September 21 1966 DECLASSIFIED DRAPT - OATSD PA DFOISR a TOP SECRET CONTR L OCT 3 1 2006 Au hori y EO 12958 as amended ChIef Records Declass Div WHS MEMORANDUM POR TIlE PBESIDENT St lIJECT NATO Strategy and Force Structure U I have reviewed NATO's forces defense plans and strategic concepts and tbe Implications of recent French actions As a result of tbe ongoing NA70 Force Planning Exercise we now hsve enough information to tske certain initiatives with our lies and to define a framework for a major review of U S forees oriented toward NATO There are ' serious imbalances in our Allies' present and planned forces and d' 'ii i8 b lld make vigorous efforts to have these remedied I also believe ' '- ' that some modifieations are warranted for U S o forcea in Europe or J ill i I ' 'A o e deployed tbere While this memorandwa does not discuss ' f l' ' j t ic l tactics necessary to implement certain of the rec01llDl tl ' l y iil fiji these recOlllllll lldationo have been developed in light of the 'l til'lW tf e I CIIl fllctors within NATO whi b fect the feasibUity of our o ti' ' ing certain objectives My c mclusions regarding NATO strategy IiDd forces and my recOllllDendations for' modifications to them are as follows 0 Respect to the Adequacy of NATO's Nuclear Forces I believe external and theater nuclear forces avaUable to NATO are now ' ' adequate and Working Group III of the Special Committee - jH l lW Ministers agrees with this conclusion As Theater Nuclear - qu al Ltllt l ve improvements our appear varranted however some ot while further study of others is ' OSD33 h S i I my adequate in manpower I threats but a number of ' qualitative defic en- ' 'J ' I' J Ll e a forces require Jmaediate attention NATO force require- ' ' l i 1IM 'lfaditiollally been based on large and sudden attacks and I ' ' ' ' I ' ' t If ' ' ' 5200 10 ' ' Py i f ' ' V 200 ' CopieS ' ' ' Page 1 of 26 Pages OSD Control CCS X-5490 I I ' September 21 1966 DECLASSIFIED OCT 312006 Author fy EO 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS ' believe that there has been a tendency to exaggerate the size and capabilities of Pact forces relative to NATO units OUr Allies' attempts to meet the resultiag large requirements vith iaadequate res urces bBYe produced serious imbalances in their forces These imbalances have ia turn 148sened their forces' capabilities to defend against less extreme and aGre likely contiagencies We should accordiagly reorient U S force plann1ag and des for nonnuclear war and if possible our Allies' force plans ay from emphasis mainly on massive attacks mounted with minimum warning and tovard leBs extreme and far more likely nonnuclear cootiagenciea as I shall discuss later in IIIDre detail o 1 C i r With Respect to Allied Force Plans Our Allies' planned defense for the next five years sre generally inadequate and we lI4 J IIBke eve effort to persuade them to iacrease their cODtributions - 1 - to the co_an defense burden Even more boportant we should presa thell n ' 'f ' rre t those deficiencies ia their forces which prevent their ve 11 i ltantfa1 defeoae expendiJ ures from producing a fully effective COD o tdblition to the COlllllOll defense Our Allies' present and plllllned forces ' o lIppear particularly iDefficient in the following respects I- e itures tJ 1 o 'h ''1 F ' 1 SOllIe countries are plllllniag excessiv e naval aud air ' forces by comparison to their urgeDt Deeds for larger and better land forces 2 Most coIIDtnes are planning to emphasize the quantity of force units at too great a cost both in M-Day combat capaand in NA70's potentially l rge mobilization capabilities y land ty Host cOUl1tnes are not making proviSions to ensure that ' i i i dlarge nonDuclear potential of NATO's tactical air forces t I allocations have arisen for tlUlDy reasons I ost important of these has been the persistent gap between sest1mateB of the forces required and political decisious on r to be made available and vs are taking steps within NArO to close this gap 'Th efficieDt J I 1 ' ' i Th e u s u to more vithshould respectrevise to the l O f eN ArO's overall nonnuclear capability and those Doo which are most probable I recommend two immediate i 1 We should aske logistics guidance for U S forces oriented toward Europe more conaistent with the possible length of a conflict o -EUR I The JCS do not consider that this shift ia emphasis should be _de 2 l ' ' ' 1 ' September 21 1966 DECLASSIFIED OCT 3 1 2006 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS ' Ii there an iIIter1a objective I recClll1lleDd 60 caabat days' stoclcage ill Europe aDd total procurement of 90 cOllbat days' stocks for these forces lJ 2 In our relocation from France we should substantially reduce part of the lIustaiuiDg sUpport structure for our EuropeaD land forces DOW in Frmcef271 although we should maintain in Europe those persOlllle1 ' needed to accept BUglll8Dtation froces frOlll CONUS that TuG other modifications in our Europe-deployed forces are now under conllideration but further study is required before a detailed progrm CaD be prepared and i a political implications assessed These are r J ilt 3 L We are now considerillg the advisability of makiDg over the h nsxt several years substantial reductions - beyond those due to our wit - l fr Frmce - in our EurOpeIUI ground forces personael 110 withdrawn i1 II believe be flown back to Europe rapidly enough to et the likely 11' I -r li l which would require their employment I ' 11 I I I ct' lI' 't 'IN I'i ' F' 4 'the Air Force is IlCIV consideriDg alternative plans j ifubsi antial portion of our Europe-based aircraft to COND S and t llese squadrons wbile per lodically exercisillg them to Europe would be so designed as to be capable of redeployment to Europe days to return dual-base Such units ill a few Q ' l ' future formal force cOllllldtments to NATO the U S should ensure tiAf h e coms I tmenta accurately reflect the expected t lme-phased avail I 1 ' J y of our sugmentation forces In particular we should contillue iiil J 'i '''$ ' c f any aircraft squadrons which are dual-based as well as Arrrry lillilm1R' _ wit dravn from Europe and planned for rapid redeployment there o J j f' ' Joi r _j' h ' ' ' o il 'lfif' lly in determining our overall general purpose force requiremen s 1 e should review the requirement f rogramming large CONUS-based land forces for reinforcement of Europe is by no means clear that r_ curr nt capability to reinforce Europe with 12-14 division forces thill six Ilonths is warrant With respect to our tactical air forces we should carefully review 0 the Dext year what number of these air ft should-be specifically programmed against NATO requirements til e ' i' d i - I'l ilith Respect to Recent French Actions The enforced withdr al of and facilities from France wUl involve sub f i U i1'fi' f tMr ll one-time costs It will however be sOllIe time before we ' 'f 1 1 ' UII erstand the military implications of the French position I nf l1'i s n3Vothei' NATO forces ' 1 t t ' r t t o ' r - y ' - ' I lIavy ' ' ' go - th reCOllllleUds 90 days in Europe ' '%I' the JCS and AnIi1 disagree with this recommendation ' I ' 3 I o ' o jIK' SEGREf Septe ber 21 1966 1 1 U S OBJECTIVES AJID STRATEGY IN EOlIOPE DECLASSIFIED OCT 3 2006 Authori y EO 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS For a mmber of reasons we need intensively to review all aspecta of NATO tbis year The Proch problell by itself calla for re-evaluation and will nece88itate change tbe NATO Force Planning Exercise and our continuing snal -ia bave provided wch ilrprovsd information about our Allies' forces and plana and action vUl have to be taken on 1970-72 force planning for the Alliance In these circWl8tances it is appropriate to begin by revieviDg our goals in Europe and tbe strstegy we are using to acbieve tb I I' The llDited States' overall military objective in providing forces to NAXO baa heeD and reaa1ua to make aggression at any level grossly unprofitable for the Warsaw Pact in NATO Europe To accomplish this we l b e be providing very large strategie theater nuclear and conventional fore to the Alliance Our political objectives in 1l8intainiag a U S military presence in Europe have been and remain as important aa lIilitary objectives They include 1 prevention of Soviet pod black1l 11 in Wastern Europe 2 maintenance of 3 deterrence of any bUateral Soviet-l'RG security and discouraging the ' revival of German ' milit riBij ' IJPY Our external strategic forces - both missiles and bombers - deter Sovi t Union frOll UIldertalting general var they also provide to some ute t a ''bonus'' deterrent against large-scale aggressions Duclear or 'DODDuclear vhich atop short of Duclear attack OD the CONUS the Soviet e lk ilon can Dever be sure that ve will not employ so of theae forees ' I ha event of large-scale aggreseion Ilven if the U S eould other e reuin a S8D tuary et the outset ' pili l je r ' in draft Memorandwa for the Preaideut on Theater r L our tbeater nuclear foree ' are provided to extend our aetel mc e to lesaer ' eonfliets They uke ' it unprofitable So rl t Union to initiste tbeater Duclear varfare and tbey also 'Dt ov I de a powerful deterrent against large nonnuclesr sggreasions o o l o - t 'J l' ' I' __ I I o I' r I o r r -' - J j Work-ing Group III of the Special Cobdttee bas concluded in recent have a aufficient quantity _ _ While these forces stroD po sil le ag@ re sionl' in tbe U S view NATO also requires sub l1 mt 1al forces vhose funetions fall into three main eate- OS 33 r H atincidents the lawestandpossible leveltheae of ' force uninto prevent situations tbe Soviet Union vith the opportunity for quick 8lld to' shov determination' by pars el foree build-up if a ' nt atioD should arise over some issue and 3 to help deter and 4 ' 8f'SfeRn I ' V o ' b qS h ' ' f ' ' 'Record of DeciaioD J 40' I September 21 1966 II if Decessary defeat larger-acale aggresaiona which tbe Soviet DniOD II1pt iDitiate iD the belief that ve vould Dot reaist or would not ill it1ate the use of nuclear veapons This memorandUII focusses OD U S and A1-lie d force requirl llleDta to aeet these obj ectivea it is useful to begiD by a review of the forces DOW available to each aide I I o HAm AIID PACT GENERAL PUlIPOSE FORCES 0CT 3 1 2006 DECLASSIF-IED o Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div NHS LaDd ' Forces We have somewhat improved our UDderstanding of Pact land forces during tbe last year but ve still know less about tbe character and capabilitiea of tbeae forces than about any otber large element of - tbe Pact's defeDBea cd thia is the IIOSt difficult problem encOUlltered iil att tiDg to evaluat NUO'a defeuaive requirements Specifically V mow the crverall siZe of Pact andes and the nUllber of divisions they Ja ra1lable but ve know little about bow vell most of these divisioDs i E1 ' equipped tbe 8IIOUDt of reserve stocks maintained for tb the _ cd -enning of_CCIIIIbat and logistics support UDita available for the diviaions and tbe reliabilitY of East European forces iD various con- pIi ea o An additional problem is that tbere is no satisfactory way of CORCounting divisions is deceptive bacsuse of great vsriatiOD8 iD size and differences in non-div1aioual 1t t1 i r P1 repower JDe8Suremeut vbile ' videly used is limited by tbe R of reducing many different types of firepower to a cOllllllOn ad also because firepower is only one of many factors which oj affect the C01Ibat potentisl of land forces However direct i 1 l rec t costs of IDSDpower account for about 70-80% of the cost of IU LU' ' land forces Accordingly I will use manpower comparisons here because they are a useful guide to what can be accolDplished vitb t 'I f jor budget increases but i t should be understood that tbese conceal what may be important differences in training equipment and the t1PF f'Pd efficiency of organization employed The table on page 6 indicatell tbat wbile NATO's standing andes exceed the Pact' a by about ' t p OOO men including 337 000 French personnel we w be utstr1pped ' a jS1multaneous lDob 1lization in tbe Ceotral Region b H 30 2 - altbough 1 ' li Jj o 1 ''' iih '- I tJ-1II t t t paring various COUDtrles' land forces 3lti o I I P'iifp 'Uamjle a U S division force in Europe contains 41 000 lien a Soviet division force in East Germany bas SOlO81 g le a tban 14 000 '1 H Ms1pd ng l French support of NUO the Psct would bave about 1 S I ' lIIi i o L4 ion meo against 1 1 million for NATO Considering that IlATO 'Fl ' woUld have both time to prepare defeosive positions and probably J o aubstant1al tactical air advantage it is by no meaDS clear tbat I r defensive prospecta at H 30 would be unfavorable w 1O IHaotI o fU peacetime ji i S I ' I II I t f - ' - _ r- 1 14no ' r - t' icu ap ii ' b1e ' t t' o l061 ' r UO't _ - I i ' r ' ' - 166 25'2 o l 7' i SO r ' o m o o 110 o ' - - 't ' IIrInlI -n '1 ' I ' til 0 ' ' ' i '' '' - ' ' llitNay G ' ' o o 1 ' I ' j ' ' ' ' - ' ' ' 11' i w 166 - 350 n 477 I oo o t 7 1 h ' '1 O7 oo 1 0 U S S I zJ5 lSO U S S L blplrla 1 r I ' - ' ' ' ' ' liI1J ' ' ' ' 51 5 f '- _ - ' _ - 1 - ' - ' _ l ' 11 0101 - 1 Vooooo f'J - ' o ilY ' 7 -- t ' ' ' i i' - r - y - p 6IL ' '3- 1'4 __ aa U lUI M a IM S2 lo II I 1 0 91 lOS ' ''f ' acr 72140 170 51 t'2U 0 - 16 it - 1 6 '1 19%31 llts l Us ' ' ' t Af - o 0 ' o uy 10 -- 2Ul UJ - 211$ OCT 31'2006 r _ i-Oij $ SOlrl'CD o ' - ' l _ -'- ' ' _ '- o ' ' ' o L_ ' __0 o - - ___ _ C m F 1 ' ooh lMI ' CCNl _ t 'f o' _i ' _tIVI ooo '- ' 'tbtl eJ '-t D 'i J ' o ' t ktia ta wbtcb cal 250 CIOO __ 'l- o t a-z t c au14 k WII tc4 ' I ' ' ' - ' mtli r 1a noUI_U an nlltatab MI I w tIIIOt ' fa rrt'l1laf It ' _ ' Oft- cot at 7 ' ' ' ' - ' ' ' ' '' '''' ' --- - ' ' ' ' ' ' l '--- -- ---- -- --- - ' f- i 1 o ' o l ' ' aU af CTeece ' ' -- _ _-- o te '-- -#VJPY ' j I n K t r ' '- j p ' lathtleiU t t Sa ' ' 0 ' _ f ' I US 115 1509 lSI Ii ' ' ' ' ' q 171 -1I' e AppUca le-- ' d - - ' ' ' - ' r s lt e ' d ' I fvt fl l P ' vU' I' '''' ' ' M ' o j 'r _ I fJ i ioiioI -u - ' 'A Io t 58' '''''''iYu nded i - - 1 t o ' ' 'Jo i 11111a1 __ a44i t' t ul ' b u t - I rci p o MUl liJtlr 7 1 - ' n c QA -4IIt t ' ' - 'i ii - rf ' ' 1 0 ioi 'I J#o ro w' f eco s' Declass Dlv WHS ' o ' _ lrtJi4Itt l'CIMta lIon 'bCIIJlQ t ' - l r o ' t 10' _' o - ' f _ ' ' oo - ' ' r JJ I1 kw1 et ' hIa rt o fCI'I 'ICCII '' i ' t - I ' ' ' ' t x f ' - ' ' - -- jiF eiMt a1 ' - u ti _ coalcI nauy w et f iJ t'- i ' ' -1Iet Uu 'U - - ' i ' o 24 1 ' auaa ' ' 324 uO -' 'ijdii1 'uo ' ISO ' ' P1 1I'I' ' o - ' 'A' ' i ' 7 r r - CJNID1VfAL uJ'O nu 'U l i i 3US ' ' ' 71 - 362 - - t Iltil1 tr i' run J 70 e- ' ' 7 1ICI - L J ' ' ti - 'lG'W SOUIIZIS% ' ' 't p - '''' I ' r ' f' no ' ' ' ' ' '- ' ' ' ' I q - I I i I oo L beard of Decision r 1 i r o September 21 '1 966 - _ ve vould catch up by GBPJ- and i f the Pact began lIObUizing before NATO the disparity would be even greater WhUe CONUS-based forces WOul ultimately awing the balanee in NMO's favor today onlyl iitout 75 000 U S troops could be depl ed to Europe and ready for co at byrR 3 although our rapid deployment capability is programmed to incre e greatly in the nesl five years - 'Ibe real issue regsrding NArO Pact mob1l1zation capabUities 18 not how uny aum could be placed in orgaD1zed units rith equipment of aOllle adequacy but vbat would be the cOlllparative effectiveoess of the resulting UDita We are far from having a clea ansver to this question for either the Pact or our Allies WhUe our Allies have very large llUllbers of reservists moat of them do not receive enough refresher training there are too fev reserve UDits and IaOat reserve UDits have obaolescent equip t and insufficient peacetime cadres We are also extremely UDCertain about the equipMllt training and support of Pact reserve forces On balance vbUe the IISDpower data conceal a number of important factors they abow rough parity at H-Day even exclud1ng French forces ucept in Horthem Norway but i f all mellhers of both alliances began 'U1zing at the s _ tille NArO would fall behindf Central legion and r n at a manpover dl8advantage until perhaps K 60 As I v1il later diaCUS8 i t appeara both poa8i ble and desirable to r NAl'O's IIObUiution capebUit1ell aubatant1ally and ao doing should not require large c reuea in our Allies' defense budgets I 'I ' ' Tactical Air Forces Becsuse tactical aircraft are IllUCh easier to make reaaonably good com I P11-t1 appraisals of NATO and Pact aircraft My staff and the Joint o o I taff ractmtly undertook such an analysill based on expected 1968 forces The key findings can be aUIDBrized 88 follows - r i'_ t Dd evaluate than ground forces we can f f I 1 NATO and Pact aircraft in place in Eur e wUl be in 1968 Aboul equal in number 060 NArO versus 4 080 Pact If both sides began to augment as rapi 88 possible the alcou temporarily outlIU1IIber If 0 by roughly 1 000 aircraft By 30 NATO forcea would be la ger 850 ve1 SUS 5 475n and even N 0 could pot y comait abO 50% more aircr than the Pact 10 360 versus 6 76221 NAl'O aircraft coat on the average about 20% more than P t aircraft using the alllle prices ve believe that thia increased COIIt 1 '1'1 e individual aircraft costs used in this analyal8 vere c omputed the basis of producing the 300th aircraft in a aeries The cost of the aVerage aircraft in each force was obtained by veighting the individual aircraft coats by the nUlllber of each type of aircraft in the total force Due to certain characterl8tica of the methodology used for est1lllating costs the 20% cost differential cited herein 18 somewhat of an understatement OD I I ' ' o 7 OCT 3 1 2006 DECLASSlrlED Authori Y EO 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS September 21 1966 Record of Decision is in fact justified by a proportional or possibly greater effectiveness per aircraft Pact aircraft have been designed mainly as interceptors and aa a result have quite limited offensive capabilities for nonnuclear var The higher average cost of NA70 aircraft because we have provided them with substantial capabilities and multi-purpose nonnuclear operations In particular our can carry a much larger payload than Pact aircraft on a given mission For theae reasons NATO training standards md costs are also much higher CSD33 bJSj 3 Because U S aircraft are 80 well supported logistically NATO aircraft taken as a whole are considered to have fewer logistics problems than the Pact's 'Our Allies' practices in this respect however leave much to be desired as I shall discuss later in this MemoraadUlll b i ji 4 Because HATO tactical air forces ' are numerically larger and better suited for' multi-purpose nonnuclear operations tbey could even t Ual ly be expected to acbieve a cOllllWlding degree of air superiority and - to 'provide much more close air support interdiction and reconnaissance ' o ' tban Pact forces For NArO to realize this potential our Allies should correct a number of existing deficiencies in training baaing and logiStics support this can be dqne relatively inexpensively We also need a number of low-cost improvements to ensure that U S tactical sircrsft programmed for European reinforcement can be rapidly deployed and effec c lH ' 1 I H i rely supported o 1 l%L 10 ' '- ir c ' ' o r tus t '-1 1t 1 ' we conclude that NATO baa tile baais for a large advantage in t j ' I tact ical airpover 88 compsred to the Pact This is quite different from ' o the 8ituation in land force tbere our lDI uurement capabUities are rela 11 if ' i ti vely poor but sucb meaaurelll llta as ve can make indicate rough overall j equality in III IIpower but vitb- an advantage in favor of the Pact in terms o ' of early mobUization capability Baving nov considered tbe opposing o land and air forces let us consider some situations in vhich nonnuclear coaflict aigbt begin in Europe w _ ' ' ZJ I NONNUCuwt - ' ' i CONTINGENCIES IN NArC DECLASSIFIED OCT 312006 Authori Y EO 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS 1 o - In appraising HATO' present nonnuclear capabilities and possible in tbem it is useful to consider four general types of contin- 1 Small-scale conflict unexpected by either Side sri8ing j out of some incident or Ilisunderstanding perhaps one that initially involved neither U S nor Soviet forces 2 Politieal-military aggression in vbicb ss a result of tension or crisis tbe Pact might undertake large mobilization and de_ p wment of forces forward This aight occur for example in connection With an effort to restrict A111ed access to Berlin o l'i rJ I t - 1 ' ' ' I ' September 21 1966 Record of Decision OCT 312006 DECLASSIFIED Authori y EO 12958 as amended Chief Records Oeclass Div WHS 3 Deliberate surprise nonnuclear attack with limited objectives e g an attempted land grab against Thrace Blllllburg or Northern Norway 4 Premeditated full-scale nonnuclear aggession lDouuted with as little warning as possible and aimed at _jor objectives e g the seizure of Weat Germany or possibly all of continental Europe o While these are ot the only situations which tight require NATO conventional forces they do cover the entire spectrum of general purpose land and air force requirSlDellts in Europe 1 by reviewing these contingencies we can determine the suitability of our present forces for each and force changes which wo ld mprove that auitability The following diaCU88ion concentratea on land forces beCause it is in this area that we encounter both NATO's greatest uncertainties 8S regards requireaeuta and the IDOSt obvious need for JDOdifications Requirements for and desirable iIIlprovements in NATO's tactical air forces are discusaed later in the KemorandUlD S all Unexpected Conflicts No nonnuclear conflict in Europe is likaly today but if one vere to occur its IIOst probable cause would be acme c OIIIbination of a provoking incident and misunderstanding by one side of the other side 'a intentions and degree of cDllllllitment Tltere is litUe b8llis for predicting the course of an incident in Europe that 1D o1vea armed conflict but our chances of preventing escalation iIIlprove t be extent that HATO's in-place forcea are capable of l118king an ade quate IIIld controlled response Tlte conflict sbould not be allowed to develop in such a way that the Pact concludes tbat what began 811 a lI1atake DOW preaents opportunities to IIBke lllilitary gains a Tlte table on page 6 shows that in every theater except Northern Norway NATO's imIIIediate1y aVai1ab1e nd forces outnUllber the Pact's eveu i f French forces are excluded But the lowest quality units in the Central Region are deployed in t IDOst vulnerable sector the North rIUD plain and some of them are far frOll their defensive positi wh e force size is not a problem as regards tbie contingeucy orce q'uali ty and position1Dg _y be _tters for concern Crisis Mobilization Contingencies Despite our uncertainties as to the Pact's mobilization capabilities the table on page 6 indicates that 'l'he war at sea contingency NATO Pact conflict restricted to naval eDgagements could have an important effect on U S and certdn Allied naval force requireaents We do not yet under blnd the iIIlplicatiODll of this contingency sufficiently to varrat ita inclusion in this HealorandUlD but we are continuing our analysis I 9 September 21 1966 Record of Decision OCT 31 2006 DECLASSlrlED Authori Y EO 12958 as amended ' Chief Records Declass Div WHS ' hJ 4 il'i ' 10 ' Ei NA70 could keep pace with the Warsaw Pact in a mobilization i f our Alliea planned and procured forces on this basis because their reserves of Uained 1I8IIpaver are very large Improvements in equipment and reservist training could be achieved at relatively low cost compared to H-Day forces and this would enable us to realize this potential I i' in a parallel mobilization and fONard deployment by both sides the Pact would be able to develop at the outset a much larger effective force than NATO in the Central Region and Northern Norway Both sides' mobilization capabilities would be lilDited by the availability of adequate equ1 ment and we do not know exactly how 1I4Ily Pact units could be equipped but the Pact forces postulated in the table could probably be provided with more or leas adequate equ1p111ent There is moreover an important difference between Pact manning practices for reserve units and those of our Allies While our Allies could call up many hundreds of thousands of former so1 diers in a fev dsys many of the units into which they would be orgSDized are aanned in peacetime with very smaU or non-existent cadres such units could not be made combat-effective for two or three IIIOIlthS The Pact on other hand maintains its divisions at graduated states of readiness et divisiOns for example V8%J' frOll 90% manning East Germany to -20%' inside the USSR A sufficiently large peacetime e ezists to serve as an organizational nucleus for incoming regervis ' -'-' ' It should be noted however that the probability of all NAtO and Pact countries beginning rapid mobilization at the same time is very low A more plausible scenario would be one in which only the U S S R o and 'one or tW9 other Pact nations initially atarted to mobilize on the one hand and the FRG U S and one or two additional NAtO countries on the other Depending on the exact assumptions used it is easy to reach widely differing conclusions about relative NATO Pact strengths K y and any point thereafter One can imagine situations in which the Soviets would receive no direct support from any Pact ally and in cI oDly the U S and FaC would take steps to match a Soviet _bilil at on N Surprise Nonnuclear Attack The Defense Intelligence Agency DIA j has estimated the forces which the Pact mighbseej to assemble 1GBP they I' decided on a l1sited attack with no warning 6 1 division forces 570630 000 men could be employed in the Central Region and about three somewhat smaller division forces 35-40 000 men against Creek or Turkiahl i 1 10 ' Tbe Army considers that HAlO would receive some varning Of attack of this Size and that probably only 20 divisions would be initially eaaployed 1GBP the aim vere to provide no warning at all o j 11' MeR fac September 21 1966 rlbraee Such an attack VDuld presumably aim at a fait accompli perhaps the seizure of Hamburg or aD Aegean port An IDldertaking of this type would seem to be very unlikely because the pact could not easily discount the possibility of a tactical nuclear response by NATO but they adght be more tempted and more likely to adsjodge our determination to defend if our nonauclear capabilities were obviously inadequate Our ImIoediate1y available forces are today however large enough to aake such a venture unattractive even without the threat o f NATO initiation of nuclear war The postulated Bulgarian foray toward the Aegean would be very IDllikely to succeed since the Bulgarian forces would be 'ubstant1slly oucn mred by Creek and Turkish H-Day In the Central Region NATO's 668 000 _n 558 000 without France in lDlediate1y available units wo i f manpower alone were the det nan ff combat ca$Uity probably be adequate to repel an attacking force f 570-630 000 men and this estimate of Pact manpower is probably excessiv or a nowarning attack But many of these units are not fully effective and our forces are not optimally deployed against the likely corridors of attack part1cularly in Northern Germany What is needed is - as in the case of the first contingeney - a higher degree of quality in our Allies' land forces plus SOlIe streugthening in Northern Germany I believe that i1f our K-Day units wer Oper equipped and -deployed a NATO Gentral Reg10n force of perhaps 500 00 would probably suffice to deter the I' Pact fro1II launching au an a ck since their nUller1cal advantage vnuld I 1 17 llUell too IIIIUIll for th to have high confidence of a successful operI ation Furthermore a NATO force of this size would probably suffice -- to contain the aggression should it be lalDlched IS' ' o Ra id Full-Scale NODDuclear Aggression The contingency which requires the largest H-Day NATO force is a major nonnuclear attack in which the Pact builds up its forces as rapidly as possible -' _ an optimum size without a concurrent NATO buildup and thea attaeks'l IA estimates t 50-60 division forces 875 000-1 050 000 men could be assembled by the Pact in 21-28 days and could aUack in the Central Region with 7-15 d4ya' tWambls l supported by a 20-division theater reserve about 280 000 In o this contingency the Pact would have about 10-15 days' head II start in mobUization and deployment before NATO received warning In Greece and Turkish Thrace the str1king force is esJJr-ted at about 16-18 division forces with 6-8 division forces in reserv r - _ o o Ratimates of the NATO forces which would be required to def nd against this attack without using nuclear weapons have varied coos1derably for three aiD reasons First since there are great uncertainties regarding the ct character of Pact land forces and their effectiveness relative to NATO unita there is considerable latitude for judgment as to how 1IIIIDY IIlATO visioaa would be aeeded to oppose a given Pact force effectively 1 t j The JCS aud Services correct ly obaerve that t he effeet 1_ warniAg t1J e aisht be reduced from this estimate if NATO did not act c1ecis1vely as Boon as the threat buildup beC8lle evident 11 OCT 31 2006 DECLASSIF-IED AuthoritY EO 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS September 21 ' 1966 DECL6 SSIFIED OCT 3 1 nn Authorj y EO 12958 as a frcr d' Chief Records Declass DIV WHS we Second even 1GBP had perfect information on Pact land forces conflict outCOllll would be very uncertain becauae it depends on many factors besides the forces employed and their comparative capabilHies Thua there is rooao for judgJlK llt as to hDv _cb confidence of successful defense - is appropriate A poature which for example exactly matched the timephaaed buildup of Pact caobat potential might well suffice but we would b ve apprec1ahly less confidence in JIOunting a successful defense than 1GBP our forces were say 25% larger The Soviets bowever would also 'be subject to such uncertainty and might be deterred frOll IItarting a var without a CODSiderable aeasure of auper Lority Third because of tbe uncertainty in estimating effecta recent military analyses appear to have taken redit for NATO's inherent tactical air advantage in calculating land ce require ents This uncertainty is partly cauaed by our geDeral laCk f q t1tative knowledge of the effects of air paver on large scale lana QPerationa aDd is increased by uncertainty aa to how loug the large Pact a defense forces II1gbt delay the impact of NATO air power on the land battle I - r lii aw e of these factors estimates of the ech forces those available j 1 1 oo - foJ ' J 't I' NATO K-Day and first in 7-15 days ftCIuired for tbis contingency in the Central Begio'n bave varied frOID about 35 equivalent U S division forces as suggested in last year's Memorandum on NATO Strategy and Force Structure to about SO baaed on tbe objective forces set fortb in tbe receDt JCS ''NAHILPO'' study Tbe exiating and planned NArO H-Day forces unt only to about 20-24 U S division force equivalents -based on firepover effemvene s indices given io the JCS' Joint Strategic Objectives Plan JSOP Tbe additional cost to the U S to fill the gap between our Allies' p anaed forces and the JCS objective forces would be SOllll tens of billions of dollars for land forces alone Qlr8r the IUtZt five years even asllWling that our Allies equipped and - ed' th_air planned H-Day units effectively Moreover a 1IIIIjor part tt ' of the increased U S force would bave to be permanently stationed in Urope to provide the required M-Day capability In view of these con siderationa ve must determine the importance to the-U S of trying to JDIIke up for our Allies' deficiencies against tbill threat To assess this we DUSt aSK whether such an sggressiDD is at all probable despite the fact thet the Pact is capable of launcbing a sudden aaasive assault of thi type In brief I consider this the least likely of the four nonnuclear contingencies discussed above for three main reasons Pirst aside from the risk of general nuclear var the risK to the Pact of a NATO theat4ir nuclear response U enol'lllDUS our vital intereBts VDuld clearly be at ' stake in such an attacK and the Soviets could therefore assume t at va would take whatever defensive measures proved necesBary The Soviets recogidze in their II1litary discussioDs that such a responae by RArC to a large Pact noanuclear attacK could be disastrous not only VDuld 12 i ' ' - r o Record of Decision 0 - _ ' September 21 1966 OCT 3 1 2006 DECLASSifiED Authority EO 12958 as ame nded Chief Records Declass Dlv WHS I the attacking Pact forces be subject to rspid destruction but even more important they would lose lIlUch of their theater nuclear capability In this regard it is worth noting that the Soviets have optimized their 'general purpose forces for nuclear warfare presumably they do not con template deliberate large-scale attack' on NATO using nonnuclear weapons only ' Second I find it increasingly difficult to foresee circumstances in which the Soviets could persusde their Pact Allies to provide the wholehearted support necessary to such an adventure East Europeans voold ' certainly see their societies as being at risk whereas they might expect the' USSR to remain a sanctuary ' Third NATO and Pact land forces are today too closely balanced in terms of manpower for the Soviets to be confident of the success of such an attack even if NATO did not respond with nuclear weapons The Pact probably also recognizes the quantitative and qualitstive advantage IIA'IO would have in air operations and lIlUst surel y make prudent calculations about how NATO air superiority would affect the success of Pact land operations ' ' ' - m 'The Capability and Suitability of NATO's Land Forces I believe we the cepabilities of lIA'IO's present land forces as follows o N1 i iJJt N orthern Norway present forces are more than adequate to deal '-'c j ' rith BIIl8ll unexpected conflic s even those which might inv olve as 1' q ZO-ZS Pact divisioDIS in the CentriU Region and even f SUJDe that Fraru e w Iuld not participate If the Pact decided to 'expand the scale of the cbaf ict beyond point however NAXO's prospects would not be so favotabl e As for the crisis mobilization type of contingeilcy i f NATO had 6 or more' to mobilize and i f all members used this time effectively the 'resulting force would I believe at least deny any overwhelming Pact superiority and might reasonably be expected to mount a successful forwsrd nonnuclear defense o rize ' ' ' his ' ' ' ln the case of the surprise nonnuclear attsck i e 20-36 Pact visions attacking in the Central Region without warning NATO WDuld have at ' wont sDlllething approsch OUgh equality in manpower even without France but qualitative w esses in Allied forces snd malde P toymliilts would lessen our prospects for successful forward defense o ODe c8nu0t say with any confidence how such a conflict would develop g1 ven today's NATO force - Finally in the caae of full-scale ' lIion O might well have It should be noted however but by no means provable assumptions present forces might permit stabilization of the battle line at some point East of the Rhine without initiating the use of nuclear weapons o 13 Deciaion o September 21 1966 OCI DECLASSifiED 312006 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS As regards S1d tabi11ty of Allied land forces most K-Day units sre DOt adequately equipped or supported' indeed we could achieve a greater H-Day capabi11ty with a smaller llUDIber of higher quality better supported units and at the same or lover total cost Moreover through aal deployment we are losing III1ch of the capability inherent in the size and cost of present A111ed forces And perhaps most important our Allies bave generally not spent the modest sums necessary to realize the great IIIObUizatiDn potential wh l ch ia inherent in the l r large numbers of reserv i sts In short NArO's land forces today are not optiaally postured to deal v i th any of the four contingencies discussed above We particularly need h i gher H-Day quality units for accidental conflicts and a much greater mobU1 zation capability for situations in which the Pact might mobi11ze aDd move units forward in order to exert political pressure ' o Our A1l I es' land forces today are largely t he result of an inefficient COIIproadse between 1II1 litary and political estimates of the threat NA'1'O 'force goals have been designed with reference to an extreme case the massive assault launched as rapidly as possible But HArO's political autboritias have for the reasons discussed above considered such ag gresaion so improbable that they have been unwilling to provide the very large resources necessary for nonnuclesr defense against it and their 1970 force plllD8 shov ' no change in their view In an attempt to meet the' goala quantitatively they have sacrificed far too much quality and because oGBP the emphasis on sudden attacks they have largely ignored the need for rapid and effective mobi11zation base o oo ile 1D theory the U S could unUaterallyundertake to provide O th a high-confidence nonnuclesr defense against rapid and massive IIO c lear attac lt very large and costly increases in U S forces would e called for 1GBP we attempted to make good the Allied defiCit aga l ost ''''' H s threat and it ia by DO means clear'that such an ettelllpt could suc C eed Our Allies 1II1 ght respond by reducing their forces Because I believe that such an attack is already so highly deterred I believe that the very large U S expenditures which vOuld be incurred in an attempt to meet it are not varranted Thia is not to say that ve should permanently forego as a long term objective nonnuclear capabilities sufficient to repel any type of Pact nonnuclear aggression I f our Allies # eventually agree to increase the l r nonnuclear capabi11ties suffic ly to counter all threats t e U S should provide an appropriate sha J o But this increased Allied contribution ia not now likely and in its absence our near-term efforts should concentrate on using those resources we have efficiently with respect to the most likely threats I vill discuss in Section V some ways in which by modification of their forces our A1l I es could achieve a better return on their large defense resource coaaitllents First however a brief review of the French problem ia in order 14 Jaf S CREl J ol d 0 September 21 1966 f Decision OCT 3 1 2006 IV o FRENCH ACTIONS AND THEIR IHPLICATIONS DECLASSIFIED Authorl Y EO 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS While we do not yet know the ultimate implications of France's recent change of 'status in NATO a number of issues have beeD raised The 1I8in issue of course is wat the French withdrawal iJlplies for NATO's defensive prospects and requirements TiDely and complete 'rench cooperation would be necessary in the event of a sudden and massive attack both because of the illlpOrtance of the large French forces in such an event and the requirement for French airspace and terrain to provide depth in 'our defenses Cooperation would not be so vital lIIilitarlly in small-scale contingencies nor during a prolonged aobUization the _npower comparisons used above show that even without France NATO es are stUI very substantial relative to the opposing Pact forces WhUe we do Dot yet know the cirCUllStances in wich we can be' confident 0 tiDely French support mit 'h ' f i t DOW appears that we can probably count on France in those cases were In 'Ppart would be ntal - large sudden attacks - but in lesse Dt1n sbe IIIlght well witbbold both political and lIIilitary sUpp ' 'C I g r ' 'Lne withdrawal of U S forces from France will involve substantial costs It does not now appear however that the 1088 of our rear base ' in France need result in any substantial degradation in the capabilities of our Europe-based forces to deal with the likely contingencies iith NATO and the U S are of course continuiDg to negotiate with Franc on the conditions of her participation in NATO and on the pos si1 ilities for leaving sOllIe U S and other NATO facilities in France ou1d this prove desirable Within the next few IIIOnths we should have a _cb c1eaJr picture than at present of the possibilities in both of ese areas V MODIFICATIONS IN ALLIED FORCES I think we now know wat general types of reallocations would be desirsble in st Allied forces and SOllIe specific changes which should 1I8f8 altbough 1D8DY of the details remain to be worked out and are ig b 11 lg analyzed further As a result we have taken steps to raise these Ullue a both within NATO-wide forums and also in selected b11ater2 l dis ' 1W ci1lls1911U1 Jlett iIr Our Allies need to equip their land forces much b is the csse today but we need further study to detenine how much equipment of wat types is essential The Soviet Union sel lll8 to 1I8lce do with equiplllent that is both less cOllplex and less frequently replaced than that in the U S Army o oo 15 ' September 21 1966 - ' bcord of Decision - o 'Z OCT 312006 DECLASSifiED Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS 1' ' o -A critical weakness in our Allies ' divisions is the ahorts e of nondivisional combat support - especially artillery and sir defense units and the inadequacy of logistics support forces NAMILPO has identified a UUIIIber of specific weaknesses and further analysis will probably reveal more We are intensifying our efforts to point out remedisl measures to specific Allies because a division without adequate combat support is of questionable initial value and without logistics support it can only fight for 10-15 days More aupport units are needed and most of th must be manned at or near the same percentage of full strength as in the case of the division A non-organic artillery battalio IlUSt be just as ready as the infantry brigade it supports 1 think however- that peacetime manning for H-Day divisions and their necessary combat support units should be relaxed from the current SHAPB standard of 100 percent of wartime strength to perhaps 85-90 percent While this matter is now being studied in NATO in my view an 85-90 percent level should be adequate to ensure both that the unit can be Immediately committed to combat if necessary e g in a small unexpected conflict and that if 7-15 days' warning is received as would be true for a rapid full-scale attack the unit can be brought to full strength As for reserve units while the optimUIII manning policy is not yet clear it see1llS evident that the current second-echelon divisions manned at 3-5 percent active personnel - would be of little use except C- with 60-90 days' warning and I am accordingly requesting the JCS to evaluate alternative manning policies for Allied reserve units it would pe that perhaps a 15-25 percent active cadre would be both efficient iDd feasible _ ' Another major weakness in our lies' land and air forcea is the lack of adequate balanced stocks l ile DIOst countries have large stocks of small arms ammunition and frequently a great deal of artillery and tanlr _nit ion for -calibers now being phased out they typically have an average of only 15-30 days' ammunition supplies for the modem weapons in their uniti 1 These ition shortages exist despite the fact that our Allies tend to have far fewer heavy' weapons per division force than does the U S For example the current FRG division forces contain only about one-third as lIlany artillery pieces as aU S division force in I unlpe Furthermore specific shortages of key ammunition items are even aoraaeriona the table on the following page shows the reported end-1965 _mition inventory for selected Central Begion Allies at U S rates 16 J9f SECRET Recoilless Rifle 175 Gun FRG FRG Netherlands Light Tank Netherlands Medium Tank Netherlands Heavy Mortar 34 days 18 14 36 28 September 21 1966 OCT 3 1 2006 DECLASSifiED Authori y EO 12958 as amended Chief Records Dec ass Div WHS U K l U K U K o 8 Howitzer 5 5 Rowitzer Mediwo Tank 2 days Belgium Belgium Belgium Recoilless Rifle 1 Anti-Tank Veh 18 Light Mortar 16 20 26 --- Equipment stocks to replace weapons and other equipment lost in combat are both small and obsolescent and it is likely that the same situation obtains with regard to spare parts a result the U S has proposed in NATO the adoption as an interim o a capab y to support the forces with complete balanced stocks comb t or 4S days This appears a feasible goal for 1971-72 at least ' 'AL' c'r 'W08t countries d is surely a necessity if we are to have any conof ioounting even a temporary defense When this goal has been met we should proceed in balanced increments to increa e our stocks Until it has been attained we shoUld discourage our Allies from what appears to be a rather haphazard approach of buying very large stocks of sOlDe tellS e g the PRe has 165 days of rifle ammunition at U S rates while stocklr' 'll '-l r t ing only 2-30 days of other equally vital supplies As target '- l _ or how these improvements might be achieved I think that we should J rat encourage our Allies to increase budgets sufficiently to bring their current K-Day divisions up to these standards and to create adequate nou-divisionai support units as well NATO's overall effectiveness can be increased by reallocations avay from currently planned naval and air forces to land forces i f our Allies can be persuaded to do so Where large national forces those not c ttcd to NATO are maintained ad i j onal resources may be available by reallocating avay from them in I ' j ' favor of NArD-committed forcea But where these three aources are insuf'j ' i quantitative reductions should be encouraged to the extent nec to achieve adequate force quality '_ ' As f and when the K-Day forces can meet appropriate standards of qualve should encourage our Allies to provide better mobilization capaby balanced increments of equipment cadre personnel and retraining ' This is desirable not only for the mobilization case lao an efficient step if Our Allies ultimately agree to increase o i i ' K Additional stocks of these items are probably maintained in the U r but we do not knlll their size and COIIposition -- 17 J8f SECRET Record f Decision '- JB1f SECRET September 21 1966 tf f li l their' M-Day forces Given such agreement reserve units could rapidly converted to M-Day status because the long lead-time item - the equip Ji' t - would already' be on hand ' In summary there is room for great improveuoent in our Allies' land forces without large increases in their defense bud ets manpower or major combat units While it would be naive to think that the U S can single-handedly persuade our Allies to make all these changes I believe that our first need is for a clear understanding of which modifications are most urgently needed Tactical Air Forces We should not attempt to influence our Allies to increase the size of their tactical air forces above present levels for tllO reasons First if we organize and use NATO's present air forces effiCiently we can reasonably expect a substantial margin of superiority aver the Pact whereas the same is not true for land forces The effect of this potential air advautage on the land battle in Europ e is however highly uncertain Until we are are confident of at least holding in the land war ve should not devote additional resources to winning the air var beyond those required ' to eliminate current inefficiencies Second even were it desirable to increase NATO's air superiority further it would be far more efficient for the U S to provide any increase if our Allies put the resources saved into land forces The basis for this fil i fI W' 1 economic it costs our Allies about as much as' it does us to provide a given air squadron but it costs them only about half as much or in J he ease of Greece and Turkey only ten percent as lIIUch for a given l1 imd force unit The reason is that Allied mimpower costs are far lower than ours whereas their equipment-related costs are typically the same 11 higher Equipiol nt-re1ated costs'dominate total air force costs whereas personnel-related costs daminate land force ezpenditures We should however encourage the plauned modemization of existing Allied air UII1ts and far more important we should try to persuade our Allies to spend the relatively small sums needed to realize the substautial 1l0DDUclear capabilities of their tactical aircraft t I 1 i 0 1 f Specifically our Allies need more air-to-ground ordnance and much it hould be of the latest types o 1 Furthermore their pilots require ' 11 To illustrate in recent months an average of 790 U S attackcapable aircraft in Southeast Asia have been delivering about 34 000 tons of nonnuclear munitions per month exc ing about 8 000 tons per month delivered by our B-S2 force Our Allies have roughly 2 000 attack-c apable aircraft but the r total stock of nonnuclear air ordnance is only about 60 000 tons i e about 3 weeks of supply at our Vietnam rate and most of this ordnance is not of the latest types i 18 lIP' SECRET DECLASSifiED OCT 3 1 2006 Author y EO 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS ' i i Decision lJH SECRET September 21 1966 OCT 3 1 2006 DECLASSifiED Authori y EO 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS lIOre and bett nloii iiniiuiiciiliieiiaiir ad si siiOinis since today the emphasis o NAMILPO has recommended relatively low-cost modifications in Allied F-104Cs which would greatly increase their nonnuclear offensive capabilities And perhaps DOat important Allied air bases require passive and active defenses of the type U S bases in Europe Because of the fixation on - a role which for the most part can better I missiles - our Alliea have generally measures needed to achieve a useful nonnuclear capability We have already discussed these points in detail with the FRG and I plan to raise them with other countries as well' Allied lIaval Forces Considering the weaknesses in our Allies' land forces IIDd the resulting III1certainty in NATO's ability to deAl in all re J ' uF' with full-scale lIIDd attacks aOllle of the money which our Allies now apending on naval forces could be better spent on improving land f ti s Many of the missioaa of these naval forces are of doubtful feasi D 7 and even if they could be carried out in many cases would contribute to the overall defense of the Alliance only marginally Doubtful feasibility and marginal value especially characterize Creek and Turkish forces in the Black and Aegean Seas German and Daoish forces in the Baltic Norwegian Daval forces in- general and to a lesser degree part of the Itslian and naval forc most of our Allies are now committing a considerable portion of budgets to these forcea typically 10-20 percent because naval force deCisions more on the basis of tradition and politics relative military requirements In these circumstances we have l 1p ' opportunities to influenca Allied naval force plans but some acla 'appear feasible and might somewhat improve the aituation I f se We have raviewed our Allies' specific ship procurement plans through early 1970s o 80 fsr as they are known as part of an overall analysia of NATO naval force 'requirements developed by my staff Based on this UliBl '8JLs we have tentativaly identified a number of Allied procurement ' I'DJLII1l 1I bich ought to be changed as sWllllSrized in the tabla On the fol1i i p a ge After appropriate review I plan to uae this lIaterial in i ' discussions with 8elected Allies he lIODlnCATIONS IN U S FORCES FOR NATO In their NAKILPO study the JCS bave not only reviewed Allied forces and desirable modifications to them but they have also made a recommen- i on a s to tbose forces which the U S should program against European contingencies Their specific recommendations are set forth in the 19 Jef SECRET ' ' 11' o ' llecord of Decision September 21 1966 OCT 312006 DECLASSIFIED Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Pj INHS DESIlWILE CllAllGES IN IIAl'O NAVY Cuu uY Pt IIis STear Naval Comt ' ' Belgi Dellar Cel llllUl Action IDE 2DE Defer construction leUre 2 lIE 2 au Defer c oaatruction Drop plans 2 l'P8 Defer construction 3 DOG 10 DEC Coat SaYings 'Hillions of l Remarks 14 5 2 3 To be commissioned in 1969 wwtI units Vith limited speed and ASW capabilities 33 9 6 9 tvo One and Two --u s 5 9 4W Drop plan Drop plane Drop plans 190 5 343 8 112 2 6 SSIt Drop 1'1 Defer construction Drop 1'1 108 8 87 1 32 8 6DD letire 12 sse 10 nrc 6 LSK 17 6 i92 i 4 DD Retire 4 8 4 yr 4SS letlre 18 PCB Retire 1a 4DD Retire letire 2 5S Return to 2 5Slt Defer construction 5 0 4 yr 10 2 li I 20 0 12 5 1 2 1 yr 2 3 3 yr 36 9 u s 52 9 20 8MIEI to be commissioned in 1970 to be c oo ioned in 1969 one in 1970 to be commiSSioned in 1969 To be built in Ceruany To be ccam1ssioned frOD 1972 on Five to be comodss1oned 10 1968 S 10 1969 and 2 in 1970 To be commissioned fram 1969 on To be coaaiss1oned 10 1968 Tbree to be cammissioned 10 1969 o and three in 1970 Retire 6 WWII unit now 1nata d of 3 10 1967 and 3 after 1970 Retire WWII unit now lostead of 1970 or later Retire WWII units now instead of 1970 Retire WWIl units now instead of 1970 Obsolete Retire WWII units DOW in tead of 1967 Return WWIl units now in tead of 1969 To be coam1oo inned 10 1969 September 21 1966 of Decision OCT DECLASSIFIED 312006 Authority EO 12958 as amended ' Chief Records Declass Div WHS NAHILPO-197l goals which are judgea to be realistically attainable for These goals call for the u s to continue and in some re'increase its forces programmed for Europe beyond the currently approvea F1veYear Defense Plan I if ' ' I In my view however those forces which the U S nOll has in Europe are excessive in cert8in respects and I think our programs can accordingly be modified over the next several years While a number of areas need further review before final details can be worked out I believe that we can make some reductions in our Europe-deployed land and air forces I also think that in determining overall U S general purpose land and air force requirements we need a careful review of whether the very large reinforcing forces we are now capable of providing Europe are in fact required C ' ' ' 1 U S Land Forces In considering possible changes in U S land forces r Eur it is useful to treat our Europe-deployed forces separately from I Our CONUS-based reserves 1 U' S Land Forces in Europe II'believe that some reductions in our Europe-based land forces would se o balance their capabilities both with respect to the DIOst likely threats we face and with Allied m kl 'I I' ll I_ forces' capabUitiesil The reductions sugp ested below can i f properly probably be accomp shed with only limited political costs and I '1 Jr 1M1 4 evaluate the appropriateness of this course of action over the several months o o iI s Army Europe USAREUR now baa abo tI205 O men in its five division' forces including 30 OOO-odd personnh in I sustaining support units these are units needed if the division force is to maintain itself in combat beyond 60 days Roughly 13 000 of these sustaining support i p rsonne1 are now in France with the remainder in Germany Some of these are necessary for peacetime support of USAREUR or to receive war augforces the remainder would not have to be in place in Europe well after D-Day We would incur a large investment cost $100 O mil li on to relocste the 13 000 now in France elsewhere in Europe r a't Allies cannot at present sustain large-scale combat fqr even 45 estimate is probably optimistic so that the relevance about 20 000 additional Army personnel not attributable to the divisions or their support e U S A personnel in SHAPE headquarters Recently Vietnam drawdowna reduced our Army strength in Europe by about 15 000 but it should be back to programmed strength by December 1966 21 1 ' Jar'SURE' September 21 1966 OCT 31 2006 DECLASSIFIED Authori y EO 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS of our SUBta lning support forces is' far frOlll clear Moreover witb our groriDg abUity to move large forces quickly ' we should have adequate Il lae to IIIDve aUstaia1ng forces from CONUS to Europe in say contingency where they would be required '1 believe therefore that we sbould re ' turn susta1ning support personnel to CONUS except for those needed for peacetime operations or for receiving war augmentation forces from CONUS 'l'bis should perlllit us to return to CONUS lII81ly of the sustaining support personnel now in Frauce as well as sOlIe in Germany o r iR' 's For s l m1lar reasons I recommend that war reset Ve stocks in Europe be maiDta1u ed at 60 COIIbat days as opposed to the current 90-day autborization for our forces deployed there plus those scheduled to be airlifted to Europe by Hf-30 Stoc ks for our progrllllllll d sea1ifted forces are carried by sbip witb tbe forces Sixty days' stocks c sn be aec omil ated in ex1at1Dg Europeau facilities at low cost but for a 9O-day 't level we would bave to spend SOllIe tens of mllions of dollars on new depots and releed 'facilities because of our need to evacuate fae1lities in Prance A ay level moreover appears adequate to permit resUpply in situationa ere pply could be useful tlSAlIE1lR today is by far the most combat-ready land force in Europe ' Temporary' Vietnam drawdowus will be made good by the end of tbe yesr Its divisions and initial support units are programmed to be manned at 100 per I ot wartime strengtb In sharp contrast the IIIOSt fullY_ODed large forces in the fars Pact' tbe 20 Soviet division forces in East IIDIY are lIIBIUled at less than BO percent of wartime strength and are L ' ll l judged capable of ate cOllllitlDeDt to combat o ' - In addit1 on I 8111 disturbed by estillates of the ilIIplied relative effectiveness of the U S and Soviet divisions Despite tbe fact that ' be peacetime ta dng of a USAREOll division force is roughly three times that of a Soviet division force in East Germany the Army's indices of t 'i Cif 1 comparative firepower used In JSOP indicate that the USAREUR unit has lIly about fl lperc 81lt llare firepower than the Soviet unit ThiS implies -f im f t't li t t e SoVi'8ts get as lIIUch firepower from a peacetime dep o 'llll llt of p t9 lIIen 1 75 1t 14 000 as we do frOlll41 OOO calling into question 'j 'U1 llkfi fi' t Vifue we receive frDIII e 16 500 IIIIUl differ J Finally USAREUR's ' o ing level poses a serious balance of p s problem particularly if ce fbe FRG is findiDg it increasingly difficult to meet tbe fu U offset I greeMl1t o 1 am therefore directing the A to develop alternative plans for achieving various degrees of reduction in the size of USAlUmR's current 41 000_ division force Ratber than IIIBldng reductions n most or all individual units it ll8y be 1II0re efficient to withdraw entire units suc h as battal1oaa aud leave their equipment prepositioned in EIlrope so ' 22 September 21 ' 1966 OCT 31 DECLASSIFIED MS Author EO 12958 as amenoed Chief Records Declass Div WHS fl c an be rapidly flowD baa 1D crisia of var Before II8k1ng tmy tion 1D our Europe-deployed lAmd forces ve vill have to weigh political factors very carefully But since the average U X and 'JIG diviaiOD forcea are lIIIIIIDeel at about 17 500 some reduction 1D our ' current 41 000 - division force should be politically acceptable 2 U S Land Forces for ReinforCA lle11t of Europe lihUe ve could today r oree Europe vitb some 12-14 divisions over a period of four to six atba it is Dot at all clear tbat ve should 8 8 5 _ the Deed for doing 80 in C01IIputilig total U s land f'1rce requirements Host of ' these forces including all reaerve unit8 could not arrive in Europe before H 75 aod a DDlIIber of tbea probably vould not arrive until H 120 or later Indeed these are optill 18tiC estimates today they vni be realistic ouly around 1970-72 vben the large jrogr_d increase in our rapid deployIleDt capability begins to occur o o tl' - - fi ut the need for large-scale u s reinforce_nt at H 60 and beyond theory be ' modest thus alling into question the need to aaiDtaiD U S reserve division forces for NATO If all of our Allies weft ilizing as fat as possible their reserve units vould start to t bec aae c ombat-capable in large quantities 8tarting at about H 6O DIA o U hl eat1matea that our Central legion Allies could by Ht-9O increase tbeir andes to a total of about 1 500 000 meo in organized and equipped diviif i I si forces and substaotial numbers of fillers to replace combat 10s8es r ' l 1d_ 1Bobe available The Pact might have ab0 i'OOO OOO 111m in divio I aioo forces available by H -90 in tbe Central legion t $ 1 o I t I' I o 'Aa mentioned earlier the relative effectiveness of the mobUized O and Pact reserVe forces ia very unclear but there ia DO reason to believe tbat ooe aide'e forces would heve a substantial qualitative advantage over the other's Accordingly a U S force of only 500 000 Den would stUl provide NATO with numerical parity relstive to the Pact Sinee NATO's lAmd forces would be strengthened by prepared defensive poaltions and would operate with the assistance of superior tactical air power manpower equality would probably not be needed to mount an uate defeose l I 00 balance in a contingency which produced both substantial time to_J bJPYize and a concerted NATO respooae i f the U S vere to deploy o Europa the tbree coamitted K-Day Army divisions in CONUS and fill out all eight division forces to 50 000 men eaeh providing a totel U S force of 400 000 men I see DO reason to think that the Warsaw Pact would be in a significantly superior position to NATO t ' In fact if 60-90 days' varoiog vere assumed these three OONUSbaaed reinforcing divisions could presumably be largely or wholly in the reserves There is of course s require_nt for sOllIe rapid land C ' augmentation to provide in tiae of crisis elear and eady evithe U S COIIIIIIitDeot to defend Western Europe but I b elieve that would only require ODe U S division or perhaps less Thus the 'j ii J r 'i 'f of I ' or' 23 l IL c rd of Decision September 21 1966 ease GBPor mainta101og three active divisions explicitly for Europe rests on two main assumptions First conflict must begin with relatively little warn1og second the attack must not be so large that it overwhelms NATO's forces before the arrival of reinforcements cfl M- 'l lJti rea11am of theae aasUlllptions and the military utility of early itr1val need to be evaluated ' As regards U S reserve division forces a case can be made that a number should be programEd for European reinforcement to hedge against the posaibllity that in a crisis sOlIe of our Allies III1ght not lID bllbe or in tbe case of France III1ght not even cDlllllit their peacetime forces to the common defense If we had sufficient strategic warning to activate and deploy U S reserves tbey could provide considerable insurance in this type of contingency o On balance tbe correct number and mix of active and reserve U S land forces for European reinforcement is far from clear and the range of unCBrta10ty is v ery great Under some assUlllptions our present caJia Uiti a appear to be roughly the right ones under different ODes we 1111 ' Iiate far too little capability or alternatively far lDOre than ve ' need ' At 'present '1 ' have considerable question as to the need for ma1oreining our present reinforcing capability particularly since our Allies are generally not making efforts to provide rapid and effective mobi11 ution eapabilit1es Thus it is evident thst over the next year ve must develop a reasonably detailed set of European contingencies against whicb to program our reinforcing capabllities and ve shilll make this a priority uudertaldng 'In b respect to our Marine forces for politic reasons ve should leont e our present colllllitment of two Marine div1aion-ving teallll to NAtO's s't rategic reserve These forces are however maintained on the basis of 'r iI ' iIDn-NATO contingencies and should not be considered as part of the cost A of our' COIIIIIitment to the defens of Europe _ Alternative O S Tactical Air Forces for Europe The U S now has 1 sqUadrons of Air Force tactical aircraft fighter reconnaisaance 'Ir ' ' and attack types in Europe comprising about 622 aircraft Two squadrons o f B RB-66 aircraft and one RF-4C squadron formerly in France are being returned to CONUS These lill be replaeed by two dual based squadrons i e unita which will normally be based in the U S but l h ' N If t o ' the Navy bas about 150 aircraft in the Mediterranean OD two aircraft carriers and l'l '# f 1 tl COl1- the O S has plana to deploy to Europe 45 Air Force tactical squadrons two Marine Wings imd eight carrier air wings c0mprising SOllIe 1700 unit equi llt aircraft If necessary theBe could be supple ented by anotber 1600 unit equi nt aircraft 24 ' 1 j' 1tti' ord jif nec ia i ' ' September 21 1966 Will periodical lY b'e deployed to European bases for training and to o ' evidence the c onti nu1ng I OIIIII1t nt of these aircraft to NATO I believe ' that over the 'n ext several years i t will be hoth feasible and desirable ' -- ' ' to return to cONul ' and ' dual-base a substantial nUllber ' perhaps 10-15 J' o of our ' Europe-based squadrons but no decision will be made until the ' eo pletion of the Air Force dual-basing 8tUdy which is now IDIdenray i o ' I The llAin advantage in 80 doing is a reduction in gold outflow of roughly $2-4 III I lliOlL per squadron per year The III I litary disadvaotage of dual-basing is that if large-scale var begins vithout varning ' ' ve DUlY lose the use f CONUS-based aircraft for a few days but as dis cussed above the occurrence of major conflict vithout varning 8 ' ' ' ' ' ' h1 h1y Improbable ' and in a l1 er conflict not all of our aircraft would be -distely required in theater In addition until we are able to provide our European 'airbaaes with adequate active and passive i o p 't'I'''t t1 defeliaes our Europe-based aircraft vill be very vulnerable in their o peacetia deplo m ts to surprise attack and dual-hasing reduces tbia riak The Air Force is now undertaking a COIIIprehenaive study of the advanta ea and disadvantages of dual-basing when it has been completed lite -should be able to judge the extent to which thia I ODcept should be I 1IIpl_ted o f ' l I o As discussed above in lI ' MeaorandUII on Tactical Air Forces _ NA O nov to outstrip the Warsaw Pact very substantially in ac ltic a 1r power and thia advantage IIhould increase further by 1971 tbC Us h we expect our' Allies ' air forces to shrink during the peryet recent analyses of NAtO's defenses have genersliy aSCribed nO positive 'effect on' the -land bat tie to thia _jor advantage power For exaaiple the NAKILPO study states that' the primary d elr 1lflln lDts of lad -force requirements to defend NATO's Central gion Size d coaposition of likely opposing force Probability r possibility of the attacker gaining surprise as to tiae and location of hie attack Terrain on vhich the battle is likely to be fought and Defense frontage capabUity of HArD units o ut thoee U S forces which ve c uld deploy to Europe under the current prograas are in conjunction with our Allies' forces probably aufficient to destroy in all regione the Pact' offensive and defensive aircraft and grolDld-to-air defense syst end to provide Bubstantial interd ction close air support aud associated reconnaissance for up 2S 1 ' ' o September 21 1966 OCT 312006 DECLASSIFIED Authori y EO 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS -e to 90 days' sustained operations in addition sufficient aircraft could be retained outside Europe for at least a balding action in Asia 1GBP our oaly objective were 'to neutralize the limited offensive nODDuclear capability of the Pact air forces JIAto 'would need far fewer aircrsft tiwl it has' available Specifically 'it appears 1iltely that the roughly 4 000 aircraft NATO DOW bas in Europe would suffice to achieve thia objective the 3 000-5 000 potentially available U S augmentation airc t would not be necessary for this purpose Our present force atructure BUIlt therefore be juatified on the basia of the need for these forces in other theaters or on the basia of the as yet und8lllOD8trated utUity of superior air forces in nonnuclear war in Europe o I t appears to me that our present lII8jor offensive air capabilities ought _ h a t to reduce the BllDUDt of' NATO laod forces required to pro'Vide a given defensive capability by comparison with an air force sufficient only to neutralize the Pact's limited offensive airpower We I need therefore a careful review of the benefit we receive from what appeua to be our vety large tactical air advantage o o I 1 o 26 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu