3U-L Action EUR Inm my 35 Rec d 9 15 AM FROM Moscw J49 TO Secretary of State 2887 MAY 2h NOON SECTION Two 0F Two N0 NIACT SENT DEPARTMENT 2887 REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 29h PARIS 329 BONN 232 LIMIT DISTRIBUTION HE SAID HOWEVER THEY WOULD NOT IMPOSE BLOCKADE WHEN HE REVERTED TO QUESTION OF FRONTIERS AND SAID THIS WAS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO POLES AND CZECHS AND WAS DISTURBING FACTOR EXPRESSED PERSONAL OPINION THAT IF THIS WERE HEART OF PROBLEM IT WOULD NOT BE TOO DIFFICULT TO HANDLE HE EXPRESSED GREAT INTEREST IN THIS BUT I REFUSED TO BE DRAWN FURTHER AT ONE TINE WHEN HE WAS AGAIN TALKING OF HORRORS OF WAR BUT HIS DETERMINATION TO FACE IT IF NECESSARY HE SAID HE COULD NOT BELIEVE WE WOULD BRING ON SUCH CATASTROPHE I POINTED OUT IT WAS HE WHO WOULD BE TAKING ACTION TO CHANGE PRESENT SITUATION TO THIS HE REPLIED WE WOULD BE ONES WHO WOULD HAVE TO CROSS FRONTIER TO EMPHASIZE SERIOUSNESS OUR POSITION I SAID I THOUGHT IN WEST WE LOOKED AT MATTER IN FOLLOWING WAY IF WE GAVE IN TO HIS PRESSURE WE WOULD LOSE WEST BERLIN AND THIS WOULD PROBABLY LEAD TO LOSS OF WEST GERMANY AND EUROPE WHEN HE CHALLENGED THIS POSITION I SAID EFFECT WOULD BE DISASTROUS TO OUR POSITION HE SAID THEIR PROPOSAL HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO SAVE OUR PRESTIGE I SAID IT WOULD NOT DO SO HE REFERRED TO PROPOSALS THEY HAD MADE TO ADENAUER AND SAID THEY WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT TEMPORARY BERLIN SOLUTION TO ALLOW TWO GERMAN SIDES NEGOTIATE BUT SAID CLEARLY IF THEY DID NOT AGREE AT END OF GIVEN PERIOD PEACE TREATY WOULD BE CONCLUDED WITH TWO GERMANIES HE KNEW WE WOULD NOT AGREE AN HE WOULD SIGN SEPARATE TREATY REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS ENT PROHIBITED UNLESS CONF 0 This copy must be returned to centrg l files with notation of action taken ACTION ASSIGNED TO- ACTION TAKEN NAME or OFFICER ornct SYMBOL DATE OF ACTION - 2887 MAY NOON SECTION TWO OF TWO FROM MOSCOW PERHAPS ONE OF HIS MOST REVEALING REMARKS WAS WHEN I SUGGESTED SITUATION MIGHT BE LEFT AS IT IS HE DECLARED WITH SOME HEAT THAT WE APPARENTLY WISHED TO DAMAGE THEIR PRESTIGE AND SAID MATTER COULD NOT GO BEYOND FALL OR WINTER THIS YEAR HE REMINDED ME HIS ORIGINAL PLAN HAD BEEN TO ACT WITHIN 6 MONTHS THIRTY MONTHS HAVE NOW PASSED HE THREW OUT POSSIBILITY OF OUR EACH REDUCING OUR TROOPS IN GERMANY BY SAY I SAID WE FAR RATHER DEAL RUSSIANS THAN LEAVE IT TO GERMANS TO HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR KEEPING PEACE IN THIS AREA AND SAID REFUSE TO BELIEVE THAT YOUR GERMANS ARE ANY BETTER THAN LAUGHED REACHED OVER TABLE AND SAID IMPULSIVELY SHAKE ON AFTERWARDS HE SEEMED SOMEWHAT EMBARRASSED BY HIS REMARK HE SEEMED TO BE GROPING FOR SOME POSSIBLE WAY OUT OF IMPASSE AND I THEREFORE PUT FORWARD IN GUARDED TERMS AS PURELY PERSONAL SUGGESTION MY THOUGHT THAT WE MIGHT AGREE TO PUT MATTER OFF FOR NUMBER OF YEARS ON BASIS OF OUR GENEVA PACKAGE PROPOSAL HE REPEATED MATTER COULD NOT WAIT AND THAT THIS WAS WAS SPOILING ALL OUR RELATIONS HE WAS CONVINCED IF THIS PROBLEM COULD BE SOLVED WE COULD MAKE MUCH PROGRESS ON OUR MANY OTHER PROBLEMS THESE OTHER PROBLEMS WERE SERIOUS BUT NONE OF THEM WAS VITAL AS WAS GERMAN PROBLEM WHEN I SAID OUR GENEVA PROPOSALS HAD NOT BEEN BAD HE SAID IN ANY EVENT WESTERN MINISTERS HAD WITHDRAWN THEM I THOUGHT IT BEST NOT TO DENY THIS BUT ALSO NOT TO CONFIRM IT IN PRESENTING MY SUGGESTION I SAID THIS WOULD GIVE US TIME TO APPROACH DISARMAMENT QUESTION CALMLY AND SUCCESS IN THIS WOULD FACILITATE SOLUTION OF GERMAN PROBLEM HE SAID FRANKLY DISARMAMENT IMPOSSIBLE AS LONG AS BERLIN PROBLEM HE IGNORED MY QUESTION HOW LONG ULBRICHT NEEDED TO CONSOLIDATE HIS REGIME TO POINT WHERE HE COULD FACE FREE CHOICE OF PEOPLE MAKING REMARK IT WAS QUESTION OF DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS IN THIS PART CONVERSATION HE REFERRED TO FACT WE HAD PREVENTED SOVIET UNION FROM COLLECTING REPARATIONS FROM GERMANY BUT WE AGREED NO POINT RAKING OVER PAST HISTORY CONFIDENTIAL - - WVILSEUKQPOD '833id38 NI LNENNOD ONV SLD3P808 HEHLO Nl1838 11v NV dO AN AWTVDIHOSELVD 3H 183M NI 833803 DITOGWAS JO AWNO AEHL GIVS 3H NIWHBS SIH SNISSUDSIG NI SlHi 03lN30 383000 30 I N318033 NI1338 3n 0N11V3H 333M 831100 SVM 33 Give 0Nv anQV 00 ONV 01n0M 3H NO 89333 300 sw31 01 03333333 3H '0Nt133w iv 03HDV33 N338 3AVH 2-0 303 N338 ll OVH 0NV 1331 38 03003 NI1330 000193303n HBMOHNESIE Noussa33wl 9N03Ls GVH 3H OIVS 0Nv 33MOHN3SI3 MWVL SIH 01 SENIL 3V33A38 03333333 051v 33 'SlHi A13n3 33 01vs 33 N318033 va33a NI 1303l33l0 330w N3A3 NI 1nd 3 v33v Nvena 03A33seo N3HM 30333 30vw OVH 1N3018333 1v31 GIVS 108 iN30l8333 303 038833dx3 3H 3o 03A0333v 3H GIVS GNV 01 sx3vw33 0v33 OVH 3H 3 NI A13v3 mossow w033 031 30 031 NOON 32 AVW ngz 30-L Ac on mm Info 0 SAID FRANKLY HE HAD SEEN ENOUGH ICE SHOWS AND A gthAs EXCUSE FOR DISCUSSION FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH PRESIQENTO a 63 3Q -I A Lo 1 Ems 00 3 002 510' Control 15100 Fwdd 8 33 AM ff FROM MOSCOW A 5 TO Secretary Of State 5 F3 N0 2887 MAY 2A NOON SECTION ONE OF TWO if 543 NIACT to SENT DEPARTMENT 2887 REPEAT PARIS 329 BONN 232 LIMIT DISTRIBUTION IN ORDER REPEAT INTERESTED MISSIONS THIS MESSAGE NOT HIGHLY CLASSIFIED BUT TRUST WILL BE HANDLED WITH GREAT DISCRETION I SHALL GIVE ABBREVIATED ACCOUNT BRITISH FRENCH AND GERMAN COLLEAGUES YESTERDAY AM KUZNETSOV PHONED TO SAY WOULD BE ATTENDING AMERICA MAY 2h I961 uJ Cum Iah7_nloo ulo ICE REVUE AND HOPED I WOULD BE PRESENT ON ARRIVAL MY WIFE AND I WERE TAKEN DIRECTLY TO HIS BOX HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY FURTSEVA KUZNETSOV TROYANOVSKY AND HIS SON AND AT INTERMISSION WE SAT DOWN TO SUPPER IN ADJOINING ROOM AND NOT RETURN TO REVUE HE SAID HE EXPECTED LEAVE SAT OR SUN BY RAIL STOPPING IN WONE KIEV FOR SOME RELAXATION AS WELL AS LVOV AND BRATISLAVA HE WOULD SPEND 30 HOURS HE EXPECTS ARRIVE VIENNA ABOUT JUNE 2 HE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY WIFE AND CONVERSATION RANGED OVER WIDE FIELD AND AS I COULD TAKE g NOTES SEQUENCE FOLLOWING REPORT MAY NOT BE EXACT BUT ESSENTIALS ERE AS FOLLOWS PROHIBIT REPRODUC ION FRO UNLESS 0 This copy must be returned to cent al files with notation Mn en- mw s ACTION ASSIGNED ACTION 7 4 TAKEN To NAME OF A orrIcE A I OFFICER DATE or DIRECTION Wm I- ASPEN 7 i32z22222_ CONF ENTIAL 2887 MAY 2h NOON FROM MOSCOW SECTION ONE OF TWO HE REVEALED PLAINLY HE WAS TROUBLED BY PROBLEM HOW DEAL PRESIDENT ON QUESTION BERLIN HE WOULD NOT MAKE SAME APPROACHA TO PRESIDENT AS HE WAS NOW MAKING To ME ALTHOUGH HE I WOULD REPORT OUR CURRENT CONVERSATION THIS WAS DIFFERENT MATTER HOWEVER THAN FOR HIM AND PRESIDENT TO HAVE DISCUSSION ON THIS DELICATE PROBLEM IN FRONT OF THEIR ASSISTANTS IN GENERAL HE TOOK SAME LINE WITH ME AS HE HAD WITH KROLL STATING AGREEMENT REACHED ON BERLIN THEY WOULD SIGN SEPARATE PEACE TREATY IN FALL OR WINTER AFTER GERMAN ELECTIONS AND PROBABLY AFTER PARTY CONGRESS THIS WOULD END OUR RIGHTS AND EAST GERMANS WOULD CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS HE REALIZED THIS WOULD BRING PERIOD OF GREAT TENSION BUT HE WAS WOULD NOT LEAD TO WAR GERMAN REUNIFICATION WAS IMPOSSIBLE AND IN FACT NO ONE REALLY WANTED IT INCLUDING DEGAULLE MACMILLAN AND ADENAUER HE SAID OEGAULLE HAD TOLD HIM NOT ONLY SHOULD GERMANY REMAIN DIVIDED BUT WOULD BE EVEN BETTER IF IT WERE DIVIDED IN THREE PARTS I TOLD HIM WITH UTMOST SERIOUSNESS IT WAS MY DUTY AS AMBASSADOR TO SEE THAT HE WAS UNDER NO MISUNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION AND THAT IF HE SIGNED SEPARATE TREATY AND FORCE WAS USED TO INTERFERE WITH OUR COMMUNICATIONS IT WOULD BE MET WITH FORCE HE REPLIED IF WE WANTED WAR WE WOULD GET IT BUT HE WAS CONVINCED ONLY MADMAN WOULD WANT WAR AND WESTERN LEADERS NOT MAD THOUGH HITLER HAD BEEN I SAID OUR PRESTIGE WAS DEEPLY ENGAGED IN OUR PLEDGE TO PEOPLE OF BERLIN AND WE WOULD CARRY OUT OUR COMMITMENT WHEN HE PLUGGED THEIR FREE CITY PROPOSAL I SAID FRANKLY WE WERE BOUND TO BE SUSPICIOUS OF EMPHASIS THEY PUT UPON CHANGING BASIS OF OUR RIGHTS THERE AND REDUCTION OF OUR WHEN HE SAID NOTHING WOULD REALLY BE CHANGED ASKED ABOUT OUR ACCESS AND HE REPLIED FRANKLY THIS WOULD BE PREVENTED EXCEPT BY AGREEMENT WITH EAST GERMANS WHEN HE DENIGRATED IMPORTANCE OF BERLIN I INQUIRED WHY THEN SHOULD HE TAKE SUCH RISKS OVER IT AND OBSERVED WHILE HE MIGHT NOT WANT BERLIN ULBRICHT CLEARLY I POINTED OUT HE HAD HIMSELF OBSERVED OUR TROOPS CONFADENTIAL CONFTDENTIAL 2887 MAY 2h NOON FROM MOSCOW SECTION ONE OF TWO HAD NO MILITARY VALUE HE REPEATED MANY TIMES THROUGHOUT CONVERSATION IT WAS 16 YEARS AFTER WAR AND NECESSARY PUT END TO OCCUPATION UNDER MY PRESSING HE SAID ONE REASON FOR ACTION WAS THAT SO LONG AS QUESTION REMAINED IN PRESENT STATUS ADENAUER WOULD ASPIRE TO MAKE BERLIN CAPITAL OF WEST GERMANY IN THIS CONNECTION HE REFERRED TO TALK OF BUNDESTAG MEETING IN BERLIN I PROBED FURTHER TO FIND OUT WHAT ELEMENTS OF PROBLEM WERE OF GREATEST IMPORTANCE T0 HIM AND MENTIONED REFUGEES HE BRUSHED THIS ASIDE AND SAID BERLIN WAS RUNNING SORE WHICH HAD TO BE ELIMINATED I SAID ALTHOUGH PROBLEM HAD EXISTED FOR I6 YEARS WE HAD SURVIVED THAT PERIOD WITHOUT TOO GREAT DIFFICULTY WE COULD NOT STOP HIM FROM SIGNING PEACE TREATY BUT IMPORTANT QUESTION WAS WHETHER OUR RIGHTS WERE INTERFERED WITH HE REPEATED CATEGORICALLY OUR ACCESS WOULD BE PREVENTED H SAID THEY WOULD NOT TOUCH OUR TROOPS IN BERLIN BUT THEY MIGHT HAVE To TIGHTEN THEIR BELTS THOMPSON SGC Note Advance copy Mr Winship EUR 11 3 12 CON ENTIAL This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu