SECR TI#AEb 1 0 USA AUS CAN GBA NZl OHNR OH-2011-79 DOI r 3 NSA TRSID QCSID INAME 22 September 2011 DTR 11October2011 rb 3 NSA Text Review 31 Oct 2011 MCCULLOUGH Bernard J Text w Tape Barry VADM USN IPLACE National Security Agency OPS-3 Fl Meade Maryland IVIEVVER fb_ J_ N_s_A --' NOTE fb 3 NSA CLASSIFICATIO MARKINGS ARE WITH fONCURRENCE FROM TENTH FLEET SSOJ 3 NSA _ AN UNCLASSIFIED VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT WILL BE CREATED WITH THE CLASSIFIED PORTIONS REDACTED FINAL RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT TO THE NAVAL HISTORY AND HERITAGE COMMAND IS PENDING APPROVAL BY VADM MCCULLOUGH U FOUO This is NSA Oral History 2011-79 Today ls 22 September 2011 and we are talking to Vice Admiral Bernard J Barry McCullough Commander of U S Fleet Cyber Command Commander of the U S Tenth Fleet This interview will focus on Vice Admiral McCullough's experience as commander of U S Fleet Cyber Command Commander Tenth Fleet My name isrh 3 NsA It am the National Security Agency's Oral Historian with the Center for Cryptologic History Along with me is fb 3 NsA Historian for the U S Tenth Fleet This interview is being recorded in the OPS3 Building The classification of this interview is up to TOP SECRET COMINT We can adjust this classification at the end if needed Vice Admiral McCullough welcome I We in the Center for Cryptologic History appreciate you donating your time for this Oral History interview Would you provide us your academic background and previous service assignments I McC U FOUO TR NOTE Name abbreviated because It will not flt Into the format if spelled out Yeah I'd be glad to Academic background is secondary school I went to high school in a little town in northern West Virginia Weir High School I received an appointment to the Naval Academy and went to the Naval Academy In June of 1971 and was Page 1of21 OH-2011·79-MCCULLOUGH Claalfled By 000002a973 Derived From NSA CSSM 1- 2 o tad 20130930 Deel •ify OR 2031030-1 6EGRE1'UREL TO YSA Alli GAN GBR NA SECRETHREL TO USA AUS GAN GBR NZL graduated and commissioned on 4 June 1975 My other education includes various service schools for professional development and completion of a master's program at National Defense University the Industrial College of the Armed Forces So that's pretty much the academic background Service assignments as a junior officer I was assigned to nuclear cruisers I have finished the Navy nuclear-propulsion instruction program and am a certified engineer on D2G power plant and A1W power plant So I served as the Main Propulsion Assistant on the USS Texas CGN-39 and as the Engineer Officer in USS Virginia CGN38 I also spent about two and a half years at the nuclear prototype in Ballston Spa New York from 1980 through 1982 I've been the CO of three ships the commanding officer of three ships USS Gemini which was a patrol hydrofoil missile ship out of Key West Florida I was the commanding officer of USS Scott DDG-995 a new threat upgrade destroyer and commanding officer of USS Normandy CG-60 an Aegis Class guided-missile cruiser I served as the region commander for Navy Region Hawaii in my first flag assignment and was dual hatted as the Commander of Naval Surface Group Middle Pacific where I was responsible for three cruisers and a DESRON of six destroyers and frigates Following my tour in Hawaii I was the commander of Cruiser Destroyer Group 12 which transitioned into Carrier Strike Group 14 and I was the commander of the Enterprise Battle Group At the same time I was assigned as Commander Carrier Strike Group Six Commander John F Kennedy Battle Group and we participated in operations in the northern Arabian Gulf including the 2004 November liberation of Fallujah by the Marine Corps in Iraq Following that tour I was assigned as the Director of Surface Warfare on the Navy Staff OPNAV N86 and then I was promoted to Vice Admiral and assigned as the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for the Integration of Capabilities and Resources OPNAV N-8 Following my tour in the Pentagon I was assigned as Commander Fleet Cyber Command Commander U S Tenth Fleet here at Fort Meade rb 3 NSA b 3 NSA McC U FOUO Okay U FOUO TR NOTE fbl 3 I l NsA name is too long to fit the column in the format so I am abbreviating it as shown So Admiral you've had an amazing career When looking back as you may be doing sometimes what are some of the things that kind of made you you know defining principles things that kind of carried you to success UIFOUO Well first I'd say that I grew up in a lower-to-middle middle- class home and my father imbued me with a work ethic that allowed me to do the things I do today I took a relatively difficult curriculum at the Naval Academy I have a Bachelor's Degree in Naval Architecture and when I went to my first at-sea assignments I was given positions of Page 2of21 OH-2011-79-MCCULLOUGH SliGRfi' l' IAlib TO USA AUS GAN GBR NA SECRE f 'REL fO l ISA Al IS CAN CBR NZL increased responsibility and authority ahead of my peers On USS Texas I was assigned as the Main Propulsion Assistant after being on the ship for approximately six months I was a very junior junior ah lieutenant junior grade if there is such a thing as a junior lieutenant junior grade and it was a second-tour lieutenant's billet so I was responsible for about 168 people and all the machinery and two nuclear power plants When I went to prototype I worked a lot with the civilians at the then General Electric Company that operated and owned the prototype at Ballston Spa New York it was operated by the Navy And I was able to lead a group of sailors that were both submarine sailors and surface sailors and we accomplished some really difficult technical tasks on that power plant And again it gave me a level of responsibility inside that organization that no Navy lieutenant had had previously And then when I went to Virginia as the engineer in 1983 I was at that time the most junior officer that was ever assigned to be the engineer officer on a nuclear-powered cruiser I went to my first command in 1986 I had only been out of the Naval Academy for 11 years And so I think the opportunity the Navy gave me to be a leader of increasingly large organizations with increasingly greater scope of responsibility and authority over the first 11 12 13 years of my career is what enable me to be considered for positions of hlstier authority later fb 3 NSA McC U FOllO Wrth all that any Those are a lot of great events and activities any people that kind of you know as you kind of looked to like the three to five people that had the biggest influence ofyou on you over the course of your career UIFOllO The CO I had on Virginia Captain Retired Joseph King We were off of Beirut in 1983 when they blew up the Marine compound in Beirut and we'd been conducting fire missions surface fire missions into targets in Lebanon prior to that event and it was to watch how that CO molded the crew in the face of that calamity Our folks went ash ore and helped dig helped do the recovery ops of the bodies of the Marines And that was probably the hardest thing I've seen anybody try to organize and shape a crew to get through and Joe King was spectacular When I went to the Naval Academy as a battalion officer I met a gentleman by the name of Joseph Prueher who was promoted to one-star as the Commandant when I was at the Naval Academy And Admiral Prueher became a four-star admiral and was Commander of PACOM and later the U S Ambassador to PRC And his ability to form a team and execute the mission at the Naval Academy through some pretty trying times just taught me how to be a better leader and I really enjoyed working for the Ambassador When I had command of Scott Vice Admiral Retired Doug Katz as the commander of the Cruiser Destroyer Group in America Battle Group made Scott the Air Defense Commander in the Fleet Certification Exercise-they were called FLEETEXes at that time-and used two Aegis Page 3of21 OH-2011·79-MCCUU OUGH SEGREf 'IREl fO USA t US t N G8R Nil SECRET REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL cruisers commanded by senior 0-6s in a silent SAM role so I got to coordinate the air defense for this graded exercise that certified the battle group to deploy Again that was a huge responsibility laid on a pretty junior group of folks I mean my department heads were all mid-grade to junior lieutenants and the XO was a lieutenant commander and I was a 16-year commander so it Somebody that would put that level of faith and confidence in is pretty pretty interesting I worked for both Vern Clark and Fox Fallon when they were the Second Fleet Commander And I was going to When I went to Second Fleet in May of 1997 I told then Admiral Clark that I wanted to pass through Second Fleet staff as quick as I could 'cause it was an I stop and go off to my Aegis cruiser And I got told by then Vice Admiral Clark that I would learn more about joint war fighting under his t tela e than I ever would in command of that cruiser And he was right bl 3 NSA huckles And then Fallon Admiral Fallon by then Vice Admira a Ion relieved Clark and so it was I got asked to stay so I ended up doing 22 months of a six-month I stop Now how you stay some place for 22 months on non-PCS orders I don't know but I did More chuckles So that was a really great opportunity And then I worked under Admiral Roughhead when he was commander of George Washington Strike Group I was the air-defense commander on Normandy When he was the Second Fleet commander I had command of my carrier strike groups And then obviously when he was the CNO I was the N-8 And Admiral Roughhead just routinely let me have more than enough rope to hang myself and we had a truly great relationship So there's those folks The last one I'd bring up is a guy named Mike Malone a retired vice admiral that was my second commanding officer when I was Engineer on Enterprise He not only has become a very close friend but as a twice-served commanding officer to go back to sea as a department head on an aircraft carrier is you know you think it's demoting But he taught me how aircraft carriers really worked which served me extremely well when I went off to be CO of Normandy and the air-defense commander for GW Not only that he qualified me as Command Duty Officer Underway which let me sit in the CO's chair during fixed-wing carrier operations And I'd venture to say there's not two other SWOs in the Navy-Surface Warfare Officers-in the Navy that have ever been qualified as a COO Underway on an aircraft carrier and adually sat in the captain's chair during fixed-wing flight ops And so those folks I'd say probably had the most impad on my life fb 3 NSA McC U FOUO Thank you That's outstanding Any disappointments you'd care to share U FOUO I didn't screen for major command on my first look you know and you're flying along I got deep seleded for 0-4 I got deep seleded again for 0-5 and then due to some fitness report politics I didn't screen for ah major command on first look and I you know that's I got to tell Page 4 of21 OH-2011 ·79-MCCULLOUGH SliCR ' WREb g use AUS CAN GBR NZb SECRET JREL TO YSA AYS CAN CBR NZL you thafs a wake-up call when you've gotten everything early and often and then you get smacked in the face with a 2x4 ifs entertaining But it all worked out in the end fb 3 NSA McC U FOUO Thanks I want to kind of shift gears and capture a couple of things I guess in sort of a general question to get your sense So we've had a lot of changes in the Navy in the last you know couple of years with information dominance we've got this name you know Tenth Fleet We had a Tenth fleet in World War II I think you know people kind of talk about some of the parallels If you cou Id just kind of tell us the story from your end of Tenth Fleet how the name came about how the whole information-dominance thing came about and how it felt to you to make it happen U FOUO Historically the United States was in peril as we approached the calendar year 1943 The German U-boats were just having a field day off the east coast of the United States The cities didn't want to go to black out The ships Those merchant ships were silhouetted against the cities and they were just slaughtering the merchant seamen And Admiral King the then CNO-that wasn't the title but that's what he wa ecided that we had to act and we had to take extreme action to stop this or we were going to lose the war because if you can't get stuff to Great Britain you can't ever invade the continent and restore order to the continent And so he decided to stand up a fleet In being if you will that had no assigned ships or airplanes--and I include submarines and ships And he wanted to utilize advanced technology-and what's advanced technology at the time Well It's HF OF and other code-breaking technology-to figure out where the U-boats were and then to bring kinetic assets to bear to eliminate the threat And so he stood up the Tenth Fleet in May of 1943 and we developed and refined HF OF and code-breaking and the history of what we did with Enigmas is well documented We also used HUMINT and other sources of ELINT although we didn't call it ELINT or HUMINT at the time and fused that data to be able to bring kinetic assets to bear and kill the submarines So once we fused the date and we had the picture if you will then there were kinetic tactics techniques and procedures that had to be developed and executed And It's like the antisubmarine carriers or the jeep carriers we used to fill the air gap in the center of the ocean It's how do you bring airplanes to bear against submarines I mean these were things we'd never done before And the fusing of that data and the ability to transfer kinetic assets to act on the data is what enabled us to drive the U-boat menace In the Atlantic below the noise level And it killed a lot of German submariners and it killed a lot of their submarines and they were suffering from the ability to train their crews starting in about '43 and early '44 and so It turned the tide of the war in the Atlantic and enabled the eventual victory I believe So where are we now We have nation-state actors we have patriotic civilians in Page 5of21 OH-2011-79-MCCULLOUGH SEGREl IREb lO USA AUS AN GllR ND SEGRETJ REL TO l ISA Al IS GA II GBR NZL adversary nation-states and we have cyber criminals that are stealing us blind And the amount of unclassified data that's being exfilled from this country is just total thievery of the intellectual property of the United States of America Now we haven't seen any cyber attacks if you will other than nuisances to this point but the exfil of data is just horrendous And so how do you take and build a fleet-in-being from the Navy perspective that has no assigned ships and airplanes to operate defend and maintain the Navy's networks and to develop non-kinetic capability in support of combatant commanders' operational and concept plans And so when CNO Roughhead looked at the Navy's history this was very similar to what CNO King had done what Fleet Admiral King had done in the Second World War And so he and I believe with the assistance of Vice Admiral Retired Jack Dorsett came up with the notion that we would build a fleet in being and appropriately re-designated it and re-commissioned it as the U S Tenth Fleet And so that's the operational arm for the Navy in cyber warfare ah full-spectrum cyber operations if you will Then as we were going along and the SECDEF decided that we needed to embark in this new domain and decided to stand up U S CYBERCOM there was a discussion on how the services would provide components to U S CYBERCOM And at that point the Tenth Fleet was dual-hatted as U S Fleet CYBERCOM And that echelon-two command is the service component and was designated as the service component to U S Cyber Command as well as an Ech-2 administrative command to the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Roughhead and I and Secretary Mabus-I guess it's and me and Secretary Mabus-went down and briefed DEPSECDEF Wynne on how we were going to do componentcy for U S Cyber Command in about February of 2010 And Secretary DEPSECDEF Wynne at that time approved and Navy is way ahead And so that's sort of how the Tenth Fleet came to being today and how the Fleet Cyber Command came into being fb 3 NSA McC fb 3 NSA McC fb 3 NSA McC U FOUO Fascinating At the time you were the N-8 UIFGYO Um hmm UIFOUO Um why you UIFOUO Uh yeah I ask myself that U FOUO Probably didn't phrase that correctly but you get my point Admiral is speaking at the same time UIFOUO No not That's I mean thafs fine I was walking I attended Undersecretary Work's swearing in in a courtyard in the Pentagon in the fall of 2009-and I don't remember whether it was October or November-and CNO Roughhead asked me to walk back with Page 6 of 21 OH-2011-79-MCCULLOUGH EC RE f ' REL TQ YSA AYS GAN GBR NZL SECRET JREl TO YSA YS CAN CBR NZl him which was not unusual for him to ask me to either come to his office or walk with him because the real function of any service staff is to build a program and the budget and thafs what I did So I walked back with him and he asked me what I thought about Tenth Fleet So I've got my budget hat on and I told him I really didn't know what that was And he goes No I mean about you doing it And I said Why would you want me to go run an organization that uses computers to do anything when I can barely tum a computer on And he said That's exactly why I want you to go do it And so thafs how I got the job fb 3 NSA McC b 3 NSA McC UIFOUO That's a great story I've been wanting to know that for a long time So you came in and clean slate U FOLIO Yeah UIFOUO At the time there was a vision Information Dominance information as a battery and all those things-dean slate So what were the biggest challenges You had to stand up a new organization essentially out of nothing U FOUO NOTE THIS IS THE KEY PART OF THE WHOLE INTERVIEW Well there's a goodness and badness in being given a clean whiteboard and handed the markers All laugh CNO wrote a letter and I think it was in it was in the summer of 2009 July-I don't remember the date on the letter-and it laid out what he wanted this organization to do and it talks about networks and it talks about cyber and it talks about information operations it talks about electronic warfare and it talks about SIGINT cryptology and space Now thafs a pretty broad scope of responsibility or things they want you to go muck around in for lack of a better word And so what I did was I came up here I started coming up here in December of 2009 and I think I had about 20 or 25 people And you know I knew what information warfare officers did-and I'll call them cryptologists because that's what they are-I knew what intelligence officers did and I thought I knew what IPs and ITs did but I just Okay so that's what I had And when I looked at cryptology SIGINT with this Merry Band of Brothers I had up here I said It seems to me we're pretty good at that that the Navy's pretty world-crass In SIGINT cryptology I mean when you go to NSA's big sites in Texas Hawaii Maryland Georgia there's lots of CTs running around There's lots of information warfare officers and they do really well Okay So that mission set seems to be okay When I looked at electronic warfare while surface-ship electronic warfare in the Navy is not where we would like it to be and is significanUy degraded from where it was at the end of the Cold War-although Admiral Harvey has put it on a course to return to some preeminence-but when I looked at electronic warfare in toto and I looked at the airborne electronic surveillance and the airborne electronic attack · Page 7of21 OH-2011-79-MCCULLOUOH SEGRlmlREl TQ USA t US CAN GIR NJ SECRET REL TO YSA AYS CAN G8R NZL we had oh we have the nation's only airborne electronic attack right now that that was world class especially with the shift from prowlers to growlers and what we had with the EP-3s and other airplanes So that was pretty world class And then I looked at space And having been a programmer and a budget guy alls I knows' about space is the programs are behind schedule and over budget and there wasn't enough money I could put together to do anything about that so I just sort of said Yeah okay that's neat Got to go learn about that later Information Operations-what is that It's all things to all people It's really how do you put all this other stuff together And then I looked at cyber and networks And okay so now what networks do we have We have the NIPRNET and we have the SIPRNET and JWICS NSANet so upper classification stuff Where do we command and control kinetic forces at the operational level of war Well you do it on SIPRNET And SIPRNET and the NIPRNET were never built to be operational networks they were built as administrative networks and to say we understood where the transport went and how the transport was arranged and who did what to who in that realm- whom --would be a significant understatement also the fragility of it And so you know all the services but the Navy in particular-and obviously I know the Navy better than the other oneshave invested a huge amount of money in kinetic capability to go beyond visual range NEED CLARIFICATION on KILL RATIO COMMENT And you can only do that if you can command and control at the operational level of war And so I got to tell you when I came up here and they gave me my TS read book and I opened it up and I get a report from another three-letter agency in town the first time I opened it up it was like the guy with the Aquos television and when they brought in more it was like Wow Wow Shouted About the fifth day it was Yeah Whispered And to see what adversaries across the globe were just stealing from us was just amazing So if they can steal it from you what else can they do to you And okay so they're doing that over the NIPRNET Where's the transport for all this stuff Has DISA got their own cables running all over the place Well no jeez they don't It's all commercial transport So there must be a separate transport for this network Oh no that rides on the same stuff this other stuff does we just encrypt it Okay So now you're depending on commercial Internet service providers be they local or global to give you your command and control of forces Okay well that gets the stuff to the ground stations How does it get to the ships So we go back to that space thing you know and what's the health of the satellite communications Okay so we got FLEETSATS that are probably all beyond their expected service lives We got UFOs other UHF satellites that have VHF transmitters on them that are at or beyond their service lives We've got some government SHF We used to call it Challenge of Athena · I don't remember what we call it Well that's a commercial it was DSCS Defense Satellite Communication System pronounced discus So we have some Page 8of21 OH-2011-79-MCCULLOUGH SECRE r YREb l'O USA AUS CAN GBR Nill SECRETl REL TO USP AUS CAN CBR NZL government SHF and we lease the rest of it through the commercial broadband satellite program So now I've got leased bandwidth that's providing the stuff we need to forward-deployed ships And the stuff that we own is on its last legs and is wlnerable to man-made or environmentally-made interference as is the SHF And so this is what my C2 structure hangs on and it bothered me a lot and so that's what we looked at So then ifs how do you get a picture 'cause I'm an Aegis guy I come in and say Where's the picture And everybody says boss you have a picture on your wall They didn't know what I was talking about And so how do you display the network so you can do net ops Where are the sensors so you can do net defense How do you do collections to enable proactive defense instead of reactive defense And what Intel do you have to support all of that And so that's what we decided to work on And so how do you display it So we went and visited people like AT T and Verizon and all these guys I went to AT T in Bedminster New Jersey and I walk into this space and it's a pretty big space it's about half the size of this building-Minster Ops Center So I walk into it and AT T still does telephony- Ma Bell is alive and well and getting more healthy as they assimilate all the baby Bells that went away 'cause we figured out that wasn't such a good idea-and they do networks and computers and ifs a 140-billion-dollar-a-year company So I figured You know if they do this wrong they go out of business Probably be bad for the shareholders so how do they do it So we go into this Ops Center and the left half of it's networks and the right half of ifs telephony And if the military had an ops center that big there would be 300 people in il I mean that's just the way we do things There were 19 people in this place Okay so what did HO'tN did they display the transport How did they display their sensors And how did they understand what was going on Because right now we're all pretty reactive-we're getting to be proactive-but we're pretty reactive to intrusions You find somebody in your network you go Oh my god They're in there You figure out how they get in you seal that hole then you go clean them up and make sure you didn't You figure out what you lost So these AT T guys-and this was off the telephony side but they did it the same way for networksthey bring me or shO'tN me a diagram and they've got what normal was for the last week and they've got what normal was 30 days ago what normal was a year ago so they understand what normal is We don't understand normal from attacks or volume or whatever And they showed me this other thing that was There was a real aberration in it a vertical spike ramp up and then vertical drop off And I said Wow that's deviation from normal What did you do about it Ah nothing It was 'American Idol' voting night We knew that the capacity demand was going to go way up at 1800 Eastern Time or 2000 Eastern Time It was going to ramp up through the course of the evening and then fall off when the voting window closed and we put more capacity on to deal with il • That's not only going from reactive to proactive that's going to predictive Page 9of21 OH-2011-79-MCCULLOUGH 8EGREJllREL l9 UU AU GAN1 QIR NZI SEGRET JREL TO USA AUS GAN G8R NZL And you've got to have the SA the situational awareness that the operators can see and understand to get to predictive And so now you can see somebody come in the network in relative in near-real time and you can stop it before they get in and steal all your stuff and you figured out what they you figured out what they were doing and then did what I said we'd do today And so we had to build the SA to do that So we've worked on that and that was I think you know we got a world-class Ops Center in the other end of the building The other thing was okay so I've said we've got world-class cryptologists and it's how do you generate effects to support combatant commanders I mean if you just look at what happened in Libya and you can read it in the open press those guys ran out of weapons and had to get weapons from us tb do Libya Okay Now there's a real tough opponent kinetically What's going to happen if you go against a high-end nation state that's got a lot of stuff you've got to use kinetic weapons for How long will How What's our inventory And so how do you generate effects to support the combatant commander so he doesn't have to use all the kinetic weapons that are currently in his OPLANS And so almost at stand-up I told my folks to figure out what they had to do to support PAC Fleet and his OPLANS specifically and what we had to do to support NAVCENT with his OPLANS And I never worried about it You know 1 1didn't worry about Europe that much I didn't know Libya was going to erupt But we're working with NAVEUR now too So what intelligence do you need How do you put the organization together And then how do you gain the appropriate capability and capacity to execute the mission if you're called upon And oh what are the legal authorities you need to do it So General Alexander and his folks are working on the legal authorities But to me we have to develop the capability and capacity now emphasized because I firmly believe that when the bullets start to fly they're going to tell you to do the mission and we'll get the legal authorities And if you haven't started now and developed the capability and capacity you're going tell the guy that wants your effects Got it I'll get back to you in two years A war is not going to last two years So you've got to develop the capability and capacity and be ready to use it when you have the authority and you're called upon So they're sort of the things that we've worked on and I think we've come a pretty long way b 3 NSA McC U FOUO With the industry I think you hit on a lot of really great points Kind of going forward you know with wearing your N-8 hat looking at you know cost versus capability what are some of the engagement things with industry that we should continue to hone in on U FOUO You I mean this technology is Ah I mean some of the real high end of it's driven by some of the combat support agencies make no doubt about it The National Security Agency's unbelievable in the brain power and computing power they have at NSA but even knowing that we Page 10 of 21 OH-2011-79-MCCULLOUGH EGREl'ffREb 1'0 Y A it YB GAN GBR Nn SECRET REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL are not the technology drivers in this domain In general for 99 5 percent of it-giving NSA half a percent-the technology is driven by commercial sector And so I've been to Microsoft I've been to AT T I've been to Verizon-ah can't even remember all the places I've been-and to try to learn what they did why they did it and how they did it And when we did TERMINAL FURY 2010 Admiral Walsh asked me to come out thereand then Admiral Willard figured I was out there and didn't give me to Admiral Walsh-we took an industry cell and I think we Between federally funded research and development centers and academia and Industry we had fifteen plus or minus partners out there with us And so when we took the industry folks I mean some of them are cleared into what we do and some of them aren't but it doesn't mean the ones the ones that aren't can't tell you how to solve problems So I put them In their own little cell and the ones we could bring into the SCIF we did But I'd go down Or our folks would go down and talk to them every day and say Okay here's what we're seeing on the battlefield not Where you got it • It's not Important It's you know they were All had clearances or they couldn't have been in the building but that some of them didn't have the TS SCI and compartments that we just have all over the place around here And so you go down and you GENSER It up and you put the classification at SECRET GENSER and then you have all these people that can help you work on this problem And NSA has done that with an organization that General Alexander is the gen I believe the Executive Secretary is the right title for And we did it in miniature fashion out In PACFLT out in PACOM And I think you've got to be there 'cause these people can help you solve problems And if you have that relationship with them then not only can they help you solve problems in crisis but because you've developed this relationship during normal ops when you got to spike to go to crisis these people are part of the national defense fabric of this country and they will participate fb 3 NSA McC So if you don't use the JCOTF model or the Cyber PAC then there's something else Going forward how do you make sure that you capture these processes Well I You know first of all everybody thinks I'm the author of the JCOTF construct and they just want me to go away so this will die and they can go do off go off and do what they want The real originator of the JCOTF concept was a fellow named General Keith Alexander And when I first came here he and I had a discussion about service his service components supporting different regional combatant commanders in their OPLANS and CONPLANS and how would you execute that mission And his vision was that there would be some constant steadystate relationship between that service component and that regional combatant commander and his staff in developing capabilities and capacities to support his OPLANS And when a contingency occurred- Page 11 of 21 OH-2011 ·79-llCCULLOUGtl SE6RE'FllAEl FQ YSA AYS1 GAN GllR NZL SECRET ' REL TO USA AUS CAN G8R NZL and you've got to define what's a contingency that requires this level of participation and what is not-that that three-star commander would go forward with enough capability and capacity be it technical or personnel to become a joint task force commander if you will for that combatant commander to execute operations defensive ops and non-kinetic effects generation to support that commander And that's the JCOTF concept and that's what the boss still believes And so it's And the general will be here for a couple more years I think so I think we'll get there I mean you know Admiral Willard and I are not just professional relations we're friends I would say And I understand why the combatant commanders think they need to actually control everything because they want to believe it's going to be there when the fight starts and they're not going to have to turn around and look for the cavalry and so they that They want the capability and capacity there to support them They really don't want to own it like everybody thinks because when people say they want to own it they don't understand what it is And the network's global and you can't put an enclave around it fb 3 NSA McC fb 3 NSA McC b 3 NSA McC b 3 NSA McC fb 3 NSA U FOUO Right U FOUO In a region and Because okay now the transport that goes through PACOM's AOR on the way to India or Africa he can't seal that off He doesn't We don't own it DoD doesn't own it So I think that we will eventually come to the right answer And I was encouraged by a conference that Rooster Schmidle and Cecil Haney just hosted on this topic U FOUO So I meant to print off kind of an org chart to talk about U FOUO I drew those I know what they look like U FOUO A couple little things Well I kind of added some things to this Admiral chuckles and I've been beat up a lot by some people in the building here And this is a little old but I guess where you get the challenges here are-we talked a little about that-you know U FOUO Um hmm U FOUO Your peers So you've got regional MOCs you know Vice Admiral Harris other fleet commanders It's the capability versus capacity tradeoff exactly that you talked about There's the space piece U FOUO Um hmm U FOUO I understand that a little bit better it's budget driven Let's just kind of leave that aside for now you know but ah even with You know Page 12of21 OH-2011-79-MCCULLOUGH BEGRltt6 REb TO UB t AUS GAN GBR N SECRETl REL TO USA AUS CAN CBR NA you The relationship with STRATCOM for space working through NElWARCOM with the space cell they're still McC fb 3 NSA McC b 3 NSA U FOUO Were getting ready interrupting We're getting ready to clean that up Right now STRATCOM has all the Navy forces assigned either through the latest GFMG Global Force Management Guidance spoken gifmig or the FY-11 Memorandum For Forces for Forces For Memorandum So STRATCOM has all these forces assigned Everything that works for me is assigned to STRATCOM with the exception of some capability we have in Colorado and at Suitland So my space forces all the network forces all the transport forces all the defenders and all the non-kinetic effects generators are all in the Forces For Memorandum of STRATCOM STRAT has COCOM of those forces and delegated OPCON of those forces with the exception of the space forces which were sort of ambiguous because of the way the Navy did it he delegated OPCON of those forces to CYBERCOM He delegated OPCON back to the service components the same way we do ships and airplanes So PACOM has COCOM of all the Navy forces in the Pacific They're assigned in the Forces For Memorandum He delegates OPCON to PAC Fleet who delegates OPCON his numbered fleet commanders to execute the plans So we've done that the same way Also it provides a legal chain of authority to the President to fight wars in thiS domain which we've never had before So we have that So now you got the space guys that are sort of hanging out So how does NAVSPACE respond to tasking from STRATCOM through JFC Space And we're having a discussion on that right now And what I'd tell you is you don't want more layers in between JFC Space and the Navy guys that fly the satellites because you might get somebody in that chain of command that doesn't understand that you can't have two satellites occupy the same cubic meter of volume somewhere 300 miles above the planet and don't have the SA to see it coming And so what We're working with ah the at the Action Officer level right now with STRAT and our space folks is that STRATCOM will delegate OPCON of the space forces to me which they've already done because it's in the Forces For Memorandum and then I will delegate TACCON to JFC Space And then JFC Space has a direct relationship with NAVSOC and that's the way it needs to be And so I think we'll get that cleaned up U FOUO So like as an example I was one of the guys that helped stand up the space cell for Vice Admiral MacArthur a few years back UJFOUO Right U FOUO And so we're doing this TERMINAL FURY And going into It you know the thought around what are the inter-dependencies between space networks and 10 just you know weren't really there Page 13of21 OH-2011-79 ftlCCULLOUOH SEGREJllREl W USA JI US CAN CHIR NZL SECRETt REL TO USI AUS GAN GBR NZL McC tb 3 NSA McC U FOUO Yeah U FOUO So you lose comms The comms guys you know 'What's going on Talk to the space guys maybe there's a space event that could have affected that • Talk to the ayppies Why would I talk to the cryppies 'Well there might have been a ground terrestrial event that affected something in space that drove this • U FOUO Well that's why it's all fused here and I have visibility into all of it fb 3 NSA McC b 3 NSA McC b 3 NSA McC fb 3 NSA McC U FOUO We kind of still have the tendency of thinking that it is 1943 My name is Bull Halsey and I am going to go through the Straits of Luzon and I am going to change the lighting scheme of this TBMD platform and make it look like something else but I'm not thinking we have awareness of overhead capabilities and that kind of stuff The awareness of how those things happen doesn't always occur out on the numbered fleet as you know U FOUO Well what I'd tell you is we through the MOC have real-time contact with all those people and now they've started to get visibility into it And as we go to distributed ops and distributed defense they'll have much clearer visibility in their MOCs of what we're doing And we're working on that right now WFOUO Cause I guess that's where the •so whar is that gives the reach back and the push-pull demand signal WFOUO It's going to be lt's Well first it's got to be I'd tell you it's mutual support They got to understand what we're doing we need to understand what they're doing That's the Memorandum of Agreement I have with all the numbered-fleet commanders and there's one document with all our signatures on it It's not one I have with Second Fleet and one I have with Third Fleet and one U FOUO Right UIFOUO It's one document we've all signed and we've just developed this capacity to do real-time interactive planning with them We're getting there U FOUO And I mean this has been exponential over your U FOUO Yeah Page 14of21 OH-2011-79-MCCULLOUGH ECRElWREl TQ YU AY CAN GBR NZl SECRET JREL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL fb 3 NSA McC fb 3 NSA Mee b 3 NSA McC fb 3 NSA McC UfFOUO Your time Uf FOUO It's Yeah ifs ah Yeah I'm sort of running out of good ideas Yeah Chuckles U FOUO Because So from your N-8 experience UfFOUO Yeah utFOUO I guess what do you see In like five years down the road You know what are some of the things that we need to do here on the staff to you know show that value so as we go into a POM Program Objective Memorandum - Navy Budget Process -14 crunch utFOUO Well I mean It's I've talked to CNO Roughhead about this got in a meeting with Admiral Greenert on his first work day in the job You can have all the kinetic force In the world you want and if you can't command and control of It you're still going to lose the war And so you can't just say Okay in this era of declining budgets I'm going to try to protect my kinetic force because if you can't see to it you're not going to win Admiral Roughhead understands that in my preliminary discussions with Admiral Greenert he understands It And so when you go to make budgetary adjustments because your top line went down you've got to balance the entire portfolio you can't just try to take it out of what we do for a living to hold on to force structure and I think both Admiral Roughhead and Admiral Greenert and the folks in the A Wing understand that U FOUO With the ADCON OPCON all these relationships the lines of spaghetti on the organizational chart what have been the things that have been the most challenging for you U FOUO To get It done The OPCON I explained We finally The services had never put the forces and capability we bring in the Forces For Memorandum they were always reserved for the services And when we did the Forces For Memorandum revision In FY when we did it la s t ' ' November so FY the revision for FY-11 I talked with the N-3 N-5 fbl 3 NSA fbl 3 NSA land we decided this was time to do it right and we put all the forces in the Forces For Memorandum So that gave us the OPCON and then STRAT did what they were supposed to and CYBERCOM did what they were supposed to and we got the OPCON The ADCON was more difficult because other numbered fleets and some Ech-2s don't have ADCON Okay so In the kinetic force-the ships and airplanes and submarines-Fleet Forces Command in PAC Fleet had the ADCON and they executed that ADCON through their type commanders SURFLANT SURFPAC AIRLANT AIRPAC and the submarines SUBPAC because Page 16of21 OH-2011·79 CCULLOUGH E6RET9REI 'Fe YIA AUi GJM Glilfti NZI SECRETJ REL TO l JSA Al JS CAN GBR NZL the forces deployed and they changed operational command So they would chop from Third Fleet to Seventh Fleet to Fifth Fleet or from Second Fleet to Sixth Fleet to Fifth Fleet And you wouldn't want the administrative control to change because it would be way too cumbersome and the staffs weren't equipped to do it b 3 NSA McC rb 3 NSA McC fb 3 NSA McC rb 3 NSA U FOl JO Right U FOl JO So when I looked at that model okay I got why we did this But then I looked at the model I had and my guys don't chop to anybody They belong to us So why wouldn't I have the administrative control And there's some important things in administrative control The OPCON commander can reorganize a subordinate command to accomplish a mission So I can reach down into somebody's organization and tell them to change it to do a mission if they're OPCON-ed to me ADCON assigns people emphasized to that organization So if I didn't have ADCON and the ADCON rested with Fleet Forces Command I could change the organization any way I wanted and he could pull all the people out of it Now Admiral Harvey wouldn't do that and Admiral Harvey and I have been friends since 1977 Well you can't have things like this built on personal relationships And so we needed the ADCON from a personnel perspective Also the budget execution authority I needed because I was dependant on another budget submitting office even with the ADCON relationship to get me my money Now that was Admiral Harvey again and Admiral Harvey's got a lot of competing requirements in a decreasing fiscal environment and where do I play inside of his requirements I'd rather play in big Navy's requirements And the ADCON and the budget submitting office approval thafs in works will give us that capability And so that cleans up the entire command and control from a fiscal administrative and operational relationship with this command And it's different than the status quo and nobody's ever thought about it this way before And as in most things change is hard and it's just taking a lot more time than I thought it would but U FOl JO Can I ask you just a question about U FOl J Yeah U FOl JO You've been talking here You referenced previously about going through an exercise and having contractors come in U FOYO Yeah U FOl JO And working with them and everything And I just get this feeling that there's this construct of your having to have flexibility kind of out-of-the-box thinking along with Page 16 of 21 OH-2011-79-MCCULLOUGH EGRET 'IREb T9 Y J J Y G J N GBR N SECRETf REL TO YSA AYS CAN CBR NZL McC fb 3 NSA McC fb 3 NSA McC U FOYO Yes U FOl JO The whole thing with the And how much flexibility and how mu Where do you see Where do I have to draw the line with out-of-thebox thinking and military construct and how difficult has that been with· these boundaries U FOl JO I haven't found that boundary yet U FOl JO Okay U FOl JO It's hard to explain to some folks It's not usually the senior leadership I mean it's not the combatant commanders and the component commanders It gets down into the majors and lieutenant commanders that don't understand why you want this civilian included that's not a government employee so that That's where the push-back's been You know if I say I'm bringing Mr Jones into a meeting and I know Jones has got the credentials and I can prove it nobody says anything But If I've got some commanders that want to take this guy into a planning effort you get Oh we can't talk to Jones He's from AT T or He's from Verizon or He's from Microsoft or something else I think So I don't think I've reached the bounds on that What has to be understood is they provide advice and they provide counsel and they can tell you how to do it from their perspective In the end it's not command by committee The boss has the decision authority and as long as we keep that clear we're fine fb 3 NSA U FOl JO Okay Thank you fb 3 NSA U FOl JO So with Libya we talked a little bit about that You were working closely with one of my emphasized top three people Vice Admiral Harry Harris What are some of the things you learned from TERMINAL FURY that you were able to apply there Mee U FOl JO That goes back to what's a major theater contingency and what's not Now I don't want to in any way detract from what the United States and NATO was able to accomplish in Libya But TERMINAL FURY is at one level of conflict U FOl JO And Libya is at a significantly other level of conflict Where's the target-set development and how do you gain access to things you need access to deliver messages to shut things off or whatever Libya disconnected itself from the Internet f Slf H R E Lt l O k a Yv r fb 1 U ss c_ _ _ _ ur' ' P ro b a b Y•' And that' sfb 1 ussc I b 1 ussc Page 17of21 OH-2011-79-MCCULLOUOH SEGRE'Fe IREl 1'9 1161 AY8 1 GAN GlilR N SECRETJ REL TO YSA AlJS CAN GBR NZL McC SJ IREL Ah so I mean whaL You know I talked about where's the trip point So when do you deploy this three-star JTF commander to execute Alexander's work in support of this geographic Well if you're having a major theater war-and I know that's not in vogue anYllJore-but if ou're fi htin a ma· or contin enc So ou're You're oin b 1l ussc J 1l ussc this is a major theater contingency that requires three-star level command-and-control capability capacity with the understanding of how that relates to what Alexander does in both hats globally Okay So that's That's TERMINAL FURY Ah Libya-one bad actor small country relatively little kinetic capability to fight back And so it was really messaging And I talked about the access and we hadn't looked at Libya since Qadaffi declared he was a good guy and gave everything up more or less So what access di · · ' the r ht level bl 1 ussc b 1 ussc J 1russc So I sent some folks over to talk to Admiral Harris and to Admiral Locklear about that And we were sort of working that in conjunction with AFR IC OM because he had the cell that understood it And l lt was The organization was In Naples and I needed somebody on with Harris to be able to try to tie this together I mean you know Locklear's statement to me was-and Admiral Locklear and I are good friends-he said Barry we just weren't ready to do this He's absolutely right That's why you got to develop the capability and capacity now so that when the whistle blows you're ready to go fb 3 NSA McC U FOYO Outstanding Um let's see We kind of talked Cyber PAC and JCOTF any things you learned you know doing one vice the other U FOUO Ah you know I just Cyber PAC to me is a steady-state organization They have to have a relationship with one of the service ln this case the Navy is General Alexander's service component that's been aligned with PACOM So there's got to be a tie They've got to understand that they They can have situational awareness they can do planning If they want operations done they've got to come to CYBERCOM through the service component to get that done because the COCOMs don't own the networks You know if you go to Hawaii they think they own TNC PAC they think they own DISA PAC They don't I mean that's just the nature of living on Hawaii I mean the folks at Kunia that are Navy work for me So NIOC Hawaii works for me they don't work for PAC Fleet And so how do you establish that relationship How do you make it clear The commanders understand It's how do you make it Page 18of21 OH-2011-79-MCCULLOUGH SliCAliT AEb TO USA t llS CAN GBR Na SECRET REl TO IJSA AUS CAN CBR NZL clear to the next two levels who really for works for who in this and how that authority has got to go I think Cyber PAC's a good initiative I think you need that steady-state capability there I think you need a Cyber Support Element out there and we've just got to make sure we get the relationships right And then when the contingency erupts what's the trigger that causes the three-star headquarters and capability and capacity to descend on Oahu And so that's Navy I mean the same for CENTCOM The Army has been given responsibility for CENTCOM so Rhett Hernandez has got to have that relationship with people in General Mattis's headquarters And what are the trigger points where he roll in on top decks cue the mission for CENTOM And I think the Air Force has got 1-2g weak the same thing b 3 NSA McC fb 3 NSA McC So we talked about ou know Lib a bJ 1J ussc U FOIJO Well first I think you know it's What worked out well and what didn't There's no baseline to say what didn't go welll mean everything went better than it did the last time because there was no last time Okay so it's really what Mike Rogers has got to do You know did I Did we do it right while I was here I don't know Twenty years from now somebody will know I don't know• I just know we did something different where nothing existed before We built something where there was nothing So it had to be better than nothing And so now Admiral Rogers has the opportunity with the fresh set of eyes that hadn't lived in the problem every day for the last 20 months to come in and look at where we are where we came from and what I envisioned as the future and he has the chance to adjust the future And I think thafs what's important here U FOIJO Thank you I I know we're taking up a lot of time I kind of wanted to I keep asking you questions and I know people hate being asked questions Any other things that you want to talk about that you think are you know important to kind of capture here U FOYO No I think that I think you know General Alexander has done a terrific job I mean the man's got huge responsibility I don't know how he does it I mean the Director of the National Security Agency last time I checked was a fulltime job and being a sub-unified commander is a fulltime job he's managed to do them both so I don't know whether he cloned himself or what But I think he's done just a superb job putting the United States military on a course it has to go and then giving us the latitude to go execute what he's told us he wants us to do You know I Page 19of21 OH-2011-79-MCCULLOUGH 6EGRE'tl REl lQ USA MIS CAN G8R NZL SECRETJ REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL might be parochial I think the Navy is way out in front of this I think the way we organized is right The fact that I am the service cryptological component commander which gives me Title-50 authority and none of my other service component commanders have that I think is a huge disadvantage to them I think we did it right I think if you talk to the general he thinks we did it right I don't know how you fix it that's up to the Marine Corps Army and Air Force to figure out So I think you know we're on the right track from that perspective I know my OPS Center is better than anybody else's including CYBERCOM's because Rob Schrier has been over here and said How do I get one of these • So I think we're ahead that way And the fact that we had this core of people the Navy IWs ITs and ISs that did this in different stovepipes and we've managed to bring this expertise together has again put us further ahead And so I think we're on the right path and I think it's good that Mike's coming up here and has the opportunity to give it a fresh look fb 3 NSA U FOUO So come 1 October what are you planning on doing U FOUO I don't know Something Ah just l'm looking forward to it I mean I've done this for a long time I've enjoyed every minute of it You know people say Well what do you miss I'll miss being with the sailors I'll miss sunrises and sunsets and stars at sea But life looks pretty good on the outside too McC fb 3 NSA SNREL Excellent I This is great I mean I got all my checkmarks here People talking ln the background-unintelligible Let's see Yeah I guess One thjna I foraot to ask you about-fbl 1l ussc J fb 1 USSC ·-· ---·' What do vou thinkf bl 1l ussc b 1 ussc McC b 3 NSA b 3 NSA b 3 NSA fb 3 NSA McC I Well this is great I got everything I Good I I'm good ------ I Thank you very much Is that enough for you Page 20of21 OH-2011-79-MCCULLOUGH SEGRET YREb TQ llSA llS G N GBR NA SECRET JREl TO YSA AYS CAN GBR NZl fb 3 NSA McC fb 3 NSA fb 3 NSA fb 3 NSA That's good That's excellent U FOUO I'll tell you that I got guys llkefbl 3 NSA who's been transfe d i utenant commander I've got a commander down here named bl 3 NSA And then there's a commander that retired whose name escapes me right now that works for us as a civilian now over in Maryland Believed to befb 3 NsA J These guys are spectacular I mean they're probably the best cyber planners on the face of the planet And they go between TAO and service So I mean the talent The talent thafs there is just amazing And we didn't talk about this and since I've still got some time how do you How do you retain these people Okay So I know the equations for for keeping people in the service and I know that unemploymenfs at 9 2 percent and if it goes below 8 percent and your recruiting starts to fall off and it goes through below 7 percent your attrition starts to go up So I don't ever wish for a bad economy-none of us do-but right now thafs giving us this wealth of talent If we had it they didn't leave and if it's out in public they want to come work for us So how do you maintain that if the unemployment goes back to six percent 'Cause I mean there's There's other government agencies who can pay our kids a lot more money our sailors a lot more money than we do And you've got the same talent pool that industry wants that other departments in the federal government want that combat support agencies want and the military service wants and so how do you make your career or your employment opportunity better than the others And once you get the folks into our business they enjoy a level of responsibility they get at a very early age they enjoy the work and I think they realize ifs to a higher cause than just next quarter's numbers And then with the incentives we still maintain for our folks that do this I think It makes the military a viable alternative How we're going to compete in lesser fiscal wellbeing and for the limited talent pool here is something that everybody is going to have to work on Outstanding I Great Thank you very much Thank you Sir Ends abruptly l lllllll llllll lll l l lllll lll lllllEnd of tranacrl ptllll llll l l llllllll lllllll l llll ll Page 21of21 OH-2011 ·79-llCCULLOUGH SEGRlm REl TO USA t U GAN GlilR NZL TOP OHNR ECRETt l l t JOF ORt J OH-2014-21 TRSID l b 3 NSA QCSID l b 3 NSA DOI 24 March 2014 DTR 28 March 2014 I Text Review 14May 2014 Text w Tape INAME ROGERS Michael S Mike VADM USN IPLACE NSA OPS 3 Building Ft Meade Maryland IVIEWER ' b- -3 _N_S_A------------- l b 3 NSA I This is NSA Oral History 21-2014 OH-2014-21 Today is 24 March 2014 and we are talking to Vice Admiral Michael S Rogers currently Commander U S Fleet Cyber Command and Commander of U S TENTH Fleet-and recently nominated as the new Director of the National Security Agency and Commander of USCYBERCOM This interview will focus on perceptions and concerns as he assumes command of the National Security Agency and USCYBERCOM I'm l b 3 NSA Oral Historian for the Center for Cryptologic History Along with me is l b 3 NsA United States Navy U S Fleet Cyber I Command and U S TENTH Fleet and hbJ 3l NSA Historian for the for USCYBERCOM The classification of this interview is TOP SECRET COMINT We will adjust this classification at the end if needed Vice Admiral Rogers the Center for Cryptologic History wants to thank you for taking time from your busy schedule to discuss your thoughts as you assume command of the National Security Agency and USCYBERCOM Would you please provide us an overview of your academic background and military career I I Rogers In he clears his throat Excuse me In terms of academics I have an undergraduate degree from Auburn University in Business specifically Personnel Management Industrial Relations So if you ever need a contract negotiated I'm ready to go Chuckling heard My master's is from the National War College and it's National Security Strategy with a specific concentration in East Asia So as General Alexander reminds me Hey if you just had your technical side education side Rogers you'd be perfect for these prospective new duties VADM Rogers chuckles Classified By b 3 NSA NSA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 20070108 CeGla ify OR' 20401201 TOP SECRETl Sl NOFORM So it is That's one thing I always tell people I enter this not with the technical background in terms of formal education that many do I'll be honest and tell you hey that's not a factor in my mind It's never been Mm hmm l b 3 NSA Rogers I always used to urge when I was a detailer-a person responsible for the assignment of professional SIGINT and cyber officers with my own service-I always used to tell them Hey I wish I could send you all to Naval Postgraduate School to get you know master's level education in electrical engineering mathematics computer science Hey it's not going to happen We just don't have the time and the resources So what I think you need to do as an officer to be viable in our mission set in the 21st century you must be technically proficient and you must be comfortable applying technology against a very technically focused target set If you can do that I think you have the relevant skill set for the future If you can't then we need to think about how do we augment your technical background So in my case I have always enjoyed the technical side of what we do It's something I have always been comfortable with and never thought that my education was a positive or a negative either way just never thought it was a major factor for me The second part of the question you asked in terms of my professional background I was commissioned in the United States Navy out of the NROTC program at Auburn University August the 281h 1981 I initially was commissioned as a surface warfare officer I did that for approximately five years-three of which were spent on a destroyer for my initial sea tour on a destroyer out of Norfolk-during which I did Unusual for them-this is the early 1980s combat deployments to Grenada Beirut El Salvador a couple of times So it was a fun time I was very lucky I was on a ship that did a lot of stuff Had nothing to do with me It was just the luck of the draw At the time that ship also the USS Caron DD 970 was a cryptologic platform I had no clue that the journey was ultimately going to take me into cryptology but I was a TAO tactical action officer-the commanding officer's representative down in combat in different tactical scenarios So you would always go up to the Bo o CES to get your brief before you came on watch Again so I'm dealing with CTs and cryptologic professionals I had no clue that I'd end up in their world But I did that for three years I had six months' of training and I to become a Bo o surface officer And then I spent about 18 months on a shore tour in Bo o Washington DC where I changed specialties Classified By b 3 NSA NSA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 200701 08 C111 la ify OR· 20401201 TOP SECRET Sl NOl ORN TOP ECRET l l fl JOFORfl J I then became what was then a cryptologist November 1986 As a cryptologist I first went to Rota Spain where I did I started as a COMEVAL airborne reconnaissance trainee working with VQ-2 Unfortunately the USS Stark was hit by two Exocets missiles in the Persian Gulf in June of 1986 '86 June of '87 l b 3 NSA Rogers '87 And the decision was made we're going to ramp up the Navy presence there We're going to put We're going to reflag tankers So I got sent over I got ripped out of the aviation program Got sent over to do surface work riding small 8% buoys I did the first ten Operation Earnest Will escort missions through the Strait of Hormuz Was there when we shot up the Rostam oil platform Sank an Iranian frigate So that was an exciting time It was a lot of fun Was there for ship attacks during the tanker wars trying to stop the Iranians from shooting up tankers So that was a lot of fun 1-2G close quarters with those guys Chuckling heard Then got into A little unusual in the cryptologic world then I focused a lot of time on ELI NT-more so than most of my peers It just worked out this way I ran the largest ELINT or electronic warfare segment in the Navy at the time for Europe So I did all the Navy's reprogrammable libraries for all our automated systems aircraft ships submarines threat recognition systems I ran the technical guidance unit that did all the training for all the electronic warfare for the Navy forward in Europe I ran the analytic center for the largest SIGINT field site in Europe I ran all the ELINT segments of that So l That has worked out very well for me It's given me a pretty broad portfolio in my career which I'm very grateful for Most Many cryptologists tend to be very COMINT-focused I've done both the COM INT but I've done a lot of the ELINT side-and EW which I really liked Mm hmm supervised analysts as well l b 3 NSA Rogers Yeah And then 'Cause they Don't get me wrong they do the work I'm just there as the officer to take the credit They do the work Hmm l b 3 NSA Rogers Then I went to a Fleet CINC tour where I ran for the East Coast of the Navy It was a Navy tour four-star staff senior you know waterfront guy Classified By b 3 NSA NSA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 20070108 Cec la ify OR' 20401201 TOP SECRETl'Sl IMOfORN in the Navy on the East Coast I was the Cryptologic Plans and Policy guy So my niche in life was to think about how do we need Coming out of the Cold War-this is like 1990 to 1993-my focus was we're coming out of the Cold War What's the future going to look like in I worked for some great people Five of the officers that I worked with in that organization There were 19 officers Five of us went on to be flag officers It's among the highest concentration of really smart professional cryptologists I have ever been a part of then Those guys were just phenomenal And my niche was Okay Rogers Work with the team and let's figure out where we need to take cryptology and SIGINT for the United States Navy and by extension our joint partners What are we going to do after the Cold War So that worked out really well Got into some collection capabilities on non-traditional platforms I argued that SPECWAR was the biggest investment area we needed to get into-that I thought the future was going to have a big 8% ground component to it for us And then counternarcotics was the other big focus of the next decade 8% from then So I got involved in working on that From there I went to Norf up to Washington O C where I was the detailer for all of the 04 and below in my specialty So my job was to determine what was the best fit for people Where should they go How I help them build their careers I was also the Assistant Community Manager So I got involved in Hey how do you build the cryptologic work force officer and enlisted Primarily officers for me but I also got involved in the enlisted side How do you build a cryptologic workforce for the future What are the skill sets you need How do you train and educate How do we give people the right set of experiences to optimize that training and education How do we assess performance Then I left there and was the Executive Assistant to the Senior Cryptologist in the Navy So I go to sit you know and by his side so to speak just as the note taker to see how the organization worked from the flag deck-which was very interesting for me I learned a lot from that From there I went to command up at Navy Security Group Activity Winter Harbor Maine-which has subsequently closed down It had a very traditional mission up there HF DF l b 1l ussc l b 1 l ussc I -lt-w-as_o_n_e_o_f_fi_v_e_m_1_·s-s-io_n_g_r_o_u_n_d__ sites in the system That system has subsequently been retired And I also ran the schoolhouse At the time the Navy ran one of the four major on-orbit intelligence constellations We don't do that anymore but we did that one Classified By b 3 NSA NSA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 200701 08 Cec la ify OR 20401201 TO SEC ET Sl NOl O N Mm hmm l b 3 NSA Rogers And I also The biggest challenge there was I was The base was going to close within two years of my departure So I did the initial work you know with the governor with the Congressional delegation with the Navy with NSA about Okay how do we go through a closure So I learned a lot about that which is really Stood me in good stead Now I find myself in a position where I have shut down installations in my current duties knowing what that's like at the other end From there I went out to 5th Fleet where I was the Senior Cryptologist ran all of the SIGINT cryptology as well as all the information operations for 5th Fleet which was the operational commander for Europe and Africa from a Navy perspective Interestingly during that tour I was embedded in the B% three vice the two which I freaking loved I was a Battle Watch Captain At one point they approached me about Hey would you like to be the N3 He chuckles And I said I really can't I would love to do it but I really can't stay I really loved it I got very immersed in the operational side even as I was working traditional intel kinds of things And from there I went to the National War College Got a degree Like I said focused on East Asia So I got to spend a lot of time focused on the PRC from a strategy and a policy intellectual thought kind of perspective as well as North Korea-not realizing that this was going to pay off for me later in my career Then I went to the Joint Staff for my payback tour And quite frankly in some ways that's where the wheels came off What do I mean by that got totally out of the traditional experience set which is one reason why I believe that I am if I'm confirmed by the Senate I'm going to be the next Director of NSA and the next commander of U S Cyber Command Because I found myself First I started in very traditional areas I ran the cyber effort of the Joint Staff It was a very different time then This is 2002 Or excuse me 2003 I went to college at NDU from 2002 to 2003 Mm hmm l b 3 NSA Rogers This is now 2003 Cyber is still relatively immature The J3 ran everything We did all the policy We did the operational piece The J5 Classified By b 3 NSA NSA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 20070108 C Gla ify OR' 20401201 TOP SECRETl SlttNOj ORN TOP SECRET l Sl IOFORN B% worked the information assurance piece But at the time that was considered kind of a niche We didn't really look at it in a comprehensive way And so as an 06 I found myself Hey you are Mister Cyber for the Joint Staff So I Wow man I loved that now I only got to do it for four or five months before I changed jobs In fact in that tour if you looked B% at that very first order that we ever sent from the department to U S Strategic Command for Network Operations the POC is Captain M S Rogers That was one of my babies he chuckles when I was 1 G Hmm l b 3 NSA Rogers My predecessor did all the work We took 18 months to get that order out I was only there for the last four My job was to get it across the finish line My 06 boss I was an 06 but at the time I was working for another 06 He got grabbed to go be General Richard Myers' Executive Assistant as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff So I got asked would I move up and take his job So I ran the STO Special Technical Operations side for the Joint Staff as well as all the Information Operations elements on the Joint Staff That's what I did for again three or four more months Then General Norton Schwartz who was the J3 at the time asked me Hey would you come be my EA which I found very Executive Assistant which I found again a little different I'm an intel guy in a J3 organization We're in the middle of two war And this when things were particularly going bad in Iraq Mm hmm l b 3 NSA Rogers He chuckles He says Hey I'd like you to be my EA And I said Sir why don't you grab somebody who's been a k I mean in the J3 B% You got carrier skippers You got brigade posts Iraq and Afghanistan brigade commanders You've got wing commanders in the Air Force you know Why would you pick a guy like me I wouldn't normally be in a 3 But he was a kind guy From there I went B% up to be the Director I did that for six months Then he was informed he was going to be the Director of the Joint Staff I got asked to go up there So I did He asked me to go ahead of him 'cause he said I want you to understand the processes learn the organization So I was the EA to two different Directors on the Joint Staff One of whom Admiral Tim Keating would subsequently be a big factor in my career From there I'd now been on the Joint Staff about two years and thought I was going to be able to go back to the J3 when General Peter Pace the Vice Chairman had been nominated by the President to be the next Classified By b 3 NSA NSA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 20070108 C11i la ify OR· 20401201 TOP SECRET Sl NOFORN TOP gECRETJ glJ MOF ORN Chairman He asked me to come interview to be his Exec I did that He started the interview by telling me Hey I'm going to be the first Marine Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff I cannot have a Navy guy as my EA Rogers And I said Hey I understand Sir I'll go back to the J3 You interviewed a Navy guy This is good He called me back for two more interviews constantly telling me the same thing And then said I have a job for you after I get confirmed but I can't tell you what it is Chuckling heard So I thought he was just being nice Sure enough he gets confirmed The morning he gets confirmed he grabs me in the E Ring passageway-'cause I'm just walking between offices And he says I want you to be my thinker I want you to do the things that I don't have the time to do or the things that I'm not paying attention to that I should I want you to travel with me where ever I go I want you to sit in on all my meetings I want you to build a small team to help me analyze situations So I created a Chairman's Action Group for him and then traveled with him everywhere for his two years as Chairman Sat in in all his meetings During that tour I also got tapped to ended up becoming one of the leaders of what they called the Joint Staff Working Group Things in Iraq were going poorly The Chairman and most of the Chiefs had come to the conclusion the current strategy is not working and we got to do something different That was in September of 2006 August of 2006 because he came off his July leave And I remember he came back saying We got to do something different I've come to the conclusion we got to do something different They commissioned a group four people from each Service supposedly the best and the brightest of guys like 1 G B% Masters There were four Navy guys All four of us went on to make flag officer Again I was just fortunate But we were tasked by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to do a strategic assessment of the current global strategic environment And then help them And then bore down specifically on Afghanistan and Iraq Particularly with Afghanistan it was to do a sense of where we are And for Iraq it was help us figure out what we ought to do differently As a result of the work of this group plus many other people-and many other groups-ultimately after our presentation to President Bush they came they for a variety of reasons came to the conclusion Hey the Surge What became known as the Surge in Iraq was the strategy they Classified By b 3 NSA NSA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 20070108 Ce1 la ify OR· 20401201 TOP SEiCREiT Sl'LNOIOORN TOP SECRETJJSl l JO OR J went with He coughs Excuse me Then I left that job And Admiral Keating-who had been the Director I worked for for three months as EA-heard that I had been selected for flag officer said Hey why don't you come out to PACOM and be the J2 I said Sir I have never served a day in the Pacific and I got 27 years of commissioned service And I'm not an intel officer I'm a cryptologist Are you sure you want to do this Then his comments And I was very lucky His comment to me was Hey 'Cause I said If you want me to get off that plane at Pearl and be the duty expert on Beijing and Pyongyang I'm just not your guy Sir I've never served out there He chuckles Then his comment to me was Hey I got a lot of people who are very smart about this AOR That's not I don't need more of that What I need is somebody who understands the broader context somebody who can think strategically somebody who's going to speak the truth to me as they believe it and somebody who knows how to build teams I said Okay Sir If that's the caveat I think I can maybe be of minimal value to you did that for two yea for like twenty months And then Afghanistan meanwhile has gone has gotten much worse And the decision is made to relieve the current commander General McChrystal is selected to go in as the Commander on the ground McChrystal decides he wants to take the Joint Staff J2 with him-a guy named Mike Flynn now currently Lieutenant General Mike Flynn the Director of DIA So now they're trying to find a JCS J2 And I get a call one day out at Pearl Harbor Hey the General wants to talk to you about coming back to be the J2 And I'm I had never worked for Admiral Mullin I didn't know Admiral Mullin And I'm thinking We're in two ground wars right now and you want a Navy guy from the Pacific to be the J2 That doesn't make any sense to me Mullin says same kind of thing Hey look I got tons of people that are focused on Afghanistan and Iraq And it's going to suck up a lot of your time but I don't want us to be totally 8% bore sighted on this Plus you got a pretty broad background in a lot of different areas I want you to see what you can do So I came back and did that I did that for two years And then in September of 2011 I was asked by the CNO to come out and be the second commander of Fleet Cyber Command and U S 1Q1h Fleet Classified By b 3 NSA NSA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 200701 08 Ce la ify TOP SECRET Sl IOi ORN OR 20401201 8% And it's now two and a half years later and I find myself having been nominated for the DIRNSA job and the U S Cyber Command job And we're waiting for the Senate to l've done my confirmation hearing from the Senate Arms Services Committee And now we're waiting for the Senate to make up their mind about do they want this Rogers guy to get a four-star and take on these jobs He chuckles __J b_l _3J_N_sA_ _ Rogers _ l Are we still thinking we'll get the vote in the committee tomorrow I don't know We'll see I mean the current hope General Alexander is doing the ceremony on Friday the 28 1h of March at 1500 either waywhether it's a retirement ceremony for him Yeah J b 3 NSA Rogers Or if it's a retirement and a change of command We're hoping that in the next 24 hours we're going to get a sense for can they do it by the end of the week If they can then the current thinking is we'll just do it all in one ceremony change of command and retirement If not it'll be a retirement ceremony for him And I'll just go over there if and when I'm confirmed Yeah 8% okay l b 3 NSA Rogers Is that more detail than you Just to give me a sense for what you're looking for That's great That was great l b 3 NSA Rogers Is that more detail than you 3-4G faint That was good What experiences in your background were important in preparing you to be DIRNSA and command USCY8ERCOM What do you think l One thing Let me follow up and ask you l b 3 NSA Rogers Sure sure I noticed throughout what you were talking about here is the fact that you have a broader background scope than a lot of people and you seem to be able to use that-or people saw that as a real advantage during your career l b 3 NSA Rogers Right Classified By b 3 NSA NSA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 20070108 DeGla ify OR' 20401201 TOP iECRETllSl 11 NOl ORN TOPSECRETHSIHNOFORN A command And brought you in specifically because of that broader background as opposed to some specific expertise you had l b 3 NSA Rogers Yeah I'll tell you I'm very fortunate First I started out in the operational world as a traditional surface warfare officer-or combined arms guy in any of the other Services That very much shaped the way I view the world around me It very much shaped my approach to doing things Secondly even as a cryptologist or SIGINT individual I have spent l've been I got 32 and a half years commissioned service I have probably literally spent half of my career in J3 or command echelon organizations not in 2 organizations Between my two tours on the Joint Staff for example I have six and a half years I spent my entire 06 time on the Joint Staff and then I spent my entire two-star time back on the Joint Staff So six and a half years Eight different jobs across the Staff in that six and a half years Only two of those years were spent in the J2 for example Mm hmm l b 3 NSA Rogers The Four and a half were spent in the J3 in the Director's Office working for the Chairman So I have a very unusual I'm not going to argue if it's better or worse But it's just a little different than most of my peers with the same kind of background I've spent more time in non-traditional and in you know strategic kinds of things The other thing I was very lucky When I made flag officer At the time I happened to be working for the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who was getting ready to leave He unfortunately from my perspective only served one two-year tour vice the normal two two-year tours of most chairmen And he pulled me aside when I made flag and he said There's two things I want you to be thinking about The first is there are many people who will look at you and they will try to stovepipe you based on your background I am going to work hard to try to fight that while I can And secondly I think you ought to be the Director of the National Security Agency one day I'm like What He laughs This is about 2010 when 3-4G said that J b 3 NSA Rogers This is like No this is 2006 Wow l b 3 NSA Rogers When I made flag Classified By b 3 NSA NSA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 200701 08 C Gla ify OR 20401201 TOR SECRET1'Sl 11 NOFORN Wow l b 3 NSA Rogers So I have been very fortunate Literally since I was a senior 06 I have had senior officers and policymakers in the department talking to me and trying to give me experiences that optimized me for these two jobs Mm hmm l b 3 NSA Rogers One of the reasons why Keating wanted me to go out to PACOM was Hey look I want to broaden you and because I want you to get experience in the theatre that I think lfwe look 10 years down the road I was there from 2005 to 2007 Hey as I look 10 years down the road this is going to be the strategic imperative for the nation I think I want you to get you some experience Admiral McConnell was always Again former Director of NSA He approached then Admiral Mullin who was the Chairman about Hey you got a chance to use Rogers to be your J2 I McConnell who was a Navy intel officer not a cryptologist He was a Navy intel officer McConnell had been the JCS J2 during the Gulf War Mm hmm l b 3 NSA Rogers Before he came out to NSA And he told Mullin Hey the JCS J2 is a great It'll give Rogers a very broad perspective across the intelligence arena He'll become a known entity across the leadership of the IC He'll get the opportunity to work and interface on the Hill as well as in policy issues Hey I think you need to look at Rogers as a potential Again I'm very lucky I'm a one-star out in Honolulu Now Sir this is when McConnell was l b 3 NSA Rogers 8% Sure Director of National Intelligence Is that correct l b 3 NSA Rogers I don't remember if he was the DNI then or if he had left that job already 'Cause again I never worked 8% I didn't Right He left in early 2009 'cause 8% I've l b 3 NSA Rogers I never worked for Admiral McConnell but he knew about me And he would reach out through others occasionally just to say Hey keep doing what you're doing You know Hey I think you're building a great career Classified By b 3 NSA NSA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 20070108 Ceclassify OR· 20401201 TOP SECRET Sl NOICORN TOl2 SECRET l ii31 fl 10 0Rfl I Hmm l b 3 NSA Rogers I didn't know him And then So now I'm the JCS J2 And the then Chairman says to me So I think what we ought to look at for you is you I think you ought to be the next Alexander This is like 2009 So here's what we're going to do You're going to do this tour And then we need to look at potentially getting you to command on the Navy component side for both U S Cyber Command And the other thing I'm also the Service Cryptologic Commander for the United States Navy So the Navy's the only Service that's organized this way I mirror General Alexander's current duties where he's both the cyber guy and the NSA guy I mirror that in the United States Navy I am both the cyber guy and the Service Cryptologic Commander We're the only Service that is structured that way And then General Alexander interceded to help me out When I was getting ready to leave the Joint Staff they said Hey Rogers we want you to be a three-star This is the Navy is saying But we think maybe we want you to go be the OPNAV in 2N6 We're trying to push this whole information dominance idea You know you're the senior information dominance guy per se You know this strategy and policy piece seems to be something that you enjoy or we've used you for Admiral Gary Roughead then the CNO says Hey you really ought to go do that And I pushed back arguing No Sir What I really ought to do is take this and apply it in an operational context to drive change at the deck plate level And I ought to be the Fleet Cyber Command and the TENTH Fleet Commander That's what I think is the best use Because Sir look at what I have never been I've never been a resource guy Hmm l b 3 NSA Rogers OPNAV N2 N6 fundamental mission is to align that policy and that strategic vision with the resource investments that we're making You got to lt's all about progammatics and money for them Sir that is not my world And quite frankly I love the fact that I have been operational almost my entire career It's what I really enjoy doing And then Admiral So then General Alexander contacts me and says What are they talking about for you I said Hey Sir you know on the positive side I think they're going to make me a three-star I'm very grateful I'm very fortunate I think Admiral Roughead is talking about going to be N2 N6 And he says Let me get back to you He calls Admiral Roughead and says If you want This is Again this is 2011 now If you want Rogers to potentially be my relief then he needs to be an Classified By b 3 NSA NSA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 20070108 Oe la ify OR 20401201 TOP SECRETUSl NOf'ORN operational commander not a staff guy You need to put him in Fleet Cyber Command And Roughead says Okay Yeah l b 3 NSA Rogers And so they make the change And then the decision is made to send me here And now it's two and a half years later So I don't say any of that to name drop I say that to tell people that 'Cause one of the reasons one of the th in gs I get asked is Given all the challenges that NSA in particular but as well as U S Cyber Command is dealing with right now why in the heck would you ever want to go to that job I tell people because this it's payback time for me I literally for the last eight years have had seniors telling me We're going to try to optimize you to go in behind General Alexander They gave me a set of experiences that were designed to do that They gave me an opportunity that most people In my particular specialty in the Navy we had never had a three-star before I became a three-star We had never had an operational commander before I became the Commander of Fleet Cyber Command and TENTH Fleet He chuckles We had never had an information warfare officer or cryptologist-information warfare being my designator title-who had ever been DIRNSA or ever been a four-star And so I'm very mindful that a lot of people went out on a limb to try to give me an opportunity And what kind of officer or leader would I be if I turned my back on that and just said Hey look It's been great I'm going to go out and make a lot of money now on the outside I just can't do it I'm not wired that way Now it's payback time Do you think one of the situations or one of the characteristics that you have that maybe was a catalyst for a lot of this is strong people skills l b 3 NSA Rogers Yeah Probably I guess 'Cause there are certainly plenty ofpeople I mean I always kid General Alexander Hey Sir you could be the Chief Engineer of this organization Rogers can't be the Chief Engineer of NSA or U S Cyber Command General Alexander is getting ready to leave his current duties with his name on six patents during his tenure as the Director Sir you're never going to find Roger's name on a single patent He laughs It's not that I can't do it and it's not that I'm not comfortable with it But it's not my vision of what my strengths are Classified By b 3 NSA NSA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 20070108 Cec la ify OR' 20401201 TOP SECRETllSl NOfORN TOP SECRET l Sl JOFOR J And if people ask me Why are you going to this job I'd say probably three things Number one because of my background and the set of experiences I was given Secondly because not only did those experiences pertain directly to the mission of U S Cyber Command and the National Security Agency but I was also given the opportunity to think much more broadly And got involved in a lot of stuff that quite frankly you would not normally find somebody with my background doing Again I was very fortunate The third thing is because I do think that I work well with people and I've always been able to build strong teams And then finally in some ways the one that means the most to me When I got hired by General Pace and I got this opportunity to travel with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff I mean I'm sitting B% in him with Karzai with you know heads of state talking about some pretty dicey issues I'm just there as the note taker He chuckles But he took me everywhere he went And I said to him one day Sir you could have had anybody do this If you follow history I'm going to be if I'm lucky and I'm lucky enough to make flag officer Sir I'm going to be a two-star and then I'm going home You got guys who could be potential Chairmen in the future You've got guys B% that'd be combatant commanders in the future on this staff that you could have picked You could have taken anybody in DoD as the Chairman Why would you pick a guy like me And he said to me Because you will find Mike when you get more senior as you get more senior that which you value the most is people around you who are willing to speak the truth to you You will find this increasingly rare the more senior you get Mike I hired you because I believe that you will speak to the truth to me Hmm l b 3 NSA Rogers And because Mike you know that if you don't you won't be working for me I have never ever forgotten that And so one of the things that I pride myself on is I have always been honest and direct with my bosses with my subordinates with my teammates I always try to talk to them in a forthright manner I want them to do the same thing for me I've never hidden bad news I'm a big fan of Hey you deal with challenges head on That So that would be the fourth thing right B% say Hey I think that's one of the reasons why they decided to go with Rogers And I think Classified By b 3 NSA NSA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 200701 08 C Gla ify OR· 20401201 TOP SECRET Sl NO ORN TOP SECRET lal l JOF ORM you see that in the you know the challenges ofl b 1 ussc I that we just went through where I decided Hey look We're going to use this as a vehicle to drive change across the entire god damn department I am not going to play whack-a-mole with we'll just fix it and make it go away No way Let me ask a follow-up on this if I mayl b 3 NsAIYes on Sir General Davis Deputy Commander of Cyber Command asked me to do a narrative It was his word do a narrative on what happened in l b 1 ussc I He hit me with this late September right after we did that 8% hot wire 2-38 l b 3 NSA Rogers l b 3 NSA Right Over in the Director's large conference room And so I came up with that And so I spent a lot of time Sir digging through this And this could have played out differently Rogers l b 3 NSA 1-28 That whole thing could have played out It could have gone this way it could have gone that way It could have been a whole lot worse than it did How do you think that experience shaped you and shaped Fleet Cyber as well-and preparing both and the Navy for the future Rogers So specific to that set of experiences in July of 2013 through NSA reporting Fleet Cyber Command Let's see Personally-Mike Rogers'cause I remember this 8% And it was The first reporting was on I think Saturday the 22nd of July 2013 I'm in the office I always work on Sundays 'cause nobody's around I can get stuff done So I'm in the office on Sunday and I see 8% this first report And I'm going Okay guys We got a game changer here And what this reporting initially suggested was hey b 1 ussc b 1 ussc l b 3 NSA Mm hmm Rogers That led to a series of steps First it took us a while to identify exactly how bad the compromise was What was the extent of their presence on the network We took a couple of initial ste s within about 10 da s Those were based on an assessment that b 1 ussc b 1 ussc It turns out that they had Classified By b 3 NSA SA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 20070108 Cec la iJy OR' 20401201 TOP SECRET Sl NOj ORN TOP SECRET l SlhlNOFORN actually been able to move into a different section And we made one mistake We 1-28 l b 3 NSA 8% That the password reset That did it reset Rogers l b 3 NSA b 1 ussc Mm hmm Rogers l b 3 NSA One digit one misplaced error and you're totally off Based on that I then decided Okay we have to assume that we've got a fundamental compromise on the unclass ified section of the network And I don't just want to play clean-up on aisle nine I want to drive fundamental change So I said We're going to use a very operational approach to doing business I want a named operation I want this operation to have phases with an 8% objective OR objected time to each phase with a set of steps designed to generate these outcomes I want those outcomes expressed in operational terms that non-network non-SIGINT non-cyber people can understand And I want to use this to not only reassess that segment of the network but I wanted to look at the entire unclass ified infrastructure as well as the SECRET level networks Mm hmm Rogers l b 3 NSA So we then im lemented what we called b 1J ussc b 1 ussc which - -'- -'--'---' _ _ --'- a Of August yeah Rogers Of 2013 At the time I predicted it would take 90 to 120 days to complete the evolution l b 1 ussc 1 went back to the department as well as General Alexander and my Service and said I believe that we have bJ 1J ussc I b 1 ussc Classified By I b 3 NSA SA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 20070108 Cec la ify OR· 20401201 TOP SECRET Sl NOi ORN TOP aECRETJ all MOF'QgM And then the final part of the operation Again I was thinking longer term change I wanted to get into what could we do on the classified systems even though we had b 1 ussc But I still wanted I would tell you that l b 3 NSA Hmm Rogers I believe that's another reason why I'm going to this next job-because while we could have used it as Oh my God The sky is falling I told my team ''This is the Apollo 13 for us What does that mean You can either make it your worse day or it's going to be the best damned thing that we've ever been proud of And by God we're making it the best damned we've ever done Chuckling heard We came out of that operation with a network in better shape than we had ever had with a fundamental level of knowledge that increased to a level we had never seen with a sense of buy-in from the operational commanders across my Service with a buy-in across the department I mean I got Hey look we're going to use this as the basis for changes we want to make to JIE to how we're going to build the structure I partnered with many other people-it wasn't just us U S Cyber Command l b 1 ussc j b 1 ussc lmy fellow Services 8% say 'L_o_o k- Iw_a_n t to_d_ r iv_e_ __ change across the whole department So what do we got to do differently Hey U S Cyber Command what does it really mean to be a subunified o erational commander in this environment l b 1 ussc b 1 ussc And how do you make sure that the benefit of that gets out to operational commanders b 1 ussc b 1 ussc I l b 3 NSA Mm hmm Rogers l b 3 NSA I got my intel teammates We love to monitor We want it to flow The operational side of me is going Damn it I want to stop it at the Tier 1 boundary I don't want to have to deal with it at the Tier 3 and Tier 2 boundaries that I'm responsible for Mm hmm Rogers So I thought And in the course of this I had to go to the White House multiple times I had to brief six different committees on the Hill multiple Classified By b 3 NSA SA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 20070108 DeGla ify OR 20401201 TOP SECRET' Sl 11 10i 'ORM TOP SECRETt Slt MOfOR l times Chuckling heard I'm dealing with the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman 1G U S Cyber Command and NSA teammates the OSD CIO my own Service CIO my Service Secretary never met Secretary Mavis before I got to meet him because of this You know I've always worked closely with the CNO 'cause he's my other boss aside from General Alexander But I thought it came across to the department in many ways-not Don't take for one minute that I thought it was perfect But it came across I thought to others as Hey look This is how you got to deal with things in the cyber network of the 21st century l b 3 NSA Bo o Right Rogers l b 3 NSA Bo o That Hey look This is going to become much more This was one of the points I was trying to make Hey guys welcome to the new future This is the norm This is how we fight Okay This is how we maneuver This is what you got to do So there is no doubt-that experience is really really shapes what I will bring to the table good and bad with U S Cyber Command and NSA about Hey here's sic some things I want to try to do a little differently Did you think it changed views l b 1 ussc land as you said the new normal down in the senior levels of the Pentagon even the White House Rogers l b 3 NSA I thought it did because to them it made it very real I mean example As this is going on So we first see this at the end of Jul Our first ste s in August don't work as I had hoped b 1 ussc b 1 ussc b 1l ussc But I still remember I'm over at the White House with Lisa Monaco who's the Presidential Assistant for Homeland Security now- John Brennan's old job Mm hmm Rogers And it's the first It's the end of August Broader context The President has come out and said He look we ot a situation b 1 ussc b 1 l ussc nd I'm there telling him b 1 ussc ' - ------- - ---- -- - - - ' --' Classified By b 3 NSA NSA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 20070108 C11Glassity OR' 20401201 TOP SECRET Sll NOJOORN b 1 ussc ussc And I'm at the White House tellin them So ou mean Admiral b 1 ussc b 1 ussc Yes ma'am that's what you need to tell the President ' Laughter heard bJ 1J Do you think that was a factor in Sir do you think that was a factor in ussc b 3 NSA r 1 b 1 Rogers No I don't think so because my comment to her was But the flip side is let's remember what we're talking about We're talking about our CON US unclassified segment Yeah b 3 NSA Rogers I'm telling you as a service I can fight If I have to I can lose this and keep fighting It's going to be painful but I can do it Right right l b 3 NSA Rogers So I don't think it led them to Bo o believe But it certainly made them stop and think for a minute Ah ooh Absolutely mm hmm yeah Yeah and they don't have your level of proficiency on these matters b 3 NSA Rogers Bo o Something like Eeee He chuckles Bo o And so b 3 NSA Rogers And we put some additional things l bJ 1J ussc ussc I b 1 ussc I Because again if were that would be the orQanization on the Navv side that would be l b 1 ussc b 1 ussc I b 1 Mm hmm b 3 NSA Rogers So I put some extra things in place over there to make sure hey b 1 ussc Classified By b 3 NSA b 1 ussc NSA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 20070108 Dsi la ify OR· 20401201 TOP SECRET 11 Sl 111 10f0Rl I I TOP SECRET Sl l fl lOFORfl l They never did but I put some extra things in place to make sure Chuckling heard So Sir if I may l b 3 NSA Rogers Sure Take you back to 2011 as you arrived here Just to ask what your initial impressions were where the command was and what you saw where you saw it going 1 G l b 3 NSA Rogers The command was In September 11 we were just under two years old The command was stood up in January of 2010 So it's still new in the big scheme of things To be brutally honest I saw a command that-from my perspective-was overly focused on what had been and was not focused enough on what should be What do I mean by that To create this command we had blown up a couple other so to speak We had stood down and literally picked apart a couple of other organizations Shifted their resources around and created this So much of this workforce had been working in different organizations-doing much the same thing but workin in different organizations Some of them had been down in b 1 ussc vice up here---i b 1 ussc I And I saw a workforce that I thought was just way focused on Oh my God We've made all these changes It's terrible And I'm thinking Hey we're way passed that decision point What are we doing to optimize mission outcomes here guys This is all about delivering effects and meeting our mission That's what I care about number one Number two I thought I was joining an organization that had great that had strong technical expertise but didn't have an operational mindset What do I mean by that I kept telling them You haven't really thought through what it means to be a warfighter in the network age in the 21st century What are the implications for how we're going to organize What are the implications for what we value How do we prioritize How do we structure ourselves Where should we be investing finite resources people money expertise We've got to create a warfighting organization here And we can't be a self-licking ice cream cone It's not enough that we think we're doing a good job Chuckling heard The measure of Classified By b 3 NSA SA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 200701 08 Oe la ify OR· 20401201 TOP SECRET Sl l IOi 'ORl I success to me ain't us I could care less what we think What I care about is sic the traditional kinetic-based operational commanders that we support and who at times support us That's who I care about General Alexander is our U S Cyber Command and NSA boss That's the metric I care about What do they assess our proficiency How do they assess what we're doing Are we ever able to generate value Are we able to get the mission outcomes I don't care what we think Again it was a ve different mindset And I will say it was tough on the organization for b 1 ussc He chuckles Early on as we're going through this I sat down with the Chief of Staff and said Okay I normally pride myself on being a very collegial very team-oriented very personable individual We're l b 1 ussc Iright now and it ain't time to be Mr Nice Guy Chuckling heard I need to kick some ass now and I'm going to be a very different leader than they have seen Some will respond well to this Some won't But I need to get their heads on straight And so I changed my approach was I choose I chose to take some of public forms as vehicles to drive change to say 'This is unacceptable to ensure that everyone understood I was going to hold subordinate commanders accountable to a higher level of performance a higher level of knowledge than they were used to For some that was a little unsettling But I said Hey look This lt remind l love Again I love history If you go back to the Second World War in the Pacific post-Pearl Harbor environment First campaign really for the United States Navy is in the southern Pacific Solomon Islands You go back and you look at that campaign-in some ways much of like we're doing here Radar is integrated afloat and used on platforms and tactical combat situations really for the first time for us as a Service You get people who don't understand how to who know technology but don't understand how to apply a technology You get people who aren't You're in a world war You're in a combat scenario What worked for us in the peace time Navy ain't going to work out here So you look at like Admiral Bo o Goreley sic was Commander Southwest Pacific Operation 2-3G TR NOTE Admiral Rogers is probably referring to Admiral Robert Ghormley He got relieved by Nimitz And they put a guy named Halsey in because Nimitz felt not that Goreley's Ghormley's not a good guy but we got to drive change here And I can't afford to spend a year getting people up to speed you know I need to drive change So he put a guy in like Halsey who was known as a nail-biting Hey it's about us versus the other guy And that other freaking guy's going to lose not us What don't you understand So that was a big cultural change for us but I thought it worked out in the end Classified By b 3 NSA SA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 20070108 CeGlaeaif · OR· 20401 201 TOP SECRET SIUNOl OR I TOP ECRET l NO ORN He chuckles Mm hmm hmm l b 3 NSA We have seven minutes left Sir And I have a couple more questions l b 3 NSA 8% Okay Rogers 8% Digging a little deeper l b 3 NSA And if you guys need to do more I can 1'11 go get something else Rogers 2-3G l b 3 NSA 'Cause I probably talked longer than you wanted So 8% I'll 1-28 Rogers I l b 3 NSA 8% Okay l b 3 NSA This is great Sir l b 3 NSA 8% Yeah this is good 8% We're good 1-28 I l b 3 NSA Yeah this is really good And I should also note for the record that Iwanted to be here He's done this in the past but was not available l b 3J NSA Rogers 3-48 Sir so a little bit deeper into the mission set Has the Central Operational Authority for the Navy for networks and cyber and 10 and across the mission sets how have you shaped that-which as you noted when you arrived you know there was this organization It was still fairly new To take it across the mission sets into the future l b 3 NSA Rogers 2-38 So what the question really goes to is my predecessor had worked out a series of Memorandum sic of Agreements sic written Memorandums sic of Agreements sic where this organization was designated as the Central Operating Authority for five or six different lines of operation-which you just heard in the question Big cultural change for us as a Service Classified By b 3 NSA SA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 200701 08 CeGla ity OR 20401201 TOP SECRET Sl NOl ORM I'd been in command two weeks And we had a frigate out in the Atlantic and which I'm watching on the network side I'm watching this ship go out to a lot of IP addresses that they shouldn't have been going out to One At leastJ b 1 ussc And I'm going What in the hell is going on And so I said Okay we got a Memorandum of Agreement that sa s as the Network 0 eratin Authori for the United States Nav b 1 ussc b 1 ussc b 1 ussc J b 3 NSA Was this 8% the Sullivan Sir X8 Rogers J b 3 NSA No this was What was the frigate God dang it Out of 8% Maine Port I apologize I should remember this but I'm I'll find it Rogers I'm blanking out of the frigate's name Yeah yeah I'll find it l b 3 NSA Rogers I called down to U S Fleets sic Fleet Forces Command-the fourstar in the Navy that owns that ship and said Hey this is what I'm going to do And they said Okay The commander was not there I talked to the deputy Said ''This is what I'm doing So we do it The four-star commander comes back he chuckles and calls me the next day Hey I'm not so keen about you deciding whether my ship should be taken on or off the GIG And I said Well Sir you've I got an MOA with your signature on there that says that's our operational concept and that's what we need to do Sir Here's why Well Mike I'd like you to look at changing that And I thought to myself well this is one of those opportunities you either going to be in command for a relatively short period of time chuckling heard I'd literally been in command two weeks And I said Well Sir I respectively don't agree I believe that what we need to do is continue with the Memorandum of Agreement I think this is a text book case of why you need that kind of unilateral authority And it's my intent to continue this And I'm waiting There's a pause He's clearly unhappy Okay I'll think about it and he never called me He then like two days later said okay He sends me a note that says Okay Classified By b 3 NSA SA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 20070108 tle1 la1U1ify OR· 20401301 TOP SECRETl Sl NOi ORN TOP ECRET 11 t JOFORt J Has he since retired j b 3 NSA Rogers Yeah Admiral John Harvey who was a Again it wasn't because Admiral Harvey was a bad guy B% Right but j b 3 NSA Rogers But it's just an example of So what does it really It's one thing to say all this stuff but what does it really mean I was a big fan We're going to show people what it really means 2G Chuckling heard Now having said that I think we've done a really good job in the cyber and the network world where we have not done the job that I wish we had-and one of the things I'll talk to my relief about is-In the electronic warfare area and the space mission sets for the Navy We still have not driven that same level of change across the Navy And I'm going to suggest to her That's an area you need to focus on For a variety of reasons-probably 'cause the network had was the biggest challenge at the time-I opted to focus much of my time on the network piece Hmm 1G j b 3 NSA Rogers B% But For the record Sir your relief is Admiral Tighe l b 3 NSA Rogers Admiral Jan Tighe right B% Right j b 3 NSA Rogers Who has been confirmed by the Senate for duty as Vice Admiral and Commander Fleet Cyber Command and Commander TENTH Fleet And now she's just waiting for this Rogers guy to get the hell out of the way Is she measuring the drapes Is she Chuckling heard l b 3 NSA Rogers No she's much more professional than that More chuckling heard But she's the Deputy now Yes j b 3 NSA Rogers So she has been here as my Deputy for five months So she's done great What else Classified By b 3l NSA SA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 20070108 Cei la ify OR 20401201 TOP SECRET Sl NOl ORN l b 3 NSA And l lf I can Rogers l b 3 NSA Sure come on Drill a little deeper into the l've heard you talk before about NCWDG pronounced as nic-widge -Navy Cyber Warfare Development Group as a the unique research and development arm for this command And if you could just make a few comments about how that's aided you or your vision in implementing change here Rogers 1-2G When we created this Fleet Cyber Command and TENTH Fleet construct in the Navy one of the things I liked about it was we came to the conclusion that to be successful in cyber the network the spectrum EW space electronic warfare information operations SIGINT we needed to build a construct that followed very traditional Navy war fighting lines that the rest of the Service could relate to So we fight in the maritime environment through these things we call fleets and task forces So we created in this organization a fleet with subordinate task forces I was very adamant I want the same structure the rest of the Navy uses want people to be able to understand this and relate to it in a way that they're comfortable with The one area So every other numbered fleet in the United States Navyand there are five others-is defined by its geography We are unique in that we are defined by our mission set Our geography is global and we're defined by our mission set The other thing that makes us unique is given the dynamic nature particularly of the cyber and SIGINT mission sets the decision was made-which I really like-to provide us with an organic R D capability a skunk works if you will Again no other numbered fleet in the Navy has that kind of thing But for us the Navy Cyber Warfare Development Grou or NCWDG-currently down in l b 1Jussc also known asl b 1 ussc for us-was an R D capability assigned Bo o to OPCON to us that enables us to harness their engineering expertise and their knowledge of networks and signals that go after particular problem sets-whether it's developing tool capabilities on the cyber side whether it's doin some bein able to work some signal sets in b 1 ussc mission set That's worked out great for us I l b 3 NSA 1-2G Are they working j b 1 ussc Rogers ISir Yeah Classified By b 3 NSA SA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 20070108 De la ify OR 10401101 TOP SECRET Sl 11NOl ORM TOP l b 3 NSA SECRET £11 JOFORN B% Yeah Rogers Although they're not the lead forl b 1 ussc Ibeing a project that we're going to do in the summer of 2014 in which we Fleet Cyber Command with teaming with some others We are oin to throu h the UNCLASS network demonstrate our abili to b 1 ussc b 1 ussc '--- l b 3 NSA Mm hmm Rogers l b 3 NSA b 1 ussc You're going to ruin some poor captain's day Rogers It's alright Somebody's going be unhappy when we say chuckling heard But again one of the things I always tell the CNO is Sir as much as I love the United States Navy and I've dedicated my entire adult life to it-as have many-we're a bureaucracy And you want to drive change in a bureaucracy You got to drive it from the top down And then number two you got to cause pain Sir I want to go tol b 1 ussc because I want to cause pain Chuckling heard Just like we've used cyber inspections as a vehicle to cause pain to drive changes in behavior-which has worked out well for us l b 3 NSA On that b 3 NSA last question that I leveraged here is fitting for A nd b- -3 -N-sA--- --m ight have something l b 3 NSA B% Go ahead l b 3 NSA Along the lines of what do you see the future for Fleet Cyber Command with the developments in IT and networking policy Rogers I think we got a fundamentally sound vision for the future I think the basic is organizational construct as highlighted l b 1 ussc fundamentally sound But I think we need a B% new working on You know if I was the next commander the argument I would make is you got to build on what we've done on the cyber and the network world You got to overlay the cyber mission force capabilities that we're bringing online because that's you know one of my other big things 2-3G during this l Classified By b 3 NSA NSA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 20070108 Cei lassif y OR· 20401201 TOP SECRET SIHNOfORN TOP ECRET ll'llliJOFOR lil two and a half years was doing the initial conceptual work partnering with U S Cyber Command and others about so how do you build a cyber mission force How should it be constructed What are the skills that you need How should you organize them Hey what should the Navy do versus what should the Army or the Air Force do So we've come up with Collectively between us we've come up with a plan that tasks the Nav to do you know a series of thin s There's a b 1 ussc ussc I'm not going to spend a lot of time on this one Laughter heard But that's our share We're going to do this between 13 and 16 The next commander's got to build on that The next commander's also got to figure out how do you make the JFHQ Cyber a true war fighting organization and how do you put the J in JFHQ b 1J And then I think how do you oper The same way we've managed to operationalize the cyber and the network piece in our Service what do we got to do to drive that same kind of change particularly in space and EW And how do we maximize the synergies between the spectrum and the network world Because they are converging Hand held digital mobiles being the at the forefront of this Where we're using the spectrum to access networks down to the individual user level literally wherever we are in the world As a SIGINT officer I lick my lips at that because I'm going Hey I love going against RF-based challenge sets Mm hmm l b 3 NSA Rogers That's opportunity But B% so much of that Sir did you have anything I have one last thing I want to ask you l b 3 NSA Rogers Sure As becoming Director of the National Security Agency what's your major concern l b 3 NSA Rogers I have not conscious Again 'cause I'm not confirmed yet I am not I haven't sat down and put a single pen to paper yet 'cause I told myself Hey I got to hold off until I'm confirmed But in general when I did my Classified By b 3 NSA SA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 20070108 l ei la iJy OR· 20401201 TOP SECRET Sl lllOliORN TOP aECRET'JaWNOFORN interview with the President in I guess I did that in January Yeah in January of '14 'Cause I was You know I interviewed with the Chairman and the Secretary And when I interviewed with Secretary of Defense Hagel he said Okay the President has indicated once they make the decision as to whether U S Cyber Command and NSA should be together should be separated Once they make that decision the President has decided he wants to interview And in December the decision was made they're going to keep the organizations togetherwhich I think was the right thing to do When I got asked I said Hey look Here's why I think that's the right answer Now I would argue that's not necessarily the long-term answer Mm hmm l b 3 NSA Rogers Mm hmm l b 3 NSA Rogers We need a partnership here But when I think about the NSA side of the house I'm struck by several things Number one the morale of the workforce NSA has now experiencing what our CIA teammates have had to live with their entire career It's very public Mm hmm l b 3 NSA Rogers l b 3 NSA My view is you want each organization particularly U S Cyber Command to generate enough capability and enough capacity where they don't have to be you know one organization that over time might One of my goals I hope as U S Cyber Command is to generate enough capacity so that you know if queried by the Secretary or the President I can say Well now you got enough capacity where you could actually make it work if you separated them I believe that where we are right now Sir we don't have enough capacity to separate these still You've got to keep them together NSA is so foundational to U S Cyber Command I mean the reali is NSA can do its mission without U S C ber Command and it'll do fine b 1 ussc Often viewed in a very critical light by many of the citizens of the nation as well as many other foreign citizens and foreign governments CIA has gotten used to that environment And their view is Hey you're a professional You do what You comply with all regulation and policy Keep your head down and you keep working And you don't worry about that kind of stuff NSA The workforce at NSA never had to deal with this before They've always been somewhat anonymous Mm hmm Classified By b 3 NSA NSA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 20070108 CeGlassify OR 20401201 TOP SECREWSl 11NOFORN TQP Rogers EC ET l l f JQFQ N The mission not well understood by others outside of the profession The flip side is the organization finds itself in a situation now where many-I won't say all-but many individuals to include average citizens are asking What are they doing Why are they doing it And boy I'm uncomfortable You see that in foreign many foreign citizens right now Now that's not to imply by any stretch B% of the imagination that everybody out there thinks that Oh my God NSA is some rogue organization that's you know acting unilaterally and without any care or thought to protect the rights and the privacy of our citizens But as my father always used to tell me when I was growing up Michael focus on the way life is vice the way you wish it were Because if you focus on the way you wish it were you're going to waste a lot of your time and energy Chuckling heard And I have always been a big fan of Hey Again it goes back to that truth to power question Recognize the way things are Be forthright and open about it And deal with it So I go into this job thinking to myself ''I'm not going to waste my time debating well is it fair Is it true Is it accurate Is it right that citizens are questioning NSA My attitude is I'm not wasting one second of time debating that I'm dealing with what is And what is is for a variety reasons many of our citizens now question the role of the National Security Agency So my view is we got to deal with that My first challenge is the workforce I believe because my concern is So a workforce that's not used to this a workforce that in many instances is composed of individuals who highly technically proficient incredibly gifted in what they do But in terms of ability to express it to people who don't necessarily deal with this all the time The ability to interface with people who don't have a clue about what we do it's that's a challenge for many people It's a challenge for intelligence professionals As I said in my confirmation hearing Look I've spent You know I've been a cryptologist for 27 years now And I spent my entire life in an SCI environment thinking 'Okay don't compromise this Don't talk about that ' Hey that ain't going to cut it as the Director in the 21st century I don't believe The second challenge that concerns me is our relationships with industry and civilian and commercial partners In the cyber and SIGINT world of today and tomorrow you we cannot operate in isolation thinking NSA or U S Cyber Command's going to solve all the problems by itself That is never going to happen We have got to partner with others And one of the implications of the Snowden revelations to me is now you got a lot of companies that are starting to say Yeah I just can't take public knowledge of my connection with you Even organizations that we have been working with for some measures of years you now have their CE Os Classified By b 3 NSA NSA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 20070108 DeGla ify OR 20401201 TOP SECRET Sl NOl'ORN T012 SECRET l Sl t JOFORt J very publicly speaking about Hey we can't do this You're compromising our business position I'm not going to get in a public discussion about well fill in the blank You know what we've been doing together for the last few years-which I thought was to the benefit of both of us Mm hmm l b 3 NSA Rogers I'm not going to get into a public outing But if that expertise says I just can't work with you guys anymore that has negative implications for the nation It has negative implications for NSA's ability to do its mission We have got to try to reverse that The third concern I have is I don't want to lose our foreign partners in all this Some of been more vocal than others But again we have got to make sure that on the NSA side as on U S Cyber Command we have strong partnerships with our foreign counterparts Now some of those partnerships like in the FIVE EYES arena are at one level versus pick I where we have a very another nation l b 1l ussc different relation Not a bad relationship but it ain't at the FIVE EYES level l b 3 NSA Mm hmm Rogers l b 3 NSA I'm not arguing that that model should be everybody should be in the FIVE EYES club I reject that premise But on the other hand we have got to be able to have partnerships with a broad range of foreign entities out there And the Snowden revelation at the political level has got some of our forei n intelligence counterparts bJ 1 ussc I bJ 1 ussc oing Well I don't have a problem with you guys But my government's really a little dicey right now about what the hell it is that you guys do And so we've been told we got to back off a little bit Mm hmm Rogers b 1 ussc b 1l ussc And so I spent some time even though 'm not confirmed yet But I went down and talked to them anyways as in my current duties And in the course of the discussions I'm listenin to them bJ 1l ussc b 1 ussc Classified By b 3 NSA NSA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 20070108 Cec la ify OR· 20401201 TOP SECRET Sl' MOi ORN I' ' ' b 1 ussc And then finally we have got to make sure that we don't lose the political support of the Administration and the oversight mechanisms on the Hill Because if we lose those guys now we're fighting with both hands tied behind our back 2-3G we got a nation that doesn't believe in us Again I'm not trying to argue that everybody But the reality is there's a large segment of our population that just-based on what they've heard-has come to the conclusion that they are nervous about what the National Security Agency is doing If you combine that with we lose the Administration or we lose the Hill Mm hmm l b 3 NSA Rogers B% Then man we got real problems Now we're really in a situation where potentially our ability to execute our mission starts to be significantly degraded Yes l b 3 NSA Rogers That's a bad thing for the nation I would argue most importantly But it's also a bad thing for NSA Yeah l b 3 NSA Rogers Anything else for me No that's great Sir l b 3 NSA Rogers Oh And then lastly on the NSA side ln the midst of all that we got to be asking ourselves So what investments what changes do we make now So that the guy the men and women who are doing this mission set five ten years from now they're positioned for success One of the things I love about what General Alexander did You go back to when he first assumed the duties back in 2005 as the Director of NSA he stepped back And came to the conclusion that the fundamental vision that he inherited was not the right one He came to the conclusion we got to change what we're focused on We've got to make some fundamental investments in things like And these aren't in any priority order We got to change what we're doing in terms of computing and analysis We got to change what we're doing in terms of our ability to access and push information across this enterprise And the ability to make information Classified By b 3 NSA NSA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 20070108 Ce10la if y OR 20401201 TOP SECRET' Sl NOFORN TOP SECRET Sll'NOFORN available from the SIGINT enterprise to non-SIGINT people-whether they be forward commanders in the battlefield l b 1l ussc l b 1 ussc We need to invest in the computing and analytic and mathematical foundations that are going to help us out as we're dealing with the cryptographic and encryption challenges that are going to be coming down the pike Not now but five ten years from now they're going to be here for us I I He really We've got to do infrastructure In his time in the job we have totally rebuilt the power infrastructure here at Fort Meade Mm hmm l b 3 NSA Rogers We have fundamentally rebuilt the infrastructure 8% to every one of the major sites outside of the Fort Meade campus We have fundamentally built a data network and a storage and defensive strategy that enables us to operate like a global enterprise and to access rapidly amounts of data volume-wise that were unimaginable you know five years ago And that all happened because of a director and a broader team that I think consciously sat down and said Okay what do we got to be doing now that's going to pay off for us five ten years from now I don't think General Alexander realized five ten years from then he was would still be the Director Laughter heard So I need to be thinking about what are the things need to do now that are going to pay off five ten years And then the last thing that I'm interested in is what do we need to do today right now that prepares us for the challenges in the next 12 to 24 months And I believe those challenges include We will see disruptive offensive actions taken against infrastructure in the United States in the next 18 the next 12 to 24 months It's going to happen 8% Okay l b 3 NSA Rogers l b 3 NSA So are we ready-whether you're U S Cyber Command whether you're NSA The future to me is much more about integration then creating cylinders of excellence I see tons of cylinders of excellence at NSA and I'm very grateful for that But to really get it to the next level to me it's about integration So those are the kinds of things that I'm thinking about as I get ready now Just a couple Rogers Yeah Classified By b 3 NSA NSA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 20070108 Cec la ify OR 20401201 TOP ECRET 11 1 iJO ORl iJ Or three things he's going to be worried about j b 3 NSA l b 3 NSA A couple ah huh l b 3 NSA For the next couple of years Laughter heard And remember in that's in the end it's all about the workforce Our advantage is the workforce Rogers Yeah l b 3 NSA It ain't the network It's not the analytics It's not the tools Not that those aren't important But our edge is our people And that goes back to my very first concern I don't want to lose the workforce 8% you know OR no Rogers Well Admiral l b 3 NSA Okay Rogers l b 3 NSA Thank you very much l b 3 NSA 8% Yeah l b 3 NSA Appreciate it Oh 4-58 Rogers Thank you very much Sir l bH3 NSA I l b 3 NSA Rogers Yeah thank you Did you guys get what you were looking for TR NOTE Audio ends at this point II IIIIIIIIIIllll IIlllllI IIIllllllllllE nd of transcript II IIII fllllI IllllllllllllllfllIIllll Classified By b 3 NSA SA Center for Cryptologic History Oral History ProgramOH-2014-21-ROGERS Derived From NSA CSSM 1-52 Dated 20070108 Cei la ify OR 20401201 TOP SECRETl Sl NO ORM