the DoD rogram be No changes are needed in cammun cat1ons application Expansion o canputer related high throughput applications What are the measures of success The current effort should produce the following demonstrations of capability within three years o o o o RF Spectrum Analyzer 1GHz 40 db dynamic range A to D Convertor 1 GBPS Laser Gyro interferometer OOOla hr Programmable Filters and Correlators D-23 1a TECHNDLOBY Sp1ce-811ed Radar What 1s tt The tey technologies encanpassed under thfs category include 1dv1nced so11d state microwave devices preferably three tenntnal FET 11np11fier1 1dv1nced 1ntenn1s 1nd novel sfgnal processing techniques for greater onboard 1utonom _ Why 1s ft 1mrortant What difference can tt make Thts technology can pro vfde-1 near-reelo 11111 survei11ance and 1rget1n9 c1p161lt ty with Day night 1nd o111 weathero operatton Worldwide coverage Support of t octfcal and strategic op1r1ttons over l1nd and 1t se1 o o o Techniques to be developed are those 1n1bltng oo oo More reliable oper1tfon Higher resolution cap1bfltty Greater ECCM techniques c1p1b111ty Lo er untt costs o These areas of perfonnance growth are crucial to meet the demands of future land and naval scenarios What 1s the current status Space-based radar systems have been configured for low earth orbtts primarily for naval applfcatfons and TACAIR No u s decision has been made to deploy such I system even though the Soviets have done so The u S -hes1tancy stems from the unclear performance advantage of a space-based radar system based on current technology versus OTH-B What 1s the current DoD program Low level study and trade-off efforts are underway within the Navy Air Force 1nd DARPA DARPA 1110 has I technology program for advanced antennas and onboard processing The Navy and Afr Force have relevant component technology efforts An 1stfm1te of the combined magnitude of these efforts 1s $SM What should the DoD profram be The current program seems reasonable until the techno1091 has been deve oped to allow destgn ofo otechnology 1nsert1on demonstr1tion program What are the measures of success The o key 1111surts of success are Canponent perfo nnance - - So11d state device power noise figure and reltabtltty Antenna designs wfth 1dequ1te performance gafn wefght Onboard processing demonstrated autonomous c1p1b111ty o Deftnttfon_of viable space-based radar systems based on proven o Full-scale demonstration and test of I prototype o iechnology D-24 17 TECHNOLOGY Short Wavelength High Efficiency Lasers What 1s it Thfs technology encompasses high average power lasers which operate at wavelengths of order 1 micron or shorter with high efficiencies of order lOS or greater as well as the sub-mfcroradian pointing and collimation beam control technology for their use both through the atmosphere and 1n space The laser concepts which currently are covered include free electron lasers excimer lasers metal vapor lasers and iodine lasers Why is it imfortant What difference can it make Short wavelength lasers have the po tentia for enabling key strategic applications o Submarine Laser Communications t Ground-Based ASAT o Strategic Space Weapons What 1s the current status Current achieved perfonnance in the 1aborato ry t Excimer - XeF - demonstrated 1n the laboratory up to the kilojoule level o Free electron laser - gafn in visible and oscillation at 3 8 microns demonstrated high efficiency experiments in process What is the current DoD pr gram The major programs are o Weapons oriented Free Electron Lasers DARPA $ 2 gM -- High Power Vis Lasers DARPA $ 5 4M $ a 3M o Blue Green Lasers Communications Oriented Not directly applicable or s alable to weapons Blue Green Lasers Navy -- Submarine Laser Comm DARPA space-based and or relay D-25 $ 2 0M $11 0M $13 0M What should the DoD program be The weapon oriented portion of thfs program is subtr1tica1 given the enabling nature of thfs technology The currently planned fundfng profile should at least double to allow both free electron lasers nd excimers to be brought to I decision pofnt within 3 to 4 years In addition beam control technology specific to short wavelength lasers 1s I critical technology which should receive adequate funding during this time period The blue-green laser programs for communications with submarines and other underwater app11catfons appear adequately funded What are the measures of success They key success criteria for weapon oriented programs should be o Laboratory demonstratfon of scaling and average power for both excfmer and free electron lasers to allow decision within 3-4 years for best candidate ta scale to weapon level power and efffc1ency o Laboratory proof of principle experiments cC1npleted for key beam control issues o Confident hardening assessment data for ICBM booster fn thfs time frame 0 26 I APPEND IX E SOME ALTERNATIVE FIGURE OF MERIT CALCULATIONS -- A NOTE Of CAUTION -- APPEIIUX E SOM ALTERNATIVE FIGURE OF MERIT CALCULATIONS In order to understand the sensithfty of the Figure of Merit results to the numerical wefghttngs several alternative we1ght1ng schemes were calculated The attached table shows the result of these calculations The first column on the table is the weighting actually used by the panel Columns 2 through 5 are the alternatives As seen in this table the actual numerical values change drastically and the priority ranking changes to a lesser degree Because of thfs sens1t1yity the reader should not use the actual numbers as a direct measure of value nor should he attempt to use the order of the Top 17 in decisions The key conclusion to draw from the Figure of Merit analysis 1 s that these-17 technologies are very important to the U S military and should be aggressively pursued 11 11 11 E-1 o oMoo'o ooo ALTERNATIVE FIGURE OF MERIT CALCULATIONS Tei o1r l'fCIIIWiIES ' o - - uY ltllN 511o IITEIUTD CIIICUITI 4 7 kTIVI - J O 2 0 2 11 1 7 I DNCD PAIIIVI STULTM SDmNll fflll DIYIUINIT fllclONOCIID lllD IIDW TM111o Am fAIL-5onlforiCUUNTJ51 rVOL IC 1o icTIONICI 1 tt1 1of 1 2 i 1- a a ' 2 2 2 J B 1-7 o I J 2 1-7 f2 o J 1 7 s s 1 1 a 9 3 7 ' 1 1 3 aa I '-'ID Sol 111'lCATIDI TICNIIOLDIY 2 2 J J O J 7 96 kMIIII IITII I IIIIICI 2 1 1 5 2 1 2 -76 SuNar Mm 2 1 1 J o 4 0 16 j2-7 J 4 -89 2 2 3 5 78 1 g 3 3 76 t DAICIZI Cotfa11T1 lkTllHU 2 0 1 s HIM Dl'IY 11HIC foe- F MI iAIIIAYI 1 1 1 s ICADtATlorff t-- E snaNlCI l-1 1-5 Snc1ilcL1MPolel1 1 s 1-3 ' 1 9 J J 59 that fada c _YE INEIIATOII 1-Q 1 J 1 s J 2 ss IMfit 5NcE STKTIIIU 1 3 J J 1 11 J 2 51 DmlEL TIIOIJCI J J 1 2 1 J 2 Q 1-3 1 2 1 s 2 7 57 1-2 1 2 1 2 J 1 - ----- I SHINn IIAVIU lllTN WP E-2 ' 2 le w m fof tl 1 o I APPENDIX DESCRIPTION OF THE 4050 EXPERIMENT APPENDIX F DESCRIPTION OF THE NOSC EXPERIMENT This descr1ptfon 1s taken from a detailed explanation of the experiment as found 1n the Federal Register of 18 April 1980 Vol 45 No 77 pp 2650526554 1he d1mon11r1tlon praject plo n 11 approYecl br the Office of Peraomel Manaaeme111 reado oo followa Am lntepalN Appioada To Par Perf'onnuce Appr IML ud PoalU Cfa1aUlcallDD for More Effectlwe Operallan of Govonuneal Orpal olloas A Pion for II Demanollolion Ptof I AalAoriad by Tillo VI of lho Civil Ssviff Reform At I of 1g11 Ptepared br Navo I Ocean Systems Cenler San Die10 CaUfumla 1%152 Naval Weapono Cen1er China Lake c urom1o 83S55 Execullvo Swmnm flle endo ed plan 11 1ubmflted ta the omc e of Pe 'oMel Manaaemenl 11 o clemonatrallon project d11fped ta Improve Ilse performance of federal employee- 11 authorized by Tide VI ar die Civil S vlce lteforin Act CSRAJ For the reader'o con 'enlence o broad awnmu of the lnfonn11Jon conl1lned In 1h11 p111l la provided below For men lnfonnatlon lhe reader 11 referred to corrupondina sectiono of lhe repmt Pu pt#o Wt1JK1n1 Center NWCJ Chine Lale Calir wilt be Joint particlpanll in 1h1 prltject flae School or PubUc AdmlnlalnUon Unlverailr of Saudaem C liramla Lot Anselooo will sorve oo an lndependenl proJed n1lu11or nae Office or Peraonnel Management OPM incJudin the W1111m R1ponal Office will provide 111l1t1nc1 to da1 p o ec t oo will components of the DepuUneal or lheNav Typeo and Numben of Parlidpallq Emplo 'Ht The Initial increment will comprise alt technical profe11ion1l1 ICM throuah CS-15 and 111 other CS-13 thrvqb 15 employees 11 o hown In Table Z o t the two p1rtlci1 1IJns Cenlon Addltfon1J caleaorlea lhat may be included aubsequentl r are lechnfcl1n1 and 1drnlnf1tr1live proru1fon1l1 below CS13 and clerical peraonneJ 1be basic tncr menr will Include 1 100 mpfo1ee1 11 each of the two Ccnlera Mo tlsocloloa 1'bi1 11l1n tpeJla out lhe melhudology lo 1a ompJiah over a 5-year demon1tr1Uo11 period the FoJlowJ apeciftc ch1n e1 I nn leveJt or cl111fftcallon Z broad pay b1nd1 wilhln d111lnc11lon level1 with lndlvid111I p11cemcnt lnlo one of nve basic lncenllve pay aroup1 3 development or 1eneral cJ111mc1lion perfo mo nce 1to ndard1 4 perrorm1nce o pprel11I based on Performanct by ObJ1cUve1 IS reductlon-ln-for e procedum 1h11 empha o ize perrormance whfle 1ub111ntt1Jly nt1lnin1 exi1tin1 ranJclna r1c1ora and f J the u e of 1v1pencltd pena1t e1 in certain adverse action 1ftu1Uon1 Ffsure I JIJu1tr11ea the PoJ' and performance ch1nae1 of thia plan LIVILI 'fto pv rpoae of the profeel ii lo cl1111onetn11 dl11 die 1ffecliv1n111 of t deral l1boralori11 can be enho nced br o Uowlna peeler mana1eri1J concrt 1 ovn penonnel fl nctfan1 and at 1ho Mme time expandlna lhe opportunllin avo ilab e lo 1111ployee1 lhroqh o more re1pon1Jve and nexlble penonnel aystem In order to accomplish tbla purpoae ch1n111 an proposed that include 1J o more Dexible m1n1111ble and undentando ble cJassificatiOA l 'llem 2 o penonnanca 1ppr1i1aJ system that linko performance obJecUve- comp1n11llon o nd maoniullon effecUvene11 3 an expanded o pp lcallon of lho merit pay concepl 4 recopllion of demon11111ecl lndivich 11 performance In the reductiono In-force IRIFJ Pf'DCISo and 5 the 11M of 1uspended pen11Uea in cerlain advene acUa altutlona Tqether 1hue - h onaes can h1Jp m1n11er1 to operate With mare authority r11pon1ibility and lkill lo lncre111 work force and oraanlutlonal elrec Uv1ne11 and efficiency o 11fAIIIOING UCIIOID OIJICT1VEI AIWNU I LY DIVIDID oTO flVI TIWI fAYGROU'I Ill OlllCTIYts MIDS 9WROVCIIIIWT 19CGn'IDUAL NIii o 11 titel ITMIDAlllOS flGUIE l Pe111dpadq OlaalulloU The Naval Oaan Sy1tem1 C ntar NOSCJ San Diep and die No val lllt OIJICTIYU F-1 IIUf GIMI- v11 f411Allllt AIIDf0 o0111 ra- 11 AC1'0d - oo1 114 Ptrforunce Plan llttf 0-UAICCI AGal CVollotCATIOM ltftUCfutl lf t I I oUIJOfla Al I oooAA1'41 SoltCM 1$11 t---- -- IUll 'VISCA IMPLOYII 101 SAt sl -CTU N VARlloD1 U CHt I I I _ ___ l'IUlM 1111 cwa- GIS I I I I AOYCftS l'CflON I I I I I I I 1 I I I 'I I I I I ' I I I I I OC 1 11c11 a -o ITIIVCf 9'f 01uet S10NAI IIID l'I 0lono t0oooi ltAN CI01 tO'I vor _o u uaiAtr ra o 11 o ot t1o 011 IIA Cl UtlAl -aL l'tlllfJNNf I IUfllflTPM '' ' ao lillGna o I TC I o 11 tl'HOVllJ AICRUITMlNT o CHA IO ICHAVIO I o lkCft AICD ATllfACTION o o oRuvro noovct v1too o f fltMAHCfO lU LC11VI HIii AND f Ul TION '' I I I I I o tMPIIIOYIO WOIIC Vli IT HtOOftll-NCI ' I ITAllflACTION o IIGH 11CA 1 o 11r 11ov1o I CINtCN o 1u 11ov10 OAGAIIIIATtO'WAL '' ' oo 1 - e1 JOI IAT1tr ACTION o IICHlf ICANTI W' a - 11ov1D U Y IOUITY fl Cl'TIONI flCURE z Cenenl Evo1uat1on Schematic f or 1 emon1tr1U on froJecc tho re1aclon1hip1 bet ecn 1ffip1ementDt1on of the planned changes and varia le1 to e evauat1d are ahow Nu bcra in parenth1ae1 Teler to corre1pondial paaoo 11 th11 propoaal for further d11cu1alon F-2 Ta 1111111 1 l 1Tt sroup1 will bt trained d ring liar Ji l sear of project implernt olion Ill r-u l' l1or1 or dem0n1111llon l'lliplO 'l el 2 dcmon11r1ticm employee and 3 pcraonnel profe11ional1 and olhcr adminil allve 1laff Included in tro lnfna lar 11c h of these pup will be lnformatior on the new 1111cm and bow Uwor'kl u d on employee and 1uperli1or riaht ancl re1pon1ibil11ie1 under thi1 1y1tt n In addition Instruction 111d proctite In objective-1ctt1n1 1kllJ1 will prr 1re 1upcr 'i1an and cmplaycea for he Perlorm1nce bJ Objectlv11 pro e11 Tr1lnlna for new 1upcrvi10r1 ar d employees will be aiven lhroug uul the 5 Jean of the project EvaluDdon Plu In order to 11se11 prajeci ovlc ome and to evilu1te the reuibilily Df appllcat1on1 lo other federal ors1nlzation1 1 comprehen1h e and mcthodoloaic1llJ rfgor0u1 vafaatiou model 11 beina developed Fi11 -e 2 1umm1rizeo the m1Jor cateaor 11 variable lmrolved ind specilies o 1el or rel11fonship1 lhal will be mon 1rled and evaluated evaluatian effo 1 will or ne Include 1 pre-lmplemen11tion crlleriao 1c1tlng ind baseline data collt tion Z multldimen1t0n1I performance m111uremenl1 o nd trend 1Val 1tion al 1peciRed 11at1d of the demon1 rat1on and 3 1 o ummativ1-ph11e comprehensive 11se11menl of he prole r overall Impact an o nt outcome me11uru or LonsttucliD1I measureo beglnnlna wllll A111borl i-a d Walwrn c Law ra I pre-lmplcmcntallon do ta will be Repa o UDD Re qui rod c allected from lht 1ff1 dod Conlera Jn a Sprclnc 1ath0riUc1 are net'dcd by a elJ'ort to track lmpactl putlcfp o U Ccnlcra lo crtabllsh and o evalu1UoD ital wllJ be drawa lmpJemcAI new merit par control ln m lllternaJ and exlenud 1omcaL tedmfquea DOI currently i J I he law In Quallned laboratorr ital membcn wW addJUoQ outhority It needed to aive or work with members of lhe facu t ' of lho modil r Nin 1ectlon1 orntJe s m School of PubUc AdmfnJatratlon order lo gSve p ofect partidpanta lh1 Unlverslt ' or Soulha m Callromf1 on the neccuary dwificaUou authority merit dcslp ud eJLecutfan of lhe evaluatloa pay t lcxfbUHJ and other aulhoriu'ea 10 sc1ta 8e occompli1h the dr monatralioa project Colla Alllldpatod IJ c ill or PraJec t EITorll will be made lo obtain '11ie proJ CI la expactcd to o consre11fonal funding rar IJJl1 demon1b'ale 1h11 o manasemenlo demon1tration projecl 11' congrC sstooal cen1ered pe onneJ 1dmlnbtr1Uon fundln1 11 not available lhe cosll proce11 Jead lo more tfflch nt and atacdated wllh lhe profeel will be bom1 effactfvewill 1111 or the nn ow es of Iha b ' lhe Department of the NoVJ md the puUdpatiQa Cealen ID 1ddillon by two parllclpallng Cen1en with fundlq provldlnl o mean1 or real-world testing provided out or noma1 actJvlly tralnlna Jor model o or lmprovtd and simplified and 1dmlnJ1tn1tive overhead funds The da11fftca Uon and performance total cost for the reu project 11 evalu1 Jon system oo the proJ cl will estimaled to be SZ 700 000 lD 81caJ yeu have resulta lhat can be applied 1918 dollan It 1howd be noled that a thraupout the FederaJ servf ce Some ignJficant part of 1hJ1 co1t would examples of utlclpated effect caused otherwise be Incurred In lmplemenUna by lhe changeo and corresp 0ndlna the provl1f 0111 of the CivU Service me11ure1 for evaluati ag these efTec11 Reform Act of 1971 are depicted la Table s TAILl l Some txa pln of Anlicfpoted trrec11 Caused by che Planned etaan ra Vicb 11eao urea for Evaluadna these Cheu n Ch1n11 CJa11UiuUon and In addition to lhe 1bove m1 tioned 1nea1ure1 and data there will le an onaotna monitortaa or existinf recorcft and reports on die t1bor1loriu Un0btn11ive mea1ure1 will bt kept on 1uch basic considerationo 11 1 1 pronle or the scientili and en1ineerL- 1 work force of the l1bor1tori11 lnch inr EEO profiles to enable mea1ureme 1 o EO impact oo defined ln lhe Unifc m Guidelines on Employee Sele tion Procedure1 When melhodoloaicaJly Jur mablec ontro sroup data will be ob 1ined from 01her Na -y l1boralariu nol t oJved ln theprolec L Antlclp1ted effoct1 lncr ased recnitment 1ucc111 FJ1xl llitJ of orkload Hlilftlleftt lncrtased 1ersonnel o ubsyatea oproduct-SVicy Evaluation ro1suroo Cos per recruit crulc 11Uallty and qv1ntlc1 TlN coat or reossignt ent1 ancl uanlfera DPM prodvcti tty c oo roo Mnt approach Pertoro ofttl o ppratsal oo Correl1t DD of paJ o nd performanc1 Jncroooecl 1aplo1oo comitment Perct-lved equtc Satlafartlon and coftlftitont lnstrumenu A Survey DecT1a1ed turnover of desirable eDployeco lncrooood t nover of lov pufanera lncn a 1ed oqanlaatJonal effoctiYo nHS TurDover rate of critical uployeH Turnover ra ta Pooro sponsor ond u1eT evaluacton1 co1c to conduce buatne11 l1untlcm oo AdverH action ooooo F-3 o1entlon of hl1h p1rror11Us lecent to11 rate1 tQprovod vJor of problco o111101ooo Y bor of ouorondod peno o11t1a a1fccted oo opposed co hos o nee orfec ud TABLE 2 All technical Profesalonala CS-S throuab -15 and All Ot1aer GS-1l through oJS Emplo7ces Included iD the laltlal lncraeat of the DemoutratloD Project S of occupatloa Serlea pcrsoMel b7 partlo cSpattag activitJ tlt1o ll SC ooo 40J lnvlrorDanta1 protectSon apecialfst ooooooo tatelltge ft specialist ooooooooooooooooooo Geographn oo oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo Engineering psychologist oo ooooooooooooooo 'DJ ital computer systemo administrator ooo Computer opJcialiotooooooooooooooooooooooo Prograa manager ooooooooooooooooooooooooooo Program analystooooooooooooooooooooooooooo cmunlcotlon management 1peciallstooooooo Co nieatioD 1peciali1t ooooooooooooooooo l olag cal ac1entist oooooooooooooooooooooo llfcrobl alogi1t oooooooooooooooooooooooooooo 408 Ecolo lotooooooooooooooooo oooooooooo oooo n 132 ISO 180 330 334 34D 345 3'1 393 401 uo Zoologist oooo oooooooooooooooooooooooooooo Phyat logist oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo Veterinary aclentl1t oooooooooooooooooooooo Ceneral enginoer oooooooooooooooooooooooooo Material engineer oooooooooooooooooooooooo Architect ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo Civ ll englncer 1truc cural engineer oo Mechanical engfneerooooooooooooooooooooooo Elec rlcal engineerooooooooooooooooooooooo Electronico engineeroooooooooooooooooooooo Aerospace engineer ooo oooooooooooooooooooo Chemical er ginear ooooooooooooooooooooooooo Industrial enalneer oo oooooooooooooooooooo Physical 1cienti1t oooooooooooo oooooooooo Hulth pbyslci1c oooooooooooooooooooooooooo Ph71icl1t ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo OJ 101 aot 806 808 110 1 0 850 ass 861 BU 896 1301 1306 1310 11 o ApproslJDate D Aber of eligible Ceoph 1tcl1c ooooo oooooo o o oo ooo oo oo o o o o o o Cbml1t oo oo o o o o oo o o o o o o o oo o o o o o oo ooo o o o o o o Metallurgist oooo oo ooooo oo ooooo ooo oo oo o Ceo lo 1st ooooo oooooo oo ooo o oo o ooo oooooo 1320 1321 1350 1360 1515 1520 1529 USO All ther 2 5 0 1 ooo 1 16 6 IZ 6 14 II 1 1 1 2 I 4 ooo ooo 2 ooo ooo 1 ooo ooo ooo ooo o oo 151 7 1 ooo 7 11 193 1 II 4 6 664 54 o oo 102 16 1 2 10 1 222 1 12 ooo ooo 1 1 o oo 200 ooo 59 ' 2 Oporatlons res o rcb analyse ooooooo ooooooo 20 57 o oo Kaihe mtScl _an oo oooo oo oo oo oooooooooooooooo 16 93 the natical 1tatlatlclan ooooooooooooooooo 2 1 1 OceanogT pheT oooo ooooooooooooooooooooooo o INC C puttr 1cientl1t o oo o o o o oo oo oo o o o o o o o o CSoll chro 11i oIS 1Hapla7ee1 ooooo oo oo o oo o o o toloo oooooo ooooooooooooooooooooo F-4 oo JZ 1 0D 63 J 6J ' ' 1 APPENDIX G EXAMPLE OF A VERTICALLY INTEGRATED PROGRAM THE U S DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROGRAM FOR DEVELOPMENT OF VERY HIGH SPEED INTEGRATED CIRCUITS I Example of a Vertically Integrated Program I THE U S DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROGRAM FOR DEVELOPMENT OF VERY HIGH SPEED INTEGRATED CIRCUITS I Introduction I This paper describes a new conceptual approach to the management of major OoD technology 1n1t1at1ves which 1s based on vertical integration Such vertical integration includes o Centralized management and coordination of the total tri-Serv1ce program with fenced funding to ensure accountability o The inclusion under one industrial organization of all aspects of a technology's development and transitfon into military systems e g processes design materials etc o Continuity of the industrial team s from early technology development through transition to system applications o Early consideration of multiple system demands on the technology to define not only the individual technologfcal thrusts but also the necessary interaction of dfverse technologies e g processes architecture The VHSIC program is managed using this concept It can be generalized for application to other technology base programs This paper presents the DoD VHS program as an example of such a technology base management concept II VHSIC Program The very high speed integrated circuit VHSIC development area covers technologies supporting design and architecture methods for laying out chips with up to 100 000 active elements providing the advances in lithography and processing necessary for l 25 to submicron 11newidths and developing philosophies of VHSIC design architecture software and testing DAST The VHSIC program is a vertically integrated trf-Serv1ce effort with FY 81 funding of $40M DARPA also funds related technology and research VLSI $21 6M The program has demonstrated the processing and lithography capability for l 25 features for silicon devices The VHSIC program is motivated by the DoO's desire to o Maintain a qualitative _lead 1n key technologies over our principal adversaries in furtherance of the U S military philosophy of countering numerical superiority through qualitative superiority in anns- force multipliers and o To provide affordable and reliable military systems which incorporate transparent complexity G-1 After a 6 c1de of 1ow 1nv estment f n _I C technol og Y ancJ a trend toward a total dependence on commercial product 11nes the DoD inftiated this program to focus industry R D on 1nt rated s1 na1 processing systems fn areas of high m111tary utility The destr end goa fs a line of devices which are the signal processing counterpart to c_cxnmerc1a1 microprocessors and which incorporate order of magnitude improvements 1n perfonnance ava11abflfty usability and affordability Key areas of VHSIC military utility are 1 o o oo - o Autonomous adaptive -satel l1te sensor and RPV sensor processing IR ESH and radar Anti-jam c0l'l'lllunfcat1ons and radar systems with very wfde instantaneous bandwidths Survivable fnteltf nt d1strJbuted processing o Adaptive missile guidance with improved accuracy recognition capability and ECCM o o Implement fn real-time advanced acoustic array processing and rapid correlation and screening of multiarray data Adaptive navigation and guidance o VHSIC technology offers greatly improved capab111tfes in self-test and repair and offers s1mp11f1ed operation transparent complexity Such devices will enable a w1de range of revolutionary military capabf11tfes through their 100-fold increase in signal processing speed greatly reduced cost per function and lower size weight and power The management philosophy of -the VHSIC program provides a strong tie between military needs and the evolution of the complex VHSlC signal processing systems The VHSIC program has four phases Phase O was the program definition stage Phase O was guided by arehitectual studies of Serv1ce-1dentfffed high priority systems see Figure 1 An architectural approach was sought which provides a minimum chip set to fulfill signal processing requirements between systems of diverse generic types Phase O provided more etatled and complete information on architecture IC technology approaches and other important aspects prior to making major program decisions It set the stage for the vertical integration of Phases I and II defined It -r-- o Signal processing may be clearly distinguished frcxn data processing based upon the different operations perfonned by each Signal processing operations in elude correlation convolution transformation nonlinear filtering ambiguity function calculation coherence function calculation etc In general signal processing is robust 1nd tolerant of occasional errors 1n the sense that the accuracy -of the output may be degraded but not eliminated On the other hand data processing consists of operations such as branching jumps decisions 11st1ng general logic etc Data processing 1s generally intolerant of errors For example a signal error at a conditional branch point can collapse the whole program because data begins to be read as instructions - G-2 Phase I has two parallel efforts The first part seeks to accomplish an 1nter1m goal of developing VHSICs wi th 1 25 feature sfzes This interim goal will provide near-tenn c1rcuits which will be applied to specific systems The second effort addresses the technology problems associated with crossing the one micron barrier Lithography dry processing etc are areas to be emphasized Phase I is a vertically integrated effort with systems design architecture software and IC fabrication and production closely combined into a single synergistic program A pilot production capability for 1 25 VHSICs is major goal Phase I is planned to be 2 1 2 to 3 year effort Figure 2 shows the Phase I efforts Phase II also has parallel efforts The first part is to build system demonstrations using ICs developed with 1 25 minimum feature sizes These system demonstrations are being designed to expedite the fntroduction of advanced ICs into future military systems to provide tangible evidence of the value of the IC development to the DoD system community to serve as a mid-point validation of the design and fabrication technology and to realize a near tenn return on the DoD investment The second part of Phase II will extend the state-of-the-art of IC fabrication to subm1cron feature sizes nominally 0 5 t o 0 8 microns A pilot production capability for submicron Cs is the major goal of this part of Phase II Additionally this part is essential to meet the more advanced projected systems needs As in Phase I Phase II 1s also a vertically integrated program combining design architecture software and IC fabrication and production into a single progam Phase III is a six year progam run in parallel to Phase I and II consisting of technology efforts to support and supplement Phase I and II Phase III i s intended to provide new and or alternative directions not specifically included in the other phases In contrast to Phase I and II which are large vertical ly integrated program Phase III consists of shorter programs with more limited scope focusing on key technologies equipment or tools The overall VHSlC management structure emphasizes close coordination among the various Service efforts to provide feedback and a high degree of cooperative learning and development The net effect of this tie among system designers and technologists from diverse areas e g ASW radar communication is a closer integration of the total VHSIC effort G-3 -- To insure that the resources are properly al located a-- new- program element was established with fenced funding controlled by the VHSIC programs manager In sunnary the vertical integration of the VHSIC is as described below 1 Top down management and coordination of the VHSIC program by USDR E with fenced funding and a clear audit trail Result This structure helps to meld the diverse needs of the Services into a canmon technology base to avoid duplicative efforts and to focus the available funds on t he highest payoff opportunities 2 The fnclus1on of system top level requirements definition architecture development DAST and IC processing development within each Phase I and Phase II contract Result such an approach fosters a mu1t1d1sc1pl1ne technology development with a direct system requirements to technology to system transition linkage Recognition of the total system as the driving force for VHSIC chip design and acceptance of the fact that chip commonality among systems of a generic type and between systems of diverse generic types must be maximized will result fn fundamental changes in chip level emphasis The end result 1 s the integration of all these technical factors into a syste atic VHSIC chip capability which 1s strongly coupled vertically and horizontally with signal processing systems specification and design 3 Maintaining continuity of the Phase I and Phase II contractors contractor teams from the requirements definition stage through technology development through transition to engineering development within military systems Result This continuity will develop the total industry c apability necessary for production of the V HSIC devices early demonstrations of the costs and r1$kS associated with their app11cat1 n 4 Early and continuing input of a wide range of system top level requirements see Figure 1 into the technology development effort e ncouragf ng an optimal balance between custom design for specific applications and use of standard building blocks Result This creates an environment within which the signal processing interests and expertise throughout all thr e Services can creatively and productivelyointeract on a continuing basis This nteraction will lead to integrated VHSIC systems with high value to a range of military signal processing applications The result will be very early transition into military systems G-4 - FIGURE 1 VHSIC SYSTEM CANDIDATES ARMY NAVY Multi-Mode Fire-and-Forget Missile Battlefield lnfonnat1on Distribution System EW Weapons Targeting System Target Acquisition Fire Control System Acoustic Signal Processor A J Communication Modems Surveillance Radar Signal Processor Tactical Radar Signal Processor ESM Signal Sorter Imaging System Signal Processor Ge'neral Purpose Computer AIR FORCE Programmable Radar Signal Processor Programmable Communications Processor E-3A Universal Signal Processor Advanced Air-to-Air Missile Autonomous Cruise Missile Guidance Advanced Power Management System General Purpose Computer Advanced Onboard Signal Processor G-5 FIGURE 2 VHSIC PHASE ONE CONTRACTORS F ATUR S CONTRACTOR TEXAS INSTRUMENTS Nultfmode Ftre and Forget Mtsst-le o V1rt1nt Bipolar Tech Coverage o Pr09r11mblt Chip Set Arch Appro1ch o Ptlot Ltne Alread y Operating KUGHES o CMOS SOS Technology o Kybr1d Custoca Destin Ardlttect rol A proedl 81ttlef1eld o Bulk Cll S 1nd Btpo11r Covero o o Stngle Chip Set Arch1tectur1 Approach W 51gna1 IBM o o o o Acoustfc Signal Processor HONEYWELL o Bipolar T1chno1ogy Cov1r1ge o Custom Design Architettural Approach 1 ectro-Opttc1l Sfgn11 Processor WESTINGHOUSE Atr Force o Provides Essent11l Rld1r BB iT1cttc11 1 ltern1t1 Bu1k CMOS Cov1r1g1 o Alt1rn1ttve Stngle Chtp Set Approach Advanced T1ct1c1l Fighter Rider TRW Navy Atr Force BB Al'IDI Anny _ o Provides Essent111 2Ff BRASS80ARD Provtdes Essential Acoustic 8B ff 05 Technology Cover11e Custcntzed Macro-Cell rch Appro1ch 0Utst1ndi119 Knowl1dge of Computer Software lnfomatton Dtstr1button 5 ystem Processor Processor APPENDIX RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE DOD LABORATURV MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE DOD LABORATORY MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE JULY 1980 __ _ _ l'UISCl-l II MAl'fl'OWflil IISOMffl II MAN' OWHI ISM o _ pallf 1111 o Cll'l saumns 1111 Ml llSSOOIT11 _ o 1UIIITl f_ _laUKS -nt o o II _ MS o Sit rusn Int - - l l l l l l llU M IIOo'ttl - tin flllMlltT M8 SCJIIIUIIIIIC 9J tlWICn _ IICt o tlllll Mimtl 1111 _ ICJ f t 1'1YI _ lfl lfl WS ti ISll'I IIIIIJI - o MJJ or - - - - o utCUIIOII IUtfllCTo IIStan DIS lltlll1ICIII 11111 o M 1111111111cn Ill rMIIIIS -Sllllll lllllo IIOll Mt o NI - S NGlllfl mMlfff OIIIIS M fll'l'IM - S o o _ n - aoo ICTlllllt o _ _ fflDIIT ff lf _111 o _ _ N - Ulmwt o I N - '11111- flln lUlrt 1111 MICl-1 o o - llllfll tt NS Sall SSIIIUI ut-llOIIS It Cllllll t '1111 _D KtmhlS o Cllf ClllrtWUI '11 SUI nMlll1H tlllMI - cis o m - _s o mw11anrm1 n o OW_ IUIOtllt 0 ClllNCS 11111 UIMIIIAT-1 IIIDIII fVIIOIII lMll lll-1 o RCl I OR DISIXffDIIMT MllllOflffT It ST _111 IJIIOMIDIIT CIIIIKS ao-oo o c 111 o - ' RC tllW tt I ffl _l flll Utllgll Te IIIAl lltlll Mf _ _ o o - ac 11o _ 111111 o-- ICIIII - oo o11 m TD lllln -111111 NOUCIIC ' o tlltA I IUllnl stlllla - H-Da rsan Rlffltl lt Tlllld o staJlf r llfPUl o ltC 111W Gf Pl ISff o tSI _ '11 9 I 11 DIU I lllllfSI SIii S lfflQ c I 1 ' 1 ' 1 1 It MANl'OWl 11 ISM o IMM'f - NIISONN l II MAM'OWtll _tlllt _o - W-oain -m - INDM IMMT IDIIDUlH IMIII n W5nm -SH UIIJ llntlT llfflS Al MAXIIIIIIM l lAW 1 11111 ll'ftl - 11111 WTMTAT o 1JNo11011 1'Mf1' o IIISam lltOlllflll #POllloins Al SnP I -CSll 11- OW S11r I llfDUlll I KlllltT IUI _ MlleTI o '-ll Qlff CIIAWIIIR-UISflK MUS IISUfflCH'I fl A IMC - oosrwsncwnu o 1111ctss Net llllf Y ' st II ID M 1a1t o - Atllllll 11 'Ill llffllll 1111'1 lt W SAUIIIY KMI IIMrl o 5'SC Ja o DPllll'I Malrt Y Mlle ARI MITIIOllltf - IIIJll Jllf o u All 1fCfl - - M CS tARI OIi lltOII IIUAUIICAI_ o MIR Gstl 11 S JO t t m ll'ftlS Ill _ _ _ o ISi su '1 111 INIIII Of INIU M I 11111 SCAtl ID l'IIIIYIOI M IIUI coo1r111111111 TD -0 JUlif O 'IIIIUI S I _ ISM o 'IMW1 - ll'tll' M-llOII MlS fllll lltlA1111'11111 PNIIUMS o A-IIAflll'I f llAffl IIU lllC Ill Na fYll ftJt ml o - QI _ _ -wssamus ' ' c t- C IIISIIIIITDI 11'1 9 Kl L'Al OAIIS 11111'' flDllll flllft WI LIISSIOII 11 111 otAt 111 'I ANl W SPIIIIIAIIOII o l IIKS IDUIC Ill AS AS Allt llln$l1um'ft wm o _ IISIIIIIQ 111$ 1111 ITlll lfl UAISllllt OCMIQ o MSIIIICTIOIIS DlllfflY - IIC '1KIIMI COlilOUtf - o fllllCtS lllll1Clllll'I loCTIOln o ooc--llOlt o IClllfflt atal l' ISIMtlt n o - - POS$1Wll Mlllll t1UII PMCnca IIIIQ Q l l l g q 111 -'II o SIC llf ll UIo Doll_ IICIIOIIS to 11ri ua ' ACTS rum MIMI Inn-mum m m m- m1 mil MIMI am I'll m I um II cunt-n I Kim I'll um All am mm It ll cal-um it l ll II MIMI mum all I mun-u m it I autumn-mu Willlml ' Imml lml mm It'll mm mull-mm 3mm mm an in In m I IIMHIIM I a nun mum um us an tum-um mm new mu nun an mu mm-M nmmumumnmm ISM mum I mums II I ma In ll stimuli In I ms mum mammal-I3 II mn- I new noun-Ilcll lhlon lulu-mutual nun-Am mtnuns-mum I msmumummwvumcmum I I In I llsum mm I O lm lnh NW I II mm nu uncut-n nor-In a mun-mum ms Ila-am Inn-ls ml mm mm Hum Imm Mum nun-m mm II tun-m mum rum-I mm ma- dl Ill-rum mm Mill on MullIMI 31 MW 1mm IS ml MIMI I MI IHIICI l'l ON muntun nocuut mrn AND acouasmdn Ill mu If mm WI ms ll ll mum swarm autumn Ill 10 In MW mm IOI MIAMI Will-lam no mm mm In mum-I comm nm mn In Ilium a mu mm m must um um mum-u mm mm Minamow MI Mil - ll my mm mm mm lm ID mm mun Mil- lm mm IN Mimi 0mm mm DIN Mill um mm I 'um 3mm Milli umumms munumm nocuumm ACIIUISIM sum Um autumn mm In mums mm mm I alum Hm Sill W33 MB sun- tall alumna- IN mu MIMI mu Imam ll Wu ll l 03 0' am mammal WM mu 0 cum-um 33 mm 0 mo um Mill sums mm I l l l 11m an um It mm In ll WINS Ill ll- ll Ill sum 3 1 I APPENDIX I REFERENCE APPENDIX I REFERENCE MATERIALS Investment Strategy Tactics Lindner V U S Anny Armament R D Command August 1981 Innovation Ado tion 1n Naval Ship Design Leopold R Naval Ship Engineering Center May 19 7 Conwnents on the Transition from the Technoloff Base to Production Rechtfn E Defense science Board Summer Study August 1 1 Airland Battle 2000 U S Army Training an Doctr1_ne Command 1 July 1981 Look Forward Twenty Years Air Force Systems Canmand March 1980 Report of the Defense Scfence Board Task Force on Technology Base Strategy Director Defense Research and Engineering October 1976 Tactical A1rpower 1n Europe Airing the European View Assistant Secretary of Defense Program Analysis and valuation 19 July 1976 Technolog y Trends Colloquium Joint Defense Research and Engineering-Intelligence Community Publication 1 April 1978 Re ort of the Ad Hoc Committee on In-House Laboratories Anny Scientific Advisory ane ce er o Management of Federal Contract Research Center Director Defense Research and Eng1neer1ng June 1976 Proceedings of an AAAS Symposium on How Much Does the Defense Department Advance Science American Association for he Advancement of Science January 1980 Regu1red In-House Capabilities for Don Research Development Test nd Evaluation Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering October 1980 Ad Hoc Group on Scientific Personneli Anny Scientific Advisory Panel Apr11 1964 I-1 Report of the Joint Defense Science Board National Bureau of tandards Panel on Research and xp1oratorf Development Undersecretary ot Detense for Research and Engineering Ju y 1967 o Report of the Science Advisor's Panel on Basic Research tn the Department and Technology Policy June 1978 of Defense Offieo of Science Historical Persfect1ves on Long-Range Planning in the Navx Naval Research Advisory Counc1 Study September 1980 Ara Reeort of the Science Board on Technology Planning for Future Fielded Systemsi Army Sc ence Board 1979 Summer Study July 1980 Report of the Defense Science Board 1975 Sumner Study on fundamental Research 1n Un1vers1t1es Director Defense-Research and Engfneer1ng October 1976 Man-Machine Technology in the Navy Naval Research Advisory Council Study December 1980 DoD Small Business Advanced Technology Program DESAT 1981-82 Ad Hoc Review of -the 1974 Anny Sunmer Study Review Anny Sc1ent1f1c Advisory Boa rd October 1975 Report of the Ar JY Scfent1f1c Panel Sunmer Studyi Army Scientific Advisory Boa rd 19 74 Report of the Arf Science Advisory Board Sumner Study Army Scientific Advisory Board Volumes 1916 Re ort of the Arff Y Air Force Joint Sunrner Study U S At Force Academy fg 6 Project Hindsight Office of the Director Defense Research and Engineering October 1969 Department of Defense Laboratory Ut11fzat1on Study Allen Study 1975 Technology Assessment Methodology ICBM The RAND Corpor tion July 1980 An Overview of Department of Defense Space Missions Systems and Technology Aerospace Corporation March l9BO Assessment - - - - -----___ a Balance ______ _ Naval Research Advisory Council o M111tar Technologies fn the 1980's Army Scientific Advisory Coun 11 July uro 1-2 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu