Preparing for the Cyber Battleground of the Future 2nd Lt Chris Babcock USAF Disclaimer The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense Air Force Air Education and Training Command Air University or other agencies or departments of the US government This article may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission If it is reproduced the Air and Space Power Journal requests a courtesy line F or space and cyber Airmen tomorrow’s fight will be determined largely by the concept of cyberspace dependency That term as defined by the author is the degree to which a military capability relies on supremacy over a portion of the cyberspace domain in order to cause or carry out its effects 1 Cyber dependency is rapidly growing due to the cyberspace domain’s exponential nature the trajectory of market forces in the civilian world and the strategic integration by the military of computer technology in the land maritime and air domains 2 Unlike employment in the three traditional war-fighting domains the present employment of capabilities in the space domain cannot be achieved without cyberspace 3 The recognition of this unique relationship between space and cyberspace has profound implications for recruitment initial intermediate and advanced training and development in the space and cyber career fields A transition from the current force-development system towards one that acknowledges the unique relationship between space and cyberspace will have the additional benefit of informing the greater operational community as war fighters in the land maritime and air domains continue to become increasingly dependent upon cyberspace and space This article discusses the implications of cyber dependency and proposes six recommendations to ensure that from recruitment to advanced training space and cyber Airmen are prepared to excel in their interconnected domains Space Cyber Dependency The relationship between space and cyberspace is unique in that virtually all space operations depend on cyberspace and a critical portion of cyberspace can only be provided via space operations —Joint Publication 3-12 R Cyberspace Operations 5 February 2013 All space operations currently performed by the US military are cyberspace dependent fig 1 4 Space operations take place in the physical space domain not November–December 2015 61 Babcock within cyberspace But because those who perform space operations are not physically present in space they must rely entirely on control of their segment of cyberspace to transmit their commands to space vehicles in order to carry out space operations 5 SPACE OPERATIONS - Satellite Operations SO Offensive Space Control OSC Defensive Space Control DSC CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS - Department of Defense Information Network Operations DODIN OPS Offensive Cyberspace Operations OCO Defensive Cyberspace Operations DCO SPACE OPERATIONS - SO OSC DSC - Planning - Commanding - Analysis Figure 1 Space and cyberspace operations Due to physical limitations space operations take place on both sides of the cyberspace domain If a military space operation were to involve a pilot physically residing in a space vehicle reacting to the environment in order to carry out effects in space this would describe a space operation that is not reliant entirely on cyberspace supremacy 6 In the absence of that scenario space operators must use specialized computers and computer programs to transmit information to and from their space vehicles— which are themselves complex information systems—over a computer network 7 Space’s cyber dependency demands that special attention be paid to the cyber defense of space capabilities but it also foreshadows the future state of the traditional war-fighting domains The physical network layer of cyberspace includes the information systems with which space operators command their satellites the circuits connecting those information systems to the ground equipment and the ground equipment itself The logical network layer of cyberspace is embedded in each piece of the physical network The cyber-persona layer describes the space operators who rely on the physical and logical network layers to perform space operations fig 2 62 Air Space Power Journal Preparing for the Cyber Battleground of the Future CYBER-PERSONA LAYER PHYSICAL LAYER LOGICAL LAYER Figure 2 Cyber layers in space operations The Exponential Domain But if you think you’re safe in cyber when you wake up tomorrow everything is different —Gen John E Hyten Commander Air Force Space Command Ever since Intel cofounder Mr Gordon Moore observed in 1965 that the capability of computer circuitry grows exponentially over time it has been widely understood that innovation in computer technology expands at a rate unmatched in human history 8 Innovation begets innovation and the changing nature of information technology poses unique challenges for military operators in the cyberspace domain compared to those of the first four war-fighting domains 9 First among those challenges is that the private sector has now begun to advance far more rapidly than the defense industry in several areas of technological innovation 10 This can mostly be attributed to the molasses-like procurement and configuration management processes in the Department of Defense’s large technological programs relative to the nimbleness of a Silicon Valley start-up company 11 A second serious challenge is that the asymmetry of cyberspace allows attackers to more quickly and more easily utilize rapid changes to their advantage than can defenders 12 At a fundamental level cyber defenders attempt to ensure that soft- November–December 2015 63 Babcock ware and hardware work the way they are supposed to while cyber attackers attempt to break software or hardware to cause harmful effects 13 In this matchup the aggressor will almost always have the advantage Additionally the exponential nature of cyberspace causes institutional knowledge and individual skill sets to atrophy far more quickly than they do in the traditional war-fighting domains This poses especially interesting challenges for the training and education of cyberspace operators For all of its difficulties the US Air Force has a well-established grasp on the current cyberspace battleground Yet it must fully account for the nature of cyber dependency and the implications it holds for the expanding cyber battleground of the future Self-Induced Dependency The F-35 Lightning II is one of the most complicated weapons systems ever developed a sleek and stealthy fighter jet years in the making that is often called a flying computer because of its more than 8 million lines of code —Christian Davenport Washington Post While the space domain is the first to be wholly dependent upon cyber it will not remain the only one In the air domain remotely piloted aircraft are an excellent example of a weapon system that is wholly cyber dependent 14 Even the newest manned fighter aircraft the F-35 has been described as a flying computer furthermore while the Army develops personal drones smart exoskeletons and computerized rifles the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is developing packmule robots and the Navy is creating its own autonomous drones including both submarines and aircraft 15 While those efforts will certainly enhance war-fighting capabilities increased cyber dependency also comes at a cost The cost may be paid in increased risk to the missions that these technologies support or in deliberate security and active defense of the newly dependent systems 16 In each example the inherent risks introduced by cyber dependency are monumental In the civilian world hackers have already been able to take control of vehicles most notably gaining full remote control of the latest Jeep models smart guns and hobby drones They have even infiltrated the internal networks of commercial aircraft 17 For the cyber squadron of the future security and defense of local weapon systems—from land and air to space— must be a priority fig 3 64 Air Space Power Journal Preparing for the Cyber Battleground of the Future COMM SQUADRON CYBER SQUADRON - Base Network Operations and Maintenance - - Legacy Base Communications - Postal - Telephone DODIN Operations - Enterprise Network Operations Support - Enterprise Network Touch Maintenance - Local Battlespace Cyber Operations - Mission Network Operations - Mission Network Defensive Cyber Operations - Limited Mission Network Operations - Airfield - Ground Radio Joint Information Environment JIE Mission Cyber Dependency Evolving Threats Figure 3 From communications to cyber Based in part on briefing Lt Col David Canady subject Cyber Squadron of the Future Headquarters US Air Force A6CF May 2014 http www safcioa6 af mil shared media document AFD-140512-040 pdf One particularly thorny challenge for those cyber operators will be the requirement to perform cyber operations on the live network of a weapon system but this challenge can and must be overcome 18 Choosing not to secure and defend is the riskiest choice of all In cyberspace the longer any vulnerability exists in an unmitigated form the greater the odds that it will be weaponized and exploited by an adversary By some measures the process from discovery to weaponization and attack takes hackers little more than one week to complete 19 Cybersecurity concerns have not yet stopped the Department of Defense from procuring weapons that are increasingly cyber dependent In the civilian world regular consumers also seem to not yet be dissuaded by security concerns Market-Driven Cyber Dependency These characteristics and conditions present a paradox within cyberspace the prosperity and security of our nation have been significantly enhanced by our use of cyberspace yet these same developments have led to increased vulnerabilities and a critical dependence on cyberspace for the US in general and the joint force in particular —Joint Publication 3-12 R Cyberspace Operations 5 February 2013 November–December 2015 65 Babcock Market forces in the civilian world are rapidly driving many categories of consumer products towards the “Internet of Things” IoT By 2020 it is estimated that there will be between 50 and 100 billion devices that are networked to each other across the world creating an IoT 20 From refrigerators to coffeepots and thermostats the commercial marketplace is growing increasingly flooded with Internet-aware devices of all types 21 Arguably the preponderance of devices in the marketplace in the near future will be Internet-aware making it difficult for a discerning consumer such as the Department of Defense to find noncomputerized alternatives 22 This will leave the military with difficult choices to make regarding the trade-off between accepting risk or accepting the costs associated with cybersecurity and defense of these newly networked refrigerators and coffeepots If we accept that in the future a much higher percentage of devices infrastructure and systems will have computer networking capabilities that are either a permanent part of military installations such as supervisory control and data acquisition SCADA or will regularly enter military installations such as smart watches and self-driving cars then those devices will become a de facto part of the cyber battlespace It is the cyber squadron of the future that should be relied upon to secure and defend those devices Efficiencies provided by organizational and structural changes such as the move to the joint information environment as well as new technologies such as software-defined networking may free up many of the resources required to allow the cyber squadron of the future to secure and defend the expanded cyber terrain however additional investment and reforms will also be needed to sustain these new requirements 23 Winning Tomorrow’s Fight Given the speedy movement towards greater cyber dependency throughout the military it is critical that Air Force Space Command examine and consider the following recommendations for the cyber and space force-development systems 24 Leverage Big Data for Decision Making Air Force Space Command should develop three standard tests and should implement them throughout the force-development process to assess both space and cyber Airmen The first test should be for cyber proficiency and propensity only This test would measure a recruit’s or trainee’s potential to comprehend cyber concepts and acquire cyber skills regardless of formal cyber training 25 The second and third tests would be knowledge based—one for knowledge applicable to cyberspace operations and the other applicable to space Initially it may be impossible to determine exactly what cyber proficiency looks like This is acceptable and should not dissuade the command from undertaking this effort As scores for all three tests are compiled they must be associated with members and tracked alongside other metrics to determine how scores appear to correlate to a given individual’s success mediocrity or failure The process of data compilation and analysis should continually in66 Air Space Power Journal Preparing for the Cyber Battleground of the Future form a cyclical reevaluation of the tests to ensure that they adequately assess ability and knowledge Pertinent data points that should be associated with test scores fall into three major categories education training and experience By combining proficiency and knowledge test scores with data points from these three categories Air Force Space Command will gain powerful insight into how to prioritize education training and experience when it makes force-development decisions By strategically retesting Airmen the command can gain insight into how specific training events or educational milestones affect or do not affect scores 26 Mission-Specific Cyber Training Air Force Space Command is close to having implemented the optimal framework for an initial intermediate and advanced training system for cyberspace operations The current focus on mission-specific intermediate training as opposed to general intermediate training and on-the-job training is a great leap in the right direction 27 Increased cyber dependencies will create the need for many additional mission-specific training courses such as SCADA and IoT defensive operations as well as intermediate cyber defensive training that is specific to various Air Force land space and air mission systems For enlisted Airmen the 1B initial training course should be split between a combined 3D and 1B initial training course and intermediate training courses that are specific to the mission requirements that 1B and 3D Airmen will encounter The 3D career fields should not be left out of the operationalization of the communications career fields because they play important roles in the security and defense of the cyber battleground and will continue to do so Efforts to divide training requirements between the 3D and 1B career fields should follow the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education Framework 28 While training for enlisted 3D and 1B Airmen will diverge fairly quickly after the basics there must be a set of core “operational cyber” fundamentals shared by the two career tracks 29 Specialized Training for Cyber-Dependent Operators For those noncyber officers whose mission sets have high levels of cyber dependency such as space operations personnel and remotely piloted aircraft pilots opportunities should be made available for them to attend the intermediate and advanced cyber training that is applicable to their mission Program acceptance for noncyber Airmen should be based in part on their cyber proficiency and knowledge test scores Just as there is an advantage provided by having weapons officers who are proficient across the spectrum of weapon systems so would it be advantageous to have officers in cyber-dependent missions who are also proficient in cyber operations 30 A program similar in many ways to the one offered by the USAF Weapons School but with a smaller footprint should be established to strategically place graduates within their cyber-dependent career fields 31 November–December 2015 67 Babcock Work to Expand Industry Partnership Opportunities Air Force Space Command should work with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition SAF AQ and the Air Force Institute of Technology AFIT to create a special pipeline for officer and enlisted Airmen in the space and cyber career fields to tour in the Education with Industry EWI program If this cannot be accomplished Air Force Space Command should consider establishing a similar program focused on bringing cutting-edge innovation and specialized skills back to the military while expanding ties with industry partners Graduates of the EWI program not only help close the technology and skills gap between the military and the private sector but also help increase cooperation and strengthen ties between the two sectors at a critical time for space and cyberspace 32 Air Force Space Command should focus on embedding officer and enlisted Airmen within corporations that are at the forefront of space and cyberspace technology and should press to expand outside the list of traditional cleared defense contractors Though the EWI program is not generally made available to enlisted Airmen space and cyberspace require unique technical skills that can be developed and grown during an EWI tour While an officer in the EWI program may develop unique leadership skills and pick up innovative ideas correctly placed enlisted Airmen could bolster their coding or other technical skills that are specific to their mission and career field These efforts would be in line with Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter’s initiative to increase innovation in the Department of Defense and strengthen military and industry ties 33 In addition to coordination with SAF AQ and AFIT on the EWI program Air Force Space Command should seek to develop direct ties with Defense Innovation Unit X the new Department of Defense cell in Silicon Valley 34 Because Unit X will primarily develop and strengthen industry ties in the area of cyber operations Air Force Space Command would benefit from coordinating with Unit X on force development of cyberspace operators 35 Encourage New Forms of Education and Training The civilian market for Internet-based microdegrees nanodegrees and other forms of short-term topic-specific training has greatly increased cost-effective education and training opportunities for Airmen to leverage 36 Shorter than an associate degree but longer than a traditional training course microdegrees and other new forms of Internet-based learning have proliferated in recent years Air Force Space Command should actively embrace and explore this trend as a way to train and educate space and cyber Airmen Partnerships with online learning companies such as Udacity Coursera edX or other massive open online course MOOC providers may yield opportunities for Airmen to gain topical education and training customized to the needs of Air Force Space Command with much lower entry costs and time barriers for students 37 Traditional education still has a very important role to play but Air Force Space Command should take active steps to investigate how these education technologies are changing the civilian education market 38 Microdegrees can provide Airmen with a far more agile topical and responsive form of education that also allows 68 Air Space Power Journal Preparing for the Cyber Battleground of the Future them to stay up to date in the rapidly advancing field of information technology Beyond individualized education and training partnerships between Air Force Space Command and MOOC companies could provide a relatively cost-efficient way to train space and cyber Airmen on the whole 39 Extensive Investment in the Cyber Training Corps Of all the war-fighting domains cyber’s exponentially changing terrain makes “teaching cyber” a challenging task over time Comparatively very little changes year-to-year as pilots are trained in air operations or as space operators are trained in space operations yet course material in the cyber domain may become outdated within months 40 Just as an individual operator’s skills and knowledge will atrophy far more rapidly than in the other domains so will material developed for training and education 41 For every instructor assigned to a cyber instructional course Air Force Space Command should consider assigning a second member whose responsibilities include rapid revision of course material based on changing circumstances in the cyber domain and tuning based on analysis of student feedback and performance While the instructor handles instruction grading and administration a course developer would be tasked to ensure that course instruction remains timely and relevant Whenever possible course developers should be embedded with operational units and or industry partners in the private sector for short bursts of time to retain cutting-edge knowledge and skills 42 Like an information system with known vulnerabilities cyber instructional courses cannot afford to remain static instead they must be treated like a constantly evolving system For every cadre of instructors there should be an equally large or greater cadre of course developers handling this function Conclusion Of all the war-fighting domains cyberspace is the most rapidly changing These changes are driving Air Force missions and weapon systems towards greater cyberspace and space dependency By understanding anticipating and posturing for greater degrees of cyber dependency throughout the force Air Force Space Command will develop space and cyber Airmen who are ready to prevail in the cyber battleground of the future Air Force Space Command should consider the advantages of leveraging big data for decision making continuing to develop mission-specific cyber training making cyber training available to operators in cyber-dependent missions strengthening ties with industry partners encouraging new forms of education and training and investing heavily in an expanded cyberspace training cadre These investments some small and some large would yield sizable dividends when Air Force Space Command suddenly finds itself immersed in the cyber battleground of the future It is possible to imagine at some near-distant point in the future an Air Force that is wholly dependent on space and cyberspace It is equally possible to envision an Air Force whose cyber defense capabilities are far greater than the new threats that November–December 2015 69 Babcock these space and cyber dependencies will pose The time to begin overcoming the challenges of cyber dependency is now   Notes 1   Degrees of cyber dependency may be used to describe any military capability technology or strategy Supremacy in the cyberspace domain is analogous to air supremacy and is defined by the author as the degree of cyber superiority over a portion or segment of cyberspace wherein the opposing cyber force is incapable of effective interference 2   Market forces will drive the military to secure and defend a larger battlespace but the Department of Defense itself will also deliberately expand the cyber battlespace in a much more consequential way 3   Joint Publication JP 3-12 R Cyberspace Operations 5 February 2013 http www dtic mil doctrine new_pubs jp3_12R pdf JP 3-12 refers to this as the “ unique relationship” between space and cyberspace The author calls this “domain cyber dependency” because all operations in the space domain presently rely on cyberspace supremacy 4   Ibid and JP 3-14 Space Operations 29 May 2013 http www dtic mil doctrine new_pubs jp3_14 pdf 5   JP 3-12 R Cyberspace Operations defines cyberspace as “many different and often overlapping networks as well as the nodes any device or logical location with an internet protocol IP address or other analogous identifier on those networks and the system data such as routing tables that support them” I-2 6  Ibid 7   Ibid With regard to space operations the physical network layer of cyberspace includes the information systems with which space operators perform command and control operations and receive and analyze telemetry the circuits connecting those information systems to the ground equipment the ground equipment itself which prepares and sends data to the space vehicle and the space vehicles themselves The logical network layer of cyberspace is embedded in each piece of the physical network When space operators change configurations on or send commands to any part of the physical network layer encrypt or decrypt transmissions or perform data aggregation and analysis they are operating within the logical network layer of cyberspace To some degree these actions may be considered cyberspace operations The cyber-persona layer describes the space operators who rely on the physical and logical network layers to perform space operations The cyber-persona layer also includes potential adversaries who may disrupt space operations through their own cyberspace operations 8   Damon Poeter “How Moore’s Law Changed History and Your Smartphone ” PC 19 April 2015 http www pcmag com article2 0 2817 2482133 00 asp 9   JP 3-12 R Cyberspace Operations and Mark Pomerleau “Army Cyber Chief Outlines Key Challenges Goals ” Defense Systems 18 March 2015 http defensesystems com Articles 2015 03 18 Army-cyber-Cardon-outlines-challenges-goals aspx 10   Max Boot “The Paradox of Military Technology ” New Atlantis no 14 Fall 2006 13–32 11   Jose Pagliery “Love Not War Pentagon Courts Silicon Valley ” CNN 23 April 2015 http money cnn com 2015 04 23 technology security military-silicon-valley 12   Lt Col Gregory Conti and Col John “Buck” Surdu “Army Navy Air Force and Cyber—Is It Time for a Cyberwarfare Branch of Military ” IAnewsletter 12 no 1 Spring 2009 14–18 and Andrew Phillips “The Asymmetric Nature of Cyber Warfare ” US Naval Institute 14 October 2012 http news usni org 2012 10 14 asymmetric-nature-cyber-warfare 13   JP 3-12 R Cyberspace Operations 14   Katia Moskvitch “Are Drones the Next Target for Hackers ” BBC 6 February 2014 http www bbc com future story 20140206-can-drones-be-hacked and Aliya Sternstein “How to Hack a Military Drone ” DefenseOne 29 April 2015 http www defenseone com technology 2015 04 how-hack-military -drone 111391 15   Christian Davenport “Meet the Most Fascinating Part of the F-35 The $400 000 Helmet ” Washington Post 1 April 2015 https www washingtonpost com news checkpoint wp 2015 04 01 meet-the -most-fascinating-part-of-the-f-35-the-400000-helmet “Insects Inspire Military Mini Drones ” Fox News 70 Air Space Power Journal Preparing for the Cyber Battleground of the Future 18 September 2014 http www foxnews com tech 2014 09 18 insects-inspire-military-mini-drones Joyce P Brayboy “Army Researcher’s Interest in Robots Leads to Innovative Device ” US Army 2 July 2015 http www army mil article 151527 Terri Moon Cronk “Robot to Serve as Future Military’s ‘Pack Mule ’ ” US Department of Defense 19 December 2012 http archive defense gov news newsarticle aspx ID 118838 Brendan McGarry “U S Military Begins Testing ‘Smart’ Rifles ” DefenseTech 15 January 2014 http defensetech org 2014 01 15 u-s-military-begins-testing-smart-rifles and Kris Osborn “Navy to Deploy First Underwater Drones from Submarines ” Military com 13 April 2015 http www military com daily-news 2015 04 13 navy-to-deploy-first-underwater-drones-from-submarines html 16   Cybersecurity is most commonly understood to be compliance related such as the management of vulnerabilities and the implementation of protective measures This contrasts with active defense which is the implementation of defensive measures or maneuvers in anticipation of during or after a cyber incident or engagement with an adversary 17   “The Pentagon Got Hacked While You Were at Def Con ” Wired 9 August 2015 http www wired com 2015 08 security-news-week-pentagon-got-hacked-def-con Andy Greenberg “Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway—with Me in It ” Wired 21 July 2015 http www wired com 2015 07 hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway Kim Zetter “Is It Possible for Passengers to Hack Commercial Aircraft ” Wired 26 May 2015 http www wired com 2015 05 possible-passengers -hack-commercial-aircraft and Hallie Golden “Security Experts Point to OPM’s Biggest Cybersecurity Failure ” NextGov 21 July 2015 http www nextgov com cybersecurity 2015 07 security-experts -point-opms-biggest-cybersecurity-failure 118274 In each of these examples the exploits were uncovered by security researchers not professional “militarized” hackers If a well-organized advanced persistent threat were to commit its resources to similar targets the results would likely be far severer 18   JP 3-12 R Cyberspace Operations Traditionally the bulk of defendable battlespace in the cyberspace domain has been communications infrastructure that provides support to the primary mission One implication of greater cyber dependency will be that the defendable battlespace will expand to include the mission systems themselves The challenge posed is that intuitively friendly disruption to the mission would be more likely while defensively operating on a mission or weapon system than it would be while defending communications infrastructure 19   Recorded Future Special Intelligence Desk “Week to Weak The Weaponization of Cyber Vulnerabilities ” Ref ID 2014-02 Somerville MA Recorded Future 4 December 2014 http go recorded future com week-to-weak-report The “Week to Weak” report published in late 2014 illustrates the rapid speed at which vulnerabilities are now weaponized and seen in the wild Analysis by Recorded Future found that the median number of days for a vulnerability to be exploited is only 7 5 For reference the report cites the National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST as publishing roughly 7 000 newly known vulnerabilities in 2014 This illustrates the incredible speed at which cybersecurity measures such as vulnerability management must occur to maintain risk at appropriate levels 20   “Standards Are Making the Internet of Things Come Alive ” IEEE Standards Association 8 April 2013 http standardsinsight com ieee_company_detail standards_iot and Dr W Charlton Adams Jr “The Internet of Things and the Connected Person ” Wired December 2014 http www wired com insights 2014 12 iot-connected-person 21   Klint Finley “Hacked Fridges Aren’t the Internet of Things’ Biggest Worry ” Wired 12 March 2015 http www wired com 2015 03 hacked-fridges-arent-internet-things-biggest-worry Bill Wasik “In the Programmable World All Our Objects Will Act as One ” Wired 14 May 2013 http www wired com 2013 05 internet-of-things-2 and Dan Saffer “The Wonderful Possibilities of Connecting Your Fridge to the Internet ” Wired 29 October 2014 http www wired com 2014 10 is-your-refrigerator -running 22   If the public is not dissuaded by privacy and security concerns consumer preference for smart devices from self-driving cars to networked refrigerators should provide supplying firms a competitive advantage If this is the case competitors to those “first-mover” firms may seek to adopt the same technology or develop their own potentially commoditizing the technology itself and driving out nonadopting alternatives from the market 23   Cade Metz “Mavericks Invent Future Internet Where Cisco Is Meaningless ” Wired 16 April 2012 http www wired com 2012 04 nicira and Klint Finley “GE’s New Cloud Must Be the Most Tempting Hacker Bait Ever ” Wired 5 August 15 http www wired com 2015 08 ges-new-cloud-may -tempting-hacker-bait-ever November–December 2015 71 Babcock 24   Since space operations are overwhelmingly reliant on cyberspace supremacy several but not all of these recommendations are cyber-centric 25   A cyber proficiency test would likely assess logic-based problem solving as well as abstract thinking two skills required for success in cyberspace and in space 26   Critically these tests should not be used to affect the career vectoring of individuals during the first several years of implementation Over time as the tests are refined and conclusions are able to be teased out of data points they will become useful in making those decisions Drawing conclusions too quickly and making vectoring decisions during the refinement process would skew the results and only lead to foregone conclusions rather than provide true insight 27   Capt Kinder Blacke “Intermediate Network Warfare Training Up and Running ” Air Force Space Command 3 March 2011 http www afspc af mil news story asp id 123245023 and SSgt Jarrod Chavana “Airmen Train for ‘New Wild Wild West’ in Cyber Domain ” Santa Maria Times 10 October 2014 http santamariatimes com news local military airmen-train-for-new-wild-wild-west-in-cyber -domain article_1633ec02-eb22-54e5-ad04-f4bea53b776c html 28   “National Cybersecurity Workforce Framework ” National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education accessed 15 October 2015 http csrc nist gov nice framework 29   In addition to being informed by the NIST standards initial and intermediate training for enlisted Airmen should be informed by operational techniques used in the joint community such as the plan brief execute debrief PBED process 30   J R Wilson “Interview Col Robert ‘Shark’ Garland Commandant USAF Weapons School ” Defense Media Network 6 November 2011 http www defensemedianetwork com stories interview -col-robert-%E2%80%9Cshark%E2%80%9D-garland-commandant-usaf-weapons-school 31   Entry into the program and placement following the program could be managed very similarly to the procedures of the USAF Weapons School without the need to develop an entire training program that is separate from the traditional intermediate and advanced cyber courses that are specific to the graduate’s mission 32   Jim Garamone “Winnefeld DoD Must Strengthen Public Private Ties ” US Department of Defense 14 May 2015 http www defense gov news newsarticle aspx id 128810 and Kevin Gilmartin “Education with Industry Program Offers Different Perspective ” Air Force Print News 14 March 2008 http www hanscom af mil news story_print asp id 123090306 33   Cheryl Pellerin “Carter Seeks Tech-Sector Partnerships for Innovation ” US Department of Defense 23 April 2015 http www defense gov news newsarticle aspx id 128655 34   Mark Pomerleau “Carter Details DoD’s Innovation Plans ” Defense Systems 6 May 2015 https defensesystems com articles 2015 05 06 carter-dod-innovation-plans-congress aspx and Patrick Tucker “Pentagon Sets Up a Silicon Valley Outpost ” Defense One 23 April 2015 http www defenseone com technology 2015 04 pentagon-sets-silicon-valley-outpost 110845 35   Pomerleau “Carter Details DoD’s Innovation Plans ” 36   Stuart M Butler “How Google and Coursera May Upend the Traditional College Degree ” Brookings Institution 23 February 2015 http www brookings edu blogs techtank posts 2015 02 23-mooc -google-coursera-butler 37  Ibid 38   In addition to partnering with the companies themselves an examination of the underlying technology and methods may illustrate efficiencies that could be implemented in military-led training courses 39   Jeffrey R Young “Will MOOCs Change the Way Professors Handle the Classroom ” Chronicle of Higher Education 7 November 2013 http chronicle com article Will-MOOCs-Change-Campus 142869 40   Conti and Surdu “Army Navy Air Force and Cyber ” 14–18 41  Ibid 42   Semiregularly instructors and course developers should rotate between their respective functions to retain currency in each 72 Air Space Power Journal Preparing for the Cyber Battleground of the Future 2nd Lt Chris Babcock USAF Lieutenant Babcock BS Indiana University is the crew commander and deputy section chief for the 50th Space Communications Squadron’s Air Force Satellite Control Network Network Operations Security Center He is a cyberspace operations officer with a special interest in network defense and intelligence integration Let us know what you think Leave a comment Distribution A Approved for public release distribution unlimited http www airpower au af mil November–December 2015 73