WOFORN Information Operations Roadmap 30 October 2003 WMOFORN WMOFORN PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Table of Contents U 1 FOREWORD U 1 2 IO ROADMAP CHARTER U 2 A APPROACH U 2 B KEY ASSUMPTIONS AND OBJECTIVE U 3 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY U 6 I 6 B THE FOUNDATION FOR BUILDING A CORE MILITARY COMPETENCY U 7 C RECOMMENDATIONS U 10 i U Apprave a camman understanding ain 10 2 U Cansaiidate Oversight and Advacacy far i 3 U Deiegate Capabilities ta Camhatant Cammanders i2 4 U Create a Wei Trained and Educated Career Warkfarce i2 5 U Pravide Cansalidated and Camprehensive Anaiytic Suppart t3 6 U Carrect immediate Shartfaiis and Deveiap a Long Term Defense in Depth Strategy far CND i 3 7 U Mature CNA inta a Reiiahie Wat ghting 14 3 U Deveiap an Eiectranic Warfare Investment Strategy 14 9 U increase Operatians i5 10 U Ciarify Lanes in the Read far PSYOP Public A airs and Pubiic Dipiamacy 15 i i U Assign Advacacyfar Operatians Security and Deceptian 16 12 U Imprave Transparency cf I0 in the Pianning Fragramming Budgeting and Executian System 16 4 ROADMAP REPORT U l A IO POLICY U 18 Paiicies and Pracedurai Cantrais U 13 2 Reiatianship Of Public Dipiamacy and Puhiic A airs ta H U 24 B EFFECTIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL AND SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS C A TRAINED AND READY CAREER FORCE U 32 1 Career Farce U 32 2 Educatian and Training U 35 D FOCUSED ANALYTIC AND INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT U 33 i Anaiytic and Suppart U 33 2 Eiectramagnetic-Space Anaiysis Center U 41 E ENHANCING IO CORE CAPABILITIES U 44 i Camputer Netwarh Defense U 44 2 Camputer Newark Attack U 48 3 Electranic Warfare U 59 4 Operatians U 62 5 Operatians Security U 65 6 Deceptian U 6 APPENDIX A U 69 ii APPENDIX B 10 ROADMAP RECOMMENDATIONS U 70 APPENDIX C DISTINGUISHING TASKS U 71 APPENDIX D GLOSSARY U 72 1 Secretary s Foreword U U The Information Operations Roadmap provides the Department with a plan to advance the goal of information operations as a core military competency It provides a common framework for understanding IO and policies and procedures to empower Combatant Commanders with authority to plan and integrate 10 It consolidates oversight advocacy and analytic support for IO It calls for a dedicated work force and improved training and education for Lastly it mandates innovative organizational structures that advance operational capabilities to keep pace with warfighter needs and support defense transformation Like any plan it will evolve over time as the Department gains experience through implementation For that reason I will review the implementation effort after one year and the plan will be adjusted as apprOpriate U The Roadmap stands as an another example of the Department s commitment to transform our military capabilities to keep pace with emerging threats and to exploit new opportunities afforded by innovation and rapidly developing information technologies The recommendations in the Information Operations Roadmap begin the process of developing 10 into a warfighting capability that will enable Combatant Commanders to target adversary decision-making while protecting our own U I approve the Roadmap recommendations and direct the Services Combatant Commands and Agencies to fully support implementation of this plan Original Signed Donald H Rumsfeld Secretary of Defense 2 IO Roadmap Charter U I U The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review identified Information Operations IO as one of the six critical operational goals that focus transformation efforts within It required the Department to treat IO along with intelligence and space assets not simply as an enabler of current military forces but rather as a core capability of future forces I Subsequently the Defense Planning Guidance DPG for FY2004-2009 directed tha IO become a core military competency fully integrated into deliberate and crisis action planning and capable of executing supported and supporting operations The DPG encapsulated expected output from the Roadmap as follows A Approach U I U Mandate The DPG assigned the Under Secretary of Defense Policy in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense Command Control and Communications and the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff CJ CS to develop a comprehensive IO Roadmap for presentation to the Secretary of Defense The IO Roadmap was to address the full scope of 10 as a core military competency and include supporting studies focused on policy plans organization education career force analytic support Operations PSYOP Operations Security OPSEC Electronic Warfare EW Military Deception and Computer Network Operations CNO I U Leadership established an IO Roadmap oversight panel led by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Resource and Plans The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Security and 10 and the Deputy Director for Information Operations DDIO on the Joint Staff served in senior leadership roles for their respective organizations The panel included representatives from other offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense OSD the Services and Defense Agencies and also included regular attendance by representatives of Special Operations Command SOCOM and Space Command SPACECOM SPACECOM responsibilities transferred to Strategic Command STRATCOM on 1 October 2002 2 SEWWNOFORN U Method The principal work of the oversight panel was to guide the 15 separate supporting study efforts required by the Each of the supporting study teams developed and briefed its terms of reference to the oversight panel After terms of reference were agreed upon each study team researched its topic culling insights from multiple sources and antecedent studies Study teams then provided an assessment of factors that currently constrain that 10 area from contributing to 10 as a core military competency The study groups then drafted output statements sufficient to correct the limitations identified and deveIOped prioritized recommendations that collectively would be sufficient to achieve the desired outcome EOHQ Study leaders were appointed for the 15 supporting studies and Specific milestones were assigned Those studies assigned completion dates in September and October 2002 by the DPG were intended to in uence the program and budget review which they did Approximately was provided through the FY04- 09 Program Decision Memorandum supporting interim IO Roadmap recommendations which were vetted by the oversight panel leadership U The study leads presented in-progress reviews and final reports to the oversight panel Between June and December 2002 the oversight panel met weekly to address issues raised by the studies The and DDIO also met on a weekly basis to review which study action recommendations should be included as major IO Roadmap conclusions U Senior leadership reached agreement on all but a handful of recommendations In those cases where agreement was not possible as the DPG-directed lead for the Roadmap resolved the difference of opinion or elevated options for decision by the Secretary of Defense B Key Assumptions and Obiective U U Kev assumptions Information always important in warfare is now critical to military success and will only become more so in the foreseeable future Three key assumptions underscore the growing importance of information - U Effectively communicating US Government USG capabilities and intentions is an important means of combating the plans of our adversaries The ability to rapidly disseminate persuasive information to diverse audiences in order The 15 supporting study efforts reflected 2004 DPG guidance They were as follows Overarching Information Operations Roadmap Requirements Policies Procedural Controls Relation of IO with Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs IO Organization IO Career Force 10 Education and Training IO Analytic Support Computer Network Attack Computer Network Defenses Computer Network Defense Threat Attribution Computer Network Insider Threats Electronic-Space Analysis Center Transforming Electronic Warfare Capabilities Operations Operations Security 3 to directly in uence their decision-making is an increasingly powerful means of deterring aggression Additionally it undermines both senior leadership and popular support for employing terrorists or using weapons of mass destruction U Networked C4ISR is a critical prerequisite for transforming our forces providing for an increasingly tranSparent battle space swift and effective decision- making and rapid parallel effects-based operations U Networked C4ISR is dependent upon automated decisiommaking and support broadband networks and electromagnetic capabilities with a corresponding increase in associated vulnerabilities that should be planned for and managed U Objective IO becomes a core competency The importance of dominating the information spectrum explains the objective of transforming 10 into a core military competency on a par with air ground maritime and special operations The charge to the 10 Roadmap oversight panel was to develop as concrete a set of action recommendations as possible to make 10 a core competency which in turn required identifying the essential prerequisites to become a core military competency U IO as a core competency requires a common understanding and appreciation within the Office of the Secretary of Defense the Services and Combatant Commands on the value of 10 10 as a core military competency also requires U Policies and procedures that I U Clearly define 10 provide a common understanding and clarify authorities and boundaries for execution I U Delegate the maximum possible authority to Combatant Commanders to plan and execute integrated IO - U Plans operations and experimentation that I U Incorporate 10 in contingency planning within all joint force headquarters I U Integrate 10 into the broader development of new operational concepts I U Include IO in all major training regimes and exercises U 10 force development made possible by I U Four-star Combatant Commander advocacy of 10 for experimentation concept development and definition of needed capabilities I U Streamlined organizational and command and control relationships 4 I U A trained and educated career force I U Joint program equivalents to develop-dedicated IO capabilities I U The recommendations of this report address all the requirements to make 10 a core military competency just identified 3 Executive Summary U A Conclusions U I U The 10 Roadmap participants collectively identified three matters of key importance that require immediate attention I N We Must Fight the Net is building an information-centric force Networks are increasingly the operational center of gravity and the De Iartment must be but be fully re Iared to ensure critical war ghting network functionalit and to MHowever networks are vulnerable now and barring si nificant attention will become increasingly more vulnerable he recommendations of this report offer a good start point for remedial action for etwork security to maintain decision superiority A robust layered defense in depth strategy is the next necessary step in providing Combatant Commanders with the tools necessary to preserve warfighting capability i U We Must Improve PSYOP Military forces must be better prepared to use PSYOP in support of military operations and the themes and messages employed in a PSYOP campaign must be consistent with the broader national security objectives and national-level themes and messages Currently however our PSYOP campaigns are often reactive and not well organized for maximum impact U PSYOP enhancements outlined in this report and clarification of the respective reSponsibilities and tasks associated with PSYOP support to public diplomacy and public affairs will enhance DoD s ability to aggressively conduct IO and to do so fully consistent with broader national security objectives U In particular PSYOP must be refocused on adversary decisionimaking planning well in advance for aggressive behavior modification during times of con ict PSYOP products must be based on in-depth knowledge of the audience s decisionvmaking processes and the factors in uencing his decisions produced rapidly at the highest quality standards and powerfully disseminated directly to targeted audiences throughout the area of operations I U We Must Improve Network and Electro Maanetic Attack Capability To prevail in an information-centric fight it is increasingly important that our forces dominate the electromagnetic spectrum with attack capabilities 6 Q When implemented the recommendations of this report will effectively jump- start a rapid improvement of CNA capability Moreover the follow-on EW roadrnap should define an overall investment strategy for the De-artment that will U Collectively the recommendations of this report begin the transformation of 10 into a core military capability for Combatant Commanders If aggressively implemented these recommendations will produce the following benefits for the Department'in general and the Combatant Commanders in particular U A common lexicon and approach to 10 including support to integrated information campaign planning U More execution authority delegated to Combatant Commanders U A trained and educated career force capable of IO planning and execution U Centralized IO planning integration and analysis support from STRATCOM - U Enhanced 10 capabilities for the warfighter including I U Improved ability to disseminate powerful messages in support of adversary behavior modification I U Protection of networks with a real defense in depth strategy I U A robust offensive suite of capabilities to include full-range electronic and computer network attack with increased reliability through improved and control assurance testing and refined tactics and procedures B The Foundation for Building a Core Military Competency U U A uniform understanding and appreciation of 10 should be based on a common DOD framework that includes a full spectrum concept of 10 built upon three broad 10 functions five integrated core 10 capabilities and a supporting definition as described below U Three integrated 10 functions The Department's concept of 10 should emphasize full spectrum 10 that makes a potent contribution to effects based 7 skaqrx NOFORN Operations across the full range of military operations during peace crisis and war The concept includes three integrated 10 functions of overriding importance U Deter discourage dissuade and direct an adversary thereby disrupting his unity of command and purpose while preserving our own - U Protect our plans and misdirect theirs thereby allowing our forces to mass their effects to maximum advantage while the adversary expends his resources to little effect U Control adversarial communications and networks and protect ours thereby crippling the enemy s ability to direct an organized defense while preserving effective command and control of our forces U By extension when executed to maximum effect seizing control of adversary communications and networks will allow Combatant Commanders to control the enemy s network and communications dependent weapons infrastructure command and control and battlespace management functions U Peacetime preparation The Department s IO concept should emphasize that full- Spectrum information operations are full-time operations requiring extensive preparation in peacetime U Well before crises develop the 10 battlespace should be prepared through intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance and extensive planning activities I U Similarly considerable effort should be made to characterize potential adversary audiences and particularly senior decision-makers and decision- making processes and priorities If such human factors analysis is not conducted well in advance of the con ict it will not be possible to craft PSYOP themes and messages that will be effective in modifying adversary behavior U Computer Network Defense CND and OPSEC are vital capabilities in all phases of conflict but should be given priority especially during peacetime to prevent adversaries from preparing effective information operations or exploiting vulnerabilities against our forces Protecting our plans and networks 3 SEW morons will ensure our ability to make decisions effectively and execute plans with minimum disruption U Five core capabilities Full spectrum IO employs five core capabilities to achieve desired Combatant Commander effects or else prevent the enemy from achieving his desired effects EW PSYOP OPSEC military deception and CNO U The focus on five core capabilities is a significant change from the 10 construct promulgated in December 1996 that included thirteen primary capabilities There are three reasons why IO has been narrowed to these five core capabilities I U They are operational in a direct and immediate sense they either achieve critical operational effects or prevent the adversary from doing so I U They are interdependent and increasingly need to be integrated to achieve desired effects For example tsq and in support of a broader military deception plan undermining the adversari s confidence in his capabilities g I U They clearly define the capabilities the Services and SOCOM are expected to organize train equip and provide to the Combatant Commander A broader conceptualization of IO dilutes its focus on decision-making and serves to divorce IO from the three primary operational IO objectives of greatest importance to the warfighter U Identify supporting and related capabilities All IO Roadmap participants agreed with the need to identify supporting and related capabilities Like all core military competencies information operations can not be successfully executed without diverse supporting capabilities 9 SE U Capabilities such as physical security information assurance counter intelligence and physical attack make important contributions to effective 10 Like many supporting capabilities such as logistics and surveillance and reconnaissance they also serve other core competencies besides IO U Public affairs and civil military operations remain related activities as first identified in the original 1996 construct of IO These capabilities are related in the sense that the effects they achieve may be similar to some aspects of IO particularly PSYOP U One result of public affairs and civil military operations is greater support for military endeavors and thus conversely these activities can help discourage and dissuade enemies which PSYOP does more directly with its own tactics techniques and procedures U IO requires coordination with public affairs and civil military operations to complement the objectives of these related activities and ensure message consistency C Recommendations U U The 10 Roadmap are condensed and in some cases consolidated in the following paragraphs along with a brief background statement in order to summarize the essence of the IO Roadmap effort 1 U Approve a common understanding of IO U The Services Combatant Commands and Agencies do not have a common understanding of 10 Services do not uniformly equip and train for IO and Combatant Conunands do not adequately assist in requirement generation As a result 10 is not fully integrated in plans and orders The first step in making IO a core military competency is agreement on a framework for 10 including a standardized definition and a uniform approach to using IO in joint warfighting U 10 should focus on degrading an adversary s decision-making process while preserving our own To that end I0 should I U Deter discourage and dissuade an adversary by disrupting his unity of command while preserving ours I U Protect our plans and misdirect theirs I U Control their communications and networks white protecting ours 10 WIMOFORN U To accomplish these functions I0 should integrate the ve core capabilities and be applied across the full range of military operations To be successful full spectrum IO must be a full time endeavor with continuous planning and preparation prior to a crisis or con ict To best communicate this approach to 10 the following de nition should be included in a revised Directive on Information Operations and in appropriate updates of joint publications The integrated employment of the core capabilities of Electronic Warfare Computer Network Operations Operations Military Deception and Operations Security in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities to in uence disrupt corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making while protecting our own 2 U Consolidate Oversight and Advocacy for 10 U A major deficiency identified in advancing IO as a core military competency is the balkanization of IO responsibilities across OSD the Services and Combatant Commands During the development of the 10 Roadmap a revised Unified Command Plan UCP expanded IO role on behalf of the other Combatant Commands With reSpect to OSD has been assigned lead for implementation of the 10 Roadmap but the need for consolidating OSD oversight of 10 remains an issue In the near term U P should chair an I0 Roadmap Executive Committee for the purpose of coordinating the e orts of USDU Director CJCS Commander STRA TCOM and Commander SOCOM to implement the recommendations included in this report I U The IO Roadmap Executive Committee will be supported by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense DASD level group chaired by that includes Service participation and provides guidance and routine oversight and is supported by an I0 Implementation Team overseeing daily activity to achieve Roadmap recommendations U Following the rst full year of 10 Roadmap implementation the should present to the Secretary any additional recommendations necessary for consolidation of OSD oversight of IO These recommendations should be coordinated among the 10 Roadmap Executive Committee In the case of principled differences between or among Committee members options with pros and cons should be presented shear moment 1 1 3 U Delegate Capabilities to Combatant Commanders Information 0 Iterations will not become an established core competency until to ra idly employ IO capabilities The Standing Rules of Engagement should be modi ed and PSYOP In particular The CJCS in coordination with STRATCOM should proose to SecDef modi cations to the Standin Rules of Engagement for so that except those that entail high risk of knowledge transfer to enemies see p 57 Plans for such attacks should be prepared in accordance with existing procedures R should modt the PS 0P approval process so that overall PSYOP program approval and approval for all products with substantial political or strategic content or implication remains with P All other PS 0P product approval should be delegated to Combatant Commanders 4 U Create a Well Trained and Educated Career Workforce U The five core 10 capabilities are not understood and applied the same way across the Services Instead each Service deveIOps specialists in 10 disciplines to meet Service- specific requirements In addition the growing complexity and technological growth in EW PSYOP and Computer Network Operations tend to isolate the specialists who practice these disciplines from one another thus hindering integration of core IO capabilities Therefore U should lead the establishment of an 10 career force comprised of planners and capability specialists It should also oversee the designation of Service and joint l0 billets to provide I0 opportunities up to senior executive or ag level rank allow-on actions should establish parameters to monitor accession retention and promotion rates for personnel in the I0 career force U The CJCS and should ensure joint and Service training is aligned to support the career force objective U The Joint Forces Staff College should be designated the lead to develop standardized joint 10 curricula at mid and senior levels including an expanded Joint 10 Planners Course The Joint Forces Sta College should collaborate with Service schools to integrate joint 10 curricula into their education U The Deputy Secretary should o icially designate the Naval Post Graduate School as a Center of Excellence to provide graduate level full-spectrum l0 12 core and specialty programs as well as assistance to joint doctrine development and innovation through analysis and research 5 U Provide Consolidated and Comprehensive Analytic Support Multiple studies Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments the 200010 Broad Area Review and the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and erational lessons learned Kosovo and Afghanistan have Combatant command staffs currently cannot produce rapid solutions for tailored 10 effects due to the lack of sufficient staff expertise and no single support center for integration of IO analysis planning and targeting To alleviate these well-documented shortfalls U STRA TCOM in coordination with I and CJCS should develop a Joint Integrative Analysis and Planning Capability JIAPC to provide timely analysis planning and targeting in support of Combatant Commander s I0 requirements This capability should integrate the analysis products of the Electromagnetic-Space Analysis Center at NSA the Human Factors Analysis Center at DIA the Joint Information Operations Center and the Joint War ghting Analysis Center The JIAPC constitutes an integrated network of analysis centers that properly managed could provide holistic analytic support to Combatant Commanders II NSTRA TCOM in coordination with I should develo memorandums of imemem at me and the Director Defense Intelligence Agency on the Human Factors Analysis Center I N I in coordination with the will develop direction for the to provide operational planning and advanced EA development programs 6 U Correct Immediate Shortfalls and Develop a Long-Term Defense in Depth Strategy for CND U requires a robust layered defense across the Department based on global and enclave situational awareness with a centralized capability to rapidly characterize attribute and respond to attacks DoD s Defense in Depth strategy should Operate on the premise that the Department will fight the net as it would a weapons system More speci cally U should develop the Defense in Depth strategy to give senior leaders high con dence that additional investments in network defense will ensure the graceful degradation of the network rather than its collapse The strategy should take SEW morons 13 into account limited resources and balance them against known risks The starting assumption should be one of attrition i e that the networks will be degraded However the strategy should be engineered to sustain required capabilities across the range of military operations 7 U Mature CNA into a Reliable War ghtiug Capability asmgned STRATCOM authority for CNA N TRATCOM should be assigned combatant command of CNA forces 8 U Develop an Electronic Warfare Investment Strategy m A number of studies over the past several years to include Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments JWCA and the Airborne Electronic Attack Analysis of Alternatives Study reached the following conclusions with respect to current EW SWIMOFORN 14 capabilities Defensive EW ca abilities are overem-hasized in com_-arison to electronic attack capabilities There are There is no central investment strategy or vision for EW To correct these shortcomings U should formally establish and charter an Electronic Warfare Executive Steering Group to develop a coherent multi-Service investment strategy and provide e 'ective oversight of the development of Electronic Warfare system and operational architectures The primary objective should be to develop a comprehensive roadmap to focus s efforts on providing joint forces and component commanders operational level electronic attack options that deny degrade disrupt or destroy a broad range of adversary threats sensors command and control and critical support infrastructures 9 U Increase Operations Capabilities '31 Over the last decade numerous studies have documented the deterioration of PSYOP capabilities and have recommended remedial action Well-documented PSYOP limitations ersist These include the insuf cient numbers of experienced and well equipped PSYOP personnel and a limited ability to disseminate products into denied areas SOCOM and Army PSYOP force enhancement efforts are already underway per 10 Roadmap recommendations in the last program review and they should continue In addition U 0C 0M should create a Joint PSYOP Support Element to coordinate Combatant Command programs and products with the Joint Staff and OSD to provide rapidly produced commercial-quality PS 0P product prototypes consistent with overall U S Government themes and messages U SOCOM 's ongoing PS 0P Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration and modernization e orts should permit the timely long-range dissemination of products with various PSYOP delivery systems This includes satellite radio and television cellular phones and other wireless devices the Internet and upgrades to traditional delivery systems such as lea ets and loudspeakers that are highly responsive to maneuver commanders 10 U Clarify Lanes in the Road for PSYOP Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy U Future operations require that PSYOP capabilities be improved to enable PSYOP forces to rapidly generate and disseminate audience specific commercial-quality products into denied areas and that these products focus on aggressive behavior modi cation of adversaries at the operational and tactical level of war The likelihood that PSYOP messages will be replayed to a much broader audience including the 15 American public requires that specific boundaries be established for PSYOP In particular U PS YOP should focus on support to military endeavors exercises deployments and operations in non-permissive or semi-permissive environments when adversaries are part of the equation U should collaborate with other agencies for U S Government public diplomacy programs and information objectives PS 0P forces and capabilities can be employed in support of public diplomacy as part of approved theater security cooperation guidelines U Public A airs should be more proactive in support of U S Government Public Diplomacy objectives to include a broader set of select foreign media and audiences 11 U Assign Advocacy for Operations Security and Military Deception U Protecting our plans while rnisdirecting those of the adversary is one of the three broad functions of integrated 10 This cannot be accomplished without significant improvements in both OPSEC and military deception Therefore SQ The Department should assign advocacy for joint OPSEC and military deception to TRATC 0M and ensure their full inte ration into IO conce ts lannin and careerforce education and naming- 12 U Improve Transparency of 10 in the Planning Programming Budgeting and Execution System U should improve IO capabilities through a coordinated investment strategy and senior leader oversight of IO processes Better insight into the level and distribution of fiscal and personnel resources would be an initial helpful step in this regard U The Department should establish a virtual Major Force Program for Information Operations to identify what spends on 10 and its core capabilities 16 4 Roadmap Report U U Recommendations by Major IO Roadmap Areas U Five part agenda The 2004 Defense Planning Guidance DPG mandated 15 Roadmap studies which the 10 Roadmap oversight panel aggregated into five major areas for reform U Policies and Procedural Controls U Conunand and Control and Supporting Organizations - U Trained Educated and Ready Career Force U Analytic Support I U Enhanced Core Capabilities U Report format Specific recommendations to the Secretary to make 10 a core military competency are organized for each of the five reform areas in a standard format that reflects the approach adopted by the Roadmap studies U DPG Tnsking Displays the tasking given in the 2004 DPG U Current Situation Provides an assessment of current ability to contribute to 10 as a core military capability with emphasis on particular problem areas U Desired Outcome Articulates a specific desired outcome to expedite transformation of 10 into a core military competency - U Recommendations Provides specific recommendations to rapidly establish 10 as a core military competency and achieve the desired outcome A general timeline to implement the recommendations is at Appendix A l7 A 10 Policy U U This major study area incorporates a review of overall policy and procedures for 10 as well as review of the relationship of public diplomacy and public affairs in relation to IO 1 Policies and Procedural Controls U U DPG Tosking I U will deveIOp recommendations for policies and procedural controls for 10 in coordination with CJCS and as necessary the National Security Council NSC and the Intelligence Community In doing so will actively improve and enforce interagency processes to decon ict Computer Network Exploitation CNE and Computer Network Attack CNA and enhance CNE activities as an essential precursor for operations U Current Situation I Nlnadequate policy A review of existing policy for 10 found that policy lags behmd operations U There is not a consensus on how to define 10 or its contribution to warfighting U Computer Network Defense CND lacks up to date policy and legal guidance including newly acquired authorities provided by the Patriot and Homeland Security Acts to guide responses to intrusions or attacks on networks ecu em of desired capabilities speci c weapons development and employment interagency coordination and declaratory policy U EW policy is outdated DoD s overarching policy was published in 1994 after the first Gulf War The directive is not consistent with the approach or recommendations of this report It needs to be updated to stress EW as an integral part of Information Operations with important linkages to Computer Network Operations and other 10 core capabilities I @Overlv centralized control of IO capabilities E Combatant Commanders conduct some planning for 10 but have for execution even after their plans are approved SMIWNOFORN 13 -- U In March 2002 DPG precursor work on 10 was briefed to the Senior Leadership Review Group SLRG which consists of the Secretary CJCS Service Chiefs Service Secretaries and OSD principals The SLRG directed that the Roadmap review delegation of IO authorities to Combatant Commanders as a matter of high priority Consequently the Joint Staff DDIO conducted a study of the IQ review and approval process That study found the following The study recommended that much of this capability be delegated to Combatant Commanders I U All PSYOP programs are currently approved by although after initial product approval by similar succeeding products are sometimes delegated to Combatant Commands I U The DDIO study concluded that existing approval processes for EW OPSEC and military deception were satisfactory I Ella a recent change supported by the 10 Roadma leadershi the Secretary now delegates some i to a Combatant Commander in advance when the target effect is reversible and non-destructive I R Command and control issues U In July 2002 the Operations Deputies of the Services requested the JCS conduct a Proof of Principle exercise to test command and control of CNA The November 2002 Eligible Receiver 03 exercise was used for this purpose I R The no-notice JCS scenario exercised STRATCOM as both a supporting and supiorted commander for - and examined the role of the - I The exercise highlighted the need to revise the and improve the command and control construct i E Resource management QThe Department can not currently identify what is Spent on 10 or even on specific core capabilities with the possible exception of PSYOP which is largely visible under MFP 11 I U The lack of a systematic methodology to account for 10 resources across the Department is a major impediment This limitation was keenly felt during 19 the program review when the IO Roadmap leadership was required to recommend adjustments to 10 programs including identification of offsets - U Services and Agencies often embed 10 resources within Program Elements PEs Additionally some 10 programs are protected inside Special Access Programs SAPS Both factors severely limit the ability of senior leaders to monitor and evaluate the adequacy of IO efforts U Desired Outcome U I U Clear unambiguous and streamlined oversight and policy that empowers Combatant Commanders to execute full spectrum 10 before during and after combat operations U Recommendations Numbers 1 - 5 U Recommendation Publish IO policy i U Upon approval of the IQ Roadmap the should immediately publish revised overarching policy on Information Operations to facilitate a common understanding and appreciation of 10 de ne objectives and delineate IO responsibilities This uniform understanding and appreciation of IO should be based on a common framework that includes a full spectrum concept of 10 built upon three broad 10 functions five integrated core 10 capabilities and a supporting definition as described below U Recommendation Adopt a full spectrum concept of IO built upon three broad functions and ve core capabilities II U Three integrated 10 functions The Department s concept of 10 should emphasize full spectrum 10 that makes a potent contribution to effects based operations across the full range of military operations during peace crisis and war The concept includes three integrated IO functions of overriding importance U Deter discourage dissuade and direct an adversary thereby disrupting his unity of command and purpose while preserving our own U Protect our plans and misdirect theirs thereby allowing our forces to mass their effects to maximum advantage while the adversary expends his resources to little effect - U Control adversarial communications and networks and protect ours thereby crippling the enemy s ability to direct an organized defense while preserving effective command and control of our forces 20 SEC I U By extension when executed to maximum effect seizing control of adversary communications and networks will allow Combatant Commanders to control the enemy s network and communications-dependent weapons infrastructure command and control and battlespace management functions - ii For exami le Combatant Commanders - to infrastructure and quickly reconstitute them consistent with national objectives U Peacetime preparation The Department s IO concept should emphasize that full- spectrum information operations are full-time operations requiring extensive preparation in peacetime U Well before crises develop the 10 battlespace should be prepared through intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance and extensive planning activities U Similarly considerable effort should be made to characterize potential adversary audiences and particularly senior decision-makers and decision- making processes and priorities If such human factors analysis is not conducted well in advance of the con ict it will not be possible to craft PSYOP themes and messages that will be effective in modifying adversary behavior I U CND and OPSEC are vital capabilities in all phases of con ict but should be given priority especially during peacetime to prevent adversaries from preparing effective information operations or exploiting vulnerabilities against our forces Protecting our plans and networks will ensure our ability to make decisions effectively and execute plans with minimum disruption U Five core capabilities Full spectrum 10 employs five core capabilities to achieve desired Combatant Commander effects or else prevent the enemy from achieving his desired effects EW PSYOP OPSEC military deception and CNO U The focus on five core capabilities is a significant change from the 10 construct promulgated in December 1996 that included thirteen primary capabilities There are three reasons why IO has been narrowed to these five core capabilities 21 SE I U They are operational in a direct and immediate sense they either achieve critical operational effects or prevent the adversary from doing so U They are interdependent and increasingly need to be integrated to achieve desired effects For example U They clearly define the capabilities the Services and SOCOM are expected to organize train equip and provide to the Combatant Commander A broader conceptualization of IO dilutes its focus on decision-making and serves to divorce 10 from the three primary operational IO objectives of greatest importance to the warfighter U Recommendation Approve a de nition of IO based upon the full spectrum concept I U At the inception of the 10 Roadmap effort the de nition of information operations being used in a draft Directive was Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one s own information and information systems Roadmap participants agreed that this definition was too open- ended and that it ought to underscore the central importance of the five core capabilities Moreover as the Secretary pointed out when briefed on 10 Roadmap progress the definition ought to underscore the centrality of decision-making rather than the general importance of information writ large Therefore the 10 Roadmap recommended definition is U The integrated employment of the core capabilities of Electronic Warfare Computer Network Operations Operations Military Deception and Operations Security in concert SWOFORN 22 WHNOFORN with specified supporting and related capabilities to in uence disrupt corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision- making while protecting our own U Promulgate the approved definition The approved definition should be included in the revamped Directive on Information Operations and in appropriate updates of joint publications U Identify supporting and related capabilities A1110 Roadmap participants agreed with the need to identify supporting and related capabilities Like all core military competencies information operations can not be successfully executed without diverse supporting capabilities U Capabilities such as physical security information assurance counter intelligence and physical attack make important contributions to effective 10 Like many supporting capabilities such as logistics and surveillance and reconnaissance they also serve other core competencies besides IO U Public affairs and civil military operations remain related activities as first identified in the original 1996 construct of IO U These capabilities are related in the sense that the effects they achieve may be similar to some aspects of 10 particularly PSYOP I U One result of public affairs and civil military operations is greater support for military endeavors and thus conversely these activities can help discourage and dissuade enemies which PSYOP does more directly with its own tactics techniques and procedures U 10 requires coordination with public affairs and civil military operations to complement the objectives of these related activities and ensure message consistency U Recommendation Delegate selected execution authority to Combatant Commanders NA common approach to 10 based on the aforementioned full spectrum concept will clear the way for development of 10 as a core competency but it will not become one until Combatant Commanders are empowered to ra idly em loy 10 The Standing Rules of Engagement should be modified for PSYOP CNA Delegation using all CNA weapons except those that entail high risk of knowledge transfer to enemies 23 U PSYOP Delegation Combatant Commanders should have approval authority for all PSYOP products that do not contain substantial political or strategic content or implication U NOTE To facilitate comprehensive presentation of recommendations related to a core capability area more detailed discussion of and recommendations for delegating CNA and PS YOP to Combatant Commanders is contained in the sections of the report addressing these capabilities For the same reason recommendations for national policy for CNA and cooperation with the Intelligence Community on CNA are included in the section on CNA U Recommendation Improve visibility and accountability of 10 resources I U Director in coordination with and components should create a virtual IO major force program for resource identification U IO resources are generally a subset of a Program Element PE Because resources are embedded within multiple PEs it has been almost impossible to develop an accurate 10 program baseline across U should require components to create whole PBS for IO core and associated capabilities This would require components to identify embedded 10 resources and transfer those resources into whole IO PEs As an example of associated capabilities components should identify resources for 10 training and education thereby distinguishing these resources from larger education requirements 2 Relationship of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs to IO U U DPG Tasking I U in coordination with will analyze and make recommendations on those policy strategy and legal issues affected by and related to the proper role for public diplomacy and public affairs in relation to 10 Particular emphasis will be given to examining the appropriate relationship of PSYOP to public affairs as they relate to USG strategies for both adversaries and non-adversaries The analysis will include recommendations on policies requirements resources training and education to support a transformed communications capability in support of military operations in the global information environment U Current Situation 24 SWIWNOFORN U Coherent messages It is increasingly important to national security objectives that the USG put out a coherent and compelling political message in concert with military operations Preserving unity of effort and morale has always been important in war However the desire for broad political support of military operations the prevalence of access to global communications in the modern world and the political and cultural origins of terrorism require more comprehensive and proactive USG communication strategies - U The USG can not execute an effective communication strategy that facilitates military campaigns if various organs of Government disseminate inconsistent messages to foreign audiences Therefore it is important that policy differences between all USG Departments and Agencies be resolved to the extent that they shape themes and messages U All information activities including information operations which are conducted at the strategic operational and tactical level should re ect and be consistent with broader national security policy and strategy objectives Coordinating information activities Major information activities include pu lic affairs military support to public diplomacy and PSYOP The State Deiartment maintains the lead for public diplomacy the and the International Broadcasting Board of Governors maintains the lead for broadcasting USG messages overseas often with in a supporting role has consistently maintained that the information activities of all these agencies must be integrated and coordinated to ensure the promulgation of consistent themes and messages U Historically PSYOP is the IO area considered most in need of coordination and deconfliction with public affairs and public diplomacy In particular attention is typically paid to the need to carefully segregate PSYOP from public affairs for fear that PSYOP tactics and techniques would undermine the credibility of public affairs efforts U Department of State practitioners of public diplomacy have historically expressed similar reservations about PSYOP U PSYOP in the past however often was used to support US Government public diplomacy and information objectives with non-adversarial audiences These actions include counter-drug demining and AIDS awareness programs in friendly countries In most cases PSYOP used in this capacity was justifiable as support to military operations U Other comparisons In the past some basic similarities and dissimilarities between PSYOP support to public diplomacy and public affairs generally have been 25 WWNOFORN accepted Historically all three used truth to bolster credibility and all three addressed foreign audiences both adversary and non-adversaries Only public affairs addressed domestic audiences In addition all three activities sought a positive impact for USG interests but with some differences in the methods employed and objectives sought The customary position was that public affairs informs while public diplomacy and PSYOP in uence PSYOP also has been perceived as the most aggressive of the three information activities using diverse means including manipulation and personal threats - U Impact of the global village The increasing ability of peOple in most parts of the globe to access international information sources makes targeting particular audiences more difficult Today the distinction between foreign and domestic audiences becomes more a question of USG intent rather than information dissemination practices U PSYOP is restricted by both policy and executive order from targetng American audiences our military personnel and news agencies or outlets I U However information intended for foreign audiences including public diplomacy and PSYOP increasingly is consumed by our domestic audience and vice-versa U PSYOP messages disseminated to any audience except individual decision-makers and perhaps even then will often be replayed by the news media for much larger audiences including the American public U Desired Outcome I U Establish a clear delineation of responsibilities for information activities that properly delimits IO and ensures that 10 is fully coordinated with the broad themes and messages promoted by the USG more generally U Recommendations Numbers 6 - 9 I U Requirements To inform and influence a variety of foreign audiences in the increasingly complex global information environment should U Recommendation Enhance and refocus PSYOP capability i U Improvements in PSYOP capability are required to rapidly generate audience specific conunercial-quality products into denied areas I U Future operations require that PSYOP focus on aggressive behavior modification at the operational and tactical level of war The likelihood that PSYOP messages will 26 be replayed to a much broader audience including the American public requires specific boundaries be established - U PSYOP should focus on support to military endeavors exercises deployments and Operations in non-permissive or semi-permissive environments when adversaries are part of the equation U However PSYOP forces and capabilities may be employed to support U S public diplomacy as part of approved theater security cooperation guidelines In this case PSYOP personnel and equipment are not conductng a PSYOP mission but rather are providing military support to public diplomacy For example PSYOP forces and capabilities could continue to support U S International Broadcasting Board of Governors operations such as Radio TV Marti when so requested U Recommendation Improve military support to public diplomacy While IO is focused on creating effects against adversaries for the joint warfighting commander and preventing adversaries from doing the same to us there is a broader set of information activities that serve USG interests For example may collaborate with other agencies for public diplomacy programs that directly support DoD s mission The Department recently provided funds through the Office of Management and Budget to purchase a radio transmitter in Afghanistan for use by the Voice of America that makes a direct contribution to improved force protection conditions The Program Decision Memorandum PDM 1 provided in FY04 to enhance DoD s ability to provide support to public diplomacy U Recommendation Support active public affairs programs that in uence foreign audiences FUEQ Clear boundaries for PSYOP should be complemented by a more proactive public affairs effort that expands to include a broader set of select foreign media and audiences provided to over the Future Years Defense Plan FYDP to implement this intent These funds will enable to U Develop a global web site supporting U S strategic communications objectives Content should be primarily from third parties with greater credibility to foreign audiences than U S officials U Identify and disseminate the views of third party advocates that support U S positions These sources may not articulate the U S position the way that the USG would but they may nonetheless have a positive in uence 27 SMOFORN -- U Implement strict ground rules for media embedded with military forces to protect Operational security U Maintain quick response public affairs teams with organic linguist support U Include coordination between public affairs civil military operations and 10 in major training regimes and ensure that coordination is regularly exercised U Recommendation Develop distinguishing tasks I U OSD should develop task lists so that public affairs public diplomacy and PSYOP practitioners are clear about their objectives and activities See Appendix for an initial list of these tasks SE 28 B EffectiVe Command and Control and Supporting Organizations U U DPG Tasking U DPG 04 directed the CJ CS in coordination with and to provide recommendations on organizational arrangements for better integrating and IO capabilities U Current Situation U Centralized reSponsibility At the outset of the IO Roadmap responsibilities for 10 were dispersed across the Combatant Commands and on the OSD staff Only the Joint Staff has largely centralized IO responsibilities in one office the DDIO U DDIO organization study An organizational study conducted by the Joint Staff in the summer of 2002 was merged with the IO Roadmap effort The study recommended empowering STRATCOM with greater 0 authority U The 10 Roadmap leadership unanimously supported the recommendations proposed by the study I U The study noted that previously SPACECOM although given the mission for CNA did not have the forces to accomplish the tasks required I U SPACECOM highlighted the lack of CNA forces as a major impediment in advancing CNA into a robust warfighting capability when STRATCOM and SPACECOM combined in October 2002 I NThe study also noted that PSYOP capabilities had not kept up with requirements but did not endorse assigning the PSYOP mission to STRATCOM The study recommended SOCOM retain the PSYOP mission but STRATCOM should coordinate with SOCOM to ensure full integration of PSYOP as a core capability of IO M Unified Command Plan UCP 02 Change 2 This change approved in January 2003 included recommendations endorsed by the 10 Roadmap Specifically STRATCOM was assigned responsibility for integrating and coordinating 10 that cross geographic areas of responsibility or across the IQ core capabilities U The UCP identified the core 10 capabilities as CNA CND EW OPSEC PSYOP and military deception It specified role in IO to include I U Supporting other Combatant Commanders for planning 29 shag morons I U Planning and coordinating capabilities that have trans-regional effects or that directly support national objectives I U Exercising command and control of selected missions if directed to do so by the Secretary or President I U Identifying desired characteristics and capabilities for DoD-wide CND planning DOD-wide CND and directing DoD-wide CND I U Identifying desired characteristics and capabilities for CNA conducting CNA in support of assigned missions and integrating CNA capabilities in support of other Combatant Commanders as directed I U Identifying desired characteristics and capabilities for joint EW and planning and conducting EW in support of assigned missions I U Supporting other Combatant Commanders for the planning and integration of joint OPSEC and military deception I U Responsibilities across OSD A major deficiency identified in advancing 10 as a core military competency is the balkanization of IO responsibilities across OSD U promulgates overarching IO policy but reSponsibilities for policy strategy plans operations and programs for 10 capabilities are diffused across OSD in multiple offices within and U Creation of introduces another organization with responsibilities related to 10 U The need for a more streamlined OSD organizational IO construct became more pronounced once the UCP expanded IO role on behalf of the other Combatant Commands U Desired Outcome I U An effective structure for force development integration planning command and control and joint execution of 10 as a core military competency U Recommendations Numbers 10 - 12 U Recommendation Empower STRATCOM to undertake critical precursor activities for successful 10 planning and execution I U A single four star Combatant Commander should be given responsibility for advocacy and oversight of IO capabilities to ensure they are capable of supported and supporting operations and that they are fully integrated into planning This SE 30 recommendation is already underway as described above in the discussion on the UCP Change 2 The terms of reference being developed by the CJ CS for UCP implementation should specifically include authority and reSponsibility for STRATCOM to develop concepts for integrated IO prioritize IO planning needs among regional Combatant Commanders develop measures of effectiveness for 10 and promote 10 in joint concept development and experimentation activities U Recommendation Streamline CNA and PSYOP organizational constructs and command and control U The 10 Roadmap developed a comprehensive series of recommendations for CNA and PSYOP To aid in clarity and put the recommendations into proper perspective these specific recommendations have been integrated into the respective CNA and PSYOP sections of this report U Recommendation Consolidate OSD Oversight of IO U Consolidating OSD oversight of 10 is advisable for two reasons First it would put one source firmly in charge with a level of authority sufficient to promote IO aggressively Second having one source in charge of all five core capabilities would improve the likelihood of their effective integration which will be increasingly necessary to achieve desired effects U The should lead an Executive Committee to oversee implementation of the policies programs and recommendations contained in this Roadmap An immediate priority will be to translate the recommendations in this roadmap into a matrix that identifies the action the approval authority the lead for the action required coordination the mechanism for completing the action and the due date All relevant components and agencies should designate a lead individual to support rapid implementation of the Roadmap recommendations The target for full implementation should be one year The should provide periodic updates on progress to the Deputy Secretary of Defense U Following the first full year of IO Roadmap implementation the should present to the Secretary any additional recommendations necessary for consolidation of OSD oversight of 10 These recommendations should be coordinated among the 10 Roadmap Executive Committee In the case s of principled differences between or among Committee members options with pros and cons should be presented 31 C A Trained and Ready Career Force U U This major study area incorporates a review of the personnel training and education requirements necessary to transform 10 into a core military competency 1 Career orce U U DPG Tasking U in coordination with CJ CS and the Services will make recommendations relating to the 10 career force The recommendations will address career paths for IO personnel accession retention and promotion opportunities to Senior Executive and Joint Staff and Service ag general officer level commencing in Y04 U Current Situation U Service constructs of IO produce a varying work force The five core capabilities of 10 are not universally defined understood or applied across the Service Departments As a result each Service develops specialists in those disciplines that meet Service-specific requirements U Isolated communities of specialists The complexity and technological growth in EW PSYOP and CNO tend to isolate the specialists who practice these disciplines from one another U Unfortunately there is often little application or awareness of the relationships of one core capability to the others U Not having personnel in the five core IO disciplines that are familiar with the other disciplines undermines efforts to apply IO as part of a common integrated approach to joint warfighting U Retention of critical personnel mav be a problem Anecdotal evidence from the Services collected during the course of IO Roadmap deveIOpment indicates that retention of personnel possessing these keys skill sets may be a challenge U Military deception and OPSEC are often ignored The growing superiority of US military capabilities against conventional opponents devalues these time-honored skills As a result there are few trained practitioners that can demonstrate relevance to the overall planning process U OPSEC is largely an afterthought in planning even though doctrine and policy is widely promulgated The OPSEC planning process developed for is not widely applied - 32 sWoronN - U Personnel assigned to accomplish military deception and OPSEC planning on Combatant Command staffs are often assigned without any knowledge of these planning processes or the relevance to IO I U Few ioint or service billets are coded for 10 Even though duty positions and assignments require personnel that may have 10 skill sets the Department lacks an accepted method of identifying 10 qualified personnel to match 10 skill requirements U Desired Outcome U requires a cadre of IO professionals capable of planning and executing fully integrated 10 in support of Combatant Commanders An 10 career force should be afforded promotion and advancement opportunities commensurate with other warfighting areas and provided opportunities for advancement to senior executive or flag level rank U Recommendations Numbers 13 - 18 U Recommendation Establish an 10 career force U As 10 grows into a full military competency it may be necessary to consider making 10 a dedicated military occupation specialty or career field For the time being should establish an 10 career force comprising two categories IO planners and 10 capability specialists To be successful an 10 career force will have to break some cultural norms Isolated communities of personnel should begin to think of themselves as 10 personnel rather than personnel participating in a core component of IO U Recommendation Develop IO planners U These of cers emerge from the more traditional warfighting career paths fighter pilots combat arms officers service warfare officers and planners across all Services and enter into planning assignments that require expertise in the five core capabilities U 10 planners should serve alternating tours with 10 assignments and with their basic branch or specialty to remain competitive U 10 planners should understand the basic principles associated with CNO EW and PSYOP and be capable of integrating their effects into Combatant Commander plans or orders -- U 10 planners should be fully educated and trained to understand the planning principles associated with OPSEC and military deception 33 U Recommendation Develop IO capability Specialists i U IO capability specialists are functional experts in one or more of the highly specialized core capabilities of CNO EW or PSYOP U 10 capability specialists should serve alternating tours between their specialized core capability and assignments as IO planners U 10 capability Specialists should possess specialized expertise on a certain 10 core capability but gain experience in the planning and execution of the broader construct of IO U 10 capability specialists should be fully educated and trained to understand the planning principles associated with OPSEC and military deception U Recommendation Identify joint and Service 10 billets i U should work with the Services STRATCOM and other joint commands to identify joint and Service IO billets that require 10 career force personnel Identification of these billets should drive Service manpower requirements for IO planners and 10 capability specialists U Billet identification through flag officer level is the first step to ensure IO planners and 10 capability specialists are assigned to the correct duty positions U Services should prioritize assignments to key 10 billets within Combatant Command and Service staffs U Recommendation Provide focus for enlisted and civilians I U While initial focus of the 10 Roadmap is on jump-starting the of cer career force should also extend 10 career force objectives to the enlisted and civilian domains U should create opportunities for the enlisted and civilian 10 career force specialties to focus on a particular subset of information skills requires a cadre of enlisted and civilian specialists that maintain proficiency with the guarantee of advancement and continued opportunity U Recommendation Monitor 10 career force compliance across I U should establish parameters to monitor accession retention and promotion rates for personnel in the 10 career force 34 2 Education and Training U U DPG Tusking U Services CJCS and Defense Agencies will make reconunendations on expanding 10 education and training including Joint Professional Military Education commencing in FY04 to support the development of IO professionals U Current Situation U 10 education does not support the assignment process Education and training for 10 is late to need for officers reporting to Combatant Commands All too often officers assigned to Combatant Commands lack necessary operational IO planning experience and must depend upon on-the-job training The general military pepulation lacks an understanding of 10 as well U Education to meet 10 career force requirements is not available 10 career force recommendations require a training and education infrastructure Currently DoD s education system can not meet these IO career force reconunendations U No standardized program of instruction to implement a shared view of IO Numerous schools offer 10 instruction but no accepted standardized curricula exists for joint 10 training or education No single school or organization has responsibility to oversee joint 10 curricula U No central database for 10 education or training A central database identifying all 10 courses either Service or joint does not exist Such a repository would minimize training costs by avoiding duplication and provide a common registry of course schedules and capacity A central database could also identify where potential shortfalls in courses exist as the 10 career force evolves U Desired Outcome U A robust joint and Service education and training infrastructure underpinning the 10 career force and general military population 10 education and training should focus not only on the specialized technical aspects of the five core capabilities but also should address integrated planning and employment as well U Recommendations Numbers 19 - 21 U Recommendation Integrate IO earlier in education U The general military population requires a deeper appreciation of IO Incorporating 10 into Professional Military Education and Joint Professional Military WHNOFORN 35 Education will expand knowledge across CJ CS should add IO to the joint learning areas that determine the content of joint military education U Standardized curricula should be implemented at mid grade 04 and senior level 05-06 schools Targeting this cross section of the general nnlitary population should produce the greatest impact U Joint learning areas for IO should be introduced into company grade 03 and ag levels 07 education I U Introductory instruction pertaining to 10 should be pushed down to junior officers and Flag officers require executive level education on IO as well U Recommendation Expand modify current IO training courses and or develop new ones W Although there are several valuable courses and training programs offered across oD there is little standardization Although the existing instruction may satisfy Service unique requirements it was developed prior to the 10 Roadmap with its construct and definition intended to move 10 forward as a core military competency The Joint Forces Staff College should be designated the lead to develop standardized joint IO curricula at mid and senior levels provides the Joint Forces Staff College over the FYDP with 8 additional military and civilian billets As the joint 10 curricula coordinator the Joint Forces Staff College should U Develop an expanded Joint IO Planners Course that will be a prerequisite for personnel assigned to the IO career force This course should establish a common level of understanding for 10 planner and 10 capability specialists U Collaborate with Service schools to integrate joint IO curricula into their education and make recommendations to the JCS concerning which Service courses serve as an approved substitute to the Joint IO Planners Course U Maintain a central database of all 10 education and training for both specialized and full-spectrum 10 courses to assist planning and make it web accessible The data should be integrated into the master joint course database maintained by FCOM for all joint individual training U Recommendation Establish a Center of Excellence for 10 U Transformation requires exploration of new techniques research and analysis of new concepts and an atmoSphere where new ideas can be investigated Historically centers of excellence have provided opportunities for rigorous examination of other transformational trends An 10 Center of Excellence will infuse the general military population with new ideas in a rapidly growing core competency 36 U The Naval Post-Graduate School NPGS is implementing this intent today but needs and should receive an official charter and funding from U The Deputy Secretary should officially designate NPGS as a Center of Excellence to I U Provide graduate level full-Spectrum 10 core and specialty programs - across the technical and dimensions I U Sponsor short courses for executive and professional development The 10 quarterly seminars previously conducted at the National Defense University should be funded I U DeveIOp curricular innovations for discussion and dissemination through joint 10 curricula conferences to U Enable institutions to share experiences and improve quality of instruction across the Department U Distribute state of the art 10 technologies and best practices to educators I U Provide assistance to joint doctrine deveIOpment and innovation through analysis and research U Monitor and analyze commercial technological developments SBCQEFHNOFORN 37 D Focused Analytic and Intelligence Support U U This major study area addresses analytic and intelligence support to 10 It includes recommendations to merge kinetic and non-kinetic analysis and makes the case for a single focal point to integrate and collate EW data 1 Analytic and Intelligence Support U U DPG Tasking U in coordination with the CJCS and Services should make recommendations to establish in FY04 an integrated IO support capability to Combatant Commanders that effectively characterize targets improves weaponeering and matures 10 measures of effectiveness U Current Situation NNeed for analytic support Combatant Command staffs lack organic capability to rapidly analyze complex systems and generate IO target sets They need support from a robust analytical center that combines multi-disci line anal sis ca ability with specifically tailored intelligence supporting 10 including Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments the 200010 Broad Area Review the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review as well as erational lessons learned in Kosovo and Afghanistan Combatant Command staffs can not currently produce rapid solutions for tailored 10 effects for the following reasons U Lack of sufficiently detailed intelligence data to support 10 planning U Lack of sufficient staff expertise Combatant Commanders do not have the trained manpower to conduct the analysis necessary for effective 10 planning h WMOFORN 38 U Desired Outcome U Rapid fully integrated nodal and network analysis providing Combatant Commanders with holistic kinetic and non-kinetic solutions for a full range of electromagnetic physical and human IO targets U Recommendations Numbers 22 - 26 U Recommendation Develop a program for intelligence support to full spectrum 10 U Intelligence is a fundamental prerequisite for full spectrum 10 The growth of 10 as a core competency is in some respects contingent upon the quality and timeliness of supporting intelligence should oversee the achievement of accurate and timely intelligence in support of the core IO capabilities to provide the access precision targeting and rapid battle assessment required for fully developed and integrated 10 Among other things the program should focus on U Timely multidisciplinary integrated targeting intelligence that allows commanders to choose the best combination of kinetic and non-kinetic options U Better depiction of the attitudes perceptions and decision-making processes of an adversary Understanding how and why adversaries make decisions will require improvements in Human Intelligence HUMINT and open source exploitation as well as improved analytic tools and methods U Timely accurate relevant and actionable EW intelligence that is integrated in a single source for rapid esploitation by operators U Greater investment in all types of intelligence to develop and maintain target network access in support of Combatant Commander CNA requirements Cultural change and new priorities will be required if the intelligence community is to make a commitment to exploitation of networks that may not yield much priority intelligence but which are critical targets in an operation plan U Greater attention to the ability of adversaries to read U S intentions and capabilities from poor OPSEC practices These analytic intelligence products would greatly assist efforts to improve OPSEC practices throughout the Combatant Commands SWIMOFORN 39 U Recommendation Provide dedicated support from a single analytic organization I U STRATCOM should create a Joint Integrative Analysis and Planning Capability JIAPC with and CJCS oversight that provides focused timely analysis planning and targeting in support of Combatant Commanders The IAPC constitutes an integrated network of analysis centers that properly managed could provide holistic analytic support to Combatant Commanders U JIAPC should provide rapid responsive analytic support Based on Combatant Commander needs JIAPC should provide I U Single point access to DoD s entire community of IO analytic experts I U Prioritization of requests for intelligence to ensure timely response to critical operational needs I U Integrated and mutually supporting analysis and planning in support of Combatant Commander effects-based operations U IAPC should provide seamless holistic target characterization JIAPC should present targeting options based on links-and-nodes analysis within and across the human electromagnetic and physical domains The focus of this effort should be an integrated IO concept that contributes to the broader plan JIAPC should prioritize the missions and integrate the capabilities of the following organizations based on Combatant Commander needs I U Electronic-Space and Human Factor Analysis Center HFAC To facilitate further growth in the analytic community STRATCOM should establish relationships with the E-Space Center and HFAC U STRATCOM in coordination with should develop memorandums of agreements with the DIRNSA regarding the E Space and the Director Defense Intelligence Agency on the HFAC I U Joint Warfare Analysis Center JWAC WAC should provide the Combatant Commands Joint Staff and other customers with effects based precision targeting options for selected networks and nodes I U Joint Information Operations Center JIOC Already assigned to STRATCOM the JIOC provides integrated IO planning support to Combatant Commanders IOC support teams should work with Combatant Commands to identify and shape analytic requirements U Recommendation Assign WAC to STRATCOM snag momma 40 U The 10 Roadmap recommendation was to assign WAC to STRATCOM This recommendation would give STRATCOM all the key elements in the 10 analytic support chain intelligence for battlespace characterization targeting and planning support It would better permit STRATCOM to support integrated effects-based targeting with consolidated kinetic nuclear and conventional and non-kinetic space and IO expertise to meet theater and national objectives U However the IW AC affects a wider range of capabilities than 10 For this reason during a March 2003 briefing on the IQ Roadmap the Secretary asked the CJ CS to work with STRATCOM and JFCOM and recommend the best solution for the full range of missions supported by WAC U Recommendation Enhance analytical capability over time with continual improvements in virtual collaboration PM Initially separate analytic centers at the DIA NSA and IW AC should operate virtually in a collaborative environment with STRATCOM providing overarching guidance Linking the centers virtually should maximize integration and minimize costs of physically co-locating the centers The provided STRATCOM across the FYDP to improve the virtual collaboration Should virtual integration prove inadequate should consider a physical co location U Recommendation Adopt a joint integrated planning capability U The Air Force currently Sponsors an 10 planning capability should expand the Air Force s Information Warfare Planning Capability IWPC into a standardized IO planning capability at the joint level This capability will serve as a suite of automated data analysis and decision support software tools designed to facilitate IO planning by Combatant Commanders It will enable users to U Accomplish intelligence preparation of the battle space U Develop IO strategy and candidate IO campaign targets - U Plan 10 missions U Monitor and assess execution 2 Electromagnetic-Space Analysis Center U U DPG Tasking U in coordination with the will develop direction for the Electromagnetic-Space E Space Analysis Center to provide analytic and technical 41 sang mom RN intelligence support to EW operational planning and advanced EA development programs U Current Situation I U Requirements The evolving IO mission area demands new and greater degrees of intelligence support in terms of collection processing analysis and dissemination I Shortfalls Current EW support processes do not always meet the needs of to ay s decision-makers or Combatant Commanders Shortcomings in actionable timel and accurate data sometimes serve to burden operational customers with an abundance of information I U Incomplete analysis of information or information at the wrong time or location is as problematic as a lack of information - EW and services to individual customers Adequate smart push and pull systems do not exist to disseminate the right data to the right customer at the right time I U Creation of an Electromagnetic-Space Analysis Center The E-Space Analysis Center was established at Fort Meade in August 2002 to fill this recognized void U Desired Outcome information on foreign electromagnetic ca abilities and networks QB-Space Analysis Center should produce operationally actionable targeting inality U Recommendations Numbers 27 - 28 U Recommendation E-Space Analysis Center should be DoD s focal point for intelligence support to EW i U should oversee the evolution of the E-Space Center to provide fQTimely accurate relevant and actionable EW intelligence that reaponds to EW user needs SWMOFORN 42 SWINOFORN U Necessary tools and collaborative mechanisms for easy access to and sharing of the data I U Reliable knowledge-based data mining techniques so that EW data is the best available to meet particular needs U Modeling and simulation capabilities to assist user s asset deployment and employment U Resident EW analytic capability to support a full range of user requirements including assistance in the resolution of data con icts U Recommendation E-Space Analysis Center should maintain an authoritative source of EW data U When fully developed the center should act as a single point of contact and the authoritative source for EW data to support operators planners and developers Improvements over the current EW environment include - U Enhanced customer access to a single portal for EW data This precludes sifting through a variety of voluminous and often conflicting data sources U A higher degree of assurance that requests for EW data are the most current and meet mission needs U Greater consistency in and understanding of EW capabilities from requirements through capability development and ultimately operational employment 43 WMOFORN E Enhancing IO Core Capabilities U U This major study area incorporates analysis and recommendations for the 10 core capability areas of CNO including separate discussions on CND and CNA as well as the current status and recommendations for improving EW PSYOP military deception and OPSEC 1 Computer Network Defense U U DPG Tuskiug I U DPG 04 identified three CND study areas U CND Integration USSPACECOM later STRATCOM in coordination with CJCS Services and Agencies will make recommendations on integrating detection protection analysis and response capabilities for CND across including vulnerability assessment programs U CND Attribution will coordinate with DISA NSA and USSPACECOM later STRATCOM to develop recommendations that apply resources to achieve the technical capability for rapidly characterizing and attributing the threat in support of CND U CND Insider Threat Mitigation Services and Agencies will counteract the insider threat by enforcing training and personnel standards and deploying the required tools on the information infrastructure to effectively monitor and manage the networks U Current Situation - I I Networks are growing faster than we can defend them - As a result greater vulnerability results from enterprise expansion Specifically SQ Unprotected networks surrender asymmetric advantage has focused attention on im roving the securit of its networks but the De artment s Attack sophistication is increasing The sophistication and capability of both hac ers and nation-states to degrade system and network operations are re idly increasing 44 WMOFORN Number of events is increasing The number of detected events on networks continues to grow while Q Exercises demonstrate our vulnerabilities Exercise ELIGIBLE RECEIVER 03 demonstrated iross vulnerabilities resulting from - - Latest tools are not available Near and long-term threats U Desired Outcome I U A robust layered defense across enhanced through global and enclave situational awareness with the centralized capability to rapidly characterize attribute and respond to attacks U Recommendations Numbers 29 - 34 U Recommendation should implement a Defense in Depth strategy I U This strategy should be based on the premise that the Department will fight the net as it would a weapons system U The strategy must be carefully constructed and managed to give senior leaders high confidence that additional investments in network defense will ensure the graceful degradation of the network rather than its collapse Like any real strategy it should take into account the limited resources and balance them against known risks U The strategy must embrace a concept of Operation that self consciously identifies and manages risk The starting assumption should be one of attrition that the networks will be degraded However the strategy should be s baqmororm 45 WMOFORN engineered to sustain required capabilities across the range of military operations with the goal of ensuring I U Sufficient protection of the information architecture to initiate combat operations in all circumstance and on preferred timelines harden I U Sufficient information architecture during con ict to defeat an adversary battle management I U The ability to quickly reconstitute information architecture to pre-con ict levels in order to restore readiness for the next con ict U The Defense in Depth strategy should include U Robust network defensive infrastructure including demilitarized zones insider threat protection and firewalls U Well-configured networks that slow down and channel the attacker U Vertical and horizontal situational awareness and configuration management to enable effective command and control of defensive operations U A CND concept of operations that allows for varied defensive postures consistent with minimum required functionality U The ability to conduct reconstitution operations that enable the infrastructure to absorb attacks minimize degradation and maintain critical network functionality - U Well-integrated efforts that permit us to maximize opportunities for CNA and minimize vulnerabilities in our CND efforts U Situational awareness and battle management tools to provide the capability for attack sensing and warning event correlation attribution and forensics U Other near-term recommendations to implement the Defense in Depth strategy include U Expand and standardize the vulnerability management and reporting capabilities U Develop and implement a cyber-event attribution capability to expand upon the current sis capability to achieve improved situational Coordinate with the and anal SE 46 Coordinate with the that mitigates DoD-wide risk while providing continued support to the operational mission U These capabilities result in reduced response times associated with detection and reSponse I U These capabilities also support rapid reconstitution of affected portions of the enterprise U Recommendation should develop a full-time well-trained professional cadre of certi ed system and security administrators U To keep pace with and protect the expanding network it is imperative to provide sufficient manpower and enforce education and training certification requirements U Ultimately however the Department should raise a dedicated force of network defenders separate from the system administrators System administrators will always tend to focus on day-to-day functionality rather than train and prepare for deliberate large-scale attacks that happen infrequently Therefore the Department should develop a plan for gradually raising up and integrating dedicated network defenders who will be able to respond immediately to limit and actively channel attacks U Recommendation Fully implement Public Key Infrastructure U Public Key Infrastructure PKI should be fully implemented on classified and unclassified networks PKI will add protection in the form of both authentication and access control on automated networks Additionally PKI -- U Allows only authorized personnel have access to the network U Complicates masquerading as another individual and increases the ability to track down insider threats U Helps force an adversary to target specific machines to obtain data instead of gaining network level access U Recommendation Review relationship to CND forces U STRATCOM can better integrate CND efforts if they have a defined command and control relationship with Services and Agencies Currently STRATCOM has Tactical Control of Service CND forces but not a formal relationship to the defense agencies STRATCOM in coordination with CS the Services and SWMOFORN 47 Defense Agencies should conduct a study and make recommendations to the Secretary by 1 December 2003 on improvements for CND command and control U Recommendation Incorporate CND recommendations in program reviews I U Remedial action to improve network protection in the manner described above should be given a high priority in subsequent program reviews U As the Department continues to move toward dependence on automated networks a balance should be struck between functionality and protection U Recommendation Develop supplemental guidance for DoD s CND response actions I U Recent CND policy established three tiers of reSponse actions with correSponding levels of approval authority The objective of this policy is to strengthen DoD s defensive posture halt or minimize attack effects or damage and support rapid complete attack characterization U The three tiers of authorized activity are U Tier 3 Local and intermediate commanders are authorized to take internal and administrative actions that do not extend outside the local enclave U Tier 2 STRATCOM and component conunanders are authorized to take actions that affect networks and CND operations across multiple networks I U Tier 1 STRATCOM is authorized to take defensive measures activities that may minimally and temporarily adversely affect adversary systems and may have a similar affect upon intermediate systems U STRATCOM should articulate supplemental guidance to identify and develop specific response actions and determine the appropriate range of those response actions within the hierarchy above 2 Computer Network Attack U U DPG Tasking SPACECOM later should to the CJCS recommendations to with measures of effectiveness that address collateral damage and probabilities of success 48 U Current Situation A comprehensive interagency process is underway to evaluate the use of offensive cyber tools and develop national policy in coordination with mom CJCS and Gc is uroviding DoD s in ut to develop the - i MUCP responsibility The UCPOZ Change 2 assigns STRATCOM respon31 ility for identifying desired capabilities and characteristics for CNA conducting CNA in support of assigned missions and integrating CNA capabilities in support of other Combatant Commanders as directed between the Combatant I NConfidence in CNA There is a Commander s ex ectations the and Current a proval authority Currently the intelligence gain loss arbitration and decon iction of operational CNA plans with the Intelligence Community I Q Intelligence support Combatant Commanders have urovided generic targett res rel uirements and desired effects and weapons development organizations to provide operational CNA capability Emloitation versus attack i SQ Prioritization does not adequately prioritize CNA requirements between Combatant Conunands U Desired Outcome I U Forces trained with well-tested and reliable CNA weapons that are aligned with appropriate target sets and integrated with other 10 capabilities and weapon systems U Recommendations Numbers 35 - 44 49 SEFHENNOFORN U Recommendation Develop national policy for offensive cyber operations i The 10 Roadma effort identified ke issues that should be addressed in the that is currently under deveIOpment SE U Employment policy issues I U Declaratory policy The USG should have a declaratory policy on the use of cyberspace for offensive cyber operations based on the following points I U Review of legal authorities 51 SWINOFORN I N A decision on when CNA constitutes a use of force is needed to clarify legal authorities both for using and responding to computer network attacks U A legal review should determine what level of data or operating system manipulation constitutes an attack This distinction is necessary to clarify which actions can be appropriately taken in self-defense and whether an action is an attack or an intelligence collection operation N requires a legal regime that responds separately to domestic and foreign sources of CNA A legal regime for handling the dif culty of distinguishing between domestic and foreign sources of attack in cyberspace is required It should capitalize on newly acquired authorities provided by the Patriot and Homeland Security Acts U Legal review should determine if appropriate authorities permit attack through unwitting hosts merely transitng or controlling the host in order to launch the attack if the action elicits an attack against the host computer system U Legal review should determine what level of certainty about the origin of an attack is required before the US can respond in kind - U Intelligence Support Requirements Greater integration of intelligence and operations and a major increase in priority for these activities is required U Recommendation Adopt a common understanding of the A battle eld I 50 CNA can be executed at the tactical theater or strategic levels Delineating these levels of CNA in cyberspace is difficult In some cases tactical means of access can enable strategic targeting and vice versa Nevertheless some general rules of the road concerning targets are possible 52 shag woman SQ At the strategic level targets include and sensitive targets national nuclear command and control etc that may have a high operational and or intelligence value 39 For most of these targets effective exploitation of these targets will require with a high standard of stealth characterized not only by non-attribution but also non-- - 230 but often assigned can facilitate theater In addition since the U Recommendation Assign combatant command COCOM of CNA forces to STRATCOM constitute small lockets of ex tertise embedded in The are closely aligned with and in many cases are SQSKETNNOFORN 53 Assigning them to Commander STRATCOM enables shaping and focusing these forces to better accomplish DoD s emerging joint CNA mission I to A COCOM relationship allows STRATCOM to conduct real-time planning integration and execution of trans regional CNA It also facilitates ability to mold this capability by standardizing joint training designating objectives specifying lanes in the roads for Service components and effectively organizing to better plan and execute CNA as a supporting or supported command i Recommendation STRATCOM should develop a robust that I 5 Commander STRATCOM is creating a subordinate Joint Force Headquarters- Information Operations JFHQ-IO led by the Deputy Commander STRATCOM with subordinate components to be assigned attack planning integration coordination deconfliction and execution functions for CNA I So should prepare a memorandum for the Secretary assigning authority to plan integrate and when directed With this memorandum E Capitalize on to facilitate the planning and integration of CNA - CS between the and Secure necessary assistance from the to conduct - on those equirements identified by the Combatant Commanders and prioritized by I N Commander STRATCOM should establish a staff element to carry out This staff should combine personnel from provides over the FYDP to integrate intelligence capabilities into CNA mission 54 - in With COCOM of Service CNA forces Commander STRATCQM could delegate Operational control to his subordinate commands ii These arrangements provide unity of effort and allow for the who have been responsible for exploiting a particular target in peacetime--or working side by side doing so--to attack targets with high confidence of success when directed by Commander STRATCOM a Recommendation Use the relationship to deeont lict should use should provide recommendations on SO I x on those CNA requirements identified by the Combatant Commanders and prioritized by STRATCOM Specifically he should coordinate CNA intelligence taskings access development and research and development to support attainment of desired affects and capabilities STRATCOM should use its relationship with 55 -- R1 and the should develop a decon iction memorandum of agreement As the Department improves its ability to as a core 10 ca ability should fully leverage H while balancing intelligence and erational equities in coordination with should work with the and develop policy and procedures to I Coordinate and operating concepts - cs Ensure see presses requires targets Q Enhance and collaboration on capabilities Q Appoint the - as the focal point for the d under STRATCOM sponsorship to coordinate efforts U Recommendation Delegate speci c CNA targets to Combatant Commanders I @111 coordination with Commander STRATCOM and on a roval the Secretary the CJCS should modify the as follows Once the has a roved militar erations should have to facilitate rapid response and provide additional strike options i e Q In addition Combatant Commanders are encouraged to submit re-uests for necific other CNA targets not included in these categories U Recommendation Categorize and delegate selected CNA weapons I DIRNSA as the Executive Agent for the should engage IOTC to apply its technical ex ertise to make recommendations to STRATCOM on the categorization of STRATCOM should then forward recommendations through the CJCS to OSD to support weapon apportionment and allocation recommendations - should direct IOTC to use the following criteria to categorize CNA weapons 4s U From these criteria STRATCOM should recommend that weapons be grouped into one the following categories I U Category I Capabilities allocated to a Combatant Commander I U Category II Capabilities pare-allocated to support a specific aspect of an operations plan OPLAN or contingency plan CONPLAN I U Category Capabilities not allocated to Combatant Commanders and therefore requiring Secretary or Presidential approval to employ - QThe necessary visibilit to determine whether and should be ensured the U Recommendation Develop an integrated network of IO and CNA ranges 57 SE U STRATCOM in coordination with OSD and the Services should oversee deveIOprnent of an integrated network of ranges that test emerging IO capabilities I U requires an integrated test range to increase confidence and better assure predictable outcomes The test range should support exercises testing and development of CNA EW and other IO capabilities II U Funds were allocated to STRATCOM as part of to lay the foundation for funding this integrated network in FY05 U Recommendation Establish assurance testing standards I U Although each Service has a CNA acquisition process there are no well-defined CNA assurance standards should develop common standards for technical testing and evaluation U DIRNSA as Executive Agent for the Information Operations Technology Center IOTC should engage the IOTC to employ its technical expertise in developing and applying assurance standards for validation and promulgation in conjunction with the Directorate of Operational Testing and Evaluation The and should be ensured the necessary visibility to determine whether CNA tools have gone through assurance testing and been categorized as potential weapons U Services should apply these assurance standards as they conduct operational testing evaluations U Recommendation Assign STRATCOM executive agency for joint CNA I U As executive agent STRATCOM should serve as the primary point of contact and proponent for joint CNA doctrine training and equipment and should lead coordinate and integrate the activities of the other Components on such matters U STRATCOM should develop and promulgate joint tactics techniques and procedures for CNA and coordinate the training of CNA forces U STRATCOM should maintain visibility on all CNA and related programs to minimize duplication of effort U STRATCOM should be the focal point for CNA requirements in To do this STRATCOM should assist Combatant Commanders in identifying requirements then prioritize these requirements across each area of operations 53 SEEREQNOFORN 3 Electronic Warfare U U DPG Tasking U DPG 04 tasked in coordination with the CJCS and Services to develop recommendations to transform and extend EW capabilities including the 6B follow-on to detect locate and attack the full spectrum of globally emerging telecommunications equipment situation awareness sensors and weapons engagement technologies operating within the electromagnetic Spectrum U Current Situation I U Lessons not learned A number of studies over the past several years including Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments IW CA and the Airborne EA Analysis of Alternatives Study reached the following conclusions with respect to current EW capabilities with disproportionate emphasis on the Suppression of Enemy Air Defense mission U No central investment strategy lacks a coherent EW vision EW enhancements are largely service specific with decentralized development efforts and operations Current rograms do not address low urobabilit of capabilities agile and spread-spectrum waveforms and advanced networking U While some of these concepts are not yet widely fielded EW concepts and technologies should be developed today to successfully counter them in future operations WINOFORN 59 SEC U Investment in EW may provide alternative options for protecting and attacking potential targets by costly or unsuitable kinetic capabilities Examples include the non-kinetic disruption of WMD facilities and disabling disruption of missiles prior to launch I Q EW net assessment Although afforded only a cursory review of classi ed programs the following assessment of current EW programs is not generally disputed R Current EW capabilities largely focus on electronic protection and the Suppression of Enemy Air Defense mission Q There is no effective joint advocacy or planning for EW R Future EW systems will need to be flexible enough to counter the rapid development and fielding and likely proliferation of inexpensive weapon systems founded on sophisticated technologies K Future capabilities should contain modular systems with conunon technology hardware and software on multiple platforms and common technical requirements that can be updated rapidly through technical or intelligence efforts U Desired Outcome I U Achieve Dial an Option Electronic Attack capabilities that deny adversary situational awareness disrupt command and control and develop targeting solutions to defeat weapons while protecting ours against the same U Recommendations Numbers 45 - 46 60 SE U Recommendation Formally establish and charter an EW Executive Steering Group i U should chair an EW Executive Steering Group that includes senior representation from Joint Staff Services and STRATCOM The Executive Steering Group should be empowered to develop and implement a coherent multi-Service EW investment strategy based on a comprehensive joint EW operational architecture that supports a concept of Operations for integrated 10 The EW architecture and investment strategy should U Cover the full range of EW missions and capabilities including navigation warfare offensive counterspace control of adversary radio frequency systems that provide location and identification of friend and foe etc U Provide a future EW capability sufficient to provide maximum control of the entire electromagnetic spectrum denying degrading disrupting or destroying the full spectrum of globally emerging communication systems sensors and weapons systems dependant on the electromagnetic spectrum i U The steering group should oversee development of both the EW operational architecture and the supporting investment strategy To execute this mandate the Executive Steering Group should U Have oversight of all EW programs including special access and compartmented programs - U Have direct linkage and interaction with Combatant Commands on EW concepts of operation and capability needs I U A subordinate EW Integrated Process Team IPT should report to the Executive Steering Group and have the primary objective of developing the comprehensive EW roadrnap as described below U Recommendation Develop an EW roadmap i U To fulfill the mandate assigned to the Executive Steering Group the EW Roadmap should U Provide an EW architecture that I U Controls the electromagnetic spectrum with integrated but decentralized execution I U Functions across service and platform boundaries SWOFORN 61 I U Acts across the full range of the electromagnetic spectrum I U Is distributed and scalable to operations I U Delivers timely information and knowledge of environment in compatible formats U Develop a coherent and comprehensive EW investment strategy for the architecture that I U Identifies capability shortfalls and accelerates high-payoff emerging technologies I U Pays particular attention to U Projecting electronic attack into denied areas by means of stealthy platforms I U As a matter of priority accelerates joint development of modular EW payloads for the Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle U Provide for common affordable active and passive countermeasures I U As a matter of priority provide effective countermeasures for non- fixed wing aviation consistent with the recommendations of the Non- Fixed Wing Aviation Study directed by I U Exploits other transformational EW initiatives including'use of the E- Space Analysis Center to correlate and fuse all available data that creates a real time electronic battlespace picture - U Develop options for improving operator access to classified EW programs and make recommendations on whether changes are required in policies and procedures for delegation of authority to apportion allocate and use classified EW capabilities 4 Operations U U DPG Tasking i U DPG 04 tasked USSOCOM to provide in coordination with the CJCS and the Services options and recommendations to enhance the current PSYOP force structure modernize PSYOP capabilities and create a strategic PSYOP force U Current Situation SE 62 SWINOFORN QDegradation of capabilitv Over the last decade numerous studies have documented the deterioration of the PSYOP capabilities and recommended remedial action Although not officially categorized as such PSYOP has long been recognized as a low-density high-demand asset which is particularly valued in the war on terrorism Well documented PSYOP limitations include U Inability to rapidly generate and immediately disseminate sophisticated commercial-quality products targeted against diverse audiences U Insufficient numbers of experienced fully qualified and well equipped PSYOP personnel with diverse linguistic capabilities NLimited ability to disseminate PSYOP products into denied areas I U Lea ets handbills AM radio and Commando Solo have a limited range and or are resource intensive U Desired Outcome U A PSYOP force ready to conduct sophisticated target-audience analysis and modify behavior with multi-media PSYOP campaigns featuring commercial-quality products that can be rapidly disseminated throughout the Combatant Conunanders area of operations U Recommendations Numbers 47 - 51 U Recommendation Coordinate and USG themes and messages U OSD oversight of PSYOP should include the requirement to ensure PSYOP messages are congruent with national themes and objectives U Recommendation Create a Joint PSYOP Support Element NDPG 04 directed the creation of a strategic PSYOP unit The title of this unit was changed to re ect IO Roadmap recommendations on the prOper relationship of PSYOP to public diplomacy and public affairs see previous section on this topic However the intent remains the same which is that the Joint PSYOP Support Element should SQCoordinate Combatant Command programs and products with the Joint Staff and OSD to ensure PSYOP integration with overall USG themes and messages SQ Rapidly develop commercial-quality prototypes on behalf of the Combatant Commanders and the Secretary 63 I U Contract for commercial sources for enhanced product development I U Determine appropriate subject matter experts as proxies for target audiences to pre-test anticipated effects whenever possible I authorizes $48 million across the FYDP to the Joint PSYOP Support Element with 15 civilian funded Spaces in FY04 and 55 military billets commencing in FY05 U Recommendation Delegate product approval for select categories of PSYOP products I U should retain PSYOP program approval authority Product approval for the following categories should be delegated to Combatant Commanders U Products that support friendly force protection U Products associated with safety or mine awareness I U should retain product approval authority for those products with substantial political or strategic content or implication This responsibility requires dedicated staff and clear procedures in order to avoid costly delays in the approval process U Once an operation is underway should delegate approval authority to Combatant Commanders for additional products and modifications of pre- approved products U Recommendation Enhance the current PSYOP force structure i U The IO Roadmap endorses the SOCOM and the Army expansion efforts that are already underway U Expansion provides two additional active component regional PSYOP companies within the 4th PSYOP Group one to support CENTCOM FY05 and a second to support PACOM FY06 It also activates four additional reserve component regional companies FY05 - m provided for the required procurement military construction and operations and maintenance funding to create these units I U These increases will enable the Army PSYOP force structure to have multi-component battalions 2 it active and 1 reserve companies focused on each regional Combatant Commander s area of operations -- SOUTHCOM EUCOM PACOM and CENTCOM U Recommendation Modernize PSYOP force capabilities 64 U PSYOP equipment capabilities require 2lst Century technology This modernization would permit the long-range dissemination of PSYOP messages via new information venues such as satellites the Internet personal digital assistants and cell phones -- U PSYOP ACTD Commencing in FY04 SOCOM initiates an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration ACTD to address dissemination of PSYOP products into denied areas The ACTD should examine a range of technologies including a network of unmanned aerial vehicles and miniaturized scatterable public address systems for satellite rebroadcast in denied areas It should also consider various message delivery systems to include satellite radio and television cellular phones and other wireless devices and the Internet PSYOP recapitalization provided funding across the FYDP to modernize the family of loudspeakers and acquire and improve lea et delivery systems This includes wind-supported air delivery systems and precision guided canister bombs Loudspeakers will incorporate technologies that improve range battery life and remote capability These systems are integral PSYOP capabilities and improvement facilitates PSYOP mission accomplishment W PSYOP Broadcast System POBS the acquisition of the first of two required POBS sets to enhance PSYOP dissemination capability This additional capability provides five receive and transmit and five receive only systems that will enable better communication between PSYOP forces and allows for the distribution and dissemination of PSYOP products from Ft Bragg NC to additional locations 5 Operations Security U U DPG Tusking U in coordination with CS will establish training objectives in OPSEC to include Red Teaming Components will ensure they provide training in OPSEC and have sufficient Red Team capabilities in both numbers and expertise to assess continually the full spectrum of vulnerabilities and the effectiveness of both offensive and defensive measures designed to thwart adversary attack exploitation attempts by technical physical and human means U Current Situation I Mission critical information compromised Numerous OPSEC violations across have occurred within the last five years The potential harm of these violations SWNNOFORN 65 represents a serious threat to our security and may provide potential adversaries with critical information to attack our vulnerabilities The Interagency OP EC Support Staff IOSS located at Fort Meade consists of 19 ersonne and is the only dedicated element to support the use i Red Teaming policy and doctrine Along with the need for review and update of overall OPSEC policy there is no policy on Red Teaming Inadequate training Although there are several institutions that offer instruction in OPSEC training is not standardized and will not meet the IQ career force or training and education goals recommended in the 10 Roadmap U Desired Outcome U All plans are built and operations executed with priority attention to operations security U Recommendations Numbers 52 - 55 U Recommendation Enhance OPSEC support U The 10 Roadmap recommended and funded the creation of an OPSEC Support Element at STRATCOM in FY04 In line with this recommendation UCP02 also tasked STRATCOM to support other Combatant Commanders for the planning and integration of joint OPSEC U Recommendation Revise OPSEC policy and doctrine U All OPSEC doctrine across should be revised A task force led by OSD STRATCOM and JCS with service command and agency representatives has been formed to accomplish this task U OPSEC training objectives were developed and should be incorporated into OPSEC policy and doctrine revisions SWNNOFORN 1 66 -- U Each component should revise their OPSEC policy and doctrine publications and reflect CS guidance not later than one year from the publication of the new Directive and the JCS Publication U OSD and Joint Staff should work with the NSC and other departments and agencies to revise USG policy U Recommendation Institute vulnerability assessments Blue Red Teaming U Blue Team OPSEC assessments should be conducted to assist Combatant Commanders in evaluating their security profile and to prepare them for Red Team EVBIHS U Red Team OPSEC assessments should be conducted to determine the adequacy of the execution of OPSEC plans programs tactics techniques and procedures Red Team OPSEC assessments should identify OPSEC problems and serve as the basis for corrective actions U Recommendation Provide command emphasis U OSD STRATCOM and JCS should promote command emphasis by keeping OPSEC processes visible in preparing and disseminating periodic reminders from leadership and implementation of training objectives U Emphasis should also come by ensuring a InSpector General review of OPSEC is conducted throughout the Department in FY04 U STRATCOM should provide a robust OPSEC management oversight program for the Combatant Commanders 6 Military Deception U U DPG asking U No tasking exists however 10 Roadmap participants unanimously agreed that military deception should be one of the five core capabilities of 10 required to achieve the three broad 10 functions Therefore the 10 Roadmap also considered how to improve military deception as a critical component of integrated IO U Current Situation U The value of military deception like OPSEC is intuitive Less apparent is the reality that effective military deception requires centralized planning security and close integration with operational planning 67 - ENE Classification of that full integration is difficult to achieve I U Service research and development centers focus largely on tools and capabilities that provide tactical advantage I U Military deception is taught in Service and joint schools but instruction is Service specific and not presented as an integrated part of IO U Desired Outcome It U All plans are built and Operations executed with military deception considered a core capability in an integrated approach to information operations U Recommendations Numbers 56 5 7 U Recommendation Establish advocacy for military deception to ensure its integration in 10 P9110 STRATCOM should be the advocate for military deception and ensure that it is integrated in all of its 10 activities As noted in the section on Effective Command and Control and Supporting Organizations UCP 02 Change 2 provides STRATCOM with the authority to execute this recommendation NRecommendation Review management of military deception I U STRATCOM in concert with the CJ CS and in light of Title responsibilities for oversight of plans should conduct an assessment and make recommendations to the Secretary to - QCIarify the role authorities and boundaries for the execution of military deception Determine how military deception could be better integrated into plans IR Enhance traditional military deception methods by fully exploiting emerging technologies U NOTE The full implementation of the in the 10 Roadmap sections on Policies and Procedures Career Force and Training and Education will further serve to advance military deception as a core 10 capability WINOFORN 68 69 SWINOFORN endix A Timeline U I NSPD 16 I Deiegatien I Respense Pnliey I Lanes in Read Pnlieies and Prneedura Centrnis I EDDIDCI MBA I Del IO Directive USDI Ell Organizatiens CMD IDC IRenrganize BSD fer ID ID CMD F c STRATCUH SEC DEF JWAC sraaretni I An lyim i STRATEGM I JIAPC IOC I Planins 'Cili-Iatiililiir Suppert HFAC Expmi n STRATCDM imsraarensi DJAFSTRATCDM Carm- Farm Df ser Identi ed - Enlisted a Civilian Program Developed - Mnniter Cemplianee seasieesieies tisnipaai Training and ID JPME Develnp J int ID I I i0 Graduate Center at Edueatiein Expmd d Planners Ceurse My CJCS HDU Defense I Aeeredit Serviee 10 Insnuetinn HDU I ACTD Denied Area - - - PSYOP I Aetnrate AC I Expand 11th Cnmpany Sinieture'It Reeapitiliaatinn Cnmpanjes Activated Annyi'SDtl DM SDCUH Cnmputgr CNA Ageney Attaek CNA C2 STRATCDM CNA Weapeniaatinn I CNA Test Range Study I s-raarensi inreinnras OPSEC DPSEC Emphasis GPSEC Slippert Eitl E l STRATCDM I- I'll Eieetrnnie Warfare I Create ESG fer EW EW investment Strategyi 0 3 FY 04 0mm FY 05 Inc as FY 06 Dc ii Indicates Cti' 'iIF aernss FYDF 1 SE Description Publish IO policy 20 Adopt a full spectrum concept of 10 built upon three broad functions and-five core capabilities 20 Approve a definition of 10 based upon the full specmiin concept 22 Delegate selected execution autho11_y to Combatant Commanders 23 Improve visibility_ and_a1 1 ountability of IO _1esources 24 32 33 34 endix IO Roadma Recommendations U Description should develop a full- time well- trained professional cadre of certi ed system and security administrators 47 Fully implement Public Key Infrastructure 47 Review 3 relationship to CND forces 47 Incorporate CND recommendations 1n program reviews 43 Develop supplemental guidance for DoD's CND response actions 43 2 3 6 7 9 Enhance and refocus PSYOP capability 26 Improve militarmppor t to public diplo_macL p 27 Support active public affairs programs that in uence foreign audiences 27 Develop distinguishing tasks p 27 35 36 37 38 Develop national policy for offensive _gber operations 50 Adopt a common understanding of the battlefield 52 _Assi_n combatant command of CNA forces to STRATCOM 1 53 10 11 12 13 14f 15 16 17 13 19 2o 21- 22 23 Empower STRATCOM to undertake critical precursor activities for successful __IQplanning and execution 30 Streamline organizational constructs and C2_ p 31 Consolidate CISD Oversight of 10 p 31 Establish an 10 career force 33 Develop IO planners Develop IO capability Specialists 34 Identifijoint and Service IO billets 34 Provide focus for enlisted and civilians 34 Monitor career force compliance across 34 Integrate IO earlier in education 35 Espandfmodifpcunent 9 training courses andfor develop new ones W36 Establish a Cen_te1 of Eacellence for ID 36 Develop ap gram for intelligence support tofull Spectrum 3W9 Provide dedicated support from a _single analytic organization 40 39 40 41 42 44 45 46 43 49 50 51 52 _Coordinate and USG themes and messages 63 _ Delegate speci c CNA targets to_ Combatant Commanders 65 Categorize and delegate selected CNA weapons 57 _Develop an integrated network of IO and CNA ranges Establish assurance testing standards 58 Assign STRATCOM executive agency for joint CNA 53 Formally establish and charter an EW ExecutiveSteering Grouup 6Q Develop an EW roadmap 61 Create a Joint PSXOP Support Element 63 Delegate product approval for select categories of PSYOP products 64 Enhance the _c111rent force structure 64 Modernize PSYCIP force capabilities p 64 Enhance OPSEC support 66 24 25 26 27 Assign JWAC to STRATCOM 40 Enhance analytical capability over time with continual improvements in virtual _collaboration 41 Adopt a joint integrated planning tool 41 E- -Space Analysis Center should be focal point for intei support to EW 42 53 54 55 56 Revise OPSEC policy and doctrine 66 Institute vulnerability assessments BluefRed Teaming 66 Provide_comman__1l emphasis p 6'1 Establish advocacy for military deception 63 2s 29 70 S_pace Analysis Center should maintain authoritativeEW data 43 should implement a Defense in Depth strategy 45 57 Review and assess management of military deception 68 SWIMOFORN Strategic Operational Tactical - Brekering press availability fer Appendix C r Distinguishing Tasks U I site s senier leaders speeches interviews etc - Ineculatiens Preemptive glebal cemmunicatiens te demenstrate past behavier er spetlight transgressions - Rapid Respenser'l ruth Squads and Briefings Plus - Humanitarian read shews - Media embeds - Of cial press releases and maintenance ef everseas infermatien web sites i - Demestic epinien pieces and editerials by senier efficials - Tewn Hall meetings by Ce mbatant Cemrnanders - Pesitien papers te militaryr and civilian leaders in AOR - News releases - Press cenferences - Jeint Infermatien Bureaus - Armed Ferces Radie and Televisien - Tewn Hall meetings in a tactical - Press cenferences - News releases te lecal fereign media - Cembat Camera preducts en I events net accessible te news media - cemmander s area ef eperatiens fibril sin a are Fi iiajzz 13W iil'mi i - - Centent ef speeches er OPIED pieces by senier ef cials te fereign audiences - Centent ef pubs prejected fer trans-regienal audiences - Talking peints fer private exchanges with fereign leaders Guidance te Defense Attaches en themes and messages fer fereign militaries - suppert te ether agency infermatien activities e g VOA - - Presentatiens and brie ngs cencerning pelicy e Defense attache presentatien te fereign military audiences - Overt disseminatien ef USG pelicy e g Asia- Pacific Ferum - Oversee Regienal Centers SEWOFORN _Luu Shear-attune- - - - RadiefI VfPrintheb media designed te directly medify r behavier and distributed in theater supperting military endeavers in semi er nen- permissive envirenment - When called upen suppert te theater public diplemacy - advisers te assist friendly ferces in develeping PSYOP pre grams - Fereign language preducts disseminated in suppert ef lecal cemmanders in ma- er semi-permissive areas - Tactical applicatien ef leudspeakers print and media disseminatien te a lecal adversarial public er cembatants - When called upen suppert te lecal public affairs activities 71 ACTD C2 CJ CS CMO CNA CND CNE CNO COCOM CONPLAN DASD DDIO DIA DIRNSA DPG EA EP EW FYDP HFAC HUMINT IADS IC IO IOSS IOTC ISR JFHQ-IO IAPC IOC JPOTF JW AC MIST SA NSC SE Appendix D I Glossary U Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration Assistant Secretary of Defense Command Control Communications and Intelligence Assistant Secretary of Defense Networks and Information Integration Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Conunand and Control Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Civil-Military Operations Computer Network Attack Computer Network Defense Computer Network Exploitation Computer Network Operations Combatant Command Contingency Plan Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Deputy Director for Information Operations Defense Intelligence Agency Director National Security Agency Defense Planning Guidance Department of Defense Directorate of Operation Testing and Evaluation Electronic Attack Electronic Protect Electronic Warfare Future Years Defense Plan Human Factors Analysis Center Human Intelligence Integrated Air Defense Systems Intelligence Community Information Operations Interagency OPSEC Support Staff Information Operations Technology Center Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Joint Force Headquarters for Information Operations Joint Integrative Analysis and Planning Center Joint Information Operations Center Joint PSYOP Task Force Joint Warfare Analysis Center Military Information Support Team National Security Agency National Security Council SWOFORN 72 OPCON OPLAN OPSEC OSD PA PD PDM PE PKI POBS PSYOP SAP SEAD SCADA SCE SOCOM SPACECOM SROE STRATCOM UCAV UCP USG WMD SE Operational Control Operations Plan Operations Security Office of the Secretary of Defense Public Affairs Public Diplomacy Program Decision Memorandum Program Element Public Key Infrastructure PSYOP Broadcast System Operations Special Access Program Suppression of Enemy Air Defense Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Service Element Special Operations Command Space Command Standing Rules of Engagement Strategic Command Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle Unified Command Plan Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Under Secretary of Defense for Policy United States Government 4 Weapons of Mass Destruction 73 SE PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu