Statement for the Record The Honorable Christopher C Krebs Under Secretary National Protection and Programs Directorate U S Department of Homeland Security FOR A HEARING ON “Cyber-securing the Vote Ensuring the Integrity of the U S Election System” BEFORE THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM Tuesday July 24 2018 Washington DC Chairman Gowdy Ranking Member Cummings and members of the Committee thank you for today’s opportunity to testify regarding the U S Department of Homeland Security’s DHS ongoing efforts to assist with reducing and mitigating risks to our election infrastructure DHS is eager to share with you the progress we have made to establish trust-based partnerships with our Nation’s election officials who administer our democratic election processes Recognizing that the 2018 U S mid-term elections are a potential target for malicious cyber activity DHS is committed to robust engagement with state and local election officials as well as private sector entities to assist them with defining their risk and providing them with information and capabilities that enable them to better defend their infrastructure Given the foundational role that elections play in a free and democratic society in January 2017 the Secretary of Homeland Security designated election infrastructure as a critical infrastructure subsector Under our system of laws federal elections are administered by state and local election officials in thousands of jurisdictions across the country These officials manage election infrastructure and ensure its security and resilience on a day-to-day basis As such DHS and our federal partners have formalized the prioritization of voluntary cybersecurity assistance for election infrastructure similar to that which is provided to a range of other critical infrastructure entities such as financial institutions and electric utilities Since 2016 DHS’s National Protection and Programs Directorate NPPD has convened Federal Government and election officials regularly to share cybersecurity risk information and to determine an effective means of assistance The Election Infrastructure Subsector EIS Government Coordinating Council GCC has worked to establish goals and objectives including plans for EIS engagement and the establishment of a sector-specific plan SSP GCC representatives include DHS the Election Assistance Commission EAC and 24 state and local election officials Participation in the council is entirely voluntary and does not change the fundamental role of state and local jurisdictions in overseeing elections The Department and the EAC worked with election industry representatives to launch an industry-led Sector Coordinating Council SCC a self-organized self-run and self-governed council with leadership designated by the sector membership The SCC serves as industry’s principal entity for coordinating with the government on critical infrastructure security activities and issues related to sector-specific strategies and policies This collaboration is conducted under DHS’s authority to provide a forum in which government and private sector entities can jointly engage in a broad spectrum of activities to coordinate critical infrastructure security and resilience efforts which is used in each of the critical infrastructure sectors established under Presidential Policy Directive 21 Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience The process is a well-tested mechanism across critical infrastructure sectors for sharing threat information among the Federal Government and critical infrastructure partners advancing risk management efforts and prioritizing services available to sector partners in a trusted environment NPPD also engages directly with election officials—coordinating requests for assistance risk mitigation information sharing and incident coordination resources and services In order to ensure a coordinated approach from the federal government NPPD has convened stakeholders 1 from across the Federal Government through an Election Task Force The task force serves to provide actionable information and offer assistance to assist election officials with strengthening their election infrastructure by reducing and mitigating cyber risk and increasing resilience of their processes Within the context of today’s hearing I will address the unclassified assessment of malicious cyber operations directed against U S election infrastructure and our efforts to help enhance the security of elections that are administered by jurisdictions around the country Enhancing Security for Future Elections DHS regularly coordinates with the intelligence community and law enforcement partners on potential threats to the Homeland Among non-federal partners DHS has been engaging state and local officials as well as relevant private sector entities to assess the scale and scope of malicious cyber activity potentially targeting the U S election infrastructure Election infrastructure includes the information and communications technology capabilities physical assets and technologies that enable the registration and validation of voters the casting transmission tabulation and reporting of votes and the certification auditing and verification of elections DHS is committed to ensuring a coordinated response from DHS and its federal partners to plan for prepare for and mitigate risk to election infrastructure We understand that working with election infrastructure stakeholders is essential to ensuring a more secure election DHS and our stakeholders are increasing awareness of potential vulnerabilities and providing capabilities to enhance the security of U S election infrastructure as well as that of our democratic allies Election officials across the country have a long-standing history of working both individually and collectively to reduce risks and ensure the integrity of their elections In partnering with these officials through both new and ongoing engagements DHS is working to provide value-added—yet voluntary—services to support their efforts to secure elections Improving Coordination with State local Tribal Territorial SLTT and Private Sector partners Increasingly the nation’s election infrastructure leverages information technology IT for efficiency and convenience but also exposes systems to cybersecurity risks just like in any other enterprise environment Just like with other sectors NPPD helps stakeholders in federal departments and agencies SLTT governments and the private sector to manage these cybersecurity risks Consistent with our long-standing partnerships with state and local governments we have been working with election officials to share information about cybersecurity risks and to provide voluntary resources and technical assistance The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center NCCIC works with the MS-ISAC to provide threat and vulnerability information to state and local officials For nearly a decade DHS has funded the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center MS-ISAC which has since created the EI-ISAC to enable its members to share cybersecurity information and collaborate with each other The EI-ISAC’s membership includes almost 1 000 2 SLTT election-specific entities Through the MS-ISAC it has representatives co-located with the NCCIC to enable regular collaboration and access to information and services for state chief information officers Providing Technical Assistance and Sharing Information NPPD actively promotes a range of services including Cyber hygiene service for Internet-facing systems Through this automated remote scan NPPD may provide a report identifying vulnerabilities and mitigation recommendations to improve the cybersecurity of systems connected to the Internet such as online voter registration systems election night reporting systems and other Internet-connected election management systems Risk and vulnerability assessments We have prioritized state and local election systems upon request and increased the availability of risk and vulnerability assessments RVAs These in-depth on-site evaluations include a system-wide understanding of vulnerabilities focused on both internal and external systems We provide a full report of vulnerabilities and recommended mitigations following the testing Incident response assistance We encourage election officials to report suspected malicious cyber activity to the NCCIC Upon request the NCCIC can provide assistance in identifying and remediating a cyber incident Information reported to the NCCIC is also critical to the federal government’s ability to broadly assess malicious attempts to infiltrate election systems This technical information will also be shared with other state officials so they have the ability to defend their own systems from similar malicious activity Knowing what to do when a security incident happens—whether physical or cyber— before it happens is critical NPPD supports election officials with incident response planning including participating in exercises and reviewing incident response playbooks Crisis communications are a core component of these efforts ensuring officials are able to communicate transparently and authoritatively to their constituents when an incident unfolds In some cases we do this directly with state and local jurisdictions In others we partner with outside organizations We recognize that securing our nation’s systems is a shared responsibility and we are leveraging partnerships to advance that mission Information sharing NPPD maintains numerous platforms and services to share relevant information on cyber incidents State election officials may also receive information directly from the NCCIC The NCCIC also works with the EI-ISAC which allows election officials to connect with the EI-ISAC or their State Chief Information Officer to rapidly receive information they can use to protect their systems Best practices cyber threat information and technical indicators some of which had been previously classified have been shared with election officials in thousands of state and local jurisdictions In all cases the information sharing and or use of such cybersecurity risk indicators or information related to cybersecurity risks and incidents complies with applicable lawful restrictions on its collection and use and with DHS policies protective of privacy and civil liberties 3 Classified information sharing To most effectively share information with all of our partners—not just those with security clearances—we work with the intelligence community to rapidly declassify relevant intelligence or provide tearlines While DHS prioritizes declassifying information to the extent possible we also provide classified information to cleared stakeholders as appropriate DHS has been working with state chief election officials and additional election staff in each state to provide them with security clearances By working with ODNI and the Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI in February 2018 election officials from each state received one-day read-ins for a classified threat briefing while they were in Washington DC This briefing demonstrated our commitment to ensuring election officials have the information they need to understand the threats they face Field-based cybersecurity advisors and protective security advisors NPPD has more than 130 cybersecurity and protective security personnel available to provide actionable information and connect election officials to a range of tools and resources to improve the cybersecurity preparedness of election systems and to secure the physical site security of voting machine storage and polling places These advisors are also available to assist with planning and incident management for both cyber and physical incidents Physical and protective security tools training and resources NPPD provides guidance and tools to improve the security of polling sites and other physical election infrastructure This guidance can be found at www dhs gov hometown-security This guidance helps to train administrative and volunteer staff on identifying and reporting suspicious activities active shooter scenarios and what to do if they suspect an improvised explosive device DHS has made tremendous strides and is committed to working collaboratively with those on the front lines of administering our elections to secure election infrastructure from risks The establishment of government and sector coordinating councils will build the foundations for this enduring partnership not only in 2018 but for future elections as well We will remain transparent as well as agile in combating and securing our physical and cyber infrastructure However we recognize that there are significant technology needs across SLTT governments and State and local election systems in particular It will take significant and continual investment to ensure that election systems across the nation are upgraded and secure with vulnerable systems retired These efforts require a whole of government approach The President and this Administration are committed to addressing these risks In closing there is a fundamental link between public trust in our election infrastructure and the confidence the American public places in basic democratic functions Ensuring the security of our electoral process is a vital national interest and one of our highest priorities Our voting infrastructure is diverse subject to local control and has many checks and balances As the threat environment evolves we will continue to work with federal agencies state and local partners and private sector entities to enhance our understanding of the threat and to make essential physical and cybersecurity tools and resources available to the public and private sectors to increase security and resiliency Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee today and I look forward to your questions 4