DECLASSIFIED Authority f J 0 q3 qSVt l Mt a SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM lle4e 1JI Jt t f't' J'U 11 U S DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIRECTOR OF INTElLIGENCE AND RESEARCH srk -etT- 66 September 22 1966 ------ --------------------------________ i 1 1 To Through From The Acting Secretary sIS INR - Thomas L Hughes r- ' - PIll 1 o o 'r Subject The Special Committee Aspirations '''''''''' S p FILE GC1Pl It J 4'J S$'ltt Can It Satisfy European Nuclear Ir r This paper analyzes why and to what extent the European members of NATO wish to participate actively in the nuclear defense of the Alliance traces the development of the Special Committee proposed by Secretary of Defense McNamara and its Nuclear Planning Working Group and examines whether the Committee or any successor organization of similar scope can satisfy European desires as they exist today for an active tole in nuclear affairs ABSTRACT The Defense Ministers of the five countries represented on the Nuclear Planning Working Group of the Special Committee meet in Rome on September 23 and 24 1966 to discuss whether a permanent organization should now be established within NATO for continuing consultation on nuclear policy and if so what form this organization should take As the Working Group conSiders whether to go permanent II this paper examines to what extent an organization such JPY the Committee can s olve the nuclear problem of the Atlantic Alliance as it exists today Thd s lip rob lem has its roots in the late 1950' s and has gone through a number of phases since then By the early 1960's there was a fairly wide- spread feeling in Europe that Alliance nuclear responsibilities should be modified in some way in order to give greater consideration to European security needs This feeling resulted in part from a mixture of the SECRET NO FOREIGN DISS EM CONTROLLED DISSEM GROUP 1 Exclud0d from automatio This report was ptoductrd by the Bureau of Intelligence and RftSean b Aside from nOl'llllll substaati'Yfl ezthGn eo with mha aCllllcieos t the woddng level it hill'l not been coordhurted elaewhere clowngr tclillg and doclas3 i fioatloll t I DECLASSIFIED Authority I D q3 q 5V' SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM - it - IImBsi Ie gap the Berlin crisis and misunderstandings about the US policy of flexible response As the events which gave rise to this feeling have passed by however no European member of NATO other than Great Britai n France and Germany has continued to express a serious desire to change thl Although the others are interested in participating in changes that may be made to accomodate Germany neither their des Lr fOl security nor their desire for status or prestige is strong enough to lead them to press actively for changes in existing nuclear relationships Since French and British desires to playa role in nuclear def4'o'nse have been satisfied by the development of national nuclear forces Germany is the only NATO country that has actively and consistently sought a wider role in nuclear defense Germany's exposed position in Central Europe naturally makes security considerations of compelling importance for Bonn In addition Germany's desire for the status and prestige that would come from a nuclear role has been an important incentive although the Germans have been restrained in voicing this desire German leaders have made clear that Germany has no intention of developing a national nuclear force It is not very like ly in fact tha t Germany would do so in foreseeable circumstances Instead Germany has sought an arrangement with its allies that would give it some voice in how US nuclear weapons 1Quld be used in Germany f s defense in the event of war and that would give Germany some kind of visible role in nuclear affairs After MLF ANF proposals were dropped from active consideration the Germans continued to seek a hardware solution l1 --- an arrangement which would have enabled them to participate in some system of joint ownership and possibly control of at least a small part of the nuclear force committed to the defense of Europe SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM DECLASSIFIED AuthoritY 1 INO q3 q5 q SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM - iii - A review of the origins and development of the Special Committee shows that Germany has pressed the need for such a hardware solution wi th decreasing urgency since the spring of 1965 This trend is in part based on specific developments of the period including suspension of MLF A L'l'F discussions the formation of the Special Committee where Germany has been able to voice its concerns about nuclear policy and a general preoccupation with the 1966 NATO crisis caused by France Long-range trends also lie behind the decreasing emphasis by German leaders on the need for hardware The threat of war appears less imminent in Europe than in the early 1960's and European governments are placing increased emphasis on detente ll rather than defense with regard to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe From the MLF experience Germany knows that pressing for hardware ll now would not evoke enthusiasm from most of its European allies and would in fact draw a vigorous negative reaction from France british and other European interest in the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty has reinforced the UK's and other countries' lack of enthusiasm for an MLF or even for the UK's own ANF proposal They believe that by granting some control to Germany over the use of nuclear weapons in a MLF ANF arrangement all chances for non-proliferation agreement with the Soviet Union might be destroyed The present German Government is still committed to seeking a hardware solution and it will probably continue to advocate this policy at least for the record Apart from these political interests however there would seem to be less reason now for Germany to need hardware than there was in the early 1960' s and therefore less real pressure behind its quest for it This does not mean that the security and prestige considerations which SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM DECLASSIFIED Authority I NiD 'l3'lStl' SECRET NO FOREIGN mSSEM coNTROLLED DISSEM - iv - have led it to seek actively a wider role in nuclear affairs in the past have disappeared To the extent that these considerations remain however the permanent successor to the Special Committee and its Nuclear Planning Working Group may well suffice to satisfy them if it can proceed with the momentum which has been established by the Committee over the past sixteen nonths o Such a body should be able to give the Germans a sufficiently greater sense of participation in the formation and execution of alliance nuclear policy to satisfy their diminishing security concerns Such a body would also be the only institutionalized inner circle in NATO now that the Standing Group has been disbanded o German membership in it would ly Germany's aspirations for status and seem to meet adequate- pre tige SECRET NO FOREIGN mSSEM coNTROLLED DISSEM I DECLASSIFIED Authority 'dNa I 43'lS C SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM EUROPEAN INTEREST IN CHANGING EXISTING NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIPS There are two basic reasons why certain European members of NATO have been interested in obtaining for themselves some voice and role -- larger for some and smaller for others -- in the nuclear defense of Western Europe The first reason of course is security The second is status or prestige Securit I Since the end of World var II the West Europeans have looked to the United States and its nuclear power for their defense against the threat posed by the Soviet Union For a long period -- the years in which they were engaged in reconstructing their economies -- they were content to leave the full responsibility for the control and direction of their defense both conventional and nuclear in the hands of the American colossus As they found their new strength their contribution on the conventional side increased albeit insufficiently from the US viewpoint At the same time they became aware that perhaps they were entitled to some say in the control of the nuclear weapons which the US had allocated for the defense of vestern Europe The UK with its national nuclear force and its special re lationship wi th the US dating from the war was not concerned to the same degree as others in this development Nor was France which despite US discouragement proceeded to develop a nuclear weapons system on its own and to establish for itself a more independent position than its European neighbors Germany however bound by the constraints imposed by defeat became the object of more and more concern in the nuc ear context as it grew in economic power and subsequently in military strength after its admission into the Atlantic Alliance partnership The division of Germany's territory and the obvious antipathy toward the Germans displayed by the Soviet Bloc made the matter of its security an even more sensitive issue for the FRG than it was for its Western European neighbors Since the nuclear deterrent 'Played the major role in Western Europe's defense it was a logical development for West Europeans like the Germans who had no national nuclear arms to seek ways in which they might have greater influence over those who did namely the United States Furthermore despite repeated and expiicit assurances from American officials a degree of doubt persists in Europe whether the US would actually use its nuclear weapons on behalf of Europe in the event of war Often these doubts are expressed in terms of some future US Government being less committed to the defense of Europe than its predecessors have been since World War II Such doubts are inherent in the Atlantic nuclear relationship and they have been apparent at least since the beginning of the East-West nuclear standoff in the late 1950's Europeans cannot help asking themselves whether an American President would invite retaliation against Adrerican cities by -- _ releasing his nuclear forces in response to a nuclear attack on Europe or in response to a conventional attack in Europe which could not be stopped by conventional means SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM DECLASSIFIED AuthoritY INO '13 qS C I SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM EUROPEAN INTEREST IN CHANGING EXISTING NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIPS There are two basic reasons why certain European members of NATO have been interested in obtaining for themselves some voice and role -- larger for some and smaller for others -- in the nuclear defense of Western Europe The first reason of course is security The second is status or prestige Securit Since the end of World War II the West Europeans have looked to the United States and its nuclear power for their defense against the threat posed by the Soviet Union For a long period -- the years in which they were engaged in reconstructing their economies -- they were content to leave the full responsibility for the control and direction of their defense both conventional and nuclear in the hands of the American colossus As they found their new strength their contribution on the conventional side increased albeit insufficiently from the US viewpoint At the same time they became aware that perhaps they were entitled to some say in the control of the nuclear weapons which the US had allocated for the defense of Ivestern Europe The UK with its national nuclear force and its special relationship with the US dating from the war was not concerned to theosame degree as others in this development Nor was France which despite US discouragement proceeded to develop a nuclear weapons system on its own and to establish for itself a more independent position than its European neighbors Germany however bound by the constraints imposed by defeat became the object of more and more concern in the nuc ear context as it grew in economic power and subsequently in military strength after its admission into the Atlantic Alliance partnership The division of Germany's territory and the obvious antipathy toward the Germans displayed by the Soviet Bloc made the matter of its security an even more sensitive issue for the FRG than it was for its Wes tern European neighbors Since the nuclear de terrent 'Played the major role in Western Europe's defense it was a logical development for West Europeans like the Germans who had no national nuclear arms to seek ways in which they might have greater influence over those who did namely the United States Furthermore despite repeated and explicit assurances from American officials a degree of doubt persists in Europe whether the US would actually use its nuclear weapons on behalf of Europe in the event of war Often these doubts are expressed in terms of some future US Government being less committed to the defense of Europe than its predecessors have been since World War II Such doubts are inherent in the Atlantic nuclear relationship and they have been apparent at least since the beginning of the East-West nuclear standoff in the late 1950's Europeans cannot help asking themselves whether an American President would invite retaliation against American cities by releasing his nuclear forces in response to a nuclear attack on Europe or in response to a conventional attack in Europe which could not be stopped by conventional means SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM - 2 - Thel bse doubts have been aggravated by American adoption of the strategy o of fl ex Ie response Hany Europeans have an oversimplified confidence in the value of strategic nuclear weapons as an all-purpose deterrent This confidence is in part a carryover from the 1950 f s when the US strategic force in effect served as such a deterrent for NATO Preoccupation with the importance of strategic nuclear forces has meant that Europeans do not look on flexible response as the more complete deterrent it is intended to be but instead fear that a greater reliance on conventional forces reflects an increased reluctance on the part of the United States to use nuclear weapons and results in a more open temptation to the Soviet Union to exploit this reluctance These fears are reinforced in Europe by a general lack of enthusiasm for paying the cost of enlarged conventional armies For these reasons therefore there has been a tendency in Western Europe not to be satisfied wi th leaving nuclear decision-making in the Alliance entirely up to the United States Status and Prestige In addition to security considerations a desire for status or prestige has motivated some NATO nations to want to play an active role in nuclear defense arrangements Status and prestige would obviously follow from possession of a national nucl ar force To a considerable if lesser degree they would also come from participation in a nuclear sharing arrangement or in a planning organization which had some real control over deployment targeting and estab 11shing the conditions for use of US nuclear forces that are commdtted to the defense of Europe It is difficult to sort out the degree to which a given European nation's nuclear aspirations are based on either security considerations or prestige particularly since these aspirations fluctuate with shifts in the overall international situation Most countries would tend to emphasize security considerations when discussing their aspirations and this would probably be the basic motivation for smaller countries whic 1 cannot even hope for the pres tige that would come from possessing a national nuclear force but which nevertheless want maximum influence on the decision-making of the allies on whom they depend for their ultimate defense The French however have been frank in citing prestige as one of their major reasons for developing the force de dissuasion and the British whether explicitly under the Conservatives or implicitly under Labor also view the possession of their own nuclear force as a symbol of power and status Present Dimensions of NATO's Nuclear Problem II The feeling which was fairly widespread in Europe in the early 1960's that nuclear responsibilities within the Alliance should be modified in some way to give broader consideration to European security needs has subsided The developments which gave rise to this feeling -- the missile gap and tension over Berlin have passed by With three exceptions France the UK and Germany NATO countries in Europe have not recently expressed an urgent desire for either security or prestige reasons to have a voice in nuclear affairs SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM DECLASSIFIED Authority lrJD 'l3QSVt SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM - 3 - Some degree of doubt about the willingness of the US to use its nuclear forces on Europe's behalf still persists in these countries but it is not strong enough at present to lead them to press actively for changes in existing nuclear relationships This is so because the threat of a Soviet attack now seems remote to most Europeans Also the desire for status or prestige in these countries is too modest to warrant the high cost or added responsibilities of developing a national nuclear force or even as the history of the MLF ANF project has shown of insisting on a nuclear sharing arrangement The Italians it is true have consistently wanted to participate in any organization that might be created to deal with nuclear affairs but their express motivation has not been a genuinely felt need to playa greater role in nuclear matters but rather a desire to assure Italy's membership in important NATO organizations In addition Italy and several smaller members of the Alliance have been interested in participating in any framework that might be devised to handle the very sensitive issue of German nuclear participation None of these countries however is challenging the Alliance's nuclear status guo as such Since French and British desires to play a role in nuclear defense have been satisfied by the development of national nuclear forces the 'Federal Republic of Germany is the only NATO country that has actively sought a wider role in nuclear defense The FRG' s exposed geographic posi tion makes securi ty considerations more compe lUng than they are for most of the other Allies A collapse of the forward defense strategy would lead to the rapid occupation of German territory and exchanges of tactical nuclear weapons in Central Europe would undoubtedly have devastating effects on Germany TI1e West German Government therefore has a very real interest in the questions of when and where nuclear weapons would be used in the event of war Under existing arrangements however it has very little to say about the matter In addition to these abiding security considerations status and prestige have been important for German policy The lack of a nuclear role clearly sets Germany apart from the other members of the Alliance's flbig four the US UK and France even though German officials have been restrained in voicing their desire for the prestige that would come from some form of control over nuclear weapons German leaders have repeatedly made clear that Germany has no intention f developing a national nuclear force and it is quite unlikely in fact that it would attempt to do so in foreseeable circumstances If Germany went back on its formal undertaking not to mm1ufacture nuclear V'eapons a strong reaction would come not only from its Hestern European Union allies but from the US and USSR as well Germany's relationship to Western defense arrangements would be radically changed and in the long run German security would be seriously weakened SECRET NO FOREIm DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM DECLASSIFIED Authority 1 tV 0 q3 q5V SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM - 4 - Instead of a national nuclear force Germany wants some arrangement with its Allies which would give it a voice in how US strategic nuclear weapons would be used for GermmlY's defense in the event of war and also some kind of visible role in nuclear affairs A nuclear sharing arrrulgement such as the MLF was attractive to the Germans for these reasons While the US would have retained its veto Germany would have been able to play an acUve part in deciding where and when at least a small part of the Alliance's strategic force would be used in the event of hostilities Germany already plays a part in deciding where and when tactical nuclear weapons would be used because of the presence of such weapons on German territory under two-key control Whatever the details of the system devised it would also have had the advantage for the Germans of providing a strong additional bond linking the United States to the Federal Republic Although the MLF idea is no longer under active consideration the Germans have continued to express interest in some sort of a hardware solution involving the joint ownership and control' of at least a small part of the strategic weapons assigned to Europe's defense in order to assure German participation in the decision-making process for the use of these weapons Concurrently with the successful development of the Special Comnd ttee German pressure for a hardware solution -- while it has not disappeared -- has noticeably diminished t lj1 l' T NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM DECLASSIFIED Authority INn Q3'lS Q SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSF CONTROLLED DISSEM - 5' II THE ORIGINS D GROWTH OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE As an ad h2GBP organization designed to expose at least a few NATO countries to the realities of nuclear planning and to give them an opportunity to consult to an unprecedented degree with the US on nuclear matters the Special Committee or more precisely the Committee's Nuclear Planning Working Group where the important discussions have taken place has been a success The 'Select Committee Secretary McNamara proposed the formation of such a Committee on May 31 1965 to a NATO Defense Ministers Meeting in Paris Advocating an improvement in NATO's mechanisms for consultation particularly with respect to nuclear policy he suggested that a Select Connnittee of four or five Ministers of Defense should study possible tvays of improving and extending allied participation in planning for the use of nuclear forces including US strategic forces The Connnittee could also expiore ways to improve communications arrangements in a crisis so that allied consultation on the use of nuclear forces would be assured The Select Committee proposal which had not been described to other NATO Governments in advance aroused innnediate public and official interest US officials stressed that its creation would be additional to any action on MLF ANF which at that time was still under active negotiation US officials said that the Select Connnittee should be viewed in the context of past efforts to increase opportunities for consultation within NATO on nuclear matters These included the 1962 Athens Guidelines which clarified to some degree the circumstances in which consultations would be held within the Alliance on the use of nuclear weapons and certain steps taken as a consequence of the Ottawa Ministerial Meeting in 1963 These included the internationalization of SHAPE's nuclear planning staff which was previously staffed only by US and UK officers the inclusion of non-US officers on SACEUR's liaison team at SAC in Omaha and the appointment of a Belgian General as nuclear deputy to SACEUR Past steps however had not led to the meaningful consultations which the Select Committee was intended to provide -- nor had they provided a select role for the Federal Republic the nub of the Alliance's nuclear problem France told NAG on July 7 that it saw no usefulness in the Select Committee proposal and would not participate presumably because it viewed the Connnittee as another American effort to extend US influence in Europe France has derided the importance of the Committee in public statements but has not specifically attempted to prevent the other NATO members GBPllOm organizing the Commi ttee on an ad hoc basis within NATO's framework With the exception of France the reaction from NATO governments to Secretary McNamara's proposal was positive On JUBe' 8 Chancellor Erhard told Secretary McNamara in Washington that he favored the idea German officials indicated to our Embassy in Bonn however that they were concerned that the Select Committee would be viewed as a substitute for a multilateral nuclear force SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED nrSSEM DECLASSIFIED AuthoritY 1 NO 1'3 q5 q SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM -6The Special Committee 1a fact overall interest in the proposal was so great that by fall the name of the proposed Committee had been changed from Select to Special because it had ten interested NATO members instead of the four or five originally envisaged At that time only Iceland Norway Luxembourg France and Portugal were non-participaats In order to have meaningful consultation on the sensitive aspects of nuclear policy however it was essential that the discussions take place before a very limited number of participants from a small group of nations including the major allies It was therefore decided to establish three working groups within the Special Committee framework of which the most important was Working Group IlIon Nuclear Planning where discussion of nuclear policy would take place and where Germany would have an opportunity to participate The two other working groups of somewhat less significance were Working Group I on Information and Data which would define the kind of intelligence and other data required for governments to engage in meaningful consultations about the use of nuclear weapons and Working Group 11 on Communications which would determine whether improvements should be made in NATO communications facilities in order to provide for adequate and timely consultation about the use of nuclear weapons in an emergency NATO's Secretary General would chair the Committee which would not have the power to make decisions but could make recommendations to the North Atlantic Council The Committee was to be a temporary organization of indefinite duration The First Meeting The Defense Ministers of the ten countries represented on the Committee met in Paris on November 27 1965 to approve formally the structure of the Special Committee and the membership of the working groups The US hoped to limit the Nuclear Planning Working Group to four countries the US UK Germany and Italy but the Def se Minister of the Netherlands was instructed to insist on the inclusion of a smaller country The Ministers decided to avoid an almost impossible political problem by choosing the fifth country by lot not exactly the solution namely its own participation that the Netherlands had in mind The country chosen was Turkey In general the membership of the working groups was distributed in a delicate balance designed to solve the requirements for meaningful consultation in the Nuclear Planning Working Group and to assuage any hurt feelings on the part of other countries left out of the discussions on nuclear policy The Committee consJ s ted of the US the UK Germany Italy Canada Denmark Belgium the Netherlands Greece and Turkey The US and the UK were represented on all three working groups Canada whose desire to be represented on the Nuclear Planning Working Group was not satisfied was allowed to participate in both of the other working groups All the other members were represented on only one of the groups Belgium and Greece on Working Group I Information Denmark and the Netherlands on Working Group II Communications and Germany Italy and Turkey on Working Group III Nuclear Planning At the November 27 meeting Secretary McNamara gave a detailed description of the existing nuclear capabilities of the Alliance He described the nuclear SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DrSSEM DECLASSIFIED AuthoritY INtO '13q5 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM - 7 stockpiles in Europe breaking them down by type country of location and nationality of delivery forces He also described the numbers and yields of weapons held by the US str gic force To participants at the meeting his presentation clearly indicated that the US was serious when it said that it wanted to consult more closely with its Allies on nuclear policy It was followed by a presentation by the UK Defense Minister who expressed the view that NATO had sufficient nuclear capabilities The problem he said was how to establish political arrangements which would enable the Alliance to decide to release the weapons when necessary The German Defense Minister said that no country could depend entirely on the decision of others to ensure its own security The Special Committee he said could not be a substitute for a collective nuclear force These misgivings about the Committee and concern over the heavy UK representation in the working groups were repeated privately to American officials after the meeting German officials expressed anxiety that the Special Committee would divert attention from the MLF The November 27 meeting established the Special Committee as a going concern In the following months Working Group I under UK chairmanship attempted to determine whether sufficient intelligence information and other data were available for governments to engage in timely and meaningful consultations about the possible use of nuclear weapons in a crisis The Working Group concluded that while the information needed was generally available somewhere in NATO it required improved handling Specific recommendations were prepared for the consideration of NAC Working Group II under Dutch chairmanship concluded that supplementary communications networks would be needed to assure timely consultations between NATO governments about the possible use of nuclear weapons in a crisis 'The Working Group assessed various communications systems which might fulfill this need and is preparing specific recommendations Working Group III The most important discussions of course have taken place in the Nuclear Planning Working Group While the representatives in other working groups have been specialists in the subject matter involved Working Group III has met formally only at the mirtisterial level Permanent Representatives to NAC have acted as the Ministers' deputies and have consulted at the working level between formal Working Group meetings Working Group Ill's first meeting in Washington on February 17-18 1966 was devoted to a discussion of the strategic forces available for NATO's defense In an agenda designed to emphasize the concerns of non-nuclear powers the meeting opened with a period for questions The non-nuclear members of NATO sought assurance 1 that an attack against them would prompt a timely nuclear reaction 2 that nuclear strikes would not be prematurely started especially not from the territOEy of the particular NATO nation involved and 3 that risks of nuclear devastation would as far as possible be equally shared by all members of the Alliance The question period was followed by American briefings on how the US assesses the threat and then plans procures deploys and targets its strategic weapons SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM o DECLASSIFIED AuthoritY Nn q3 q5 GBP SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM - 8 - This first meeting of Working Group III was by all estimates a success ' The degree of interest was high and the exchanges were frank and lively ' US presentations were forthcoming and enough time was lotted for discussion At the close of the first session Secretary McNamara comme ted that he had learned e about the views and problems of his colleagues in the past three ' hours than he had in the past five years The German Defense Minister repeated his view that the Special Committee approach would not in itself s a t i s f y German interests but he did not specifically stress German interest in a col ' lective nuclear force in this connection In their Agreed Minute the Ministers said that the meeting had showed that the general size of existing nuclear forces wdas adequate butbthat there was A need for further consideration of ' increase participation y non-nuclear N TO nations in planning d consultation i Working Group III met again in London on April 28-29 this time to discuss tactical nuclear warfare SACEUR and SACLANT briefed the Defense Ministers in detail on the tactical nuclear weapons available to the Alliance and a UK presentation described the lessons learned about the value of tactical nuclear weapons from British war games held in Germany in 1963 and 1965 Again the level of interest in the subject matter was high and the open exchanges were spirited The Agreed Minute noted that NATO's resources of tactical nuclear weapons appeared to be adequate but indicated that the Ministers found tactical nuclear weapons to have definite limitations As the Minute explained because of the dangers both of fallout in allied territory and of escalation it was difficult to predict whether it would be to the net advantage of NATO to initiate the use of tactical nuclear weapons in hostilities of a scale less than general war The Minute also raised the question of replacing the Special Committee with a permanent organization in NATO which would make possible continuing participation in nuclear planning by non-nuclear nations At the April meeting the German JPYfena e Minister seemed relaxed about the hardwara'1 question and he did not feel it necessary to make his usual declaration reserving the German position on this issue The July Meetings of The Committee and Working Group III A meeting of the Special Committee as a whole was held on July 26 in order to give the Defense Ministers who were not in Working Group III a sense of participation in the discussions on nuclear matters Norway and Portugal participated in this meeting as new members of the Committee The chairmen of the three working groups gave reports and many of the documents prepared for Working Group III meetings' were circulated to all the Ministers On the afternoon of July 26 the Nuclear Planning Working Group met briefly to exchange views about a permanent organization to replace the Special Committee The US had proposed the outlines of a new organization and had recommended beforehand that the Working Group approve its permanent establishment at the July 26 meeting The German and British Governments however were reluctant to reach such a decision at that time In view of the uncertainties resulting from the NATO crisis which France had provoked in March the Ministers of both countries SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM DECLASSIFIED Authority I ND '13'iStq -- -----_ _ _- J J SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM -9- said they were reluctant to run the risk of antagonizing France and some of the smaller Allies by undertaking to establish at that time a permanent restricted body within NATO which would be the locus of highly important and interesting discussions On July 26 therefore the Ministers merely agreed that specific proposals for a permanent organization should be considered by their deputies and then by a ministerial meeting of Working Group III to be held in Rome on September 23 and 24 During the July meeting the British Defense Minister suggested that discussion of joint or collective nuclear sharing should be deleted from the mandate of the new nuclear planning group It had been included in a draft Minute prepared by the US He said that some members of the UK Government believed that the creation of a permanent nuclear planning group should be the occasion for formally abandoning discussions of collective nuclear hardware The German Defense Minister agreed to the deletion qn the assurance that the record of the July meeting would show that the Ministers did not exclude hardware from subjects which could be discussed by the permanent group The British proposal to abandon formally further discussions of hardware when the Special Committee is put on a permanent basis is a reflection of Great Britain's actiVe interest in a non-proliferatLon treaty an interest that is echoed among many other members of the Alliance Germany has modified its former strong resistance to a non-proliferation agreement and would now apparently be willing to become a party to such a treaty as long as its minimum desires for security and status in nuclear affairs which still may include some semblance of a hardware arrangement are met in some appropriate way The Next Step Since July the US proposals for a permanent organization have been discussed at length at the Permanent Representative level By now there is general agreement with the US view that there should be a permanent body in the form of an open-ended committee called the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee NDAC which would be a Committee of the North Atlantic Council composed of Defense Ministers of any interested countries It would meet under the chairmanship of the Secretary General presumably at the time of ministerial meetings of the NAC TIle kind of intimate discussions which to date have been held in Working Group II would be pursued in a subordinate Nuclear Planning Group NPG consisting of the Defense Ministers of five or six countries The US UK FRG and Italy would be permanent members and there would be one or two rotating members to be selected on an annual basis NATO's Secretary General Manlio Brosio has expressed the view that he should also be chairman of the NPG so that proper coordination can take place bs'tween overall NATO planning and NATO nuclear planning The US and the other members of Horking Group II oppose Brosio's view but they agree that the Secretary General should be present or represented at the group's meetings The NPG would consider policies plans and programs for the use of nuclear weapons improvement in the machinery for consulting about the actual or potential use of nuclear weapons and possible modernization of existing weapons systems and the development of new systems SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM - po DECLASSIFIED AuthoritY INn 13 q Stl SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM - 10 - The Ministers of the Nuclear Planning Working Group will decide at Rome on September 23 and 24 whether to propose a permanent organization of this kind to the Special Committee as a whole Some of the British and German reluctance to move ahead at this time has persisted It is entirely possible therefore that some of the Ministers will prefer for a variety of political reasons to delay taking such a major decision on so vital an issue and will wish to refer the matter to the deputies for further consideration If the Ministers do decide to go ahead the Special Committee as a whole may agree to recommend the formation of the NDAC and NPG to the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in December If approved the new organizations could be in business by the beginning of 1967 III IS THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ENOUGH The expression of German misgivings is a recurrent theme in the story of the Special Committee German officials have repeatedly said that consultation was not enough and that the Alliance needed an arrangement for jOint ownership and control of nuclear weapons in which Germany could participate As the record of Special Committee meetings shows however the urgency with which the German Government has called for a hardware solution in additiol1 to the Special Committee has diminished noticeably since the Committee was formed There are several explanations for this trend In part it reflects specific developments of the past several months Since the end of 1965 the Allies have suspended the examination of specific proposals for joint ownership and control of nuclear policy NATO has been preoccupied with many other problems which Germany would not wish to aggravate by pressing now for a nuclear sharing arrangement The decreasing emphasis on the need for a hardware solution also reflects longer-range general trends There is less fear of war in Europe now than there was in the early 1960's when changes in the nuclear status guo e advocated with greater urgency Europeans including many Germans are more interested in seeking areas of agreement with Eastern Europe and the German Government is aware that if it pressed for a hardware solution now the prospects for detente would be reduced The story of the MLF showed that the other Allies would not be enthusiastic if Germany revived pres ure for a nuclear sharing arrangement and France for its own reasons of status and prestige would be vehemently opposed This French reaction is apparently a factor of some importance for the Germans It is true that the present leaders of the German Government including Erhard Schroeder and von Hassel are publicly committed to a lf4rdware solution and they will probably continue to state this pOSition perhaps with modifications even if only for the record There is little reason to believe however that their political GBPortune whatever state they may be in will be any more severely damaged by a failure at this late date to achieve a hardwiire solution than they were by theit inability to reach agreement SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM DECLASSIFIED Authority INn 13'15 ECRET IO FOREIGN DISSENjOONTROLLED DISSEM - 11 - with their Allies on III multilateral torce in 1964 and 1965 In aqr ease Germa n r clearly has less reason nov to press tor tthardware N than it did when the Special COIIIdttee was tormed an4 barring a sharp increase iJl Ea stVest tension in Europe there 1s no reason to belieYe that this treDd will De reYerm in the tere eable tuture This does DOt mean that all the security and prestige considerations whioh led Germany to seek a Aardware solutionll have disappeared To the extent that these considerations remain however continued participation in an organization auch as the 8pctCial Oommittee should be able to satisfy them to a reasonable degree In future discussions Germany and the other DOn-nuclear participaats C8 ft acquire greater confidence that Europe will in tact I be adeq1l8 tely dereadad by nuclear weapons in an emergency If the new or aniation or the Allianoe as a whole can devise proeedures which will assure timely consultation in an emergency Europeans could develop greater coJU idence that they will have a say about where and when nuclear weapons will be used 80 that their interests can be protected The European participants would bave t ble opportunity to become more aware of the real capabilities and limitations of nuclear weapons and could develop III greater appreciation for the considerations underlying US nuclear policy The US in turn could have III greater appreciation for the s eQif1c concerns Which nro ans na in the field of nuolear defense and could learn bet er how these concerns might be satisfied Finally active participation in deployment and targeting could provide the pre8tige of having an aotive role in the execution ot nuclear polioy In particular StatU8 could come to the Ger l'lllB ns from participation a8 a perJlll U'1 nt member in JATO I S only iIlportant fI inner circle now that the StandUlg Group of whioh GerlJll1 l ly vas not a member has been abolished s mRE'l' JO FOREIGN DISSEMjCONTROLLED DISSEM - This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu