REVIEWS OF THE WORLD SITUATION 1949-1950 HEARINGS HBLD IN EXECUTIVE SESSION BEFORB TD COMMITTEE 0N FOREIGN ItRLATIONS UNITED STATES SSENATE tEIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS PfIRST ANDlCOND SESSIONS ON THE WORLD SITUATION BY DEAN G ACHESON CHARLES E BOHLEN GEN OMAR BRADLEY W WALTON BUTTERWORTH GEN J LAWTON COLLINS PAUL O HOFFMAN PHILIP C J1ESSUP ItOUYS JOHNSON WILLIAM MoOHESNEY MARTIN JOHN J MoOLOY LIVINGSTON MEROHANT FRANIK PACE DEAN RUSK JOHN W SNYDER AND OTHERS Executive hearings held on May 19 June 22 September 20 and October 13 1949 and January 10 1 2 a t h6iMarch 29 May 1 July 24 September 11 November 28 IDecember 9 an4 24 19050 made public Jdne 1974 HISTORICAL SERIES Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 99-508 WASHINGTON 174 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS BIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS FIRST AND SECOND SESSIONS TOM CONNALLY Texas Ohalrman WALKER F GEOIGE Georgla ELBERT D THOMAS Utah MILLARD E TYDINGS Maryland CLAUDE PEPPER Florida THEODORE FRANCIS GREEN Rhode Island BRIEN MCMAHON Connecticut J WILLIAM FULBRIGHT Arkansas ARTHUR H VANDENBERG Michlgan ALEXANDER WILEY Wisconsin H ALEXANDER SMITH New Jersey BOURKE B HICKENLOOPER Iowa HENRY CABOT LODGE Ja Massachusetts FRANCIS O WILdox Ohief of Staf C C O'DAY Olerk HEINDBl Staff Asaociate RICIIARD H NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS SECOND SESSION J W FULBRIGHT Arkansas Ohalrma JOHN SPARKMAN Alabama MIKE MANSFIELD Montana FRANK CHURCH Idaho STUARtT SYMING'ION Missouri CLAIBORN E PflLL Rhode Island GALE W McGIEE Wyoming EDMUND S MUSKIE Maine GEORGE S McGOVERN South Dakota HUBERT H HUMPHREY Minnesota GEORGE D AIKEN Vermont CLIFFORD P CASE New Jersey JACOB K JAVITS New York HUGH SCOTT Pennsylvania JAMES B PEARSON Kansas CHARLES H PERCY Illinois ROBERT P GRIFFIN Michbiga- PAT M Hove Ohlef of taff AaTrss M KueL Ohlef Olerk n I CONTENTS Page Preface------------------------------------------------------- v 'Testimony of Acheson Hon Dean G Secretary of State 1 23 71 107 173 247 285 313 340 367 397 425 Bohlen Charles E Counselor Department of State 27 Bradley Gen Omar N Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff ----------- 239 Butterworth Hon W Walton Special Adviser on Japan Department of State 248 Collins Geon J Lawton Army Chief of Staff----- ------------- 434 Hoffman Hon Paul G Administrator Economic Cooperation Administration - 52 Jessup Hon Philip C Ambassador at Large----------- 93 248 Johnson Hon Louis secretary of Defense------- -- -------- 230 Martin Hon William McChesney Assistant Secretary of the Treasury 51 McCloy Hon John J High Commissioner to Germany-------------- 201 Merchant Livingston Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East ----------------------------------------------------- 89 Pace Hon Frank Jr Secretary of the Army 431 Rusk Hon Dean Deputy Under Secretary of State------------- 298 407 Snyder Hon John W Secretary of the Treasury- ---- -----------51 Williamson Francis Chief Division of Austrian Affairs------------ 18 Hearings held in executive session May 19 1949 Consultation Prior to the Foreign Ministers' Conference 1 Juno 22 1949 Results of the Foreign Ministers' Conference- 23 September 20 1949 Consultation on Trade Arrangements with Great Britain 51 October 12 1949 The Peace Treaty with Austria and Conditions in the Far East------------------ ---- -- ------------------ 71 January 10 1950 Review of the World Situation -------- -------105 173 World Situation continued--------- January 13 1950 Review of the -- 201 January 25 1950 The Situation in Getmany January 26 1950 The Situation in the Far East ----- ----- 229 March 29 1950 The Situation in the Far East ------- 247 May 1 15O0 Consultation Plror to the Foreign Ministers' Meeting-- 285 July 24 1050 Statement by the Secretary of State --------- 313 ----- 339 September 11 1950 Statement by the Secretary of State-307 November 28 1950 Statement by the Secretary of State December 9 1950 Tlihe Truman-Attlee Meeting and the Situation in the Far East ------------------------------------------397 December 22 1950 Statement by the Secretary of State Meetings 425 with NATO Foreign Ministers ------------------------------- II PREFACE June 1974 This is one of a historical series of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearings held in executive session and relating to important historical topics during the early post-World War II period The transcripts of these hearings along with related material from committee files are published in their complete form In executive session on February 6 1973 the committee decided to publish this series The transcript regulations of the committee read in relevant part as follows Executive transcripts and other executive records of the committee shall be released to the National Archives and Records Service for unclassified use in accordance with the policies of that Agency Provided That no such transcripts or other executive records shall be declassified within a period of 12 years except by majority vote of the committee and with the permission of surviving members of the committee at the time such transcripts or records were made and with the permission of the executive department if any concerned and Provided further That after 12 years from the date such transcripts or records were made they shall be declassified unless the committee by majority vote shall decide otherwise In accordance with the committee's regulations former Members have given their permission for this publication and the Department of State has indicated that it has no foreign policy objection to the publication of these hearings The hearings which are printed herewith have not been corrected for minor mistakes made by verbatim reporters v J W FvuonIarr Chaivman EXECUTIVE SESSION CONSULTATION PRIOR TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE THURSDAY MAY 19 1949 UNmED STATES SENATE oN FOREmGN RELATIONS Coxmtrrn Washehkgton D The committee met pursuant to call at 8 80 p m in the committee hearin room U S Capitol Senator Tom Connally chairman presiding Present Senators Connally Thomas of Utah Green Pepper McMahon Fulbright Vandenberg Wiley and Lodge Also present Ernest A Gross Assistant Secretary of State The CHaum N All right Mr Secretary We are delighted to have you We invited you somewhat on the understanding that you would give us a little preview as itfwere of the conference in Paris Feel entirely free to discuss it in any way that you like STATEMENT OP HON DEAN ACHESON SECRETARY OF STATE THE BLOCKADE HAS NOT WORKED FOU THE RUSSIANS Secretary AoHEsoN Mr Chairman I think we might start out by saying that we are totally without any reliable lead of any kind as to what the purpose and attitude of the Russians is going to beat this conference It seemed to us that they were willing to lift the blockade because the blockade was turning out to be a mistake from their point of view The countermeasures were hurting them very much in Eastern Germany causing a great deal of discontent among the East Geriman population by bringing a great many economic activities to a standstill The blockade was not working so far as preventing material from getting into Berlin or driving the Western powers out of Berlin So the exchange of blockade and counter-blld ae for the last 10 months had worked out to the Russian disadvantage In being willing to lift that they clearly wanted some face saver or some opportunity They aliaayS had the oportimnity of having a meeting of the Foreig Minist re if they lifted tie blockade so they put that forward as though this were a new concession whereas it has been something which has been open to their for 10 months We do not know whether they now expect to use thismeting as a field for a propaganda battle or whether as General Clay suspects they ore anxious to get some kind of a iew arangement because the present onh 1 is not working to their advantage in Germany or whether they just want to have it because they had to have something to lift the blockade The CHAIRMAN It is not probable that they will strongly urge for propaganda purposes probably a unified GermanyI They want to thoy tre their champions do they make the German people thi j not Secretary AHESON Yes sir I think if they want to get into a propatid1'battld they will ake th 'positin that they aorithe great suph porters of a unified Germapy 'hypy y repeat the Warsaw suggestions of the withdrawal of all to'6P of all nations from Europe and other very extreme suggestions of that sort In that particular exchange the obvious riposte is to ask them before you go into discussing those proposals where they stand on the eastern boundary question where they stand on reparations where they stand on the ownership of the propeties hilchlthey have sized in East Germany all of which are essential before you caan really get at a viable and united Germany That-might bery well end in a stalemate in the propaganda battle which we certainly would riot lose so far as the Germans are concerned RUSSIAN DEMANDS The CriAIRMAN Won't they probably insist upon a hand in the control of tlhe Ruhr Secretary AoHESON Yes I think they will pobaby certainly start out with all the old demands of quadrup tte control w h the Ruhr their continued complete control of the Government of the Eastern Zone a large voice in controlling German trade and exchange a position on the Ruhr Authority reparations and the continued ownership of the East German properties which they have taken All of those things they will probably demand So we do not know what they are going to do We have every kind of intelligent guess that you can imagine from all conceivable sources and each one is supposed to be right from the horse's mouth' and each is absolutely different from the others so all you fan do is say you don't know ADVICE OF THIE COUITTEEl SOUGHT In approaching the meeting we have done a good deal of work within the Government We hve had several talks wi the Biitish and French and Phil Jessup and ' Chip Bohlen arie in Paris now continuing those talks and I would like to go pyer with yo a general outline o ourposition and approach to it and have your advice and counsel about it U s CONCERN WI1H1 TIE RECOVERY OF EUOPE We have started out by sa ing that the question of a united Germany is not a question by itself and is not an end'by' itself What we ate concerned with is the strengthening and recovery 6f Western Eurblpe and the extension of that strength andrecovory s far eastWiard as possible Thit is what we are trying do The Genrman quesui rmniiny must be tion fits Tito thit sime and ha you do bout judged from the point of view of whether it helps or hurts what you have done The second thing is that in the past year and a half a very great deal has been accomplished both ii Westein Europe and i nYlrs Germany There lias been very great economic recovery in bot areas There has been a great increase in the sense of coIfidence T Je Atlantie Treaty has had an enormous effect on everybqdy'o thmnlpng aii everybody's attitude There has been very great progress with tile Germans The Germans have moved from a rather sullen acceptance of government by foreign military to a desire a rather enthusiasti desire to get on with their own government For a long time e were worried that this meeting and the suggestions that the Russiaq would throw out of a united Oermany with great big hopes would slow the Germans down on the West German Government Fortunately and due in considerable part to the wise manageinent of General Clay it has had the opposite effect The Germans are entirely cynical about these Russianproposals They are entirely aware that you never get anything free from the Russians by going after a promise that if you have something solid in your pocket you may be able to get ometinmg more Without something solid you are nowhere Therefore they are enthusiastically determined to go on witl this There has not been the slightest bit of urging that the thi be slowed up for a moment It looks as though the Bonn Constitution will be ratified even before we get to Paris The CHAIRMAN Is that ratification taking place by the legislatures of each of the states or by vote Secretary ACHEsoN That is taking place by vote of the legislatures and we think that the two-thirds will probably have ratified before we get there I think several have already ratified They will then draw up the election law prepare the lists engage in their canvassmg and probably have an election early in July and be ready to go ahead with the government by the middle of July TWO ALTERNATIVES IN GERMANY That being the case there were two alternatives One was to draw up a program for discussion which would talk abqut the creation of a unified Germany as a step now and that would necessarily involve the delay or postponement or abandonment of what we lave done The other was to go forward with what we have under the B3onn Constitution which provides for the accession of the Eastern Zone and take the position throughout that we are as much for a united Germany as anybody but that this is the vay it has to take place We have formed this government ai when e ge t firmly established we will lay down with the Russians certain principles under ihich they can create Germans who can negotiate with our Germans who will be as free as our Germans are and when that is created we will let the two groups of Germans get together and work out the conditions under which they wiUl let these new people in All of this will take some time If the conditionscall for new gee eral elections supervised throughout GQermany sometime at the end of the year that is al right wivth s rt is whatever the Germapn be lieve is to their advantage in thlie West mened to 4l1 of us aftercre Those are the two alternatives and i ful analysis that the latter one was the only sound sensible and proper one Therefore we propose to take the position that we are going 4 forward with this it is perfectly simple to bring the other liiender in provided you take these essential steps first which are there must be elections held hi their area either by all four allies or by all four allies plus the new German Government representatives There must be perfectly free opportunity for candidates from all the political'parties operating in the West There must be freedom of discussion and the actual election must be conducted by machinery other than Russian machinery or other than machinery of the existing governments That is a pretty tough proposition to put up to the Russians and it is a pretty hard one to expect them to take Senator Wr nY You are talking about the election for unification t Secretary ACHFESON No we are talking now about the elections for the state legislatures in the East You see at the present time if you should say to the Russians Well we will let the state legislatures in the East appoint a committee to go and negotiate with the new German Government what you are really doing is telling the Western German Government to negotiate with the Soviet Union and that ppts a burden onithem which is unfair It is hard enough for us to negotiate with the Soviet Union It would be very difficult for them to do that Therefore what we say is The people that the Western Gertan Government shall negotiate with will be representatives of new state governments freely elected General Clay has not the faintest doubt that even with the presence of Russian troops in the eastern zone the non-Communist parties would sweep the election TIHE RUSSIAN AND WESTERN ZONE The CHAInArIAN Do you mean in the present Russian zone Secretary AOHESON In the present Russian zone We are talking about creating legislatures now who can appoint representatives to discuss with the German Government coming into the present constitution Senator WILEY How many states are there in the eastern and how many in the western zone Secretary ACoEson There are 5 in the East and 11 I think in the West There are 45 million Germans in the West and a little under 20 million in the East General Clay believes that once you can hold those elections you will almost completely undermine Russian influence in their zone TIe says already the secret police which the Russians organized are beginning to ease up They are looking forward nervously to the day when there will be non-Soviet dominated state governments in the East They think their positions as individuals will be very insecure if they have bullied people around and the day of reckoning comes They know what has happened to Soviet police in the past in areas such as Azerbaijan where the Russians have pulled out The police haven't survived the night and they are not very keen about that So they have taken a very much more quiet attitude There have already been indications quite unreliable from their point of view that they will disband and be reorganized without too much difficulty That is at least General Clay's position WITHDRAWING TROOPS The only other position you could take would be to say to the Russians You must withdraw your troops I think that is impossible I do not see how we can say that the Russians must withdraw their troops without withdrawing ours and it would be impossible and intolerable to think of withdrawing ours in any way at this time So that would be the approach to it Senator VANDENBERG What do you say if they voluntarily propose to withdraw their troops knowing that you are a damned sight more interested in staying there than they are Secretary ACHESON I think we would say Fine If you want to withdraw your troops go ahead Senator VANDENBERG But we cannot agree to it ourselves Secretary ACHESON NO not at all If they want to pull out fine I do not believe for a moment they would and I do not think that we need to worry about the propaganda effect of that or pussyfoot about it or try to give some kind of obscure answer I think you just say No we are not going to do that Senator VANDENBERo I simply want to inject that I hope you are not obscure about anything That is the last thing you ought to be Secretary ACHESON I think that is very sound The CHAIRMAN You take the position I assume or our delegation does that pending all of these changes in government it will be necessary for us to maintain our troops there Secretary ACHESON Yes sir It is absolutely necessary from every point of view It is from the point of view of the Germans and I think they would be utterly terrified if you were to withdraw one soldier 1 foot at this point I think the same thing would be true of the French Belgians Dutch Italians Austrians and everybody The whole business would be thrown into complete terror and you probably would have lost all the gains you made in the last 2 years So I think that on that point there cannot be any doubt or hesitancy or compromise at all Senator WILEY Is it true as you say that the Germans themselves would insist that you remain there Secretary AcinsoN General Clay has not the faintest doubt about it He points out that there are all sorts of reasons why that is necessary There has been for a considerable time trouble along the CzechGerman border There are Czech troops which keep coming over and that is held in balance now by the fact that we have our troops right there Nothing happens He said if you withdrew those troops there would be terror for hundreds of square miles in that area Therefore we think we can't budge on that FREE ELECTIONS Now if the Russians in some way are able to accept that which should not be too much-we have had free elections in our zone aind they haven't--we can then say What happens after that we think ought to be in the first instance worked out by the Germans and submitted to us for approval instead of our trying to sit down and work out with the Russians the detail of how these zones should be put together As I said if the East Germans were free representatives and the West Germans should agree that at some future time say December or January there should be elections for the legislature on a new basis throughout Germany that is acceptable There isn't any reason why that isn't true WVe would just as soon have the same inspections of elections take place in the West as would take place in the East Our elections are free Everybody knows it If the Germans don't want another election and they have just had one we support them in that They know what they can push far better than we and they know what is vital better than we So we think we can allow those details to be left to them FOUR-POWER CONTROLS As I said if that were acceptable you then get into questions of four-power control The Russians will be entitled to be on the High Commission which we made up of four High Commissioners who would have whatever powers the allies would exert in this united area of Germany They would demand that it be subject to their veto and we would refuse to accept that We would insist that it should be by majority vote PROBLEM OF A FRENCH VETO Even majority vote is not too good for us because it in fact leaves the veto to the French You can expect that the British will be with us most of the time if not all the time and the French probably a good deal of the time but it gives the French the opportunity if you have three out of four that they can say Well we will have to vote with the Russians this time unless you make this concession That is inescapable There is no mathematical computation known by which you can avoid that You could not possibly say that when two agree to do something you will do it because it might be the wrong two and you could not expect anybody to accept the view that the British and ourselves should run it A'ITrTUDE OF THE FRENCHI Senator LODGE How about the attitude of the French toward this whole thing Secretary AoHESON I think the attitude of the French is pretty good They have come a long way in the last few months beginning with the meetings here in Washington They are still very nervous about some things such as disarmament and demilitarization They are quite nervous about that and that leads them into a kind of split personality They would like to have the veto on those things because they would like to use it They do not want the Russians to have the veto because the Russians might use it to allow the Germans to do 'something the French don't want them to do So they have a little internal conflict on that Senator LoDoGE Will they accept the idea that Western Germany should be integrated economically with the rest of Europe with proper safeguards Secretary ACHEsoN Yes they accept that I think they accept it solely and only on account of the North Atlantic Treaty That is th thing that has made the difference between their total unwillingess to even consider the idea before and now their willingness to consider it It has been pointed out that from the long-range point of view there is no gain to the French by insisting as an end in itself that you have this division in Germany They cannot very long get anything out of that because it is a problem which will continue to get worse They are quite aware of the fact that Russian troops in the Russian Zone are a very short distance from Hamburg and they believe that some day as this German Government takes hold and is strengthened it would be desirable to see those Russian troops getting farther frohi the borders of France than they are now A UNITED GER3MANY CLOSER TO RUSSIA Senator GREuE Suppose Western and Eastern Germany are united What is to prevent that government playing more and closely with Russia Secretary AC ESON Well there is nothing theoreti ly to prevent them from doing that Of course there is because the four-power control would have control over that Senator GREEN Subject to that but they can play it up gradually Secretary AC-jursoN Yes they could if their interests lay in that direction That again is inescapable You cannot continue' forever to have Germany governed by foreign soldiers -It just won't work It isn't working now It is past the time when that is possible It seemed to us and the French and the British that the tremendous pull of the ECA program and of all the trade of Western Europe will pull this Germany to the West more strongly than they can be pulled to the East We understand that there are powerful pulls in the other direction and that there are things which the Russians could do which would be important in any such situation-as that We have no doubt that at some time or other the Russians are going to get ready to sell the Poles 'down the river on the eastern boundary and give the Germans a larger area to live in than they now have in the lower part down toward Silesia That is a vital question so far as Gerniany is concerned But the only way you could deal with it at all is for us to be always demanding it so that when the Russians do it they cannot really get any credit with the G rinns They will be doing it because it is quite obvious that they have been forced' to do it TERRITORIAL READJUSTMENT The reason that the territorial readjustment before too long is essential is that there are now between 9 id 11i million refugees from that area and the areas farther east' who have been driven into 'the Russia i zone and irtist of them hpve come oi'er into our zone so that we have an overpopulated area which just siiply cannot exit on the balanicb betiveen agricialture and industry wluch it has and on the density of population Senaitor GmRtN How large a poptiletior is taking its place Secretary ACHEsoN In some cases no p pulation at all We got a iveryj iiterestfigipap i the other day vhieih our intelligence people picked iip 'Thiere is no secret about it at ill it is a paper published in Czechoslovaki hand it advertised that in the areas which Czecho- slovakia has taken over from Germany they wanted volunteers Czech volunteers to go and live in this area and they said Here are towns whole towns with fine houses 5 000 or 6 000 houses in this town in good repair everything fine and not a person living in the town Senator GREEN They are afraid I suppose It is just temporary Secretary ACHESON They do not know Senator WILEY Was that part of the Sudeten German group I thought that was in Bavaria Secretary ACHESON No this is some other area EAST VERSUS WEST PULL ON GERMANY Senator LODGE To answer Senator Green's question your judgment is that the chances are that the pull on Germany will be toward the West rather than toward the East although it is a contest Secretas AcIrESON It is a contest and in the old days there was a great dei f German trade with Central Europe and the Danube countries the Danube basin and that is a natural area for German trade It may be that the Russians can offer something there But they have difficulty in offering it because the way they have got those countries controlled and the way their economy is run it is not as easy as it used to be Senator LODGE You think from the standpoint of the Atlantic Pact it would be to our interest and the French interest to have the Germans oriented toward the West because they could support economically practically the whole expense of the Atlantic Pact could they notl Secretary AcHEsoN They could do a great deal Senator GREEN For the same reason it would be to our advantage not to have Germany united but to have Western Germany playing with us and Eastern Germany playing with the Russians Senator Lonox I think it would be better to have the whole of Germany playing with us would it not Senator GREEN I do not think that is possible Secretary AciEsoN The present situation in Germany is really an impossible situation with the Russian Zone coming way out west of Berlin You never can get any stability in Western Europe on the long-term basis with Russian troops 100 miles from Hamburg A RECENT ELFTION IN EAST GERMANY The CHAIRMAN Speaking of that area and I do not want to divert you at all the reason the election went the way it did-and from which people are drawing so many conclusions that it is a great victory-was about 40 percent of the voters voted No and the other 60 percent that were briefed by the Russians Secretary ACHEsoN That is the information that has been given out by the Russians The CHAraaAN How do we construe 40 percent being a great victory when they got more than we Secretary AoimsoN We believe that any announcement by the Russians that anything less than 90 percent voted for them is an extraordinary thing That led our people to analyze this and see what they think happened One theory is that it was just simply a plant that the Russian will say Well we will give the opposition 40 percent and we will publish this and wring our hands and say 'How dreadful it is' George Kennan and the people working on that think that is not really a tenable view They think that what really happened was that the vote was very strongly the other way that it was probably 60 or over 60 percent casting No ballots or invalid ballots as they call them The Russians can fake it but they didn't dare fake it any more than that because they knew they would not be deceiving the Germans because the Germans know what thev did If they all get together and whisper around and they say The vote in our town was reported as 90 percent pro when we know it was 70 percent con they would say the Russian announcement wasn't so Senator GREEN Are they claiming a great victory Secretary AcHEsoN They are not claiming much What they are doing is saying This shows how fair it was ' They claim they won and that some of these people are unreconstructed and do not understand the advantages of democracy Senator VANDENERG It is the key to something that they would either allow it to happen or announce it if it did happen Secretary ACHESON It is the key to something yes POLES AGAINST GIVING UP TERRITORY Senator McMAHON The Poles be they of the right or of the left or in the middle will be very much against giving up any of their territory isn't that true Aren't they unanimous Secretary Acheson They are unanimous and I had nine Polish Congressmen come to me and just have a fit about this The CHAIRMAN About the election I Secretary AOHesoN No about whether the United States would take the position that we have taken in the past that this border had to be rectified These Polish Congressmen said that that was very bad The CHAIRMAN That does not go up to the Elbe that territory there Secreary AcmHESO No it is in the lower part The CHAIRMAr What about the northern part Do you have to take all that territory and run the Germans out and put the Poles in Secrtary ACHESON They are run out now Senator MOMAHOX What was the argument they presented to you Secretary ACHESOx Wholly emotional that the Germans were bad people and had attacked Poland and the Poles had been defenders of democracy et cetera Senator MoMAHoN And we would be selling them down the river That is their contention Secretary ACHERsoN Yes Senator LODGE Has there been any official announcement of American policy on that Secretary AcHsoN Yes General Marshall in the last two conferences has taken the view that it is very clear that at Potsdam it was said This Polish area of administration is not a final fixing of the boundaries The Russians claim it was although they signed a paper which said it was not General Marshall has stated that in the southern part of this there must be a swing eastward to give the Germans a greater area of agricultural land which they can occupy and did occupy in the past and farmed very productively General Marshall's and the U S view was that the Poles have vastly more agricultural land than they need for their economy or can cultivate and use Senator McMASToxN How much is the area approximately Secretary AciuEsox I don't remember now It is a substantial area but is far less than half of the area which has been given to them Senator McMAIrrox Griffis told me at one time that that was the one thing they had all agreed on that they should have what they had which is not an unusual reaction Secretary ACHEsON The Poles are entirely agreed on that Then going further on the question of four-power control one thing is clear that there should be this majority voting We should not have unanimity at any point CONTROL OVER GERMAN FOREIGN TRADE AND EXCITAXE A matter which is open now not altogether decided is should you reserve as we have reserved in the three-power arrangement control over German foreign trade and exchange We in the State Department are inclined to think you should not General Clay agrees with us very strongly in that view It is fairly unimportant in the three power arrangement because we have said that we reserve it but we vote on it and iin questions of external aid made to Germany the United States controls it Our view is that you will have the greatest difficulty in the world in haggling about that or getting the Russians to agree to it and that we would be in exactly the same position and even a stronger position to have no reserved power whatever on foreign trade and exchange ind rely entirely on our ECA control and agreement to take care of that until you get the pattern set We doubt whether any occupation would be effective in that field after 1952 anyway So that is not settled but we are discussing it back and forth at the present time RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN TILE COl TROL OF THE RnHa One of the other questions which will be argued about a great deal is the one the chairman asked me about and that is Russian participa tion in control of the Ruhr We a re all agreed that we do not want that participation Whether if everything else over a period of time worked out so satisfactory to us that we would consider that to the extent of allowing the Russians three votes out of 18 on Ruhr control is open 'ie Frenich regard even that as a dangerous thing to do Sonie of the rest of us think that three votes out of 18 is so far from causing any trouble that what you really have to consider is whether the presence of a lRussiihmission in tile JRuhr would be the source of 'Communist propaganda and activities among the unions and so forth For the time being we agreed on this position The thing has nothing to do with you You never were ii6blved in Ruhr tr ae You participated in the control of demilitarization and disarmament This whole thing has to do with the matter of domestic production Senator PsrPEn Are you thinking of the period prior to the possible coming into being of the new German State Secretary ACHE8so Yes that is what we are talking about Senator 'FPPPEn The period prior to that too Secretary AciEsox Yes Senator PEPPEIn Your idea is that there will be a power control over the lRuhr economy after the German State comes into being and maybe after the peace treaty or at least until the peace treaty Secretary AcIrdsoN The present plans go up to the peace treaty The peace treaty is a thing that has to be negotiated Whether you will be for it or not is a thing that you do not know now PEACE TREATY WITH OERMAN Y That brings me to the peace treaty One of the things the Russians always spent a great deal of time at these conferences about is this talking about a German peace treaty It gets into the most abstruse sort of ridiculous procedural questions Shall four draw up a draft Then who shall be consulted before you have a great conference In the last argument I think 3 days was spent on whether Albania and Pakistan should be actually added to the group of countries who were engaged ii war with Russia 111 of that seems to us to be utterly futile and a waste of time One time in the discussions among the four powers it seemed that the drafting of a peace treaty was an important step that you had to get on with right away It seems to us now that it is quite silly to argue with the Russians or anyone else about the theoretical terms of 'the peace treaty What you want to do is to set this government up and get it going and see whether it is effective and strong what its policies are as they develop and the peace treaty can be molded to what you actually have rather than be based on theoretical prognoses of the future So what we are inclined to conclude about it is that we feel the lon't best thing to do if the Russians want to talk about it-if they want to talk about it we are perfectly happy to do it at his meeting if they do we will say Well there is a very long and difficult thing Let's appoint some High Commissioners for the negotiation of a treaty and rent houses in Geneva or somewhere else and settle down for 2 or 3 years of discussion and we will talk about this kind of problem rO o ORE REf A'IONS So far as reparations are concrrined the attitude which we propose to take is that reparations are finished that with the agreement recently reached on the dismantling we will continue with that dismantle the plants that are agreed upon give the Russians their share if they come through with their agreement to supply certain material for it We won't do it if they don't At any rate that is finished and over with There will be no reparations out of current production of coal Senator WnVEY How many plants are involved now Mr Gioss I thought it was 150-something Senator WXLEY Still remaining to be dismantled Secretary Acirksoi Yes that was it The argument sta rted oit with whether 167 should be and it was agreed on 157 It is somewhere in that neighborhood Those plants are going to be dismantled 90-5038--74-2 Senator WILEY What is the nature of most of them Secretary AcVEsoN There are some steel plants and there are some chemical plants There was a release put out the other day which lists all the plants and exactly what they do Mr Gnoss There is a lot of shipbuilding capacity Secretary ACIIESON Then you come to the vitally important question The Russians under the Potsdam agreement so far as the majority part of their reparations is concerned were given whatever they could take out of their zone plus external German assets in Eastern Europe They pretty well looted their zone They took everything that they could for a while and then they discovered that that wasn't accomplishing anything at all It was having a bad effect in their zone because it was throwing people out of work Also they got machinery pretty well damaged and rather mixed up in Russia with vital parts turning up in odd parts of the country so that the machinery wasn't much good when they got it They decided that that wasn't getting anywhere so they decided to take the plants in place Some of them they seized as reparations and others they bought with marks which they printed so that they have acquired a very large ownership in the industrial properties of the eastern zone Our views are that that is illegal It has to be given up in tote and they can not retain any of that That was not contemplated at Potsdam and anyway the German State can not be independent and free if a foreign government organized as the Soviet Government is owns the principal means of production in the whole eastern part of their country There is just no other possible course So far as reparations out of current production is concerned that means that whatever possibility-the possibility is somewhat distant at the present time--there is that Germany could be self-supporting is removed any possibility that it could repay any of the advances which have been made by the'Western Allies is removed and you have Germany as a permanent satellite of the Soviet Union They wanted $10 billion of reparations The idea was to say No all of that is over but if you want to come into this four-power control business you have to make a contribution to the total deficit of the German economy That is a position from which you will probably have to withdraw but it is at least where you start Senator GnEEN Do you mean by that that you are going to say the Russians have to pay reparations to Germany Secretary ACHESON We are doing it The moneys that we are now putting into restoring our defeated enemy is not reparations of course Senator GnrEw They have another name Secretary ACHEiSON What you say to the Russians is We are not going to pay your reparations That is what we have come to They have taken $15 billion out of Germany in equipment and fixtures plus the product of the factories which they now own Our best guess is it is between $6 and $71 z billion But at any rate the attitude is reparations stop now They are through A SPLIr EftPWEEN U S BitrTAIN AND FRANGE Senator Lormo You have not worried about splits developing between us and the British and the French Secretary ACHESON Well it is a thing you have to have in mind I am not worried about it because I think the tremendous pull of the North Atlantic Treaty helps that very greatly And the fear of the French of Germany and of Russia is such that I think that we can work out a very harmonious policy But you have to have in mind all the time that if anything happens to France then you have a very -difficult situation Senator PEPPER The Atlantic Treaty has given these Western European nations some confidence against a resurgent Germany as well as Russia THE 1940 OFFER OF A 25-YEAR PEACE TREATY Secretary ACoIESON Yes It works in all directions One thing I want to mention Senator Vandenberg that you mentioned to me some time before is the 25-year treaty What we think is the wise thing to do about that is to say to the Russians This proposal was made at a time when there was very great concern in France Russia and other countries about the possibility of a resurgent German militarism coming even before a treaty of peace The t eaty was -anoffer by us to make everything perfectly clear that that would not happen 'The Russians would not join in that They sabotaged that In the intervening years we have now taken hold of this whole business the British French and ourselves The Russians can join if they want We have complete control over the rearmament and remilitarization of Germany and this treaty that was talked about in 1946 is something that you can talk about when you come to a final peace treaty with Germany but not now It is just impossible for us to be talking in those terms in terms of a 25-year peace treaty with the Russians at this time U S CONTROL OVER GERMANY Senator THOMAs of Utah Mr Secretary how do you assume that we have complete control of the rearmament of Germany 8 Secretary AcHnsoN Well in this way Senator We have what is now known as the control boards Mr Gnoss I was just checking that title I believe that is it Secretary AcmEsoN That is an agency now of the Military Governors that will become an agency of the High Commissioners and is made up of military personnel who inspect all plants all'building operations and production operations who go about the country looking at everthing that goes on And they have authority at any time to move in--they will report to the High Commissioners--with our forces and stop anything that is happening in that direction Senator VANDENBERG Does that continue after the new domestic government is set up$ Secretary AOnsorN Yes That is the most important part of the reserved powers That iS the field in which we reserve all right to act administratively Senator VANDENBERa Is that a four-power pact Secretary ACH sON It is a three now If the Russians want to come into that they could either possibly join that or there would be another control board in the Eastern Zone The really important possibility of rearmament is in our area BIRTH OF Tl1E POST VERSAILLES GERMAN ARMY Senator THO AS of Utah It is important on paper but in 1922 we had about the same rights The French went into the Ruhr because they were not satisfied with what Germany did Public opinion of practically all Western Europe and surely the public opinion of the United States was against France Secretary ACHiESON I think Senator Thomas that if that happens and the other countries want to rearm Germany it would be a colossally foolish thing to do but no kind of machinery would prevent that Senator TIoMAS of Utah I think we put that kind of thing in the Versailles Treaty and then I think we tricked ourselves I don t think the Germans tricked us with the 100 000-man army because the 13 year term was imposed on them just because of something said at the table that a 100 000-man army would be all right Just to go ahead and train brigadiers and majors they said and then the bright boys decided that they would make that army a 13-year enlistment on the theory that it would break any man's life that he just couldn't do that sort of thing or couldn't do it over and over again However it was the most effective army probably in the whole history of the world for making rearmament possible by quick action The Germans put it on a voluntary basis They took their leaders and the facts are that no matter what anybody says in almost the course of months Hitler turned his 100 000-man army into an army of 4 million and lacked only noncoms It is the most marvelous thing in the history of military science That can happen again if we are going to recognize the genius of the German people and not be on our guard against it Senator VANDENBERG HIow would you prevent it Senator Senator TIIahoA of Utah We could not prevent it then Senator VANDENBERn Ilow would you prevent it now Senator To MAsof Utah I do not know enough of these details to have an answer but I am thinking in terms Senator Vandenberg of our actual experience on this We did absolutely nothing when the German people started marching Senator W EY They are marching again now are they not Senator TxrOMAS of Utah They went through their elections and carried about 85 percent the first time and 95 percent the second time Then after Hitler sent his troops across the line nothing was done Of course we did not stay during the 15 years Senator GREEN The only difference now is that you have the Atlantic Pact Secretary AcirEsoN I think there is one difference I think that we have learned the lesson Senator Thomas was talking about that you do not get anywhere by permitting a small army If you permit any army at all of any kind you get into the difficulty that you spoke of because what they do is to create a general staff for the Army That is the first great error Then they have those quick enlistments If you have 100 000 men you keep turning that over and you train a vast number But I think everybody is clear that it would be quite insane to make any sort of army of any kind whatever Senator GREEN YOU cannot prevent their having a police force Then they have gymnastic classes and crack military organizations Senator THOMAS of Utah We denied them every kind of military plane but they developed everything of course A RFESUROENCE OF A NAZI SPIRIT Senator Wiri We saw in the papers the other day great masses of Italians marching and giving that Fascist salute and so forth Then I saw something in the paper of a German youth march Is there any resurgence of the fact of a Nazi spirit Secretary ACIIESON I think the reports you have heard with regard to Italy were correct There were those demonstrations and I think the elections in Sardinia showed a growth in the old Fascist group What happened there was that there was a growth in both the right and left and the middle got squeezed The CHAIRMAN This whole problem is in control of a Commission until the peace treaty Secretary ACHESON Yes sir It will be in control of the High Commission POWER OF TIE 111011 COMMISSIONER The CIArIMAN During that period of course the High Commissioners would have power to do whatever was necessary would they not to keep down a resurgence of a militaristic organization in Germany9 Secretary ACHESoN Yes sir The commanders would have troops which now number probably in the neighborhood of about 350 000 It would probably be reduced over a period of years to 180 000 or 200 000 or something of that sort so you would have plenty of troops to deal with any kind of matter that occurred of that type The CHARMAN At the end of that period the prestunption is that the peace treaty would take place Secretary AcnEsoN Yes sir The CHAIRMAN In the peace treaty it would be the function of those who make it to make adequate provision with respect to these matters would it not Secretary ACHESON Yes sir and at that time it might be essential in connection with the peace treaty to have something in the treaty against the new Germany rearming The CHAIRMnaN That is what I was going to say I would be up to the peace treaty to put such limitations on thesematters as you saw fit GERMAN INTEGRATION INTO WESTERN EUROPE Senator LODGE We can get economic good out of Germany here and bring her into the Western European economic complex and- at the same time not expose ourselves to a resurgence of German militarism That is possible is it not Is it believed in the light of all the experience we have had that it is possible to do thatnow I Secretary AcHESON Yes Senator LODEr Even the French are convinced that that is a possibility and even a desirable thing are they not Secretary ACIIESON Yes A MODUS VIVENDI IF TIIE RUSSIANS SAY NO Senator VANDENBERG Before you get to that point it looks to me as though you are going to put up a program to the Russians at this conference to which the answer is No unless there is total and complete repentence on their part with respect to their entire Eastern European policy What happens if they say No at that conference Secretary ACIHESON Then I think you turn tc the second thing which is working out a modus vivendi so that you can live under the conditions which exist at the present time That would involve clear determination of our rights with regard to Berlin rights that you have specifically defined unconditional rights by truck by rail by barge into Berlin It will be highly desirable if in connection with that you could get actual physical connection The difficulty in the past with the physical connection is that if you get a corridor then you spilt the Russian Zone and the Russians have argued very strongly and quite reasonably against that There is the possibility of a corridor which would not split it and that is the automobile highway because everything that crosses that goes over it or under it It would not be the kind of a corridor that you could defend militarily if they wanted to move against you but no corridor is of that nature You could not possibly string out troops 100 miles in their territory You have to stop it short of that At least you will get physical control so you can go without getting anybody's permission and you would strive for that sort of control Then it is very important to work out some method for establishing' trade relations between the Eastern and the Western Zones because to a considerable extent they are complementary We think that one of the best ways of doing that is to let the Germans do it They can negotiate better with the East Germans even though those East Germans are Russian Germans If we Let into a series of complicated trade negotiations with the Soviet Union in which the whole question of the rate of exchange comes up then you get into matters of national trade and position and all that sort of thing whereas the Germans have no concern with either one of them but are concerned only with getting as much goods out as they get in of equivalent value So long as you have an exnort control so that you do not permit movement into the Eastern Zone controlled by the Russians of goods which we do not want to go to Russia I think that is probably the best thing if the answer to the big proposal is No which is quite likely in my judgment U S PROGRAM PROPosES A NEGATIVE RESPONSE Senator VANDENBERo That is the point As I listened to your pro- gram it seemed to me you are building a program which projects a negative response Secretary Aci tisow I thought so It is quite interesting that General Clay does not think so Senator VANDENBERO It is interesting I have talked to Clay and I realize that he has some good reasons for it and it may well be one of those dramatic things which they like to do in a spectacularly changed policy but since it is your own opinion that the program you are contemplating putting up is calculated to bring a No answer does that mean that the result of this meeting is going to establish to all intents and purposes the fact that there is a permanent cold war between the East and the East MORE STRENGTH NEEDED BEFORE FURTHER DISCUSSION Secretary AoHESON I should not think that it would mean that it was permanent but I should think it would mean that it is not stopped and that the next task is to see who develops more strength and perhaps the next time you discuss it you can get further Senator VANDENBERG Is there no sugar that you can put on this sour apple that you are presenting Secretary AOHESON We have tried to find some but the only kind of sugar you can put on it is so dangerous to what you are doingSenator VANDENBERG I do not recommend any dangerous sugar but for purposes of negotiation I would wish that there was something somewhere in the program which offered some sort of a safe concession But you have not been able to find anything that is safe If you do not find anything that is safe so far as I am concerned I don't want you to do it THE SECRETARY'S PLANS ARE SOUND Senator LODGE May I say Mr Secretary looking at it from the standpoint of American opinion in this country and of course speaking only for myself as the way I judge it I think to berin as the Secretary plans is a very sound way to do it In fact I think if you began with the modus vivendi and did not take in the overshadowing basic considerations you might lose a lot of support in this country because I think the average American does not know the details aRid he looks at the thing in the big way I think what you plan to do when you open up is something that American opinion will grasp and will approve of Senator VANDENBERG I totally agree with that and that is not what I am thinking of I am just wondering whether there is anything that you can have up your sleeve in the event that' there is some unexpected surrender on the part of the Russians to this rigid program you are laying down whether you have found anything that you could use to encourage agreement IF THE ICE BEGINS TO BREAK Secretary ACHES N We have not found anything I have not had a chance to talk as long as I should like to talk to General Clay but I am going to ask him whether he would be available in case this ice begins to break up and could get in a plane and come over I think he would be willing to do that There may be things that from his experience he knows would not be as dangerous as they look to us Senator VANDENBERG Please do not have it in your head that I am recommending to you that you get off the fundamental line because I think the fundamental line has to be pursued Yet I could wish that there was something consistent with the fundamental line which offered some hope for an agreement The CHAIRMAN May not something occur that would give you an opening along those lines Secretary ACIIESON It might The CHAIRMAN That is what you have to do You have to await the opportunity and then devise some system to meet it WOULD A REARMED GERMANY ITELP Senator TboI1As of Utah In connection with both Senator Vandenberg's and Senator Connally's statements is there developing on our part any notion that a strong Germany is necessary to help us out and by strong I mean a rearmed Germany in this sour apple war that we have with Russia Secretary ACnEsoN No Sir Senator THOMIAS of Utah I think that is the greatest danger that we have facing us because no matter how Russia may act today the history of Germany shows that you can beat her at every turn diplomatically militarily economically industrially and in every way Now there is just one more question I would like to ask and I have already put the No down as a definite No You have not heard of anybody anywhere who is beginning to say that Secretary AciEsoN No Senator TnHOrAs of Utah Well that is great The CIAIRMAN You meant Germany could whip Russia at any time Senator THOMAS of Utah Build up a strong Germany you see as the kind of buffer thing we tried to do with some of the other States around Russia after the First World War Now you said that Russia had no interest in the Ruhr That depends upon what you call Russia Some of these states which we call satellite states surely had an interest in the Ruhr and a great deal of trade And so far as what Germany always considered her pastoral back door a lot of the southeastern part of Europe has intense interest in the type of supply which did come and would start coming again from the Ruhr We could go up as far as Czechoslovakia for that matter so that I think Russia would come to this table as a spokesman for these satellites as well as herself Can't she logically claim that Secretary ACHFsoN I think you could argue that point but this is something which I do not think would depend on logic I do not care whether we won that argument logically or not I think what you have to do is to sa that is an essential bargaining weapon which the West has to have im dealing with the satellite states and we must not use it to solidify the Russian position with the satellites A SOEME FOR A COMIIDOR Senator GREEr Is it possible to devise any scheme for a corridors Secretary ACnEsoN I think the East-West trade is most important Senator GRFEN Would it be possible to correct the mistake that was made by providing a corridor Secretary AdoEoN Only in the way I have indicated Senatbr GnRax What was the mistake Wherein did it lie What could have'been done that should have been Secretary AcntEsoN I do not think there was any mistake The Russians have never denied that we had these rights What they say is that we breached the agreement by the London agreements of the spring of 1948 and so long as we had adequate quadrupartite control they say they did not question our rights They say Very well You met at London Three of you decided you were going ahead with a Trizonia agreement that breached the agreement under which you have had these rights therefore you no long have a position in Berlin Senator GREE Why didn't we set up our rights to use automobiles as well as to use airplanes Secretary AdiTESON We did Senator VANDENBERo Mr Secretary you do not mean in your answer to Senator Green to say that the Potsdam agreement was not very loosely drawn insofar as our right of access was concerned and that it could and should have been written in far more definite contractual form FUZZINESS OF POTSDAM AGREEMENT NOT IMPORTANT Secretary Ac soN I entirely agree but I think if it had been written like a corporate mortgage it still would not have had any effect on the Russian decision when they made the decision they did This is just an opinion it is a guess Because the basic Russian attitude was not that under Potsdam we did not have the rights They were fuzzy surely But what their view was was that we had breached Potsdam and no longer had a right to be in Berlin that the only right we had to be in Berlin was as partners in Germany as a whole Senator VANDENBERG Still Mr Secretary when the argument was on you had to rely sort of circumstantially on one telegram as the basis for an alleged Russian consent to your interpretation of our rights Isn't that true Secretary AoHEsow That is true Senator VANDENBERG And that is pretty flimsy basis compared with the kind of basis that ought to exist in international relations Isn't that true Secretary AcmsoN Yes All I am quarreling with was that part of our Senator VANDENBi answer to Seiator Graen which indicated that Potsdam was all jake and I don't think it was Secretary ACHEsON I did not mean that Senator GREEN I was leading up to ask you whether that hole could be atched uptt Secretary Aox'mON That is what I was saying when I was talking aboit this aodus v vendi If you get nowhere on the solution to the whole Grnman tiestoi then we have to turn to an arrangehmentunder which We can live and that arrangement has two general parts to it One is to negotiate our clear rights by truck by rail and by water We have rights 'byair because nobody dares interfere with us INTERFERENCE WITH AIR AND LAND RIGHTS Senator GREEN Why shouldn't they dare interfered That is my point If they dare interfere with our rights on land why do they distinguish What was the reason for distinguishing between the two Secretary ACHESON I think it is a pure difference of the physical situation If they want to interfere with the airlift they are taking on the most disadvantageous tussle with us that they can possibly take on We are far better equipped to force ourselves through in the air than they are to stop us Senator GIEEN They are better equipped on land Secretary ACHEON And that is why they stopped us on the land When they stop you on the land you either have to say I am going through and then you get your troops and you start your train through and they may shoot at you or not or you send engineers in with the intention to build a bridge and then you get into a fracas on that and you get into a very difficult mission or you do not go through Senator GREEN They did not distinguish in principle between the two Secretary AcHEsoN No They have always claimed the airlift was illegal and they tried to make us agree to certain rules which would have made the airlift impossible that we go through only certain corridors and we could go only at certain times and so on We never paid any attention to that Then they started this business of having antiaircraft practice and that sort of business in the corridor and we told them we would have to reply to that with vigorous measures If they went on we would have to clear that out of the way But we were in a superior position in the air Senator VANDENBERa I do not think there is any disagreement between you and Senator Green Mr Secretary If I understand your position the point he raises is precisely the point I suggested to you by letter that one of the things the minimum that we ought to get out of this affair is a contractual acknowledgment of the rights which have been in controversy with respect to access to Berlin Senator GREEN It has always seemed extraordinary to me that it should not have been explicit in the agreement OrTINO A BENEFIT FROM GERLANY Senator LTODGE Mr Secretary in connection with Senator Thomas' point about the revival of the German military threat surely it is possible is it not for us to get military advantage and benefit out of Germany without having Germany become a military threat again Don't you consider that it isI Secretary AcirsoN Yes Senator LODGE We can get the German economy integrated into the Western European economy which is a great help and if the worst came to worst you can take the German manpower recruit them organize them and regiment them not under the German flag You don't need to set up a German General Staff and Army to get the military good out of Germany Secretary ACHESON You could but nobody has any intention of that So I think Senator Thomas has a sound point that the great difficulty of keeping Germany disarmed and getting the benefits out of 'Germany without getting the benefits of resurgent militarism is that you have to have 150 000 000 Americans believing that that is the right thing and not getting misled and saying Oh well let's just forget about that THE U S APPROACH AT THE COMING CONFERENCE first part PEPPER Mr Secretary I am sorry I missed the ofSenator your statement but you started telling what your general idea of approach was at the conference Have you any rough idea about the sort of general time table you can fix In the first step the Paris Conference at which you hope to clear up certain things and to see what sort of attitude is manifested I suppose on the part of the Soviet Union And then I suppose the first idea is as nearly as possible to integrate the German economy Are we anxious to have the Eastern States that are under Russia's control integrated with the rest or are we satisfied for the demarcation to exist for some time in the future and to organize our three zones What is sort of our general policy on that Secretary ACHEsON I was explaining before you came in Senator Pepper that our primary concern is that the great progress which has taken place in Western Europe and in Western Germany for the past year and a half should continue and not be impaired If it is possible to bring a larger area of Germany into the same progressive field which would contribute to the recovery of Western Europe we are delighted to do it but it all depends on the conditions under which you can bring it in If it comes in under conditions which would retard or destroy or set back in any way what we have done then we would rather not have it in than have it in So the point is in putting up to the Russians the minimum that we think they will accept Senator PEPPER What really constitutes the threat and what makes all the problem in Western Europe is the intransigent attitude of the Soviet Union If they should suddenly assume an attitude that we share there would note any problem in Eastern Europe Secretary Aci soN We would not assume an attitude It would have to be that this was the clearly accepted Russian policy ONE OF TWO CONCLUSIONS Senator PEPPER Now then I suppose it looks to me like you have to come to one of two conclusions either they are totally unprincipled they have sinister designs that are dangerous in character which means we simply have to remain an armed camp until we can establish as soon as possible an equilibrium of power and a little edge on our side so that there will be no danger of their aggression and continue to maintain that situation until they change their attitude or the other side of it was what I inferred Senator Vandenberg was getting at that they simply be treated with the fairness with which they are entitled to be treated We would be willing to give them whatever their rights are provided they show an attitude of conciliation and fairness and peace in their point of view Secretary AcHEsoN That latter is not my attitude sir Senator PEPPER You mean you are not Willing to give them what their rights are Secretary ACHESON It is not a question of rights The most dangerous thing in the world that we can do is to again enter into any agreement which depends for its execution upon Russian cooperation and Russian good will Senator PEPPER You are just starting out with the hypothesis that that is an impossibility Secretary ACIEmsON It is not only an impossibility but it is a danger of such great scope that we should not even consider it The only agreements you can enter into with the Russians are agreements whicli do certain things One is to recognize facts Secondly are as automatically operating as possible so there is no opportunity to confuse or quibble about it When you can get arrangements of that sort surely we will go ahead and make them But if you have something purely executive which purely depends upon your belief that the Russians are nice fellows under the skin and they will cooperate you have just laid your neck on a block and they will cut it off at once Senator PEPPER I thought you said a minute ago that if they wanted to come in on the basis of majority vote in this governing group that would be all right Secretary AcmEsoN That is all right Senator PEPPER I did not intend to suggest that they have a veto I am saying neither do we have a veto RI Ca i Pe Chi ha pr VOTING ON NATO The CHAIRfAN Before you leave let me ask you one question Do you think there would be any advantage to you folks over there if this committee within the next 2 or 3 days should vote out the treaty We will not have the report ready for about a week Secretary ACHESON I think it would be of tremendous help if you voted it out I think it would be of even greater help if the Senate would consider it The CHAIRMAN The Senate will not do that for the present Secretary ACHEON If they will just get on with the thing as quickly as possible that will be fine The CIAnarAN My point was whether or not it would be to your advantage in your sessions if we formally voted to report it out That would carry the implication that we were all for it Secretary ACHESON That would be fine The CHAIRMAN We thank you Mr Secretary Whereupon at 5 10 p m the hearing was adjourned ia anc up era YO ST mit thh agr de tht enc the eve to I I This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu