THIS FILE IS MADE AVAILABLE TH RDLIGH THE DEGLASSIFIG ATIGN AND RES EARGH THE BLAEH IS THE LARGEST FREEDGM DF AGTIGGVERNHENT REGDRD ELEARING IN THE THE RESEARCH HERE ARE FDR THE DEGLASSIFIGATIDN GF THDUSANDS DGGUMENTS THRGUGHDUT THE U FDRWARD THIS DDGUMENT TDUR FRIENDS EILJT PLEASE THIS IDENTIFTING IMAGE AT THE TDP IDF THE SD GTHERS MIDRE1 REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD SUMNIER STUDY TASK FORCE ON INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE FOR THE BATTLEFIELD OCTOBER 1994 OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION TECHNOLOGY WASHINGTON D C 20301-3140 $414 This report is a product of the Defense Science Board DSB The DSB is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to the Secretary of Defense Statements opinions conclusions and recommendations in this report do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Defense This d0cument is UNCLASSIFIED Security review completed 28 November 1994 by OATSD Public Affairs Directorate for Freedom of Information and Security Review Reference 94-8-4704 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON DC zoaot-314o caregiiggumcs - 03 NOV 1994 MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION TECHNOLOGY SUBJECT Report of Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force on Information Architecture for the Battlefield I am pleased to forward the final report of the Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force on Information Architecture for the Battlefield which was chaired by Dr Craig I Fields and General James P McCarthy This study was chartered to develop recommendations on implementing an information architecture to enhance the combat effectiveness of theater and joint task force commanders The Task Force's key findings and recommendations are summarized in the report's executive summary While the Services and agencies are making good progress in developing programs to improve battlefield information interoperability continued systemic improvement is needed to ensure a flexible joint information structure is achieved A broader warfighter involvement in the development of joint requirements for battlefield information systems is required A more coordinated approach to expanding offensive and defensive information warfare capability is necessary Finally modifiCations must be made to DoD'acquisition processes to enable better use of rapidly evolving commercial technologies I concur with the Task Force's conclusions and recommendations regarding the warfighter's use of information offensive and defensive information warfare management structure changes and leveraging available commercial products and technology The recommendations provide a number of positive steps toward an improved procurement environment which in turn will provide the warfighter with the means to achieve maximum advantage in a critical warfare area km David R Heebner Acting Chairman OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 0 0 20301-3140 DEFENSE SCIENCE 2 0 061' BOARD Memorandum for Chairman Defense Science Board Subject Final report of the Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force on Information Architecture for the Battlefield Attached is the nal report of the Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force on Information Architecture for the Battlefield This DSB Task Force was charged to make recommendations for implementing an information architecture that would enhance combat operations by providing commanders and forces at all levels with required information displayed for assimilation The Task Force addressed all aspects of the Terms of Reference except for the assessment of current and future and Service programs The Task Force had neither sufficient time nor access to all detailed plans necessary to perform this assessment The Task Force addressed four aspects of information architecture for the battle eld the use of information in warfare the use of information warfare both offensive and defensive the business practices of the in acquiring and using battlefield information systems and the underlying technology required to develop and implement these systems This report emphasizes the importance of the warfighter as the principal customer for battlefield information systems In today's complex world the warfighter requires exible information systems that can be readily and rapidly adapted to accomplish different missions Further the Task Force is quite concerned that information systems are highly vulnerable to information warfare However the Task Force also found that the information systems of potential adversaries are also quite vulnerable The Task Force believes that management structure changes can provide an effective approach to integration of disparate systems The group reinforces that notion that can greatly enhance the effectiveness of limited resources by leveraging 37 available commercial products and technology We would like to thank the Task Force members and the Government advisors for their hard work on this report In addition we commend the support of DSB secretariat The quality of this 'report is a direct result of their contributions Craig I Fields I Jam 3 P McCa gy Gen Ret hair Co-Chair 'Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUWARY 1 0 INTRODUCTION - 1 1 1 Terms of Reference 1 1 2 What We Heard 2 1 3 Task Force 3 2 0 GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 5 2 1 Military Operations Continuum 5 3 0 INFORMATION IN WARFARE 6 3 1 What the Tac cal Commander Requires 6 3 2 War ghter Requires Expanded Information Capabilities 8 3 3 Empower the CINC to Fashion His Own Information Processing and Delivery System 9 3 4 CINC's Warfighting Architecture-Enables Battle eld Dominance 1 0 3 5 The Future 12 3 6 A Logical Time-Phased Approach to Provide Real Time Information to the Warfighter 1 3 3 7 Create Battlefield Information Task Force An Instrument of Change 14 3 8 Explore Direct Broadcast System 15 3 9 Provide Robust Wideband Communications 1 6 3 10 Give the CINCs Better Staff Support 18 3 11 Virtual Conflict Every Day 19 3 12 Readiness 20 4 0 INFORMATION WARFARE 23 4 1 Information Warfare-The Next Revolutionary Technology 23 4 2 Threat 24 4 3 Global Information Infrastructure Supports Military Operations 25 4 4 Security Commission Report-February 1994 26 4 5 Information Warfare 27 4 6 Offensive Operations 2 8 4 7 Conduct Net Assessment 29 4 8 Increase Defensive Information Warfare Emphasis 30 4 9 Red Team to Evaluate Information Warfare Readiness and Vulnerabilities 33 4 10 Joint Strategy Cell for Offensive and Defensive Information Warfare 33 4 1 1 Major Policy Issues 34 5 0 BUSINESS PRACTICES 37 5 1 Strengthening our Warfighter Information Infrastructure Management Processes 37 5 2 Structure Concept for Improving Our Warfighter Information Infrastructure Management 3 83' 5 3 Rapid Commercial Information Technology Evolution Must be Infused into Systems 40 5 4 Reform Warfighter Information Infrastructure Management 4 1 6 0 FOR INFORMATION DOIVIINANCE 43 6 1 Enhanced Recon gurability 44 6 2 Information and Information Systems Protection 46 6 3 Recommendations 48 7 0 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 50 7 1 Key Findings and Observations 50 7 2 The Key Recommendations 53 A Table of Contents Cont A INFORMATION IN WARFARE A-l APPENDIX B INFORMATION WARFARE 13-1 C BUSINESS PRACTICES - C-1 APPENDIX D UNDERLYING TECHNOLOGY BASE E TERMS OF REFERENCE F MEMBERSHIP G BRIEFINGS TO SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE G-l H ACRONYMS I H l ii Executive Summary Overview This Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force was charged to make recommendations for implementing an information architecture that would enhance combat operations by providing commanders and forces at all levels with required information displayed for assimilation The Task Force was instructed to focus on information support to the theater or joint task force commander in preparation for and during combat operations The global security environment provided the background for understanding the information needs of warfighting commanders in scenarios likely to occur in the coming decade Based upon this environment the Task Force assessed four aspects of information architecture for the battle eld 0 the use of information in warfare - the use of information warfare both offensive and defensive 0 the business practices of the Department of Defense in acquiring and using battlefield information systems and 0 the underlying technology required to develop and implement these systems This report provides detailed analysis and supporting rationale for the findings and recommendations of the Task Force which are summarized as follows Key Findings 0 The warfighter must be an infermed customer with an integral role in the determination of the operational output specification of requirements acquisition and implementation of information systems 0 Warfighters require exible information systems that can be readily and rapidly adapted and or altered to accomplish different missions 0 information systems are highly vulnerable to information warfare but so are those of potential adversaries and 0 The can greatly leverage limited resources by exploiting available eemmereial praetiees and technology plus buying into commercial practices Key Recommendations 0 i2 Inf rmati in Warfar as riti al 1 nt fwarfi htin by - establishing a Battlefield Information Task Force to define the Warfighter information systems needs and future vision - combining and expanding capabilities for exercises games simulations and models - giving the Commander in Chiefs CINCs better staff support by strengthening A the technical expertise and establishing an Information Warfare Officer and 135-1 augmenting the Enterprise Integration Council structure to coordinate the integration of magma requirements with technical architectural frameworks for warfighter information systems f9 a QnW aar_f are both offensive and def gnsivg by -conducting an overall net assessment to determine the impact of information warfare on the - investing more in information warfare defense providing Red Teams to evaluate information warfare readiness and vulnerabilities - creating a joint strategy cell for offensive and defensive information warfare and - providing strong inputs to the formulation of a coordinated national policy on information warfare- 0 - using commercial direct broadcast systems buying and or leasing communications bandwidth and other information services from the commercial market - providing a civil reserve commercial information service capability adopting commercial practices in hardware and software acquisition and exploiting commercial research and development Information in Warfare A During the Cold War there was potential for nuclear and conventional con ict with the Warsaw Pact on a global scale The information paradigm that matched this concept of operations put the customer for information at the top- the National Command Authority Today the principal customers for information are the CINCs and their JTF Commanders who are charged with the responsibility to conduct decisive regional operations Actionable information is needed the kind of information necessary to fight forces and win as compared to formulating broad policy or building national level strategic plans The handling and use of such information is the issue getting it where it is needed in a timely and reliable manner IN mu ntrol th and th 11 ut In order for the CINC to carry out his mission he must exercise greater control over his information system support The first step is improved understanding by the Task Force JTF Commander 13 of what can compared to what is since he not the functional specialist must become the spokesman for his needs and requirements Information must ow to the field leader weapons operator who is on the move under great stress and very busy He needs the information -- in a timely manner to achieve decisive advantage while maintaining situational awareness controlling the battle space and denying disrupting his enemy's information ow at all levels of execution in a common but somewhat adaptable format and - in a fashion that is protected but not restrictive to timely use ES-2 Even with control of his information systems the CINC must cope with the system as it exists A major problem is that the information systems are saturated today Much of - what is being moved now is of a routine nature time relevant but not critically time sensitive weather logistics status personnel admin finance data much of that cannot reach to lower echelons due to data rate limitations More throughput is critically needed Not only routine but also time sensitive products need to be distributed across the battle space In today s budget environment a substantial new buy of information systems is not likely New concepts for information distribution are needed The solution may be in exploiting another mode more than is currently being emphasized publishing broadcasting-the 'Warfighter's CNN There is great promise in such an approach in order to vastly increase throughput to operating and tactical levels through the creation of a multi band broadcast that blankets the battle space Akin to a multiband TV network such an approach could allow the CINC to tailor the information products to meet tactical demands as well as allowing the operator user to access on demand-select the channels to meet his needs In the absence of new buys the logical source of throughput is to reallocate current usage of major defense satellite systems primarily the Defense Satellite Communications System DSCS Load will have to be moved reduced primarily to commercial altematives satellite fiber and wire This would open the opportunity for the CINC's to have much more bandwidth in the short term for collaborative planning video conferencing joint training exercising etc In the longer term the must establish a publishing broadcasting mode of service that would provide wideband data to small mobile terminals at all levels of command CINC component tactical user warfighter In addition the Task Force also sees new commercial space information systems and services that can be exploited when needed In addition there is a parallel need to strengthen the CINC's expertise The CINC and his staff need to understand how information systems might be better employed The CINC also needs better technical support to be able to identify and articulate his operational requirements apply promising technologies to operational needs and improve the linkage between field user and developer A new staff function run by a combat arms of cer should build the CINC's strategic and tactical information warfare plan both offensive and defensive In addition the CINCs and ITF commanders need to exercise their information systems through virtual combat everyday The goal is to allow the CINC to practice and t0 fight from the same seat and same syStem every day The simulations of the battlespace must allow the CINC his components and tactical formatiOns to test employment concepts through Red Teaming CINC and component practice and rehearsal of envisioned employment concepts will not only raise confidence of success but also improve force readiness and drive down costs These many tasks putting the CINC in control getting actionable information to 1mobile shooters broadcasting information to users that can be accessed on demand and improving the CINC's staff support to apply this technology and fight effective information warfare-erequire a major effort to change culture and educate users To trigger such a change the Task Force formulated the five recommendations shown in Figure ES-3 RECOMMENDATIONS MORMATION IN WARFARE #1 Secretary of Defense SECDEF create a Battle eld Information Task Force to bring together warfighters and dv ve10pers to establish the future vision system needs and evolutionary deve opment plans of the operational information system to create and utilize joint battlespace Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations ACTDs to optimize existing capabilities and demonstrate futuregrowth broadcast request modes to identify and track Command Control Computers and Intelligence C41 performance metrics to provide recommendations to system developers and- the Enterprise Integration Council and to develop an Integrated Process Team IPT charter #2 explore direct broadcast satellite service for Warfighter increase capacity via broadcast downlink #3 BITP develop future vision for providing more robust wideband communications capacity to CINCs and echelons of command below D1v151on W1ng Carr1er Battle Group CVBG and explore other space-based commercial information services to allow real time surge #4 Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff CJCS provide increased technical billets to give the CINCs better staff support Strengthen technical expertise - Establish Information Warfare Officer #5 Director Defense Research and Engineering Defense Modeling and Simulation Office with US Atlantic Command USACOM Joint Warfighter Center JWFC and Joint Staff Element for Operational Plans and InterOperability combine and expand capabilities for exercises games simulations and models in C41 to enable operation from the same seat for readiness assessment requirements for acquisition debugging verification of interoperability training rehearsal confidence building mission planning and battle dama assessment Figure ES-1 Information Warfare An evolving strategy and capability to wage Information Warfare IW may be the most important facet of military operations since the introduction of stealth Unlike j a hard munitions of combat IW assets have near-instantaneous global reach and can pervade throughout the spectrum of con ict Given the dependence of modern commerce and the military on computer-controlled telecommunication networks data bases enabling software and computers the US must protect these assets regarding their vulnerabilities In addition to the importance associated with the use of information in warfare the Task Force found U 8 information systems highly vulnerable to IW Based on inputs provided the Task Force has concern over the integrity of the information systems that are a key enabler of military superiority The Task Force found similar vulnerabilities in the information systems of potential adversaries U 5 military forces and their commanders ES-4 need to be able to protect against their own vulnerabilities while exploiting those of the adversary as an element of their force structure This effort protection and exploitation must become an integral part of the joint training and exercise programs of the CINCs The Task Force sees three interlocked actions that must be addressed by and the nation '0 Design and leverage of one's own information systems to provide decision makers with actionable information 0 Protect those information systems from disruption exploitation and damage and 0 Employ offensive IW techniques such as deception electronic jamming and advanced technologies to deceive deny exploit damage and or destroy adversary information systems The overarching strategy is to mesh these interlocking defensive and offensive aspects of IW with national policy military operations and intelligence community initiatives A serious impediment to evolving a coherent and practical IW strategy is the current lack of a national policy on this matter Further there is no well defined threat to US information systems Protection of US information systems is also clouded by legal restrictions 'put forth for example in the Computer Security Act of 1987 Of concern to the Task Force is the fact that IW technologies and capabilities are largely being developed in an open commercial market and are outside of direct Government control In contrast with the very secret development and control of most weapons technologies by the Government a third-world nation could procure a formidable modern IW capability virtually off-the-shelf This fact portends a revolution in commercial and military-technological individual warfare The Task Force formulated the five recommendations shown in Figure to address these i35ues ll RECOMMENDATIONS INFORMATION WARFARE ll #6 SECDEF undertake a broad net assessment of IW including the involvement of the Battlefield Information Task Force as an aid in planning and policy development and as an input to national IW policy review #7 SECDEF support a focus on protection of critical services by supporting immediate increases in funding for and emphasis on defensive IW #8 SECDEF establish a Red Team to evaluate IW readiness and vulnerabilities #9 Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs Of Staff VCICS create a Joint strategy cell for offensive and defensive Information Warfare integrated at a Flag level and reporting to the CS This strategy cell should be tasked to develop a DoD wide IW strategy #10 SECDEF review draft Presidential Review Document PRD and related issues and expedite the net assessment to support development of the national IW policy In addition SECDEF should task the Assistant Secretary of Defense Command Control and Communications ASD C3D to lead development of policy on IW in acguisition and gport Figure ES-Z ES-S Business Practices The commercial sector is subjected to very strong forces for standardization and interoperability particularly in the information system sector An inability to interface can be fatal to a product In however budget independence and separate operating processes do not create similar levels of pressure Although each of the Services and Agencies has programs devoted to battle eld information systems that are attempting to adhere to an architecture defined for promoting interoperability results have been suboptimal Although the programs are paying some attention to the need to migrate into a unified information architectural structure by conforming to the Joint Staff migration plan the Task Force found that corresponding directives and processes are needed to ensure that individual programs have adequate cost and schedule provisions to allow the separate initiatives to achieve full interoperability and a common Operating environment Until policies and processes are put in place to ensure that the joint warfighter interoperability requirements are strongly considered these well intentioned but unique Service and Agency programs will tend to drift away from migration objectives In addition to new systems there are legacy systems that must be either migrated into or interfaced with common systems The motivation to diverge from a common joint interoperability structure is aggravated by a need to maintain compatibility with service-unique legacy systems that are not targeted for the migration Although the Task Force found a high level of attention on the issue of legacy systems no new innovative approaches had been proposed for use by the Department The Task Force found a need for to establish a process in a manner akin to that used for the Internet that identifies incremental improvements and ensures each can be accommodated and accepted by the other participants The process used in establishing Internet has been shown successful in establishing standards by consensus and in allowing continuous integration of improvements migration of standards adaptation of commercial products and distribution of value-added products Some variant of that process is appropriate for institution within the The process should include provisions for accommodating the limitations of legacy systems and easing their transition to modernization This should be recognized and supported as a continuous process as there will always be a need to manage transition from old 'to new systems and technologies In seeking constructive and viable management structural changes to improve warfighter information processes the Task 'Force reviewed the existing authorities and responsibilities of the major entities that oversee warfighter information systems in including statutory responsibilities The Enterprise Integration Board EIB and Enterprise 7 Integration Council EIC have recently been established to achieve the goals of Corporate Information Management CIM and to undertake an enterprise integration approach to the accelerated implementation of migration of legacy information systems and establishment of data standards and process improvements This structure provides a forum for interoperability and cross-functional issues Although currently the charters of the Board and Council do not include warfighter information systems membership on the Board and Council are appropriate for dealing with these systems The Task Force sees the need to change the existing management structure to allow implementation of a dynamic process that will result in much improved interoperability of warfighter ES-6 information systems and better exploitation of the leverage that those systems can potentially provide to the combat forces Also within there is an ongoing initiative to establish a technical architectural framework of interoperability guidelines interface specifications and standards such as data element definitions - under the general auspices of a Technical Architectural Framework for Information Management TAFIM Current systems are designed based on requirements from the appropriate functional community Service or agency- Iointness is not a major driver and developers are not now required to comply with cross- functional and interoperability requirements The Task Force sees a need to review the TAFIM initiatives currently underway and ensure that they are brought to a satisfactory state of maturity to serve as part of an iterative process to evolve better interface standards and interoperability requirements In addition there is a need for the Joint Requirements Oversight Council IROC to include the infusion of its validated joint warfighting requirements into the DoD-wide information architecture process The Task Force sees a critical need for the Department's acquisition system to facilitate the buying and leasing of commercial information products and services and to buy into commercial business practices Information system superiority is dependent on an ability to incorporate the latest in commercial technologies The obsolescence cycle for commercial information systems is dramatically shorter than DoD's weapon system cycle If information is to remain a key discriminator in capability should adopt acquisition practices similar to the commercial sector To address the above issues the Task Force formulated the recommendation shown in Figure - ll RECOMMENDATIONS BUSINESS PRACTICES ll #11 Deputy Secretary of Defense DEPSECDEF should augment the Enterprise Integration Council structure to coordinate integration of warfighter requirements and technical architectural frameworks for Warfighter information systems DEPSECDEF should ratify the Defense Information Systems Agency DISA role as technical architect for interfaces standards and interoperability Undersecretary of Defense Acquisition and Technology USD should augment acquisition reform efforts to assure compatibility with the extremely short develo ment and roduct lifetimes of commercial software and microelectronics Figure 158-3 Underlying Technology Finally the Task Force found that since potential adversaries have access to the same modern information systems technologies leveraging of commercial technology through unique military value-added exploitation and investment in defense-peculiar needs will be critical to attaining and maintaining information dominance of the battlefield There are three factors that should differentiate US military information- systems from those of a capable adversary sensors ability to reconfigure under stress and ability to conduct information warfare When coupled with advanced U S simulation capability the warfighter can develop and tune the skills and techniques necessary to establish and preserve a competitive edge in dynamically managing information system reconfiguration ES-7 Two special needs associated with military information systems were identified reconfigurability and information systems protection Commercial systems are designed to work in relatively static locations with predictable communications and repeatable information needs Military scenarios which are too diverse to make a system designed under these assumptions acceptable require the capability to be rapidly reconfigured Technologies supporting enhanced reconfigurability are joint battlespace modeling and simulation environments information assimilation and information movement With the increasing dependence on information technologies and the explosion of interconnected networks and databases the importance of information and information systems protection has grown significantly While 'the commercial world has security concerns most are focused on protecting access to information The military has this concern plus the possibility for network disruption In addition the mobilization of military systems complicates the ability to authenticate users and their uses of systems For information and information systems protection applicable technologies include enterprise security network security and data security It is important for the to recognize that it must accelerate its modernization and efforts along a two-pronged course First it must continue its emphasis on supporting and infusing best commercial technologies This will allow to piggyback off of the tremendous investments being made in the commercial marketplace Secondly the should continue its investments in military-unique information Those technologies that are stressed by military applications should be given priority and in particular those that support enhanced reconfiguration and information and information systems protection Special attention should be given to information and information systems protection because of the increasing reliance on commercial products and systems and the increased threat of the use of information warfare as a weapon against C41 systems Accordingly the Task Force formulated the recommendation shown in Figure The Task Force recommends that Director Defense Research and Engineering continue to leverage commercial information systems technology to facilitate rapid technology infusion and reprioritize investments to emphasize support of enhanced recon gurability and information and information systems protection I RECOMMENDATION UNDERLYING TECHNOLOGY I #12 ensure that DoD's strategy capitalizes on commercial technology and focuses investment in military-unique information technology Figure 155-4 Summag In summary the Task Force believes that the timing is right for a major push to improve the effectiveness of information systems to support the Warfighters There is a need for cultural change throughout regarding the way information systems are developed and employed In fact such changes must be a part of a larger re-engineering ES-8 of DoD's warfighting approach This Task Force underscores the importance of such a cultural change to achieving information dominance on the battle eld In addition the Task Force sees significant vulnerabilities in today's information systems The Department has not come to grips with the leverage of Information Warfare as a tools for use by the Warfighter Unfortunately the business practices of the Department are hindering DoD's ability to exploit the best systems and technologies available in the commercial sector Finally it is not clear that is investing its science and technology resources in the best way The recommendations of this Task Force are intended to address these issues for implementation of such recommendations will substantially improve CINC effectiveness and readiness However if real change is to occur leadership must aggressively pursue implementation of these recommendations Report of the - DSB Summer Study Task Force on Information Architecture for the Battlefield 1 0 INTRODUCTION 1 1 Terms of Reference This Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force was charged to make recommendations for implementing an information architecture that will enhance combat operations by providing commanders and forces at all levels with required information displayed for immediate assimilation to decrease decision cycle time The Task Force was instructed to focus principally on information support to the theater or joint task force commander in preparation for and during combat operations For purposes of this study information architecture is considered to include concepts network data bases system security and necessary software In accomplishing its objectives the Task Force was requested to 0 Assess the current and future and Service plans for battle eld warfare 0 Develop concepts for information ow on the battlefield 0 Develop an architectural approach to support these concepts 0 Consider imposition of policy security restrictions on information through explicit software and rather than hardware to ease rapid changes when authorized 0 Consider how joint exercises gaming and simulation can validate alternate concepts and 0 Provide specific guidelines for implementation of the Task Force's recommendations The Terms of Reference for this study are provided in Appendix E As shown in this report the Task Force addressed all elements of this Terms of Reference except for the assessment of current and future and Service programs The Task Force did not have sufficient time nor access to all detailed plans to perform such an assessment Because of the relatively broad scope of this study the Task Force membership consisted of a highly qualified and diversified group of individuals with expertise in technologies associated with information systems and information architectures as well as the operational employment of such systems The members of the Task Force dedicated a signi cant amount of personal time and energy in order to achieve the objectives set forth in the Terms of Reference In addition the Task Force was supported by a strong cadre of skilled government advisors representing organizations within the Of ce of the Secretary of Defense OSD the Joint Staff the Military Departments and several agencies The active and creative participation of these government advisors was a key factor in the success of the Task Force effort Appendix provides a complete listing of the many participants who contributed to this effort The initial efforts of the Task Force concentrated on a review of current programs devoted to improving information system capabilities A complete listing of brie ngs and speakers is provided in Appendix G -1- 1 2 What We Heard As re ected in Figure 1-1 each of the Services and agencies has programs devoted to battle eld support that are attempting to adhere to an architecture defined for promoting interoperability Although the programs are paying some attention to the need to migrate into a uni ed information structure by conforming to the Joint Staff's Global Command and Control System GCCS migration plan corresponding directives are needed to ensure that individual programs have adequate cost and schedule provisions to allow the separate initiatives to achieve full interoperability and a common operating environment Until a process is put in place to ensure that the joint warfighter s interoperability requirements are considered these well intentioned but Service and agency-unique programs will tend to drift away from migration objectives What We Heard MILDEP Systems Global Grid STOW 04 For The Warrior INTELINK Time Figure 1-1 Current acquisition practices exacerbate the tendency to drift Since each program is independently supported by mostly independent agencies a joint corporate perspective is not built into the acquisition process The warfighting CINCs and JTF commanders have little in uence on systems under development or being modified but they have perhaps the most at stake when systems reach their ultimate application The joint warfighters' concerns should be represented during the acquisition process to ensure the C41 systems that will support the warfighter have maintained pace with commercially available technology and will intermesh well with legacy systems Legacy systems must either be migrated into or interfaced with common systems The motivation to diverge from a common joint interoperation structure is aggravated by -2 the need to maintain compatibility with service-unique legacy systems that are not targeted for migration - - There is a need for establishing a process in a manner akin to that used for the Internet that identifies incremental improvements and ensures that each can be accommodated and accepted by the other participants The part of the Internet process that establishes standards by consensus and allows continuous integration of improvements migration of standards adaptation of commercial products and distribution of value- added products has been shown successful Some variant of that process is appropriate to institute for the Unlike the Internet the will need a method of measuring overall cost and benefit of modifications and ensuring that appropriate benefits accommodate each incremental change This requires refocused investment to develop and or acquire tools to facilitate these efforts The process should include provisions for accommodating the limitations of legacy systems and easing their transition to modernization This process should be recognized as a continuous process there will always be a need to manage transition from old to new systems 1 3 Task Force View Task Force View Global- Security Environment 0 Peace War - Civilian Mil Info lnforrnation Warfare 0 Vulnerability Opportunity Information in Warfar - Focus on the Warfighter Business Practices Modeling Simulation - noies Missions - Requirements - Architect at Assessment 0Acquisition Underlying Technology Base Figure 1-2 Figure 1-2 depicts how the Task Force approached its evaluation of DoD's information architecture for the battlefield The global security environment provided the -3- background 'for understanding the information needs of warfighting commanders in scenarios likely to occur in the coming decade Because of their importance the Task Force then assessed four aspects of information architectures for the battlefield 1 the use of information warfare 2 information warfare both offensive and defensive 3 the business practices of the Department for acquiring and using such information systems and 4 the underlying technology Detailed information regarding each of these aspects is provided in Appendices A through D respectively To further assist the reader Appendix provides a list of acronyms used throughout this report There is a need for a cultural change regarding the way information systems are developed and employed In fact such changes must be a part of a larger re-engineering of DoD's warfighting approach This Task Force underscores this need for cultural change The recommendations of this Task Force will help facilitate such change by providing much closer linkage of the real users of information and information systems with the development and acquisition process -4- 2 0 GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 2 1 Military Operations Continuum Military Operations Continuum Operations Other Than War Disaster Relief Contingency Operations Human AssiStanoa Vietnam -9 Fall of Berlin Wall 20 Evacuation Operations Post Berlin Wall 17 Civil Disturbance Current Flash Points 39 Peace Keeping Mobile Training Teams Peace Enforcement Probability Counter Drugs Counter Terrorism Counter Proliferation Surgical Strike Regional Contingencies I Risk Different Military Situations Demand Different C4l Capabilities Figure 2-1 The world is fraught with destabilizing factors that make the threat to US interests ambiguous and hard to define As shown in Figure 2-1 there is a continuum of potential military operations between peace and regional contingencies 0 The predominant types of military operations for the foreseeable future will be operations other than war OOTW including both combat and non-combat missions These operations will be highly diverse in character and may be conducted amidst the threat of weapons of mass destruction 0 WMD and associated technology in the hands of outlaw groups pose the most complex and serious challenges that the United States is likely to face short of war - Accordingly the battlefield architecture must be refocused from the Cold-War orientation to meet today's needs of war ghting units for this changing environment The extent to which suppliers of information are able to distribute necessary information to the warfighting commander and to manipulate control of that which is available to the enemy will become a decisive advantage The diversity of missions requires CINCs and JTF commanders to have the ability to tailor their forces and information systems to meet the specific objectives of each different situation The challenges associated with OOTW- type operations may be less demanding than major regional contingencies MRCs but the consequences of a perceived failure will have far-reaching effects 3 0 INFORMATION IN WARFARE 3 1 What the Tactical Commander Requires What the Tactical Commander Requires - Timely information to achieve decisive advantage on battlefield Provide total situational awareness - enemy and friendly -Dominate all levels of battle space 0 Rapid movement of actionable combat information Information necessary to fight forces Fieliabiy realtlme - Delivery to decision makers and weapon holders Responsive to CINCIJTF commander and below Taiiored to the warrior at each level In useable format 0 Effective but not restrictive security Confident protection -Graceful degradation - lnforrnation Warfare as major discriminator Denyldisrupt enemy s information force multiplier Acceierates conflict resolution Treat the Warfighter as the informed customer Figure 3-1 As shown in Figure 3-1 the battlefield information architecture must recognize the CINC and the ITF Commander and below as the informed customer This does not imply that national needs should not be met or recognized It does argue that the Warfighter s current and future environment requires this priority in an unstable non-threat Specific world Besides the advantages afforded by trained and ready forces and the capability to project and employ them rapidly and efficiently the tactical commander also requires critical information as it pertains to his mission and the ability to use that most effectively-if he she is to achieve a decisive advantage on the battlefield It is key that US force decision making remain within the decision cycle time of their adversaries The battlefield information architecture must support such a decision cycle time This translates to the need for total situational awareness of the enemy disposition capabilities intentions and vulnerabilities as well as pertinent information on one s own forces The ability to get that information to one s own forces re5ponsively and in usable format tailored for assimilation at each level of command is crucial At each level of the battle eld there are hundreds and potentially thousands of customers Therefore tailored information means delivery of the right piece rather than the whole piece and in usable format for assimilation Further the information must be appropriately safeguarded and protected but not to the extent that would degrade the advantage afforded by its availability The explosion in information and information system technology also creates an area of vulnerability Enemy systems and vital data bases can be exploited as a new dimension of war Information Warfare Taking advantage of the opportunity to degrade an adversary's capability can become a significant force multiplier saving lives reducing collateral damage and speeding the end of con ict The existing methods for moving and distributing information in the fighting forces are largely hierarchical and sequential Information ows' a very orderly pattern up and down the operational chain of command While the new users of information are the regional CINC and ITF commanders the old patterns of distribution are embedded 1n doctrine force structure and equipment As a result the top leadership is well serviced but lower levels are increasingly unable to meet their information needs There isn t enough access or enough capacity at the lower levels due to bandwidth limitations as well as equipment and frequency availability Desert Shield Desert Storm demonstrated both the need for moving large volumes of information and the enormous dependence on satellite communications Military satellite communications formed the backbone of the US command and control system of which the DSCS and Fleet Satellite Communication FLTSATCOM systems were the primary players This con ict and the UN operations in Somalia a much smaller commitment of much different character both pointed out significant command control and information distribution problems Figure 3-2 defines the capabilities that are necessary for command and control for integrated situation awareness to all appropriate levels for effective support to the shooters and for effective analysis and training Information systems of appropriate capacity are required between and among all levels of command to facilitate access to and exchange of information vital to collaborative planning and the effective execution of combat operations This connectivity is accomplished by highly interactive switched wideband networks at the higher echelons of command providing interactive video and distributed database transfer capability Effective command and control among deployed warfighting tactical voiCe and data networks requires more complex connectivity with narrower band information The warfighter should have dynamic control over the information form and ow He should be able to lay out his information needs tailored to the particular mission As shown in the matrix provided in Figure 3-3 for each type of information air surveillance imagery friendly force status etc commanders should be able to specify what information he needs to what level of detail at what frequency of update with which access controls with which other information it should be fused and in what form it should be displayed One might 1magine commanders conceptually filling out this chart Within the constraints of the current situation the information officer would then 'reprogram the sensor communications and computing assets to respond to these needs This capability to reconfigure is not available today The systems are not capable of being -7 rapidly recon gured and the tactical staffs do not have the technical capability or necessary tools to do the job This is an important refocus area for investment 3 2 Warfighter Reguires Expanded Information Capabilities Warfighter Requires Expanded Information Capabilities - Command and Control - Connectivity between ClNC JTFIcomponent commanders COnnectivity among mobile tactical nets Network management and control Collaborative planning Interactive video Distributed database transfer 0 Integrated situation awareness Expanded battlespace picture Timely weather information Digltal terrain maps 8upport information - Support to shooter Specific system requirement Real time essential - Analysis and training Training Rehearsing Figure 3-2 Today point-to-point communications are dominant in the distribution of information for the battlefield Voice circuits message traffic circuits and remote computer connections and switching all play a part in achieving such information distribution While this permits the greatest degree of information customization it is very costly in terms of communications resource utilization This Task Force believes that the broadcasting publishing mode of operation could be used to off-load a nOtable fraction of the information distribution workload without adverse effects on the quality of the information For example certain status of forces and logistics information environmental information and Global Positioning em GPS time are very well suited for broadcasting Broadcasting is used today but through custom data links such as Joint Tactical Information Distribution System JTIDS and Tactical Relay and Processor TRAP Different approaches to broadcasting can extend the range of this kind of service In order to maximize effectiveness an analysis of information distribution alternatives is necessary utilizing a variety of communication media New commercial technology may provide added capacity and less expensive user-equipment Potential vulnerabilities would need to be accounted for in any management decision Dynamic Information Management for the CINCIJTF 83% 5% 02 C153 urn 0-11 0 8 6 135 Air Surveillance Ground MT E0 Imagery Blue Force Status Air Task Order 1 Threat Alerts Artillery Locations Figure 3-3 3 3 Empower the CINC to Fashion His Own Information Processing and Delivery System The CINC must be able to fashion his own information processing and delivery systems Figure 3-4 The CINC should become the principal spokesman to the Services the JROC the ASD C31 and DISA for his information needs The CINC should also be the person who actually assembles and integrates his information systems in concert with other elements of his force structure The CINC must view information and information systems as critical resources to marshal as he plans his her operation To accomplish this the CINC must tailor a system of systems to meet each mission and to support the specific forces that are to be involved The CINC must define the information fusion points for a given operation the limits of information access and dissemination the nature of broadcast information to be provided and prioritization of such information for the forces editing and filtering of information interconnection management needed mission planning and weapon system support vulnerability management associated with information dissemination and declassification of tactical information the information needs of offensive and defensive information warfare operations and the information needs for battle damage assessment Much of the foregoing is controlled by the CINC now in varying degrees However this Task Force is recommending that the CINC become the responsible official decision maker and orchestrator for information support to his theater To do this a warfighting architecture must be established that defines who needs what information and on what time scale This Warfighting architecture demands are an input to the definition of an information architecture which de nes the classes of information services and their characteristics The information architecture then becomes an input to the communications architecture which establishes the interface interoperability and timeliness requirements - Empower the to Fashion His Ownilnformation Processing and Deliveg Svstem NOW FUTURE Warfighter Controls Fusion Points Access Dissemination Limits Broadcast Programming Prioritization Editing Filtering Connection anagement Mission Planning GINO Division BrigadeIWlng Group Warlighter Weapons System Support Vulnerability Management Declasslfication of Tactical lnforrnation Offensive Defensive Warfare Info Battle Damage Assessment Figure 3-4 3 4 CINC's Warfighting Architecture-Enables Battlefield Dominance There are four general classes of information services see Figure 3-5 Interpersonal Communications are dynamic connections for real time information exchange such as voice video conferencing etc between a number of networked users This is a switched service with very tight requirements on set-up time delay and jitter within the information network supplying these services Information Access represents the ability to access and transfer stored information This is an interactive two- way switching capability that has similar but less stringent requirements on network characteristics The other two classes Messaging and Publishing do not require network switching operations and have much simpler end user equipment requirements Messaging refers to the storing and forwarding of messages via point-to- point connectivity while Publishing represents the broad distribution of information created and generated from a centralized node The question for is Has technology enabled us to redistribute our message tra -ic among the four classes in a manner that enables us to do much more for the Warfighter -1o- Warfighting Architecture - Enables Battlefield Dominance a Connectivity 1 Communlca ons Specifically to support forces involved 2- 0 System of systems --Specifically to meet each mission 0 Con uence of three architectures - 3 Wow 0 3 Access 4 0% Has Technology Enabled Us to Redistribute Our Message Traffic Among the Four Classes in a Manner that Enables Us to Do Much More for the Warfighter Warfighting I lnformation' COmmunications A Figure 3-5 The expanded information services required to meet the future needs of the warfighter generally fall into these four classes The expansion of the use of interactive video teleconferencing between the CINCs and component commands down to the Brigade Wing Carrier Battle Group level for collaborative planning and the demands of distributed data base management between these levels of command will require expanded interpersonal communications and information access services with wider bandwidth and more connectivity The need for significantly improved situation awareness implies a major expansion in the ability to broadcast essential and timely background information that can be used at all levels of command Background information can include the location of all forces friendly foe and neutral an integrated intelligence picture of the battlespace imagery Electronic Intelligence Signals Intelligence SIGINT weather maps and logistics support information This information can be disseminated using the unswitched publishing mode via direct broadcast concepts to small receive only terminals deployed at all levels of command The increase in the ability to move relevant information rapidly to all levels of the battlefield and establish complete situational awareness provides the commander with greater control over his destiny The commander can now determine what happens and how and can better select the most effective and efficient use of combat forces and resources fusion points information access management and vulnerability to optimize the Warfighter s advantage in the eld In essence the CINC can directly reconfigure the -11- information system serving his needs to ensure that it is actionable and supportive to the situation he faces 3 5 The Future Figure 3-6 breaks the future information services required by the tactical forces into three categories The rst is the connectivity among the distributed ground sea and air mobile tactical networks used for low data rate information exchange and voice connectivity at levels of command below Brigade Wing and CVBG These tactical networks include Single Channel Ground Radio Systems SINCGARS Joint Tactical Information Distribution System Mobile Subscriber Equipment MSE and Cooperative Engagement Capability CEC The tactical networks may connect force structures which are highly mobile and require Connectivity via satellite communications Connectivity will be provided at UHF via the eet SATCOM and Ultra High Frequency UHF follow-on UFO systems The UHF band does not offer any protection from jamming and can be easily interfered with by even an unsophisticated enemy For these reasons Extremely High Frequency connectivity among tactical networks is being deployed within Military Strategic Relay MILSTAR and parts of the UFO systems The jamming protection at EHF is excellent and will allow for assured connectivity among tactical mobile force networks The Future Tactical c2 Nets High Capacity Direct Broadcast 0 Small mobile terminals 0 illediiuml to large 0 Small mobile terminals 0 Tactical 3 networks i twid ba Wideband broadcast cgnri'n-iunlgat'lons 3m - Integrated Ops intel picture Protected circuits - Interactive video - Weather LOW data rates 0 Collaborative planning 899399 - Logistics Figure 3-6 -12 The second category recognizes the need for high capacity two-way pointt-to-point connectivity between the CINC and echelOns of command above Brigade Wing and CVBG as well as connectivity to support activities in the Continental United States CONUS This connectivity involves high data rate command and control collaborative planning and distributed data base transfer These functions are currently implemented via SATCOM using the DSCS satellite system operating at Super High Frequency SI-IF and commercial SATCOM and ber optic systems The DSCS system provides relative insensitivity to jamming interference if spot beams and large antennas are used at the higher echelons of command since jammers are unlikely to be deployed within the beams servicing the upper echelons of command Commercial systems can provide the connectivity and bandwidth required but cannot guarantee that commercial services will be available in the locations where a CINC must deploy his forces unless formal arrangements are made with commercial communications and information services companies ahead of time - The last category of service is provided by direct broadcast of integrated situation awareness and critical support information to tactical users at all levels of command This category of service provides subscribers with quick efficient and simultaneous access to broad band information via small mobile and inexpensive receive-only terminals The user can employ filters to select broadcast information A satellite broadcast system can be made inherently invulnerable to the ground mobile jamming threats expected in the future in that these threats cannot attack the downlink broadcast information Only an airborne or space-based jamming threat can attack the downlink and this level of sophistication is not expected in many future operations A broadcast satellite system could transmit the joint battlespace picture vital intelligence data weather maps logistics etc The ability of operational commanders to shift a high percentage of the information dissemination needs to the direct broadcast mode is a key enabler of the information systems exibility needed for today's diverse mix of missions 3 6 A Logical Time-Phased Approach to Provide Real Time Information to the Warfighter Within the last several years numerous demonstrations such as ULCHI Focus Lens and Talon Sword have illustrated the benefits of providing real time information directly to the warfighters In addition recent joint exercises such as Tandem Thrust and Ocean Venture have demonstrated the value of interactive video conferencing between the CINC and the ITF and component commanders As illustrated in Figure 3-7 this has spawned a vision of the future wherein all warfighters have the ability to directly access information that can provide decisive warfighting advantage The question is how does evolve from the current system to the vision of the future The formation of a cross-functional multi-level BITF could provide the mechanism for moving from the system in place today to the future vision Such a Task Force could closely couple the warfighters and developers in an environment where they would use modeling and simulation to tradeoff potential performance improvements on the basis of cost schedule and achieved warfighting advantage The BITF could become an important agent for cultural change throughout DOB -13- A Logical Time-Phased Approach to Provide Real Time Information to the Warfighter Existing Minor Mod Out Year Demonstrations Enhancements ancements Future Vision Capability to Existing Systems Battlefield InformatI - -Prioritize needs 54 7 U k -Couple War-lighters and developers to trade requirements any -Use modeling simulation to optimize system configuration Werbresker 3 oTendem Thrust Figure 3-7 3 7 Create Battlefield Information Task Force An Instrument of Change Figure 3-8 provides additional details concerning the charter and makeup of such a BITF The first recommendation of this DSB Task Force is to form a Battlefield Information Task Force charged with the responsibility of defining the warfighters information needs and future vision The BITF chartered by the Secretary of Defense would report to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff JCS The executive agent for the BITF would be the CINCUSACOM The BITF would be led by a military 0-8 Field Commander with a DISA Senior Executive Service deputy The leader of the musti have suf cient operational command experience to articulate the needs of and ITF commanders The primary product of the work of the BITF would be the definition of a vision for future information systems the joint warfighters information system needs for today and the associated milestones that could lead to vision Needs will be traded and evaluated utilizing joint battlespace modeling and simulation tools that also provide the basis for training programs and joint exercises The would sponsor technical demonstrations and in-theater exercises that both educate the warfighters and provide evidence of decisive battlefield advantage Performance metrics would be developed and used to verify overall system improvements Recommendations regarding the system configuration cost and -14- lii'fd f i 'nw'r - schedule would be provided to both the JCS and the Enterprise Integration Council for appropriate action Create Battlefield lnfOrmation Task Recommendation #1 Force An Instrument of Change -- Create a Battlefield Information Task Force BITF Tasks - Bring together warfighters and developers to establish the future vision system needs and evolutionary development plans - - Create and utilhe lolnt battlespace modeling and simulation for requirement tades training and exercises - Develop ACTDs to optimize existing capabilities and demonstrate future growth broadcast request modes - Exploit current science a technology base programs - Demonstrate combat potential of C4l improvements to CINCs via relevant exercises in theater - identity and track 04 performance metrics - Provide recommendations to system developers and Enterprise Integration Council - Develop ongoing Integrated Process Team IPT charter Led by Military 0-8 Field Commander with SE5 Deputy Term 24 months follovIed by ongoing IPT 0 Cost - Action SECDEF Reports to CJCS Executive Agent is CINCUSACOM Figure 3-8 The BITF would be an interim organization that would jump-start the cultural change processes for a period of- 24 months The would then transition to an integrated process team IPT to continue the effort as the system evolves The charter and membership of the follow-on IPT would be established by the BITF during its 24 month tenure - 3 8 Explore Direct Broadcast System To enhance the information services available to the CINC component commanders and deployed warfighting forces the Task Force recommends that the BITF explore the utility of a Direct Broadcast Satellite DBS Service see Figure 3-9 This service would be designed to provide much greater capacity for integrated situation awareness at all levels of command The BITF should use recently deployed on-orbit assets for Direct Broadcast TV and evaluate its utility in joint exercises ACTDs and simulation and modeling When this potential capability to broadcast essential formation to all levels of command to simple receive-only terminals is shown to have utility and the mechanisms for insuring that the appropriate and necessary information can be selectively included within the information broadcast the should pursue its future development -15- Recommendation #2 Explore Direct Broadcast System - Explore direct broadcast satellite service for Warfighter Increase capacity via broadcast downlink lmplement in high frequency military or commercial band Large bandwidth for large volume data dissemination to small simple terminals User at any command level selects information channels he needs Provides integrated intel picture ATO weather logistics etc Delivery of wideband information independent of chaln-of-command organization deployment - leverages commercial infrastructure and equipment Explore the potential to offload traffic from stressed military unique assets Action Battlefield Information Task Force Figure 3-9 If the information needs of the deployed warfighting forces were being adequately satisfied by the satellite systems connecting the deployed terrestrial and airborne tactical networks with the DBS capability providing the large bandwidth background data needed for integrated situation awareness the additional capacity of the DSCS system could be better utilized For example DSCS could then be dedicated for uses in support of the point-to-point wideband connectivity required between the CINC and his component commanders at echelons above brigade wing CVBG as well as providing connectivity back to CONUS 3 9 Provide Robust Wideband Communications There is also a critical need today to provide more robust wide bandwidth point-to-f- - point connectivity to CINCs and their component commanders at levels above Wing Division CVBG see Figure 3-10 Multimedia information is needed to perform such functions as collaborative planning interactive database transfer and video teleconferencing Current systems in the field do not provide such services for use during training or during actual military operations Operational commanders must go to modeling and simulation centers to exploit such technologies The Task Force sees the need to mainstream such services such that the Warfighters can exploit them from the same seat as in other functions The current DSCS system provides a number of wide bandwidth transponders at SHF using a variety of antennas and provides fundamental long haul point-to-point 16- connectivity This system could provide the CINC and his component commanders with additional wideband services needed for collaborative mission planning The BITF should encourage and continue the efforts with ASD C31 and DISA to of oad the current DSCS system as much as possible in order to provide additional capability to the CINCs Provide Robust Wideband Recommendation #3 Communications - Provide more robust wideband communications capacity to CINCs and echelons of command above DivisionNVing CVBG -' Critlcal multimedia information needed for collaborative planning interactive database transfer video teleconferencing etc - -Current systems are inadequate to meet needs of CINCs and component commanders during training and military operations - Options - Fie-evaiuate current oscs system utilization by Intel Community Space Command etc and offload to commercial fiber and SATCOM where feasible -Explore commercial Information services to allow real-time surge CRAF- llke concepts - Action Battlefield Information Task i- orce BITF Figure 3-10 As an alternative adjunct to the of oad approach the BITF should also encourage and continue the efforts of ASD C31 and DISA to explore the acquisition 'of dedicated leases of wideband communications capacity from commercial satellite vendors to allo for real time surge capability during significant con icts The advent of a variety of low cost commercial information services is bringing about a revolution in space-based commercial communications navigation imagery and environmental services In Desert Shield Desert Storm over 80% of the communication satellite use was through commercial assets and three quarters of the airlift was from the civil reserve airlift eet CRAP and commercial systems The Department of Defense should invest in space-based commercial and federal government civil imagery navigation environmental and communications systems to enhance their assured support to military needs Accordingly the Task Force recommends that through the BITF alternatives or dramatically expanded defense prioritized requirements and investments be examined for more dependable and robust dependency and use of -17 commercial imagery navigation environmental and communications information services 3 10 Give the CINCs Better Staff Sup port The DSB Task Force also makes two recommendations aimed at giving the better staff support Figure 3-11 First should provide additional support to operational training and simulation environment Currently CINCs are authorized a - single scientific advisor Given the pace of development in improved information handling and distribution as well as its increased importance to effective warfighting this level of support is judged to be marginal at best Recommendation #4 Give the Better Staff Support - Strengthen technical expertise - Assess new capabilities to meet CINC requirements Appiy promising technologies to operational requirements definition 8upport joint interoperability and unique coalition warfare requirements - lmprove dialogue between user In field and developer 0 Establish Information Warfare Officer as major staff function for each CINC - Formulate lnfonnation Warfare strategy offensive and defensive - Provides dedicated information architecture management Supports tactical and strategic decision making - Control and use of information recognized as a warfare discriminator Action CJCS provide increased technical billets Figure 3-11 The CINC has an increased need to incorporate technical judgments and knowledge in the generation and justification of operational requirements Through emersion in the operational training simulation and actual contingency response environment its envisioned technical expertise can accelerate the battlefield information architecture definition and process improvement The technical advisors could also facilitate and clarify the necessary dialogue between the developers and users throughout the acquisition process The technical expertise should be made available from existing quali ed personnel within the service laboratory and support activities The recommendation should be implemented by SECDEF with CJCS providing increased technical billets for CINC staffs TWO commands should be designated as pilot entities consistent with the USE Acquisition Reform Initiative USACOM and United States Central Command CENTCOM are the recommended commands Secondly the increased importance of Information Warfare and Information in Warfare as true force multipliers increases the urgency to assign an Information Warfare of cer of ce as a dedicated support function for the CINC The designated of cer in charge must be a quali ed combat arms of cer preferably with recent eld duty at the command level Such an of cer would effect the formulation integration and execution of the Commander s operational strategy for information warfare and information in warfare He would ensure the continuity and accessibility of information to support all war ghting levels and he would formulate and support offensive and defensive information warfare to enable achieving a decisive advantage on the battle eld 3 11 Virtual Con ict Eveg Day It is important that modeling and simulation for information systems as well as other operations and training be developed such that the resulting tools enable operators to exploit the tools from the same seat that they use in day to-day operations Today the modeling and simulation assets are located at sites that require War ghters to move to locations that differ from their real command centers This situation makes the resulting training different than real operations The modeling and simulation tools should be integrated with the assets of the operational commands and must be interoperable with the planned C41 for the Warrior common operating environment with USACOM as lead CINC IWFC and should develop and validate a modeling and simulation system for war ghting operations including information systems to support training readiness assessment and acquisition assessments As shown in Figure 3-12 the Task Force recommendation has six major thrusts 0 Initiate and guide the development of an integrated interoperable test 'simulation exercising wargaming and planning system for War ghter information systems in support of the Battlefield Information Task Force and with the goal of mainstreaming modeling and simulation into daily operational use in the GCCS environment 0 Model a joint battlespace environment for requirements acquisition training wargaming exercise activities and planning 0 Include a real world architecture of deployed and projected systems to assess utility limitations and sensitivities of critical parameters including cost 0 Provide interconnection across services and command levels to validate mission planning information and operational order ow and to provide a combat decision aid for the force commander - 0 Provide for a seamless insertion of actual components systems for exibility in evaluation and verification of interoperability -19- 0 Ensure that the interservice interagency joint simulation and warfighting initiatives provide the simulation emulation modeling tools to CINC exercises and warfighting centers and laboratories to develop CINC confidence in their information system readiness in the normal course of joint exercises and demonstrations Recommendation #5 Virtual Conflict Every Day - Combine and expand our capabilities for exercises games simulations and models From the same seat For Readiness assessment - Requirements for acquisition - Debugging - Verification oi interoperability Training Rehearsal - Confidence building - Mission planning - Battle damage assessment Action DMSO with USACOM JWFC and J-7 Figure 3-12 Such efforts to enhance joint simulations exercises and gaming should incorporate metrics for evaluating warfighter information system readiness A marginal increase in current resources may be required but the principal change is a reorientation of current modeling and simulation efforts with higher priority and increased level of supervision gs and scrutiny metrics 3 12 Readiness Impact There is a significant readiness dimension once these recommendations are implemented Regional situations develop very quickly and at the onset are of uncertain dimension Accurate preplanning and exercising builds confidence substantially shortens deployment and execution times materially increases initial effectiveness and should significantly shorten engagement time with fewer losses and consumption of resources today's test of success -20- The CINC information architecture 'pO sture is much improveduhe knows what he needs to succeed When a CINC pulls together a concept of operations for an emerging situation the experience of having a strong modeling system that allowed the CINC to simulate and later train and exercise a potential concept of Operations is a significant confidence builder and readiness boost The CINC wOuld be training and fighting from the same seat 0 He will have tested his concepts A Red Team will have exercised logical counters to his Blue Team operations concepts allowing development of new approaches to increase confidence of success 0 He will determine what information support he'll get When transitioning from the known information architecture structure of Cold War operations to the unknown structure of regional operations there is high uncertainty as to what kind of communication and intelligence support will be available Implementation of these recommendations would materially alter that perception Since most deploying forces would come from CINCUSACOM the standardized modeling and simulation plus joint training and exercising concepts would be a well understood baseline for regional support of deployed operations 0 The CINC will know what to deploy The combined impact of the recommendations would be widespread understanding of regional information architecture requirements and substantial experience in sizing assembling transporting setting up and exercising the information system employment concepts The combination of these four features 1 matching the information system need to the regional problem 2 testing its viability via joint exercising and red teaming 3 educating operating levels of what to expect and depend on and 4 sizing practicing what to take-constitutes a very robust capability that is ready when called Since the use of information in warfare has been identified as a significant force multiplier the CINC needs a means of measuring the state of this readiness Figure 3-13 displays a logical manner to accomplish this - a series of metrics The high end of the spectrum will show in advance the surge capability and capacity required for the information system'infrastructure to support two MRCs near simultaneously The BITF should be tasked to establish information system readiness metrics requirements and measurement processes in consultation with each CINC -21- Information in Warfare - impact on Readiness Readiness is Defined as Ability to Get Essential Information to the Warfighter at the Right Time Train Plan and Execute from the Same Seat S stern Simulation Readiness Metrics 1mm Training 3m cm Response Time Communication Exercises Rumba Surgical Strike Interoperability Red Team A Dopioyabllity OOTW Real World Task the Battlefield Information Task Force to Establish Readiness Metrics and Measurement Process Figure 3-13 4 0 INFORMATION WARFARE 4 1 Information Warfare-The Next Revolutionary Technology The United States perhaps more than any other nation has exploited modern information technology The result is a dependence upon the proper functioning of a US national information infrastructure Virtually every facet of society is touched by information systems television radio banking communications and the entire panoply of electronics associated with industrial manufacturing and service industries The Department of Defense has been a leader in adapting information technologies spends hundreds of millions of dollars to leverage this commercial technology These coincident activities have provided the with very powerful capabilities while simultaneously making US forces dependent on the same technologies U S combat forces have begun to use information per se as a powerful new weapon Paradoxically these same new create significant vulnerabilities The tens of thousands of computers connected to other computers has increased the damage that can be in icted from the vantage point of a single computer or computer-controlled network Figure 4-1 illustrates the overlap of military and civil infospheres and the concomitant spanning of these two domains by Information Warfare Information Warfare - The Next Revolutionary Technology Long-Bow Use of Information Use of Information GunPOWder QWarfare in Civil Society I Economy Peace - Repeating Rifles - Armored Vehicles 0 Military Aircraft - Code Breaking and in Peace 0 Radar 0 The Transistor Overlap Depends on Nuclear Weapons Civil Information Enterprise 0 Guided Missiles 2 - Stealth Figure 4-1 As shown in Figure 4-1 the military use of' information in warfare overlaps civil sector use of such technology depends 'on the civil information enterprise in -23- peacetime as well as in time of war Information Warfare spans all three regions depicted in the Figure 4-1 diagram military-unique civil-unique and common information systems in peacetime and war 4 2 Threat Vulnerabilities of the national information infrastructure NII are easily described however the actual threat is more dif cult to pin down Nevertheless there is mounting evidence that there is a threat that goes beyond hackers and criminal elements see Figure 4-2 This threat arises from terrorist groups or nation states and is far more subtle and dif cult to counter than the more unstructured but grong problem caused by hackers The threat causes concern over the spectre of military readiness problems caused by attacks on computer systems but it goes well beyond Every aspect of modern life is tied to a computer system at some point and most of these systems are relatively unprotected This is especially so for those tied to the N11 Threat Structured - Over 100 nations with capability More than 50 target the US - Some have computer intelligence efforts - Transnational multinational corporations terrorists Unstructured 25 Countries with computer underground groups - lntemational hackers Individual hackers very sophisticated - Really a Continuum A large structured attack with strategic intent against the us could be prepared and exercised under the guise of unstructured activities Figure 4-2 As the US military enters a new world order where regional con icts and economic competition take center stage more and more potential adversaries will see Information Warfare IW as an inexpensive and even surgical means of damaging an adversary's national interests Many such efforts are natural extensions of attempts to gather intelligence by means of attacking computer networks It is only a small step from -24 exploiting a system to corrupting or even disabling it An unstructured attack could be used as screen or as a surrogate for more insidious efforts by a hidden adversary Although there are limited efforts underway to detect and counter the unstructured threat there is no nationally coordinated Capability to counter or even detect a structured threat The matter is made more complicated by the fact that many systems that need protection are non-DOD The Computer Security Act of 1987 limits DoD s ability to use its core expertise much of which is resident at the National Security Agency NSA to help protect these systems A national policy for IW is required that addresses this threat and - offers an integrated response encompassing and non-DOD elements 4 3 Global Information Infrastructure Supports Mili y Operations The Global Information Infrastructure GII which interacts with or supports military operations is a vast complex set of information systems supported in the large by commercial grids and infrastructure Figure 4-3 In fact communications to and from forward deployed U S forces likely traverses a commercial network The protection of critical segments of the must be a concern as becomes more dependent on information systems and hence more vulnerable to an adversary exploiting that vulnerability Global Information Infrastructure Supports Military Operations 0 Media and Infrastructure public switched networks Commercial communications satellite systems - U S foreign - Intelsat Inmarsat Panamsat Navigation systems Transoceanic cable system Global positioning system Foreign telephone telegraph Databases Intemet Milsatcom - DSCS UHF Tactical networks and CZ Supporting infrastructure - Power grid commercial system support spares maintenance transport etc Figure 4-3 Interoperability between information systems more real time transfer of vast streams of digital data huge on-line databases and powerful client-server computer networks are trends in the G11 This means that standards protocols and commercial off- the-shelf technology take on more significance for the It also says that in reality the government does not control the development or proliferation of information technology The challenge for is to take maximum advantage of the bene ts of the G11 while at the same time to understand the need to protect critical elements of this system of systems 4 4 Securig Commission Report - Februagy 1994 Information systems security INFOSEC was one of the two areas specifically recommended for increased investment by the Joint Security Commission Report issued in February 1994 see Figure 4-4 The report noted that INFOSEC technology development has lagged far behind information Ln warfare system technology development Joint Security Commission Report - February 1994 The Commission considers the security of information systems and networks to be the major security challenge of this decade and possibly the next century and believes there is insufficient awareness of the grave risks we face in this arena We have neither come to grips with the enormity of the problem nor devoted the resources necessary to understand fully much less rise to the challenge Figure 4-4 Noting the current level of attacks on information systems the report recommended immediate steps to 0 Increase development of automated capabilities to detect network intrusions 0 Develop system management tools to react to intrusions 0 Accelerate development and deployment of network protection to enhance confidentiality integrity and authentication of unclassified as well as classified networks and 0 Increase training and awareness -26- The Joint Security Commission Report specifically proposed a security approach based on risk management rather than risk avoidance to drive down cost and increase deployment of INFOSEC The report recommended increased investment to a level of 5% to 10% of information systems infrastructure costs - including Operations and maintenance 4 5 Information Warfare IW C2W Definition DoD Non-Do Coordination 3 Assessment Intelligence Counteriorce Deterrence Figure 4-5 There are a number of issues in IW The term information warfare itself means different things to different people Others terms such as command and control warfare are used in related contexts but they are also interpreted in varying ways These differences are great enough to seriously impair development of policy strategy tactics ands program plans The use of euphemisms in unclassified definitions compounds the 3 4 problem Further serious management attention is needed to develop and promulgate a set of useful understandable terminology Secondly IW moves the into new roles IW operations involve civilian assets as well as military assets Such operations are inherently joint In fact IW can be conducted globally Because of this the coordination of such operations with organic assets of the Warfighters is difficult Personnel supporting the CINCs and ITF commanders may not have trained with other force elements Many IW effects do not involve physical damage though some can either directly or indirectly IW capabilities do provide significant lethality and are force Options for -27 employment by operational commanders on both sides of a con ict IW can be lethal to operational forces These soft effects may however be hard to observe and assess and it may be difficult to base certain actions on them Intelligence collection and evaluation of IW capabilities and activities is new and difficult Some IW attacks are dif cult to detect What IW counterforce and deterrence mean and the extent to which either or both can be incorporated as a part of an overall IW strategy are also at issue As shown in Figure 4-5 information warfare has many elements some new some old which interrelate in complex ways Some are 0 operations and perception management which have been used for millennia as forms of information and in uence 0 INFOSEC and Operational Security and 0 Technology blockades which can be used to restrict ow of information technology to adversaries A new type of information warfare exploits the ubiquity of software control for networks telecommunications data base management and operating systems of all kinds It has both offensive and defensive aspects Information warfare can in principle be used in peacetime peacetime preparation for war and in war It can involve military and civil information systems IW further blurs the distinction between peace and war 4 6 Offensive Operations In the information age military commanders should be positioned to use information as another weapon similar in character to the other available systems With the development of the various Information Warfare options the CINC Warfighter can achieve the same precision kill as he presently accomplishes with precision guided munitions In the case of IW weapons the target is the information system that controls an adversary s weapons and platforms Even though the effect 'of IW is nonlethal such spoofing of adversary information systems can render their weapons and platforms harmless to US forces and can even provide lethal effects loss of aircraft control Figure 4 6 depicts IW as a tool for the warfighter Military commanders should be able to 0 Manage perceptions of events or circumstances 0 Deceive potential adversaries 0 In uence information in content or delivery 0 Protect its interests through INFOSEC or Communications Security and 0 Debilitate or destroy information of others needs clearer definitions of what information warfare and command and control warfare are and what they are not There are important distinctions to be made about and non-DOD roles as well as which organizations ought to be responsible for which activities The concept of information warfare in peace will require levels of coordination not previously demanded of such disparate players the State Department the Commerce Department Federal Emergency Management Agency -28- FEMA industry etc Damage assessment of the results of information warfare will be dif cult - there may be very few observables Finally intelligence support of IW will demand difficult-to-obtain information specifically information required to assess the viability of IW for counterforce and deterrence Offensive Operations PGM CBU Jamming Spoofing Munitions Precision Area Precision Figure 4-6 4 7 Conduct Net Assessment information systems and the National Information Infrastructure are playing an increasingly important role in the effective conduct of military operations U S offensive information warfare capabilities offer great promise in providing a critical advantage across the information warfare spectrum in all kinds of operations At the same time growing information warfare capabilities are increasing the vulnerability of and national systems and have the potential to degrade the effectiveness of military systems and operations - A broad net assessment is needed to determine the impact of the full range of IW activities on military capabilities installations operations and support activities see Figure 4-7 It should include an assessment of the interplay among US and potential adversaries offensive IW defensive IW and IW intelligence operations both current and projected It should address a range of scenarios and threat models This assessment will be one basis for policy organizational resource and strategy decisions The following topics should be addressed in a net assessment -29 0 The performance effectiveness of and national information systems in an IW environment and resultant implications 0 The nature extent and implications of vulnerabilities of the US C41 infrastructure and its operation 0 The robustness and vulnerability of US weapons systems to f0 Evolving U S and adversary IW capabilities and vulnerabilities and 0 The cost and effectiveness of strategy options for IW and for the use of information in warfare Recommendation #6 Conduct Net Assessment 0 A broad Net Assessment is needed of Information Warfare 0 It should examine and national systems and implications Nature extent and implications of vulnerabilities Evolving US and adversary capabilities - Cost and effectiveness of strategy options 0 input to national IW policy review 0 Involve Battlefield information Task Force Action SECDEF undertake Net Assessment When Complete by September 1995 Figure 4-7 The results of the net assessment should provide inputs to and participation in the National Policy Review and should include an evaluation of strategies to offensive defensive and intelligence capabilities against both structured and unstructured threats 4 8 Increase Defensive Information Warfare Emphasis continues to field information systems that are vulnerable to outside attack Through necessity has tied its information systems to the private commercial sector and routinely use INMARSAT INTELSAT EUROSAT etc Additionally many users are directly hooked to the INTERNET The Joint Security Commission among others has recognized this shortfall and has recommended concentrate on protecting -30- systems NSA has the charter to perform this task in coordination with the Of ce of the Secretary of Defense Command Control and Communications OSD C3D DISA and The Services and Agencies need to increase their funding to support defensive IW measures see Figure 4-8 There are two parallel paths of observation on Defensive IW programs On the one hand there is a baseline of critical data that must be protected must identify essential networks and systems that contain this critical data to perform a vulnerability assessment of those systems On the other hand one must consider varied and unidentified potential adversaries and their threats to US information systems A risk assessment that compares and contrasts these two parallel efforts that results in a risk management decision becomes the basis for a defensive program strategy After the strategy is developed the result is the processes procedures and systems used as a basis for continued protection of critical data Current policy Directive TS 3600 1 directs that command and control of forces shall be planned and exercised in such a manner as to minimize the amount of information transfer required for effective direction and application of force to ensure our forces are able to operate successfully in degraded information and Communication environments Additionally elements of the information system critical to transmission and use of minimum-essential information for control and direction of forces are directed to be designed and employed in a manner that minimizes or prevents exploitation denial or degradation of services Current standards policies procedures and tools are designed to mitigate an attack on the information and information infrastructure mounted for the purpose of destroying or disabling the functions that depend upon the information and or information infrastructure without regard to the classification of the information If the US military is to maintain a competitive combat advantage in further con icts the information and information services upon which the US military depends must be protected commensurate with the intended use Analysis shows that all of the Department of Defense military and support functions are highly dependent upon the information and information services provided by the Defense Information Infrastructure DII The DH is highly susceptible to attacks which disrupt information services availability or corrupt the data integrity within the infrastructure Many' nations and groups have the capability to cause significant disruption both availability and integrity to the D11 and in turn cripple U S operational readiness and military effectiveness The design factors used to protect against normal breakage and natural disasters or attacks to obtain access to sensitive information content are inadequate to deal with the levels of disruption that can readily be caused by malicious actions For example an signal can protect the content of information An attack that upsets the of the device will not expose the content of the information but may stop the ow of the information and thus stop the function using the information If the Department of Defense is to maintain a suitable level of military preparedness to meet the US national security requirements the information infrastructure upon which it depends for information services must be strengthened against malicious attack This must address protection against attacks detection of attacks and the ability to react to attacks -31- A key problem is the vulnerability of national and infrastructures and the defensive aspects of dealing with those vulnerabilities A Program Objective Memorandum POM issue paper on a defensive IW alternative exists Also the Joint Security Commission recommended spending 5-10% of the infrastructure costs to protect the civil infrastructure These estimates not withstanding the Task Force s judgment is that no comprehensive analysis has been completed of the cost and effectiveness of defensive weapons for systems to establish where the knee of the cost benefit curve is nor how far beyond the knee should be willing to spend considering the gravity of the vulnerabilities for defense activities in both peace and war Despite the absence of such an analysis this Task Force is persuaded that is currently spending far too little on defensive IW and that the gravity and potential urgency of the problem deserves redress We therefore recommend that 0 The Secretary of Defense support immediate increases in funding for defensive IW focusing attention on protection of critical information services 0 As a more detailed part of the Net Assessment process recommended above the Secretary of Defense should direct ASD C31 to carry out - An assessment of 5 critical information needs - Threat development as part of the National Intelligence Estimate NIB process and - A risk assessment and a risk management strategy to apportion actions during procedures processes and systems Increase Defensive Information Recommendation #7 Warfare Emphasis information systems are vulnerable to Information Warfare - The Joint Security Commission recommends spending 5% to 10% of information systems to ensure availability confidentiality and integrity Would equate to about $1 253 to $2 508 per year for 03 in 000 Action - SECDEF support immediate increases in funding for defensive IW Focus on protection of critical services BITF exercise and simulate IW and resultant degradations JCS design military operations to avoid catastrophic failure if information is degraded - DISA NSAencourage the use of available multi-Ievel security trusted technology everywhere Trusted technology can remove the need for duplicate systems and reduce personnel support - support the recommendations made by the Joint Security Commission' In Chapter 8 of their report dated February 28 1994 Figure 4-8 -32 4 9 Red Team to Evaluate Information Weli fare Readiness and Vulnerabilities Red Teams that imitate the capabilities of potential adversaries have been used in the past to determine vulnerabilities and countermeasures to a wide range of threat types IW Red Teams are needed to operate against IW protection afforded to individual weapons systems elements of information systems and full information systems that support defense operations Figure The results of Red Team actions and analyses could be incorporated into the modeling and simulation recommendation Section 3 11 and Red Teams could be an active player in the BITF Red Team methodologies and results could also be an integral element of the recommended net assessment An IW Red Team should be incorporated in instruction 5000 1 3600 1 and other applicable instructions and directives Red Team to Evaluate Information Recommendation #8 Warfare Readiness and Vulnerabilities - A Red Team activity is needed to help evaluate Information Warfare vulnerabilities and readiness It should be - Integrated with other assessment and exercise activities --Audited by ASD cal -Coordinated with parallel DCI activity Distributed coordinated audited system for information Warfare Red Teaming Action SECDEF When Within 180 days Figure 4-9 4 10 Joint Strategy Cell for Offensive and Defensive Information Warfare An IW strategy that integrates offensive IW defensive IW and intelligence operations must also integrate IW with information in warfare and take adversary actions reactions and evolution into account This Task Force recommends that as shown in Figure 4-10 the VC1CS create an integrated joint IW strategy cell This cell should include 'at a minimum representatives of the 1-2 1-3 1-5 1-6 and 1-7 staff elements the US Special Operations Command the Services the and the intelligence agencies It should be led by a Flag level officer and report directly to the VC1CS -33- A major function of this cell would be to speed up the process by developing a focused operational strategy to implement the information warfare technology revolution Joint 000 Strategy Cell for Offensive Recommendation #9 and Defensive Information Warfare 0 Need for more focus and emphasis on IW in - Need to develop IW strategy that lntegrates offensive and defensive IW lntegrates with Information l_r_I_Warfare Takes adversary actions reactions evolution into account lnvolve Joint Staff CINCs Services DISA and Intelligence Agencies - Create an integrated joint IW strategy cell in the JCS lntegrated at Flag level Reporting to Action Figure 4-10 4 11 Maior Policy Issues Information warfare issues are larger than but there is no national IW policy Figure 4-11 although a PRD is in draft The vulnerabilities of the national use of information coupled with the global spread of information warfare capabilities raise the prospect of strategic information war with potentially grave implications for US interests This possibility should be a focus of the national policy review based on inputs from at There is a policy on Information Warfare whose basic strategy is to seek dominance in both the use of information as warfare and in Information Warfare Below this basic strategy there are fundamental questions as to how to achieve dominance within available resources The questions and issues for are very similar to the issues at the national level This is not surprising since the prospects for civil information warfare in peacetime have much in common with concerns Alternatives or building blocks for both national and strategy all have cost and effectiveness issues and some especially in regards to the civil infrastructure have legal and or other policy implications Major Policy Issues Recommendation #10 Draft PRD in work 0 Key issues VuInerabllity of national use of Information - Possibillty of strategic peacetime Information war Protecting national Information systems weapon systems policy acquisition and export - There Is no national policy on Information Warfare - Computer Security Act bars from bringing competence to bear fully No Do policy on IW In acquisition or export of technology and Actions SECDEF review draft PFID and related issues Expedite Net Assessment to support development of national task ASD cal to lead development of 000 policy on in Figure 4-11 There are several common issues between the national and the problems First widespread protection of the civil and military information enterprise or making it more robust against degradation would be a and extremely costly process and there is a fundamental teclmical question as to their effectiveness Substantial protection of the civil information enterprise would entail a cultural change in the private sector side of the enterprise The development of the information infrastructure has been based on ease of use and access Software has stressed friendliness and a trend toward openness These increase vulnerabilities System intrusions by hackers and the grong incidence of industrial software espionage and fraud are beginning to cause change but there will continue to be a tension between utility and security Further to have high confidence that the vulnerabilities would be reduced below the level of strategic concern the Government would have to insert itself more and in new ways I This also means that unclassified but not sensitive federal data could be left totally unprotected For example medical financial economic or air traffic control system data may be deemed in this unprotected category In both the civil and cases potential adversaries' need to be taken into account 50 also does the evolution of the strategies and capabilities global technology base as it shapes both US and adversaries' capabilities especially because generation changes in information technology happen so fast The interplay between offensive and defensive information warfare both that of the United States and that of potential adversaries must be addressed Xe has begun to address information warfare related questions but has devoted more attention to offensive IW than to defensive IW Of particular note is the fact that the majority of communications pass through the highly vulnerable Public Switched Network PSN The NSA possesses the critical expertise needed to help protect the PSN and the larger NII but IS limited by existing authorities e g the Computer Security Act of 1987 to dealing with federal systems handling classi ed information The same Act assigns the National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST the role of protecting federal-only unclassified but sensitive information is responsible for protecting the commercial public and private systems upon which national viability now depends This must be addressed in the national policy review Likewise acquisition and export policy related to IW systems currently falls into several areas of responsibility A coherent unifying policy is needed to bring all aspects of IW into focus and avoid wasting decreasing resources SECDEF is in a good position to draw upon DoD s IW experience and lead the effort to develop an effective national IW policy The Secretary of Defense should review the draft PRD and the related issues The net assessment recommended earlier in this report should be expedited to provide a basis for these reviews The Secretary of Defense should also direct ASD C31 to lead development of policy for treating IW in acquisition and in export policy 5 0 BUSINESS PRACTICES 5 1 Stren enin our Warfi ter Information Infrastructure Mana ement Processes This section of the report summarizes the assessment of DoD's business practices for information systems Business practices are defined broadly in this assessment to include modeling and simulation for use in training exercise and requirements definition the requirements definition process for information systems net assessments in information in warfare and information warfare and the roles and mission of the various organizations involved in information systems development and use with special attention regarding the need for and role of an architect for military information and the acquisition process Strengthening our Warfighter Information Infrastructure Management Processes - Past investments in Warfighter C4I have resulted in a system of systems that does not adequately support the warrior especially in joint operations 0 has recently initiated management processes which should yield major improvements as they mature 0 But some concerns remain Fioleslresponsibilities for Warfighter information systems are diffuse --lnadequate Wariighter requirements input to information architecture acquisition processes lnabllity of 000 acquisition system to keep pace with information needs and technology Figure 5-1 In reviewing U S battlefield information systems the Task Force concluded that has built a system of systems that collectively does not adequately support the warfighters especially where they fight in joint operations Figure 5-1 There are shortfalls in interoperability information dissemination and the rapid reconfigurability of battlefield information systems For example US forces encountered difficulties in preparing coordinating and disseminating the Air Tasking Order during Desert Storm had problems in disseminating imagery to tactical users in Desert Storm especially national imagery and encountered chronic problems when trying to equip an ad hoc Joint Task Force with appropriate information system capabilities -37 However the has recently established a number of management process initiatives which ought to significantly rectify these deficiencies as these processes mature and become a part of the DoD's management mechanisms These initiatives include 0 The C41 for the Warrior Vision 0 The implementation of the Global Command and Control System 0 The expanded Joint Requirements - Oversight Council JROC Joint Capabilities Assessment and the more vigorous plan for the JROC in articulating military requirements 0 Interoperability initiatives within the DISA including the Technical Architecture Framework for Information Management T AFIM the Defense Information Infrastructure the Joint Interoperability Test Center and others 0 The DEPSECDEF's initiative to establish an Enterprise Integration Board and an Enterprise Integration Council to oversee the interoperability and cross-functional management of DoD s Corporate Information Management CIM systems 0 Information architecture initiatives that are underway in each of the services and finally of course The Acquisition Reform and commercial off the-shelf COTS initiatives already underway However even taking into account these constructive initiatives some major concerns remain First the roles and responsibilities for our warfighter information systems are more diffuse than the roles and responsibilities assigned for our functional component information systems such as logistics health and finance The mechanisms that produce information architectures and information system acquisition processes suffer from a lack of adequate input from the joint warfighter community And the acquisition system is unable to keep pace with the rapid evolution of information technology which is occurring today in the commercial sector 5 2 Structure Concept for Improving Our Warfighter Information Infrastructure Management In seeking constructive and viable management structure changes to improve our warfighter information processes the Task Force rst reviewed the existing authorities and responsibilities of the major entities who oversee warfighter information systems in including statutory responsibilities and examined the initiatives the currently has underway to deal with the concerns identified on the previous chart As depicted in Figure 5-2 the DEPSECDEF in April 1994 created the BIB and EIC to achieve the goals of Corporate Information Management and to undertake an enterprise integration approach to the accelerated implementation of migration of our legacy information systems and establishment of data standards and process improvements This structure provides a forum for interoperability and cross-functional issues but the charters of the Board and Council do not include war ghter information systems Also within DISA there is an ongoing initiative to establish a technical architectural framework of interOperability guidelines interface speci cations and standards -- such as data element definitions -which are beginning under the general auspices of the TAFIM DISA has recently published a second revision of the TAFIM and is in the review process now It represents a preliminary first-generation technical architectural framework -38- 4 within which individual systems can be developed which will possess the attributes of interoperability and interconnectivity Finally current systems are designed based on requirements from the appropriate functional community Service or agency Jointness is not a major driver and developers are not now required to comply with cross-functional and interoperability requirements Structure Concept for Improving Our Warfighter Information Infrastructure Management 'se Expanded erp DEPSECDEF Chair JROC ' tegram chcs Secs usus Board Warfighters Information Requirements Process Enterprise PDUSD Co-Chalrs Battlefield ASD can Informatlon ln igursgi FunctIonaI Components Task Force J-s Warfighter Warfighter DISA Information Information JBOO- - Intartacaa 5 Requrrements Technical sum Validated Architecture Architecture - Exists Framework Framework Proposed Figure 5-2 The structure is charged with responsibilities in the following areas 0 Information system technical requirements definition 0 Incorporation of legacy systems within information system modernization plans 0 Information system interoperability 0 Definition of a technical architectural framework for information systems and 0 Policies and procedures for implementing this framework The difficulties in the existing structure include the following warfighter information systems are not included in the current charter and the warfighter input to these processes was not adequate Therefore the Task Force recommends that the DEPSECDEF augment this Enterprise Integration Board Council structure to coOrdinate the integration of warfighter requirements and the technical architecture framework for warfighter information systems just as it does for functional component systems This requires a change to the charter of the Board and Council -39- Secondly the Task Force recommends that the DEPSECDEF clarify that the Board's responsibility and authority include oversight and con ict resolution of interfaces standards interoperability and cross-functional issues which are associated with information systems which must operate in a joint environment Systems design system architecture and development are not a part of this charter Third the director DISA should review the TAFIM initiatives currently underway and ensure that they are brought to a satisfactory state of maturity to serve as part of an iterative process to evolve better interface standards and interoperability requirements Fourth the IROC should include in its expanded processes the infusion of its validated joint warfighting requirements into the DoD-wide information architecture process A Warfighter Information Requirements Architecture Framework based on a yet-to-be-developed Functional Architecture Framework for Information Management FAFIM compatible with the TAFIM should be developed and formalized This Warfighter Information Requirements Framework should be used to develop the warfighter systems technical requirements which will in turn provide integrated and joint requirements to systems developers Finally the Battlefield Information Task Force recommended earlier in this presentation should be tasked to dynamically identify cost effective and timely actions for improving the reconfiguration evolution acquisition test and fielding of warfighter information systems using the mechanisms described earlier The BITF should provide ongoing input to the development of war ghter information requirements architectures and systems and when necessary support the Enterprise Integration Council in its oversight and con ict resolution roles The Task Force believes that these changes to the existing management structure will allow implementation of a dynamic process that will result in much improved interoperability of our warfighter information systems and better exploitation of the leverage that those systems can potentially provide to our combat forces 5 3 Rapid Commercial Information Technology Evolution Must be Infused into Systems Figure 5-3 depicts the startling disparity in development cycles and life cycles associated with commercial information systems hardware and software contrasted with weapon systems The horizontal axis represents the duration of these cycles in elapsed time measured in years on a logarithmic scale Reading from the bottom up one - can note that typical commercial hardware and software development cycles for information systems range from a few months to a few years at most and further that typical life cycles for use of these same commercial systems ranges from a few months again to only a few years - certainly less than a decade For most commercial hardware and software systems after four to five years it is now cheaper to replace them than to repair their components since one or more generations of hardware software serving the same purpose with better capabilities have likely been fielded by that time In stark contrast the typical weapon system development cycle ranges from about seven to fifteen years a decade or more The lifetime for most of our weapon systems is measured in decades This is due in part to the fact that the technologies that -40- drive our weapons systems airframe and propulsion technologies for military aircraft for example - are evolving at a much slowerqj-pace and acquisition and life cycles of these durations can accommodate them in most cases Rapid Commercial Information Technology Evolution Must be Infused into Systems l- Typical Weapon System Life Cycle - I Typical Weapon System Development Cycle Typical Commercial Hardwarel' Software Life Cycle Typical Commercial Hardware Software Development Cycle - I 1 1 10 100 Log Time years Figure 5-3 The challenge facing D00 is to take advantage of this very rapid evolution in commercial information technologies in order to achieve and sustain information dominance on the battlefield For example if a weapon system life cycle is thirty years six to ten generations of commercial hardware and software could be inserted into the weapon if could make information system acquisition timelines as short as the commercial development cycles In order to do this must develop new acquisition processes to reconfigure evolve acquire test and field both embedded and stand-alone warfighter information systems at a rate that takes full advantage of these rapid commercially driven technology generational cycles The ongoing acquisition reform initiatives are crucial for information system dominance but more is needed to allow to buy commercial products ands services directly and to buy into commercial acquisition practices - 5 4 Reform Warfighter Information Infrastructure Management Figure 5-4 summarizes the specific actions that the DEPSECDEF must direct in order to accomplish the structural process improvements described previously Brie y the Enterprise Integration Council must be assigned the added responsibility to provide -41- oversight and con ict resolution for warfighter information systems The warfighter must make a broader more comprehensive and timely input to this entire process and the Task Force proposes that the be used to provide dynamic recommendations for improvements and that the IROC and Joint Staff play an expanded role in the infusion of their requirements The Task Force endorses the activities already underway in DISA to achieve a dynamic architectural framework for our joint warfighter information systems Reform Warfighter Information i Recommendationtu Infrastructure Management Actioni 0 DEPSECDEF should augment the Enterprise Integration Council structure to coordinate Integration of requirements and technical architectural frameworks for Information systems Add battlefield information systems Add oversight and conflict resolution of framework Use Battle eld Information Task Force for generating alternatives Task JROC and JCS staff to develop maintain and validate a warfighter information requirements architecture framework Ratify DISA role as technical architect for interfaces standards and interoperability 0 USD should augment acquisition reform efforts to assure compatibility with the extremely short development and product lifetimes of commercial software and microelectronics Figure 5-4 In order to take advantage of the significant opportunities and leverage which battlefield information systems can provide the Task Force recommends that the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology undertake an initiative to identify and implement the unique aspects of the reconfiguration evolution acquisition testing and fielding processes that can be used to exploit the unique aspects of information systems The Task Force recommends that this initiative draw upon the excellent work done in the recent acquisition process studies cited earlier and recent information systems acquisition process successes such as the Mobile Subscriber Equipment that the process take full account of the warfighters' views and perspectives that exploit the unique and rapid evolution in commercial information technologies and finally that ensure adequate protection against potential vulnerabilities in evolving information systems These changes can be implemented abost immediately and the costs associated with this recommendation consist only of the opportunity costs of rationalizing the evolution of a system of interoperable information systems -42 6 0 FOR INFORMATION DOMINANCE Fi for Information Dominance Information in Warfare I Information Warfare Information Warfare nfnnation Inforrnatin Systems Protection 3r 3 75' 1 nformation Movement 1 Information imiIation Figure 6-1 While the Task Force found no breakthrough efforts it is clear that since potential adversaries have access to the same modern information systems technologies as the United States leveraging of commercial technology through unique military value- added exploitation and investment in defense-peculiar needs will be critical to attaining and maintaining information dominance of the battlefield In that light as is indicated in Figure 6-1 two special needs of military information systems relate to enhanced reconfigurability and information and information systems protection Commercial systems are designed to work in relatively static locations with predictable communications and repeatable information needs Military scenarios are too diverse t0 make a system designed under these assumptions acceptable While the commercial- 5 world has security concerns most are focused on protecting access to information The military has this concern plus the possibility for network disruption In addition the mobilization of military systems complicates the ability to authenticate users and their uses Of systems There are three factors that should differentiate US military information systems from those of a capable adversary sensors ability to recon gure under stress and ability to conduct information warfare When coupled with advanced U S simulation capability the warfighter can develop and tune the skills and techniques necessary to establish and preserve a competitive edge in dynamically managing information 'system reconfiguration Enhanced Reconfigurability and Information and Information Systems Protection are improved by leveraging commercial and or technologies Supporting technologies for Enhanced Reconfigurability are categorized as Joint Battlespace Modeling Simulation Environment Information Assimilation and Information Movement For Information and Information Systems Protection applicable technologies are categorized as Enterprise Security Network Security and Data Security Figures 6-2 and 6-3 provide the specifics on each of these technologies Note from these gures that the Task Force con- siders it important to leverage current commercial and ongoing efforts in many refocus areas as well as to initiate more investment where the commercial marketplace does not lead 6 1 Enhanced Reconfiggabilig 4- DLeverage Commercial Enhanced and or Ongoing - - - Need More 000 Investment Reconflgurab'l'ty Jolnt Battlespace Information Information Environment Assimilation Movement CI Data program encapsula- CI Multi-media CI lntemet Intelink tion for legacy systems 0 Display devices 0 Multicasting CI Distributed 0 High density storage CI Direct broadcast telecom heterogeneous DBMS 0 Large heterogeneous DBMS CI ATM DIS STOW CI Collaborative distributed Cl Broadband CI Distributed interactive planning systems narrowband ISDN modeling simulation tools 0 Voice recognition CI Gigabit Terabit networks Visualization human factors Component systems human interfaces Antennas development 8 CI Language translation Low-cost digital radio Dynamic information Common reference models distribution - digital terrain it Application specific Self-describing data data compression models evaluation tools Figure 6-2 The necessity to deal with a wide range of unanticipated crises that involve joint and coalition operations places new requirements on the warfighter information systems These systems must be designed with architectures that facilitate reconfiguration at two levels First the systems should be designed to permit new technologies and functionality to be rapidly added to the system Second they should permit the warrior to adapt the system to meet unique needs Meeting these dual requirements necessitates refocused investment in the three areas described below loint Eaglespacg Environments Today s simulation based training systems planning and collaboration tools and operational systems have been separately developed - and do not interoperate Additionally separate communications systems are used to support these applications Having these separate systems results in a very inefficient use of our resources More importantly it deprives the warfighter from using the simulation environment to evaluate new information tools and to plan for and rehearse operations using real data and the same information systems that will be used in exercises and combat operations Technologies needed to support joint battlespace environments are 0 Tools for developing fielding and evaluating component systems A great deal of exibility is needed in- the joint battlespace environment to accommodate the testing and evaluation of new - information systems and software Tools and methodologies are needed to support the development and elding of systems by assembling components and rapidly tailoring the system to meet specific mission needs These tools should incorporate performance metrics help evaluate interoperability and provide measures of relative operational utility WW Traditional problems of information overload and miscommunication are exacerbated by unanticipated crises joint operations and coalition operations Overcoming these problems depends on leveraging advancing technologies in three areas information presentation information filtering and and tools for collaboration However even with today s technologies problems remain in integrating information from the large collection of preexisting incompatible databases and in finding common reference models for information presentation should make further investments in specific technologies that will support these needs 0 Common reference models Information presentation is a three step process data must be collected it must be fused to form functional composites and it must be presented in a form the customer can rapidly and unambiguously interpret Much of the information needed for the battle eld picture can be described in geographic coordinates locations of friendly and enemy forces supply routes weather planned maneuvers etc During a crisis when there is a need to rapidly and unambiguously interpret such information graphical presentations based on digitized geography and terrain are an excellent way for humans to absorb complex information More research is needed into the technology to support the use of digital terrain as a common reference model for presentation Better techniques are needed to convert imagery data to digitized terrain data at varying resolutions to improve animation techniques and to overcome bandwidth problems associated with transmission and display 0 Self-describing data models The problem of multiple representations and multiple interpretations of data can be solved by imposing data standards or by requiring the use of standardized data dictionaries An alternative approach is to design data models in which the semantic meanings for the data items are attached to the data items These self-describing data models can facilitate the integration of data from numerous heterogeneous data sources Additional research in these techniques is especially needed due to the urgent need for data definition and waveform standards for joint operations Information Movement information systems will become increasingly heterogeneous and dynamic They will incorporate high bandwidth backbones satellite direct broadcast systems high capacity Wireless communications and low data rate tactical networks in a telecommunications environment that dynamically evolves to support -45- varying Operations and within the course of a single operation To maintain a telecommunications advantage the component systems must continue to evolve and better methods for managing bandwidth and information distribution must be found Technologies needed to support information movement are 0 Low-cost digital radios Advances in semiconductor technology including mixed- signal front ends offer the prospect of building low-cost digital radio systems which can meet a wide range of voice and data needs in These systems must interoperate with a wide range of legacy systems as well as meet future needs for high bandwidth data transmission jamming and spoofing Systems such as Speakeasy are being developed as proof of principal the challenge is to leverage-the commercial manufacturing base to develop low-cost radios which can meet a wide range of needs 0 Advanced antennas As the amount of data required on the battlefield continues to rapidly increase mobile tactical units must be able to access multiple satellites simultaneously to achieve the necessary bandwidth Currently single-band electro- mechanical antennas can access only one satellite at a time There is a pressing requirement for low-cost broadband high gain electronically steerable antennas that can simultaneously access multiple satellites both and commercial in different parts of the sky 0 Dynamic information distribution Tools for managing the ow of information become crucial as telecommunication systems become more complex combining high bandwidth backbones satellite direct broadcast systems high capacity ploint-to-point communications and low data rate tactical networks These tools must matCh user information needs with bandwidth constraints and provide for the dynamic reconfiguring of the information ow when a communications component becomes unavailable 0 Application-specific data compression New technologies are needed to cope with DOD-unique needs for data compression particularly for image and aperture radar SAR data There is a need to dynamically alter compression ratios and elds of compression as communications bandwidth changes in the transmission systems Additionally systems which allow users to specify variable compression ratios for different regions of a single image need to be further developed 6 2 Information and Infarmation Svstems Protection The DoD s reliance on increasingly sophisticated information systems provides numerous opportunities for penetration and disruption by both sophisticated and unsophisticated adversaries Currently data security can be costly and a major constraint on timely information flow to the user Consequently low cost- ways must be found to implement security so that it does not limit the value that can be provided by the information system Two recommendations are made First should harmonize its current practices with the recommendations of the Joint Security Task Force and the recommendations made in the for the N11 Technical Challenges report Second should field -46- available security components and make further investments in several specific technologies that are critical to support DoD s information and information systems protection needs which at a minimum must provide for the development of capabilities and tools for protection against attack detection of attacks and the ability to react to attacks These technologies fall into three broad categories enterprise security network security and data security Each of these described turn below nformation ClLeverage Commercial Don Information Systems Need More 000 lnvestrnent Enterprise Security - - ata Security 0 Technology DAuthorization authentication Cl Protect data on DMS Secure E-Mail access controls methods personal info cards El Digital signatures Automated classification Vulnerability models and downgrading procedures metrics Classification Tools for risk Failure detection management for data management containment recovery objects Component level procedures Data integrity authorization lnfrastructure protection techniques authentication access mechanisms Data contamination control techniques recovery procedures Figure 6-3 Enterprise Security It 15 important to preserve the security needs of the enterprise while maintaining a exible information system that supports the needs of the warrior An appropriate strategy of risk management is needed which provides protection for secret to unclassified information based on COTS and government-off-the-shelf COTS products being assumed to be adequate protectors unless shown otherwise Technologies needed to support enterprise security are 0 Automated classi cation downgrading procedures PrOgrams such as Radiant Mercury provide an automated way to downgrade certain information for distribution These tools should be expanded to cover broadcast systems and be made available as network tools 0 Tools for risk management Tradeoffs between the need for information protection and the benefits of broad information distribution systems are inevitable Tools for risk assessment and management are needed to make these tradeoffs in relevant manners 0 Component level authorization authentication and access control Techniques are needed to authenticate components verify that they are acting functionally as they are authorized and control their access to the information system -47 Wig Information systems depend heavily on telecommunications networks with significant vulnerabilities Few technologies exist to assess these vulnerabilities or to cope with catastrophic failures to the networks Technologies needed to support network security are 0 Vulnerability models and metrics Networks have many sources of vulnerability and users need models metrics and tools to assess these vulnerabilities These models and tools should build on experiences with actual attacks Failure detection containment and recovery procedures Simple systems failures power grid and the telephone system and overt attacks Internet worm have lead to catastrophic failures in our infrastructure Research is needed to develop methods to detect isolate and contain the impact of failures within or attacks on our infrastructure Infrastructure protection To protect the integrity of the infrastructure security mea- sures such as configuration contro1 and prevention of unauthorized modification tamper-proof routing protocols protection against denial of service protection of switches and communications circuits and protection against unauthorized traffic analysis are needed mm Data security requires that data be protected from unintended disclosure while maintaining full confidence that the data has not been compromised Technologies needed to support data security are - 6 3 0 Classification management for data objects Techniques are needed to ensure that data maintains the appropriate security classification even when processed fused or extracted from other sources Data integrity Techniques are needed to provide information about one s data to help establish the data's integrity including pedigree currency and confidence levels Contamination recovery procedures Data may be compromised because of system failure tampering or through the use of inaccurate or incomplete data Techniques are needed to allow the system to recognize and isolate contaminated data items and recover from data contamination Recommendations Recommendation Prioritize Investment with Focus on Military-Unique Information Technology Technology is not a major impediment to information dominance on the battle eld The commercial information industry leads in technology and research investment Information technology is available globally should Invest in military-unique information technology - Give special attention to information protection technology - Use the best commercial technology Action ensure that strategy capitalizes on commercial technology and focuses investment in mili -uni ue information technolo With respect to modern information systems component technology is not the major impediment to information dominance on the battlefield must assume that both current and increasingly more capable commercial technologies will be available acquired and used by friend and foe alike It will be important to stay abreast of current and emerging technology but our real discriminator will be our ability to continuously infuse these technologies and to con gure reconfigure the ensuing products to support joint warfare Key to technology insertion is the recognition that the commercial information technology industry leads in technology and research investment has seen advances in of ce automation systems mapping systems imagery processing and GPS Those technologies and resultant products are available from the global marketplace With the increasing dependence on information technologies and the explosion of interconnected networks and databases the importance of information and information systems protection has grown significantly In response to this dramatically changed environment it is important for the to recognize that it must accelerate its efforts along a two-pronged course First it must continue its emphasis on supporting'and infusing best commercial technologies This will allow to piggyback off of the tremendous investments being made in the commercial marketplace Secondly the should continue its investments in military- unique information technology Those technologies that are stressed by military applications should be given priority and in particular those that support enhanced reconfiguration and information and information systems protection Special attention should be given to information and information systems protection because of the increasing reliance on commercial products and systems and the increased threat of the use of information warfare as a weapon against C41 systems The Task Force recommends that continue to leverage commercial information systems technology to facilitate rapid technology infusion and reprioritize investment to differentiate military-unique information technology in support of enhanced reconfigurability and information and information systems protection -49- 7 0 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7 1 Key Findings and Observations The charge to this Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force was to make recommendations for implementing an information architecture that would enhance combat operations by providing commanders and forces at all levels with required information displayed for immediate assimilation to decrease decision cycle time The Task Force saw a variety of good information system initiatives among the Services and agencies as well as policies and procedures that if enforced should motivate interoperability of such information systems The key observations of the Task Force are outlined in Figure 7-1 Key Findings and Observations - Make the Warfighter an informed customer - Warfighters need to change information systems to accomplish different missions 0 Our information systems are highly vulnerable to Information Warfare so are our adversaries - Buy commercial products buy commercial services buy into commercial practices Figure 7-1 Make the Warfighter an Informed Customer There is a need to strengthen the expertise While the CINC and staff need to better understand how information and information systems might be better employed the CINC needs better technical support to be able to identify and articulate his requirements apply promising technologies to operational needs and improve the linkage between field user and developer The ever increasing importance of information warfare requires focus on both its opportunities and its vulnerabilities A new staff function run by a combat arms officer should build the strategic and tactical information warfare plan both offensive and defensive -so- In addition the CINCs and ITF commanders also need to exercise their information systems through virtual combat every day The goal is to allow the CINC to practice and to ght from the same seat and same system every day The simulations of the battlespace must allow the CINC his components and tactical formations to test employment concepts with Red Teaming CINC and component practice and rehearsals of envisioned employment concepts will raise confidence of success and improve force readiness Warfighters Need to Change Information Systems to Accomplish Different Missions During the Cold War there was potential for nuclear and conventional con ict - with the Warsaw Pact on a global scale The information paradigm that matched this concept of operations put the customer at the top-the National Command Authority NCA Today the principal customer to be served is the Commander and below charged with the responsibility to conduct decisive regional conventional operations Actionable information is needed the kind 'of information necessary to fight forces and win as compared to formulating broad policy or building national level strategic plans The handling and use of such information is the issue getting it where it is needed in a timely and reliable manner The CINC must control the process In order for the CINC to carry out his mission he must exercise control of his information support Information must flow to the field leader weapons operator who is on the move under great stress and very busy He needs the informationtimely manner to achieve decisive advantage while maintaining situational awareness controlling the battle space and denying disrupting his enemy's information ow 0 At all levels of execution in common but somewhat adaptable format and 0 In a fashion that is protected but not restrictive to timely use US Information Systems are Highly Vulnerable to Information Warfare So Are Our Adversaries In addition to the importance associated with the use of information i_r_1 warfare the Task Force found U S information systems highly vulnerable to Information Warfare IW The Task Force was briefed on activities and capabilities that caused concern over the integrity of the information systems that are a key enabler of military superiority The Task Force found similar vulnerabilities in the information systems of potential adversaries US military forces and their commanders need to be able to exploit these vulnerabilities as an integral capability similar in character to traditional weapon systems These systems should become an integral part of the joint training and exercise programs of the CINCs An evolving strategy and capability to wage IW may be the most important facet of military operations since the introduction of stealth Unlike the hard munitions of combat IW assets have near-instantaneous global reach and can pervade throughout the spectrum of con ict to create unprecedented effects Further with the dependence of modern commerce and the military on computer controlled telecommunication networks data bases enabling software and computers the US must protect these assets regarding their vulnerabilities The overarching strategy is to mesh these interlocking defensive and offensive aspects of IW with national policy military operations and intelligence community initiatives A serious impediment to evolving a coherent and practical IW strategy is the -51- current lack of any national policy on this matter Further there is no well defined threat to US information systems Protection of US information systems is also clouded by legal restrictions put forth for example in the Computer Security Act of 1987 Of concern to the Task Force is the fact that IW technologies and capabilities are largely being developed in an open commercial market and are outside of direct Government control In contrast with the very secret development and control of most weapons technologies by the Government a third-world nation could procure a formidable modern IW capability virtually off-the-shelf This fact portends a revolution in commercial and military-technological warfare As viewed by this Task Force the nation is under IW attack today by a spectrum of adversaries ranging from the teenage hacker to sophisticated wide-ranging illegal entries into telecommunications networks and computer systems As continues the use of a single integrated operations plan SIOP for strategic nuclear warfare the might want to consider an Information Warfare SIO process The IW SIOP could be used in part to play against an adversary IW strategy examine offensive and defensive deconfliction and would deal with intelligence equity issues Buy Commercial Products Buy Commercial Services Buy Into Commercial Practices Today the information system is saturated Even with control of his information systems the CINC must cope with the system as it exists today Much of what is being moved now is of a routine nature time relevant but not critically time sensitive-- weather logistics status personnel admin finance data etc-and much of that cannot reach to lower echelons due to pipe constriction data rate limitations More throughput is critically needed Not only routine but also time sensitive products need to be distributed across the battle space A substantial new buy of information systems is not likely New concepts for information distribution are needed The solution may be in exploiting another information system mode than is currently being emphasized publishing broadcasting the Warfighter's CNN There is great promise in such an approach in order to vastly increase throughput to operating and tactical levels through the creation of a multi-band broadcast that blankets the battle space In the absence of new buys the logical source of throughput is to reallocate current usage of major defense satellite systems primarily the Defense Satellite Communications System The information load would then have to be moved to commercial alternatives- satellite fiber and wire In the longer term must exploit the broad array of commercial space information systems and services much more The Task Force sees a critical need for the Department's acquisition system to facilitate the buying of commercial information products and services and to buy into commercial business practices Information system superiority is dependent on an ability to incorporate the latest in commercial technologies The obsolescence cycle for commercial information systems is dramatically shorter than DoD's weapon system cycle If information is to remain a key discriminator in capability must link its acquisition cycle to that of the commercial sector The Task Force also found a need for to establish a process in a manner akin to that used for the Internet that identifies incremental improvements and ensures each of these improvements can be accommodated and accepted by the other participants The process used in establishing Internet has been shown successful in establishing standards by consensus and in allowing continuous integration of improvements migration of -52 standards adaptation of commercial products and distribution of value added products Some variant of that process is appropriate for institution within the DOD The process should include provisions for accommodating the limitations of legacy systems and easing their transition to modernization This should be recognized and supported as a continuous process as there will always be a need to manage transition from old to new systems and technologies 4 Finally while the Task Force found no signi cant breakthrough areas it is clear that since potential adversaries have access to the same modern information systems technologies leveraging of commercial technology through unique military value-added exploitation and investment in defense-peculiar needs will be critical to attaining and maintaining information dominance of the battlefield Two special needs associated with military information systems are reconfigurability and information systems protection Commercial systems are designed to work in relatively static locations with predictable communications and repeatable information needs Military scenarios which are too diverse to make a system designed under these assumptions acceptable require the capability to be rapidly reconfigured While the commercial world has security concerns most are focused on protecting access to information The military has this concern plus the possibility for network disruption In addition the mobilization of military systems complicates the ability to authenticate users and their uses of systems 7 2 The Kev Recommendations The key recommendations of the Task Force support three basic thrusts 0 Give the Warfighter customization Battlefield Information Task Force - Virtual con icts every day CINC Information Officer and staff - Enterprise Integration Process 0 Gear up for Information Warfare - Net Assessment - Invest in defense Red Teaming - Coordinated national policy JCS strategy 0 Leverage commercial world Direct broadcast system - Buy bandwidth in commercial market Civil reserve communications and commercial information services capability - Acquisition cycle for software Exploit commercial -53- 'Figure 7-2 lists the speci c recommendations cited earlier in this report Each of these speci c recommendations is described below Create a Battle eld Information Task Force SECDEF 2 Explore Direct Broadcast Satellite Service for Warfighter BITF ll 3 Provide Vision for More Robust Wideband Communications Capacity BITF 4 Provide Increased Technical Billets to Give CINCs Better Staff ll Support 5 Combine and Expand U S Capabilities to Enable Operation from the Same Seat USACOM JWFC I-7 6 Undertake a Broad Net Assessment of Information Warfare SECDEF II II 7 Support Increases in Funding for Defensive IW SECDEF II 8 Establish a Red Team to Evaluate IW Readiness and Vulnerabilities SECDEF II 9 Create a Joint Strategy Cell for Offensive and Defensive IW CS 1 10 Review Draft PRD and Expedite Net Assessment to Support SECDEF Development of the National Policy 11 Augment the Enterprise Integration Council Structure for Warfighter DEPSECDEF Information Systems 12 Ensure that Strategy Capitalizes on Commercial Technology and Focuses Investment in Milit Uni ue Information Technolo I Figure 7-2 #1 Action SECDEF create a Battle eld Information Task Force There is a need to bring together warfighters and developers to establish the future 'vision system needs and evolutionary development plans The proposed BITF could act as an agent of change Its specific functions should include the following - Create and utilize joint battlespace modeling and simulation for requirement trades training and exercises Develop ACTDs to optimize existing capabilities and demonstrate future growth broadcast request modes - Exploit current science 8 technology base programs Demonstrate combat potential of C41 improvements to CINCs via relevant exercises in theater - Identify and track C41 performance metrics Provide recommendations to system developers and Enterprise Integration Council and - Develop ongoing Integrated Process Team charter - The leader of the BITF should report to CJCS with CINCUSACOM acting as the Executive Agent The leader should be at least a Military 0-8 Field Commander with DISA SES Deputy This leader should have sufficient command experience to be credible to the functioning CINCs as their Surrogate The term for the BITF should be limited to 24 months followed by ongoing IPT process #2 Action BITF explore direct broadcast satellite service for Warfighter increase capacity via broadcast downlink The Task Force sees great potential in greater exploitation of direct broadcast satellite service in providing a mechanism for of oading much of the communications traffic presently being transmitted via DSCS and other military-unique communications systems The direct broadcast of published information under the control of CINC and ITF commander and their staffs has the potential to revolutionize information capabilities for the battlefield Direct broadcast satellite services include the following 4 High frequency military or commercial band - Large bandwidth for large volume data dissemination to small simple terminals - User at any cormnand level selecting information channels he she needs - Providing an integrated intelligence picture air tasking order ATO weather logistics etc A - Delivery of wideband information independent of chain-of-command organization deployment - Affordability - leverages commercial infrastructure and equipment and The potential to of oad traffic from stressed military-unique assets #3 Action BITF provide a vision for how to provide more robust wideband communications capacity to CINCs and echelons of command below Division Wing CVBG The BITF should also be tasked as part of its early work to provide a vision for how to provide more robust wideband communications capacity to and echelons of command below Division Wing CVBG This analysis should address critical multimedia information needed for collaborative planning interactive database transfer video teleconferencing etc Current systems are inadequate to meet needs of CINCs and component commanders during training and military operations The BITF should re- evaluate current DSCS system utilization by intelligence community Space Command etc and of oad to commercial fiber and SATCOM where it is feasible The BITF should also explore commercial information services to allow real-time surge CRAP-like concepts #4 Action CJCS provide increased technical billets to give the CINCs better staffs support There is a critical need to provide the CINCs with better staff support in the area of C41 for the battlefield Modern information technology is moving very fast and the commanders need to strengthen the technical expertise of their staffs Such an expanded technical cadre must be able to - Assess new capabilities to meet CINC requirements Apply promising technologies to operational requirements definition - Support joint interoperability and unique coalition warfare requirements and Improve dialogue between user in field and developer -55- In addition the CINCs should each establish the position of Information Warfare Of cer as major staff function This position should be tasked to formulate the Information Warfare strategy offensive and defensive for each CINC and to provide dedicated information architecture management support to the CINC This officer should support the tactical and strategic decision making and control and use of information recognized as a warfare discriminator #5 Action DMSO with USACOM IWFC and I-7 combine and expand U S capabilities for exercises games simulations and models in C41 using the evolving common operating environment to enable operation from the same seat for - Readiness assessment Requirements for acquisition - Debugging Verification of interoperability Training Rehearsal - Confidence building Mission planning and - Battle damage assessment The should provide the basis for warfare to be conducted throughout the commands and ITFs on a daily basis without the need to go to special modeling and simulation centers #6 Action SECDEF undertake a broad net assessment of Information Warfare This assessment should include the involvement of the Battlefield Information Task Force to aid in planning and policy development and should be designed as an input to national IW policy review and formulation The Net Assessment should examine - and national systems and implications Nature extent and implications of vulnerabilities - Evolving US and adversary capabilities and - Cost and effectiveness of strategy options #7 Action SECDEF support immediate increases in funding for defensive IW with a focus on protection of critical services In addition SECDEF direct that - BITF exercise and simulate IW and resultant degradations JCS design military operations to avoid catastrophic failure if information is degraded - encourage the use of available multi-level security trusted technology everywhere Trusted technology can remove the need for duplicate systems and reduce personnel support and - support the recommendations made by the Joint Security Commission in Chapter 8 of their report dated February 28 1994 #8 Action SECDEF establish a Red Team to evaluate Information Warfare readiness and vulnerabilities The Red Team should be integrated with other assessment and exercise activities audited by ASD C31 and coordinated with parallel Director Central Intelligence DCI activity #9 Action create a joint strategy cell for offensive and defensive Information Warfare integrated at Flag level and reporting to the This Joint strategy cell should be tasked to develop an IW strategy that - Integrates offensive and defensive - Integrates IW with Information in Warfare Takes adversary actions reactions evolution into account and - Involves Joint Staff CINCs Services DISA and Intelligence Agencies #10 Actions SECDEF review draft PRD and related issues and expedite the net assessment to support development of the national policy In addition SECDEF should task ASD C31 to lead development of policy on IW in acquisition and export #11 Action DEPSECDEF should augment the Enterprise Integration Council structure to coordinate integration of requirements and technical architectural frameworks for Warfighter information systems This augmentation should add battlefield information systems to the charter as well as oversight and con ict resolution The Council should employ the Battlefield Information Task Force for generating alternatives and task the JROC and JCS staff to develop maintain and validate a warfighter information requirements architecture framework DEPSECDEF should ratify the DISA role as technical architect for interfaces standards and interoperability In addition USD should augment acquisition reform efforts to assure compatibility with the extremely short development and product lifetimes of commercial software and microelectronics #12 Action ensure that strategy capitalizes on commercial technology and focuses investment in military-unique information technology should be investing in military-unique information technology and giving special attention to information protection technology In addition should be using the best commercial technology Summary In summary the Task Force believes that the timing is right for a major push to improve the effectiveness of information systems to support the Warfighters The Task Force sees significant opportunities for in the use of information in warfare as well as vulnerabilities in today's information systems The Department has not come to grips with the leverage of information as a tool for use by the War ghter There is a need for change throughout the Department regarding the way information systems are developed and employed This Task Force underscores the importance of such change to achieving information dominance on the battlefield Unfortunately the business practices of the -57 Department -are hindering DoD's ability to exploit the best systems and technologies available in the commercial sector Further needs to place high priority on military- unique science and technology areas in its information technology investments The recommendations of this Task Force are intended to address these issues for implementation of such recommendations will substantially improve effectiveness and readiness However if real change is to occur leadership must aggressively pursue implementation of these recommendations -53- Appendix A 4 Information in Warfare 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 6 0 7 0 8 0 9 0 10 0 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION A-1 1 1 Tasking Assignment A- 1 1 2 Warfighter Panel Membership and A- 1 1 3 Overview - A-2 WARFIGHTING FOCUS PAST AND PRESENT A-4 2 1 The Cold War Perspective Global Nuclear Operations A-4 2 2 The World Has Changed Today' 3 Focus Is Regional Conventional Operations A-4 2 3 Today's Principal Information Architecture Customer The Regional CINC A-S CINC INFORMATION SYSTEM NEEDS SUBSTANTIAL AND ROBUST A-6 3 1 The Warfighter' 5 Requirements A-6 3 2 The Warfighter' 5 Information Architecture Vision Actionable A-7 THE CINC NEEDS BETTER INFORMATION TOOLS FOR EFFECTIVE FORCE EMPLOYMENT A-8 4 1 Command and Direction of A-8 4 2 Maintaining Situational Awareness A-9 HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS NOW A-10 5 1 Just Cause Experience 5 2 Desert Shield Storm Experience - A-10 5 3 Somalia Experience A-11 REGIONAL INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE ENVIRONMENT AUSTERE AND SATELLITE DEPENDENT A-11 6 1 Inter-Theater High Capacity A-11 6 2 Tactical C2 Net A-11 6 3 A Concept for the Future A -13 BROADCAST FROM CONCEPT TO IMPLEMENTATION A-14 BOTTOM LINE WHAT IS NEEDED IS CINC CONTROL A-15g RECOMMENDATIONS A- 16 9 1 Recommendation 1 Create An Awareness Explosion to Fuel Change A 16 9 2 Recommendation 2 Explore Direct Broadcast Satellite A- 18 9 3 Recommendation 3 Provide Robust Wideband Communications A- 19 9 4 Recommendation 4 Give the CINCs Better Staff Support A-20 9 5 Recommendation 5 Virtual Con ict Every Day A-21 9 6 Recommendation 6 Real Time Situational Awareness Accurate Time and Positional Data via Communications A-22 READINESS IMPACT A-24 10 1 The CINC Information Architecture Posture is Much Improved 10 2 Measuring Effectiveness A-24 A-i LIST OF FIGURES Military Operations Continuum A-S Figure A-1 Figure A-2 'Warfighting Architecture Enables Battlefield Dominance A-9 Figure The Future A-12 Figure A-4 Create Battlefield Information Task Force An Instrument of Change A-17 Figure A-5 Explore Direct Broadcast - - - A-19 Figure A-6 PrOvide Robust Wideband Communications - A-20 Figure A-7 Give the CINCs Better Staff Support A-21 Figure A-8 Virtual Con ict Every Day A-22 Figure A-9 Accurate Time and Positional Data via Communications A-23 Figure A-1O Information in Warfare - Impact on Readiness A-25 1 0 1 1 INTRODUCTION kin si nt The 1994 Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force on Information Architecture for the Battle eld the Task Force' convened three times as a group during the early summer to receive briefings on relevant Government initiatives and programs and to plan its approach to the Summer Study The Task Force created four Panels as follows Warfighters Panel to address Information 1n Warfare Information Warfare Panel to address Information Warfare Management Panel to address Business Practices Technology Panel to address the Underlying Technology Base This annex is the Final Report of the War ghters Panel which was charged with addressing the needs of the warfighters for C41 capability The panel addressed its tasks by examining The Warfighters' task and the need for information in warfare How the world has charged Role and capabilities it the CINCs 1n defining their C41 architecture The C41 problems of today and conceptual approaches to address these problems Use of Virtual combat 1n joint C41 system definition and training Recommendations for change These themes formed the major focus of the Panel's assessments and will be addressed in various ways in the report which follows 1 2 Warfighter Panel Membership and Pam'gipatign Members of the Warfighter Panel were assigned as follows ADM Leon Edney USN Ret Chair Dr Joseph Braddock Gen Michael P C Carns USAF Ret Mr G Dean Clubb Mr Gordon England Dr George Heilrneier Lt Gen Robert Ludwig USAF Ret GEN Carl W Stiner USA Ret Mr Vince Vitto Government Advisors who contributed to the Warfigher Panel 5 efforts were as follows MG Edward R Baldwin Jr Ms Deborah Castleman Col Thomas Hall CAPT William Henry MajGen David Richwine 'Dr David Signori Col Roderick Taylor Mr Anthony Valletta Technical and administrative support to the Panel was provided by Mr David Thomas of Strategic Analysis Inc 1 3 Qverview Ifhe Warfighter's Information Architggnire Vision Achieve decisive advantage by moving actionable information reliably to decision makers and weapons operators with security appropriate to its sensitivity 0 The Warfighter's Task The CINC Joint Task Force Commander's responsibility is to decisively apply force with minimum loss of life and consumption of resources Sun Tzu said you know your enemy and know yourself you need not fear the result of a hundred battles 0 The World Has Changed During the Cold War there was potential for nuclear and conventional con ict with the Warsaw Pact on a global scale The information paradigm that matched this concept of operations put the customer at the top- the National Command Authority NCA 0 The Customer Has Changed Today it's different The principal customer to be served is the Commander and below charged with the responsibility to conduct decisive regional conventional operations The NCA continues to be the customer for information related to the nuclear threat 0 Actionable Information is Needed The kind of information in question here is that necessary to fight forces and winuas compared to formulating broad policy or building national level strategic plans The handling and use of this actionable information is the issue getting it where it is needed in a timely and reliable manner 0 The CINC Must Control the Process In order for the CINC to carry out his mission he must exercise control of his information support The first step is improved understanding by the Commander of what can be -- as compared to what since he not the functional specialist must become the spokesman for his needs and requirements 0 The Mobile Tactician Has Special Needs Information must ow to the field leader weapons operator who is on the move under great stress and very busy Hes needs the information -- In a timely manner to achieve decisive advantage while maintaining situational awareness controlling the battle space and denying disrupting his enemy's information ow - At all levels of execution in common but somewhat adaptable format and - In a fashion that is protected but not restrictive to timely use 0 The Problem The Information Systems Are Saturated Today Even with control of his information and information systems the CINC must cope with the system as it exists today - clogged Much of what is being moved now is of a routine nature time relevant but not critically time sensitive--weather logistics status A-2 f h w 1' personnel admin finance data etc much of that cannot reach to lower echelons due to pipe constriction data fat 'lii'nitations More Throughput Is Critically Needed Not only routine but also time sensitive products need to be distributed across the battle space A substantial new buy of information systems is not likely New concepts for information distribution are needed The Solution Publishing Broadcasting The War ghter's CNN One recommended approach to vastly increase throughput to operating and tactical levels is to create a multi-band broadcast that blankets the battle space Akin to a multiband TV network it allows the CINC to tailor the information products to meet tactical demands as well as allowing the operator user to access on demand - select the channels to meet his needs Finding New Pipe--Reallocate In the absence of new buys the logical source of throughput is to reallocate current usage of major defense satellite systems primarily the DSCS Load will have to be moved reduced primarily to commercial alternatives - satellite fiber and wire This would open the opportunity for the CINC's to have much more bandwidth in the short term for collaborative planning video conferencing joint training exercising etc In the longer term we must establish a publishing broadcasting mode of service that would provide wideband data to small mobile terminals at all levels of command CINC component tactical user war ghter Strengthen the CINC's Expertise While the CINC and staff need to better understand how information assets might be better employed the CINC needs better technical support to be able to identify and articulate his requirements apply promising technologies to operational needs and improve the linkage between field user and developer Focus the CINC's Information Warfare The ever increasing importance of information warfare requires focus on both its opportunities and its vulnerabilities A new staff function run by a combat arms of cer should build the CINC's strategic and tactical information warfare plan both offensive and defensive Conduct Virtual Combat Everyday The goal is to allow the CINC to practice and to ght from the same seat and same system every day Models for simulation of the battlespace are needed to allow the CINC his components and tactical formations to prepare for commitment under uncertainty Testing his employment concepts with Red Teaming CINC and component practice and rehearsals of envisioned employment concepts will raise con dence of success and improve force readiness Implementing Change-A Major Cultural Hurdle These many tasks putting the CINC in control getting actionable information to mobile shooters broadcasting information to users which is accessed on demand and improving the CINC's staff support to apply this technology and ght effective information warfare--requires a major effort to change culture and educate users The Igniter The Battlefield Information Task Force To trigger change the task force approach must be used led by a eld experienced operator-an unsatis ed customer A-3 with speci c output taskings charged with altering the landscape in a defined period of time two years Working for the CICS this task force would survey the field demonstrate new concepts to the CINCs apply them in relevant exercises improve the requirements development process and put together a CINC oriented action program After the two year start up period an IPT would be charged with maintaining the ongoing program 0 The Output Decisive Regional Conventional Operations Implementation of these recommendations will substantially improve CINC effectiveness and readiness He will have a much better understanding of what he needs will have tested his concepts and his troops will know what to expect having practiced from his fighting seat and will know what it takes to be lethal and effective with minimum loss-today's standard of success 12 0 WARFIGHTING FOCUS PAST AND PRESENT 2 1 The Cold War Pegpegtivg global Nuclear Operations During the Cold War not only was there potential for global con ict but also for use of both conventional and nuclear operations against the same adversary The envisioned concept was deter if that failed engage conventionally while maintaining the capability to respond with nuclear force if unable to prevail or if preempted be able to conduct and prevail in sustained nuclear operations 0 The Cold Wa ustomer The Nation 1 Command uthori The information paradigm that matched this concept of operations put the customer at the topnthe NCA--because - of the responsibility for making the solemn nuclear decision Control and direction owed from the top down _a defined pipe narrowing in throughput as it descended This tight knit system minimized the risk of an inappropriate action triggering the nuclear decision on either side of the conflict 0 The Cold War Outcome A Success This worked There was no nuclear exchange during the Cold War a ringing endorsement of not only the concept but also the leadership and command that dealt with events and controlled the use of force as well as the communications and intelligence that informed and shaped the views of those leaders and commanders 2 2 The World Has Chan Toda cu Is Re nal Conv ntional erati ns Today it is different Nuclear capability is still a necessary part of our deterrence posture but now it is nOt only a smaller feature of our arsenal-smaller target base much reduced force it is also largely disconnected from where we are likely to use force We still possess nuclear weapons in order to deter use by any party but there is reduced likelihood that any of the other current major nuclear parties are also potential near term adversaries in a conventional engagement involving US forces Conventional operations are now postulated to be regionally orienteduthe two MRC strategy The experience of the past several years in Bosnia Somalia Panama Rwanda lends strength and credence to this strategy FigUre A l illustrates the continuum of potential future military operations that we face today Not only are they A-4 diverse from the standpoint of probability and risk but they also demand substantially different information system capabilities - While nuclear operations are necessarily very structured strongly centralized and consist of a series of discrete actions conventional operations are less structured much more diverse and consist of thousands of individual acts actions all requiring coordination In the context of Battlefield Information Architecture what's different today is the principal customer In conventional regional operations this is the Commander The CIN controls and directs events carrying out the NCA mandate with the implied understanding that no nuclear operations are envisioned and these remain the purview of the NCA The information system capabilities necessary to conduct regional operations must be provided in what could well be a very austere environment Whereas con ict in Europe against the Warsaw pact would have been on known terrain using a high quality communications network composed of both military and host nation capabilities honed and refined over decades such is not the case in regional operations Not only must the military communications be deployed but also the host nation capability may range from modest to essentially zero e g Rwanda-and Somalia Military Operations Continuum Operations Other Than War Disaster Relief Contingency Operations Human Assistance Vietnam - Fall of Berlin Wall 20 Evacuation Operations Post Berlin Wall 17 Civil Disturbance Current Flash Points 39 Peace Keeping Mobile Training Teams Peace Enforcement Probability Counter Drugs Counter Terrorism Counter Proliferation Surgical Strike Regional Contingencies Risk Different Military Situations Demand Different C4l Capabilities Figure A-1 A-5 3 0 3 1 CIN INFORMATION SYSTEM NEEDS SUBSTANTIAL AND ROBUST The Egguigments Not only has the principal customer focus shifted to the Commander but also the very nature of how he is provided information support must change On the regional battlefield the tactical commander requires Timely Information To achieve decisive advantage Situational Awareness From deployment of the first forces to the engaged battle the commander needs situational awareness Where are his forces Where are coalition forces Where are adversary enemy forces What is going on now What activity is underway Joint Surveillance Targeting and Reconnaissance ISTARS Airborne Warning and Control System AWACS God's eye views Continuous weather ELINT SIGINT etc Control of the Battle Space Once the commander has the basic grasp of the situation the task is to exert control over it The challenge is to be the initiator of what happens - proactive - rather than the victim reactiVe - and in a catch up recovery mode damage limiting until the initiative can be regained The desired level of control of the battle space is dominance -- all levels theater battlefield tactical engagement such that the commander determines what happens and how it happens the most effective and efficient use of combat forces and resources Denial Disruption of the Enemy's Information Flow The corollary to friendly domination of the battle space is to insure the same advantage is denied to the enemy not only to distort or destroy his picture of the battlefield but also to impede or prevent his capacity to act to command and direct the effective use of his forces Rapid Movement of Actionable Combat Information Information Necessary to Fight Forces There is no shortage of information nor of data The information architecture challenge on the battlefield is to provide actionable information - germane tailored and in usable format to the leader operator who must fight forces This is a very demanding requirement movement of information to operating units that are very mobile have limited communications and are ve busy Information Provided Reliably and in Real Time The warfighter must have confidence that information will reach him reliably He must trust the system since he is risking forces and resources Just as importantly information must reach him when he needs it as close to real time as possible so that he can apply it to the situation he faces He must also be able to acknowledge receipt and report back important information needed by others Information Focus on Decision Makers and Weapon Holders The principal customers are the Commander and below They should control how they are structured and serviced This does not imply that national needs are not recognized Rather it argues that at the level of situation accountability and control the Commander should have the authority to decide what is needed and A-6 i when it is needed - and structure the information system accordingly using common interoperable approaches to all CINCs 5 Information Tailored to the Warrior at Each Level On the conventional battlefield there are at least hundreds potentially thousands of customers In meeting this need considerable effort needs to be expended to insure that not only is the user's need understood but also that it is tailored to his needs An important piece rather than the entire whole may often meet the in limited pipe envirOnments such tailoring could prove crucial to success 0 Information In Usable Format The purpose of information on the battlefield is to implement the defeat of adversary enemy forces It must be presented to the user in actionable format and be usable for the purpose intended 5 Effective but not Restrictive Security - Confident protection The challenge is to balance opportunity with vulnerability The warfighter needs assurance that the information being provided to him is not also available to his adversary in time to use the information against him That does not mean that the enemy must not be able to receive it only that he not be able to act on it constructively Information should be provided at the level of security commensurate with its sensitivity and need which could even mean unclassified in certain situations - Graceful degradation The battlefield is messy and from time to time discontinuous Units and even headquarters are going to be taken under attack Equipment is going to be destroyed lost and break down Alternate means to provide for the protected distribution of critical information must exist 0 Information in Warfare as a Major Battlefield Discriminator Force multiplier While more intuitive than quantifiable there is no question that having information that allows you to operate faster or inside the decision cycle of the adversary is of inestimable value The power of the initiative allows tailored often smaller forces to operate effectively against larger formations with fewer losses and lower consumption of resources - Accelerates conflict resolution Again more intuitive than quantifiable it neVertheless stands to reason that a force that holds the initiative takes advantage of situations as they present themselves and acts decisively and lethally will unquestionably bring about quicker con ict resolution 3 2 The Warfighter'g Information Architecture Vision Actionable Information Summing up what the tactical commander requires in one succinct statement the Warfighters' Information Architecture Vision is the intent to - A-7 Achieve decisive advantage by moving actionable information reliably to decision makers and weapons operators with security appropriate to its sensitivity The challenge then is to transition the existing information system structure concepts doctrine and equipment-with enhancements as required to meet the needs of regional warfare In considering how to better meet the CINC's regional warfighting needs it is useful to consider how the Commander might group categorize- his information needs as well as considering how it is done now From that examination a new information architecture support concept will be proposed 4 0 THE CINC NEEDS BETTER INFORMATION TOOLS FOR EFFECTIVE FORCE EMPLOYMENT A military force commander and subordinate organizations need information to accomplish two major purposes 1 to command direct actions and 2 to maintain a common frame of reference - situational awareness keeping everyone on the same sheet of music 4 1 Command and Direg gn of Forces The command direction function is fundamental to effectiveness - maintaining control in order to act coherently and decisively with minimum loss of personnel and consumption of resources Command direction communications are necessarily structured - up and down the chain of command -- with support link-ins each level of command is responsible for coordinating its own support requirements--logistics personnel etc Structured switched command direction communications necessary to orchestrate and control the actions of forces as illustrated in Figure A-2 are generally of three types 0 Discrete Point-to-Point Communications These are the dynamic real time exchanges of information linked in the form indicated in Figure A-2 Their purpose is to carry out such tasks as exercise of command and control between CINC ITF Component Commanders and field command elements connectivity between mobile tactical command elements links among collaborative regional tactical planning cells to include coalition forces interactive video two way distributed data base transfer and direct support to leaders weapons operators with time-sensitive actionable combat information of all types Command and Control C2 SIGINT Human Intelligence HUMINT etc 0 Messaging This grouping of information communications describes the storage and forwarding of information data and data bases It is necessarily structured both because of the function it performs and the way that it links often by hard wiring It includes such tasks as routine message distribution filing of reports updating of data bases etc 0 Information Access This grouping of information communications also structured provides the capability to access stored information from both central and distributed data bases and to insert access update and or extract information A-8 Warfighting Architecture - Enables Battlefield Dominance Class Connectivity 0 System of systems 1 I Communlculons - Specifically to meet each mission Speclfically to support forces involved 2- mm - Confluence of three architectures - 3 Wm - 02 Access 4 Publishing 0% Has Technology Enabled Us to Redistribute Our Message Traffic Among the Four Classes In a Manner that Enables Us to Do Much More for the Warfighter Warfighting Information Communlcations Figure 4 2 Maintaining Situational Awareness The second important information function also illustrated in Figure A-2 that of maintaining a common frame of reference often referred to as situational awareness is currently being accomplished through distribution using existing structured switched nets These are the only paths available Situational information is important to everyone It is the basis of orchestrating commanding directing action Since everyone needs it--the weather for example it could be distributed in a more universal distribution scheme - unstructured and unswitched horizontal so to speak - if it were available This grouping onifE information distribution is labeled the publishing or broadcasting mode 0 Publishing This grouping of information distribution describes the centralized creation and distribution of high quality information broadly horizontally-such as via broadcast similar to commercial radio and TV a sort of CINC CNN concept This mode would be used to support distribution of important information such as weather synopses summary reports inventory listings personnel data etc It could also be used to distribute current situational information such as the picture and an integrated intelligence picture cf the battlefield Another use by the would be to respond to inquiries that have applicability to a broad cross section of the command coalition A-9 5 0 THE SYSTEM WORKS NOW The existing methods for moving and distributing information to our fighting forces today are largely hierarchical and sequential structured switched Information flows in an orderly pattern up and down the operational command chain While the new focused customer in the net is the regional Commander 'the old patterns of distribution are embedded in our doctrine force structure and equipment As a result the top is well serviced but lower levels are increasingly unable to satisfy their perceived information needs In short for regional operations there is neither enough access nor enough throughput at the lower echelons due to clogged pipes as well as limited equipment and frequency availability There is enormous evidence accumulated during recent regional operations to support the latter statement - 5 1 - ri In JUST CAUSE one nding was that timely automated intelligence support was not provided to units staff during the initial to faulty design environmental problems and shortage of automation Again in CAUSE a report commenting on information ow noted that volume of reports processed by 1-2 operations other staff sections and units was at times to the volume most of these reports could not be followed up by 1-2 5 2 Deseg Shield Storm Experience DESERT STORM provides an abundance of views on communications support of the field commander Because of the size of the deployed force as well as the length of the effort there was a requirement to move large volumes of information The austerity of deployable resources as well as limitations on the host nation's capabilities created enormous-dependency on satellite links Senior command'officials considered themselves well informed during DESERT In the words of General Colin Powell CICS No combat commander has ever had as full and complete a view of his adversary as did our field commander Intelligence support to operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm was a success story General Norman Schwartzkopf s view was similar The great military victory we achieved in Desert Storm and the minimal losses sustained by US and Coalition forces can be directly attributed to the excellent intelligence picture we had on the Iraqis That view was less sanguine as one moved down the chain of command Lt-Gen William M Keys USMC Commanding General 2D MARDIV noted that At-the strategic level intelligence was fine But we did not get enough tactical intelligence frontline battle intelligence This information support-satisfied at the senior level lacking at the operational leveluwas as noted earlier heavily dependent on satellites DESERT STORM after action reports contain statements such the beginning of the offensive DSCS provided 75% of all inter-theater connectivity and was used extensively to support intra-theater requirements across long distances not supportable by terrestrial satellite communications formed the C2 backbone and highlighted exibility tailored to prioritized C2 And 95% of the Navy's A-10 message traf c went over UHF satellite the end less than 75% of the known UHF satellite requirements could be 5 3 Ex The UN operation in Somalia a much smaller commitment but of a much different character pointed up significant information architecture problems caused by the regional operating mode posts in Somalia were widely separated well beyond normal doctrinal distances and beyond the normal range of FM voice Tactical Satellite TACSAT to overcome the distance problem but there were insufficient assets to cover all unit units were simply forced to operate outside communications range rendering them unable to call for MEDEVAC fire support or emergency maintenance 6 0 REGIONAL INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE ENVIRONMENT AUSTERE AND SATELLITE DEPENDENT The actual nature of regional operations and information support are well described by these brief operational insights The lack of existing host communications infrastructure the need to haul in required terrestrial equipment to support operations plus the inadequacy of the resulting structure gives perspective to why there is such a push to use satellite means to communicate both out of theater and within These important satellite linkages are of two main types those used to primarily support high capacity information movements and those used to primarily support tactical information- networks and requirements 6 1 Inter-Theaterl igh Capacity Today movement of large amounts of information the inter-theater bulk traffic _effort--is done by land line when it is available but also by high capacity satellite connectivity Recall the statement that some 75% of DESERT STORM intra-theater comms moved by DSCS alone in the early days of combat operations This mode of support requires medium to large terminals Figure A-3 - High Capacity example - transportable but not mobile - that provide large volume point-to-point wideband connectivity It can also provide interactive video recognizing however that large bandwidth is the price This mode moves the majority of intra-theater intel C2 and other support required out of theater Figure A-3 illustrates how this mode primarily designed to service CINC and ITF needs can also directly serve tactical warfighter users either by downlink or by two way use Low density low bulk users drive down the efficiency of the satellite mode but can provide critical capability when needed 6 2 Tactical C2 Net The second grouping of satellite capability is the tactical C2 net This net is characterized by small mobile terminals aimed at supporting mobile tactical units Throughput is limited - low data rates-making it unsuited for moving large amounts of information or high data demand productsusuch as digitized imagery - except under emergency circumstances A-l 1 Both the USN and the USAF are major users of this capability the USN with its UHF Fleet Satellige FLTSAT constellation and the USAF with its UHF Air Force Satellite Communications AFSATCOM network Not as well understood is the importance of this net to the Special Operations Forces of the United States Special Operations Command SOCOM units are often deployed to distant remote locations on short notice They are either precluded from communicating by existing host means for security reasons or have no other recourse other than owned comms to accomplish all required C2 functions both in theater and inter-theater This capability is especially significant since the sensitivity of such operations often involves national interests that reach to the NCA level Tight linking for positive command and control is an essential requirement in such force applications The Future Tactical c1 Nets High Capacity Direct Broadcast ll nr 0 Small mobile terminals 0 Jediiuml to large 0 Small mobile terminals oTactical c1 networks i ld - Wideband broadcast - cSn'ini r' callol iegrated Ops lntel picture Protected Circuits video Weather LOW data 93 0 Collaborative planning MaPP f g - Logistics Figure A- 3 The critical UHF satellite connectivity among tactical terrestrial command and control networks are quite vulnerable to ground mobile jammers and cannot be protected For this reason the USN 's UHF Follow-On System UFO and the MILSTAR-II system scheduled for launch in 1998 include relatively narrow band to medium band highly protected data links at EHF frequencies uplink ZOGHz downlink Figure A-3 describes the tactical C2 net concept Note that it looks the same as the high capacity net except that the size of the lightening bolts are thinner indicative of low data rate and service reaches out to the tactical userwreally the primary user-- of this unique capability A-12 As noted earlier the key difficulty in meeting C2 needs is the lack of capacity Since host national capabilities cannot be depended upon the Theater forces must deploy terrestrially-linkable and satellite terminals That has proven insufficient to meet the need And given that large buys of new equipment are not likely theprincipal path to meeting the requirement lies in better utilization of what now exists using new concepts and new approaches 6 3 It is generally accepted that much of the information distributed from outside the theater as well as that circulated within it is of a routine nature time relevant but not critically time sensitive This includes information activity such as establishing databases upon initial deployment updating databases particularly if of a distributed nature and providing routine summaries intel logistics personnel finance weather mapping These and other needs are distributed frequently to abroad array of receivers users-a horizontal distribution scheme Direct Broadcast The logical question is why not make this time relevant information available to all users simultaneously by means other than hard wire or other limited capacity structured means The recommended solution is to employ a direct broadcast mode of service This would be a wideband link to small mobile terminals servicing all levels of recipients- CINC component tactical user warfighter Moreover since the transmission is broadcast style it could provide everything from low density simple listings to high bandwidth demand digital imagery It would reach all potential users simultaneously but allow receivers to exercise selective reception -- pull as desired Future use of this system would augment the current capabilities discussed above The broadcast concept is quite robust with respect to vulnerability to ground mobile jamming threats expected in the future These threats cannot attack the downlink broadcast information Only an enemy controlling space-based or airborne jamming equipment can impact the downlink These are evaluated as less likely threats The high power uplink can be made invulnerable to jamming by insuring that it is placed in a sanctuary location or satellite relays are considered to protect this critical injection mode Direct broadcast systems are therefore much less vulnerable to jamming than other two- way communications systems used for command and control Figure A-3 also illustrates the direct broadcast concept Note the characterization of large pipe and blanket coverage across the engagement region This concept is conceived as one way inputs edited based on requirements and then delivered - pumped by broadcast means In addition to having this broadcast fed from outside the theater as illustrated the CINC through his Information Warfare Officer would also have the capacity to input to the broadcast net from within theater The CINC would therefore exercise control of the net and based on user need con gure it to deliver information appropriately Depending on the frequency band used and the degree to which current systems can be downloaded it is possible to make on the order of hundreds of channels available for broadcast material A-13 7 0 BROADCAST FROM CONCEPT TO IMPLEMENTATION Two approaches could make this concept a reality The first is to reallocate existing use of our large high capacity satellites The difficulty is deciding how to move displaced information data No doubt some of the use could probably be eliminated but the estimate is that the percentage is minor The second possibility is to move significant segments of the information stream by other means - either commercial satellite or by linked means-wire ber etc While means exist to move the information by another mode resources are lacking Today users of high capacity satellites justify time throughput based on priority the cost to the user is free since centrally funds the capability If a user is required to find alternate movement means - presumably commercial they lack the dollars to fund the service This is a major impediment to implementation in this resource-tight environment One possible way to work this problem is to convert use of satellites to user funding distribute the centralized cost of running the system to the user in the form of Operations and Maintenance funding and then charge a fee for service This is a common practice in defense service supply and transportation systems referred to as revolving funds or more recently the Defense Business Operating Fund DBOF This would open up some capacity perhaps substantial capacity to serve not only CINC theater needs the broadcast net for example but also other users who are willing to pay but cannot get time space on the net The expected result would be more rational bulk data movement based on market rates--the real cost of doing business as well as opening up capacity for operational priority use Capacity would be created to practice in peacetime conduct collaborative planning between components and potential coalition partners to train and exercise in CONUS as well as overseas as the CINC intends to operate in crisis contingency con ict exercising large data transfers and using interactive video to name a few The proposal however also involves downside risk that must be thought out It is both the need to substitute new resources-to buy the capacity that is diverted to commercial markets as well as the potential risk not now quantifiable that diversion from the DOD satellite net might result in significant underutilization -- a foolish and unintended resource consequence And given that the cost of satellite operations is of a magnitude in hundreds of millions per year the offload DBOF proposal requires careful study before considering implementation Another major hurdle to implementation is the lack of understanding of just what new technology such as the broadcast mode of information delivery can do to help meet - the Commander's information architecture requirements The military is not driving information technology The commercial sector is in the lead and likeiy to remain so And they have advanced faster than most senior leaders commanders understand in their ability to provide arrays of information services-and it is growing every day A-14 Some device needs to be found to educate users on capabilities now and envisioned and to communicate a sense of the rate of development of improvements Unless and until this happens the process to identify information architecture- requirements will not be driven by commanders leader but rather by specialist functional providers This is an unsatisfactory situation that demands reform if the military requirement is going to be articulated by the end user the Commander rather than the functional provider 8 0 BOTTOM LINE WHAT IS NEEDED IS CINC CONTROL Control This one word describes the major change being proposed putting the CINC in control of his information needs The CINC should be the principal spokesman to the Services the IROC the ASD C31 and DISA for his information needs The CINC should also be the person who actually assembles and integrates his information systems in concert with other elements of his force structure The CINC or his JTF commanders would 0 Determine the arrangement and linking of the operations and intelligence information systems The CINC would become the judge of when to fuse intelligence information as well as how to fuse it 0 Establish the rules for access and dissemination to command echelons In the case of coalition operations national-level guidance would play a role When forces are engaged however the CINC would have the latitude to make access and distribution determinations 0 Direct and support the means of information assembly and distribution to include filtering editing and the mode of distribution publishing 0 Determine the information support needed for combat operations from mission planning through battle damage assessment This would include control of theater intelligence gathering assets such as unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs The CINC would also have a dominant voice in the tasking and use of national technical means as they apply to his area of responsibility Much of the foregoing is controlled by the CINC now in varying degrees However this Task Force is recommending that the CINC become the responsible official decision maker and orchestrator for information support to his theater 7 To do so requires an attack on a broad front from education to informed articulation An igniter needs to be found to fire the effort to force alteration of the status quo Since this is a military warfighting effectiveness issue it should be led by a field experience senior ag officer And since change is best implemented when there is ownership at the top the undertaking should be constituted at the level The recommendations which follow are intended to support the implementation of CIN Control A-15 9 0 RECOMMENDATIONS 9 1 Rec mmen ation 1 eat An Awaren Ex 10 ion to han e The Battlefield Information Task 9ng Figure The user must regain control of the information architecture requirements process The commander leader must appreciate what' 'can be rather than what is A means must be found to attack the culture of comfort that exists The commander leader must 0 Be 1n control of his needs and requirements 0 Be the focus for articulating the requirement and 0 Build his knowledge and awareness of information technology to match his familiarity with weapons and weapons systems To trigger change the creation of a Battlefield Information Task Force is strongly recommended This Task Force sponsored by SECDEF constituted by C3D reporting to with CINCUSACOM as the executing CINC would be tasked to explore innovative means to move information to around from the' battle eld It would be led by a combat joint experienced commander at the level 0-8 reporting to the job from field command This insures hands-on field experience and a representative knowledge base at his level of seniority The deputy would be a subject matter expert a civilian of SES grade probably drawn from DISA Information technology is advancing at an explosive rate System developers well versed in the technology changes however often do not understand the warfighter' 5 needs enV1ronment On the other hand the warfighters do not know what capabilities and technologies are available to solve their p roblems The Battlefield Information Task Force is intended to bring together warfighters and developers in the warfighters' environment as an instrument of change and to break down knowledge barriers and resistance to change - The Task Force would have limited life 24 months recommended to accomplish the taskings noted This term was selected recognizing that suf cient time was needed to accomplish the task but short enough to insure a high quality officer could be made available without career prejudice The Task Force Commander would report not less than quarterly to This links the Services into every aspect of the effort and when findings are endorsed ties into the programming resource entities the Services to fix the problem A-16 Create Battlefield Information Task Recommendation #1 Force An Instrument of Change 0 Create a Battlefield Information Task Force BITF -Tasks - Bring together warfighters and developers to establish the future vision system needs and evolutionary development plans Create and utilize Joint battlespace modeling and simulation for requirement trades training and exercises - Develop ACTDs to optimize existing capabilities and demonstrate future growth gig broadcast request modes - iolt current science a technology base programs - Demonstrate combat potential of improvements to CINCs via relevant exercises In theater - - Identify and track performance metrics - Provide recommendations to system developers and Enterprise Integration Council - Develop ongoing Integrated Process Team charter -Led by Military 0-8 Field Commander with DISA 855 Deputy Term 24 months followed by ongoing IPT Cost - Action SECDEF Reports to CJCS Executive Agent is CINCUSACOM Figure A-4 Prioritized tasks for the Battlefield Information Task Force Bring together the warfighters user and developer in the warfighters' environment Establish baseline information architecture tailored for each CINC at all command levels Identify theater unique and common elements among and - Identify current interoperability and integration issues between legacy systems Establish the future vision joint interoperability requirements and evolutionaryg development improvement roadmap In conjunction with the Advanced Research Projects Agency ARPA design a series of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations to be conducted for CINCs in theater Educate the warfighter to what can be and Include demonstrations of the direct satellite broadcast wideband down link Create baseline for a common battlespace modeling and simulation environment to support joint training and exercising in the field from the same seat - Apply to requirements evaluation and acquisition cost and operational analysis 0 Provide metrics and processes to measure readiness of information systems using training exercises and real world operations from the same seat 0 Provide recommendations to C31 on short and mid term improvements to the battlefield information architecture based on field exercises and user developer dialogue Establish required interface with Enterprise Integration Council 0 Provide metrics for the JCS Joint Staff ASD C31 to evaluate implementation progress in achieving Battlefield Information Architecture road map 0 Provide recommendations to concerning - Best utilization of increased technical expertise assigned to and - Information in Warfare and Information Warfare staff functions 0 Provide recommendations to C31 for transition of Task Force efforts to standing Integrated Process Product Improvement Team to support ASD C31 Battlefield Information Architecture road map Action ECDEF Re arts to 'v cut is Cost Estimated at million dollars Well within the funding authority of the CJCS's and Initiative Funds This does not include the cost of exercises since such activities are already funded and would be reoriented as part of the exercise cycle 9 2 Recommendation 2 Explore Direct Broadcast Satellite Figure To enhance the information services available to the- CINC component commanders and deployed warfighting forces we recommend that the Battlefield Information Task Force investigate the utility of a direct broadcast satellite service That concept would set up a direct broadcast service from space that blankets the regional operating area and could be received by small satellite dishes down to the tactical level This service would provide much greater capacity for integrated situational awareness across the command transmitting a full range of data and information from the routine such as weather reports etc to major activity directives such as the Air Tasking Order and significant situation summaries This direct broadcast service would 0 Allow delivery of information across the regional operations area independent of the chain of chain of command organization deployment unit 0 Provide broad pictures of intelligence operations logistics environment weather etc 0 Be implemented in the high frequency military or commercial band 0 Offer large bandwidth for large volume data dissemination to small simple terminals and 0 Allow the user at any level to select the stream of information that he needs A-18 Recommendation #2 Explore Direct Broadcast System - Explore direct broadcast satellite service for Warfighter increase capacity via broadcast downlink -lmplement in high frequency military or commercial band Large bandwidth for large volume data dissemination to small simple terminals User at any command level selects information channels he needs Provides integrated lntel picture ATO weather logistics etc Delivery of Wideband information independent of chain-of-command organization deployment - Affordability - leverages commercial infrastructure and equipment Explore the potential to offload traffic from stressed military unique assets Action Battlefield Information Task Force BITF Figure 11-5 Action 'e I kP 9 3 Recommendation Provide Robust Wideband Communications Figure A-6l The primary thrust of the DSB study effort has been to move control for information architecture needs to the Commander and expand the capacity available to him in peace crisis con ict There is a need to provide more robust Wideband communications network capacity to the CINC and subordinate echelons to be used for 0 collaborative planning interactive data base transfer and video teleconferencing and 0 significantly expanded use during CINC and component commander directed joint training joint exercising and conduct of military operations Such capabilities should be available at CINC and ITF command centers For the foreseeable future additional capacity can be made available 'by 0 re-evaluating DSCS system utilization by current users-intel community Space Command etc 0 considering off-loading some of the current loading to commercial fiber and other means as appropriate feasible and 0 exploring contingency or dedicated leases of commercial Wideband communications capacity to allow for real time surge Provide Robust Wideband Recommendation #3 Communications - Provide more robust wideband communications capacity to CINCs and echelons of command above Critical multimedia information needed for collaborative planning interactive database transfer video teleconferencing etc Current systems are inadequate to meet needs of CINCs and component commanders during training and military operations 0 Options - Re-evaluate current 0568 system utilization by Intel Community Space Command etc and offload to commercial fiber and SATCOM where feasible Explore commercial Information services to allow real-time surge CRAF- like concepts Action Battlefield Information Task Force BITF Figure A-6 Action Battlefield Information Iask Force Recgmmenda gn 4 give me QINQs Better Staff Figure A-7i The recommendation is in two parts Strengthen CINC's Technical Expertise The intent is to provide additional support to CINC's operational training and simulation environment Currently are authorized a single scientific advisor Given the pace of development in improvedf information handling and distribution as well as its increased importance to effective warfighting this level of support is adjudged to be marginal at best Additional staff expertise is required to 9 4 assess new capabilities to meet CINC requirements apply promising technologies to operational requirements definition efforts support joint interoperability and unique coalition warfare requirements and improve dialogue between field user and the developer in order to better de ne re ne C41 architecture at all levels A-20 Recommendation #4 Give the CINCs Better Staff Support - Strengthen technical expertise Assess new capabilities to meet CINC requirements Appiy promising technologies to operational requirements definition Support joint interoperability and unique coalition warfare requirements -lmprove dialogue between user in field and developer 0 Establish information Warfare Officer as major staff function for each CINC - Formulates lnforrnation Warfare strategy offensive and defensive - Provides dedicated information architecture management - Supports tactical and strategic decision making - Control and use of information recognized as a warfare discriminator Action CJCS provide increased technical billets 0 Establish Information Warfare Officer information warfare requires focus on its potential as well as its risks and vulnerabilities Today information warfare responsibilities are diffused across military staffs There is a need to assign a combat arms of cer to lead a CINC staff section responsible for formulating Information Warfare strategy offensive and defensive -- providing dedication information architecture management -- supporting the CINC's strategic and tactical decision making controlling and using Figure A-7 information recognized as a warfare discriminator Action ICS provide increased technical billets to CINC staffs 9 5 Recommendation Virtual gon ict Every Day gure A-gl With the uncertainty of what US and coalition forces will be called upon to do and which forces will be committed there is a compelling need to jointly train exercise and rehearse likely taskings - The goal is to allow the CINC to practice and fight from the same seat The need is to combine baseline and then expand models simulations exercises and games By modeling the joint battlespace to approach real world situations commanders and components can conduct virtual con ict every day The ever increasing importance of The ability to conduct xvirtual con ict every day would Allow constant readiness assessment Identify requirements for acquisition - Permit debugging Verify interoperability Facilitate training exercising rehearsals and Build con dence in readiness and excitability Recommendation #5 Virtual Conflict Every Day - Combine and expand our capabilities for exercises games simulations and models From the same seat For - Readiness assessment Requirements for acquisition Debugging - Verification of interoperability - Training - Rehearsal Confidence building - Mission planning Battle damage assessment Action DMSO with USACOM JWFC and J-7 Figure A-8 Action with USACOM IWFQ and 9 6 Recommendation Real Time Situational Awareness Accurate Time and Positional Data via Communications Figure The Global Positioning System if integrated with existing C3 systems could provide a highly accurate spatial global time and position grid that could revolutionize warfare It is possible now to provide the precise location of our own friendly and enemy forces information at any given exact time This would contribute greatly to surveillance reconnaissance targeting identi cation electronic warfare data processing and analysis and communications and fulfill many requirements for all weather day night operations identification friend or foe ingress into new geographic locations precision weapon delivery reduction of collateral damage and positive control of forces A-22 Recommendation to Accurate Time and Positional Data via Communications 0 GPS time and positional accuracy would contribute greatly to surveillance reconnaissance targeting identification electronic warfare data processing and analysis and communication Label communications with GPS time and positional accuracy in order to achieve a more precise global situational awareness in both time and space - Technology available now Current Continue and expand JTIDS I TADIL with its precise position location and ID PPLI 4 Near Term Augment TADIL using GPs-based position and ID reporting using US Navy technology - Long Term Embed GPS time and position reporting into all communications links and networks Modulate transmissions with 8 bits of data 0 Action ASD C3I Pigure A-9 I To in'lplement the integration of GPS into information systems it is recommended that the Tactical Data Information Link TADIL I with its inherent precise position location and identification PPLI features anchored to a GPS referenced position continue to be fielded and expanded to other link nets Small inexpensive GPS receivers can modulate any communication transmission to provide the exact time of transmission and precise location of the unit communicating If the hiatus between communications exceeds the periodical for positional updates as determined by doctrine an automatic burst transmission time position can be made All future information systems should have embedded the ability to transmit and receive GPS positional and time data The result would be a highly accurate global positioning navigation and spatial situational awareness system with precise time whereby targets objects own forces data etc could be accurately xed relative to all others at any time The reduction in uncertainty and variance across the information systems would improve fidelity and quality of tactical operations Fielding this capability could be done relatively inexpensively and in an evolutionary manner - A-23 10 0 READINESS IMPACT There is a significant readiness dimension once these recommendations are implemented Regional situations develop very quickly and at the onset are of uncertain dimension Accurate preplanning and exercising builds confidence substantially shortens deployment execution materially increases initial effectiveness and should significantly shorten engagement time--more lethal more fewer losses and consumption of resources today's test of success But the CINC needs ways of measuring the effectiveness of his information systems The following sections describe what the impact of the Task Force recommendations would be on the readiness of the CINC's information systems along with a discussion of ways for measuring their effectiveness 10 1 The CINC Information Architecture Posture is Much Improved He Knows What He Needs to Succeed Whena CINC pulls together a concept of operations for an emerging situation the experience of having a strong modeling system that allowed the CINC to simulate and later train and exercise a potential concept of operations is a significant confidence builder and readiness boost The CINC would be training and fighting from the same seat He Will Have Tested His Concepts A Red Team will have exercised logical counters to his Blue Team operations concepts allowing development of new approaches to increase confidence of success He Will Determine What Information Support He'll Get Transitioning from the known information architecture structure of Cold War operations to the unknown structure of regional operations there is high uncertainty as to what kind of communications and intelligence support will be available Implementation of these recommendations would materially alter that perception Since most deploying forces would come from CINCUSACOM the standardized modeling and simulation plus joint training and exercising concepts would be a well understood baseline for regional support of deployed operations The CINC Will Know What To Deploy The combined impact of the recommendations would be widespread understanding of regional information architecture requirements and substantial experience in sizing assembling transporting setting up and exercising the information system employment concepts The combination of these four features 1 matching the information system need to the regional problem 2 testing its viability via joint exercising and Red Teaming 3 educating operating levels of what to expect and depend on and 4 sizing practicing what to take constitutes a very robust capability that is ready when called 10 2 Measuring Effectiveness Since the importance of Information In Warfare has been identified as a significant force multiplier the CINC needs a means of measuring the state of this readiness Figure A-10 displays a logical manner to accomplish this a series of metrics applied to training exercises and real world operations The high end of the spectrum will show in advance the surge capability and capacity required for the information system infrastructure to A-24 support two MRCs near simultaneously The Battlefield Information Task Force should be tasked to establish the information system readiness metrics and measurement process in consultation with each CINC Information in Warfare -- Impact on Readiness Readiness is Defined as Ability to Get Essential Information to the Warfighter at the Right Time Train Plan and Execute from the Same Seat S stem Simulation Readiness Metrics 'i'raining 9 Wm - Response Time 0 Communication Reallabillty 0 Interoperability I Red Team Reconfigurabilly Real World Connectivity Task the Battle eld Information Task Force to Establish Readiness Metrics and Measurement Process Figure A-IO A-25 Appendix Information Warfare I TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 0 INTRODUCTION - -- B-1 1 1 Tasking and Membership - B-1 1 2 Background B-1 1 3 A Military-Technological Revolution B-2 1 4 Recommendations - - B-3 2 0 INFORMATION WARFARE 3-4 2 1 Why Information Warfare 2 2 What IS Information Warfare B-6 2 3 Where Are We in Information Warfare 3-8 3 0 ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13-9 4 0 DEFENSIVE INFORMATION WARFARE AN OVERVIEW OF NECESSARY INITIATIVES B-12 5 0 PROTECTION B-14 6 0 DETECTION B-16 7 0 3-16 8 0 REFERENCES 1' B-16 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 3-1 Revolutions in Joint Warfighting 3-2 Figure B-2 Terms and Relationships B-S Figure B-3 Information Warfare B-7 Figure B-4 IW Activities B-8 Figure B-S Information Warfare Doctrine and Studies Assessment 3-9 Figure B-6 Defensive Program Studies B-12 1 0 INTRODUCTION 1 1 kin nd Mem hi The 1994 Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force on Information Architecture for the Battle eld created four panels as follows Warfighters Panel to address Information in Warfare Information Warfare Panel to address Information Warfare Management Panel to address Business Practices Technology Panel to address the Underlying Technology Base This appendix is the final report of the Information Warfare Panel which was charged with addressing the needs of the warfighters for offensive and defensive Information Warfare Members of the Information Warfare Panel were Dr Donald C Latham Chairman Dr Richard L Wagner LtGen C Norman Wood USAF Ret Mr Lawrence T Wright Government Advisors who contributed to the Information Warfare Panel s efforts were as follows 0 BrigGen Billy J Bingham 0 LCDR Gary Bumette 0 Mr Dennis Chiari 0 'Maj Robert Evans 0 LTC Greg Gorzelnik 0 COL Thomas Hall 0 CAPT William Henry 0 COL Douglas Hotard 0 Mr Harold McDonough 0 Mr David Patterson 0 LtCol Wilhelm Percival 1 2 Background An evolving strategy and capability to wage Information Warfare IW may be the next most important facet of military operations since the introduction of stealth Unlike the hard munitions of combat Information 'Warfare could pervade throughout the spectrum of con ict to create unprecedented effects Further with the dependence of modern commerce and the military on computer controlled telecommunication networks data bases enabling software and computers the US must protect these assets relating to their vulnerabilities There are three interlocked aspects of Information Warfare 1 The design and leveraging of one's own system to provide decision makers with actionable information 2 The protection of those infOrrnation systems from disruption exploitation and damage -and B-l 3 The employment of offensive techniques such as deception electronic jammers munition and advanced technologies to deceive deny exploit damage or destroy adversary information systems The overarching strategy is to mesh these interlocking defensive and offensive aspects of IW with national policy and for example military operations and intelligence community initiatives One serious impediment to evolving a coherent and practical IW strategy is the current lack of any national policy on this matter Further there is no well defined nor understood threat to US information systems Protection of US information systems is also clouded by legal restrictions put forth for example in the Computer Security Act of 1987 1 3 A Military-Technolog cal Revolu gn As one ponders the significance of Information Warfare in relation to Nuclear Warfare the comparison depicted in Figure 8 1 illustrates some key differences and similarities Of significance is the fact that Information Warfare technologies and resulting capabilities are largely being developed in the open commercial market without Government control This contrasts sharply with the necessary very secret development and control of nuclear weapons technology by the Government This means a so called third-world nation could procure a formidable modern IW capability virtually off-the- shelf This fact portends a revolution in commercial and military-technological warfare Revolutions in Joint Warfighting Nuclear Warfare Information Warfare - Technology 0 Technology - Controlled by Government - - Not Controlled by Government - Capability - Capability Massive Lethality - Lethal Non-lethal - Doctrine - Doctrine - Deterrence Destruction Information Supremacy - Peace Crisis Wartime - Strategies Strategies Assured Destruction - Information Combat - Counter Force Ca wa are Flexible Response Defensive Measures 0 Issues Issues N0 99 9 - Vulnerabilities Figure 3-1 This nation is under IW attack today by a spectrum of adversaries ranging from the teenage hacker to sophisticated wide-ranging illegal entries into telecommunications B-2 Au networks and computer systems As we continue the use of a SIOP for strategic nuclear warfare the might want to consider an Information Warfare process The IW SIOP could be used in part to play against an adversary IW strategy examine offensive and defensive decon iction and would deal with intelligence equity issues The Information Warfare panel attempted to address these and other related issues during the D53 Summer Study on Information Architecture for the Battlefield This appendix expands on the IW material in the main body of this report and focuses on several specific recommendations to address the issues as we saw them 1 4 Recommendations These recommendations are 1 The SECDEF should direct that a broad Net Assessment of Information Warfare be undertaken to examine 0 Information Systems and supporting national and global commercial systems and the related implications for US IW readiness and operations 0 The nature extent and implications of assessed vulnerabilities 0 Evolving US and adversary capabilities in and 0 Cost-effectiveness of IW strategy options 2 The should increase its emphasis on Defensive Information Warfare because of the perceived and known vulnerabilities In particular the SECDEF should support immediate increases in resources for Defensive IW This recommendation parallels a similar recoMendationJ in the Joint Security Commission Report 3 A Red Team activity across the should be institutionalized to help evaluate IW readiness and vulnerabilities This Red Team activity should be integrated with other assessment and exercise activities parallel and coordinated activity with the DCI is also recommended The ASD C31 should provide oversight and audit these activities 4 The Vice Chairman JCS should create an integrated joint IW strategy cell in the JCS This ag-level cell would report to the and consist of representatives staff elements SOCOM Services DISA and intelligence agencies Its missions would be to develop an IW strategy which 0 Integrates offensive and defensive and 0 Integrates IW with Information in Warfare This cell would support the JROC assessment process provide the Joint Staff point of contact for all IW matters with the Services and agencies review for correct IW integration and be the advocate for technological advancement in IW The cell would also act as a champion for resources and be the Joint Staff advocate for IW in the POM process 5 The SECDEF should review the existing PRD and actively promote the development of national policy to be embodied in a Presidential Decision Directive PDD Further the SECDEF should direct the ASD C31 to lead the development of IW policy in acquisition of systems and in the export of US technology abroad B-3 These recommendations are critical to the future readiness of this nation as it evolves the N11 into the CH The N11 is under active IW attack today by a diverse set of adversaries This has blurred the concepts of peace crisis and war as we traditionally have known them Information superiority provides enormous political economic and military opportunities to the United States Maintaining information superiority is as impOrtant today as nuclear deterrence and dominance were during the Cold War 2 0 INFORMATION WARFARE 2 1 Why Wa gre Because it is there The United States perhaps more than any other nation on earth has adopted electronic information technology The result is a policy which is fundamentally dependent upon the proper functioning of our national information infrastructure Information storage and exchange has become characterized by computers linked to computers many systems of systems connecting global information Virtually every facet of our lives is affected by electrOnic media television radio banking communications and the entire panoply of electronics associated with our industrial manufacturing and service industries The Department of Defense has been quick and in many cases the leader in adapting electronics specifically including information technology to our military establishment We spend hundreds of millions of dollars trying to leverage such technology into force multipliers These coincident activities have provided the with very powerful capabilities and simultaneously made us virtually dependent on these same technologies We have begun to forcefully use information per se as a powerful new weapon Paradoxically these same new create some of our most significant vulnerabilities The tens of thousands of computers connected to other computers have increased the damage that can be in icted from the vantage point of a single computer or computer controlled network This has become especially true in light of the increased use of commercial networks and other communications media by the Figure 8-2 illustrates the overlap of military and civil infospheres and the concomitant spanning by the Information Warfare concept of those two domains It is important to note that in addition to Information in Warfare there is Information Warfare These distinctions often get smeared and we will address in subsequent paragraphs some important definitions This ubiquitous nature of global information creates serious issues with respect to the assurability of information when and where we need it For example a number of components of the 311 for support to military operations operate on or in 0 US public switched networks 0 Commercial communications satellite systems such as INTELSAT 8 0 Transoceanic cables 0 Foreign postal telephone and telegraph systems Shared navigation systems including Global Positioning System 0 military satellite communications systems - MILSTAR DSCS UHF and 0 Supporting systems - power grids and so on 3-4 Terms and Relationships Use of Information Use of Information mWarlare In Civil Society I Economy Information Warfare - - In Traditional War and in Peace Overlap Depends on Civil Information Enterprise - In Peace - In War Figure 3-2 Furthermore our infosphere specifically ineludes users such as logistics maintenance medical personnel administration and commercial support infrastructures in addition to the traditional command and control and intelligence systems Thus our span of interest interdependence and potential vulnerability has grown significantly This - is predominantly the result of a networking of resources driven largely by new technologies This is a dramatic change from the stovepipes that used to exist for each of - these disciplines it A measure of the magnitude of this issue is contained in the Joint Security Commission Report - February 1994 which states that The Commission considers the security of information systems and networks to be the major security challenge of this decade and possibly the next century and believes there is insufficient awareness of the grave risks we face in this arena We have neither come to grips with the enormity of the problem nor devoted the resources necessary to understand fully much less rise to the challenge Our Information Infospheres are under attack today in some cases by computer hackers in other cases by organized activities by those who would do the U S harm There are at least 25 countries with computer underground groups and these international hackers often are very sophisticated - often sharing technologies for breaking into computers and computer controlled systems such as INTERNET Many of the computer attacks over the INTERNET are known but based on information generated by its own testing DISA estimates that only 5% of attacks are detected and of those only 5% are reported Not only that over 100 countries have intelligence collection capabilities B-5 Transnational multinational and terrorist organizations each have interests in gaining access to our information systems There is really a continuum of activities about which we need be concerned ranging from an accidental intrusion by a student to major focused deliberate and sophisticated intrusion into our systems at the time of greatest impact upon us We need to be aware that A large structured attack with strategic intent against the U S could be prepared and executed for example under the guise of unstructured hacker activities All of this indicates that there is a serious and escalating vulnerability of the U S infrastructure In many respects our vulnerabilities are of much greater concern than the currently known threats In the coming years the number of nations and individuals with the capability to access and damage our systems will grow substantially Furthermore the concept of peace-crisis-war is becoming blurred because of the concept of conducting warfare with information Maintaining information superiority becomes as important as nuclear superiority deterrence Information superiority provides enormous political economic and military Opportunities to the United States This area warrants national focus and policy It may help with deterrence in a new world order as more and more we are involved in Operations Other Than War around the globe 2 2 What Is Information Warfare Information Warfare is a term which has come to represent an overarching integrating strategy to recognize the importance and value of information per se in the command control and execution of military forces and in the implementation of national policy IW means different things to different people Other terms such as Command and Control Warfare C2W which is the military application of IW on the battlefield are used in related contexts but they too often are loosely or imprecisely used These differences are great enough to seriously impair development of coherent policy strategy tactics and program plans A draft UNCLASSIFIED definition of IW is Actions taken to achieve information superiority in support of national military strategy by affecting adversary information and information systems while leveraging and protecting our own information and information systems Some aspects of Information Warfare are very old - for example what we now call Operations Some are relatively new such as Electronic Warfare Better information might equate to earlier victory or fewer forces or combinations of both Information can provide dramatic leverage in combat a virtual form of stealth It operates in any weather day or night and under certain circumstances can be as lethal as many other weapons Additionally it pervades all levels of tactical operations Information Warfare is a revolutionary strategy - as were advances such as the longbow gunpowder armored vehicles aircraft code breaking transistors nuclear weapons guided missiles and stealth Figure 3-3 illustrates the concept of Information Warfare and how what previously was called peace is now a part of the continuum of con ict B-6 Information Warfare C2W De nition PM Roles Ian mm Joint Service Roles 1 Coordination i Damage Assessment Figure B-3 A range of activities contribute to Information Warfare Perception Management OPSBC Electronic Warfare Deception Information Influence and many others depending upon the circumstances It is important to note that IW comprises the entire range of activities to use information to our advantage or to our adversary's disadvantage _This raises a number of issues like those cited on the left side of Figure 3-3 some of which are definitional others of which relate to organizational issues or the roles of various organizations in coordinating or executing IW Information Warfare then is a national strategic concern Our economy national life and military capabilities are very dependent upon information - information often vulnerable toexploita tion or disruption Even if there were no possibility of use of Information Warfare in the offensive sense the use of information in warfare will always be of great valuefIt is the use of information in warfare that is at the heart of the current revolution in military information technology and this is why Information Warfare is both more feasible and more valuable 2 3 Where Are We in Information Warfare A wide variety of IW activities are underway in for example has established an IW Directorate requested a special National Intelligence Estimate on Information Warfare and drafted a PRD The Joint Staff other Agencies and the Services all have begun to participate in several respects see Figure B-4 iW Activities 080 can - - Joint Staff 0 Policy Construction Leading to 0 Lead PDD J-2 lWIIntel Support 0 Established iw Directorate - J-6 Information Security - Requested Development of NIE JROC-Expanded 30' in w by the Director for Central JEWC chwc Intelligence Agencies Services - Lead-Non-Lethal - 0 Air Force iw Center - Development - Navy-Naval iW Activity - DlSA-Established Joint - Operations Information Security Center with NSA oNz-lntel Support ONSG-Executlve Agent 0 Army - Information Operations Doctrine Development -Army Center Coming Figure B-4 Doctrine and Studies Assessments underway are shown in Figure 3-5 Clearly Information Warfare has become and properly so a critical issue'for the Department of Defense - an issue requiring major attention and resources now Equally importantly Information Warfare needs to become a national issue as we begin to really understand the extent to which our government and our way of life depend upon the effective functioning of our national infosphere The complex interrelationships imbedded in these concepts and activities raise a number of issues several of which require urgent coherent near term attention The functioning of the U S economy and our national life in general are becoming increasingly dependent on the use of information in digital electronic or optical form and on the national infrastructure which handles that information The same is true of our military posture in peacetime crisis and war We use the civil national information infrastructure for a wide range of defense functions including wartime operations And our national information infrastructure is becoming increasingly integrated with the global information infrastructure The use of information employing these linked B-8 infrastructures is increasingly an enabling factor in national and international economic growth and in the development and use of military capabilities Protection of essential information and the infrastructures used to support the information is important for military operations I Information Warfare Doctrine Studies Assessment DOCTRINE - JolntPubs-ladointC NOperations 2NDDtaftAug94 - CompleteFeb95 - Jammeozmemoymmoroammc-s aegInFabesComplataFebss Capstone DooumenttorOandC l Protection STUDIES - NIE on 'l'hreat to us Telecommunications and Automated Information Systerm' Baseline Study - JSIASD Sponsored Study on Information Requirements oi Joint Commander Prioritize Requirements Develop Risk Management System - Figure 3-5 3 0 ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS This translates into a basic issue at the national level on how to deal with the widespread vulnerabilities in our civil and military information enterprise and the potential severe consequences for our national interest and security 4 As pointed out earlier there is no national policy on Information Warfare IW A although a PRD has been drafted In contrast there is a policy on Information Warfare Its basic strategy is to seek dominance in both the use of information in warfare and in Information Warfare Below this basic strategy there are fundamental questions as 5 to how to achieve dominance within available resources The questions and issues for poD are very similar to the issues at the national level This is not surprising since the prospects for civil information warfare in peacEtime have much in common with concerns Alternatives or building blocks for both'xnational and strategy all have cost and effectiveness issues and some especially in regards to the civil infrastructure have legal and or other policy implications Three factors illustrate common issues between the national and the problems Widespread protection of the civil and military information enterprise or making it more robust against degradation would be a and extremely costly process and there is a fundamental technical question as to their effectiveness Substantial protection of the civil information enterprise would entail a cultural change in the private sector side of the enterprise The development of the information infrastructure has been based on ease of use and access Software has stressed friendliness and a trend toward openness These increase vulnerabilities System intrusions by hackers and the growing incidence of industrial software espionage and fraud are beginning to cause change but there will continue to be a tension between utility and security Further to have high confidence that the vulnerabilities would be reduced below the level of strategic concern the Government would have to insert itself more and in new ways In both the civil and cases potential adversaries strategies and capabilities need to be taken into account So also does the evolution of the global technology base as it shapes both US and adversaries' capabilities especially because generation changes in information technology happen so fast and The interplay between offensive and defensive information warfare both ours and potential adversaries must be addressed This situation leads to two interrelated recommendations The Secretary of Defense should direct a Net Assessment of Information Warfare and The Secretary of Defense should review the draft PRD and related issues The Net Assessment should examine Both and national systems The nature extent and implications of both US and adversary vulnerabilities Evolving US and adversary offensive and defensive IW capabilities and The cost and effectiveness of a variety of US strategy options in light of possible adversary strategies The Net Assessment should be accelerated so that it can serve as one of DoD's inputs to the national policy review It should involve the BITF recommended earlier in this report A key problem mentioned above is the vulnerability of national and infrastructures and the defensive aspects of dealing with those vulnerabilities A POM issue paper on a defensive IW alternative exists Also the Joint Security Commission recommended spending 5-10% of the infrastructure costs to protect the civil infrastructure These estimates not withstanding the Task Force s judgment is that no comprehensive analysis has been completed of the cost and effectiveness of defensive weapons for - systems to establish where the knee of the cost benefit curve is nor how far beyond the knee should be willing to spend considering the gravity of the vulnerabilities for defense activities in both peace and war 13-10 Despite the absence of such an analysis the members of this Task Force are also persuaded that is currently spending too little on defensive IW and that the gravity and potential urgency of the problem deserves redress We therefore recommend that 0 The Secretary of Defense should support immediate increases in funding for defensive IW focusing attention on protection of critical information services and As a more detailed part of the Net Assessment process recommended above the Secretary of Defense should direct ASD C31 to carry out An assessment of DoD's critical information needs - Threat development as part of the NIE process and - A risk assessment and a risk management strategy to apportion actions during procedures processes and systems The recommendations immediately preceding are needed to jump-start Defensive IW Beyond that a continuing activity to assess vulnerabilities and readiness is needed based on a system of on-going assessments and evaluations We recommend that 0 The Secretary of Defense should direct establishment of a joint Red Team activity in which a team evaluating adversaries' offensive 1W is used to attack DOD's information enterprise This activity should be distributed throughout and carried out at various levels and locations after appropriate legal considerations are addressed It should be coordinated and audited by ASD C31 and should be coordinated with a parallel DCI activity and 0 The JCS build IW and its resultant degradations into exercises and simulations Earlier in this report the Task Force recommended that greater attention should be given to simulation and modeling of information systems and operations The BITF should play a leading role This overall system of exercises simulation and red teaming should be coordinated and evaluated by ASD C31 The Task Force also noted deficiencies in how took 1W into account in systems acquisition and in policy on export of systems and technology Weapon systems contain embedded information systems which can be vulnerable in many of the same ways that information networks and infrastructures are Further IW is taken into account in inconsistent ways in the acquisition cycle for both weapon systems and information systems per se Also export of information technology can be used in a variety of ways to help the US achieve our objectives in both information warfare and the use oft information in warfare We recommend that The Secretary of Defense task ASD C31 to lead development of policy on 1W in acquisition and export - Information Warfare needs to be integrated into a more cohesive warfighting strategy with associated doctrine and tactics in a way which has some parallels with the nuclear SIOP see Figure 8-5 Various measures will need to be decon icted target lists should be developed and maintained and potential adversary responses should be anticipated Unlike the nuclear SIOP at least during the Cold War it will probably be impossible to predict the nature of the contingency until it begins to deve10p What is needed is a capability within JCS including a set of planning tools such as 1W simulations B-ll so that comprehensive IW plans can be built in near real-time as contingencies unfold We recommend that 0 The VCICS create an integrated joint IW strategy and planning cell within ICS This cell should be integrated at the flag level and report to VCICS It should involve the Joint Staff the CINCs the Services SOCOM DISA and the intelligence agencies In addition to its planning and warfighting functions this cell will be a focal point for increased emphasis on IW in It should be closely coupled to the 4 0 DEFENSIVE INFORMATION WARFARE AN OVERVIEW OF NECESSARY - INITIATIVES There are two parallel paths of observation of Defensive IW programs as illustrated in Figure 3-6 On the one hand there is a baseline of critical data that must be protected We must identify essential networks and systems that Contain this critical data to perform a vulnerability assessment of those systems On the other hand one must consider varied and unidentified potential adversaries and their threats to our information systems A risk assessment that compares and contrasts these two parallel efforts that results in a risk management decision becomes the basis for a defensive program strategy After the strategy is developed the result is the processes procedures and systems used as a basis for continued protection of critical data Defensive Program Studies Baseline Critical Data Threat Assessment i Identify Essential Networks and Systems - Vulnerabilities Assessment of Risk Assessment Essential Systems Risk Assessment Defensive Program Strategy Processes Procedures Systems Figure 8-6 8-12 Current policy Directive TS 3600 1 directs that command and control of forces shall be planned and exercised in such a manner as to minimize the amount of information transfer required for effective direction and application of force to ensure our forces are able to operate successfully in degraded information and communication environments Additionally elements of the information system critical to transmission and use of minimum-essential information for control and direction of forces are directed to be designed and employed in a manner that minimizes or prevents exploitation denial or degradation of services Current standards policies procedures and tools are designed to mitigate an attack on the information and information infrastructure mounted for the purpose of destroying or disabling the functions that depend upon the information and or information infrastructure without regard to the classification of the information This view of warfare is made clear in the October '1991 observation of Lieutenant General Bogdanov Chief of the General Staff Center for Operational and Strategic Studies that Iraq lost the war before it even began This was a war of intelligence electronic warfare EW command and control and counter intelligence Iraqi troops were blinded and war can be won by informatika and that is now vital for both the US and the In a similar vein Major General G Kirilenko wrote in the June 4 1991 issue of Komsomolskaia Pravada number of barrels and ammunition aircraft and bombs is no longer the important factor It is the computers that control them the communications that makes it possible to manage force on the battlefield land the reconnaissance and concealment assets that highlight the enemy's dispositions and cloak one's own These Russian general officers were correct as far as they went However information warfare targets include all of the information information systems and control systems associated with the activities of a modern society and military These include energy finance health logistics maintenance transportation personnel numerous control systems for example air sea rail road river pipeline and canal transport systems that depend upon control mechanisms intelligence command and control and communications All depend upon an assured availability of correct information at the time needed Destroy or degrade the information or information service and the function is stopped or delayed Exploiting this dependency relationship is the basis of Information Warfare If the US military is to maintain a competitive combat advantage in further conflicts the information and information services upon which the US military depends must be protected commensurate with the intended use Analysis shows that all of the Department of Defense military and support functions are highly dependent upon the information and information services provided by the Defense Information Infrastructure The DH is highly susceptible to attacks which disrupt information services availability or corrupt the data integrity within the infrastructure Many nations and groups have the capability to cause significant disruption both availability and integrity to the D11 and in turn cripple U S operational readiness and military effectiveness The design factors used to protect against normal breakage natural disasters or attacks to obtain access to sensitive information are inadequate to deal with the levels of disruption that can readily be caused by malicious actions For example an signal can protect the content of information An attack that upsets the of the device will not B-13 expose the content of the information but may stop the ow of the information and thus stop the function using the information If the Department of Defense is to maintain a suitable level of military preparedness to meet - the national security requirements of the U S the information infrastructure upOn which it depends for information services must be strengthened against malicious attack This must address protection against attacks detection of attacks and the ability to react to attacks Information systems usually consist of six primary elements hardware computers entry output and display devices storage media and facilities operating software system application software including data base software communications devices and links which are just a specialized form of an information system data and the people who have been trained to operate or maintain one or more of these elements All of these elements can be damaged or destroyed by physical attaCk Some can be damaged or destroyed by over-the-wire attacks The trained people who have access to these components can become a threat The hardware operating software commercial shrink wrap software and communications media unless this is the target usually can be considered as readily replaced commodity items Tailored application software data and trained people are more difficult to replace These assets should be given- protection commensurate with the value of the process or function they suppOrt Storage of data creates unique vulnerabilities that require increased attention to a means to verify the integrity of stored data - 5 0 PROTECTION To asSure effective prOtection DOD should 0 Provide sufficient redundancy so that functions do not depend upon the uninterrupted operation of any particular Automated Information System AIS or communications service To determine sufficiency an analysis is required to relate the time dependent relationship of all functions and the information services upon which these functions depend to the expected actions and interrelationships of the Department's enterprise activities in peace crisis and con ict That is in effect a campaign plan It addresses'what functional events have to happen and when and what information is needed to obtain the objective at the desired operational tempo 0 Provide sufficient protection in information systems so that over-the-wire attacks 55 cannOt exploit known aws in'computer operating systems to cause the underlying computers or communications devices to malfunction or information to be corrupted or destroyed - 0 Eliminate the practice of assigning responsibility for developing security functions by the classi cation of the information to be protected 0 Provide suitable protection to the physical plant including those used for back up of data and restoration of functions that houses information systems and the supporting utility services such as water and electricity that are essential to the support of high-priority operations - B-14 Design the facilities that house information systems supporting high-value processes or functions in such a way as to facilitate the rapid repair or replacement of the information systems housed within the facility Develop security processes and devices fire walls etc that will enable the DH to operate secure information processing enclaves while allowing safe access to the global information infrastructure Determine which functions or processes must be supported by information services that are within a secure enclave Determine which functions or processes must be supported by information services that are located on a distributed structure Establish a means to identify all assured wartime information services in priority by function by time Develop metrics to portray the relative value of a function or process to the defense mission s as a function of time during peacetime force deployment force employment and force sustainment Develop metrics such that the manager of the D11 can portray the cost basis underlying ef ciency versus effectiveness trades the cost delta for added increments of resiliency obtained by alternative design or by the addition of security features Conduct the necessary research to enable the network data manager and information security manager to protect information in a mobile environment to include suitable means to dynamically limit the availability of or access to sensitive information as a function of the current subscriber location Develop suitable processes to share knowledge of offensive and defensive information warfare trade craft with DISA as the manager of DH Enhance security training and education so that the users of information systems operate more securely and know how to behave when under information warfare attack Develop a defensive information Warfare exercise capability and train the combatant forces to operate in an information-hostile environment This capability should include a means for exercise references to stress the information systems supporting the forces so that the military learns how to operate under varying time bandwidth and error rate ratios Challenge the purveyors of concepts for using advanced technology to enhance information services to portray to the warfighter the operational dependencies and security limitations that may accompany the claimed gains in combat utility Adopt a testing process that would enable purchasers to have confidence in whatever security claims are made for an information system or security component offered for sale Determine if the increased use of is an affordable means to maintain the integrity of stored and transferred data Develop or adopt some type of dynamic password devices s that can be used for information transactions throughout the Department of Defense and eliminate the use of static passwords static means that the password change time is greater than seconds of time B-15 6 0 7 0 DETECTION To ensure effective detection 'of threats to the D11 should Develop tools to monitor network operations detect and audit inappropriate behavior and detect abnormal operating patterns Develop tools and techniques for validating the integrity of the data held in a data base Develop tools to aid in the detection of malicious software code and aid in the repair of damaged code Train and exercise information workers in all functional areas on the expected an information attack and what steps they should take upon detection REACTION To ensure effective response to active'threats to the DH should Provide the D11 security control center s robust computing and communications capability such that it can perform triage functions and manage the restoration of operations in the DH without being dependent upon the infrastructure that it is monitoring Train and exercise information workers 1n all functional areas on the expected of an information attack and what steps they should take to support services restoration Develop a plan for the reallocation Of information utility services computing and communications to support priority defense functions in accordance with the dynamic priorities established by the JCS Conduct live exercises of the reallocation of information utility services Develop a listing of reserve computing and communications capacity including personnel with technical skills in the commercial educational and industrial sectors that can be used in times of national emergency including restoral of critical defense support activities in the commercial sector Develop a plan and procedure to include legislative initiatives if required to preposition software and data bases at industrial commercial reserve sites REFERENCES Joint Security Commission Report Redefining Security 28 February 1994 Chapter 8 Draft Presidential Review Directive TS NF Subject Policy on IW for Presidential Decision Directive Directive TS 3600 1 Information Warfare 21 December 1992 Joint Pub 3-13 Joint Command and Control Warfare Operations Joint Pub 6-02 Joint Doctrine fOr Employment of Operational Tactical Command Control Communications and Computer Systems Draft JCS Memorandum of Policy MOP 6 3 March 1993 8-16 10 11 JCS Memorandum of Policy MOP 30 Command and Control Warfare May 1993 CJCSI 6212 01 Compatibility Interoperability and Integration of Command Control Communication Computers C4 and Intelligence Systems 30 July 1993 CJCSI 3211 01 Joint Military Deception 1 June 1993 ASD C31 Information Warfare Security Guidance 11 May 1993 FY-96 POM Issue Paper Defense Information Systems Security Program DISA B-17 Appendix Business Practices TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 0 INTRODUCTION C-1 1 1 Tasking Assignment 01 1 2 Management Panel Membership and Participation C-2 2 0 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES - STRENGTHENING OUR WARFIGHTER INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGEMENT PROCESSES G3 2 1 The Status Quo - C-3 22 Alternative Structural Concepts for Improving Our Warfighter Information Infrastructure and Processes 0-4 2 3 Recommended Structural Concept for Improving Our Warfighter Information Infrastructure and Processes G6 3 0 IMPROVING OUR ACQUISITION PROCESSES FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS - - - C-10 3 1 The Context for an Improved Information Systems Acquisition Process C-10 3 2 Some Guiding Principles for the Architecture Process C-11 3 3 Some Unique Timing Aspects of the Acquisition of Information Systems 015 3 4 Improving the Acquisition Process for Our Warfighter Information Systems 017 4 0 NET ASSESSMENT AND RED TEAM CAPABILITY C-18 LIST OF FIGURES Figure C-l Recommended Management Concept 07 Figure C-2 Recommendations for Strengthening our Warfighter Information Infrastructure Management 08 Figure C-3 C41 Responsibilities and Authorities C-9 Figure C-4 Responsiveness to the War ghter Requires Three Kinds of Reconfigurability C-13 Figure C-5 A Candidate Process to Produce Rapidly Reconfigurable C41 Systems C-14 Figure C-6 Rapidly Evolving Commercial Information Systems Technology Must be Infused into Systems C-16 Figure 07 Assessing Our Information Systems Posture C-18 1 0 INTRODUCTION 1 1 Tasking Assignment 4 The Task Force convened three times as a group during the early summer to receive brie ngs on relevant Government initiatives and programs and to plan its approach to the Summer Study The Task Force created four Panels as follows 0 Warfighters Panel to address Information in Warfare 9 Information Warfare Panel to address Information Warfare 0 Management Panel to address Business Practices 0 Technology Panel to address the Underlying Technology Base This appendix is the nal report of the Management Panel which was charged with dealing with the management and business practices aspects of the Terms of Reference These aspects generally fell into five major areas 0 Proposing a constructive and viable information architectural process that 15 congruent with the Roles and Responsibilities of the organizations charged with oversight of battlefield information systems 0 Proposing organizational adjustments and processes to increase the in uence Of the warfighter on battlefield information systems 0 Suggesting improvements to the acquisition process for the procurement of battlefield information systems 0 Proposing the conduct of a broad net assessment of our current battlefield information systems posture and 0 Establishing a Red Team process for the on going identification of potential vulnerabilities 1n our information systems Prior to the August 1994 Summer Study session in Irvine California the Management Panel conducted a series of interviews with senior executives and other personnel involved in the use and management of battlefield information systems The interviewees included - Honorable Emmett Paige Jr Adm David Jeremiah USN Ret Lt Gen Jim Clapper USAF Lt Gen Al Edmonds USAF VAdm Mike McConnell USN Mr Tony Valletta Mr Mike Munson Mr Dick Mosier Mr Steven Schanzer Mr Douglas Perritt Mr George Endicott Maj Ioseph Bruder USMC C-l Notes from these interviews which were conducted on an off the record basis were reviewed by Panel members and formed the basis for much of the Panel s early perspectives on the study topic Panel members with the assistance of their Gayernment Advisors also conducted a review of the statutory assignment of responsibilities authorities and accountabilities in the information systems area and considered current Directives and organizational structures associated with the management and operations of battlefield information systems 1 2 Management Panel Membership And Pam'gipatign Members of the Management Panel were assigned by the Task Force Io-Chairs as follows Mr Howard K Schue - Chair Dr John S Foster Mr Jerry King Mr Robert N Parker MG Cloyd H Mike Pfister USA Ret Government Advisors who contributed to the Management Panel s efforts were as follows Dr Duane Adams Maj Joseph Bruder USMC Mr George Endicott Mr Dick Mosier Mr Mike Munson Mr Douglas Perritt MajGen David A Richwine USMC Mr Steven Schanzer Dr David Signori Mr Anthony Valletta Administrative support to the Panel was provided by Strategic Analysis Inc through the efforts of Mr Brad Smith l 0 Mr Fred Karkalik Management issues were also identified and addressed by the other panels participating in this Task Force and were shared with the Management Panel In particular the Panel wishes to recognize the Warfighters Panel for its work on the Battlefield Information Task Force the In- formation Warfare Panel for its emphasis on the importance of Net Assessment and the Red Team and the Technology Panel for its detailed thoughts on improving the Acquisition PrOcess The Panel is grateful for the advice and assistance provided by all who contributed This report represents the judgments conclusions and recommendations of the Management Panel C-2 2 0 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES - STRENGTHENING OUR WAR-FIGHTER INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGEMENT PROCESSES 2-1 Our battle eld information systems have grown increasingly complex as our weapons systems technologies have become more sophisticated threats to our national security more varied and the range of potential military operations more diverse Because battlefield information systems can provide the military commander with the capability to understand the situation he faces and employ his forces effectively against opposing forces they can provide the commander with enormous leverage in combat or they can render him ineffective against a so- phisticated adversary Thus the parallel tasks of providing capable fully functioning battle eld information Systems to our combat forces and ensuring their effective use by our forces in military operations are of critical importance to our national security However in reviewing our battle eld information systems the task force concluded that we have built a system of systems that collectively still does not adequately support war ghters joint and combined operational requirements We found shortfalls in information dissemination interoperability and in the rapid reconfigurability of our battle eld C41 systems For example we encountered dif culties in preparing coordinating and disseminating the Air Tasking Order during Desert Storm we had problems in disseminating imagery to tactical users in Desert Storm especially national imagery and we encounter chronic problems when we try to equip an ad hoc Joint Task Force with appropriate C4I capabilities While advanced technology can materially assist in dealing with these shortfalls they can be attributed primarily to management and organizational limitations and consequently will be amenable to improvement through management and organizational improvements The panel found that the has recently established a number of management process initiatives designed to produce major improvements in these shortfalls These initiatives include The C41 for the Warrior Vision The implementation of the Global Command and Control System Admiral Owens expanded JROC Joint Capabilities Assessment and the more vigorous roles he plans for the JROC in articulating military requirements 0 Interoperability initiatives within the Defense Information Systems Agency including the Technical Architecture Framework for Information Management the Data the Defense Information Infrastructure the Joint Interoperability Test Center and others 0 The initiative to establish an Enterprise Integration Board and an Enterprise Integration Council to oversee the interoperability and cross-functional management of DoD s Corporate Information Management initiatives 0 Information system architecture initiatives that are underway in each of the services the Army s Digitized Battlefield the avy s Joint Maritime Command Information System JMCIS and the Air Force s C41 Horizon 0 The Acquisition Reform initiative and the initiative to use commercial hardware and software which are already underway and nally 0 The USD and ASC C31 MOU to establish a jointly chaired review board process to identify the best software practices C-3 However even taking into account these constructive initiatives the task force feels some major concerns and opportunities remain First we observed that the roles and responsibilities assigned 1n the oversight of our war ghter information systems are more diffuse than the roles and responsibilities assigned for our functional component information systems such as logistics health and nance Second the Panel found that there IS no single authority or process for establishing implementing and enforcing an architectural process for our battle eld information systems Consequently system developers are faced with resolving incomplete and con icting architectural standards a dynamically changing field of technology and operational requirements Third the Panel found instances where the Services and agencies initiate aggressive bottom-up activities which address theirown information system needs but there is little evidence that these various ar- chitectures and systems play together operationally in top-down joint operations Fourth some programs still 1n development and some just starting do not have the proper C41 interfaces to other systems jointness 8 interoperability Fifth some C41 issues are falling between the cracks of the various functional organizations Finally and perhaps most signi cant we found that the mechanisms which produce both our information architectures and our information system acquisition processes suffer from a lack of adequate input from the joint war ghter community Conversely the CINCS do not seem to have the technical and analytical capabilities necessary to address their C41 issues in a timely way while working in conjunction with the design and acquisition communities The pacing problem seems to be the lack of a top down war ghter driven process to oversee C41 operations and the reconfiguration migration evolution design acquisition test and maintenance of our battlefield information systems This process must both recognize the existing statutory and delegated roles and responsibilities within the Department and be dynamic enough to ensure that US forces are able to achieve and maintain information dominance on the battlefields where they will be called to ght i 2 2 Alterna ive tru Im vin ur rfi Inf rmation Infrastructure And Processes In seeking constructive and viable management structure changes to improve our warfighter information infrastructure and processes the task force first reviewed the existing authorities and responsibilities of the major entities who oversee our warfighter informa-fi' tion systems We included statutory responsibilities and examined the initiatives the currently has underway to deal with the concerns identified in the previous section In examining alternate organizational approaches for improving management of our battle eld information systems the Panel concluded that given the span of responsibility the proposed manager architect must report directly to either the SECDEF or DEPSECDEF and be authorized to speak with their authority Organizational options for this manager architect which the Panel considered included the following and combinations thereof ASD C31 with expanded charter 0 New ASD or Assistant to SECDEF C-4 New Joint Staff Element CINC USACOM Defense Agency New or Expanded Role Function Joint Staff Agency Center Joint Warfighting Center DEPSECDEF Council Committee Brie y the Panel s evaluation of these organization options for the battlefield information architect led to the following observations 0 Assigning the responsibility solely to ASD C31 with an expanded charter has the benefit of recognizing that the ASD C31 currently has responsibilities and functions in many of the needed capacities especially in the area of battle eld support systems However his responsibilities currently do not encompass all war ghting information functions and stop short of complete oversight of architectures encompassing weapon systems and platforms He does not have direct control over the acquisition of major warfighter information systems especially those embedded in weapons systems and platforms He must gain USD support and act through that of ce to in uence the acquisition of battlefield information systems Finally there is some concern in the Services and agencies that the ASD authorities in the information systems policy arena represent a potential con ict of interest with expanded responsibilities in the architec- - tural design and acquisition arenas 0 Creating a new ASD or Assistant to SECDEF charged with this oversight would have the advantage of linking closely to support and it provides dedicated attention to this important problem but it has the disadvantage of greatly overlapping both ASD C31 and functions 0 Charging the with this responsibility would augment build-on and strengthen his current acquisition authorities and he would likely assign a deputy to cover the C41 area This would greatly overlap with many current ASD C31 functions 0 Creating a new element in the Joint Staff would strengthen the linkage between warfighters and the C41 acquisition process but it adds to the complexity of the Joint Staff and assigns new overlapping areas of responsibility across Joint Staff functions The Joint Staff currently has neither the technical expertise nor the capacity to handle this task without major augmentation Also the Joint Staff has a legal ceiling in its size and- 53 would require offsetting cuts to other already overworked staff sections or a change in the law 0 Assigning CINC USACOM who has broad roles and missions in support of all the other CINCs - including joint training responsibilities for all CONUS units - would greatly strengthen the linkage between warfighters and C41 acquisition process but this may not meet the needs of all the CINCs many of whom have battlefield information nequirements unique to their areas of responsibility Also currently CINC USACOM does not have a staff which is technically capable of performing all of the needed functions Further a Unified Command is not in position to exercise functional and programmatic oversight over-all supporting CIM C41 systems embedded in weapons C-5 systems or embedded C41 systems in development To give a CINC such responsibilities could seriously divert his main warfighting focus 0 Assigning these responsibilities as a new or expanded function to a Defense Agency DISA is an obvious choice has the advantage of placing the responsibility where there 15 likely to be a critical mass of technical expertise able to address all of the technical and engineering functions needed However no single agency is likely to possess the necessary warfighting operational expertise to exercise competent authority over all the functional architectures Also in case because some organizations may perceive a potential con ict of interest between the oversight aspects of this assignment and the fact that DISA currently manages some communications programs directly it would be important to spell out in detail the respective responsibilities and authorities 0 Charging a Joint Staff Agency Center Joint Warfighting Center with these responsibilities would enhance the role of the Joint Staff and the CINCs in the acquisition process but here again the technical capabilities and relationships of such an organization must be developed almost from scratch 0 Appointing a Council or Committee to discharge these responsibilities is relatively easy to implement The right structure and membership could recognize and incorporate the relevant operational and technical expertise and existing statutory and delegated authorities of executives Committees of course are unwieldy management structures but when assigned oversight of line organizations they can provide the necessary checks and balances and can select relative priorities and preferred approaches for current issues 2 3 Recommended Structural Concept For Improving Our Warfighter Information Infrastructure And Pracesses After consideration of the above alternatives and their variants the Management Panel chose a variant of the Council approach In April of this year the DEPSECDEF created an Enterprise Integration 'Board and Council to achieve the goals of Corporate Information Management These include an enterprise integration approach to the ac- celerated implementation of migration of our legacy information systems and establishment of data standards and process improvements This structure provides a forum to address interoperability and cross-functional issues Although the charters of the Board and Council do not currently include warfighter C41 systems the memberships on the Board and Council are appropriate for dealing with these systems Therefore as shown in Figure C-1 the Management Panel and the Task Force recommend that the DEPSECDEF augment this Enterprise Integration Board Council structure to coordinate the integration of warfighter requirements and the technical architecture framework for warfighter information systems just as it does for functional component systems This requires a change to the charter of the Board and Council 06 Structure Concept for Improving Warfighter Information Infrastructure Management Warfighters Information JROC Requlrements Process Board EXPanded DEPSECDEF Chair SVC Secs USDs PDUSD A3117 Co-Chairs I Battle eld Enterprise ASD ml Ifomaoth lngeglz giqn Functional Components as rce J-G I Warfighter Warfighter DISA 1300 Information Information Validated Requirements Technical sung m3m m m - Inter- d D Architecture mum - Exists Framework Framework Proposed Figure Second we recommend that the DEPSECDEF clarify that the Board's responsibility and authority include oversight and con ict resolution of interfaces standards interoperability and cross-functional issues that are associated with information systems which must operate in a joint environment Individual system design system architecture and development are not a part of this charter 'so long as the individual system is compliant with standards and interoperability and interface specifications - Third the Panel recommends that the IROC include in its expanded processes the infusion of its validated joint warfighting requirements into the DOD-wide information architec- ture process A Warfighter Information Requirements Architecture Framework based on a yet to be-developed Functional Architecture Framework for Information Management FAFIMIV compatible with the TAFIM should be developed and formalized This FAFIM architecture should take into account who needs to talk with whom in what formats with what data how quickly under what circumstances with which data bases which legacy system's to migrate earlier which to retire sooner what standards are operative how to assure reachback to older technologies etc all from a warfighter s perspective This Warfighter Information Requirements Framework should be used to develop the warfighter systems technical requirements which wi11 _in turn provide integrated and joint requirements to systems developers Fourth the Battlefield Information Task Force recommended in the Task Force Study Report and discussed in more detail in the Warfighters Panel Appendix should be tasked with C-7 dynamically identifying cost effective and timely actions for improving the recon guration evolution acquisition test and fielding of warfighter information systems using the mechanisms described earlier The BITF should provide ongoing input to the development of warfighter information requirements architectures and systems and when necessary support the Enterprise Integration Council in its oversight and con ict resolution roles Fifth the Panel recommends that the director DISA review the DISA TAFIM and related data administration and functional initiatives currently underway and ensure that they are brought to a satisfactory state of maturity one which can guide an iterative process that produces better interface standards and interoperability requirements The TAFIM and associated data element administration program initiatives are intended to establish a technical architectural framework of interoperability guidelines interface specifications and standards such as data element de nitions The TAFIM represents a preliminary first-generation technical architectural framework within which individual systems possessing the attributes of interoperability and interconnectivity can be deve10ped We believe these changes to the existing management structure will allow the to implement a dynamic process which will result in much improved interoperability of our warfighter C41 systems and better exploitation Of the leverage that those systems potentially provide our combat forces Recommendations for Strengthening Warfighter Information Infrastructure Management - 0 DepSecDef augment the Enterprise Integration Council structure to Coordinate Integration of Requirements and Technical Architectural Frameworks for Warfighter Information Systems Add Responsibility for Battle eld Information Systems to the Enterprise Integration Board and Councrl Charters C arify That the Board's Responsibilities and Authorities include oversight and conflict resolution of Interface Standards and Interoperability issues associated with systems that must operate jointly System Design System Architecture and Development arenot part of this Charter - JROC include in its expanded Processes the infusion _of its Validated Joint Requrrements Into the Information architectural process - Warfighter lnforrnation System Developers and the Enterprise lnforrnation Council should use the Battlefield Information Task Force to dynamically identify cost-effective and timely actions for improving the reconfiguration evolution acquisition test and fielding of Warfighter Information Systems 0 Director DISA ensure that the Technical Architecture Framework Initiatives currently underway in DISA T AFIM Dll are brought to a satisfactory state of maturity and implemented Whert Now Cost Opportunity Costs of Rationalizing Evolution of a System of Systems Architecture Figure C-2 C-8 Figure C-2 above summarizes the speci c actions which the DEPSECDEF must direct in order to accomplish the structural process improvements described above Brie y the Enterprise Integration Council must be assigned the added responsibility to provide oversight and conflict resolution for our warfighter information systems The warfighter must make a broader more comprehensive and timely input to this entire process The Panel proposes that be used to prOvide dynamic recommendations for improvements and the JROC and Joint Staff play an expanded role in the infusion of their requirements The Panel endorses the activities already underway in DISA to achieve a dynamic architectural framework for our joint war ghter information systems The Panel believes these changes can be implemented almost immediately and that the expense will be limited to the opportunity costs of rationalizing the evolution of a system of interoperable information systems As Figure shows the Management Panel was careful to ensure that this management structure recognizes the existing responsibilities of the offices and agencies involved in the development procurement and operation of warfighter C41 systems Responsibilities and Authorities in C4I Wariighters 0 0 Agencies 0 C4l Doctrine - Valldates - Define System quts - C4i Systems 0 How to Fight Operational 0 Develop Weapon Sys Interoperability 0 Plans Requirements 0 Comply wl C4I Protocols Data - Scenarios - C4l Connectivity Standards Protocols Standards - Exercises Sources and User Needs - C4I Policy - Defines Recipients 0 Upgrade legacy systems - COMSEC Operational - Responsiveness Battlefield Information Task Force Enterprise Integration Council Figure C-3 First the warfighter chain of command - from the National Command Authorities President and SECDEF through the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff to the CINCs and their Joint Task Force Commanders - retains their authorities and responsibilities associated with operating warfighter C41 systems The JROC the Joint Staff and the CINC staffs retain their C-9 advisory and staff responsibilities to articulate operational requirements for the use of those systems Second we recognize the unique authorities and responsibilities of the Services agencies and functional components to define technical requirements for and develop and acquire warfighter C4I systems in response to these requirements Third we recognize the responsibilities and authorities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C31 in the area of oversight of interoperability standards and interface issues associated with the joint operations of those warfighter C41 systems which are required to operate in joint and combined circumstances Each of these responsibilities and authorities some of them statutory are preserved in our recommendations and it is not the intent of this recommendation to reallocate responsibilities or authorities in any way Thus there is an architecture for requirements which is clearly the domain of the warfighter The responsibility for architectural issues associated with joint warfighter information system interoperability standards interoperable software and interfaces resides with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C31 Acquisition responsibility for these systems resides with the Services agendas and functional components with oversight provided by the OSD acquisition community The Management Panel believes that the individuals and agencies with these statutory authorities must come together under the forum of the Enterprise Integration Council subject to the review and direction of the Enterprise Integration Board and chaired by the DEPSECDEF for the purposes of joint oversight priority setting and con ict resolution of issues associated with warfighter information systems 3 0 IMPROVING OUR ACQUISITION PROCESSES FOR WARFIGHTER IN- FORMATION SYSTEMS 3 1 ontex rAnIm ved Info ati tems Ac i ition Process Variability is a fundamental characteristic of future con icts - there is no longer a typical scenario There are great uncertainties relating to threat geography rules of engagement allies and coalition partners joint forces involved etc C41 must respond rapidly and surely to trolling political factors In addition to the changing nature of the conflict rapid changes in commercial information systems technology and off-the-shelf exponential capability increases dictate that the proper approach to an architectural process is one that inherently accommodates change Battlefield C41 like our forces should be - Rapidly configurable and reconfigurable Able to respond quickly securely and reliably inside the enemy decision cycle and - - Quickly and visibly expandable a primary deterrent to enemy escalation These attributes can be achieved for information systems if there is an underlying - technical architecture framework which promotes interoperability among C41 systems and if his C-10 accompanied by a functional or operational information architecture framework Compliance with these information architecture frameworks should allow individual C41 systems to exchange manage and exploit information throughout the battle eld environment Confusion persists over the term architecture and the development thereof Various organizations create architectures based on their interpretation of what an architecture is Furthermore the concepts of both' functional and technical architectures are confused and co-mingled This leads to the danger that some of the benefits which might be derived from an effective information architecture could be lost some compromised and some of shorter duration than they otherwise would These risks will remain until a more cohesive and coherent statement of objectives and strategy for information architecture concepts is announced and accepted The management approach recommended in the previous section should facilitate this process A related problem derives from the notion that regardless of size or complexity there is a stable and specific end state for a system ConSequently if substantial effort is required to reach the end state in the current environment the time required to develop a system may very well make that end state obsolete by the time it is achieved In many cases by the time the planned end state is achieved it no longer supports the desired functionality Improved syStems and capabilities for the warfighter can be achieved using a process of incremental improvements while following a high level and generalized architectural framework This approach provides improved capabilities to the warfighter at a pace consistent with both changes in environment and with the way funds are released At any time the system of systems is able to support combat operations and perform well at its current level of functionality Capitalization practices in industry provide a good example information systems tend to be replaced in small increments while following a management-supported strategic plan rather than by wholesale replacement 3 2 Some Guiding Principles For The Architecture Due to continuing technical advances and shifting mission needs organizational structures and strategies there is no final solution for an appropriate information infrastructure Instead the architecture process must allow continuous transition from what exists to what is more appropriate - Allow for rapid integration of applications developed outside the system Software must be portable across hardware platforms System must be scalable to meet evolving requirements and multiple users needs System should be able to accept technology advance infusions Use commercially available technology to reduce risk Heavy user involvement and feedback plus operability testing throughout development cycle Evolutionary acquisition rapid development required Open system distributed architecture standards and User pull multi-media seamless system C-ll needs to evolve a process for introducing future C41 capabilities in harmony with the consolidation of legacy systems The common wisdom is that one must choose either the conservative migration or the radical leap forward Current guidance is that the movement into the future is in fact a migration - an evolution and not a revolution may want to allow two distinct but coordinated tracks to be followed the current path toward a Global Command and Control System common operating environment and migration to a future objective Investment in a second oriented more toward the information management in the future may be warranted The Joint Task Force Advanced Technology Demonstration is an example of a new type of COB using new technology It would probably be object oriented representing the products and real-world representations that command and control information is all about must change its information systems acquisition approach in order to 0 Establish a dynamic building code inspection and permit process that embraces enterprise architecture concepts the 0 Create incentives for program managers and contractors to exploit commercial capabilities and 0 Require cost performance trades in acquiring information systems e g 80% solutions at 60% of the cost of custom systems Joint Warfare Doctrine and the Joint Task Force concept are the organizing principles for the US military This is supported by the C41 for the Warrior C4IFTW concept that calls for vertical and horizontal sharing of information The desire to drop military specifications notwithstanding data elements formats and waveforms must be standardized or we will continue to have the Tower Of Babel seen in all recent con icts The information sharing envisioned in C4IFTW will not happen unless data element standardization remains a high priority effort and dissimilar and redundant terms are ruthlessly rooted out The Air Force Horizon concept and the Army Enterprise Strategy recognize that force projection will be anchored at the CONUS base We are convinced that if terminology and information technology piece-parts are not interchangeable and rehearsed in garrison the information systems that deploy forward will not plug and play on the battlefield Much attention has been paid to well architected information systems see the upper right hand box in Figure C-4 with particular emphasis on the design of computer software and communications systems that conform to commercially provided standards and subcomponents To a large extent the process of developing exible reconfigurable systems has been subsidized and catalyzed by the availability of commercial technology that supports such systems Each of the Services and several of the agencies have undertaken efforts both within individual programs as well as in procurement practices applicable to many programs to capitalize on commercial systems Those initiatives should be endorsed C-12 The us Warfighters Edge - Reconfiguration Options for Information Systems System Recon guration Options Warfightere Reconfiguration Options Data Management - what data muet have eeme eemantlce - now are rele onehtp modeie kept ceneietem Access Management omniehionmdonmeiondme -whet options are needed ter hie delivery reeponee time -metering hlo Vulnerability Management emat edvereary into enould be monitored 39 I Interoperable Systems - Responsive to Warfighters I Figure 0-4 There has been corresponding attention although not as well publicized to Organizational operational architectures see the upper left hand box in 'Figure G4 The Services and the warfighting joint commands are exploring ways to bring different sizes and types of organizations together into effective combat forces Various options are explored by different training exercises although training exercises with full C41 and mission weapon regalia are relatively expensive to conduct Consequently there is an emerging interest in distributed simulation and battle eld exercises Those initiatives should be endorsed Given that system architectures are well supported by the commercial sector and current Service initiatives that some data consistency is being sought by data standardization efforts and that interoperation among executingfforces frequently takes place emphasis should now be placed on the new processes represented by the unshaded parts of Figure C-S Processes need to be put in place to evolve the operational functional information architecture and to augment the organizational and reconfiguration options available to the warfighter There is no single insertion point for these new processes Several must be instituted simultaneously and the processes must interact iteratively Nevertheless they will be presented sequentially - in 'the order through - even though they should not be sequentially implemented C-13 0 Technical advances and engineering efforts should be applied to ongoing simulation initiatives to allow cheaper and more widespread include all CINCs experimentation with the advantages of interoperating C41 systems Generation of distributed heterogeneous simulations which mix C41 systems in-the-loop with simulated systems and a environment will enable commanders to better understand the capabilities limitations and possible synergies of our legacy as well as newly developed or improved systems 0 Such practices will allow joint commanders to identify new configuration options for their organizations Practicing with these will enable joint commanders to be better prepared for unpredictable warfare or OOTW events that may surface in the future A Process to provide Reconfigurable C4l Systems - The derivation of an Information Architecture 5W Information ArchiTectures m - Consistent Data - Managed Vulnerability - Managed - I Interoperable Systems - Responsive to Warfighters I Figure C- 5 0 As a consequence of the experience gained via enhanced fidelity simulations exercises and battle environments joint commanders will be able to identify previously unanticipated operational requirements for information interoperability Such experience will result in more functionally oriented architecture attributes for the information architecture i e what information should be provided to whom bvahen and in what format This is the Functional Architecture For Information Management 0 The FAFIM needs to be converted into practical application and there are two aspects of this task One is relatively static develop a description and mechanism for C-14 revising it that allows data consistency to be built into the C41 syStems that are sent to the field The second is relatively dynamic develop a set of options for managing in- formation access content and vulnerabilities and a set of tools which complement those options 0 In addition to the data dictionary initiatives there is a need to establish mechanisms that ensure data model consistency To the extent technology supports it there will be improved interoperability among systems In the period before technology offers tools and techniques for automating data model consistency system engineering oversight may compensate 0 and The presence of a sound information architecture the tools to manage it and the warfighters organization that exploits it will lead in concert with the exibly architected systems to a capability which will produce information dominance on the battle eld As joint warfighters improve their skills in managing battlefield information they will evolve new requirements for how information needs to be managed on the battlefield Some information such as maps and imagery has high bandwidth requirements for sending or storing information but has general use for a large number of people Broadcast schemes for passing update information might be most appropriate for this data Other information such as a direct order to execute some maneuver requires few bits and is usually of interest to only a small number of people for a relatively short period of time Acknowledged message transmission might be most appropriate for this data However exceptions exist Specialized intelligence information may be of interest to only one site and for this a query based informa- tion passing scheme might be more appropriate required for execute the maneuver commands might be best supported by broadcast schemes It is therefore important to build into our systems the exibility to shift from one information management scheme to another 1 3 3 ome Unique Timing Aspects Qf The Acquisitign Qf Information Systems Figure G6 on the next page depicts the startling disparity in the development and life cy- cles associated with commercial information systems hardware and software contrasted versus weapon systems The horizontal axis represents the duration of these cycles in years reader should note that the scale is logarithmic Reading from the bottom up we note that typical commercial hardware and software development cycles for information systems range from a few months to a few years at most and further that typical life cycles for use of these same commercial systems again ranges from a few months to only a few years - certainly less than a decade For most commercial hardware and software systems it is now cheaper to replace them after four to five years than to repair their components It is likely that one or more generations of hardware software serving the same purpose with better capabilities would have been fielded in that time In stark contrast the typical weapon system development cycle ranges from about seven to fifteen years - a decade or more The lifetime for most of our weapon systems is measured in decades This is due in part to the fact that the technologies that drive our weapons systems airframe and propulsion technologies for military aircraft for example - are evolving at a much slower pace and acquisition and life cycles of these durations can in most cases accommodate them Rapidly Evolving Commercial Information Technology Must be Infused into Systems 1 Typical Weapo System Life Cycle - Typical Weapon System Development Cycle Need New Processes to reconfigure evolve acquire test field warfighter information systems Typical Commercial Hardware Software Life Cycle Typical Commercial Hardware Software Development Cycle 1 1 10 100 Cycle Duration years Logarithmic Scale Figure C-6 To achieve and sustain information dominance on the battle eld warfighter information systems operators and developers must take advantage of the very rapid evolution in commercial information technologies and continuously infuse new capabilities into our military information systems For example if a weapon system life cycle IS thirty years six to ten generations of commercial hardware and software could be inserted into the weapon if we could make our C41 acquisition timelines as short as the commercial development cycles In order to do this we must develop new acquisition processes to reconfigure evolve acquire test and field both embedded and stand-alone warfighter information systems at a rate that takes full advantage of these rapid commercially driven technology generational cycles Many of the capabilities that we can buy can also be bought by our adversaries To attain and maintain information dominance of the battle eld and get and stay inside our adversaries' information cycle time must aggressively invest in development of C41 tools and technologies to provide unique value added to commercially available information systems C-16 3 4 Im rovin The Ac uisition Process For Our Warfi ter Information 5 stems In recognition of the need to improve the acquisition of its weapons systems has already established a number of major and constructive improvements to its acquisition processes The Acquisition Reform Initiative undertaken by the SECDEF and the initiative to buy commercially available components and systems are two excellent examples A number of recent studies have proposed mechanisms to improve the acquisition process in general and for battle eld C41 systems specifically These studies include Air Force Science Board Study on Information Architecture Army Science Board Study on Battle eld Information DSB on Global Surveillance DSB on Acquiring Software Commerically DSB on Acquisition Reform It is important to note that most of these irutiatives deal with reducing the length of the System Development Cycle in Figure G6 on the previous page and not with inserting increasingly more rapid yet commercially driven technology and products into our legacy and new weapon systems This opportunity is almost unique to our information systems and may demand unique acquisition processes for warfighter information systems beyond the acquisition reform initiatives already underway It is also possible that the innovative incorporation of these new technologies may yield substantial improvements in functionality and capability at costs far lower than for similar changes in DOD-unique systems In order to take full advantage of the significant opportunities and leverage which our battlefield information systems can provide to us the full potential of the Acquisition Reform initiatives currently underway must be realized Failure to do so will put our warfighters at a disadvantage with respect to the sophisticated adroit adversary who buys the latest information technologies and systems on the commercial markets and equips his forces with them more rapidly than our acquisition processes allow us to do The Management Panel and the Task Force recommend that the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology undertake an initiative to identify and implement the unique aspects of the reconfiguration evolution acquisition testing and fielding processes which can be used to exploit the full capabilities of information systems We recommend that this initiative draw upon the excellent work done in the recent acquisition process studies cited earlier and recent information systems acquisition process successes such as the Army s Mobile Subscriber Equipment the process take full account of the warfighters views and perspectives we exploit the unique and rapid evolution in commercial information technologies and finally that we ensure adequate protection against potential vulnerabilities in our evolving information systems C-17 4 0 NET ASSESSMENT AND RED TEAM CAPABILITY The security of information systems and networks is considered by the Joint Security Commission to be the major security challenge of the decade and possibly the next century In this era of information warfare needs the capability to detect react and recover from an information warfare attack INFOSEC is an important element of our information security program but protection of information content and local availability and data integrity are not enough In addition network control automated data processing centers and information systems must be assessed for ease of repair and reconstitution of the overall information infrastructure Assessing our Information Systems Posture Net Assessment and a Red Team Capabiliy - Because of the signi cant leverage and potential vulnerabilities associated with our Information Systems we urgently need to evaluate Operatlonal Performance Effectiveness of our evolving C4l Systems Robustness and Vulnerability of our systems to Information Warfare Potentlal Adversaries' C4I Capabilities of Adversaries' C4I to our Information Warfare capabilities Net Assessment of our Warfighter Inforrnatlon Systems W3 The SecDef should immediately direct the initiation of these evaluations and the identification of actions to redress limitations Encourage maximum interchange with Battle eld Information Task Force Provlde Action Plan for an ongoing Assessment Process - CJCS should establish a Red Team reporting directly to SECDEF and CJCS to independently test the effectiveness and vulnerabilities of our C4l systems When Complete by September 1995 Figure C-7 Referring to Figure C-7 above information systems and the National Information Infrastructure are playing an increasingly important role in the effective conduct of military operations U S offensive information warfare capabilities offer great promise in providing a critical advantage across the information warfare spectrum in all kinds of operations At the same time our adversaries growing information warfare capabilities are increasing the vulnerability of both and national systems and have the potential to degrade the effectiveness of military systems and operations Because of the significant leverage and 3-18 I potential vulnerabilities associated with our Information Systems we urgently need to evaluate 0 Operational Performance Effectiveness of our evolving C41 Systems 0 Robustness and Vulnerability of our systems to Information Warfare 0' Potential Adversaries C41 Capabilities 0 Vulnerabilities of Adversaries C41 to our Information Warfare capabilities and 0 Net Assessment of our warfighter Information Systems Accordingly the Panel recommends that the SECDEF direct that these assessments be accomplished and actions to address shortfalls and needed improvements be - identified In addition the Panel recommends that the SECDEF direct the establishment of a Red Team capability to continually test our readiness and vulnerabilities It should be integrated with our other assessment and exercise activities be coordinated with parallel activities in the Intelligence Community and be audited by the ASD C31 Appendix Underlying TechnOlogy BaSe 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 6 0 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION D-1 1 1 Tasking Assignment D-1 1 2 Technology Panel Membership and Participation D-2 1 3 Background D-2 INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE TO MEET BATTLEFIELD NEEDS D-2 2 1 Adaptable Information Systems -- - - - 2 2 Keys to Information Dominance in the Battle eld D-3 2 3 Enhanced Reconfigurability 2 4 Dynamic Information Management - -- D-6 THE NEED FOR A JOINT ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURES FRAMEWORK D-8 3 1 Convergence ya Divergence to Joint C41 For the Warrior D-8 3 2 Architecture Principles D-9 3 3 Popular Definitions Of Architecture D-11 3 4 Current Architecture Initiatives D-12 3 5 Information Architecture D-13 C41 ARCHITECTURE CHALLENGES D-14 4 1 The Role of Architects D-14 4 2 Guiding Principles and Architectural Tradeoffs D-14 4 3 Some Fundamental Information Architectural Considerations D-16 Multi-Level Security D-16 Information and Information Systems D-17 Abandon the Grand Design Approach D-18 Common Data Definitions and Waveform Standards D-19 TECHNOLOGY 5 ITS RELEVANCE TO MEETING TASK FORCE GOALS D-21 5 1 Technology Status and Trends D-21 5 2 Technology Thrusts D-21 5 3 Forefront Technologies D-22 5 4 Software Technologies D-23 FOR INFORMATIONDOMIN AN CE D-24 6 1 Enhanced Reconfigurability D-25 6 2 Information and Information Systems Protection - D-27 6 3 Recommendations D-29 Figure D-1 Figure Figure D-3 Figure D-4 Figure D-S Figure D-6 Figure Figure D-8 Figure D-9 Figure D-10 Figure D-11 Figure D-12 Figure D-13 Figure D-14 Figure D-15 Figure D-16 Figure D-17 Figure Figure D-19 Figure D-ZO Figure D-21 LIST OF FIGURES The Information System Must Adapt D-3 Flexible Innovative Use of C41 Systems D-4 Dynamic Information Management for the D-7 C41 For The Warrior D-8 Popular Definitions for Architecture D-11 Current Architecture Initiatives- D-13 Popular Definitions for Architecture Information Architecture D-13 What the Architect Does D-14 Architectural Tradeoffs D-15 Technology for Multi-Level Security 13-17 Refocus Investment Areas in Information Information Systems Protection D-18 Align Processes with Life Cycles D-19 Interoperability in the Information Architecture D-20 Specifications and Standards D-ZO Technology Status and Trends Key Technology Drivers Forefront Technologies D-22 for Information Dominance D-24 Enhanced Reconfigurability -25 Information and Information Systems Protections D-27 Recommendation 4- Prioritize Investment with Focus on Military-Unique Information Technology D-29 1 0 INTRODUCTION 1 1 Tasking Assignment The Task Force convened three times as a group during the early summer to receive brie ngs on relevant Government initiatives and programs and to plan its approach to the Summer Study The Task Force created four Panels as follows Warfighters Panel to address Information in Warfare Information Warfare Panel to address Information Warfare Management Panel to address Business Practices Technology Panel to address the Underlying Technology Base This appendix is the Final Report of the Technology Panel which was charged with addressing architectural challenges and research and development investment thrusts The panel addressed its tasks by examining 0 Information system architectural and technical capabilities needed to respond to the Warfighter' needs 0 Architectures and their meaning essential to understanding investment contributions to meeting the warriors' functional architectural needs The role of the architect and technical challenges to be faced Technology trends 1n information systems that in uence the options available to meet the Task Force goals and 0 investment thrusts to enable better management of information on the battlefield These themes formed the major focus of the Panel's assessments and will be addressed in various ways in the report which follows 1 2 Technology Panel Membership and Participation Members of the Technology Panel were assigned as follows MajGen Robert Rosenberg USAF Ret - Chair Dr Barry Horowitz Mr Arthur E Johnson Dr Deborah Joseph Mr Robert Nesbit Dr Eberhardt Rechtin Mr Thomas Skip Saunders VADM Jerry Tuttle USN Ret Government Advisors Who contributed to the Technology Panel's effOrts were as follows Dr Duane Adams Col George W Bill Criss USAF Mr George Endicott Mr Gene Famolari Arm y Col Thomas Hall USA Army Ms Beth Larson Mr Harold McDonough Mr Steven Schanzer Intelligence D-l 0 Dr David Signori Ir 0 Mr Joseph Toma Joint Staff 0 MajGen Julio Torres USAF Excellent technical and administrative support to the Panel was provided by Dr Nancy Chesser of Directed Technologies Inc 1 3 I Background Recent history suggests future military operating continua extend over a wide variety of activities The potential for changing from one level of engagement to another is relatively high and the speed with which such changes can occur can be rapid Management of infor- mation is an important ingredient to both sides of a confrontation for determining the out- come of an engagement Modern information systems products are available to adversaries as well as US forces consequently innovative use of those systems is important for US information dominance of the battle eld Innovation is particularly dependent on our ability to reconfigure both how systems are interconnected and how information is managed among C41 systems Reconfigurability is not merely a mechanical or electrical connectivity question it is an information management issue Consider the variety of information management schemes possible versus the limited number of options for information management in today s systems Many architecture initiatives are underway - but OSD technology investment refocus is needed for data access and vulnerability management Focused research and development investment coupled with a responsive information architecture derivation process is needed to shake-out the functional exibilities needed to develop the tools for managing information architecture options and to derive the most useful forms of information manage- ment exibility It will begin with concentration on the information to be exchanged around the battlefield and conclude with the selection of appropriate information management schemes and selection of communications devices and circuits which allow conformance with chosen information management strategies Prior to instituting battlefield plans for reconfigurable systems provisions for recon g- urability must be developed The acquisition processes must encourage the inclusion of recon- guration properties into new or modernized systems Migration incentives should be incor- porated in the acquisition process together with provisions for maintaining responsiveness with respect to the life-cycles of the technology involved it does little good to establish sound information management systems if they are three generations behind those of adver- sanes initiatives can be overlaid on the Information in Warfare Information Warfare battlefield to reveal appropriate investment candidates Investment is needed to foster improved reconfigurability options and investment is needed to manage the new possibilities of information warfare 2 0 INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE TO MEET BATTLEFIELD NEEDS 2 1 Adaptable Information Systems As shown in Figure D-1 since the fall of the Berlin Wall there have been many contin- gency operations confronting the U S marked with substantial uncertainty delicate interna- tional relationships and operational conditions which challenge our ability to manage infor- mation The operations may start out as relatively low risk activities but there is substantial danger of escalation and the paCe'of such change can be very rapid Wm 0 The ITF Commanders desired chain of command 0 Local telecom infrastructure 0 Joint Allied and Coalition arrangements 0 Rules of engagement 0 Local vs remoted support 0 Geography and terrain 0 The electromagnetic environment 0 Sophistication of threat Contingency Operations mm gm Post Berlin Wall 533 1990-1991 1992 ate at Sllver Fox 1992 GITMO Flery 1991 Support Justice See Angel 1991 Sharp Provide my 05 0 Exlt Egg Treneltlon Belle HOP 199 courtesy GEN Stlner 1992 4 1990 1992 1992 Pigure There is a great uncertainty concerning where when why and with whom US military forces may be engaged in the future For each situation the particular geography local'infrastructure rules of engagement threat soPhistication arrangements with coalitions and allies and the CINC and ITF commanders' desired command structure will all drive the C41 needs There is a need for an information architecture which will allow exible but responsive support for the warfighter intent on not only protecting the prime national security interests of the United States but also conducting variety of important contingency operations The information architecture must support exible assembly of capability exible application of capability and rapid responsiveness to changes in the complexion of operations As a result a refocus in investment is necessary to do two things 0 Provide the ability to more exibly configure interoperation among C41 systems and develop tools and techniques for dynamically managing the ow of information around the battle eld among the newly reconfigurable C41 systems and 0 Improve our ability to execute information warfare This involves both technology to enhance protection of our own systems as well as technology to conduct offensive oper- ations against an adversary s information management system 2 2 Keys to Information Dominance in the Battlefield As the information systems market matures there are more and more technically capa- ble resources on the Open market that are capable of supporting military operations Only a 13-3 4 few years ago most of that technology was of the class used for of ce automation Commer- cial management information systems were also becoming more and more attractive in their off the shelf form rather than custom development But for the most part it was seldom reasonable to expect commercial products to produce the robust technically advanced capabil- ities that would give a war ghter an advantage in the field Sophisticated information systems continued to be custom developments and sophisticated electronic devices were only avail- able after expensive development and integration processes made them suitable for operation in the rugged environment of a battlefield As indicated in Figure the U5 ability to underwrite the required investment kept our forces at the forefront of technical capabilityInformation Dominance in the Battle eld The US advantage was in both Technol is widely available Our fieldable technology and time to get remaining a vanta is in time to get that that technology in the field - technology in the eld and use it well Technical Capability US Forces Figure 0 2 More recently not only have of ce automation capabilities expanded but there are also complementing advances in sophisticated technology from the commercial market GPS mapping systems night vision devices satellite imagery etc are all available to one degree or another from the open market It is unlikely to presume improvements in price and capability won t continue While U S advanced sensor technology is likely to continue to provide our forces with a substantial data gathering advantage much of the effectiveness of that advantage could be dissipated if the information garnered by the sensors is not managed more effectively than adversaries manage their information Key to continuing dominance on the battle eld will be our ability to maintain pace with the commercial market and perhaps more important our ability to apply me technology with gogrdinatign and innovation among our forces Such coordination requires development and - elding of tools to aid that process practice and training in how to coordinate information management among diverse C41 systems and based on such practice and experience evolu- tion of an information architecture which provides U S war ghters with the most exible and responsive C41 systems on the battlefield The wide availability of battle eld-capable information systems technology suggests that there are increasing opportunities for information warfare New vulnerabilities must be managed by the US as it depends more on sophisticated information systems and new vul- nerabilities may be exploited by the US when adversaries use similar products In addition to the obvious management and process demands on the there are key investments that will contribute to improved innovation with respect to the war ghters C41 assets This panel attempted to identify relevant areas for technology investment 13-4 i 'fvti To address the research and developmeht'investments key to this approach one must not start in the traditional manner by selecting the communications hardware and then decid- ing what data may be overlaid on the physical assets of the communications forces Instead it is important to begin with consideration of the information to be sent throughout the system After the information is identified then appropriate approaches can be designed for how information access will be managed how vulnerabilities of the information will be managed and lastly over what physical resources the information will be exchanged Only after defining the information schemes can mechanisms for managing access vulnerability and connections be established The technology systems and commercial communications are available at a reasonable cost to Support overcoming these challenges 2 3 Enhanced Reconfigurability As is discussed in Section 3 3 of the main report one key aspect of innovation is the ability to reconfigure forces and systems Joint Task Forces tend to be assembled from a variety of assets trained and equipped by the Services Further the compositions of forces will likely vary in both the size of components integrated into a joint force and the sources providing assets The likely continuing practice of drawing partial portions of forces from standing assets and the need for exible increase or decrease in their sizes as a Joint Task Force executes its mission demands that scalability be a key attribute of the supporting C41 systems Our C41 systems should therefore have certain attributes 0 They must be designed or incrementally upgraded in the case of legacy systems to support W These should allow the warfighter to make or change the interconnections among systems during the course of the missions 0 They should provide Wm among the C41 systems in the battle eld These options should accommodate changing needs for access and changing needs for protecting information l Vhile it would be preferable to allow the warrior to tailor the information management needs to the situation on the battle eld today's sensors communications and ADP systems cannot accommodate much reconfiguration There was a need to connect information from overhead assets to Patriot Batteries during Desert Storm However since the systems weren t designed to support that link a relatively complex set of connections had to be established on- the- y Had there been disruption attempts made on the patched communications field commanders would have had few options for recovery If a commander deploys four aircraft on a mission he doesn t need the same communications and information resources that would be needed for two wings going into a theater Depending on the size of forces fusion points communications strategies etc a commander will need considerably different support systems and information management strategies These and other examples suggest that there are some fundamental reconfiguration properties that should be considered for the war- fighter's quiver - Access management would allow the warrior to select how where and when data and information are fused and disseminated Part of access management would be the metering of information to prevent overloads however the ability of commanders to assimilate informa tion in uences the speed and volume of information flow Consequently access management includes many interrelated parameters D-S Vulnerability management is similarly complex Detection of failures failure mecha- nisms recovery processes and the management of risks due to information disclosurev the risk of failure to provide needed information rapidly must be addressed The properties of the communications systems must be considered Some lend them- selves to broadcast or publishing dissemination strategies whereas others perform better as direct point-to-point links The type of information being exchanged needs to be matched to the media options available Those who reside on fiber optics will have information ow at tera op levels while the tactical mobile satellite users will be at a 10 000-to-1 bandwidth disadvantage Technology pursuits must take this variance into consideration 2 4 Dynamic Information Management Battlefield decisionmakers are at risk of being inundated by data when they need useful information to build knowledge Decisionmakers receive information effectively in different forms Filtering fusing and correlating data to selectively provide information to decision- makers needs to be emphasized in our migration of systems Modeling simulation knowl- edge mining and human factors disciplines need to be involved to improve selective informa- tion dissemination to decisionmakers - The warrior should have dynamic control over the information form and ow He should be able to lay out information needs tailored to the particular situation For each type of information air surveillance imagery friendly force status etc he should be able to specify what information he needs 1n what detail updated at what frequency with which access controls fused with which other information displayed in what form One might imagine the commander conceptually filling out the chart in Figure D-3 For each type of information that will be circulated around the battlefield the commander is asked to indicate where the information should ow the detail to beprovided the response time for delivering information etc Within the constraints of the current situation his information officer would then reprogram the sensors communications and ADP to respond to these needs This scenario is not possible today The systems are not capable of being rapidly reprogrammed and staff do not have the technical capability or tools to do the job This is an important refocus area for investment Point-to-point communications are dominant today 1n the distribution of information for the battlefield Voice circuits message traffic circuits and remote computer connections all play a part in achieving information distribution While this permits the greatest degree of information customization it is very costly in terms of communications resource utilization Echelons Served Content Resolution Detail Timeliness Comm Connectivity Access Procedures Vulnerability Backup Degradation Display Technique Air Surveillance Ground MTI EO Imagery Blue Force Status Air Task Order Threat Alerts Artillery Locations Figure D-3 As is discussed in Section 3 8 of the main report broadcasting publishing could be used to off-load a notable fraction of the information distribution workload without adverse effects on quality of the information For example certain status of forces information environmental information and GPS time are very well suited for broadcasting Some broadcasting is used today but only through custom data links such as ITIDS and TRAP Commercial broadcasting can open the range of these kinds of services To allow wider distribution of infermation it is most important that information receipt mechanisms be low cost Low cost is achieved through a combination of the design of the overall system architecture technology advances and high-volume automated commercial production The low-cost GPS receiver is an excellent example of all three of these factors It is reasonable to have high-cost TV studios expensive broadcast facilities and costly satellite relays as long as the consumer s TV set is cheap If the receipt mechanisms are in the million dollar price range we can be assured that the product will never be distributed beyond a privileged few If we are to significantly increase the ow of information to military users we must also add several architectural elements that do not exist in the structure today 0 The information needs to be packaged into readily usable forms Contrast the typical long military message ALL CAPS and annoying Headers with a Time Magazine-like format To do this requires that a creative professional and conscientious editing function be added to the distribution process 0 Methods standards and development of tools are needed to monitor and assess data quality Most military databases today have no formal procedures for quality control of the content For those that do have procedures their standards vary greatly and those standards are generally unknown to the user It really helps to know whether you are reading an article from the National Enquirer or the Washington Post It is left to the reader to make a judgment on the relative quality control D-7 0 In cases where We are bandwidth limited it would be desirable to have a content and or mission-based ow control priority process Today's ow control can be described as a combination of historical ad hoc and rank-based factors Today's systems for distribution of information can be enhanced but new approaches and mindsets are needed to do it effectively Request and delivery of information through the multi-layered information system could be substantially augmented by broadcast systems and direct database access arrangements In order to maximize effectiveness an analysis of information distribution alternatives is necessary using a variety of communication media New commercial technology may pro- vide added capacity and lower cost user equipment Of course potential vulnerabilities asso- ciated with commercially-based concepts would need to be accounted for in any management decision - 3 0 THE NEED FOR A JOINT ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURES FRAMEWORK 3 1 Convergence 1s Divergence to Joint C41 For the Warrior MILDEP 04 Systems Global Grid Figure D-4 There are several ongoing programs devoted to improving C41 capabilities Each of the Services and Agencies has programs devoted to battle eld support which are attempting to adhere to an architecture defined for promoting interoperability As is indicated by the curv- ing arrows in Figure D-4 the programs are paying some attention to the need tomigrate into a unified C41 structure by conforming to the GCCS migration plan However processes are needed to ensure individual programs have adequate cost and schedule provisions to allow the separate initiatives to achieve effective interoperability and a common operating environ- ment Until a process is put in place to ensure the joint warfighter' 5 requirements are strongly considered the well-intentioned but unique Service and agency programs will tend to drift away from migration objectives Current acquisition practices exacerbate the tendency to drift Since each program is - independently supported by mostly independent agencies a joint corporate perspective is not D-8 built into the acquisition process The warfighting CINCs and ITF commanders have little in uence on systems under development or being modi ed but they have perhaps the most at stake when systems reach their ultimate application The joint warfighters' concerns should be represented during the acquisition process to ensure the C41 systems that will support the warfighter have maintained pace with commercially available technology and will intermesh well with legacy systems Legacy systems must either be migrated into or interfaced with common systems The motivation to diverge from a common joint interoperation structure is aggraVated by the need to maintain compatibility with Service-unique legacy systems which are not targeted for migration There is a need for establishing a process in a manner akin to that used for the Internet which identifies incremental improvements and ensures each can be accommodated and accepted by the other participants The part of the Internet process which establishes stan- dards by cOnsensus allows continuous integration of improvements migration of standards adaptation of commercial products and distribution of value added products has been shown successful Some variant of that process is appropriate to institute for the Unlike the Internet the will need a method of measuring overall cost and benefit of modifications and ensuring appropriate benefits accommodate each incremental change This requires refo- cused investment to develop and or acquire tools to facilitate these efforts The process should include provisions for accommodating the limitations of legacy sys tems and easingtheir transition to modernization This process should be recognized as a continuous process there will always be a need to manage transition from old to new systems To provide the developers with the opportunity to purchase the latest most cost effec- tive components enabling standards should be used Only where absolutely necessary as a part of our migration strategy should mandatory standards be applied In the past each component has developed information systemsarchitectures in its own way Standard de ni- tions of architectures and architectural objects are missing Standard interfaces are also essen- tial There is no commonly accepted joint taxonomy of information systems architectures Airlines specify needed products for aircraft at the box level inputs outputs form factor reliability speed etc not in how the box does its job should consider such an approach ARINC approach for information systems in DOD This could potentially reduce the large number of standards that maintains for information systems We recommend investigate the feasibility of simplifying standards for information systems by speci- fying at the object level rather than at the how to level 3 2 Architecture Principles Key to applying resources to the improvement process is an understanding of architectures and how that understanding can facilitate the investment decision-making process Unfortunately architecture is almost a Tower of Babel when it comes to definitions The word architecture is best used in the form of an adjective architectural style architectural feature architectural standard architectural description etc However it con- tinues to be used as a noun and in that form promotes much ambiguity Nevertheless a generally accepted concept is that when something conforms to an architecture it has some underlying order or structure Further while in one sense conformance to something implies restrictions or diminished exibility in the sense used' here conformance provides order or structure which has some significant bene ts including enhanced exibility In current usage one bene t is in ef ciency of resource use If entities are com- puter systems ghting forces weapon systems etc there can be many options for intercon- necting them if they conform to various architectural standards If components within a sys- tem adhere to architecture rules which minimize interdependence among components a good architecture will offer as a second benefit the ability to ef ciently modify a system by improv- ing components or replacing them with newer components Lastly to the extent these archi- tectural principles are developed in the civil marketplace there will be many conforming com- ponents available for the to select for new systems This latter situation provides benefits in both cost and schedule For the war ghter the architecture theme can mean better interoperability change- ability and quicker cheaper capability in the eld While the concept and objectives are rela- tively simple to understand achieving the benefits requires both a more specific definition and a more explicit process for defining and preserving architectures - The word architecture is currently used in many contexts Dictionary de nitions are insufficient to resolve differences in current usage consequently it is possible for two or more people to engage in a conversation about architectures for substantial periods of time without realizing that communication among them has been inadequate A major contributor to the confusion is lack of standard usage for what issues or topics must be'included in a description of an architecture For the traditional building architect the blueprint offers some relief it con- tains objects their spatial connection relationships and constraints on how a building will be constructed however for disciplines other than building design the essential pieces of infor- mation to convey architecture are unde ned In concept the word is used to describesome- thing The something being described may be as tangible as a building or as abstract and intangible as a system for organizing people The two words architecture and design have interrelationships which make it dif - cult to clearly distinguish one from the other In general usage architecture refers to concepts or descriptions which are considered more generic than design However it is commonly observed that an architectural detail in one description becomes a speci c design in another context For example the architecture of an of ce building is a speci c design with respect to the architecture of a city Similarly the architecture of an of ce might be a speci c design with respect to the architecture of an of ce building The distinction refers to the scope of in uence intended by the presenter The city architect has concern over the domain of the city To the extent that there are city issues to be addressed and constraints placed on participants of the city which bene t the aggregated par- ticipants city-wide architectural rules and guidelines are established Those rules constrain options for individual buildings but bene t the overall collection of buildings Similarly there may be more constraining rules applied within individual buildings for the bene t of their occupants Designers are expected to follow architectural guidelines but are permitted to make more detailed implementation decisions The distinction remains in the intent of the presenter 3 3 Popular Definitions Of Architecture There are at least a dozen substantially different uses of the word architecture in respect to information systems None is better than another just more convenient for discussions of how information systems are used or developed Regardless of the view presented it has been suggested by Dr David Luckam that at the most abstract level architectures can be defined in terms of components connections and constraints If this criteria is used to test whether _a description of an architecture is complete there may be an opportunity to bridge the gap between proponents of one architecture over another Sometimes there are different words used for the same concepts such as is shown for the organizational perspective on archi- tectures in Figure D-6 but the basic underlying concepts are similar For the three views represented in Figure D-5 the organizational perspective is that held by someone involved with performing a mission the system perspective is that held by someone involved with the collection of personnel equipment and methods organized to accomplish a set of specific functions the software perspective is that held by someone involved in defining sOftware that works within a syste 0 Organizational - people and functional responsibilities - Functional - Mission tasks subtasks to be done - Logical- Communications links between functional areas - Physical - Resources used to execute functions 0 System - computing sensing and communication resources - Components - Major elements of system - Connections - Links between components - Constraints - Environment 8 behavior bounds 0 Software - COTS GOTS custom code interdependencies - Components - Major software design relevant structures - Connections - Data control ow mechanisms - Constraints - Performance style 8 protocol rules and resources 0 Others Academic Technical Information Framework Layered Communications 5 stems-of-S stems Hardware etc Figure D-5 When the word architecture is used by organization oriented peeple they tend to be referring to how an organization and its supporting systems are structured to serve the mis- sion Consequently when C41 For The Warrior architectures are discussed organization oriented people are thinking in terms of the functions to be provided the logical connections between those functions bOth ow of information between functional organizations and rules of decision making in the chain of command and lastly the physical resources people computing systems weapons etc needed to perform their mission When the word architecture is used by system oriented people they tend to think in terms of the information technology elements that make up a system and the environment in which it must perform These may include the computing resources the sensor systems that detect and act as sources for information etc The connections are provided by the communi- cations systems or networks that connect computing resources and the constraints are estab- lished by performance capabilities rules for who can exchange information with whom etc D-ll The definitions used by software people involve concepts more closely allied with the structure of software Components include user interfaces operating system services appli- cation interfaces etc connections describe movement of data and control throughout the system and constraints capture behavior attributes layering styles or interface protocols and the hardware allocations necessary to execute the software 3 4 1 Current Architecture Initiatives The DODIIS Technical Reference Model was one of the earliest instances of an orga- nized attempt to characterize information system structures such that commonality across multiple systems might be exploited for interoperability Although the Technical Reference Model TRM form of architecture description doesn t provide connectivity properties it has become a powerful model for more recent efforts to define architectures The Navy Copernicus architecture is more devoted to the manner in which information is managed among C41 resources and the organizations that need access to information The Air Force Science Advisory addressed information system architec- tures but never formally defined the extent of coverage for the architecture The AFSAB Information Systems architecture emphasized communications protocols between systems - thereby encouraging connectivity between systems Activities by the Air Force since its summer study have emphasized interoperability as it might be facilitated by the adoption of conformance rules for the interconnection of different C41 systems but adoption of techniques to foster semantic consistency between systems or behavioral consistency remain to be started Interoperability is more than the ability to exchange bits the bits must have the same semantic meaning on both sides of the interface In addition the expectations of behavior need to be consistent on both sides of the interface The Army Science Board ASB made a Concerted effort to distinguish between Opera tional Technical and System architectures The Operational architecture is an instance of organization architectures described earlier and the System architecture is an instance of the system architecture described earlier The Technical architecture provides a set of rules for interoperability based on Internet compliance and captures the notion of building codes to ensure compatibility among systems which are built in conformance Although the Army Science Board addressed several of the issues associated with managing information and represents a significant advance over previous efforts it does not include provisions for man- aging access to information push pull broadcast etc nor does it include provisions for managing vulnerability of information There is also some useful overlap between the A83 Technical Architecture and the AFSAB Information Systems architecture As is indicated in Figure D-6 full and unambiguous agreement on the definition of open has similarly not been established among the services There is much similarity but acceptance of proprietary products which are both open and popular is a key to being able to follow and exploit the advantages touted by adopting commercial practice Once acknowledged there will need to be sound practices for managing systems acquired with proprietary components and protocols These are yet to be established D-12 There are several initiatives to exploit architecture Intelligence agencies have developed the DODIIS model to provide some design commonality among intelligence systems The Navy has developed the Copernicus system to provide a structure for the interaction of various Navy C41 systems The Air Force has begun to implement the Horizon concept in response to advice from the AF Science Advisory Board The Army has established the Enterprise effort and has recently been advised by the Army Science Board to consider adoption of a 'I eclmical Information Architecture Most of the initiatives include provision for adopting open systems - the de nition of open varies but these are emerging as common properties - Open means system interfaces are widely known - Desirable open components or standards are ones which are widely accepted and there are many Conforming products - Proprietary is okay Open even proprietary open has become the new commercial market norm The needs li and strate _ es for usin it Figure D-6 3 5 Information Architecture Information architecture is another form of architecture To be complete its de ni- tion must also characterize components connections and constraints as depicted in Figure D-7 This is particularly important since the bene ts of conformance to an architecture will not accrue if all three aspects of an architecture de nition are not addressed Some early efforts at de ning the data consistency aspects of information systems only address subsets of the full definition and therefore have not been effective In particular a catalogue of the many different data elements in use in the mm promote interoperability until there is also semantic consistency among those data elements Further how the elements are used and managed signi cantly affects whether or not information can be effectively managed opera- tionally Too much data outdated data compromised data and insuf cient data can each jeopardize information dominance of the battle eld Consequently an information architec- ture is needed to describe how information should be managed in the Constraints - Performance attributes - security - access rules for data accuracy - ownership and pedigree information - timeliness etc Style 8 protocol dissemination strategies and rules such as push pull broadcast etc Resources storage capacity and communications bandwidth of information systems that mani - ulate data Figure D-7 It is interesting to note that there are several synergistic forces engaged for developing system architectures Not only have the various services and acquisition agencies adopted the principles but the commercial sector is providing much help due to the emergence of open systems as a market force However there are few outside agents assisting the forma- tion of an information architecture That is a task left solely to the potential bene ciaries and it is not-an easy one to manage much of that must be the domain of architects D-13 4 0 C41 ARCHITECTURE CHALLENGES 4 1 The Role of Architects Wham -0 Identi es the appropriate components connections and constraints 0 Analyzes alternatives for inclusion in each category 0 Publishes a description of the architecture to be implemented Reviews the progress of systems being implemented in accordance with the architecture guidance - Endorses adherence - Approves variations proposed to meet exigencies 0 Draws lessons learned evaluates emergent technologies and analyzes new alternatives which can be incorporated in revisions to the architecture guidance 0 Addresses challenges - The current system suffers many limitations based on past approaches to managing information and The tem must meet a diverse set of information needs with _ rather so uhisticated constraints Figure D-8 Architects identify the constituents of the architecture In the case of an information architect component de nition involves the data elements critical to overall C41 NOTE that this does not mean all data needs to be de ned and architected rather in the sense identified in the architecture definition only the data definitions relevant to achieving some globally relevant behavior For example there may be only a few critical data elements that need to be defined in order to satisfy fundamental interoperability objectives for C41 sys- tems The architect s challenge is to select and define the appropriate data elements Similarly in the case of connections there may be only a subset of data that needs to have semantic rela- tionships defined In the case 'of constraints information architects will face the greatest chal- lenge Various schemes for managing data security redundancy accuracy etc will need to be evaluated There may be a need for different classes of data to receive more or less stringent treatment There will be a need to similarly evaluate alternatives for managing the distribution of data There may also be communications bandwidth limitations and storage limitations that prevent optimum treatment of the other constraints so architects will need to make choices relative to which data is given the most preferential treatment Lastly architects will be expected to seek evaluate and publish improvements to the architecture The C41 Architect faces many challenges The current system suffers from insufficient communications connectivity and bandwidth Systems in the field are non-compatible non- interoperable and or non-reprogrammable User terminals have significant operation and maintenance costs as well as investment costs which limit their proliferation Current infor- mation management operations concepts involve passing information step by step down the chain of command with consequential delays errors and omissions There is a priori determi- nation in some cases by the suppliers about who needs what information Compounding the challenges is a concern over supplying users with too much data resulting in sending too little information 4 2 Guiding Principles and Architectural Tradeoffs Figure D-9 lists many architectural trades that will impact refocusing investment decisions D-14 511' WW 0 Possible logical communications approaches to guide migration Need system scalable in bandwidth and number of active passive users Imagery requires instantaneous bandwidth up to low Gbps How- ever there is never enough bandwidth to avoid network saturation during crises and increased bandwidth means increased vulnerability Must evaluate trades between bandwidth and access control as on free- Ways network management schemes to handle physical reconfiguration bandwidth allocation and network health and troubleshooting The proper mix of vs commercial communications Modemize site internal infrastructure including deployable and mobile forces - DOD-wide established Common Operating Environment - Local Area Networks LANs sized to type of information accessed Servers storage workstations printers scanners 0 Advances in security hardware and software components to provide - Secure recon gurable logical circuits from windows on one workstation to windows on many workstations - Centralized and distributed delegated network access management features which can respond quickly to access constraints on portions of a common network - Consistent scalable technology that can support performance ranges from data packets on lines up to bulk of backbones - Detection capability to alert users when networks and connected systems are under attack and capability to respond to and recover from such an attack - Phase in of technical solutions via a clear security loss risk management approach 0 Commercial technology to provide tools and mfras' tructure that will allow multi-media products which are more intuitive to military operator This capability permits fusion of many information sources and is essential for rapid decision makm g - Determine what these product standards should be Joint effort between military operator production organiza' tions and technologists - One product will not service all customers What information is critical for the battle eld continuously evolve Data architecture model for information to determine key points of interoperability - 0 Common data de nitions and common standards for the waveform and physical layers of information systems - Base level information infrastructures of the Services must use the same interchangeable components and standard data elements 0 Incremental solutions that support information brokers as intermediate translator combined with longer term strategies that rely on the P31 process On- 0 Information providers on the network with a pull and profiled push Imagery collection processors Digital archives fileservers imagery Intel products etc Intelligence providers Logistics Medical histories products 0 Common informah'on services across a broad range of users Information browse and retrieval Information storage management and priority setting User telephone books Network management 0 Prototype services and field in demonstrations via commercial software solutions and then integrate results into the architectural and standards efforts across the a Critical for process improvement - Begin developing tools that can automatically task across resources seamlessly For example Mission Plarming Application generates an Air Tasking Order that assigns mission execution responsibilities to multiple squadrons This message leads to tasking of numerous actions for the imagery enterprise it kicks off a search of distributed digital archives for available imagery and products for pilot orientation tasks production organizations for target materials preparation and threats and tasks collectors to address information gaps and establish a dissemination profile for new information and products as they are -enerated Figure D-9 D-IS The Architect's guiding principles in evaluating the architecture process must acknowl- edge that due to continuing technical advances and shifting mission needs organizational structures and strategies there is no final solution for information infrastructure Instead the architecture process must allow continuous transition from what exists to what is more appropriate We must allow for rapid integration of applications developed outside the sys- tem with software portable across hardware platforms and systems scalable to meet evolving requirements and multiple users' needs Our systems should be able to accept technology advance infusions use commercially available technology to reduce risk and depend on heavy user involvement and feedback plus operability testing throughout the development cycle Finally evolutionary acquisition rapid development as opposed to rapid prototyping is required using open system distributed architecture standards and user pull multi- media seamless systems 4 3 Some Fundamental Information Architectural Considerations 1 I 1 LI 15 The enterprise architecture for C4IFTW must address security concerns including multi-level security information protection privacy rights law enforcement objectives and national security The requirements for security in a battle eld architecture will drive the security structure to be implemented We must place priority values on security requirements they should not all be treated equally It has been difficult to field and obtain approval for Multi-Level Security Trusted systems that take advantage of available INFOSEC technology because the onerous security processes are based on older technology and the elimination of risk should adopt a philosophy of risk management vis-a-vis risk avoidance the bene ts of operating in a multi-level mode should be weighed against the residual risk Available Trusted technology will permit operation of a C41 system with information classified from Secret to Unclassified We need to explore non-traditional means to implement secure environments in the information infrastructure much in the same way as the Copernicus architecture took a non- traditional approach to implementing a more effective system for information-on-demand to military users must identify functionalities criteria standards and uniformity objectives which will facilitate seamless secure interoperability from a top level architecture perspective as well as from a multilevel security and information protection perspective Solutions must be practical for both operational users and product developers Better and faster solutions can only be developed effectively as a product of the devel- opment and investment strategies suggested in the technology list in Figure D-10 Without a coordinated standardized and structured approach solutions may not anticipate all factors and therefore will only offer a piecemeal response Solutions must cross institutional lines i e govemment-commercial to derive optimal effectiveness from investment decisions D-16 - 0 Con dentiality Public key - Digital signature standards - Remotely keyable COMSEC hardware - Secure networking to include lntemet issues 0 Availability 4 Wireless communications - Data coinpression - Burst communications - Directed energy applications - Integrity - Information asset hardening - Communications oath fre-uen diversi Figure D-10 OSD should require the use of currently available Trusted technology to allow classified information to reside on interconnected systems at multiple security levels To maintain protection of this information mandatory access control is needed to overcome the vulnerability of discretionary access control that permits authorized users to grant their privileges to others at their discretion Mandatory access control provides a means of controlling access to data based on the sensitivity of the data as represented by labels of operating systems objects files devices areas of memory tables sequences views etc and on the formal authorization or clearance of the user attempting to access the data Manda- tory access control and information labeling are two essential features of multi-level security systems Personnel physical procedural and technical measures have been identified for secure systems These measures are reasonably easy to-implement and all of the necessary compo- nents are available now to provide Trusted information systems security Examples include LANs operating systems compartmented work stations databases a Tessera product which employs the new Digital Signature Standard and a Navy-certi ed system that can pro- vide any combination of sanitization down grading transliteration and high- to-low or low- to-high guard functions Ll ormation and Information Protogtjoo If the US is to maintain a competitive combat advantage in future con icts then the information and information services upon which it depends must be protected commensurate A with the intended use All of the military and support functions are highly dependent upon the information and information services provided by the Defense Information Infras- tructure The DH is highly susceptible to attacks which disrupt information services availability or corrupt the data integrity within the infrastructure many nations and groups have the capability to cause sufficient disruption both availability and integrity to the D11 and in turn cripple U S operational readiness and military effectiveness It is important to understand that INFOSEC and Defensive Information Warfare share many attributes but the two are not the same Existing INFOSEC policies and activities are content-centric That is they are focused on the need for protection based on tho sgositivity of tho gontent of the information to be protected The design factors used to protect against normal breakage and natural disasters or attacks to obtain access to sensitive information content are inadequate to deal with the levels of disruption that can be readily caused by D-17 malicious actions For example can protect the content of a signal an attack that upsets the of the device will not expose the content of the information but may stop the ow of information and thus stop the function using the information If the Department of Defense is to maintain a suitable level of military preparedness to meet the national security requirements of the U S the information infrastructure upon which it depends for information services must be strengthened against malicious attack This must address protection against attacks detection of attacks and the ability to react to attacks Examples of refocus investment areas are listed in Figure D-11 0 Protection - Provide sufficient redundancy so that functions do not depend upon the uninterrupted operation of any particular information system or communications service What functional events have to happen when and what information is needed to obtain the objective at the desired operational tempo - Provide sufficient protection that over-the-wire attacks cannot exploit known aws in operating systems - Develop security processes and devices fire walls etc - Develop metrics to portray the relative value of a function or process to the mission s as a function of time during peacetime force deployment force employment and force sustainment 4 - Conduct the necessary research to enable the network data manager to protect information in a mobile environment Develop defensive information warfare exercise capability to stress the information systems supporting the forces so that the military learns how to operate under varying time bandwidth and error rate ratios 0 Detection - Develop tools to monitor network operations detect and audit inappropriate behavior and detect abnormal operating patterns - Develop tools and techniques for validating the integrity of the data held in a database - Develop tools to aid in the detection of malicious software code and aid in repair of damaged code 0 Reaction Provide robust ca abili to - rform tria functions and mana restoration of - erations Figure D-11 At a minimum ASD C31 should task DISA to develop a roadmap to implement audit- ing capabilities that can locate and isolate malfeasance develop tamper-resistant network security components and develop and field technologies that protect the information systems 53 from untrusted software and or active agents Abandon the Grand Design The architect's processes for information systems must abandon physical Grand Design approaches As depicted in Figure each of the elements that make up an information system has a life-cycle of its own Attempting to apply one acquisition strategy to components that may have a life that varies by two orders of magnitude has been proven to be unworkable 1 D18 Software Application Development 01234567 Hardware Life Figure D-12 Software applications are or should be inexpensive should serve localneeds as long as they can t fiddle with the data structure and should be rapidly built using standard soft- ware components and objects The life span of a generation of commercial computing hard- ware is currently under two years After fourto ve years it is now cheaper to replace rather than repair hardware components The useful life span of software applications can vary from one-time-use to about ten years occasionally even longer But usually the functional process that uses a software application changes more rapidly than once a decade so the software application must be redone or it will inhibit functional progress Data can have a very long life Most people would like their medical record to retain its viability for a century Although some data is transient much is retained The design of databases and the maintenance of data integrity is where much of the cost of information sys- tems is accumulated and where standardization and central management attention pays Directive 8120 1 Life-Cycle Management of Information Systems and the compan- ion instruction DODI 8120 2 recognize these different cycles and established the policy that the acquisition of these components should be done separately and using rapid prototyping and evolutionary acquisition procedures However too many are still trying to buy informa- tion systems using the outdated physical Grand Design approach mm It Data finitio Wav tan ard Joint Pub 1 makes it clear the doctrine of Joint Warfare and the Joint Task Force are the organizing principle for the US military This is supported by the C41 For The Warrior concept that calls for the vertical and horizontal sharing of information Note from Figure D- 13 notwithstanding the desire to drop military specifications data elements formats and waveforms must be standardized or we will continue to have the Tower of Babel seen in all recent wars - Since our previous discussions have twice highlighted the need for establishing joint information needs and design of databases as the fundamental starting point for the objective capability the information sharing envisioned in will not happen unless data element standardization remains a high priority effort and dissimilar and redundant terms are ruth- lessly rooted out The Air Force Horizon concept and the Army Enterprise Strategy rec- D19 ognize that force projection will be anchored at the CONUS base We are convinced that if terminology and informmion technology piece-parts are not interchangeable in garrison the information systems that deploy forward will not p1ug and play on the battlefield Interoperabihty is not possible without - Use of Common Standards for the waveform and physical layers of information systems Use of Common Dam De nitions - Use of common interpretation 0 C4IFIW will not come true until Base-level information infrastructures of the Services use interchangeable components and standard data elements Commandand control systems are built to the same common operating environment and use standard data elements Figure D-13 We recommend that on a regular and no notice basis the Joint Chiefs of Staff should call through Atlantic Command live equipment con guration tests with Joint referees where the Services demonstrate that forces can talk to each other in command and control and in all the supporting 'ilities This IS the only way to ensure we have forces that are adaptable and can be rapidly configured into a Joint Task Force to answer short notice national security challenges We wholeheartedly support the policy outlined in the Secretary of Defense memoran- dum Specifications Standards A New Way of Doing Business dated June 29 1994 This reform of the acquisition process will yield significant economic benefit However we have painfully learned that the easy ow of information within and between the various weapons intelligence and support activities of the Department is hin- dered when private and proprietary data elements style guides mapping symbols and other information artifacts are allowed into the Defense information infrastructure This propagates the modern Tower of Babel and operating inefficiencies to include fratricide adding a note of caution see Figure D-14 It is important to ensure the policies outlined in the 29 June memorandum are not inter- preted to undercut the policies contained in Directives 8000 1 Information Management 8320 1 Data Administration and 4630 5 Compatibility Interoperability and Integration of Command Control Communications and Intelligence C3I Systems 5 1 1 Policy Greater use of performance and commercial specifications and standards Secretary of Defense memorandum June 29 1994 Caution To ensure interoperability data element standardization Federal Information Processing Standards and the Technical Architectural Framework for Information Management must be retained and followed We should use commercial information technology But we must retain our own lan- a- Figure D-14 D-20 5 0 TECHNOLOGY ITS RELEVANCE TO MEETING TASK FORCE GOALS 5 1 Technology Status and Trends Current Status of Information Systems Rapid growth in capabilities including processors displays man man-machine interfaces COTS software databases communications and networks High cost of maintaining legacy systems Continuing pressure fOr decreasing budgets Procurement conStraints make acquisition and development difficult Technology Trends Distributed systems will continue to drive market and availability Open software will provide system portability Systems will be faster more ef cient parallel processor workstations will improve throughput Software solutions will focus on ameliorating network l O bottlenecks Greatly expanded capabilities will become available for capturing processing displaying storing and retrieving huge vo1umes of information Greatly enhanced multi-media user interface capability will become available with faster processors and improved algorithms Rapid developmentwill replace rapid prototyping System Development Trends Software development cycles will continue to be under two years Current established technology and elded systems will continue to provide a base to promote quick buildup and integration Developers will build on current distributed architecture systems which continue to encourage and facilitate interoperability characteristics among systems Requirements and capability for integration and interoperability among systems will continue to - ow Figure 0115 Now that we have examined the warriors' needs applied architecture processes to meet them and outlined the challenges to be addressed we need to understand the technology environment to determine the high payoff refocus areas for investment and thrust Figure D-15 summarizes the current technology status and trends 5 2 Technology Thrusts It is clear from the status and trends above that needs to aggressively refocus investment in 95 Unique mthary-value added offensive and defensive technologies to assure we exploit commercial systems better than our adversaries for data certainty and for information warfare both offensive and defensive Rapid test tools development Architecture case tool development and First principles technology for C41 architectures Some of the'more relevant key technology drivers are listed in Figure D16 D21 Pressing requirement to eld available multi-level security and trusted systems technology Necessity for and attractiveness of merging C3 systems with information intelligence planning environmental modeling and simulation and training systems 0 Tremendous increases in microprocessor pdormance requirements and great technological advances impose the need for a migration plan for introduction of highly parallel processing particularly as the limit of MOS fabrication is approached 0 Requirement to depict an accurate timely reliable transparent and seamless total situational awareness for the operational commander while obscuring the battle eld for the enemy 0 Requirement to improve greatly the process of software development and to dramatically alter the method and timing of testing software 0 Human factors is a vital companion to software If the warriors won t use it it isn t a good C41 Where design assumptions don't match human tendencies there is danger of creating a joint C41 architecture and so chisticated software thato - tors can t or don t use Figure 0-16 5 3 Forefront Technologies Applicable forefront technologies include computing hardware telecommunications hardware and software Among the technologies listed in Figure D-17 a few key technologies can be identified that are sufficiently mature to be integrated in the near term and which will play an important role in making C41 For The Warrior faster cheaper better Broadband high gain light weight and electronically steerable antenna that can access multiple satellites simultaneously Personal computing emphasis on wireless - Laptops to' Newtons Dick Tracy radios Gigabyte terabyte networks Databases with large heterogeneous data items mixing data text images etc Wireless telecommunications Software testing performance evaluation Distributed simulation systems Distributed computing - maintaining information consistency Parallel and distributed algorithms Data compression Human factors human interfaces visualization Language translation Optical storage devices particularly tape etc Figure The US is world leader in forefront technology for C41 However these technologies have not been exploited for battlefield use The problem in many cases is not technology development it is adopting the technology that has been developed Several factors have inhibited integration of these forefront technologies into the infrastructure 0 Risk-averse procurement process 0 Large capital investment in legacy stovepipe systems need for backward compatibility 0 Need for defense specific systems - inhibits off-the-shelf purchasing suppliers are typically not at the forefront and 0 Large size and widespread distribution of the software and hardware systems D-22 As a specific example the advent of commercial space systems with reductions in the cost to use commercial space services is bringing about a potential revolution in commercial communications navigation imagery and environmental services The day of the Dick Tracy wrist radio is not that far in the future Whether there are ROCS SONS or MENS will not mat- ter if and when the GLOBALSTARS IRIDIUMS DBSs WORLDVIEWs and EYEGLASSES projected commercial imagery systems are on orbit for ad hoc commanders and CIN Cs to use to provide connectivity and information for the battlefield in a crisis or contingency if the need is there they will buy and use the service The proliferation of commercial GPS receivers by caring and concerned mothers and fathers to their sons in battle in Desert Storm is a graphic example of just that The challenge again is that in the age of offensive and defensive Information Warfare as well as use of Information in Warfare to attain and maintain informa- tion dominance of the battlefield dependence on this kind of commercial capability might well result in its denial to those who will try to depend on these services in time of stress As is well known from Desert Shield Desert Storm over 80% of our communications satellite use was through commercial capability and well over 3 4 of our airlift was from the commercial reserve airlift eet and commercial systems Just as the determined many years ago that our needs for airlift in contingency and crisis would far exceed our military capacity and established contracts with the airlines to provide unique military value added capability through commercial aircraft and systems for such contingencies it would seem wise for the to make prioritized choices for mews-g investments in space-based commercial and federal goveMent civil imagery navigation environmental and communi- cations systems We need to do this to both enhance their utility to our warriors in time of need as well as to potentially deny those capabilities to our adversaries during those times It is strongly recommended that the Battle eld Information Task Force initiate exami- nation of dramatically expanded defense-prioritized requirements and investments leading to more reliable and robust dependency on use of imagery navigation environmental and com- munications information services from commercial and federal civil space-based capabilities and to allow real time surge in time of need 5 4 Software Technologies Software with a small amount of hardware can substitute for complete interoperability in many cases Internet Connectivity mechanisms include gateways marriage boxes common nodes such as satellites bridging software standards and protocols In some cases interfaces of existing elements can be modified to achieve connectivity as in Desert Shield Storm Software can be the intermediary between different security systems It can seek sources and routes and provide buffering memory redialing etc Most important ware is the key to what the user sees and hears With a simple key stroke it can completely reconfigure a display fan out whole distributions reconfigure a network etc Software offers 0 Modularity and reusability issue is selecting module size resolving the twin problems of functional aggregation and partitioning 0 External simplicity and internal cOmplexity of modules object-oriented hidden routines and external control shells 0 Shared resources used to set up phantom or virtual capabilities and networks 0 Interoperability between and among modules but not necessarily internal to each 0 Recognition of different architectures for different purposes and 0 Open architectures for extendibility expandability alternate applications D-23 6 0 FOR INFORMATION DOMINAN CE I l' Information In Warfare Information Warfare Information Warfare uformation Information Systems Protection 4 nfon'nation Movement Enhanced Information imilation Recon gurability Joint Battlespace Environment Figure D-18 While the Task Force found no breakthrough efforts it is clear that since our adversaries have access to the same modern information systems technologies as we our leveraging of commercial technology through unique military value added exploitation and investment in defense-peculiar needs will be critical to attaining and maintaining information dominance of the battlefield In that light as is indicated in Figure D-18 two special needs of military information systems relate to enhanced reconfigurability and information and infor- mation systems protection Commercial systems are designed to work in relatively static loca- tions with predictable communications and repeatable information needs Military scenarios are too diverse to make a system designed under these assumptions acceptable While the commercial world has security concerns most are focused on protecting access to information The military has this concern plus the possibility for network disruption In addition the mobilization of military systems complicates the ability to authenticate users and their uses of systems There are three factors that should differentiate US military information systems from those of a capable adversary sensors ability to recon gure under stress and ability to con- duct information warfare When coupled with advanced U S simulation capability the warfighter can develop and tune the skills and techniques necessary to establish and preserve a competitive edge in dynamically managing information system reconfiguration Enhanced Reconfigurability and Information and Information Systems Protection are improved by leveraging commercial and or technologies Supporting technologies for Enhanced Reconfigurability are categorized as Joint Battlespace Modeling Simulation Envi- ronment Information Assimilation and Information Movement For Information and Informa- tion Systems Protection applicable technologies are categorized as Enterprise Security Net-l work Security and Data Security Figures D-19 and D-20 provide the specifics on each of these technologies Note from these gures that the Panel considers it important to leverage current commercial and ongoing efforts in many refocus areas as well as to initiate more tplace does not lead investment where the commercial marke 6 1 Enhanced Reconfigurability CILeverage Commercial and or Ongoing Need More 000 Investment Reconfigurability Enhanced Joint Battlespace Environment development evaluation tools Information Assimilation Ci Data program encapsula Multi-media lntemet lntelink tion for legacy systems 0 Display devices CI Multicasting 0 Distributed High density storage 0 Direct broadcast telecom heterogeneous DBMS 0 Large heterogeneous DBMS CI ATM Ci DIS STOW Collaborative distributed 0 Broadband Cl Distributed nteractive planning systems narrowband ISDN modeling simulation tools 0 Voice recognition El Gigabit Terabit networks Ci Visualization human factors at Component systems human interfaces Antennas 0 Language translation Common reference models - digital terrain Application specific at Self-describing data data compression models Information Movement Low-cost digital radio vk Dynamic information distribution Figure D-19 The necessity to deal with a wide ran coalition operations places new re must be designed with architecture ge of unanticipated crises that involve joint and quirements on the C41 information systems These systems 5 that facilitate reconfiguration at two levels First the sys- tems should be designed to permit new technologies and functionality to be rapidly added to the system Second they should Meeting these dual re permit the warrior to adapt the system to meet unique needs quirements necessitates refocused investment in the three areas described below Igint Battlespagg and collaboration tools and operational interoperate Additionally separate co Today's simulation based training systems planning systems have been separately developed and do not mmunications systems are used to support these appli- cations Having these separate systems results in a very inefficient use of our resources More importantly it deprives the warfighter fr C41 tools and to plan for and rehearse op terns that will be used in exercises and joint battlespace environments are om using the simulation environment to evaluate new erations using real data and the same information sys- combat operations Technologies needed to support Tools for developing fielding and evaluating component systems A great deal of exibil ity is needed in the joint battlespace environment to accommodate the testing and evalua- tion of new C41 systems and software Tools and methodologies are needed to support the development and fielding of systems by assembling components and rapidly tailoring the D25 system to meet speci c mission needs These tools should incorporate performance metrics help evaluate interoperability and provide measures of relative operational utility mfomgo'oo Assimilation Traditional problems of information overload and miscom munication are exacerbated by unanticipated crises joint operations and coalition operations Overcoming these problems depends on leveraging advancing technologies in three areas information presentation information filtering and and tools for collaboration However even with today s technologies problems remain in integrating information from the large collection of preexisting incompatible databases and in finding cOmmon reference models for information presentation should make further investments in specific tech- nologies that will support these needs 0 Common reference models Information presentation 1s a three step process- -data must be collected it must be fused to form functional composites and it must be presented in a form the customer can rapidly and unambiguously interpret Much of the information needed for the battle eld picture can be described in geographic coordinates locations of friendly and enemy forces supply routes weather planned maneuvers etc During a crisis when there is a need to rapidly and unambiguously interpret such information graphical presentations based on digitized geography and terrain are an excellent way for humans to absorb complex information More research is needed into the technology to support the use of digital terrain as a common reference model for presentation Better techniques are needed to convert imagery data to digitized terrain data at varying resolu- tions to improve animation techniques and to overcome bandwidth problems associated with transmission and display 0 Self-describing data models The problem of multiple representations and multiple inter- pretations of data can be solved by 1mposing data standards or by requiring the use of standardized data dictionaries An alternative approach is to design data models in which the semantic meanings for the data items are attached to the data items These self-describ- ing data models can facilitate the integration of data from numerous heterogeneous data sources Additional research in these techniques 15 especially needed due to the urgent need for data definition and waveform standards for joint operations Information Movemgnt C41 systems will become increasingly heterogeneous and dynamic They will incorporate high bandwidth backbones satellite direct broadcast systems high capacity wireless communications and low data rate tactical networks In a telecommuni- cations environment that dynamically evolves to support varying operations and within the course of a single Operation To maintain a telecommunications advantage the component systems must continue to evolve and better methods for managing bandwidth and informa- tion distribution must be found Technologies needed to support information movement are i 0 Low-cost digital radios Advances in semiconductor technology including mixed-signal front ends offer the prospect of building low cost digital radio systems which can meet a wide range of voice and data needs in These systems must interoperate with a wide range of legacy systems as well as meet future needs for high bandwidth data transmission jamming and spoofing Systems such as Speakeasy are being developed as proof of principal the challenge is to leverage the commercial manufacturing base to develop low- cost radios which can meet a wide range of needs 0 Advanced antennas As the amount of data required on the battle eld COntinues to rapidly increase mobile tactical units must be able to access multiple satellites simultaneously to achieve the necessary bandwidth Currently single-band electromechanical antennas can access only one satellite at a time There is a pressing requirement for low-cost broadband D-26 high gain electronically steerable antennas that can simultaneously access multiple satel- lites both and commercial in different parts of the sky 0 Dynamic information distribution Tools for managing the ow of information become crucial as C41 telecommunication systems become more complex combining high bandwidth backbones satellite direct broadcast systems high capacity point-to-point cOmmunications and low data rate tactical networks These tools must match user infor- mation needs with bandwidth constraints and provide for the dynamic reconfiguring of the information ow when a communications component becomes unavailable Application-specific data compression New technologies are needed to cope with unique needs for data compression particularly for image and SAR data There is a need to dynamically alter compression ratios and fields of compression as communications bandwidth changes in the transmission systems Additionally systems which allow users to specify variable compression ratios for different regions of a single image need to be fur- ther developed 6 2 Information and Information Systems Protection The DoD s reliance on increasingly sophisticated information systems provides numer- ous opportunities for penetration and disruption by both sophisticated and unsophisticated adversaries Currently data security can be costly and a major constraint on timely informa- - tion ow to the user Consequently low cost ways must be found to implement security so that it does not limit the value that can be provided by the information syste Two recommendations are made First should harmonize its current practices with the recommendations of the Joint Security Task Force and the recommendations made in the for the Nil Technical Challenges report Second should field available security components and make further investments in several specific technologies that are critical to support DoD s information and information systems protection needs which at a minimum must provide for the development of capabilities and tools for protection against attack detec- tion of attacks and the ability to react to attacks These technologies fall into three broad cate- gories enterprise security network security and data security K_e_y_ - nformation CiLeverage Commercial am Ongoing 000 information Systems Need More Investment Protection Enterprise Security etwork Security Ci Technology DAuthorization authentication Ci Protect data on DMS Secure E-M aii access controls methods personal info cards Ci Digital signatures Automated classification Vulnerability models and downgrading procedures metrics Classification Tools for risk Failure detection management for data - management containment 81 recovery obiects at Component level procedures Data integrity authorization infrastructure protection techniques authentication access mechanisms Data contamination control techniques recovery procedures Figure D-20 D-27 It is important to preserve the security needs of the enterprise while maintaining a flexible C41 information system that supports the needs of the warrior An appropriate strategy of risk management is needed which provides protection for secret to unclassified information based on COTS and COTS products being assumed to be adequate protectors unless shown otherwise Technologies needed to support enterprise security are 0 Automated classification downgrading procedures Programs such as Radiant Mercury provide an automated way to downgrade certain information for distribution These tools should be expanded to cover broadcast systems and be made available as network tools 0 Tools for risk management Tradeoffs between the need for information protection and the bene ts of broad information distribution systems are inevitable Tools for risk assessment and management are needed to make these tradeoffs in relevant manners 0 Component level authorization authentication and access control Techniques are needed to authenticate components verify that they are acting functionally as they are authorized and control their access to the information system Network Security C41 information systems depend heavily on telecommunications networks with significant vulnerabilities Few technologies exist to assess these vulnerabilities or to cope with catastrophic failures to the networks Technologies needed to support network security are 0 Vulnerability models and metrics Networks have many sources of vulnerability and users need models metrics and tools to assess these vulnerabilities These models and tools should build on experiences with actual attacks 0 Failure detection containment and recovery procedures Simple systems failures power grid and the telephone system and overt attacks Intemet worm have lead to catastrophic failures in our infrastructure Research is needed to develop methods to detect isolate and contain the impact of failures within or attacks on our infrastructure 0 Infrastructure protection To protect the integrity of the infrastructure security measures such as configuration control and prevention of unauthorized modification tamper-proof routing protocols protection against denial of service protection of switches and commu- nications circuits and protection against unauthorized traffic analysis are needed Data gurity Data security requires that data be protected from unintended disclosure while maintaining full confidence that the data has not been compromised Technologies needed to support data security are 0 Classification management for data objects Techniques are needed to ensure that data maintains the appropriate security classification even when processed fused or extracted from other sources 0 Data integrity Techniques are needed to provide information about one's data to help establish the data s integrity including pedigree currency and confidence levels 0 Contamination recovery procedures Data may be compromised because of system failure tampering or through the use of inaccurate or incomplete data Techniques are needed to allow the system to recognize and isolate contaminated data items and recover from data contamination D-28 6 3 - Recommendations Technology is not a major impediment to information dominance on the battle eld The commercial information industry leads in technology and research investment Information technology is available globally should Invest in military-unique information technology - Give special attention to information protection technology - Use the best commercial technology Action ensure that strategy capitalizes on commercial technology and focuses investment in mili r information technolo 3 Figure D-21 With respect to modern C41 systems component technology is not the major impedi- ment to information dominance on the battle eld We must assume that both current and increasingly more capable commercial technologies will be available acquired and used by friend and foe alike It will be important to stay abreast of current and emerging technology but our real discriminator will be our ability to continuously infuse these technologies and to con gure and reconfigure the ensuing products to support joint warfare Key to technology insertion is the recognition that the commercial information technol- ogy industry leads in technology and research investment We have seen advances in office automation systems mapping systems imagery processing and GPS Those technologies and resultant products are available from the global marketplace With the increasing dependence on information technologies in C41 systems and the explosion of interconnected networks and databases the importance of information and information systems protection has grown significantly In response to this dramatically changed environment it is important for the to recognize that it must accelerate its efforts along a two-pronged course First it must continue its emphasis on supporting and infusing best commercial technologies This will allow to piggyback off of the tremendous investments being made in the commercial marketplace Secondly the should continue its investments in military-unique information technology Those technologies that are stressed by military applications should be given priority and in particular those that support enhanced reconfiguration and information and information systems protection Special attention should be given to information and information systems protection because of the increasing reliance on commercial products and systems and the increased threat of the use of information warfare as a weapon against C41 systems Action We recommend that continue to leverage commercial information systems technology to facilitate rapid technology infusion and reprioritize investment to differen- tiate military-unique information technology in support of enhanced reconfigurability and information and information systems protection D-29 Appendix Terms of Reference 3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON DC 20301-3010 AcomerON AND - TECHNOLOGY JUN 1994 MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD SUBJECT Terms of Reference -- Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force on Information Architecture for the Battlefield You are requested to establish a Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force on Information Architecture for the Battlefield The Task Force effort should focus principally on information support to the theater or joint task force commander in preparation for and during combat operations Joint combat operations require interoperability of disparate systems and most likely infusion of new concepts that take advantage of the significant technological superiority the United States can apply to information support of combat Operations Also combat operations can be enhanced by using planning analysis simulations war gaming exercises and rehearsal capabilities within the same information system used in actual situations A superior future information architecture will require changes in management organization doctrine and policy to take full advantage of these technical capabilities The objective of this study is to make recommendations for implementing an information architecture that will enhance combat operations by providing commanders and forces at all levels with required information displayed for immediate assimilation to decrease decision cycle time For this study information architecture is considered to include operational concepts intelligence support information concepts networks data bases system security and necessary software This study should 1 Assess the current and future 000 and Service plans for 3 battlefield information systems 2 Develop concepts for information flow on the battlefield 3 Develop an architectural approach to support these concepts which in particular considers - Vulnerability to jamming deception and loss of network control Interpretability among heterogeneous lower level systems through interoperability protocols data dictionaries and common addressing High leverage opportunities for retrofitting interconnecting legacy systems with digital translation - Appropriate operational and maintenance support concepts 4 Consider imposition of policy security restrictions on information through explicit software and rather than hardware to ease rapid changes when authorized 5 Consider how joint exercises gaming and simulation can validate alternate concepts 6 Provide specific guidelines for implementation of the Task Forces's recommendations The Task Force should submit its final report by September 1994 The Task Force should include an assessment of the potential impact on military readiness for those recommendations where such an assessment is appropriate The Director Defense Research and Engineering and the Assistant Secretary of Defense Command Control Communications and Intelligence will co-sponsor this Task Force Dr Craig I Fields and General James P McCarthy USAF Ret will serve as its Co-chairs Ms Virginia L Castor will serve as the Task Force Executive Secretary and Commander Robert C Hardee USN will serve as the Defense Science Board secretariat representative It is not anticipated that this Task Fore will need to go into any particular matters within the meaning of Section 208 of Title 18 U S Code nor will it cause any member to be placed in the position of acting as a procurement official Appendix Membership - Appendix Membership sci-cm Dr Craig I Fields Private Consultant Gen James P McCarthy USAF Ret Olin Professor of National Security US Air Force Academy CO Members Dr Joseph V Braddock Senior Fellow BDM International Inc Gen Michael P C Cams USAF Ret Private Consultant Mr G Dean Clubb Executive Vice President Defense Systems Electronics Group Texas Instruments Inc ADM Leon A Bud Edney USN Ret Vice President Naval Systems Loral Corporation Mr Gordon R England President Lockheed Fort Worth Company Dr John S Foster Jr Private Consultant Dr George H Heilmeier President CEO Bellcore Corporation Dr Barry Horowitz President The Mitre Corporation Mr Arthur E Johnson President Chief Operating Of cer LORAL Federal Systems Company Dr Deborah Joseph Computer Science Department University of Wisconsin Mr C G Jerry King President Boeing Defense 8 Space Group Dr Donald C Latham Vice President C31 and Tactical Weapons Programs Loral Corporation LtGen Robert H Ludwig USAF Ret Private Consultant Mr Robert F Nesbit Technical Director The Mitre Corporation Mr Robert N Parker - Private Consultant MG Cloyd H Mike Pfister USA Ret Private Consultant Dr Eberhardt Rechtin Private Consultant MajGen Robert A Rosenberg USAF Ret V Executive Vice President 8 General Manager Washington Operations SAIC Mr Thomas Skip Saunders Technical Director MITRE Mr Howard K Schue Partner Technology Strategies 8 Alliances GEN Carl W Stiner USA Ret Private Consultant VADM Jerry O Tuttle USN Ret Vice President for Business Development and Chief of Staff Of cer ORACLE Mr Vince Vitto Head of Communications Division MIT Lincoln Lab Dr Richard L Wagner Kaman Sciences Corporation LtGen C Norman Wood USAF Ret Senior Vice President 8 General Manager BDM Federal Mr Lawrence T Wright Vice President and Partner Booz-Allen 8 Hamilton Inc DSB Secretariat Representag've Commander Robert C Hardee USN Defense Science Board Executive Secretary Ms Virginia L Castor Special Assistant for Software 8 Computer Technology AT Government Advisors DEPARTME THE ARMY MG Edward R Baldwin IL USA Vice Director DISC4 HQDA SAIS-ZB COL David Brown Chief Command Systems Operations Division Joint Staff Robert Evans Senior Analyst Command US Army INSCOM LTC Greg Gorzelnik Action Of cer Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army COL Thomas Hall TSM Multi-functional Computers Ft Gordon Georgia Mr Eugene Famolari Ir Associate Director Technology CECOM Research Development and Engineering Center COL Robert L Forrester Commander U S Army Signal Center PAR NT THE NAVY LCDR Gary Burnette OPNAV VADM Arthur Cebrowski USN Director Space and Electronic Warfare OPNAV N6 RADM John Hekman USN Commander Naval Information Systems Management Mr Marvin Langston Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy MajGen David A Richwine USMC S CAPT Mary Heagney Smart USN Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command MajGen Paul Van Riper USMC Assistant Chief of Staff C41 HQ US Marine Corps THE BrigGen Buford R Witt USAF Director of Plans Policy and Resources Col Roderick Taylor Chief Technology Division USAF SCE Wilhelm Percival Special Technical Operations Of cer Joint Staff Mr Robert T Pritchard Defense Intelligence Agency Attn J2P Mr Joseph Toma Technical Assistant J6A Mr Robert Halayko Operations Research Analyst J8 OE Maj Joseph Bruder Systems Intelligence Analyst OASD Intelligence and Security Ms Deborah Castleman Mr George Endicott Special Assistant Architecture Management Analyst DIA COL Douglas Hotard OASD Mr Richard Mosier Deputy Director IPSG DIA Mr Michael Munson Director IPSG DIA Mr Douglas Perritt Deputy Director for Intelligence Systems C31 Mr Anthony Valletta DASD C31 Acquisition ABBA Dr Duane Adams Deputy Director ARPA Wm BrigGen Billy J Bingham USAF Assistant Deputy Director for Operations SA Mr Dennis Chiari NSA CAPT William Henry NSA Mr Harold McDonough Chief Telecommunications System NSA Mr David Patterson Senior Executive NSA BMDQ Colonel George W Bill Criss USAF Director BMC3 BMDO DI A Dr David T Signori Jr Associate Director DISA MGen Julio Torres Of ce of the Director of Mobilization Assistant DISA QQ Dr Annette Krygiel Director CIO Ms Elizabeth Larson Central Imagery Office Mr Steven Schanzer Director Intelligence Systems Secretariat CMS CIA Headquarters Contractor Admm isgatjyg and Mr Brad Smith Strategic Analysis Inc Mr David Thomas Strategic Analysis Inc Mr Fred Karkalik Strategic Analysis Inc Dr Nancy Chesser Directed Technologies Inc F4 Appendix Briefings to Summer Study Task Force Appendix Briefings Presented to Task Force Mr Calvin Vos Standards of Conduct Orientation C41 for the Warrior Information Architectures That Enhance Operational Capability in Peacetime and Wartime Air Force Scienti c Advisgy Board Global Command and Control System CAPT John Ward Jr USN Dr Larry Druffel Col Bernard Skoch USAF Army Enterprise Strategy COL Scott Long Navy C41 Architecture RADM Sel John Guass Digitization of the Battlefield COL Mike Simonich Air Force C41 Top Level Architecture Lt Col Terry Preston Technical Architecture TA for Army C41 Army Science Board Summer Study The Global Grid Initiatives Dr Michael Frankel- Mr Lee Hammarstrom II Intelink Mr Steven Schanzer II II Internet - Dr Vinton Cerf II The Global Grid Initiative Mr Lee Hammarstrom Maj Gen Paul Van Riper DSB Chairman's Remarks Building Knowledge-Based Information Systems DISA's Roles in C41 Architecture and Standards C41 - The Tie That Binds Dr Paul Kaminski Dr Signori Mr Brown Dr Kaplan MG Kelley BrigGen Bohn II Object Oriented Approaches to Interoperability Dr Myra Jean Prelle C41 Systems Strategy Mr Woodall Mr Evans Advanced Distributed Simulation War Breaker Col Robert Reddy Mr Laurence Stucld Information Warfare Defense Multi-level Security Initiatives CINC Perspective - Theater C41 Capabilities Readiness 8 Requirements II Measures of Effectiveness Used Assess Joint Task Force Readiness USACOM Joint Training Program Information Systems Requirements Dr David Signori Mr John Nagengast ADM Paul David Miller RADM Thomas Fargo 4 CAPT James Sherlock Measures of Effectiveness Used to Assess C41 Readiness RADM Charles Saffell Joint Warfighting Center CAPT Stanley Bloyer ll Sensor-to-Shooter Mr Douglas Cupo Joint Simulation System CAPT Mark Falkey Defense Mapping Agency Vision for Digital Products Dr ' Kenneth Daugherty and Ms Roberta Lenczowski Central Imagery Office C10 C41 Architecture Tactical Intelligence Ms Beth Larson II Ms Polly Hussain ARPA Study on Advanced Technology for Operations Other Than War Gen Ret Carl Stiner II National Intelligence Support Team Mr Neil O'Leary II ll Intelink Briefing to Technology and Management Panels Mr Steve Schanzer Cli er Chi Briefin Dr Brooks G-l Appendix Acronyms Appendix Acronyms AB2 ABCS ACC ACTDs ADA ADANS AFATDS AFCZS AFMSS AFRA AFW CC AGCCs ALCOM AMC AMU AMWG AOC API APP APS ARPA ASAS ASD ASD C31 ASOC ASTEC ATARS ATCCS ATM ATO AWACS AWIS BFA BGPHES C2 CZIPS CEC CENT COM CIM CINC CINCUSACOM u ABCS - Brigade and Below Army Battle Command System Air Combat Command Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration Air Defense Artillery Airlift Deployment Analysis System Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System Air Force Command and Control System Air Force Mission Support System Air Force Reference Architecture Air Force Wing Command and Control System Army Global Command and Control System Alaskan Command Air Mobility Command Air Mobility Unit Architecture Methodology Working Group Air Operations Center Applications Program Interface Application Portability Profile Automated Planning System Advanced Research Projects Agency All Source Analysis System Assistant Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense Command Control Communications and Intelligence Air Support Operations Center Advanced Satellite Technology and EHF Communications Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System Army Tactical Command and Control System Transfer Mode Air Tasking Order Airborne Warning and Control System Army World-Wide Information System Battlefield Functional Area Battle Group Passive Horizon Extension System Battlefield Information Task Force Command and Control Command and Control Information Processing System Command Control and Communications Command Control Communications Computers and Intelligence Contingency Air Reconnaissance System CIN Command Complex Command and Control Processing and Display System Replacement Cooperative Engagement Capability US Central Command Command High Baud Data Link Corporate Information Management Commander in Chief Commander in Chief U S Atlantic Command -1 c1cs cm CMOP CMU cos COMSAT COMSEC CONUS cors CRAP CRC cs CTAPS DBMS DBS DCI DDN DMSO DEPSECDEF DII DISA DISN DISSP DMRD DMSO DOD DODIIS DSB DSCS FAADCZI FACP FACRP FAFIM FDDI FEMA FLEX FLTSAT FLTSATCOM FSS Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Commander Joint Task Force Chairman's Memorandum of Policy Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade Common Operating Environment Communications Satellite Communications Security Continental United States Commercial Off the Shelf Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet Control and Reporting Center Constant Source Combat Support System Combat Service Support Control System Combat Service Support Control System-Echelons Above Corps Contingency TACS Automated Planning System Command Tactical Information System Carrier Battle Group Data Base Management System Direct Broadcast Satellite Director of Central Intelligence Defense Digital Network Director Defense Research and Engineering Director Defense Research and Engineering Defense Modeling and Simulation Office Deputy Secretary of Defense Defense Information Infrastructure Defense Information Systems Agency Defense Information System Network Defense Information System Security Program Defense Management Review Decision Defense Modeling and Simulation Office Department of Defense Department of Defense Intelligence Information System Defense Science Board Defense Satellite Communications System Echelon Above Corps Extremely High Frequency Enterprise Integration Board Enterprise Integration Council Electronic Intelligence Electro-Optics Electronic System Center Forward Area Air Defense Command Control and Intelligence Forward Air Control Post Function Analysis and Consolidation Report Functional Architecture Framework for Information Management Fiber Distributed Data Interface Federal Emergency Management Agency Force Level Execution Fleet Satellite Fleet Satellite Communications Fire Support System For the Warrior Gigabit LAN Global Command and Control System Global Decision Support System Global Information Infrastructure Global Information Exchange System General Of cers Steering Group Government Open Systems Interconnection Profile Government Off the Shelf Global Positioning System General Services Administration Graphical User Interface High Frequmcy Headquarters US Air Force Human Intelligence Integrated Battle eld Targeting Architecture Intelligence Correlation Module Integrated Definition Intelligence and Electronic Warfar Information Security Internet Protocol Integrated Process Team Integrated Services Digital Network International Organization for Standardization Information Warfare Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Electronic Warfare Center Joint Force Air Component Commander Joint Operations Planning and Execution System Joint Requirements Oversight Council Joint Simulation System Joint Services Imagery Processing System Joint Task Force Joint Tactical Information Distribution System Joint Warfighters Center Local Area Network Major Command Measurements and Signatures Intelligence Multimission Advanced Tactical Terminal Modular Control Element Military Communications and Electronics Board Maneuver Control System Mission Element Need System Military Strategic Relay Multilevel Information System Security Initiative Multimode Multimission Broadband Antenna Mission Needs Statement Memorandum of Policy Major Regional Con ict Mobile Subscriber Equipment H-3 NSA NSG OODBMS OOP oorw OPFAC OPSEC 0RD oso OSE 031 owe P31 PDD PMD POM PPLI PRD PRISM PSN PSTS ROCS SAB SATCOM SB II SCN SECDEF SIGINT SINCGARS SIOP SON SONET STACCS STOW SWSC TACC TACS TAD Message Test Format Moving Target Indicator Maneuver Control System National Command Authority National Intelligence Estimate National Information Infrastructure National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency Naval Security Group Object-Oriented Data Base Management System Object-Oriented Programming Operations Other Than War Operational Facilities Operational Security Operational Requirements Document Of ce of the Secretary of Defense Open Systems Environment Open Systems Interconnect Operational Testing and Evaluation Preplanned Product Improvement Presidential Decision Directive Program Management Directive Program Objectives Memorandum Precise Position Location and Identification Presidential Review Document Portable Reusable Integrated Software Modules Public Switched Network Precision Spaceborne Targeting System Research and Development Request for Proposal Required Operational Capability Statement Scientific Advisory Board Standard Air Force Wing Command and Control System Satellite Communications Sentinel Byte II Sensitive Compartmented Information Satellite Control Network Secretary of Defense Super High Frequency Signals Intelligence Single Channel Ground Radio System Single Integrated Operations Plan Statement of Operational Need Optical Network Standard Theater Army Command and Control System Theater of War Space and Warning Systems Center Tanker and Airlift Control Center Tactical Air Control System Theater Air Defense H-4 USACOM USD UTM vc1cs WAN Tactical Data Link I Tactical Data Exchange System Technical Architecture Framework for Information Management Tanker Airlift Control Element Theater Battle Management Transmission Control Protocol - Technical Exploitation of National Capab' 'ties Tactical Information Broadcast System Tactical Operations Center Time Phased Force Deployment Document Time Phased Force Deployment List Transportation Command Tactical Relay and Processor Technical Reference Model United Nations Unmanned Air Vehicle User Datagram Protocol UHF Follow-On Ultra High Frequency Network Architectures System US Atlantic Command US Air Forces in Europe Undersecretary of Defense Acquisition and Technology Universal Transverse Mercator Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Wide Area Network Wing Command and Control System Weapons of Mass Destruction Wing Operations Center Worldwide Military Command and Control System