SECRET NO FOREIGN mssEIA PlleJel tCh U S DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIRECTOR OF INTElLIGENCE AND RESEARCH J11eJIiOltatJ'Ule111t 132 REU-4 February $ 1965 To Through From The Actill l f ecretary Subject Can i - ThoJM s L w Hur hes l Do Business Hith De Gnulle This paper is the third and last in series of studies dealinp with the problem of France's position within the Atlantic alliance and in particular with th e implications therefor f the establishment of some kind of allied nuclear force including a mixed-manned component with Hest German participation The first paper estimated that President de Gaulle was likely to speed up the eliseneagel'lent of France from it remaininll NATO commitments i f he became convinced--for example by H st Germany's joining such a force--that the Federal Republic could not be looked to for support of his 0 ' ideas about the future orp anization of l estern F urope and the North Atlantic alliance RH REU-70 Is de Gaulle Bluffinll December 17 1964 llFll Th seconel concluded that de r 1u11 e ran littl e risk of upset at home if he thus disen la ed France from NATO RM REO-n Domestic I imitations on de Gaulle's Foreir n Polic'l December 2 1964 s Nrn This paper examines whether means mi ht he found to 1 chieve the cre 1tlon of some form of alliance nuclear force without concomitantly hnvinR to accept A we kenin of NATO by n resultant rupture with FrAnce More brondly i t considers the possibility of preventing a 'French withdrnwal from NATo--whether this would be carried out sooner because of the establishment of an ANF or later because of de Gaulle's long range policy ABSTRAct This paper does not Rnswer the question asked in its title su gests It that French withdrawal from NATO can be prevented if at all only as part of an overall package deal between the United States and France The key element of this would be that the two parties agree 1 that they still had common interests on which they could collaborate e g resistance to a continuing Soviet threat opposition to German national nuclear armament and 2 that therefore they would agree to disagree on other subjects e the future organization of Europe the ultimate relationship between GROUP r Exoluded rro autOlat10 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSI M dO lll4ll' Qill5 and - DECLASSIFIED AUlhority deo1aa 1tloat1oD NiJD101' 1'1 - -------------------------- FOREIGN DISSEM -11- Western Europe and the United States without calling into duestion their overarching agreements While emphasizing the extreme difficulty of achieving this degree of meeting of minds with de Gaulle the paper suggests the main headings of the kind of agreement that would be necessary 1 commitment by de Gaulle to leave NATO alone at least through 1969 even if an allied nuclear force is established and if possible his participation in a non- proliferation agreement 2 some US concessions to de Gaulle's status- seeking perhaps in a United Nations framework 3 some degree of nuclear cooperation between the two governments 4 a Franco-American non- dissemination agreement with respect to WeSt Germany and 5 agreement to disagree on other things- major as they are--without infringing on the preceding points No conclusion is reached about whether an agreement between the United States and France would in fact be possible on these or any other or whether if possible would be desirable in the U S national terms interest It may well be that the parts of this political problem are too interconnected and that each side will feel the stakes too high to permit such limited agreement If so we must then face the fact that nothing significant really remains of Franceo-American cooperation Anything goes and much will FOREIGN DISSEM DECLASSIFIED I Aumo i SECRET NO FOREIG I DISSE 'i The Problem President de Gaulle's objection to the present structure vi - TO and his disen g a ement of French forces pro ressively from alliance contro l long antedate the a F AN F question As wa s ointed out in a paper written after his decision to remove French officers from the integrated SACL T staff was made known in April 196 ooo what de Gaulle has done to NATO in t ne six years since he returned to pOHer and what he has failed to do in that substantial period of time give so e reason to think thnt his overall purpose has not been to Hreck t he alliance the need for which he has constantly proclair 1cd nor even to demol1 h its existb 7 inte rated military structure in order to imnlement his endlessl y re e ted statements that France's defense must be solely in French h nds The circums tances surroundin his most recent action vis-a-vis NATO sug r es t rather t ha t he has these tlJO aims 1 to mount a Slmol but constant T reSSllre on the United States and the other allies Hhich will lead them to understand th t rance's partic ati n in Alliance affairs may be diminished re u1 1rly until they are willin to a ree to some restructuring of the Al1iance--never set forth in detall--more to de Gaulle's lildn and 2 actually to bring about such a restructurin g by-unilaterally creatin situations of fact in hich France continues to particioate in Alliance military affairs but on bases other than those of integrated commands The A ' Fj LF problem has not provoked a holly new CaulUst ooUcy toward NATO rather it is sharpenin and s eedinp un the nolicy that existed The difference'is that arising in a new framework the French problem may become acute s ooner ratller - than later ' Since this problem basically concerns the place if any which France is to continue to occupy in the estern alliance and its component and related institutions answers must be looked for in terms of t he purpose and nature of the alliance itself France and the Hestern Alliance The purposes of the estern alliance have been variously conceived and observed at different times by the several members but may be summed up in their current standing under two headings 1 To bring together in the most effective possible manner the military resources of the members so as to deter and if necessary to counter Soviet aggression in Europe and Turkey 2 To provide a more or less permanent framework for relations aMon the European arid North American members not only in defense but in other matters and in particular since 1950 to provide a place for West Ciermany which will satisfy its reasonable aspirations and contain any potential unreasonable ones Research Hemorandum P F U-31 French Military Partlc1oation in lIATO iay I 1964 S ir l ' SECRET NO FOREIGN DISS J I-- D - E C ' L-A S S ' FI I 'E D L Authority N JD 101'f SECRET 0 rll 1V Ul OL 1 - 2 These purpose s are of cour se lntl at e ly intertwined but It i uoeful ln con lde rln the French probl em t o dhtin uhh bet cen t ho for pollcies which an swer to one purpos e o y be no r or Ie irrelevant to or even ln contradiction with t oe othe r In uc ca e priorities would be established by balanc in a i n' on one count a al ns t losses on the other No att oop t i m do here to est ll ah a balance hee t of t he DIu and minus of France ' role aa an allv I aln t t ho Soviet thre3t a an actor large l y IndeDenden t of It o al lies on the world st3 e a re or Ie uncooDe rative p 1 rtlcln nt In th e hu il ln of t he tlan tlc cO ' '1un ltv and a main' tay of ' est Germ flv ' po litical rthah llit tlon ru t it i s nos i ble to s l l Oal n n e r of tOnic th at ouJd he car efuJ1-t studied In reckonlnP up the value of France's p rtlcl tlnn hit he rt o In e tHn lll nee affairs and t he loa es if any wh i ch it denarture ' ul tal1 Among the que tions to I b con ld re un c r t he flr t he rlln would be hat would be t he lopUcdtio of Frenc lIithdr l fr ' ATO on the objective millt ry position of th e all1ancp on th e Soviet sae s n t of t hat po ltlon nnd on Soviet ollcies which h ve been Jt r on lv influenced by the alllnnce's Ml1itnry Do ture of trenr-th l at outd be the Impllcntion of t he los of Frnnce on the milltary sl niflc an c of US doctrine of tle db le r oMe 110 1 ' culd toe othe r nt ll r enct to t h withdr al In par tIcular oul t ey--Inclu1In o tho e that i ' t join the F--b e o re or Ie oo ll ely to Make the efforts ne e e to rl np t h l r aT le f forces un to t he level of the tlll unachieved ' ATO f crce -oals Assuoln a I li k ly t ha t the French asked lATO to re ve Its -Installati on s fTor- Fr an ce--lnclltrltn not bl ' contr ibute t o th e sub tantlal c t its heac1 c O rtC r3 -- oult' t C alltes of olocatln t hes e faCilities 'hat on t e other hand is Frnnce'l present m111t - contribution to th e alll ance lorth includb c Itl real estate In t ro $ of present jud e t on the nature of the Sovle t thre t Itself and on the a all l1J e l1hood of a S viet attacl If France rli not leave ATO 'mulel It be possi ble to wor out n11it rll atlafactory rran e 1ent for 1 ee01n Frenc ' forces nvn11 nhle to the nlliance without the Inte t ution th t de Gaulle oP o e Do the pre se n t cooneratlve A9 r ements Ilnk ln deInte ra te d French naval forces to SACLA rr and Cr CC'lA '1 afford a orece ent In thla res pe ct i1ght de roaulle' repe terl offers eve ttuolly t coordinAte French nuclear forces with TATO have any military or other significance fnr th e alliance If SACEL were n de ComMander of the NATO MeMbers' jOint Mlaaile foree de Gaulle coul 3 lntaln that SI APE had become in effect the c and pOlt on French soil for a nuclear force of which France vas not a membe r and which had been ille ally Inte rated into ATO military machinerY without French a sent He would prohably 1n th oo e circumstancea ask SHAPE to leave France ut he ml ht do no lesa if a he would ay the ANF in effect replaced NATO under aome new allied eommander and SACEU rema ined aa comcnnder of only a shell of the former alliance S CRETf FOREIG OF C I ASSlfIEJ Au hority N i 1011 '1 L DISSEM --------------- SECRET 1 0 FORE I G j DISSE I - 3 - Under the - above-J lentioned community-buildin g purpos e of the Atlantic llii ance French withdraHal from iATO also raises important questions for i lO tra-alli a nce relation sh i ps m a t ould remain without France would not be t he same alliance min us one meJ lber but would be qualitatively different A key point in this respect would be tho role of Pest Germany Since 1950 the states of Hes tern Eurone have developed institutions by which the revival of Gemany was to be balanced and contained within organizations of wh ich France was the principal othe r member The European institutions-in addition to ATO itself which r ermanv did not join until 1955--are a major part of the -system defining Gemany's Dlace in the t-lestern alliance Eve n if as is li k ely de Gaulle does not disrupt the European co unities the political Withdrawal of France would mean that Germany remained the principal military partner of the United States in Europe and as such the principal continental member of the alliance _ What Hould the smaller allies make of this particularly those for whom the Atlantic alliance has become an important means of containingll Germany Would not the disappearance of a certain sub-balance of p er within the European part of the Atlantic alliance system mean that the United States would have to fill the gap itself becoming more deeply involved in intra- Europe an affairs -lhat would be the effects on these sma ller allies of the anti-German campaign launched by Paris which would be likely to a ccompany de Gaulle's pullout and of uhich there were already hints during the high point of -ILF t ensions in Oct -Eov 1964 llbat would be the effect of this c amp aign in France itself and its implications for a post-de Gaulle res tora tion of the old Franco-German tie Can it be assume d that de Gaulle f 5 successors France's empty chair in an alliance interval and in wh ich Germany would the USSR and other Eastern Euro pean this dissension in the Hes t muld be able sir lply to return to which would have moved on in the be a yet wei htier force Hm ould countries seek to take advantage of Preliminary Considerations In Ouest of a Solution The preceding parag r aphs suggest some of the problems that are likely to arise as a result of French withdraHal from lIATO If after study of thes e and other problems the US were to conclude that some effort sh9Uld be made to search for means to o revent this the uestion would then aris What would be ge C-aulle's price to call he ' matter by its right name for refrainln from t akin the actions prejudicial to estern unity Hhich it now seems he will ta ke at once i f the AXF ' fLF comes into beine and by 1969 in any case It is prudent a nd proper to state immediately that de Gaulle's price would at best be hi gh - - perhaps too hil h for the US to consider paying The chances of reaching an agreement with him are probably worse than they were before the HLF Has conceived Present chances of reaching such an agreement are probably a good deal less than even The followin g comme nts are made on t h is basis I t is probable to be in ith that no persuading no explanation of the ANF's purposes - ould suffice to deter de Gaulle His stakes--the SECRET O DECLASSIFIED AUlhoril ' NtJD103'-A FOREIGN DISS I SECRET NO FORJ IGN DISSE' - 4nature of the future Europe and France's place in it--are very hi h To be able realistically to entertain hope of deflecting him from l eavi g NATO if the force is established an important shift in US olicy would be a cle ar necessity Preli inary to any discussion of actual policy adjus t ment s by either side it is orth considering the adjust ments on what migh t be called t'le psychological level that ould be called for The most pror lisin ap roach 'lOuld be for the Unite d States to be willing to act 00 the ass ption that ome a re o ent with France is bett er than no agreement hen broad a ree'11ent is il11 o sible Since American and French grand d si ns for the Atlantic area and for estern Eut'o e as presently understood are not compatibl e the questions to be answered are wh ther nevertheless there arc any overarchin3 consi er- ations that brin the t JO f overnnents to ether anrl lo'hethcr in cas e there are they can devise connon lolicies that can cooe dth all of their common pt'oblens The analo y of the course of recent F ast- e t rel ations is su cstive in this respec t Pundits in short-han terms have described this rel ationship by saying that the United States and the USSR do not agree on the ultimate state of the world which each is orking to develop but they do aRree to abstain from nuclear ar witb each ot er to oro ote their long- term policies there fore they agree to compete by other Means Do the United States and France still have enou h in cornman to be able tacitly to agree to limit their disagreements One critical area in which such com non interest ' ould a pear if is that of policy to ard the Soviet Union Can a inirnum basis of political and technically adequate military cooperation be found visa-vis the USSR There are certainly differences bet'Aeen Hashington and Paris on the correct tactics to be applied to relations with the USS there 1s also competition for the decisive role of foremost l' estern interlocutor with t he USSR over terms of an eventual German and Central European settlement loMtheless the ultimate security problems posed to both the US and France by the Soviet military threat and by Soviet external a bitions would appear to provide an i ortant foundation for American-French cooperation Even here a problem might arise if de Gaulle insisted on carryin into effect to the letter the nachronistic notions of wartime coooeration he tween allies that he has presented an he re Related to thiS of course is the question of the function that lvestern alliance mechanisms are to play If either the US or France decided that these instrumentalities were themselves to he used primarily to promote the intra-European or intra-alliance political policies of Washington or PariS then even a minimum agreement would hardly be possible But if it became apparent that the United States government had concluded that the present nature of the Soviet threat required an attempt to handle certain particularly military intra-allied relationships mainly as a function of that threat rather than in terms of community-building or of other intra-allied non-military relationships de Gaulle mi ht then judge that the US was prepared to pursue a dialogue with him on - SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM DECLASSIFIED Authority_ N OJOl4C i FOREIGN DISSEM - 5 specifics The United States and France ma als in common 0 have another conce to see that their competition does not contribute to brinping 33 38 Eiarer to the national possession of nuclear weapons assuming rema b1 ever be so inclined as it now appears not to be It is a that the US and France both consider this an undesirable but that a chain of events in which both have participated has to a Situation in which the question of Germany's relationship to nuclear weaponry has become a principal international preoccupation Would it be possible for the two governments-to agree that this domain like that of their cooperation against potential Soviet aggression should be excluded from their competition Even if both the United States government and de Gaulle could agree that they have these common interests an important problem would still remain Not only is de Gaulle's policy based on the idea of reducing American political influence in Western EurOpe and of reducing its military presence over the next decade as a means to this end but he seems to have a fixation that the United States is conspiratorially acting to block his success by every means He sees the MLF or AMP as the latest American device to this end In this atmosphere any American presentation or even offer to de Gaulle would be met with suspicion Heaningful political dialogue has been suspended between the two governments for so long that it would seem that no business could be done between them on major issues until it is restored until the cloud that de Gaulle hasspread around himself in the direction of the United States is broken through The illness is de Gaulle's but the antibiotic if there is one would have to be supplied by the United States It is easier however to diagnose the problem than to suggest remedies All that can be said is that somehow de Gaulle would have to be convinced that whatever disagreements exist between the two governments they still have sufficient interests in common to be able to do business on the specifics of those interests The word specifics is perhaps the key to such a breakthrough if one is possible There is little use discussing abstractions with de Gaulle such as European integration or the merits of integrated versus coordinated military forces Progress would be conceivable only if de Gaulle became convinced that issues of this kind could be left aside and that bargaining could take place on precise practical questions The implications of this problem were analyzed in RM France Eurooe and the United States Five Months Later June 19 1963 This is not so say that there has been a failure of communication between the two governments While de Gaulle puts the blackest color on American policies he is not wrong nor is the US government in judging that present long range goals of each are incompatible Political dialogue as used here means not mutual explanations no matter how candid but explora- tion of possible areas of agreement even if within a framework of broad disagreement Such dialogue need not preclude continued public diSpute on other matters FOREIGN DISSEM DECLASSHHED Authori SECRET INO FORJ l '1 Ul W - 6 - Elements of a Limit ed Under tandin If the US r overnment decided' to try this limited anoroach in an attempt to persuade de Gaulle to do or abstain from doing certain thin s ' if a dialogue were su ested to him for the purpose of seekinS limited areas of a reementn on soecifics and if he resnonded favor bly in principle then it ould be time to outline to him the rnain headings of the kind of package deal that we desired The followin g examples of such main headings are frav rnentary iMperfectly worked out and unex lored as to some of their imnlications favorable and unfavorable Thev are meant to suo est the kinn of apenda that our understandin of Fren h oolicv indi cat s ould be called for i f it were I ashim ton's considered judr m nt to seek a dialop ue ith de Gaulle and if beforehand the sycholo ical at n sl herc had been cleared to facilitate the attempt to develop such a give-and-take exch3 n 1 What de Gaulle Would Be Exoected To Do as His Part of a argain a NATO In general terms subject to c reful refine e t de Gaulle would be expected to take no action in ATO against the estahlishment of the 'IF to halt his slo -1 HithdraHal of French military forces from JATO or at least to ar ree in principle and in advance to reassi n then on a bas is that as il1tarlly satisfactory to the alliance to desist from or at least to mininize verbal attacks on the existence structure and functionin of ATO and to agree not to give notice of intention to withdrau fr o the Atl mtic Pact when it beca e legally possibl e for Fra lce to do so in 1968 or at the very least not to ma' e knOtm 'i510n to give such notice until that time and in that case to inform the United States thereof six months in advance of the ti e for givin3 notice in order that t e t'l m overnr ents could carry out to etheT privately a revi of the possible future of the alliance If de Gaulle would agree to this much the rob l em of France's relations i th lATO ould not be solved but time would be gaine d After all ho knows here he and e and the alliance will be in 1969 b Non-Proliferation In addition to these im ortant but ne gative concessions by ne Gaulle it is just possible that France might agree i f the overall arran err ent nere sufficiently attractive to something more ositive viz participation in a non-proliferation a reement The French say they do nnt favor the further spread of nuclear yea ons but de Gaulle has stated that he considers it nevertheless to be inevitable In any case de Gaulle's O1m netermination to build Q nuclear fnrce for reasons of his own political-military policies has not been and will not be affected by the possible spur thus given to other to follow the lame nuclear course But this does not necessarily mean that he might not lee some benefit in having the five world powers or possibly even the four of them now in the U N join in an agreement--excludin coercion on others--pled in8 themselves not to promote the development of nuclear forces by other nations SECRET NO FOREIGN DISS M DECLASSIFIED AUlhu'i'y N D1Q r FOREIGN DISSEM - 7 2 De Gaulle's Conditions a French Status De Gaulle's most basic political aim is to establish and secure recognition of the independence of France and of its status as a great power entitled to be in on virtually all major decision- making throughout the world His 1958 memoranda proposing what has come to be called a three-power directorate constituted a move to secure such recognition from the United States and the United Kingdom This question remains unspoken but unfinished business for de Gaulle Any attempt to improve relations with France would probably have to include some American give on this subject If the French were asked to buttress their claim to great power status and if they were willing to try to justify what they consider a self-evident fact their reasoning would run thus Who are the permanent members of the Security Council US UK France China properly Communist China who are the nuclear powers US UK France Communist China who are the main powers in the Atlantic alliance US UK France and to some degree west Germany who are the main powers in German affairs US UK France to some degree West Germany who are the most influential foreign powers in Africa US UK France the USSR and Communist China- Hho are the main powers in Southeast Asia US UK France and Communist China What western powers have all these claims to status Exactly three US UK France Q E D This points up the fact that much of the earlier discussion about the directorate has for one reason or another missed the heart of the issue De Gaulle did not propose a three-power directorate only or even mainly 'giggin the Atlantic alliance he seeks one over and outside it What he wanted was to have the three western powers with worldwide responsibilities and status make plans for joint action in all areas of the world and to have these plans FOREIGN DISSEM DECLASSIFIED authority Q'LCZ q SECRh NO FOREIGN DISSEM - 8 - transmitted to and carried out by such regional organizations--includin NATO--as might exist The example he had in mind s the rtime relat 70nshl p between the United States and the British as he saw--and experienced-- t US objections to establishing such a directorate are well knovn and need not be repeated here But if three-power arrangements within the Atlantic alliance which de Gaulle did not ask for are no longer possible that they were routine up to about 1956 is evidenced by the existence of the ATO Standing Group because of the assumed adverse effect on lfest Germany ItalY and the smaller members there are perhaps two possibilities of giving de Gaulle some satisfaction on the issue outside the alliance Both are suggested in a recent speech by Pr ime Hinister Poml'idou who noted that the five nuclear powers are also the five per anent members of the Security Council or will be when the United Nations eventually come s to agree with France and thc UK that Peking is entitled to the Chinese seat In the first case by fact and in the second by the terms of the United Nations Charter France is a mell'ber of an exclu ive club of five world powers and within these clubs of a 'Jestern sub-caucus of three Would it not be possible for the US to turn this to good account One possibility would be to initiate three-power estern consultations as preparation for five-power negotiations on such matters as stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons Germany and the smaller members of NATO could not reasonably object too strongly to France's inclusion with the US and the UK in such talks Then once the three powers had acquired what might become or at least seem to become a habit of meeting on these subjects the range of their consultations might be somewhat broadened Some kind of regular staff ing might even be established to prepare these consultations Ind eed institutionalized assurance to France by the US and UK of advance consultation on arms control and security issues might eventually induce France to assume its vacant seat at the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Conference A broader framework for three-power consultation and tharefore one more likely to appeal to de Gaulle could be established on the basis of a suggestion made by Harold Wilson and by others over the years to the effect that an annual Summit take place in the form of a regular meeting of the Security Council or of its permanent members at the heads of state or government level It would be logical that such a session be preceded by a meeting of the representatives of the Wes ern participants the United States Great Britain and France This meeting in turn might be prepared by a session of the foreign ministers of these countries some months ahead and perhaps by the work of some kind of staff or secretariat established for the purpose SECRET No FOREIGN DISSEM DECLASSIFIED Authority NIJD101LJ 1 SEX REl' No FOREIGN DISS' - 9 The details would depend in part on the IlB ture of the East-Hest cont3 ct that was to be established the more regular and organized this laS to be the more regular and organized the Western lub-caucus could be hich as noted above is not to say that the estern powers could not agree on such regular meetings without tying them to an East- est Sa t The point is that a three-po er pseudo-directorate of this kind would give as little offense to Germany which might be compensated in other 'ays and is not in any case a member of the UN and other WO allies as ar arrangement that can be imagined for the scale and emphasis of meetings at t his level and in this framework would obviously be far wider than North Atlantic and European affairs This of course is just the scale that de Gaulle asked for in his 1958 memoranda The word pseudo-directorate is used above to describe this arrangement because it is obviously out of the question for the three major Y estern powers to try to manage restern affairs in the way that de Gaulle thinks the US and the UK managed alliance affairs in World ' Iar II It is not clear however to what extent de Gaulle in his 1958 memoranda was seeking the status which the establishment of such an arrangement would give France and to what extent he was actually seeking three-power planning The question cannot be answered except in practice The foregoing outline however would go far toward dealing with the problem insofar as it is a question of status-seeking But further there is no reason to take de Gaulle's every word at face value or to think that what he proposed in his 1958 memoranda or in any other form is necessarily his last word on the subject De Gaulle like everyone else knows how to ask for more than he may expect to get We should have no illusion however that if de Gaulle were given some such status satisfaction as that mentioned above as part of a package deal with him agreement on all issues between France and its allies will follow ere common policies can be worked out well and good But de Gaulle's free-wheeling in Southeast Asia and elsewhere is related to his deeply motivated drive to convince the French people that they are the masters of their own fate and to convince allies enemies and others of it as well Discussion with de Gaulle may blunt this drive to show the flag but will not end it The justification other than to improve the atmosphere for exploring such an arrangement with France as that discussed here is not the hope of ending all friction but of winning de Gaulle's agreement on the other concrete items in the package b Nuclear Relationships It is out of the question that de Gaulle would agree to any NATO or Atlantic arrangement by which France would give up control of its independent nuclear force If the US accepts this fact at least for de Gaulle's tenure of office it might be possible to arrange SEX ru 'T NO FOREIGN DISSEM DECLASSIFIED AUlhority NIJD1OlLf1 j r i I SECRET No FOREIGN DISS M - 10 - I I for the coordination of allied nuclear forces certain American forces the French force the British force while it remains nationally controlled and in some fashion the ANF if it is established Each force wouldro rewdi n o under the entire control of its government or in the case of the ' r lts governing authority but plans could be made to coordinate the utilization of each in wartime including common r ge in ' and other appropriate actions The United States would assist in the targeti of the French nuclear forces in such a manner that they would be available for suitable use by the French government on its own decision Entirely apart from the small d1itary gains thus acquired the benefits to the United States of the education that French officers could acquire in this way in the facts of nuclear life might not be negligible in the long run The United States would contribute to an improvement in Franco-US re1 tions if when entering into such a cooperative arrangement it diminished its open criticism of the existence of the French nuclear force In fact now that five years have passed since the first French nuclear detonation the force could be publicly treated in much the same way as is the UK force without thus adversely impinging on US efforts to prevent further nuclear proliferation In addition and regardless of the public line taken the US would probably find it necessary to reduce if not to eliminate the obstacles now raised to French purchase in the United States of wAterials and equipnent useful to the development of the French nuclear force The importance of this can hardly be overestimated De Gaulle is a great believer in the principle that acts as he understands them speak louder than words No US verbal acceptance of the fact of the French nuclear force would mean much to him if the US continued to act in a manner which he would see as a continuing attempt to block its development and to treat France in a much less favorable way than the UK is treated in this regard Indeed he is quite capable of believing--and may believe now--that verbal concessions are intended to hide from him the hard fact of continued US hostility to his policies c Further Nuclear Relationships If these American concessions were not sufficient to bring de Gaulle to accept even the minimum concessions asked of him by the US the one additional move that might be decisive would be a broader agreement on positive US nuclear assistance to France It should be noted here that there seems little basis for the widely held view that de Gaulle would reject help for his nuclear force because he wants every nut and bolt of it to be French The KC-l35 deal in itself should refute this idea t is critical for the French rather are the conditions not the fact of outside aid Obviously the more that is offered to de Gaulle in the way of assistance to his nuclear program the more likely he will be to make concessions in return SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM DECLASSIFiED AUlhorily NND 1014 1 FOREIGN DISSEM - 11 maattempt is made here to catalogue the kinds of nuclear assistance that be C n$1deredo One example is mentioned however because it has not received much attention in discussions of the matter This would be assistance to France in developing tactical nuclear weapons or the outrinht transfer of such weapons with warheads to France As French weapons systems became less crude French strateoic doctrine might also become less crude and less dangerous French doctrine is now determined by the narrow constraints of French possibilities Massive retaliation is emphasized because it suits the very limited weaponry likely to be under French control in the next decade Diversification of weaponry would no doubt lead to sonhistication of stratezv bringine nuances into French doctrine which would at the least brine it some- what nearer to American doctrine Such diversification would also help to build up the position of the French army at present the increasingly poor relation in the family of the French armed services and with it in the nature of the case a greater influence for doctrines of flexible response While de Gaulle would remain the arbiter of French military affairs during his tenure there seems no reason why even he might not modify his present stratecic doctrines if he possessed the wherewithal to allow it And after his passing the French might feel that the possession of tactical nuclear weapons would permit them to abandon exclusively national control of their costly and marginal stratecic force without losing their special nuclear -and therefore political--role in Europe 3 Germany There is one other topic on which it would be well for the US and France to reach a minimum of acrecment Germany This would be what miqht be called a bilateral non-dissemination agreement between then with respect to West Germany Under this compact de Caulle would accent the decree of German participation in nuclear weaponry involved in the AHF but the parties would make clear to each other that neither would assist the Germans further down the nuclear path This would involve no substantive change of policy on the part of the two governments for just as the United States has made clear that the ANF would not lead on to German national nuclear weapons so de Gaulle certainly has no intention at present of sharing control of French weapons or nuclear knowhow with anyone hat is important is that the two states agree to stick to these positions and to refrain from competing for Germany's favor by offering nuclear bait This deal might be facilitated by a US commitment not to seek to turn the ANF into an anti-French political instrument within NATO or the Six See RM REU-Z Notes on French Strategic Doctrine January 15 1 65 FOREIGN DISSEM DECLASSIFIED Authori i SECRET '110 FOREI GN DISS t 'l - 12 - 4 Agreement to Dis agree If the United States and France reached limited agreement along the lines sketched above they would at the same time agree to disar r ee on other subjects In particular they would understand that each would continue to oursue its 0 '11 Atlantic and European policies The difference betHeen th situation in this case and that which will exist if there is no limited a reement is that they would pursue their competition as state d earlier by other means 1I that is by not dra ling all subjects in which they have interests into the competition It would obviously be a major concession for de Gaulle to agree to pursue his European desi ns without callin all Atlantic military relationships into question and in particular to llo his r r s that hi s courtship of Hest Germany 1Ould be irrevocably set back by German adherence to an Atlantic missile force Presumably he mi gh t come to accept this--if at all--only if his interests were advanced on other fronts as outlined above There would also be problems for the United States in seemin to give the Rreen li gh t not of course it should be emphasized to de Gaulle's designs but to his pursuit of them 1O ever while this kind of agreement would no doubt appear to be a success for Gaullist policy and hile some difficulty with Germany and others might be anticipated from it it would not be equivalent to handing over Hestern Europe to de Gaulle There is no si gn that the other states of the area are at all incli n to subordinate thens e lves to Pnris and in fact it is clear th' t t le surge of sentiment among Hest Europeans for independence of the Unit-ad States does not exist to the extent that de Gaulle himself and numerous writers includinl1 many Americans had judged That this should be the case at a time when East-l' est tensions are less sharp than in the past presents something of a paradox Perhaps the ans er lies in the fact not only that the US provides better securitv against whatever threat the USSR is still thou ht to pose and not only that de Gaulle's bal d effort to establish French hegemony is resented everywhere in Europe but also that most Europeans remain satisfied with a structure of inter-allied relationships marked by American leadershio of the alliance De Gaulle s challen e by presentin a clear and unacceptable alternative seems actually to have crystallized support among l est European 'lovernments for American leadership and also perhaps staved off more subtle and potenti lJy more successful challenges The preparation for any such dialogue with ce Gaulle as that considered here would have to include careful study of uhether this kind of payoff to de Gaulle to keep France associated ith NATO for several years desoite the establishment of the ANF mi ht drive other European governments into the ams of France or whether the very facts both of the F's establishment and of the counteroal mce of the type of French success ostulated here would not between them enable the United States to continue with dexterous management of affairs to count on the support of most of these SECRET NO FOREIGN DISS I DECLASSIFIED AUlhority NtJD1Oi49 o - L_ S CRET I1' o FOREIGX DISSr - 13 - resistin ne ative Euro ean the aspects of de Gaulle's governments for schemes and for advancin American long term oals The oint of departure of such studies ould be the evi ent fact that for all his power of destruction and blackmail de Gaulle has failed sip nally to advance his European policies since his veto on January 14 1963 of UK membership in the Common ' arket and that therefore the US would be dealing with him if it came to do so from a position of inmense strength I J - - Modalities If it were decided to undertake anv such dialo e with de Gaulle the mOdalities would obviously have to be handled with ut ost care for his own susceptibilities as lie know are remarkably acute and those of the allies Might become hardly less so in the process The critical importance of a psychological brea through to de Gaulle has already been discussed above This implies probably careful intimation to de Gaulle with symbolic gestures that some changes in American Dolicy towards France mi ght be forthcomin in certain circumstances UthDut entering into the complex details of this subject we 1Ould estimate that 1 a useful means of mru ing known to de Gaulle that such DrDposals mi ght be made while assuring ourselves of German sup ort for the plan would be to maneuver the Federal RepubUc--already surely sOr 1cHhat alarned at the thought of France's breaking off the reconciliation and leaving NATO-into taking the first steps in Paris thus using the at osph ere created during Erhard's visit on January 19-20 1965 and 2 the substance of the package should be broached to de Gaulle by the President himself in a special meeting for the purpose Point 2 particularly seems an indispensable element of the psycholo ical brea through discussed above Conclusion This sketch of the possible terms of a limited a reeme nt with de Gaulle Is not pres en t ed as an argW lent for such an a reeT11e 'l t or even for a chan e in the present US approach to the French problem It only suggests the kinds of things that de Gaulle mi ght possibly agree to and the kinds of things that lvould at a minimum be necessary to cause him to carry out the major reversal of his policy hich French tolerance of the ANF ould 'involve It may be objected that it is hard to think that de Gaulle ould thus limit his freedom of action in pursuit of his policies even in return for the concessions that the United ' States might make to him l o eve r this cannot be known until the US mal es the attemp t On the other hand it may be concluded that if these are de Gaulle's minimum conditions then any See RM REU-50' De Gaulle At Bay Septe b er 2 1964 SiNFUl To the extent that momentum is not resumed in the lIest durins 1965 t rds creating an IF de Gaulle rill not feel his policies so acutely challentied by the US and ill be less tempted to early destruction of NATO machinery To this extent US policy concess i ons for achieving the type of limited agreement ith him outlined he re might not have to enter t he picture But thes e oves ould still havc relevance if t he re ere a desire in asl i n g ton to i Mp rove rel a t ions l l i th Paris quite independent l y of t he A '1 F issue or to stave off p r o re s s ive French disengagenent fro ATO SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM - -- DECLASSIFIED Authority NIJD1014q S X FU 'I' NO FOfGIGN DISSEX - 14 question of a bargain with him yould have to be dismissed out of hand yhatever the consequences because the price for the US yould be too high This of course is a judgment for US poiicy-makers to reach In this connection it is certa inly true that yhile it is analytically useful to distinguish among various French or US policies--e g tOYards the USSR tOYards I ATO towrds Germsny--it is in practice difficult t o be sure that once it had been decided to begin bargainlng this process could be confined to only certain particular segments of selected policies Reality may turn out to be too interconnected to permit profitable or safe exploration of this kind of pragmatic limited approach If for these or other reasons a fruitful political dialogu such as that outlined here cannot be established betYeen the United States and de Gaulle then this fact should be clearly faced It yould mean that since the tyO governments differ on long range fundamentals their inability to agree on limiting their competition in pursuit of their divergent goals yould almost certainly exclude even the narroyest kind of modus vivendi bet en t hem In that case then anything goes --and it can be expected that much yould SFX RET No FOREIGN DISSEH DECLASSIFIED Authority NtJD-w l '- This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu