INCOMING TELEGRAM 0 t-- ACTION BROWN PEDERSEN INFO A-B-C-E I i IInllllb-l l 1 9IMUNICAfI8IS UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS o' ' E 'r i t v J-L C ' A'ctlOft SECRET lo t I SECTION ' -i R ' P N ' pt' Control 6242 ' F11ed Wash 8 00 PM Oct 24 1958 Rec'd N Y 12 46 AM Oct 25 1958 FROM SECSTATE TO USUN NO QADEL 67 October 24 8 P M PRIORITY 2 9 Re DELGA 250 In deal1ng w1th Ir1sh proposals USDEL may draw on follow1ng po1nts 1 US shares bas1c object1ves Ir1sh proposals We are opposed uncontrolled spread nuclear weapons tor very reasons Ir1sh c1te and th1s remains cardinal object1ve US d1sarmament po11cy US laws are express10n th1s policy 1n that they proh1bit transfer custody nuclear weapons to others 2 US d1sarmament proposals which contemplate world-w1de cessat10n production ot f1ss1onable materials tor weapons purposes would lead to d1rect achievement results Ir1sh seek Th1s is a measure wh1ch we believe is tully controllable and only Sov1et pos1t1on has prevented progress toward this objective 3 Bas1c quest10n for US 1s context 1n which th1s obJect1ve should be ach1eved and how control such measures would be ensured US cannot accept any obligat1ons observance ot which cannot be ver1t1ed and Irish proposals partake ot th1s detect 4 Equally important cons1derat10n 1s that restr1ct10ns on ab1lity to develop and deploy nuclear weapons must be part ot 1ntegrated attack on entire armament problem unless causes which impell states take steps improve their detenses are m1t1gated they must be lett tree to develop arrangements they cons1der necessary tor the1r own secur1ty A QA act10n forb1dding transfer weapons absolutely betore any other d1sarmament measures agreed and as isolated step would not be observed by states when facing overwhelming conSiderations national tit SECRET I DECLASSIFIED Au'hori'Y D711l is ACTION C Qj Y oro_ SECRET -2- USUN 6242 nat10nal secur1ty Our objective is to prov1de context 1n wh1ch states can make this undertak1ng and know that 1ts observance can be assured w1thout jeopardiz1ng their own aa1'ety Th1s can be accomp11 s h ed as part of conoerted action which lim1ts power ot aggressor to enforce his will on others and not simply abi11ty ot defender to take steps he deems necesS8r Y for his protection 5 It these principles correct creation of ad hoc oommittee to study problem would be 1n effect to examine entire d1sarmament problem This properly function of DC 6 Department believes that language author1zed last paragraph QADEL 39 on subject matter of Irish resolution may prove useful particularly in the 11ght or the foregoing Pollow1ng for your baokground is further reason which cannot of course be used publicly why US cannot subsor1be to Irish resolution We are working out arrangements with our NATO l11es for storage of nuclear weapons in NATO area for use by torces or other NATO countries in time of war This program is in implementation ot publicly announced NATO heads of government decision December 1957 to establish stocks of nuclear warheads which will be readily available tor defense or Atlantic al11ance in cue or need US retains custody ot nuclear warheads under this program as required by US law and hence we are not contr1buting to spread of nuclear weapons However we would be vulnerable to attaoks that we are in fact contributing to spread of nuolear weapons through NATO atomic stockpile program Such attacks would ignore fact that US retains oustody FYI End FYI DULLES 'GADEL 39 1s USUN 5581 SECJtBT I EC LASS l f IEI AUlhorilY 07 ZJl JS ----- This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu