r - INR REPORT AND RELEASE FORM The producing office is responsible for obtaining clearance of tf epo t from appropriate Departmental Bureaus other thnn P which DDR orronges classified reports RFII_11 DATE COMPL DI t ' -t t NUMBER OF PAGES 28 '_11 oo l ' REPORT NO This form and appropriate distribution lists must be submitted in duplicate to OoR with each INR issuance INR obtains Departmental clearance befol e releasing any INR report outside the Deportment of State The Coordination Stoff INR CS arranges clearonce of '- TITLE OF REPORT Possible Implicatioas of a Substantial Cutback of US Forces in Europe REQUESTOR Agen cy Unit if State N ame Self-init PRODUCER OfficoJ Di REQUESTOR'S DUE DATE State CLEARANCES Other INR Offi Supervisor Project Anclyst REU RA Mae8l l 'De DePorte Packman Clement CalPs JohnS Deary Gardner Hostie D1Scuillo Bell None C LEARANCE OF UNCLASSIFIED REPORT Other Oeportmentol officers - RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DISTRIBUTION NOTE All INR issuances fall under the provisions of DCID 117 This directive defines the various markings that con trol disseminat ion of copies and or use of the information in reports these markings are additional to security classification Control marking is important when Q report includes information from another agency DISTRIBUTION WITHIN THE U S GOVERNMENT If it is necessary to limit distribution to specific recipients only please ex ploin in space marked Comments at bottom of form o r commend d for release outside tn Deportment of Statoo Mark DEPARTMENT OF STATE ONLY NO FOREIGN OISSEM CON- Iii o TROLLED DISSEM Recommended for release to Stat and USIS ogencies Mark CONTROLLED DISSEM Reports mark d CONTROLLED DISSEM may nat be released to civilian contractors without permission frOln the originoting ogency Report moy be released to any U S Government a Jency RELEASE TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS INR' general policy is to release as many reports as possible consistent with security and sensitivity If an exception is mode it i s especially important that the report be mark d NO FOREIGN DISSEM because otherwise USIS agencies may release to foreign governments the information in any INR repo rt nat sp clossifi d OCID 1 7 and posts overseas may elease the report itself at their discretion 11 FAM 600 Answer the questions below If any question is cnecked Yes the report must be NO FOREIGN DISSEM with the following ex ceptian in the case of information from onoth r agency permission can b r quested through INR CS Does this Reeort contain No Yo statements which might discl ose US polic ' or agroo ments in the process of formulotian or not yet revealed 0 Xl 0 statements about other countries which shoulcl not be reveal d to fo -eigners 0 Xl classified information cleorance for which must be obtained from another agency foreign goverllment or other non Deportmental intelligenc scurce prior to releose 0 0 information which is the property of p -ivate companies or individuals thot should net b released information which for an ' other reason should not be r leosed If Yes ' e plain be lew under Comments RECOMMENDATIONS 00 0 Recommended for releon to UK Canoda Australia and New Zeoland NOTE NO FOREIGN OISSEM don not preclude distrI_ bution to thue countries if appropriate Oepartmental concurrence is obtained Copie released to these countr ies will be oppropriotely marked 0 Recom mended for release to all NATO countr ies Australro and New Zealand COMM ENTS recommended for release to I foreign povernment Mark NO FOREtGN DISSEM DEPA RTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED IP R V 1966 IC D IIS B II DR ROOM 7818 NS E 0- TY PE D NAME jREU RA - Frank E Maestrone S RE U kL HiHI GN IiJ tDJl L DATE I 6 lfofo DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM DECLASSIFIED Att Authoriry t 1J '19 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEK CONTROLLED DISSEK f ileJ I tch JlleJJto taJtduIJ'Jt U S DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIRECTOR OF INTElLIGENCE AND RESEARCH REU-33 April 26 1966 To Through From The Secretary SIS INR - Thomas L Hughes Subject Possible Implications of a 1JfJ Subst tlal Cutback of US Forces in Europe This paper examines some of the possible implications for US relations with the other members of the Atlantic Alliance which could result from a significant reduction in the context of the Vietn conflict of the size of US ground and or air forces stationed in Europe prt arily in the Federal Republic of Germany This study does not deal specifically wi th the 11111 ted telllporary drawdown of 15 000 US troops in Geraany for Vie tn_connected reasons which was recently announced However it is not expected that the iaplications of this development will affect the eoncluaions' drawn here in connection with a more substantial reduction ABSTRACT The reactions of the other me oers of the Atlantic Alliance to a possible US decision to carry out a substantial reduction SO OOO troop or over of its ground and air forces stationed in Western Europe now totaling about 320 000 men owing to delUllde on aanpower iapo ed by the Vietnam cOllflict would be condi tioned by various previously fOnllld outlooks specifically 011 1 the extent of confidence in US leadership of the Atlantic Alliance which despite various challenges in recent years is still welca ed and desired by every Alliance member except France and 2 the lack of any real sense of involve- ment on the part of the European allies except in part the OX in the Far Eastern fighting and their cdncern over possibly adverse repercussions to their own national interests if the war in Vietnaa should escalate to a still broader and more serious conflict fra which they would wish iucre ingly to be dissociated This latter attitude will cause them to view a US troop withdr al SBCRET NO FOREIGN DISSEK DECLASSIFI ED COHT1lOLLED DISS M Authoriry 't A ECLASS 1 Lority UtljS JI SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSBM CCIfTJI OLLED DISSBM - 11- in t ra of narrow r European rather than global con id rationoo While th tilling and deftne of handling of any _jor troop cutback would of cours haYe _ch bearing on th r actiOll thus cr at d in Europe it doe not on the whole that if the prooent RAf6 crie1 had not developed a drawdawn of force would b likely to haY a great and i d1at 1y d ging ff ct Xl US relati0D8 with any oth r er of th Alliance a US _ At the _ ti_ auch would poae1b1y encourage certain trenda already rident in a nUllb r of IIAto countrieoo tOllard adoptill8 poaiti0D8 of areat r political nerlbility vi -a-ri the US within the Alliance To so deare th re would be a c _ reaction in 11 or abloat all of the alli d countri s in other respecta their respoaa s would very Thus it ie _ t unlikely that aT oth r country would attupt to build up ita own ar d forces to taka up the alack left by a US r duction So not d be1_ would judge that i f the tIS felt af in uing ub tantial cutbacks they the_ se1ve could a1 0 r duce th ir own _ller llilitary cOIItributiona without aadua ri k In addition a US cutback would tend further to und r1I1n the cceptability in We tem Europe - a1r ady _11 - graduated response to an attack of US atratepc COllC pta of 1111ited or Tbie hCIIF ver o b of lll1it d overall a1gn1ficance to the US or to _ t European dnce the 1att r either ha taken little inter st in diecuea10ns of etraUIY b ca e they did not rate th chance of a Sovi t attack very highly or would actually walc a US r turn to o-ca11ed mudve retaliation doctrine which would oooo to b the logical coaa q_ce of a large US reduction However the o t oo rious general prOb1oo nOlI likely to ari e in cODDection with a US decieion to r duc ita forcee in lurope would t fro ita coincidence SEClBT lJO FOREIGN DISSBM CONTROLLED DISSBM SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSIII - i11- in H_ witb the cr18is created by the Freach attadt on BATO If tbe prob1e created by Fr ce had been settled satisfactorily by the ti a cutback took place the US would clearly have easier sailing in this oft If not bowevar aD active suapicion of a decline in US interest in EuropeaD affairs b ed on the apparent evid nc of the r duction ou1d be likely to be foet red in the at_phere of cOllfuaion created by French _ s It 18 of course po ible to i_gin a broad s tt1_t of A1liaDC8 affain whereby th French probl would b adjuated in one way or aDother without aD absolute US break with Franc wher by Ge s curity concerna would be fairly ell satisfied in so aanner aDd whereby in th18 context a US cutbadt Eght be in consonance rather thaD at odds with other trends in the Alliance Short of th18 however a _jor US c utbadt would eaken US argu ents and leadership -- above all ts-a-vis the Federal Republic of Ge y -- at the worst possible mo ent Even then it is not likely that the Alliance would collapse but the double strain on its solidarity -- frOia France aDd fro AMrica -- would puah ven farther those trenda referred to above which Eght ha been advanced by a US cutbadt in any c When re teving individual country situations which could d velop a result of such US action it 18 obvioua that the FaG would be far and IItIBY the oet blportant and critical c e becauae 1 being leaat convinced of the with the USSR it therefore re ns detente the ost sensitive of all to security proble in gsneral and conlequently il the molt concerned about the military cootent of ita alliance with the United Statel and 2 the FIG is already the strona st military sociate of the US on the European continent and will play an even more i ortant role pulls out proportionately in the Alliance to the degree that France A US force r duction would not drive the F deral Republic to SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSIII CONTROLLED DISSIII DECLASSIF L ority U 1J3 j SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM - iv - D_ napa 11 0 or to Pari or into ilolation because even a di tnished US tlitary presence backed up by Aaerican nuclear powar would be of prime ilipOrtllllC8 to any relpon ible We t Geraan Gove nt aa a suarantee of itl ultl ate ecurity But eYen with the lIO t careful ti tng and handling uch US action would encourage the reexamination in Bonn and among public opinion leaders of We t Geraany's foreign policy direction --particularly with reference to the reuaLfication problem in the FIlG a develop_nt which in any event slowly gaining ilipetul Thll trend could be even IIOre pronounced if France in the _uti_ had broken with the Alliance an act which the Geraana would try to prevent i f they could within the conatraint iIIposed by their b ic ca a1DDeDt to the United State The Geraana would no doubt allo leek reaffiraation of US security guarantee and to give these guaranteel further concrete fora ailht presa once more for conc1lS11ion of a nuclear harinl agree_t involving hardware The greater the US cooperation in this respect the are reaction to the cutback would be ted their adver e But in any event uch US reduction symbolizing a priority f r US ca a1tments in the Far Eaat could not but help to stimulate wider rsconsideration of Germany' present foreign policy To be lure for the Germans to look for new cour of action doaa not _an that they would find them but IUch a 110ft by the US would help tep up the pace of the search Unfortunately alurel that might mitigate German reaction to a US force reduction would have the opposite effect in a nu ber of other couatrie While they would all to lome extent regret the US cutback because of its illplicatioal for European security The Netherland Luxembourg Norvay ud De- rlt would be are concerned above sll because of the prolpect of a further enhanc_t of the role of the FIlG in Alliance and European affairs beyond the increaae SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEH I Au ECL L 0rj lGBPi1f _ 'IS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEK CONTROLLED DISSEK - V - already in prospect the result of France's anti-NATO actions countries for others the Alliance as such For these and US leadership of i t are important beceuse they provide a fr ork within which the Federal Republic can be both sathfied and contained Perhaps their strongest objection to de Gaulle's current policies is that he is tampering with the system which for the ti_ baing takes care of thdr GeDlaD probl The U would not be insensitive to these cODsiderations either but the immediate effect of a ubstantial US force withdrawal would be to incre e domestic pre sures for a similar cutback of British forces on the continent in order to save foreign exchange Both because this military presence enhances Britain' role in Europe and because these troop can probably be tntainld more cheaply in Germany than at ho the British govern nt would not he likely to yield to the te tation to follow the American example especially if the US objected strongly Belgium and Luxnboura would allo be encouraged to conl1der cutback in their OIID ar ed forces Indeed it is lION than likely anyway that the Belgians will in fact soon reduce their troop trength -- regardles of any US cutback IIOfta The reactions of Italy Canada and the Netherlands would p at no aerloua difficulties except that the Dutch noted above would be di turbed over the prospect of the increased German influence in Europe Among the Scandinavian members of NATO Demurk and Norway would also be more worried about thh Gel'll8D upect of the 81tuation than about the reductiOll of US troops whUe Icelanct which like Portugal also ukes no contribution of armed forces to the Alliance would evince little intereat in the whole tter SECIET NO FOREIGN DISSEK CONTROLLED DISSEK ECLASSIFI D Authority l 1 J3'tQ ' SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM -vi- Gre ce md Turkey aisht w ll be noticeably cOllcemed they would teDd to pre eveD harder for broad US ail1tary a iltmce prosr_ whil a180 rea e iDS the value of RAra and their WelteTO allimc cODDectioal for d alins with the lecurity threat ltill felt fro Dearly c _ i l t countriel Frmcoo of coune i I a lpecial cue fro leveral POiDts of riew What- r Prmce' I relation to the All1l1Dce aisht be at the tt e IUch a US cutll k took place de Gaulle would obrioudy try to exploit i t to lupport hil a r s - t that the US could not be depended on to defend Burope and wu too ensrosled iD dan erOUI Par But m adventurel On balllDce we beli ye that be would not be abl to wiD _ch politi lupport for Preach policy iUelf with thil li_ but h could add to the Desathe reactiODI of other RATO Countri 1 to the US Indeed u we noted ab_ the double f IIpact of the French ail1tary withdr_el fro RATO IIDd of a lubltmtiel r duction of US forcel iD Burop could caule _It unfavorable coal queDC in the lon run for the attlfaM t of US policy objectiyel in Burope _ thoush the iDittal reperculliODtl I d fairly c la ADd of courle the ultt te depth of the d would d pend sreatly on the d sra to which the war in the Par But broadened further md d to pre age a ltill further uS diainution of itl ail1tary pruenc in Europe SlCDT IO POUIGII DISSBM ctII'l'IOLLID DISSBM DECLASSiF LOrj 1 fffi I SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSa CONTROLLED DISSa - - The Framework of the Problem Any assessment of the reactions in Western Europe to a cutback of US forces stationed there would depend to a considerable extent on the size of the troop reduction the form it took the explanation for it and even lIore on the circumstances of the international situation during which it occurred The evaluation which follows aSSUlles a substantial cutback of 50 000 en or more of the US air and or ground forces in Europe -- frem the approxiJaately 20 000 now present there 225 000 in West Geraany __ and considers the effect that such a lIove would have both on our allies and on the US policy position in Western Europe and in the Alliance as a whole While the attitudes of the other fourteen lIembers of the Alliance are reJll8rkably diverse and must each be examined separately sOIDe general remarks can be made at the beginning about the overall framework in which their reactions would develop This framework lillY be divided into two parts 1 the state of the North Atlantic Alliance in the light of de Gaulle's attack on it and of the consequent reaction to this attack and 2 the general attitude of our NATO Allies toward the Vietnamese conflict Against this background i t will be possible to assess more accurately the reactions to a IIIljor cut in US troop strength The State of the Alliance The North Atlantic Alliance tempted by the prospects of d tente with the Soviet Union and troubled by the involvement of its most important member in a Southeast Asia conflict has now been rudely buffeted by the formal notice given b y French President de Gaulle of his intention to witbdraw France from participation in the NATO military structure even though not frOll the North Atlantic Treaty itself or from the North Atlantic Council In the fom of a l4-power declaration of principles issued March 18 1966 the other fourteen member-states of the Alliance have reiterated their support of and loyalty to an integrated NATO Although the Fourteen wish to continue NATO even without France they nevertheless do demonstrate sane divergence of views among themselves They still share the same mutual interests in West European political stability and the common concern for their security arising fran a potential -- i f no longer iIIIIIediate -- Soviet threat and all our allies except France have reiterated their full confidence in and reliance on the commitment to NATO of the United States upon whose power North Atlantic security depends The insinuations by de Gaulle that the nuclear stand-off between the US and the USSR casts considerable doubt on the former's guarantee of Western Europe's security now that North America too is an attainable target of Soviet missiles have generally not found a responsive audience although there are some nagging doubts in many countries The continued US military presence in Europe has bolstered the faith and confidence in America which characterize the great weight of official and public opinion in Western Europe While the prospects of most Alliance members they this attraction to cast off as no longer necessary So an East-West detente have been attractive to -- other than France -- have not been induced by their NATO obligations and responsibilities far France has found no followers in this path SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM roNffiO DDISSEM SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEK CONTROLLED DISSEH I DECLASSIF 'L 0rj J - 2 On the other hand there has been a fear on the part of some members particularly the Federal Republic of Germany that a real detente might encourage the US and USSR to arrive at bilateral arrangements which might even disregard German interests they therefore look upon the Alliance structure which provides for mutual consultation as an important safeguard against any such eventuality Moreover even those in Western Europe who do not share the general view that the ditente itself owes a good deal to the existence of the Alliance as a bulwark to contain Soviet expansionism and to divert the USSR toward peaceful coexistence seem to understand that the Alliance provides a desirable and needed ready-made framework for the multiple political-military relationships that must exist berween the rwo shores of the Atlantic Nor haa Western Europe's burgeoning economic prosperity and consequently greater wish to stand on its own feet appreciably disturbed the foundation of the Alliance It is true that some West Europeans -- and not only de Gaulle -would like to be more independent of the United States and indeed the North Atlantic Council has of late seen considerably freer expression of views on and even criticism of certain US policies Nevertheless few Europeans believe it possible for the Western European countries to assure their own defense without US assistance and fewer still despite their growing wealth are willing to pay for it The political unity which would be required to make such a common West European effort possible does not exist nor in the current atmosphere will it come into being for sometime to came Thus despite this growing desire for independence and also certain nagging fears of possible involvement in various American ventures in other parts of the world the Europeans rather complacent in their prosperity are still content to rely on the present military structure of the Alliance as the guarantee of their security A further function of NATO of considerable importance to its European members is the framework it provides in which the growing power of the German Federal Republic can be harnessed in a manner consonant both with Germany's newly-won importance and with the sensibilities of Germany's residually suspicious neighbors Recently Germany's efforts to acquire a greater role in Alliance nuclear defense arrangements -- currently in the form of participation in an Atlantic Nuclear Force -- have created something of a problem for its NATO allies This problem has become less acute for the moment in light of the studies on the question of nuclear sharing and planning being pursued by the McNamara Special Committee of Defense Ministers in NATO although the Bonn Government still maintains its support for a hardware rather than a consultative solution of this nuclear issue In view of the less than enthusiastic response of most of their allies to the Federal Republic's desires with respect to nuclear sharing the Germans have for some months been quite restrained in their pressure in this connection Because of their concerns in regard to Berlin to reunification and to their own security the Germans would prefer to avoid pressing the contentious nuclear question just now if that might cause disruption in the Alliance SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEK CONTROLLED DISSEK SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEK CONTROLLED DISSEK DECLASSIFIED ----- Authority 4 1 8'tg - 3 - De Gaulle's formal challenge to NATO has inspired West European fears that the enauing adjUltment will find the Federal Republic and particularly the German llilitary organization assuming a more independent stance This factor in addition to his policy of estrangement from the United Statea has frightened away those West European whOll de Gaulle had hoped to lead to European independence and his arrogant methods have perhaps helped to thwart his own policiel even aore than have the controver ial goall which he clai to be leeking Indeed it can be argued that de Gaulle's actions have actually tended to con olidate US leaderIhip by aeelling to offer in replace ent for it only the leiS attractive alternative of French hegemony It is of course trw under present conditionl in Europe that the ittate of the Alliance is an une y one in which ita __ era except for France though deterained to preserve both the Treaty and its organizational-military structure are uncertain as to the future Yet beneath all except France stands a c Alliance platform of Ihared basic principles and objectives Attitudes of the Allies Toward Vietnam West European attitudes toward the Vietnam situation are not entirely ho ogeneoU8 there are lubstantial national differences At one end the French government is openly antagonistic to US policy The Norwegian an perhapI the Danish goveru ent are not much more sympathetic but their motives are in a sense more disinterested than de Gaulle's At the other extreme the Britilh and even more the German governments show sase lentivity to the US argument that the value of commitments given in one part of the world is conditioned by the extent to which the US carries thea out elsewhere But even in those two countrie the entiment of the public i tolerant rather than positively favorable toward US policy in Vietnam In broad term it is probably lafe to say that no European government lees an analogy between it own situation and that of South Vietn Few West Europeans feel that there is any immediate threat of direct aggression by the Soviet Union against We tern Europe though the Geraana of course de feel a apecial sensitivity in relation to Berlin and none feel the elves threatened by Communist China On the contrary European concerns in this context are over the possibility that the Soviet Union may be induced by Chinese and North Vietnamese pressures to harass the US rear by renewing cold war moves in Europe particularly in regard to Berlin or generally by abandoning the prevailing atmosphere of hard-won detente All this reinforces the view of most West Europeans that the conflict in Vietnam is someone else's war However this someone else allo happens to be the leader of their own political-llilitary security grouping and this caUles a strain on otherwise strongly pro-American orientations To be sure they hope that the US will emerge from the conflict with its prestige and power still intact but within these lillits they would prefer the US to restrict its military commitments in the Far East rather than expand them They are le s concerned that South Vietnam fall under the control of Hanoi than that the conflict llight escalate into world war or that it might ultimately reverse the downward course of Sino-Soviet relations which they have welcomed or that it llight mean an endless preoccupation of the United State in the Far East at the expense of their own -- and America's -- European interests SECRET1RO FOREIGN-d SSEH CONTROLLED DISSEM SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEK CONTROLLED DISSEK - 4- DECLASSIF AuthQrity 4 1J3 I '--- a_ At the ti_ becau e the Alliance 18 ao important to _ t of th_ and becauae it dependa upon US leaderahip and power they CaDDot but be conceraed that US preatige ia ao deeply involved in Vietu Even ao most viii give no ore than modeat token non-military uaistance to the US and South Vietuam in thia atraggle though their official statementa viiI ueually be cautiouely poaitive at leut in the cuea of the governmenta of the UK the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy all of whoa give higheat priority to preserving close relationa vith the US Theae attitudea toward the var in Vietuam viII of courae affect reactiona to the removal of US troopa in Europe for aerv1ce in the Far But but the everity of thia reaction viII depend to so utent on the aituation in Vie tum at any given time i e on whether a negotiated aettlement deaired by the Veat Buropeaua se at all possible or whether a ateadily eacalating conflict ia the only viaible proapect Individual Countl'I Reaction An analyaia of the probable reaction of individual NATO countriea to a poasible aubatantial reduction of US forcea atatiooed in Europe is contained in an Annex to thia paper Conclusions A 8ubatautial withdrawal of US troops from Burope would clearly have an impact on varioue fields affecting US relations with NATO countries in Veatera Europe However thia vould be judged in the context of the Veat Europeans' view of their 'own regional and national intereats not in the framework of global Weatera aecurity neede since there is little diaposition a oug the European meabers of NATO to view the war in Vietn as relevant to such needs They vould be prepared to recognize that Far Eutera military require-ats were Wuhington's main and - in US teme -- legiti_te otive for troop cutbacka but thil vould not in itaelf provide adequate juatification in their eye for the action Indeed if the war in Vietn eventually seemed to thea to be prejudicing the But-West detente in Burope which they want the reaction of Veat Europeana to a troop withdrawal that facilitated a till heavier US involve ent in the Far Eut could ca a to focue on this factor u veil u on the direct politicomilitary effecta in Europe of the cutback Leaving attitudes toward Vietuam to one Side the major impact of a drawdown of US forces in Europe would undoubtedly be on the Federal Republic of Geraauy where the majority of US troopa is tatioaed and where their pre ence is so closely tied to the maintenance of Weat Germany's security Prior to the de Gaulle demarche of March 7 it would appear that bilateral relati0D8 between the US and other NATO member except for Germany would have been affected on the whole relatively little by the vithdrawal of a aizable nuaber of US troop fro We tera Europe UDder the pre ent atmoaphere of criaia in the Atlantic Alliance brought on by the de Gaulle demarche of March 7 and sub ooquent French move the impact of a US drawdovn vould undoubtedly be conaiderable There would be much greater attention to its repereu sions on the credibility of the US coaadtment to defend Europe regardlea of US atatement aud intentiona CD this point SBCRET liO FOREIGN DISSEK carrROLLBD DISSEK SBCRET NO FOREIGN DISSEK CONTROLLED DISSEM - 5 - Tha a of Waat Geruay is quite 8peciel Situated in a country divided by the Iron Curtain and expoled dir ctly to the dang ra of the Soviet thre t the Geraaos continue to seek reassurance th t the lecurity guarantee offer d by the US il Itill valid th y Ie the prelence of the equivalent of six American divi ions tangible evid nce of this guarantee In fact their attachment at prelent to the -magiC number of sb divl8ions eems to have becOlle a1ao t irrational Only very recently in hi rebuttal of de Gaulle' February pre oo conference pronouncellente on the Buropean ituation Chancellor Erhard again referr d to American assurances that US troop I would Dot be removed fr We t Geraaoy because of the Vietnam war Therefore it 18 reasonably afe to that the political ahock of a ub tantial US troop withdrawal from Geruny would be great enough to cau e a evere crisis to the present West German GoverD8ent Hevertheloooo with careful diplomatic and public preparation the psychological blow of uch a cutback could probably have beeu ufficiently loften d prior to Karch 7 perhaps with renewed prel1clential aslurances about the US coaait lent to Gamany'8 defen8e to enable the US to ride out the en uing stora However lince de Gaulle'l avel again t NATO which allo bring into question the etatUII of the French troopI tationed in We t Geruny a aizable reduction of US forcea in Gemany at thia ti_ could only introduce _jor ' political coaplication futo what ia alreedy a mo t coaplex lituation Not only would Geman aUllpiciona about the _tivea behind uch a US __ and its timing be aroUlled but al80 those of DOst of our other We t Buropean alllaa who according to the country-by-country analys contained in the Annex could have accepted a ubatantial US troop withdrawal with ome uoblance of equanimity or at le t under tanding prior to Karch 7 Now some would ee thia confirmation of de Gaulle's the ia that it is unwi e for the We t Buropeans to place full dependence on US surances -- precisely because of the change in world political conditions and US views about it extra-European involvements This concern could tend to raiae doubt oo whether warranted or not about the US commitllent to Europe e pecially at a tille when the solidarity of the fourteen allies without Franc is so essential to face the de Gaulle challenge Such US action would r nder credible the d Gaulle po ition that mere adh rence to the Harth Atlantic Treaty without ground troop build-up and deplo 'llleDte h ufficient to retain the prot ction of the US nuclear umbr na This corollary effect upon NATO military organization and planning hould not be overlooked Since it i mo t unlikely that any NATO ember would increase it own force level to help compen ate for tha US cutback we would run the riak of undermining our present militery strategy in Europe with ita i' Portant role for NATO cODventional forcea if we argued that there would be no appreciable 10oo from our cutback -- because of incre ed fire power air lift potential etc -- of overall Alliance ability to resiat aggreasion in Burop C rtainly there could be no question under these conditions of trying to convinc our European all 8a to adhere to the graduated r oo pon e trategy which h n r baen popular a ong them b cause 1 the fear of a Soviet attack h greatly dildaiahed and 2 in cas of luch III attack they would prefer an i_diate SBCRET NO FOREIGN DISSEK nITROLLED DISSBK SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEH CONTROLLED DISSEH 1- - DECLASsIFJ I Autt Ori U AA - 6 and massive nuclear response rather than a ground war which would devastate their territories but leave the USSR relatively intact This negative West European position regarding the graduated response concept does not illlply an abandonment of the forward strategy to which the Germans are particularly attached and under which the defenders would first resort to tactical nuclear weapons to repel an invader and would escalate to a strategic nuclear blow only if the invader's penetration of NATO territory persisted A US troop withdrawal would also compound further the internal political confusion in Western Europe itself which the French move againat NATO haa already begun to sow A diminution of US preaence added to the growing isolatioa of Fr nce would thrust the Federal German RepubliC with its burgeoning econoaic power and its twelve division into a pre-eminent position on the continent except for the USSR The possibility of this development ia viewed with considerable distress by Germany's West European neighbora whoae fear and distrust of the Germans arising out of World War I and II is amply brought out in the cOUDtry-by-country analysea A combination of such a US action and the projected French moves would literally have a centrifugal effect upon the Western European political situation On the one hand the desire for more independent political aaneuverability in the general if not the specific senae of the de Gaulle example would tend to lead the Europeans to seek more flexibility in deciding on the nature and extent of Alliance political cooperation and in adopting policiea toward Eastern Europe and the USSR This would run counter to the objective of asinteining the solidarity of the Fourteen in the face of the French challenge On the other hand the emergence of West Germany as the dominant European power in the Alliance would tend to force the Europeans to seek a closer relationship with the United States as protection against incipient German hegemony above and beyond their reliance on the US as the only credible defender of their aecurity Naturally these conclusions have been drawn on the assumption that a US force reduction would be substantial -- as previously indicated above 50 000 and perhaps up to 100 000 troops Obviously the consequences for the European political scene would not be so grave if the reduction took the form of a thinning out of a smaller number of troops primarily of the non-combat variety West European reaction in such a case would be neRligible and even German reaction would present no political problem provided thera was appropriate consultation in advance since it is clear that our allies generally underatand our problems in Vietnam even if they do not lytDpathize with our involvement there There are however two potential -- though apparently unlikely at leaat for the present -- developments which would permit a lubstantial cutback in forces in Europe without engendering the reactionl described in this paper The first development namely a firm deciaion in favor of the establiab ent of some kind of nuclear sharing arrangement reconfirming organic US links to Europe's defense and satisfactory to the present German governmen could serve as an ideal reassurance of continued US commitment to and cooperation with SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEH CONTROLLED DISSEH SECRETINO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM DECLA SS IFI L---_ Au_tt Orit U Jt Btts I - 7- Western Europe Whether such a move had an equally reassuring effect on West Germany' neighbors would depend on its tera Their reactions would be important ince Paris could be expected to oppose such nuclear sharing and might feel impelled to mount an intense anti-Geraan campaign especially if it expected to drum up West European support Of course even if other West Europeans did not disapprove of the new nuclear sharing plan they tght still fear the consequences of counter aves by Paris toward developing closer relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at the expense of the German Federal Republic The second development which might provide a favorable clilllSte for a substantial cutback would be a resolution of the present NATO crisis and under present circumstances this seeDS well-nigh utopian Nevertheless if the US France UK and GerlllBDY could somehow work out tuaUy tolerable teru for Alliance tlitary cooperation the re-establishment of stability in the Alliance would be greeted with s uch general relief that the situation might then be psychologically ripe for a realignment of the NATO force s tructure This could offer the possibility for reduction of US forces lIISintained for the defense of Western Europe given the recognition of the changed conditions of detente with the USSR the disarray in the Ca aunist camp and the strengthening of the Alliance's own internal solidarity by the adjuae ant of existing discords SBCRETINO FOUIGN DISSEK cotn'IOLLBD DISSEM SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEK CONTROLLED DISSEK - 8 - DECLASSIFIED Authori'Y 5it8 '---- _ _-_ _-- - ANNEX Allied Reaction By Individual Country The Federal Republic of Germany The implications of a major cutback of US forcea in Europe are by far the most important and the most delicate in regard to West Germany It is the country most i1lllllediately exposed to and moat conscious of Soviet pressure and also the country where most of the US forces in question are stationed The Federal Republic far more than any other ally has had most constantly to be reaasured in one way or another that the US guarantee of its security and defense of its interests including reunification are still valid For the Germans more than for any of the others US force levels in Europe have come to be a syabol of the US intention to support NATO and to offer protection against the Soviet Union The US military presence allo means for Bonn a bona fides of Waahington's cOBllitment to uphold Geraan interests vis-a-via the USSR and to apply a forward defense strategy in the Atlantic Alliance Against this background the Germans have diaplayed great sensitivity to the queation of maintaining the American garrison in Germany at a strength equivalent to six divisions German concern on this point has been an everpresent factor in US relations with the Federal Republic over the last decade Rumors about possible US troop reductions crop up from ti to tiBe nurtured by sensational elements of the German preas Such rumors often unrelated to any objective change in the international situation from which a change in US defense posture or strategy could logically be deduced have in the past been enough to touch off speculation and a atate of jitters along the Rhine The Vietnam situation and the reaultant growth of the US military commitment in Southeast Asia both of which have found official verbal support in Bonn but little public understanding in the FRG only served to heighten German concern about potential US troop withdrawals While moat German government leaders do not consider it unthinkable that the US may be forced to redeploy n to meet Vietnamese needs they do recognize the concern of the Geraan public that this would mark a decline of US interest in Europe's fate and have taken stepa to deal with it Foreign Minister Schroeder for example told his party's parliamentary delegation in January that the US does not intend to withdraw troops from Europe but he also pointed out that developments in Southeast Asia would probably give rise to increasing discussion in the US about the posaibility of such withdrawals Schroeder's cautionary words were misinterpreted by s German newspapers -- one given to sen ationalia on this subject carried the headline Schroeder Anticipates US Troop Withdrawals As long aa the US is heavily engaged in Vietnam German anxiety about a reduction in the size of the US militsry presence in Europe is likely to continue and the US announcement in April that there will be a drawdown of about 15 000 soldiers in 1966 to cover Vietnam needs has only stimulated further doubts in West Germany even though Washington has promised full replacement of these troops by the end of the year SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEK CONTROLLED DISSEK - SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM - 9 Long-standing German concerns about maintaining the US troop coaad nt muat also be seen in the light of the NATO criais precipitated by French President de Gaulle Any weakening of the integrated NATO atructure would have implications for German security At worst the withdrawal of one of Germany's principal allies from European defense arrangementa an end to the French coaDit1llent to German defense and to Berlin and the removal of the two French divisions from the Federal Republic would have serious politicomilitary repercussions on Germany As far as Bonn'a peace of mind is concerned US troop withdrawala potential or actual coincident to the French threat to NATO would be a reurkably unfortunate turn of eventa Conceivably German political and military leaders JU ght be brought to accept the notion that sa e US troopa could be withdrawn without Dy meaningful hara to German aecurity and the US co -it1llent to uphold it The acope of the problem would obviously not be unrelated to the aize of the withdrawal contemplated -- the adverse i act of withdrawing any major force unit would aurely be auch greater than cutting back the level of individual specialiata auch as is involved in the planned temporary US reduction of 1966 Of course even the redeployment of men rather tban unita leading to a gradual process of thinningout tbe US garriaon could be highly disturbing if the size of the cut had not been stated publicly and if tbe public had learned of tbe development only unofficially or through prea leaka And if a reduction of units or a major withdrawal of individuals were involved it would be idle to tbink that even careful psychological preparation and a cala quiat aaDner for iapleaent1ns tha rednctioa would prevent grave repercussiona Thia ia doubly true in the current situation where tbe disarray in NATO and tbe extent of de Gaulle's threat as yet but dimly aeen will make any effort to leslen tbe impact of a reduction in US force levela regardless of numberl metbods or advance preparation a most difficult task If large-scale troop reductions were proposed or carried out contrary to tbe expectations of the Bonn government German policy would be influenced in a number of important ways In the NATO context the Erhard government with the full support of tbe SPD has followed the US lead in subacribing to the position of tbe 14 NATO allies vi -a-vis France It will be important to Bonn to avoid if possible a complete ilolation of France from the relt of NATO and at a minimum to preaerve through sa e sort of politically acceptable pragaatic arrangement French involvement in Berlin and in German defenae US troop withdrawals would in the face of the current threat o NAlO cause Germany to give greater consideration to accommodating France The two French divisi n Germany would assume much greater importance particularly if American redeployment reached significant proportions The Germans JU ght be reluctant to aupport allied moves which could conceivably increase the iaolation of France and lead to a complete break between Paris and the 14 NATO allies To lose the French contribution to German defense at the lame time the US appeared to be reducing its material support might portend for Bonn the crumbling of the whole edifice of German security At the very leut it would mean a strong inducement ilr Bonn political leader to reconsider the basic German poaition SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED tISSEM SIOC RET NO FOREI ON DISSl ' CONTROLLED DISSEM - DECLASsIF I Autt'Ori U 'tQ_ I ___ _ I - 10 - No doubt a number of Germans certainly those in the armed forces would think more about the value of nuclear weapons for the defense of Though the Ge ullists of German politics have been dealt a heavy blow by the General's poliCies and are now on the defensive long-cherished illusions about a third force alternative for European defeDSe may receive new itnpetull as the NATO structure appears to lose force and effectiveness Other important elements in German political life already prone to worry that the US may neglect German interests in an effort to seek aocommodation with the Soviet Union might see in any significant US troop reduction in Europe evidence that Washington and Moscow have worked out a modUli vivendi in Central Europe at the expense of German policy goals For the great majority of Germans US troop reductions at this critioal stage in Alliance affairs might have other IIIOre meaningful and far-reaching consequences There has been an increasing tendency in the recent past for Germans to question the direction of Bonn'lI policy courll8 and to reE'XBwi ne the underpinnings of the German position in the world Subjeots long considered taboo are now being openly discussed in the Federal Republic The unquelltioned responses of the past now no longer provide adequate answers for a widening circle of moderate German political opinion Past German policies have not brought reunification any closer and there is a growing tendency to consider fresh approaches The policy of building bridgell to the East of seeking aocommodation with the Communist countries of Eastern Europe becomes Visibly less controversial with the paseage of time Contacts with East Germaqy are increaSing in the cultural as well as in the economic sphere and pressure for more intensive personal and face-to-face contaot across the East Zone border and irrespective of it is rising The possibility of living with the Oder-Neisse line as a boundary in a reunified Germaqy is being broached with an increasing degree of frequency in public discussion in the Federal Republic It is in the nature of things that Bonn's endless quest for a formula to end the division of Germany will probably lead in time to greater flexibility in German foreign policy a readiness to consider national above allied interests and in the long run a possible willingness to consider some loosening of the Federal Republic's Western European and Atlantic ties It has been suggested in responsible unofficial quarters that a reduction or complete withdrawal of foreign forces from East and West Germany might contribute to a solution of the German problem and that US assuranoes of assistance in the event of attack could carry more weight than Amerioan troops in Germany A German Foreign Ministry note of March 25 on disarmament proposes such things as an exchange of formal non-aggression declarations with the USSR and Eastern European states and a pledge on the staged reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe SIOC RET NO FOREIGN DISS CONTROLLPD DISS SIDRET No FOREIGN DISSl M CONTIDLLED DISSEM -11It cannot be concluded tba eyen with a eubstantial US troop cutback the sum total of these tendencies will neoessarily lead Bonn to seek for a substitute for NATO and the Alliance with the United States in the lJIImediate future The Federal Republic will aim first at a reaffirmation or US guarantees and a NATO solution which will permit some form of multilateral defenee arrangements in Europe to continue It may also press with increased vigor for a new institutionalization ot security guaranteea particularly in the nuclear sphere At the same t1ae US troop redeployments will almost certainly make the Federal Republic a less ILII8nable and more difficult ally and basten developments which even now point toward substantially greater independent Bonn policy initiatives in the German national interest SIDRET NO FOREIGN DISSBM CONTROLLED DISSEM SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM - 12 - France The French government of General de Gaulle would be the one allied regime which would welcome a cutback in US forces in Europe and would try to tum this development to its own advantage De Gaulle hu long since prepared the way for doing so He has constantly argued that the Europeans could not depend on US protection indefinitely and that they should therefore undertake an independent defense effort of their own The French nuclear force de dissuuion has been justified on these grounds A withdrawal of US forces because of the Far Eastern situation would obviously seem to de Gaulle an exploitable confirmation of his arguments Indeed even though the recently announced temporary US drawdown of 15 000 men during 1966 does not qualify as a troop reduction at all major or minor Gaullist propagandists have already taken 'sete of it for their own purposes The important question is however what success he would have in trying to exploit this opportunity At home de Gaulle's pro-NATO opponents would probably lose some further ground to hi_ and thil might have a favorable effect for the Gaullistl in parliamentary electi to be held within the next year Bu in Western Europe we would judge that this advantage Comel to d Gaulle loas yearl too late Had there been any credible evidence of US abandcnu ent of Europe some years ago de Gaulle might have been able to tum it to his advantage in organizing the kind of European bloc he haa sought to lead But in the meantime his anti-integrationist Common Market policy his constant inveighing against US presence and hegemOny in Europe and perhaps above all the harsh and contemptuous manner in which he hu pursued his goals have alienated many of those Europeans who might hsve aoae doaa with _ of hit ide aboot 1hrropea independence While he can still influence some opinion leaders in Western Europe it is probably too late barring a very major upset of the world political situation for him to seize the leadership of Western Europe from the United States Since de Gaulle initiated his open challenge to NATO on March 7 the course of events has ind icated that no other ally supports him in his desire to reduce US influence in Europe or to replace the integrated alliance structurel with some kind of looser grouping Nevertheless it is not yet clear whether and to what extent the allies will be able to work out lome kind of accommodation whereby France would retain certain links with the other members of the alliance This uncertainty reflects the ambivalance of the allies who though they do not support de Gaulle in hil designs are not sure that they want to lee France altogether isolated in Western Europe In these circumstances a US troop cutback would probably not -- at this point -- bring support for de Gaulle's own policies but it would no doubt raise obstacles to US leadership in Europe Ideally of course the NATO iSlues raised by France should be settled before any major cutback is announced But if this is not the cale leaving aside as not to the oint the planned temporary 15 000 man ' drawdown during 1966 the US may find that the allies will be more demoralized by the cutback because of the coincident crilis created by France than the would be without the latter The other allies would be bound SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM 1 L t AA DECLASsiFIED - 13- in these circumstances to interpret a cutback as a sign of decreased US interest in European affairs and US leadership would inevitably suffer The allie8 would therefore be somewhat less inclined to make the adjustments within NATO to counteract France's departure which the US might decide to be appropriate They might be more inclined to favor accommodation with France in order to spare the alliance the double blow to its prestige and solidarity that seemed to threaten it At best the net effect might then be a subtle psychological though not institutional loosening of US ties with the other allies French designs would not really be advanced but the alliance as a whole would undoubtedly be weakened and the other members would be the ore i lled to reexaaine their own foreign policies in light of this clearly changed situation SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM SECREr 1lO FOREIGN DISSEJ COIll'ROLLED DISSEJ - 14 - The United Kingdom The diversity within the Atlantic Alliance cannot be better illustrated than by caaparing the illplications of US troops cutback for West Germany with the implications for the UK Where the foraer would feel that its security was genuinely 1IIpaired the latter would not be measurably affected by such a concern Any UK Government recognizes that the lI intenance of British military forces in West Germany carries with it both advantages and disadvantages On the benefit side the UK's contribution to NATO forces enables London to partiCipate in controlling West Gel'lll8ny's place in Rurope and it enhances Britain's role in Europe especially during a period when the UK is excluded from partiCipation in the European cOllllll1lnities Moreover given London's recent decillion to maintain the current level of its araed forces the BAOR British Aray of the Rhine affords Britain a convenient means tor retaining these troops at lesser cost than it could at haae In recent times the UK has demonstrated that it feels as free to consider the BAOR as much a strategic reserve as the troops stationed in the British Isles o On the negative side the UK has long groaned about the foreign exchange costs of the BAOR Britain's halance-of-payaents situation is extreaely serious and the foreign exchange drain of its forces in West GeI II8D Y amounts to an estimated I B5-L90 million a year In recent years the offset agreement with Bonn has never cOllIe near to covering this outlay nor is it expected to do so now Moreover the UK has also long expressed doubts about the validity of the strategic case for maintaining the BAOR British officials argue that the Soviet threat to Western Europe has receded that a long conventional war in Europe is most unlikely that the focal point of Cold War confrontation has shifted to the area East of Suez and that the main danger of CoIIIIIunist military action or subversion heightened by Pe1p1ng's development of nuclear weapons now lies primarily in the new Wlderdeveloped and therefore highly vulnerable nations foWld in that area Despite these arguments against the maintenance of troops in West Germany Britain continues to put great emphasis on the need for a strong Western Alliance and even though this is now important mainly for political reasons both Tory and Labor Governments have accepted the maintenance of a credible British military contribution to the direct defense of Europe against invasion -- however unlikely that may appear to them -- as the military price for their political influence in NATO The UK knows that significant reductions in the BAOR would raise objections fraa Washington and London's other NATO partners The Defense White Paper issued in late February stated that the Wilson GoverllDlent thought it right to maintain British ground forces in Germany at about their existing level ooo provided however that same means is found for meeting the foreign exchange costs of these forces SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM SI X RET lro FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM - 15 UK officials had told Vaehington earlier that the UK intended in consultation with its NATO partnere to make more un of the BAOR ae a eource of reinfore_nts for meeting emergencies in other parte of the wrld i e as a strategic reserve than i t hae done in the past f'uthermore Britain planned subject to consultation with its allies to make certain reductions in the RAF unite based in 'West Garmany Given its own viewe on the BAOR and Britainlll own strategic position it is understaD1able that the UK would dislike having the US make eignificant troop reductions in Europe for a variety of reaeone Ve believe that the UK government wuld feel that IlUCh cutbaCkel 1 li'ould enc01U'8 ge proponent II of the view that the oolite of the BAOR are intolerable and that the strategic reasons for retaining it are inYal1d and would therefore tend to undera1ne advocatee ot the policy ot - btaining the BAOR tor the political advantage II th 9 t keeping it provides 2 li'ould cause laDY Britons to tear that 1iashington al ready preoccupied with Vietnam and other extra-European problema wae further relegating Europe to a lesser level ot attention 3 Would be en -- in view of de Gaulle IS mollt recent movell to force the removal of NATO torces and facilities from France -- ae conetituting a further centrifugal force within NATO and endangering NATOls function of containing West Garman strength and predom1nanoe on the continent Before de Gaullelll latest actions the Britieh reaction to the long-standing French threat to pullout of NATO had been one ot insistenoe that the other 14 member II DD1st prellerve the Alliance and the Organization built up under it Since then the Britieh have Jll ved vigoroullly in puehing as a first step the iSllUllllOe of the 14-nation declaration of principles of March 18 1966 which reemphasized the essentiality of NATO and the unacceptability of bilateral arrangements as a substitute for it In view of all the foregoing we believe that it the US made significant troop reductions in Europe not to be confused with the temporary US drawdawn in 1966 of 15 000 men the UK would come under considerable presCUr8 fram quarters both in and outside the government to follow suit It in the meantime the FRG had failed to inorease its offset suffiCiently to cover vhat Britain conaidBred a sstisfactory portion of its foreign exchange costs the UK might feel compelled to make drastio reductione in ite own forces in Germany However i f the US strongly urged Britain to _intain the BAOR we believe that the UK would find ways to oontinue to keep ite troops there given the above-noted advantages to London ot doing so SJroRET JO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM - 16 Italy Unlike some other European allies Italy has never doubted the credibility of the US commitment to defend Western Europe As a matter of fact the emergence in the early 1950's of a third force movement in Italy can be traced to Italian concern especially among left-center and left elements that the US might be too impulsive in using its power in Europe Since then the so-called East-West detente has confirmed their preconceived idea that a war in Europe is extreme1y unlikely if not impossible With these basic premises in mind withdrawal of US troops from Europe even if of a substantial magnitude would not alarm the Italians unduly about their security It i assumed of course that the withdrawal would be appropriately justified and would be sccompanied by reassurances that the US was not planning to pullout of Europe lock stock and barrel To be sure Washington could anticipate a certain amount of concern in the established bureaucracies in defense and foreign affairs But contrariwise many Italians might even welcome a reduction of US forces in Central Europe as a possible contribution to a further relaxation of tensions there Some Italian suggestions might even be made that the US might negotiate a commensurate Soviet troop withdrawal from Central Europe Certainly current plans for a temporary drawdown of 15 000 US troops from Europe during 1966 have aroused no anxiety in Italy Even with de Gaulle's threat to NATO this picture is not likely to change It is extremely doubtful that a reduction of US forces would lead many people in Italy to rally around de Gaulle The political leaderahip and military protection offered by France have found few takers in Italy Only the Communists have applauded de Gaulle' recent initiatives The Italians would be very reluctant to part with some of the few US units still in Italy more because of the adverse economic impact that this would have on the affected areas than out of fear of a US abandonment of the defense of Italian security Precedents recall that the negotiation of reductions of US troops in Italy has always been a long and delicate exercise The chances that Italy would increase its own military contribution to NATO in the event of a reduction of US troops are practically zero Secretary McNamara's rapid air-lift troop deployment to Europe a few years back genuinely impressed the Italians A combination of the credibility of the US commitment and an appreciation of the proven US capacity to redeploy troops on quick notice would probably militate against any undue concern on the part of the Italians about any moral obligation to increase their share of the Allied burden The Netherlands Any significant withdrawal of United State troop from Europe would meet with a certain amount of adverse reaction in the Netherlands While the Dutch have never publicly questioned our intention to defend Western Europe against outside aggression a US troop withdrawal would tend to bring out into the open whatever private doubts there may be on this score If our position in the event of a withdrawal were carefully explained however we should probably find the Dutch understanding In fact the Netherlands Defense Mini'ter has already SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM - 17 - suggested i private the poasibility that the United States might be te pted to ahift troops from Europe to Southesat AlIia and we shou I d continue to benefit fro the fact that the Dutch have been generally sympathetic to our problema in Vietnam There are not likely to be any repercussions frOlll current plans for a temporary US drawdovn of 15 000 troops during 1966 The Dutch view the presence of US troops in Germany not only sa a bulwark against possible military aggresaion from the Soviets but also sa a guarantee against threats coming from a possible revival of German militarism Dutch relations with the Germans have generally been good since the end of the war particularly because of the fact that trade with Germany is vital to the economic welfare of the Netherlands The Dutch remain skeptical however of the depth of Germany's political reform Much has been said of the Dutch opposition to French leadership of Westem Europe and many Dutch viewed the Franco-German treaty of 1963 sa the vehicle for eventual Franco-German hege ony over Europe However the bsaic fear among many Dutcm en ia of eventual German domination rather than of French pre-eminence in Europe This fear hsa been augmented by de Gaulle's recently expressed intention to diasasociate France from the NATO military arrangements Thus increasingly more concemed about Germany the Dutch might in the event of a US troop withdrawal paradoxically feel even more heavily dependent upon the United States sa an ally Whether they did or not however the Netherlands would be likely to press still harder for a strengthening of the common i1llltitutions which tie Germany to the reat of Westem Europe Thh would lead to an incresaed awareness of the need to preserve sa much of a French presence sa possible and would again underline the Netherlands' desire for Britain'a inclusion in the councils of Europe The Dutch have maintained a generally high level of contribution to NATO It is expected that they would continue to do so despite a reduction of US forces The Dutch Government might be h ered by incresaed preaaure frOB those who would take the US action sa justification for allocating a greater aegment of the budget to domestic programs It Should be noted however that all major Dutch political parties have had few foreign policy differencea a ong themselves to date and they have been in agreement on the necessity for a strong NATO Furthermore any reduction in military strength would be carefully weighed against the above-mentioned fear of giving a stronger Buropean role to the Germans Belgium The Belgian public remains generally apathetic towarda international affairs the only strong public reaction to an announce_nt of US troop withdrawals would be among the vocal Communist and left-wing Socialiata SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM -DECLASSIFiED l I AuthOrity Ju 1 JJlfS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEH CONTROLLED DISSEH I- _ - - --- -- - 18 - who would be quick to claia along with any Belgian followers of de Gaulle that the United States has given new proof that it is an untrustworthy ally quick to abandon friend in the pursuit of an aljust1fied war in another part of the world Were the US to raduce European troop commitments however the internationalists among Belgium' leaders would be seriously weakened in their already well-nigh impossible battle to rai8e the low level of Belgian budgetary support for NATO and foreign asaistance Even the temporary US force drawdown in 1966 will nourish budget-cutting efforts Although most Belgians support NATO in theory as a safeguard against both the Soviet Union and a resurgence of German militarism they believe that Moscow no longer intends military action and they feel thst in practice the Belgian contribution to Europe's defense is ao insignificant that a change in the Belgian commitment would have no effect whatever on the balance of power Furthermore if the US troop withdrawal were announced in such a way as to leave the impression that Europe'a security now required less conventional military commitment than was previously neces ary presumably for military-technological reasons moat Belgians would then feel that it was high ti_ to devote more of their cOlDltry'a attention and resources towards meeting its critical domestic problema There would therefore be no public notion of taking up this alack left by US wi thdrawala De Gaulle's recent disavowal of NATO arrangements only gives added voice to the many Belgians who would like similarly to downgrade NATO and reduce their troop total poaaibly alder the cover of ''NATO reorganization In fact the new Belgian government aay well substantially reduce dafense expenditures regardless of any possible US action of this nature though this need not in itself have any relevance for the question of whether major NATO installations can be relocated from France to Belgium Luxembourg The withdrawal of o significant number of American troops from the continent but not the planned 1966 dravdown would meet with conaiderable concern in Luxembourg on political gro alds Luzembourg views the US presence as a stabilizing factor with respect to any German ambitions particularly in the light of de Gaulle's recently expressed de8ire to withdraw entirely from NATO comaitments Luxembourg allo regards the United States as its principal protector and this view would not be changed by a withdrawal of American troops It is not unlikely however that such a move would have the effect of increaaing French influence in the Grand Duchy for Luxembourg haa traditionally looked to the French rather than the Ge as allies Luxembourg's military contribution to NATO already miniscule 18 alder continuous attack at home Military and defense questiona have long been a political football and the army suffers from lack of any support Any US action giving the impression of downgrading European security would only increaae public pressure to abolish ailitary service in Luzeabourg altogether SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEH CONTROLLED DISSEH SECREl' 00 FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM - 19 - _ ----' '-l DECLASSIFIED I Authority 1 B1j9 L - - - -- Norway and Denmark There have been no reports of any official statements or public discussions concerning a possible US partial troop withdrawal frail Western Europe However any substantial US force cutbacJk would be viewed with alarm by the Scandinavians particularly in the context of their still somewhat uneasy relations with the German Federal Republic While the Scandinavians have not in the past questioned US willingness and ability to defend Western Europe frail Soviet ession a major troop reduction would almost certainly raise certain doubts in their minds about the steadfastness of the American commitment Greater than this concern however would be the fear that a reduction of US military involvement in Europe would automatically increase the importance of the German role and German influence both political and lllilitary in the Alliance Latent distrust of German intentions particularly in view of the Federal Republic's growing economic and military power are still strong in Norway and Denmark Any developnent tending to increase Germany's power would be especially distasteful to Denmark which counts on the present political arrangements in NATO i e US predominance to guarantee its security not only against the Soviet threat but also against the revival of West Germany as a dominant power on the continent This attitude of the Scandinavians does not necessari'l y mean they are ready to approve of General de Gaulle'S efforts to diSJll8 ntle the NATO military structure Rather they view his actions to disengage French forces from NATO with great alarm for this would be a step in thl saml unfavorable direction of enhancing Bonn's position as any US troop withdrawal Scandinavian interests dictate the requirelUmt for as little change in the present military integration arrangements in NATO as is possible Hence any coincidence of a US troop cutback and French defection from NATO would only magnify fears and policy doubts in Norway and Denmark This reaction however would not extend to the 1 5 000 temporary US troop drawdown during 1966 which has now been announced I f a US forces cutback were added to a French withdrawal from NATO military cooperation the result would almost certainly be an increase in already existing pressure particulArly from left-wing Social Democrats and other groups for a referendum on Norway's continued partiCipation in NATO after 1969 as well as for an examination in both countries of the feasibility of establishing a Scandinavian regional military pact with Sweden as an alternative to continued NATO membership The present Danish and Norwegian governments however would most likely try to maintain their present poliCies of cooperation with the US and NATO and to counter neutral_ ist trends Finally another fear which plagues the Scandinavians in this context is that the US may become so deeply involved in the Far East that the conflict there could escalate into a broader and more general war A substantial withSECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROILED DISSEM SECRET NO FalEIGN DISSEH CONTROLLED DISSEK I DECLASsiF LU 4 I - 20- Drawal of US troops for transfer to VietnaJI would be regarded as a sign that this danger was increasing and this would acid bOth to Scandinavian resentaent and to neutraUst sentiments Iceland The question of US troop withdrawals trOll the lIIIinland of Western Europe is not Ukely to create much pubUc or official reaction in Iceland Icelandic security interests are different frOII those of Europe and since Iceland has no arlled forces of allJPY significance it ia alaost entirely dependent upon the United States for its defllnse The Icelandic govert'lll8llt would therefore accept 8lIJPY US decision in this matter as long as the US naval and air c utaent to Iceland re ained unchanged However it would want to be able to counter 8lIJPY pressure frOII left-wing labor el_ems that Jlight be brought upon the governaent to deund a s1Jlilar withdrawal of US forces stationed in Iceland since this could also have undesirable dcaestic poUtical connotations Portugal A possible US troop cutback in Western Europe is largel y of peripheral interest to Lisbon Portuguese officials have never joined those Europeans who advocate US withdrawal for the sake of furthering the iJlage of growing European independence vis-a-vis the two aajor world powers The single most iIIportant factor for the governaent is its preoccupation with holding on to its overseas a pire Portuguese officials have frequentl y expressed their recognition of the US contribution to NATO during the earl y years of the Alliance as the principal deterrent to an y possible Soviet aggression against Western Europe at that tille Like aan y of their counterparts in neighboring countries they have felt that the Soviet Union has for sOllIe years no longer posed a direct threat to Western Europe The reasons underl ying their views have been rather different however Their idea is that Moscow in giving up an y thought of directly and frontall y attacking Western Europe is instead attempt1pg to extend its influence into Africa with the intention of eventuall y mounting a threat to the West trOll that continent Lisbon has always contended that NATO's jurisdiction should extend to the Portuguese spire and this contention has becOlle IIOre vehelIent since the outbreak of the Angolan rebellion in 1961 The Portuguese therefore feel they derive Uttle benefit frOII NATO insofar as their II in national interests are concerned and consequently although they pay Up service to the principle of HATO integration will not be greatl y disturbed about the effect of de Gaulle's projected moves against the Alliance While the Portuguese are bitter about post-1961 US poUcy toward Portuguese Africa they still have confidence in US detel'llination regardless of the number of ground troops in Europe to reSist Soviet aggression in the unlikely event it should occur Thus even a substantial withdrawal of US troop could be expectflCi to have few repercussions on Lisbon's attitudes This would be just as true whether the troop reduction coincided with or 1I8l'e iMependent of actions by Paris with which incidentAll y the Portuguese uintain increasingly cordial ties in an y case SECRET NO FaW GN DISSEH Q IiTROLLED DISSEK - Ll DECLASSIFIED SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM Authurity 4 1 1fi9 L ------ ----- - 21 - Greece Any significant withdrawal of US military forces from Europe would be of immediate concern to Greece which heavily depends on US support in the event of an attack from Bulgaria Reduction of the US military presence in Europe would be interpreted by the Greeks as meaning that NATO assistance in an emergency would not be forthcoming with sufficient dispatch and substance The Greeks would therefore be likely to press for greater bilateral US military assistance in order to develop and maintain a larger national military establishment of their own Failing to secure this type support the Greeks might seek a political accommodation with their Balkan neighbors that would minimize the Bulgarian threat and reduce the Turkish pressure on Greece over the Cyprus issue These national concerns would in any case prompt the Greeks to seek to maintain satisfactory bilateral relations with France and this would not be altered by de Gaulle's threat to the existing integrated NATO structure which incidentally the Greeks desire to preserve Turkey I_diate Turlthh reaction to a substantial withdrawal of US forces in Europe would not be significant nor would the reaction be _ch influenced by the fact that the reductions were connected with the war in Vietn While the initial official reaction might be confined to an expression of regret that US commitments elsewhere necessitated such a step the withdrawal would probably result in spirited -debate - on Turkey's relations with NATO and this could ultimately affect Turkey's commitment to the alliance In recent months largely as a result of the Cyprus dispute there has been considerable public debate on Turkey's role in NATO The far leftiats have advocated complete withdrawal and while the other opposition parties have coma out in favor of continued association with NATO they want unspecified changes in the relationship which would include a greater emphasis in defense policy on developing national forces i e forcea not committed to NATO The government which has often reatated its cOl8it ent to NATO has countered theae arguments by affirming that all forces are in effect national forces and can be used whenever neceasary for national purpoaea However the widespread belief that the US has prevented Turkish intervention in Cyprus by forbidding the use there of HAP-supplied equipment has created doubts concerning how readily NATOcommitted forces could be uaed for national purposes A withdrawal of US forces in Europe might alao be viewed aa convinCing evidence of lessened US intereat in NATO and if this coincided with de Gaulle's attack on the Alliance Ankara might conclude that NATO no longer represented a strong reed on which to rely In this case Turkey would place increased emphasis on arrangements which while within the NATO framework were essentially bilateral such aa increased US military assistance to Turkey The level of US assiatance would thus become increaaingly the yardstick by which US intentions toward Turkey would be measured In the short run it is unlikely that a substantial withdrawal of US forces _ld alter Turkey's basic posture toward NATO whatever de Gaulle does The government as well as the top level military commanders remain NATO-oriented However a cutback together with de Gaulle's action would act to atrengthen the position of those politicians and military officers who would like Turkey to adopt a more independent policy toward NATO and the US SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM sroRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLIJ 2 DISSEM - 22 - DECLASSIFiCl L U i t U1 CanAda The immediate reaction ot the Canadian government to a significant withdrawal of US foroes from Western Europe would in all likelihood be to deplore publioly the neoessity of such aotion wbile at the same time me nta1n1ng an understanding attitude - prowided that it were not considered that the withdrawal sigJlaled a basio shitt in US policy towardll Europe or a serious escalation in Vietnam lI'ithin the oontext of the present French-inspired NATO crisis n7 planned major withdrawal of US forces would probably cause anxiety in Ottawa concerning a possible reallocation at priorities in the US global foreign policy and they would not want it further to upset the political equilibrium or military balance in Western Europe The Canadianll themselves feel that their military participation in NATO espeoially their DUc1ear role abould be diminished in favor of greater attention to Canadian non-auelear forces IlUitable tor UN peaoekeeping operations Therefore the r are not too upset about the prospect of moving their two n-DUClear Reoonnaissance Attack Squadronll from France at French ineilltBnoe Neverthelellll they weloome the opportunity to pIa a sublltantial role in the North Atlantio Council and through NAC in Europe as a whole and they are willing to P 1 the prioe of keeping troop oOlllDitted to NATO in Europe i e tholle in Ge as long all NATO nen without France eontiDUes to give the imprellsion at being a viable organisation Consequently a withdrawal at troops by the US from Western Europe would not therefore necellsarily evoke a oonoomitant withdrawal of Csnadian foroes All in all it can be expeoted that Canada would not in n7 case be the first or mollt vocal NATO ally in criticiZing or protesting such a withdrawal of US foroes n7 more than it feels able or anxious to get into the forefront of NATO lIISIIIbers attacking de Gaulle tor his actions Canada1s pollitioD vie-a-vill both franoe and the US is too vulnerable for hilltrionios and its geographio looation reduoell ite interest in the m1lit r7 aspects of European defense and US involvement therein Sm RET lKo FOREIGN DISSIM CONTROLLm DISSEM I This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu