WC-er w u m u_ ma JWH SECTION I - TEE POLICY INTRODUCTION- Throughout its history the foreign policy of the Soviet Union has been based on suspicion and mistrust The Soviet leaders have considered the Soviet Union as an island surrounded by capitalist enemies While in the early days of the Soviet regime it was recognized that collaboration with 3apitalist countries might be advisable on occasion this was to be resorted to solely for the achievement of Soviet objectives and did not in any way imply the abandonment of the eventual aim of the overthrowing of capitalist regimes Stalin's decision to build socialism in one country brought about at least in theory the abandonment of the aim of world revolution Capitalist countries however were still considered as enemies and as recently as 1957 Stalin himeelf declared Capitalist encirclement- that is not an empty phrase it is a very real and disagreeable phenomenon The events of the past few years have doubtless done much to persuade Soviet leaders that collaboration with capitalist countries is possible but there have been too many reverses in Soviet relations with other countries for the Soviets readily to bring themselves to think in terms of lasting friendly relations with other countries I This attitude of considering other countries as enemies explains many of the conduct of foreign relations The habitsAformed in the conduct of affairs on this basis over a long period of 'years are difficult to change no matter how much the aims of Soviet policy may have deve10ped The Writ Ira-6 u u- v-dr Wows Lo sun A u aha-b The Soviet Union has always had two foreign policies one actual the other professed The two do not always coincide Let us examine first the declared or professed Soviet foreign policy DECLARED DECLARED FOREIGN POLICY 3 General Principles As in the case of other countries the declared Soviet foreign policy embraces the advocacy of certain general principles as well as the achievement of specific objectives - - The difference between the Soviet Union and other vsetwetherestatases' countries in respect to the general principles they advocate lies in the fact that in the case of states such as Great Britain and more particularly the United States their own self-interest will be served by the establishment and maintenance of these general principles They are thus in themselves actual objectives of our policy and we will on occasion sacrifice more specific objectives to further them It is true that on oecasion we have deviated from or broken the principles we have advocated but in general they constitute sincere objec- tives of our policy The Soviet Union on the other hand has professed to advocate policies such as freedom of the press freedom of religion non interference in the affairs of other states etc in which it often not only had no vital interest but to which in some cases it was actually opposed There are a number of factors which contribute to or explain this hypocrisy Such a practice naturally flows from a concept of foreign relations as ah in to war It is necessary deliberately to conceal one's intentions from the enemy But there are other factors contributing to this practice One is the the need of Soviet propaganda for a set of simple gen- eral principles for which support can be obtained not only from the mass of the Soviet pe0ple with their different nationality economic and geographic interests but also from communist or other pro-Soviet groups abroad Finally it may'be mentioned that the Sovht leaders have recognized to some extent that failure to paypat least lip service to certain widely held be e s gw%uld a cause undue difficulties for Soviet As examples of general principles advocated by the Soviet Union may be mentioned Soviet adherence to the Atlantic Charter the Declaration of United Nations and the Declaration of the Moscow Conference ieiy Soviet statement of this nature was contained in Marshal Stalin's speech on November 7 1945 when he said The victory of the Allied countries over Hitlerite Germany will put on the agenda important questions of organizing and rebuilding the state economic and cultural life of the EurOpean peoples The policy of our Govern- ment in these questions remains unchanging Together with our Allies we shall have to liberate the peOples of Europe from the fascist invaders and help them to rebuild their national states dismembered by the fascist enslavers--the peoples of France Belgium Yugoslavia Czechoslovakia Poland Greece and the other states now under German yoke must again become free and independent grant the liberated peoples of Europe the full right and freedom to decide for themselves the question of their form of government - take measures that all fascist criminals respon- sible for this war and the sufferings of the peoples bear stern punishment and retribution for all the crimes they they committed no matter in what country they may hide establish such an order in Europe as will com- pletely preclude the possibility of new aggression on the art of Germany p 5 establish lasting economic political and cultural collaboration among the peoples of Europe based on mutual confidence and mutual assistance for the purpose of rehabilitating the economic and cultural life destroyed by the Germans 9 Specific Objectives gr f r So far as Specific objectives are concerned Soviet policy is dynamic It is constantly striving to achieve a set of clearly defined objectives As these are accom- plished or become absolete they are replaced by new ones Soviet foreign relations seem never to be in equilibrium There is a similarity between this technique and that employed by Hitler befoz the present war He was con- tinually making one last demand on the basis that once this concession was made Germany would settle down to friendly relations with other states The comparison' is perhaps unfair but the technique is much the same The question of the Baltic states and Finland the second front campaign the Polish question come to mind in this connection Obviously many of these de- clared objectives are actual Soviet objectives but it will be recalled that in the case of the Baltic states for instance incorporation into the Soviet Union was not mentioned until Soviet trOOps were already in control of thoSe countries ACTUAL SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY 3 General Principles The secrecy and mystery that surrounds Soviet I foreign policy makes it extremely difficult to Judge what Soviet policy is at any given time It is only by examining the events of the past that it is possible to see the thread that connected the various Soviet moves in the field of foreign relations Certain general objectives of foreign policy are common to all countries including the Soviet Union Among these may be mentioned security economic stability etc Apart from such objectives which are so broad as to be almost meaningless it would appear that Soviet policy is based more on concrete and specific objectives than on general principles Policies such as the support of colleCtive by the Soviet leaders by their effectiveness in securing the specific objec- tives which they desire to achieve If they failJat any time to serve Soviet needs they i i en ruthlessly scrapped j_ JV T yWyf $rL a guiding principle of Soviet policy appears to be that whenever other considerations do not prevent it endeavors to further the interests and influence of extreme leftist groups in other countries The Soviet leaders appear more and more however to give weight to national as contrasted to international considerations Whatever the ultimate objectives of the Soviet regime may be the aim of world revolution does not appear to be a practical objective of its current policy haw w 34 Specific ObJeotives The actual specific objectives of Soviet-policy are seldom revealed if they can possibly be concealed Here again the tendency to consider all foreign countries as enemies is probably the chief explanation Assuming that other states wish them ill Soviet leaders appear to assume that if their objectives no matter how legiti- mate were known efforts would be made to thwart them The Soviet policy makers have a love of maneuver and surprise that frequently Operates to their disadvantage By their failure openly to state their objectives or the motives underlying a given nave they frequently needlessly stir up suspicion and distrust The manner in which the Soviet Union recently established direct relations with Italy may be mentioned as an example A frank discussion of the problem with the British and ourselves could have achieved the objective and the harm- ful repercussions of the abrupt Soviet action avoided ei e f - a gsrve e THE REGIME AND THE STATE Foreign observers frequently overlook or give insufficient importance to one of the most basic factors affecting the determination of policy in any dictator- ship namely the affect of any given policy upon the regime as contrasted with its effect upon the State The nature and structure of the Soviet system is so poorly understood even by persons who have long resided in the Soviez gziig that even if this factor is con- sidered it for an outsider to judge accurately the repercussions of a given action or development on that system SECTION II - THE ORGANIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE Introduction The structural organization of the Soviet System is highly complex and it is of course impossible accurately to describe it in a few paragraphs For the purposes of this report however it may ggughly outlined as consisting of four essential parts the Kremlin the Party the HKVD and the Bureaucracy which in the Soviet Union includes the army forces industry and agriculture By Kremlin is meant Stalin and the small group of men with whom Ste n chooses to Share the power andtremendous responsibilities that are his although% % 33n change these men at will the Soviet system is so highly centralized that obliged to share both the power as well as the responsibility of running it This group runs the country through the mechanism of the Party and the Bureaucracy with the NKVD supplying any compulsion that is needed SECTION In THE ORGANIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE So far as the conduct of foreign relations is con- cerned the important single fact about the Soviet Union is that it is governed by a dictatorship as abso- lute as any the world has ever seen Potentially the most vital and far-reaching decisions can be taken and carried out by the will of one man Marshal Stalin and it is-believed that all major decisions of policy are in fact taken by him or by the small group or which he is the unchallenged leader There have been no important changes in the composi- tion of this ruling group since the war began The most important organ of the Bolshevik regime is the Politbggo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party The last change in its composition was the addition of Shcherbakov malenkov and Vosnesenski all prominent Party leaders as alternate members early in 1939 _The State Defense Committee that was created after the entry of the Soviet Union into the war is composed of eight members all so members of the The effect of its creation was to bring about an even greater concentration of power - When power is concentrated in such a small group subjective considerations become of great importance Unfortunately little is known of the personal charact- istics of most of these men It is important to note -however that for the meet part they have had little contact with the outside world Few of them have been abroad since the Revolution and with the exception of Marshal uJ Marshal Stalin Molotov and Mikoyan almost their only contact with foreigners is the annual Foreign Office reception on November 7 It is these men who make all important decisions on Soviet foreign policy Little is known of the inner workings of what may best be described as the Kremlin but it may be men- tioned in passing that in addition to the Politburo and other organs of the Central Committee Stalin's personal Secretariat probably plays an important role and it is reasonable to suppose that this Secretariat which is known to be both large and efficient has considerable latitude in determining which questions_receive Stalin's personal attention which are referred to the high Party organs and which it can decide upon its own reaponsibility Obviously the number of decisions that must be made the Soviet regime leave them little time for personally investigating the facts upon which many of their decisions are based This is of course particularly true of Stalin and on occasion the Embassy has had reason to suSpect that Stalin had not been given completely unbiased information It is of course impossible to obtain any confirmation of such conjectures and the only certain fact is that the men around Stalin play an important role in the making of Soviet policy THE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs probably 1 Ehe least important organ30f the Soviet Government in the determination of high Soviet foreign policy Its organ- ization is very similar to that of the Department of State or any other foreign office In addition to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Mr Molotov there is a First Assistant People's Commissar Mr Vyshinski and six Assistant Pe0ple s Commissars Under these Assistant Commissars are the various geographical and functional sections of the Poreign Office Only two of the latter the Press and Consular Sections have sufficiently unusual characteristics as to call for any special comment The Press Section has accredited to it all foreign correspondents in the Soviet Union and handles almost all of the relations of foreign correspondents with other Soviet institutions There is a close link between the Press Section of the Foreign Office and the official Soviet news agency Eggs The former chief of the Press Section is at present the director of and apparently he did not relinquish his diplomatic rank upon his to this position The Consular Section of the Foreign Office handles visa and passport questions which are actually under the control of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs The Consular Section is at present under the direction of a relatively Junior official and it is believed that much of the difficulty which the Embassy encounters in connec- tion with visa matters arises from the fact that it has no contact with the officials who are actually responsible for decisions on such matters 7 The Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs is a policy making organ It is believed to to be composed of the Vice Commissars of Foreign Affairs and the more important chiefs of section Little is known of the way in which this body works but it appar- ently decides policy on routine matters and makes recom- mendations to higher authority on more important questions Rarely will even a Vice Commissar express an opinion on any question until the policy involved has been determined by the Collegium or if the question is at all important by the Kremlin Great difficulty is encountered in dealing with the Soviet Government because of the almost universal ten- dency of Soviet officials to evade personal reaponsibility The penalty for mistakes is drastic and in government as in business the man at the top is held personally respon- sible for anything that goes wrong with his Department Only those'whose positions are relatively secure by reason of their positions in the high circles of the party can afford to take re5ponsibility for difficult deciSions The result is that from bottom to tOp an endeavor is made to shift responsibility for decisions up to a higher official or to a board such as the Collegium or the Politburo It is often difficult to get a quick decision on a question because it must be referred to one of these bodies or to Stalin himself On the other hand when a question is being handled by Stalin or the the Soviet Government can act with the great- est rapidity and the decisions taken are instantly carried out by the lower officials concerned who well know the penalty for delay in such a case The decentralization of the Foreign Affairs Commis- sariat has already been discussed in reports submitted by by the Embassy Little has been done to implement the decision to create separate Commissariats in the Constit- uent Republics and it is likely that this will await the end of the war There can be no question but that the effective control of foreign affairs will remain in Moscow and in the Kremlin although the creation of separate Foreign Affairs Commissariats may well affect the methods by which this control is exercised when certain kinds of problems are being dealt with THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE Considering the importance of the position or the Soviet Union in world affairs its diplomatic service must be considered as wholly inadequate and inferior to that of other great powers The diplomatic service has not been considered a safe profession in a country where thousands of citizens have been sentenced to prison terms or death on the sole ground of having had contact with foreigners Consequently the diplomatic service did not in the past attract many of the more able young Soviet officials and a large proportion of the older and experienced diplomats were eliminated in the various purges The Soviet Government has been conscious of the weakness of its diplomatic service and has recently undertaken steps to recruit and train a larger number of competent officials and to raise the prestige of its diplomatic service Among these may be mentioned the creation of a special faculty in the Moscow University the eatablishment of a career service and the provision of uniforms and shoulder insignia for members of the diplomatic service the present however it must be said that the Soviet diplomatic service is wholly inadequate to the task of representing a great power such as the Soviet Union With the excep- tion of Litvinov and Mhisky most of the leading Soviet diplomats are mediocrities who appear to be little more than transmitting agents and whose opinions even if they dared to express them would carry little if any weight In the past Soviet diplomats in foreign capitals have been in touch chiefly with extreme leftist groups and TEE COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN TRADE The fact that Soviet foreign trade is a monopoly of the Government gives the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade a particularly important position in relation to foreign affairs It maintains organizations in foreign countries such as Amtorg in the United States and since the war the Soviet Purchasing Commission The Foreign Office as such appears to have little control over its affairs and it negotiates trade treaties on occasion and maintains its own protocol section Its influence is further increased by the personality of its Commissar A I Mikoyan who is one of the leading figures in the Soviet Government and the Communist Party A reflection of this was the fact that an official of this Commissariat was chosen to head the Soviet delegation to the recent Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods rather than an official of the-Finance Commissariat and members of the communist parties of those countries It could scarcely be expected that their reports on these countries would be fully objective Soviet collaboration with foreign countries suffers not only from the quality of its diplomats but also from the lack of experts who have the necessary technical qualifications as well as a position in the party which would enable them to be entrusted with important negotiations Xv a es 41 3 t Mega - es MessengerTASS TASS So far as the Embassy is aware gags rather than the Soviet diplomatic service is responsible for keep- ing the Soviet Government informed of developments in foreign countries The Embassy has had an opportunity of examining the Sass news file on several occasions and has been struck by the fact that it does not attempt to submit an objective report of foreign news but rather tends to report news items that support the official Soviet policy of the moment This may seem natural in that gas is supposed primarily to forward items for publication in the Soviet press and rarely does anything contrary to official Soviet policy reach the pages of Soviet publications 0n the other hand the gags files examined in 1945 were replete with reports of American strikes and labor troubles although little mention was being made of these in the Soviet press The conclusion seems inescapable that generally speaking Eggs tends to report what it thinks the Kremlin believes or wants to hear It does of course report many items critical of the Soviet Union but this is in line with the traditional Soviet view that all capitalist countries are enemies It is believed that this tendency to seek evidence to support a policy already adapted is a grave weakness in -the Soviet system of conducting foreign affairs THE COWIST PARTY Virtually all Soviet officials who have an impor- tant role in Soviet foreign affairs are of course Party members It is necessary however to distin- guish the Communist Party in general from the Party leaders referred to above who actually run the country There has been a very considerable change in the compo- sition of the rank-and-file of the Party since the war and it is by no means clear what effect this will have upon the future role of the Party A discussion of these changes is beyond the scope of this report but the two most important developments would appear to be the broadening of the base of the Party membership by the enrollment of a large number of Soviet intellectuals members of the armed forces and office workers and secondly the extent to which Party leaders have assumed Governmental positions In so far as the conduct of foreign relations is concerned two of the most important functions of the Party are keeping the Soviet leaders informed of the state of public opinion and explaining and convincing the people of the wisdom of whatever policy is decided upon This will be discussed further below in the section dealing with propaganda The role of communist parties abroad is discussed under the section dealing with the implementation of Soviet policy Now that the Comintern has been abolished it is not clear what organ of the Soviet Government handles liaison with foreign communist parties According to a statement published in Pravda in November 1943 party membership had increased from 3 400 000 3 400 000 members in 1940 to 4 600 000 It is now probably well over five million The relatively high percentage of party members among war casualties and the fact that many of the new party members have been drawn from elements of the population who previously had slight representation has resulted in a striking change in the character of party membership On the other hand the rank and file of the party appears to-l have decreased in importance during the war as far as the formulation of policy is concerned Important changes in the functions and organization or the party may be expected after the war While party members have taken a leading role in the conduct of the war the millions of Soviet men and women who have so couragebusly boyrne the suffering of the war and so heroically contributed to the victory cannot easily be left to one side in the organization of the state Either they will have to be brought into the party in which case it ceases to be the compact disciplined body it has been heretofore or else party members will lose some of their preroga tives as the elite of the Soviet state ha THE PRESS The Soviet press is completely subject to the con- trol of the regime and is an important organ in the conduct of foreign affairs Not only is it used to influence public opinion within the country but fre- quently Soviet policy is implemented by the publica- tion of articles in the press rather than by a direct communication to a foreign government or by an official statement of policy An important develoPment since the war has been the creation of the ovinform Burean This organization conducts Soviet propaganda abroad and fulfills in a sense the opposite function of ggsg It is headed by Lieutenant General Scherbakov an influential member of the who is also in charge of the Political Administration of the Red Army He is said to be anti-American but the Embassy has no confirmation of this TEE ARMED FORCES A new factor in Soviet policy making has arisen as a result of the war The Soviet Union has what is probably the largest land army in the world and in the conduct of its operations it must inevitably deal with questions related to foreign policy It is probable however that the Soviet military authorities have less direct influenCe on foreign policy than the military authorities of any other great power Nevertheless a new problem has arisen for the Soviet leaders in dealing with this enormous body of men who have been trained to accept responsibility who are conscious of their achieve- ments and who must somehow be reintegrated into the Soviet system after the war The Soviet army cannot be considered as an independent factor in the same sense as the German or even the British and American armies because of the extent to which it is integrated with the communist party machine throughout all ranks Any tendency to ieviate from the party line is dealt with by disciplinary action or by intensive propa- ganda carried out through the Political Administration of the Red Army Nevertheless the best brains in the country have gone into the army and army officers have been more free than civilians from the blighting effects of fear of responsibility and of the direct control of the N K V D The steps taken during the war to restore traditional military traditions and discipline and to raise the prestige of the army officers has intensified their consciousness of their own PartiCU1ar set 0f interests and they now constitute an important influence which the Soviet leaders must take into account in their policy making A or all the organizations that play a role in foreign affairs is beyond the scope of this report but a few should be mentioned for although they have little if any importance in the determination of Soviet policy they are instrumental in carrying out its application Prominent among these are what may be called the nationality groups such as the All Slav Committee the Union of Polish Patriots and the Free Germany Committee Similar organizations are the Anti-Fascist League of Youth and the Anti-Fascist Committee of Women There are_also a number of cultural and scientific organizations that have some contact abroad although every effort is made to channel these contacts through an organization known as Voks or the U S S R Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries This organization effectively stifles any but the most innocuous and impersonal exchange of information The steps taken during the war to restore some of the prerogatives of the churches particularly those of the Russian Orthodox Church suggest that the church may in the future be used to further Soviet foreign policies There is no indicatiOn however that there is any intention of allowing the church to have any independence or to give it any function in the formula- tion of policy mum's in imam mm In a recent public address A Y vyshinski ranking Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs stated frankly that the Soviet system was based upon a combination of per- suasion and force Although the People's Commissariat for Interna1 Affairs N K V D that supplies the force while the Communist Party provides the persuasion The many ramifications of this organization are beyond the scope of this report but some knowledge of its functions is necessary for an understanding of Soviet foreign relations It is difficult to explain to anyone who has not lived in the Soviet Union the all pervading influence of the N K V D Its power derives directly from the leaders and no one can interfere or intervene with it except the small ruling group Even they should Stalin so desire would be subject to its jurisdiction as was the case in the famous purges Because of this inde- pendence which no other organ of the Soviet Government enjoys the N K V D is probably the most efficient branch of the Government Its Operations and its relations with other organ- izations are for the most part shrouded in secrecy but whenever a subject falls within its jurisdiction its decision or ruling cannot be or at least is not opposed unless the member of the ruling group considers that it so affects an organization responsible to him as to warrant his taking the risk of having it questioned on the highest level This accounts for much of the diffi- culty foreign representatives encounter in dealing with matters matters involving the N K V D for they have no direct access to M The N K V D is responsible not only for the security of the State but also for the maintenance of the regime and it is reasonable to presume that it has an important voice in the determination of Soviet foreign policies whenever these factors are involved -The N K V D keeps a close check on the activities of all foreigners who enter the Soviet Union and its policy of holding contact between Soviet citizens and foreigners to a minimum has remained virtually unchanged since the outbreak of the war Only a small group of intellectuals artists writers personal servants and a few specially designated officials dare risk other than the most casual contact with foreigners Even members or the Foreign Office and Soviet diplomats when in Moscow scrupulously avoid personal relationships with foreign diplomats whom they may have known intimately abroad Some indication of the attitude of the N K V D is furnished by the fact that the section of the Commis sariat handling affairs of foreigners including diplomats is known as the Special or Counter-ESPionage Department It is generally belieyed that at least one repre- sentative of the N K V D is assigned to every Soviet Mission abroad apart from the regular intelligence service It seems reasonable to suppose that the intelligence reports submitted by N K V D agents do not attempt objectively to reflect conditions abroad but rather to report any activities believed to con- stitute a threat to the Soviet State or to the Bolshevik regime A large part of the responsibility for the organizing of foreign military units as well as such organizations as the Union of Polish Patriots and the _Free Germany Committee falls to the N K V D and it seems likely that it will be very much concerned with Soviet activities in foreign territory which has been or will be occupied by the Red Army hu THE SOVIET PEOPLE Even in a dictatorship the mass of the people have some effect upon foreign relations There is little agreement among observers as to the extent to which the Soviet leaders take public Opinion into account in the formulation of policy The care with which the public is prOpagandized with respect to foreign relations would indicate however that while the regime may be able to ignore public opinion to a large extent when formulating policy it feels obliged to convince the public of the wisdom of its decisions - The problem is of course highly complicated by the many nationalities involved each with its own language and cultural and historical traditions as well as by the different geographic and economic factors involved in an area as large as the Soviet Union 4 The peOple of a large and heterogeneous state such as the Soviet Union cannot long be forced to carry on a war This fact was well recognized by the Soviet leaders and at the outbreak of the war the already existent trend toward nationalism was greatly accelerated and the orthe- dox appeals to patriotism religious feeling etc re- placed to a large extent the emphasis upon communism The Soviet people responded to an amazing degree and their support of the war has been genuine and whole- hearted There were of course defections and there were stern precautionary measures such as the transfer of the Volga German population but in general it may be said that the Russian peoPle remained loyal to the Soviet regime As a result of the successful conduct of the war the regime is probably more assure than at any any previous time in its history On the other hand the Soviet people feel they have earned the right to have the confidence of the regime and to live under a less harsh and strict rule After the severe suffering of the war their immediate desires are material but they doubtless also feel that they are entitled to a greater share in shaping the destinies of the country they have defended at such cost Such a deve10pment would contribute greatly to friendly relations between the Soviet Union and other States for the Russian people desire to live in peace This brief incomplete description of the Soviet machinery for dealing with foreign affairs till it is hoped be sufficient to indicate the rigities and limitations which it places upon both the formulation and implementation of Soviet foreign policies It is clear that the linxl intimate relationships and close cooperation on detailed problems that exists between the United States and Great Britain is impossible with the Soviet Union On the other hand c00peration at the top level tor the achievement of broad major objectives is possible if each side till take account of the limitations and pecularities of the other SECTION - SOVIET METHODS OF CONDUCTING FOREIGN RELA TIONS M13122 Whatever the objectives of Soviet policy may be their methods of conducting foreign affairs are different from those of other states and are apt to interpose serious obstacles in the way of collaboration with the Soviet Union These methods are mainly based upon the enemy attitude mentioned above but even if as is hoped that attitude is rapidly changing many of the peculiarly Soviet methods will remain both from habit and because some of them are related to factors inherent in the Soviet system A few of the more striking of these methods habits or techniques of the Soviet conduct of foreign affairs are discussed below Intervention The essential basis of actual soviet conduct of foreign relations before the present war was intervention in the internal affairs of other states Particularly in the early days of the suffered from the attempts of other states to intervene in internal Soviet affairs The long period during which the Soviet Union was more or less ostracized by other states combined their own objective of world revolution left them almost no other method of attempting to achieve their objectives They could not very effectively appeal to other states as a whole to support their policies and could only openly appeal or surreptitiously connive at support by left or communist groups in other states The chief agency of Soviet interventionist policy has in the past been the Communist International which is discussed below Mention has already been made however of some of the other agencies such as the Labor Unions the Church the All Slav movement etc which can be used to intervene in the internal affairs of other states All All states endeavor to exercise influence in other states and to that extent they may be said to be intervening in the internal affairs of those states In the case of democratic countries this is often not a conscious policy of the government but a result of the independent actions of its citisens For example large investments in a foreign country private loans writings of publicists etc result in the acquisition of influence by the state whose citizens engage in these activities Under the Soviet system as presently constituted almost all such activities must be regarded as being directly controlled by the Soviet Government and therefore more objectionable to the state subject to them The Soviet Union is one of the few great powers in the world and no one can dispute its right to exercise a 5 jigs vg i if vp' - in other countries hich belonggto it by right of its importance and prestige The danger in the case of the Soviet Union however is that in the past it has seldom shown any restraint in the exercise of that influence and the Soviet system is such that it is very difficult for it to do so In the few cases where Soviet influence has for a time been predominant Hungary under Bela Kuhn the Baltic States in 1939 and Spain early in the Spanish Civil War the Soviet Union has shown a tendency to stop short of nothing less than complete Soviet domination The reasons fer this will be touched upon in the sections of this report that follow The Communist International At one stage in Soviet history the most important agency in the conduct of Soviet foreign relations was the Comintern A more or less orthodox foreign policy was conducted through the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs J Affairs while the real objectives of Soviet policy were sought through direct action on the part of the Communist Party organizations in foreign countries These parties were organized on the same basis as the Party in the Soviet Union that is on unquestioning loyalty and strict discipline The result was that the membership of these parties was small but they were completely under the control of Moscow and were ready at a moment's notice to carry out the latest directive from the Kremlin no matter how unsuited such directive might be from the standpoint of the domestic situation in which the local party had to work In the more important countries Communist controlled newspapers such as the Daily Worker were used to publicize these policies and in some countries acquired a considerable influence beyond the actual party membership in that country This system continued to function long after the objective of world revolution ceased to have any practical significance in Soviet plans Communist parties abroad were however useful in implementing purely Russian nationalistic policies During this earlier period the operations of the Comintern were mainly negative and destructive in character They were based upon the premise that all capitalistic governments were enemies of the Soviet Union and that the aims of both international Communism and the Soviet Union would be furthered by fomenting difficulties for those governments thus bringing nearer the day of revolution and weakening enemies of the Soviet Union With the advent of Fascism in Italy and more particularly the rise of National Socialism in Germany the Kremlin recognized that Soviet interests would not be served by weakening countries that might act as a counter balance to the German threat Consequently the so-called Popular Front policy was adopted Communist Parties - 4 - Parties abroad being too small and uninfluential to obtain power and themselves carry out a constructive policy on behalf of their own countries and consequently on behalf of the Soviet Union in opposing Germany they were instructed to cooperate with more moderate left groups in order to obtain power The Kremlin's long subordination of the interests of foreign Communist parthas to those of Moscow however had so weakened these organizations that they were for the most part ineffective While the abolition of the Comintern in May 1943 made a nice political gesture to Russia's allies it in fact did little more than register publicly an already existing situation This does not mean however that Moscow's influence over Communist parties abroad has been ended and there has been much recent evidence to the contrary Present Soviet policy in this respect is not now clear but appears to be developing somewhat along the following lines Control by Moscow over the individual members of foreign Communist parties has been relaxed but the leaders appear to be as much under the d ntrol of Moscow as they ever were and there is a striking similarity in the policies they have adopted The greater autonomy accorded them will in many cases no doubt enable the party to become stronger There is also evident a willingness on the part of Moscow to adapt its technique to fit local situations In general it would appear that the leaders of these foreign Communist parties have been directed to go as far to the right in forming combinations with other parties as may be necessary to obtain power or at least to ensure a position of influence to the Communists It is the fact that almost all Communist parties outside the Soviet Union have been under the direct and complete complete control of Moscow that has made the exercise of Soviet influence to bring these parties to power so threatening to other states Unless and until the Soviet Union will allow these parties to become really independent Soviet efforts in their behalf can only be regarded as an attempt to gain control of the Governments of the countries concerned There is some evidence that this has been recognized by the Kremlin but the real test of Soviet policy in this respect can only come when a Communist Party abroad actually obtains power Soviet Propaganda In addition to the direct intervention in the internal affairs of foreign states the Soviet Government has made extensive use of propaganda The art of propaganda has been developed to a high degree in the conduct of the internal affairs of the Soviet Union In addition to the usual media of the press radio books magazines and motion pictures extensive use is made of what is called agitation Highly trained specialists are constantly at work drilling into the people the line set forth by the Kremlin The Political Administration of the Armed Forces Communist Party groups Komsomols Trade Union organizations etc are used for this purpose and care is taken that every member of the community is reached The members of these organizations are themselves the subject of constant agitation both for their own enlightenment and in order that their own propaganda work will be more effective Soviet internal propaganda is generally fairly simple and based chiefly upon repetition and the fact that it has no outside competition The attempt to extend this technique to propaganda abroad is generally speaking unsuccessful although its failure is not always apparent because 5 - because many of its deficiencies are overcome by foreign groups abroad sympathetic to the Soviet Unioniwheeofrsetmv This can perhaps best be made clear by an example In its propaganda concerning its claim to the Baltic States and to Eastern Poland the Soviets have placed great emphasis upon the fact that a plebiscite had been held in those areas which had expressed a desire to become part of the Seviet Union Such an argument of course had little effectiveness abroad where it was exposed to destructive criticism and its use probably injured the Soviet case generally for it tended to lead to the reasoning that if this argument was false perhaps the other Soviet arguments were equally false Such an argument migh rggueffective in the Soviet Union share the other side of the case does not get a hearing It frequently happens that a propaganda line is put out for internal consumption even though the line taken may have an effect abroad not desired by the Soviet Government Sometimes this is avoided by giving directives to the party agitators and propagandists to explain the matter at closed meetings of factory workers party groups etc with no reference to it in the press The carrying out of such directives is highly organized and foreign observers have little access to information concerning these activities If however it is important that the issue he made clear to all elements of the population it is usually dealt with both by_the press and by the party propaganda apparatus In cases where there is a conflict between the requirements of internal propaganda and those of foreign relations it is frequently the former that determine the line taken for in the Soviet Union as in the United - 7 - United States foreign affairs normally occupy a less important place relative to internal questions than is the case in European sauntries The war greatly increased the already existing trend of Soviet internal propaganda away from the old limited slogans of Marxism and a wide field was opened to Soviet propagandists permitting them to appeal to and make use of national pride historic traditions and even religious feeling On the other hand the old such as the capitalist encirclement and capitalist imperialism had to be played down or abandoned in view of the fact that the Soviet Union found itself in the one situation it had never very seriously envisaged that is engaged in a war on the side of Great Britain and the United States Moreover criticism of internal developments in the countries fighting against Germany could no longer be conducted as before and reports of strikes race riots etc in the western democracies have received less and less attention in the Soviet press When however developments occur in allied countries that are antagonistic to basic Soviet policies the Soviet propaganda machine easily reverts to its sledge hammer methods SpecialpTreatment A technique that is peculiarly Soviet is that of giving special treatment to persons who it is believed may be of particular use to the Soviet Union It is of course in line with eastern and tradition that a distinguished visitor be given the works so far as entertainment is concerned but the treatment accorded what Ambassador Harriman has aptly called the Vodka visitors to the Soviet Union goes beyond this The movement of all foreigners in the Soviet Union including diplomatic and press - - press representatives is closely restricted and they are virtually isolated from contact Wlt all but a few Soviet officials and citizens Although permission to visit the Soviet Union is difficult to obtain once granted the foreigner concerned if he has any importance to the Soviet Union is made to feel that his every desire will be accorded and he will in fact be given privileges rarely extended to a resident foreign representative Even though this is well known the visitor in spite of himself is usually sold and goes away convinced that other people do not understand how to deal with the Russians In a somewhat similachategory is the treatment given those visitors or-resident diplomats ho are fortunate enough to be received by Stalin Stalin's friendly and cooPerative attitude may be and probably is sincere Problems taken up with him can be settled on the spot and he has tremendous personal charm and understanding It is a far cry from this however to the day to day conduct of affairs and the rigidity and cumbersomeness cf the Soviet bureaucracy on the lower levels has to be experienced to be appreciated The Party Mentality All of the important Soviet leaders and most Soviet diplomats have had long years of training in the Communist Party What may be called the party mentality is to a considerable extent carried over into the conduct of Soviet diplomacy One of the funda mental principles of the party ist hat once a party policy is decided upon and announced all members of the party are obliged not only to accept it in its entirety but actively to endeavor to carry it out Any deviation from the party line brings rapid v' - 9 rapid and severe retribution There is a consequent tendency to consider any individual even though he be a foreigner who opposes any part of Soviet policy as an enemy of the Soviet Union To some extent this also applies to foreign governments particularly those of small countries A corollary of this is that the Soviet regime is extremely sensitive to criticism In internal affairs Soviet leaders are accustomed to treating other than approved self criticism as counter revolutionary and they annot easily pass over foreign cracks at this or that action or decision of the highest Soviet authority What to us may be an objective discussion of a given Soviet policy is to them an attack upon the regime because the regime is never wrong Internal 'wreckers or traitors may cause a given policy to fail or a modification may be made in the policy to meet the machinations of foreign capitalist enemies but errors in judgment simply do not occur ithhe high circles of the Soviat system A similar aspect of this-tendency to apply to foreign relations the techniques developed for internal purposes appears in Soviet propaganda The labels of fascist or reactionary are sipped on anyone even those who are sincerely friendly to the Soviet Union if they seriously oppose any essential part of the Soviet program The attack on Mr Willkie was in accordance with the best Soviet tradition This attitude or habit of thinking is likely to make difficult Soviet reltions with neighboring states If a neighbor of the Soviet Union is to possess real independence it is bound at some stage to oppose this or that Soviet policy and is likely accordingly to find itself in a very difficult with respect to its powerful neighbor g The Elimination he - 10 - The Elimination of Qpposition The Soviet method of dealing with opposition within the country is to eliminate it If the opposition is merely dissatisfaction with a Soviet policy the matter may be dealt with as Mr vyshinski pointed out by a combination of persuasion and force If however opposition to the Bolshevik regime is involved the method used is always force This generally takes the form of ferced labor or liquidation depending upon the seriousness of the offense When the Soviet Union took over the Baltic States Ithis method was applied and large numbers were sent to Siberia The population of that part of Poland occupied by the Soviet Union under the 1959 agreement with Germany suffered similar treatment If the Soviet Union is to live up to its declarations such as those of the Moscow conference and Mr Molotov's declaration respecting Rumania it will have to learn to exercise restraint and to suffer an opposition even in areas where it exercises the predominant influence The Alternative Policy Apart from the question of a declared and an actual policy the Soviet Union has in the past frequently developed simultaneously two alternative policies There are various ways in which this is carried out One is by a press campaign that is at variance with the policy being followed by the foreign office The Comintern was also useful in this respect The existence of this alternative policy often exerts pressure on other states in the accomplishment of the policy currently being followed by the foreign office A recent example was the development of the Free Germany Committee Stalin's references to the distinction between the Nazis and the German people and other mo V88 - 11 - moves which built up the possibility of a rapprochement with Germany after the war or even a separate peace Soviet officials stated that all this was purely a move in warfare and the Embassy so interpreted it nevertheless it did also serve as a threat to the Allies not to let Russia down whether or not it was so intended Relations with the Soviet Union can reach a solid basis only ihen the Soviet Government has sufficient confidence in our good intentions to commit itself without reservation and lose its fear of climbing out on a 3h - ihe Host-Favored Nation Technique and Reciprocity The Soviet Government adapts its policy to suit -circumstances using either the principle of reciprocity or that of most-favored-nation treatment as the basis for 47 qt aet ong In its effort to isolate the Soviet people from foreign contacts and because of its attitude that capitalist governments are enemies and their representatives therefore enemy agents the Soviet Government has placed restrictions upon foreign diplomatic representatives that exist in no other capital Also with respect to many specific questions such as the protection of patents and copyrights the Soviet Union has maintained practices that are applied nowhere else in the world It endeavors nevertheless to obtain for itself the advantages of the more liberal attitude of other countries by insisting upon most favored nation treatment It maintains for example that the restrictions that it places on the movements of foreign diplomats are applied to all and that no country can place similar restrictions upon Soviet diplomats because this - 12 - this would involve discrimination On the other hand the Soviet Government is equally quick to demand reciprocity whenever the application of this principle is in the Soviet interest Immediate Self-Interest Considering capitalist states as enemies the Soviet Government has not always considered that the best transaction was one which benefited_both parties and all too often has endeavored to get the best of the bargaih As a corollary of this it has tended to Judge each problem in the light of the immediate self-interest of the Soviet Union and has taken longer range considerations into account only when obliged to do so It has regarded concessions made to it by other governments with suspicion and has not considered general good-will as having any real value in international relationShips It has accordingly been impossible to bank good-will with the Soviet Union for future withdrawals and other governments having made a concession or gesture to the Soviet Government in the interests of friendly relations haVe had a rude shock when they found the Soviet Government dealing with the next issue that came up on a hard boiled basis of advantage or disadvantage to the Soviet Union If a concession on the part of the Soviet Union were involved it had to be offset by a new equivalent concession on the part of the other state The Soviet Government considered that the other state must have already received some advantage from the previous concession or it would never have been made I This does not mean that good will plays no role in Soviet relations for like any other state it can Judge the future only by the past and friendly actions on the part of the -I15 - the United States and Great Britain have it is t be hoped done much to convince the Soviet leaders that friendly relations with us are possible Soviet Methods of Conducting Economic Relations Soviet conduct of economic relations does not differ greatly from their conduct of political affairs Secrecy suspicion and a bargaining mentality are ik i i gf While as pointed out above the Soviet Union has not heretofore attempted to penetrate or intervene in the capitalistic aspect of the internal economic affairs of foreign states as it has in their political affairs its interest in foreign labor movements has often had important economic effects Here again the Soviet Government has shown little real interest in the general principles involved in labor movements and has preferred to work specific objectives - generally political - to any general effort to improve labor standards It has never therefore shown any real interest in the International Labor Organization and it seems probable that the Soviet leaders have considered that the more capitalist states were able to improve labor conditions the weaker would be the case for the Soviet system The chief thedretical argument used in capitalist states for international collaboration to improve labor conditions has been that one state could not improve its standards without incurring a competitive disadvantage in respect of other states serving the same market which did not take similar measures Such argument has no force in the Soviet Union where cost of production has little relation to export price policies Vs '1 HONOLUQION The foregoing account naturally presents a one-sided picture for it has dealt with only the Soviet obstacles to collaboration It has not been possible in this report to deal with those that arise on the side of the democracies although in Soviet eyes these_are many Just as democratic Governments have in the past considered Communist agitation as a direct threat to their existence so the Soviet regiems fhes considered our advocacy of democratic principles as a threat to them Good relations will not be furthered by ignoring this the differences betveen us as the obstacles that lie in the say of cooperation During the next few years when the Soviet Union will need our help to will have to patiently endeavor to disabuse them or their suspicions and at the same time resolutely Oppose them vhen they step over the bounds of sound and decent relations betneen stats sovereign and independent states Weakness in such cases will only mislead them-and make the eventual solution of these problems infinitely more difficult If they clearly understand what concessions we are prepared to make to them and which principles Ie are determined to uphold regardless of the result they till respect us for defending them If theye are not clearly defined and understood there is danger that our Opposition to any given Soviet action will simply be interpreted as unfriendly and this will strengthen the hahds of those persons within the Soviet Union who are opposed to collaboration with us This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu