5 I I a 4 5 5 MILITARY POWER MODERNIZING A FORCE to FIGHT AND WIN Committed to Excellence In Defense of the Nation This report is available online at www dia mil Military-Power-Publications For media and public inquiries about this report contact DIA-PAO@dodiis mil For more information about the Defense Intelligence Agency visit DIA's website at www dia mil Information cutoff date November 2018 Cover image Navy frigate Yantai of the 11th Chinese naval escort flotilla Source Shutterstock DIA-02-1706-085 PREFACE In September 1981 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger asked the Defense Intelligence Agency to produce an unclassified overview of the Soviet Union's military strength The purpose was to provide America's leaders the national security community and the public a comprehensive and accurate view of the threat The result the first edition of Soviet Military Power DIA produced over 250 000 copies and it soon became an annual publication that was translated into eight languages and distributed around the world In many cases this report conveyed the scope and breadth of Soviet military strength to U S policymakers and the public for the first time In the spirit of Soviet Military Power DIA began in 2017 to produce a series of unclassified Defense Intelligence overviews of major foreign military challenges we face This volume provides details on China's defense and military goals strategy plans and intentions the organization structure and capability of its military supporting those goals and the enabling infrastructure and industrial base This product and other reports in the series are intended to inform our public our leaders the national security community and partner nations about the challenges we face in the 21st century IV CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win The 2015 Chinese white paper China's Military Strategy issued by China's State Council Information Office states It is a Chinese Dream to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation The Chinese Dream is to make the country strong Without a strong military a country can neither be safe nor strong The Defense Intelligence Agency--indeed the broader U S Intelligence Community--is continually asked What do we need to know about China What is China's vision of the world and its role in it What are Beijing's strategic intentions and what are the implications for Washington How are the PLA's roles and missions changing as it becomes a more capable military force Since Mao Zedong's Communist Revolution in October 1949 brought the Chinese Communist Party to power China has struggled to identify and align itself with its desired place in the world Early factional struggles for control of party leadership decades of negotiations to define territorial boundaries and continued claims to territories not yet recovered have at times seemed at odds with the self-described nature of the Chinese as peace-loving and oriented only toward their own defense Chinese leaders historically have been willing to use military force against threats to their regime whether foreign or domestic at times preemptively Lack of significant involvement in military operations during the last several decades has led to a sense of insecurity within the PLA as it seeks to modernize into a great power military This report offers insights into the modernization of Chinese military power as it reforms from a defensive inflexible ground-based force charged with domestic and peripheral security responsibilities to a joint highly agile expeditionary and power-projecting arm of Chinese foreign policy that engages in military diplomacy and operations across the globe R ober t P A shl e y Jr L ieut en a nt G ener a l U S A r my D i r e c t or D efen s e I nt el l igenc e A genc y I N T E L L I G E N C E Chinese leaders characterize China's long-term military modernization program as essential to achieving great power status Indeed China is building a robust lethal force with capabilities spanning the air maritime space and information domains which will enable China to impose its will in the region As it continues to grow in strength and confidence our nation's leaders will face a China insistent on having a greater voice in global interactions which at times may be antithetical to U S interests With a deeper understanding of the military might behind Chinese economic and diplomatic efforts we can provide our own national political economic and military leaders the widest range of options for choosing when to counter when to encourage and when to join with China in actions around the world D E F E N S E China's double-digit economic growth has slowed recently but it served to fund several successive defense modernization Five-Year Plans As international concern over Beijing's human rights policies stymied the PLA's search for ever more sophisticated technologies China shifted funds and efforts to acquiring technology by any means available Domestic laws forced foreign partners of Chinese-based joint ventures to release their technology in exchange for entry into China's lucrative market and China has used other means to secure needed technology and expertise The result of this multifaceted approach to technology acquisition is a PLA on the verge of fielding some of the most modern weapon systems in the world In some areas it already leads the world A G E N C Y Still the United States has at times found itself in direct conflict with China or Chinese forces China supported two major conflicts in Asia after the Second World War introducing Chinese volunteer forces in Korea and providing direct Chinese air and air defense support to Hanoi in Vietnam In addition China fought border skirmishes with the Soviet Union India and a unified Vietnam In all three cases military action was an integral part of Chinese diplomatic negotiations Since then China has concluded negotiations for most of its land borders India and Bhutan being the outliers but remains in contention with Japan the Philippines Brunei Indonesia Malaysia and Vietnam over maritime borders which may in part explain motivation for the PLA Navy's impressive growth and the new emphasis on maritime law enforcement capabilities V CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win CONTENTS Introduction Historical Overview 1 1978-Present China's Military Rise 2 National Military Overview 7 Core Elements of Command and Control Reform 25 Modernizing Joint Command and Control 27 Regional and Global Operations 28 Core Chinese Military Capabilities 31 Power Projection and Expeditionary Operations Nuclear Forces and Weapons Biological and Chemical Warfare Space Counterspace 33 36 39 40 Satellites 41 Counterspace 43 Human Spaceflight and Space-Exploration Probes 43 I N T E L L I G E N C E Perceptions of Modern Conflict 24 National Military Command and Control 25 D E F E N S E Military Doctrine and Strategy 23 A G E N C Y Threat Perceptions 7 National Security Strategy 12 The PLA's Role in National Security 13 Military Leadership 13 Stability Issues 17 External Defense Relations 19 Defense Budget 20 Space Launch 44 VII Cyberspace 45 Denial and Deception 46 Logistics and Defense-Industrial Modernization 47 Logistics 47 Defense-Industrial Base 48 Underground Facilities 50 Missions Other Than War 50 Outlook Developing a Robust Force 52 APPENDIX A PLA Army 55 APPENDIX B PLA Navy 63 APPENDIX C PLA Air Force 83 APPENDIX D PLA Rocket Force 91 APPENDIX E PLA Strategic Support Force 97 APPENDIX F Chinese Intelligence Services 99 APPENDIX G Military Resources Infrastructure and Logistics 101 APPENDIX H Defense Industry 105 APPENDIX I Arms Sales 107 APPENDIX J Glossary of Acronyms 109 VIII With more than 5 000 years of civilized history the Chinese nation created a brilliant Chinese civilization made outstanding contributions to mankind and became a great nation of the world --Chinese President Xi Jinping1 C hina's history dates back nearly five millennia Historians credit the armies of numerous dynasties throughout those many centuries with unifying the early warring states building the Great Wall sending the fleets of early Ming Dynasty maritime explorer Zheng He to far-off foreign lands and defending against foreign incursions However the People's Liberation Army PLA has existed for less than a century Initially referred to as the Red Army under Mao Zedong the PLA is not a national institution but rather the military arm of the Chinese Communist Party CCP Established in 1927 the army spent much of its first two decades engaged in fighting the Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek I N T E L L I G E N C E Introduction Historical Overview D E F E N S E PLA honor guard A G E N C Y Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win Image Source DIMOC CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R 1 during the intermittent Chinese Civil War as well as fighting against the Japanese during World War II which China refers to as the War of Resistance Against Japan Mao's Red Army declared victory over the Nationalists in October 1949 even as combat continued That same year the PLA expanded to include the PLA Navy and the PLA Air Force The PLA remained technologically inferior to Western militaries during its early decades but China's leaders readily employed PLA forces against the United States in Korea and Vietnam Beijing's willingness to rely on the PLA as a tool of foreign policy strengthened the PLA's position in China Even as Mao led China through the upheaval of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution the PLA endured Although the PLA emerged from the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1970s as one of the stronger pillars of CCP power its combat power was not commensurate with that of other large states' armed forces 1978-Present China's Military Rise After Deng Xiaoping's assumption of power in 1978 the path to today's PLA was set when national defense was included as the fourth of China's four modernizations the others being industry science and technology and agriculture National defense was accorded the lowest priority which carried implications for military funding and development The failure to achieve comprehensive modernization during 2 Mao's rule was brought home during the 1979 conflict between China and Vietnam when the PLA's performance exposed grave weaknesses in operational planning tactics command and control C2 logistics and weaponry The persistent exchanges of fire with Vietnamese forces during the 1980s highlighted the need for changes even as large numbers of PLA ground troops from around the country were rotated to the border to gain combat experience Meanwhile the PLA began to study contemporary foreign particularly Western military operations more closely such as the Falklands War 1982 and the bombing of Libya 1986 for insights on how to modernize China's combat forces In 1989 PLA units intervened with lethal force on behalf of the CCP to suppress political demonstrations in Tiananmen Square which considerably damaged the PLA's domestic and international image World events in 1991 further shook CCP leaders' confidence in the PLA The U S military's performance in the Persian Gulf War provided the PLA stark lessons regarding the lethal effectiveness of information-enabled weapons and forces particularly mobility and precision-strike capabilities that had become the standard for effectively waging war in the modern era As a result in the early 1990s Beijing altered its military doctrine concluding that the most likely conflict that China would face would be a local war under high-technology conditions later amended to conditions of informatization referring to warfare in the digital age This differed markedly from the Mao-era mindset that the PLA Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win Entering the 21st century China's leaders recognized the confluence of several factors that led them to expand the scope and quicken the pace of PLA development China's growing To accelerate the PLA's modernization and address capability shortfalls Beijing increased the PLA's budget by an average of 10 percent per year from 2000 to 2016 Beijing also established a PLA General Armaments Department in 1998 to rationalize equipment modernization and acquisition processes and instituted several broad scientific and technical programs to improve the defense-industrial base and decrease the PLA's dependence on foreign weapon acquisitions The PLA also revamped its training programs with all services attempting to prepare more realistically for conflict by emphasizing mission-focused exercises multiservice operations mobility better C2 and staff work and enhanced logistic support as well as achieving battlefield advantage by applying informatized warfare regional conflicts defined by real-time data-networked C2 methods For more on informatized warfighting please see Military Doctrine and Strategy page 23 A G E N C Y China's changing strategic threat perceptions also shaped military doctrine and the direction of PLA development Although the Soviet Union had loomed large as a potential military opponent the threat of a Soviet invasion diminished during the 1980s shifting the focus away from preparing for a World War II- style conflict Furthermore the U S 7th Fleet aircraft carrier intervention during the 1996 China-Taiwan missile crisis and the accidental NATO strike against China's Embassy in Serbia in 1999 led Beijing to focus on building capabilities to counter U S forces in addition to capabilities to dissuade Taiwan from any political activity Beijing deemed unacceptable global economic and political interests rapid technology-driven changes in modern warfare and perceptions of increased strategic-level external threats including to China's maritime interests At this time Chinese leaders perceived a period of strategic opportunity wherein the country presumably would not be involved in a major military conflict before 2020 allowing time for economic and military development As a result throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s China's leaders initiated several practical steps to modernize the PLA as a warfighting instrument I N T E L L I G E N C E would need to be prepared to fight a war more akin to World War II The PLA's strategy also changed moving away from the Maoist paradigm of luring an enemy into China to fight a people's war with regular troops irregular guerrilla forces and the general populace Instead the PLA began to emphasize a more offensive version of the PLA's historical strategic concept of active defense take advantage of longer range precision-guided munitions primarily ballistic and cruise missiles to keep a potential enemy as far as possible from the economically fast-developing Chinese coastal areas by fighting a noncontact short sharp conflict like the Persian Gulf War D E F E N S E CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R 3 4 Beijing also implemented personnel changes to professionalize the PLA While Beijing was focused on economic development in the late 1970s the PLA had been allowed to operate nonmilitary businesses to offset limited investment and resources This led to widespread corruption and drew attention away from training for actual military operations In 1998 Chinese leaders ordered the PLA to stop operating nonmilitary businesses and focus solely on professional military tasks As a result the PLA divested from a number of business ventures but still remains to some extent involved in business schemes The PLA developed a noncommissioned officer corps and began programs to recruit more technically competent university graduates to operate its modern weapons PLA political officers assigned to all levels of the military acquired broader personnel management responsibilities in addition to their focus on keeping the PLA ideologically pure and loyal to the CCP had become substantial drivers of Beijing's foreign policy signified a critical inflection point in the PLA's assumption of a global role and transition away from a force bound only to defending China's immediate territorial and sovereignty interests In 2004 then-President Hu Jintao outlined for the PLA the Historic Missions of the Armed Forces in the New Period of the New Century more commonly referred to as the New Historic Missions of the PLA to augment the PLA's role as a diplomatic and military instrument and as a guardian of China's global interests These new missions included ensuring China's sovereignty territorial integrity and domestic security preserving the period of strategic opportunity for China's development safeguarding China's expanding national interests and helping ensure world peace Hu's endowment of the PLA with these missions at a time when economic interests The PLA's evolution since President Xi Jinping's transition to power in 2012 has built on the Hu era but also marked a shift with Xi concurrently taking the helm of the party military and state enabling him to shape the direction of the PLA earlier during his tenure Xi has focused on strengthening the PLA as a force underscoring the themes of party rule over the military improving military capabilities and enhancing the military's professionalism 2 Xi has also expanded the scope and ambition of PLA modernization clearly affirming the PLA's overseas role and providing the institutional framework to enable substantial military growth beyond the PLA's traditional security threats Subsequent PLA activities such as counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden since 2009 international training and exercises noncombatant evacuations in Libya and Yemen and expanded peacekeeping operations in Africa under UN auspices have all been part of China's increasingly ambitious vision for expanding PLA activities to support its growing global clout China's establishment of its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017--overturning Beijing's insistence from its first defense white paper issued in 1998 that China does not station troops or set up military bases in any foreign country --is only the latest development in this progression Image Source Shutterstock In late 2015 President Xi Jinping unveiled the most substantial PLA reforms in at least 30 years The reforms were designed in part to make the PLA a leaner more lethal force capable of conducting the types of joint operations that it believes it must master to compete with the U S military Initial reforms established joint theater commands and a new Joint Staff Department while reorganizing the 4 general departments that previously ran the PLA into 15 Central Military Commission CMC departments and offices These efforts aimed to clarify command authorities integrate China's military services for joint operations and facilitate Beijing's transition from peace to war The structural reforms also established a separate Army headquarters elevated China's missile force to a full service by establishing the PLA Rocket Force unified China's space and cyber capabilities under the Strategic Support Force and created a Joint Logistics Support Force to direct precision support to PLA operations 3 4 5 The decision to place the Army which has traditionally played a dominant role in PLA leadership on equal footing with the PLA's other services underscores a postreform emphasis on jointness Overall reforms which the CMC aims to complete by 2020 are expected to touch all levels of the PLA including cutting approximately 300 000 personnel and refining military doctrine and policies I N T E L L I G E N C E PLA troops preparing for parade commemorating the 90th anniversary of the founding of the PLA - September 2017 A G E N C Y Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win D E F E N S E CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R 5 For a more detailed breakdown of PLA services and activities please see Appendixes A-I In October 2017 China's leaders used the opportunity of its once-in-5-years Party Congress to reduce the size of the CMC shifting toward a more joint command structure and aligning the military's highest body to its postreform C2 Reducing the size of the CMC will help Beijing streamline strategic decisionmaking bolster political oversight of the military and build a more integrated and professional force The move also highlights Xi's focus on eliminating corruption improving party loyalty and incentivizing operational experience The CMC now represents a capable and diverse generation of officers with operational experience which as a whole has the most joint representation in the PLA's history In his work report to the 19th Party Congress in October 2017 Xi Jinping called on the PLA to prepare for military struggle in all strategic directions and said the military was integral to achieving China's national rejuvenation In his speech Xi set three developmental benchmarks for the PLA including becoming a mechanized force with increased informatized and strategic capabilities by 2020 a fully modernized force by 2035 and a worldwide first-class military by midcentury 6 The latter two goals build on the call in China's 2013 defense white 6 paper also issued under Xi for China's armed forces to achieve a status commensurate with China's international standing Viewed in sum Xi's vision for the PLA constitutes a logical outgrowth of CCP instructions to the PLA since 2004 to protect China's expanding development interests at home and abroad The extent to which the PLA can progress in its transformation into a world-class military depends on the favorable resolution of several key issues some of which are longstanding institutional barriers The PLA's traditional identity as a party army with a military culture that is hierarchical and where decisionmaking is top-down and centralized in some ways is incongruous with efforts to professionalize the PLA and imbue it with a culture that values individual decisionmaking and embraces mission delegation The PLA also will need to refine newly established C2 structures to enable the execution of dynamic fast-paced joint military operations and effectively integrate new technologies and processes Perhaps one of the most difficult challenges of the ongoing reforms is that they represent the institutionalization of a cultural shift within the PLA away from its traditional ground-force-centric inward-facing model to one that lays the foundation for coequal professional services capable of joint operations across the globe CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win National Military Overview The People's Liberation Army at a Glance Services Army Navy Air Force Rocket Force Strategic Support Force Personnel Approximately 2 million in regular forces Recruit base Conscription some volunteer Equipment profile Primarily domestic systems heavily influenced by technology derived from other countries modern weaponry in each service some advanced weaponry Core strength Long-range precision strike information warfare nuclear retaliatory capability Developing strengths Maritime power projection special operations The party's perception that China is facing unprecedented security risks is a driving factor in China's approach to national security 7 In May 2015 China's State Council Information Office published a white paper titled China's Military Strategy which outlined how Beijing views the global security environment China's role in that environment and how the PLA supports that role The document presented a vision for the PLA's services and emerging security domains that would transform the PLA from its legacy posture to one focused more on long-range mobility Within the context of Beijing's period of strategic opportunity Beijing calculates in China's Military Strategy that world war is unlikely Authoritative Chinese publications typically avoid explicitly listing direct threats but these threats can be gleaned from several documents that point to Beijing's security concerns 8 Beijing's primary threat perceptions include sovereignty and domestic security issues that it believes could undermine the overriding strategic objective to perpetuate communist rule These include longstanding concerns regarding Taiwan independence Uighur and Tibetan separatism and perceived challenges to China's control of disputed areas in the East and South China Seas Authoritative documents also highlight the Korean Peninsula as an area of instability and uncertainty and express concern regarding unsettled ter- I N T E L L I G E N C E in the immediate future but China should be prepared for the possibility of local war D E F E N S E Threat Perceptions A G E N C Y Key vulnerabilities Logistics rigid command structure joint warfare 7 China s Territorial Claims hf 1 i 0 I nr'h'sl Buy i 5H4qu - I Winn 3th Lluun - H'vu Belated Territories in Diapulaa Map 4 IA In SelectadTaniburiaainDispuw Maritime Claims Map China s Nine Dash line Clabnad by CM fhiwan and Wm Hammad entirely or in pm by mum mm 3mm 5mm and thengopim 9 East China Sea Map Hypothe ul Equidistmt Line I Japan-01m Joint Development Zone Image Source DIA DZ Design Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win move away from the U S -led regional security system and has pursued its own regional security initiatives in support of what it views as a natural transition to regional predominance In today's world the global trends toward multipolarity and economic globalization are intensifying and an information society is rapidly coming into being Countries are increasingly bound together in a community of shared destiny Peace development cooperation and mutual benefit have become an irresistible tide of the times Profound changes are taking place in the international situation as manifested in the historic changes in the balance of power global governance structure Asia-Pacific geostrategic landscape and international competition in the economic scientific and technological and military fields The forces for world peace are on the rise so are the factors against war In the foreseeable future a world war is unlikely and the international situation is expected to remain generally peaceful There are however new threats from hegemonism power politics and neointerventionism International competition for the redistribution of power rights and interests is tending to intensify Terrorist activities are growing increasingly worrisome Hotspot issues such as ethnic religious border and territorial disputes are complex and volatile Small-scale wars conflicts and crises are recurrent in some regions Therefore the world still faces both immediate and potential threats of local wars --Excerpt from China's Military Strategy May 2015 A G E N C Y China's Military Strategy reflects Beijing's drive to establish a coherent unified approach to managing national security in a world where Beijing perceives that China's expanding interests have made it more vulnerable at home and abroad The following excerpt from the document illustrates Beijing's perception of this security environment I N T E L L I G E N C E ritorial disputes along China's border with India which periodically result in tense standoffs like the one that occurred in the summer of 2017 in the disputed Doklam region 9 Finally while it calls for a peer-to-peer cooperative relationship with the United States China also believes that U S military presence and U S -led security architecture in Asia seeks to constrain China's rise and interfere with China's sovereignty particularly in a Taiwan conflict scenario and in the East and South China Seas Since at least the 1990's Beijing has repeatedly communicated its preference to D E F E N S E CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R 9 China's Military Strategy is directed primarily at an internal audience Thus it is replete with party jargon but it does contain the broad underpinnings of China's military decisionmaking calculus For example Beijing sees both threats and opportunities emerging from the evolution of the international community beyond the U S -led unipolar framework toward a more integrated global environment shaped by major-power dynamics Furthermore China sees itself as an emerging major power that will be able to gain influence as long as it can maintain a stable periphery As it emerges Beijing will use its growing power to shape the regional environment in the face of interconnected threats while trying to avoid conflict over core interests sovereignty development and unification More specifically China believes it must plan to address the many threats to regional stability because they are individually complex and at the same time contain a potential for external actors most importantly the United States to become involved Nevertheless China must also look to safeguard its international interests as they multiply and incur additional threats Finally as new threats emerge and as other militaries adjust their acquisition strategies and structure China knows the PLA must be prepared to fight in new realms and adapt to the modern high-tech battlefield With a generally favorable external environment China will remain in an important period of strategic opportunities for its development a period in which much can be achieved China's comprehensive national strength core competitiveness and risk-resistance capacity are notably increasing and China enjoys growing international standing and influence Domestically the Chinese people's standard of living has remarkably improved and Chinese society remains stable China as a large developing country still faces multiple and complex security threats as well as increasing external impediments and challenges Subsistence and development security concerns as well as traditional and nontraditional security threats are interwoven Therefore China has an arduous task to safeguard its national unification territorial integrity and development interests As the world economic and strategic center of gravity is shifting ever more rapidly to the Asia-Pacific region the U S carries on its 'rebalancing' strategy and enhances its military presence and its military alliances in this region Japan is sparing no effort to dodge the postwar mechanism overhauling its military and security policies Such development has caused grave concerns among other countries in the region On the issues concerning China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests some of its offshore neighbors take provocative actions and reinforce their military presence on China's reefs and islands 10 CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win --Excerpt from China's Military Strategy May 2015 I N T E L L I G E N C E The world revolution in military affairs RMA is proceeding to a new stage Long-range precise smart stealthy and unmanned weapons and equipment are becoming increasingly sophisticated Outer space and cyberspace have become new commanding heights in strategic competition among all parties The form of war is accelerating its evolution to informatization World major powers are actively adjusting their national security strategies and defense policies and speeding up their military transformation and force restructuring The aforementioned revolutionary changes in military technologies and the form of war have not only had a significant impact on the international political and military landscapes but also posed new and severe challenges to China's military security D E F E N S E The Taiwan issue bears on China's reunification and long-term development and reunification is an inevitable trend in the course of national rejuvenation In recent years cross- Taiwan Strait relations have sustained a sound momentum of peaceful development but the root cause of instability has not yet been removed and the 'Taiwan independence' separatist forces and their activities are still the biggest threat to the peaceful development of cross-strait relations Further China faces a formidable task to maintain political security and social stability Separatist forces for 'East Turkistan independence' and 'Tibet independence' have inflicted serious damage particularly with escalating violent terrorist activities by East Turkistan independence forces Besides anti-China forces have never given up their attempt to instigate a 'color revolution' in this country Consequently China faces more challenges in terms of national security and social stability With the growth of China's national interests its national security is more vulnerable to international and regional turmoil terrorism piracy serious natural disasters and epidemics and the security of overseas interests concerning energy and resources strategic sea lines of communication SLOCs as well as institutions personnel and assets abroad has become an imminent issue A G E N C Y that they have illegally occupied Some external countries are also busy meddling in South China Sea affairs a tiny few maintain constant close-in air and sea surveillance and reconnaissance against China It is thus a longstanding task for China to safeguard its maritime rights and interests Certain disputes over land territory are still smoldering The Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia are shrouded in instability and uncertainty Regional terrorism separatism and extremism are rampant All these have a negative impact on the security and stability along China's periphery 11 National Security Strategy Making progress while maintaining stability --Xi Jinping in his address to the 19th Party Congress10 China's leaders see China as a country that is moving closer to center stage to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation 11 This ambition permeates China's national security strategy and the PLA's role in supporting the party Since the early 1980s when China initiated its Reform and Opening policy China's economy has grown rapidly The CCP remained focused primarily on economic growth throughout the 1980s and 1990s and in the early 2000s it identified the initial decades of the 21st century as a period of strategic opportunity in the international environment that would allow China to focus on building comprehensive national power The CCP's contemporary strategic objectives are to o Perpetuate CCP rule o Maintain domestic stability o Sustain economic growth and development o Defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity o Secure China's status as a great power China has taken deliberate steps to modernize the CCP its military the government and other institutions in an attempt to improve coherence Before 2015 departments across 12 the government formulated separate security strategies but in early 2015 China's leaders adopted China's first publicly released national security strategy outline a framework to guide China's approach to addressing both domestic and international security threats and called for international engagement to address shared security problems 12 The strategy outlines Beijing's aim to ensure security promote modernization as well as preserve China's socialist system In addition to the strategic objectives above the document emphasized the necessity of contributing to world peace and development and called for attention to promoting rule of law in support of national security 13 This led the National People's Congress to pass a package of laws in 2015 and 2016 intended to address national security concerns including harsher punishments for crimes involving terrorism and extremism cybersecurity measures and increased restrictions for foreign nongovernmental organizations 14 15 Although China's national security strategy outline contained both inward- and outward-looking elements Beijing's view of China's role in the international community was further elaborated in an article on Xi Jinping's thoughts on diplomacy published in mid-2017 by one of Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win China's Military Strategy built on a series of biennial defense reviews that Beijing published beginning in 1998 to mitigate international concern about the lack of transparency of its military modernization What differentiated the document from its predecessors was that it for the first time publicly clarified the PLA's role in protecting China's evolving national security interests and shed light on policies such as the PLA's commitment to nuclear deterrence The report affirmed many of China's longstanding defense policies but also signaled a shift toward emerging security domains such as cyber and space and also emphasized the need to focus on global maritime operations The report outlined eight strategic tasks or types of missions the PLA must be ready to execute 17 o Safeguard the sovereignty of China's territory o Safeguard national unification o Safeguard China's overseas interests o Maintain strategic deterrence o Participate in international security cooperation o Maintain China's political security and social stability o Conduct emergency rescue disaster relief and rights and interest protection missions Beijing almost certainly views these missions as necessary national security tasks for China to claim great-power status In 2017 Beijing emphasized several of these tasks in its White Paper on China's Policies on Asia Pacific Security Cooperation stressing the need for a PLA that is able to conduct expeditionary operations and other activities to defend and secure growing Chinese national interests overseas from destabilizing and uncertain factors 18 The PLA coordinates with China's law enforcement Foreign Ministry and other security entities as needed on military-related activities particularly operations beyond China's borders Military Leadership China's military leaders are influential in defense and foreign policy As the CCP's armed wing the PLA is organizationally part of the party apparatus Career military officers for the most part are party members and units at the company level and above have political offi- A G E N C Y The PLA's Role in National Security o Safeguard China's interests in new domains such as space and cyberspace I N T E L L I G E N C E China's top diplomats Yang Jiechi Yang paints a picture of Chinese diplomacy that focuses on China's ambition for national rejuvenation and becoming a world power Yang describes a confident China that is ready to shoulder its responsibility as a major country and build a global network of partnerships but one that is resolved and uncompromising as it upholds its sovereignty and security interests 16 D E F E N S E CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R 13 cers responsible for personnel decisions propaganda and counterintelligence These political officers also are responsible for ensuring that party orders are carried out throughout the PLA CCP committees led by the political officers and military commanders make major decisions in units at all levels 19 The CMC the PLA's highest decisionmaking body is technically both a party organ subordinate to the CCP Central Committee and a governmental office appointed by the National People's Congress but it is staffed almost exclusively by military officers The CMC chairman is a civilian who usually serves concurrently as the CCP general secretary and China's president During the past decade the CMC's membership has included two military vice chairmen who serve concurrently on the politburo the minister of national defense who serves as the face of the military for foreign engagement the service commanders and the directors of the four general headquarters departments This framework occasionally shifts it was revised during the 19th Party Congress in October 2017 at which Xi Jinping CCP General Secretary President and Central Military Commission Chairman Image Source Shutterstock 14 CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win point the service chiefs were removed from the body leaving the chairman vice chairmen minister of national defense Joint Staff Department chief Political Work Department director and Discipline Inspection Commis- sion secretary 20 21 These changes align the military's top body to its postreform structure and underscore key themes of jointness party loyalty and anticorruption I N T E L L I G E N C E D E F E N S E Image Source DIA D3 Design A G E N C Y People's Liberation Army's Organizational Structure 22 23 15 Political Work in the PLA The PLA has been a politicized party army since its inception and exists to guarantee the CCP regime's survival above all else serving the state as a secondary role in contrast to most Western militaries which are considered apolitical professional forces that first and foremost serve the state Maintaining this party-military identity even as the PLA embarks on major structural reforms is the top priority for China's leadership PLA reforms include establishment of the Political Work Department which appears to have assumed many responsibilities of the former General Political Department The PLA's political work system is the primary means through which the CCP controls the gun in accordance with Mao Zedong's famous dictum that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun Most PLA officers are party members and in recent decades PLA officers typically have constituted about 20 percent of the CCP's Central Committee Moreover since 1997 the two uniformed vice chairmen of the CMC have served concurrently on the CCP Politburo o The tiers of political work in the PLA are interlocking reinforcing systems that allow the CCP to penetrate the military from top to bottom These tiers comprise the political commissar system the party committee system and the party discipline inspection system o Political commissars are responsible for personnel education security discipline and morale The Political Work Department the director of which serves on the CMC manages the PLA's political commissars and is the locus for day-to-day political work in the military o The party committee system is replicated in some fashion at each level of command Party committees fall under the supervision of the CMC Political Work Department and are intended to ensure loyalty at all levels They propagate the party positions policies and directives throughout the force o Party discipline inspection bodies monitor the performance of party members in the military and ensure upright behavior The PLA Central Discipline Inspection Commission CDIC was elevated to the CMC level during recent restructuring from its previous position as a subordinate office within the former General Political Department 24 These changes culminated with the CDIC head's appointment as a member of the CMC during the 19th Party Congress The CDIC has played a key role within the military in recent years overseeing investigations to weed out graft and uproot politically powerful networks in the ranks as part of China's ongoing anticorruption campaign In November 2015 Xi also announced the creation of a new PLA Politics and Law Commission mirroring a similar party organization that oversees legal and judicial issues in the state bureaucracy 25 16 CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win Stability Issues We must do more to safeguard China's sovereignty security and development interests and staunchly oppose all attempts to split China or undermine its ethnic unity and social harmony and stability -Xi Jinping speech at the 19th Party Congress Xi Jinping Beijing has responded to these challenges with a mixture of increased repression and CCP-led efforts to address some of these underlying problems Xi is using the CCP to assert control over all facets of the Chinese state restricting the space for independent activity across social political and economic spheres D E F E N S E I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y China's leaders for decades have prioritized domestic stability and the continued rule of the CCP Since the 1990s however China has confronted chronic social protest spurred by an often unresponsive and corrupt political and legal system and a range of economic social and environmental problems Under President People's Armed Police in formation during antiterrorism drill for the 2008 Beijing Olympics Image Source AFP 17 This push includes a sweeping anticorruption campaign a faithfully propagandistic media a tightly constrained civil society and an all-encompassing concept of national security 26 In ethnic minority regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang the CCP has promulgated repressive regulations against alleged extremism by tightening limits on peaceful religious expression and ethnic identity Beginning in April 2017 Xinjiang authorities detained hundreds of thousands possibly millions of Muslims in the region ostensibly for antiextremism reeducation As part of the Xinjiang campaign security officials greatly expanded their use of high-tech and big-data surveillance systems which they are expected to extend countrywide in an effort to curb social unrest 27 China's armed forces support the CCP's domestic ambitions without question In 2015 top military guidance reaffirmed this role as one of the force's main strategic tasks maintain China's political security and social stability 28 China's military and paramilitary leaders are actively developing doctrine and forces to backstop local police respond to riots and natural disasters and stop terrorism 18 The People's Armed Police PAP is at the forefront of this mission The PAP is a paramilitary force of more than 500 000 troops that for decades has focused on domestic security and economic development tasks under the shared command of the CMC and State Council In 2018 Beijing moved the PAP entirely under CMC control and out of civilian channels and announced additional reforms intended to modernize its force structure streamline its command system and increase its operational effectiveness 29 Changes to the PAP also reflect a shift toward a more operational mindset trading legacy site-security missions for rapid-deployment counterterrorism and maritime patrols 30 In recent years Beijing's longstanding suspicion that so-called hostile foreign influences constitute a significant threat to internal stability and CCP rule has led it to step up efforts to pursue political security-related goals overseas In 2015 China passed a counterterrorism law that included a provision authorizing PLA PAP police and intelligence operations abroad--evidence that party leaders are considering this possibility 31 CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win External Defense Relations In the spirit of neighborhood diplomacy of friendship sincerity reciprocity and inclusiveness China's armed forces will further develop relations with their counterparts in neighboring countries Also they will work to raise the level of military relations with European counterparts and continue the traditional friendly military ties with their African Latin American and Southern Pacific counterparts China's armed forces will work to further defense and security cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and continue to participate in multilateral dialogues and cooperation mechanisms such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus ASEAN Regional Forum Shangri-La Dialogue Jakarta International Defence Dialogue and Western Pacific Naval Symposium The Chinese military will continue to host multilateral events like the Xiangshan Forum striving to establish a new framework for security and cooperation conducive to peace stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region China advances its day-to-day overseas military diplomacy using PLA officers assigned as military attaches in at least 110 countries 32 As China's regional and international interests have grown the PLA has substantially expanded its international engagement especially in the areas of peacekeeping operations PKOs counterpiracy humanitarian assistance and disaster relief HADR counterterrorism and multinational combined exercises For example many Latin American and Caribbean countries send officers to I N T E L L I G E N C E China's military attaches serve as military advisers to the ambassador support Ministry of Foreign Affairs and PLA foreign policy objectives and perform a variety of duties tied to PLA military and security cooperation including counterpart exchanges with host nation and third-country personnel Expanded PLA travel abroad enables PLA officers to observe and study foreign military command structures unit formations and operational training 33 D E F E N S E The PLA engages with foreign militaries to demonstrate its growing capabilities improve its tactics techniques and procedures enhance China's image and influence abroad and further China's diplomatic objectives Bilateral and multilateral exercises provide political benefits to China and opportunities for the PLA to improve capabilities in areas such as counterterrorism mobility operations and logistics Senior-level visits and exchanges provide China with opportunities to increase military officers' international exposure communicate China's positions to foreign audiences understand alternative worldviews and advance foreign relations through interpersonal contacts and military assistance programs A G E N C Y --Excerpt from China's Military Strategy May 2015 19 PLA soldiers conduct individual movement training Image Source DIMOC the strategic-level College of Defense Studies at China's National Defense University some of these countries also send officers to other PLA schools In addition to furthering PLA modernization these engagements probably will remain focused on building China's political ties explaining China's rise and building China's international influence particularly in Asia Africa and Latin America 34 Defense Budget China's approach to funding security requirements has been deliberate and substantial China's military spending increased by an average of 10 percent inflation adjusted per year from 2000 to 2016 and has gradually slowed to 20 5- to 7-percent growth during the past 2 years The official defense budget has remained at 1 2 to 1 4 percent of gross domestic product for the past decade allowing for steady sustainable expenditure growth and qualitative improvements throughout the PLA Estimating actual military expenses is difficult because of China's poor accounting transparency and incomplete transition to a market economy The formal defense budget process does not include funding for foreign weapons procurement some research and development R D and certain personnel benefits Other government ministries distribute defense funds in addition to extrabudgetary funds that supplement personnel living subsidies equipment maintenance and other budgetary items 35 36 Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R However using 2018 prices and exchange rates as an example China's total military-related spending for 2018 probably exceeded $200 billion a threefold increase since 2002 Such spending has been on the rise since the 1990s when China formally began to emphasize defense-related programs throughout the course of several Five-Year Plans Although the total dollar value of China's defense budget remains significantly below that of the United States China has benefited from latecomer advantage In other words China has not had to invest in costly R D of new technologies to the same degree as the United States Rather China has routinely adopted the best and most effective platforms found in foreign militaries through direct purchase retrofits or theft of intellectual property By doing so China has been able to focus on expediting its military modernization at a small fraction of the original cost China's Official Defense Spending 2007-2018 billions of 2018 dollars 1 3 2007 2008 1 4 1 2 1 2 1 2 2011 2012 2013 1 3 2009 2010 Real defense expenditures Billions 2018 USD Adjusted for Inflation 131 5 138 6 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 # % of GDP A G E N C Y 85 2 1 3 109 5 101 6 170 4 I N T E L L I G E N C E 77 8 97 2 156 9 D E F E N S E Image Source DIA D3 Design 92 9 114 9 149 2 21 C hina's military goal is to build a strong combat-effective force capable of winning regional conflicts and employing integrated real-time C2 networks 37 The doctrine that supports this strategy is evolving with ongoing PLA reforms For instance in 2017 the PLA began to implement revised military training regulations that focused on realistic training for modern warfare and preparations for joint combat operations 38 China characterizes its military strategy as one of active defense a concept it describes as strategically defensive but operationally offensive The strategy is rooted in the concept that once Beijing has determined that an adversary has damaged or intends to damage China's interests at the strategic level Beijing will be justified in responding defensively at the operational or tactical level even if the adversary has not yet conducted offensive military operations Beijing interprets active defense to include mandates for deescalating a conflict and seizing the initiative during a conflict and has enshrined the concept in China's National Security Law 2015 and in the PLA's I N T E L L I G E N C E Military Doctrine and Strategy D E F E N S E Jiangkai II class frigate Hengshui conducting gunnery exercise A G E N C Y Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win Image Source DIMOC CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R 23 major strategy documents 39 President Xi's speech during the 90th anniversary parade of the PLA further highlighted that China would never conduct invasion and expansion but would never permit any piece of Chinese territory to separate from China 40 China's approach to its dispute with Japan over the Senkaku Islands partially illustrates this concept China has employed both military and law enforcement assets proactively to challenge Japan's administration of the islands since Beijing determined that Japan's purchase of the islands from a private owner in 2012 constituted a serious infringement on China's sovereignty claims Although the PLA has not yet carried out kinetic strikes on Japanese forces around the islands China's active defense concept could potentially justify such attacks if Beijing perceived Japan to have further escalated the dispute 24 and using information to conduct joint military operations across the domains of land sea air space cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum during a conflict PLA writings highlight the benefit of near-real-time shared awareness of the battlefield in enabling quick unified effort to seize tactical opportunities 41 Perceptions of Modern Conflict In 2015 China's leaders adjusted guidance on the type of war the PLA should be prepared to fight by directing the PLA to be capable of fighting and winning informatized local wars with an emphasis on maritime military struggle Chinese military strategy documents also emphasize the growing importance of offensive air operations long-distance mobility operations and space and cyber operations In other words China expects that its future wars mostly will be fought outside its borders and will involve conflict in the maritime domain China promulgated this through its most recent update to its military strategic guidelines the top-level directives that China's leaders use to define concepts assess threats and set priorities for planning force posture and modernization 42 The PLA often uses the term informatization to describe the transformation process of becoming a modern military that can operate in the digital age The concept figures prominently in PLA writings and is roughly analogous to the U S military's concept of net-centric capability a force's ability to use advanced information technology and communications systems to gain operational advantage over an adversary The PLA uses the term informatized warfare to describe the process of acquiring transmitting processing The PLA considers information the critical enabler for these maritime-focused digital-age operations and as a result China invests heavily in the development and proliferation of intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance equipment force structure and a universal network that processes information across all of its operational domains These domains include C2 comprehensive support multidimensional protection joint firepower strike and battlefield maneuver Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win Consequently core elements of national- and regional-level military reforms since 2015 have focused on refining the PLA's C2 structure producing a joint operational command system with decisionmaking emanating from the CMC to theater commands and down to operational units 45 46 The reform plan aimed to establish two clear lines of authority under the CMC giving the services authority over force management issues while empowering theater headquarters to command operations--a distinction that had been ambiguous 47 One aspect of the new structure that is different from previous Chinese Core Elements of Command and Control Reform Theater Commands The PLA transitioned from seven military regions to five theaters of operations or joint commands 48 This structure is aligned toward Beijing's perceived strategic directions geographic areas of strategic importance along China's periphery in which the PLA must be prepared to operate Joint Operations Command Centers The cornerstone of the military's new joint C2 system is the PLA's national- and theater-level joint operations command centers JOCCs staffed by personnel drawn from all services The national-level joint operations command center also known as the CMC JOCC coordinates the efforts of the five theater commands to achieve the PLA's strategic objectives The theater-level JOCCs are responsible for all tasks in their area of responsibility including carrying out around-the-clock watch functions maintaining situational awareness managing joint exercises and providing a communications hub linking theater commanders with service component commanders and forces 49 A G E N C Y A key driver of ongoing military reforms is Beijing's desire to increase the PLA's ability to carry out joint operations on a modern high-tech battlefield 43 Prior to reforms no permanent joint C2 mechanism existed In fact service headquarters had operational authority over their own forces during peacetime and the former Army-centric military regions were responsible for conducting joint operations during wartime although this was never attempted This construct was impractical because it would have forced the PLA to transition from a service-oriented peacetime construct to a war-ready joint construct on a moment's notice Senior leaders recognized this flaw and President Xi remarked in 2013 that establishing a joint C2 system should be given primary importance and establishing a CMC and theater command joint C2 system should not be delayed 44 military C2 is the permanence of operational C2 which eliminates the need to create ad hoc wartime commands This system theoretically gives China the ability to quickly transition to a war footing Speaking on behalf of the PLA a Ministry of National Defense spokesman said reforms sought to improve leadership administration and command of joint operations so that the PLA would have a force structure able to fight and win modern conflicts I N T E L L I G E N C E National Military Command and Control D E F E N S E CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R 25 Image Source DIA D3 Design Theaters of Operation According to China's Ministry of National Defense the Theater of Operations construct will enhance combat effectiveness Joint Staff Department During PLA reforms the CMC dissolved the former General Staff Department establishing a number of CMC-subordinate departments from the former organization According to the Ministry of National Defense the Joint Staff 26 Department JSD is responsible for combat planning C2 support and formulating strategy and requirements 50 The formation of the CMC JSD is likely to result in more streamlined and efficient operational planning because other former General Staff Depart- Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win China continues to place a high priority on modernizing the PLA's command control communications computers intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance C4ISR system as a response to trends in modern warfare that emphasize the importance of rapid decisionmaking and information sharing and processing The PLA is seeking to improve its technological capabilities and organizational structure to command complex joint operations in near and distant battlefields with increasingly sophisticated weapons 52 Supporting the reforms with technological improvements to C4ISR systems is essential to improving the speed and effectiveness of decisionmaking while providing secure reliable communications to fixed and mobile command posts The PLA is fielding advanced automated command systems such as its Integrated Command Platform with units at lower echelons across the force The adoption of the Integrated Command Platform enables multiservice communications necessary for joint operations --Excerpt from China's Military Strategy May 2015 New technologies which are being introduced into the PLA enable sharing of information-- intelligence battlefield information logistic information and weather reports--on robust redundant communication networks to improve commanders' situational awareness In particular the transmission of intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance ISR data in near-real time to commanders in the field could facilitate the commanders' decisionmaking processes and make operations more efficient 53 As these technical improvements are brought on line they greatly enhance the PLA's flexibility and responsiveness Informatized operations no longer require in-person meetings for command decisionmaking or labor-intensive processes for execution Commanders can issue A G E N C Y Modernizing Joint Command and Control In the implementation of the military strategic guideline in the new situation China's armed forces must closely center around the CPC's Communist Party's goal of building a strong military respond to the state's core security needs aim at building an informatized military and winning informatized wars deepen the reform of national defense and the armed forces in an all-round way build a modern system of military forces with Chinese characteristics and constantly enhance their capabilities for addressing various security threats and accomplishing diversified military tasks I N T E L L I G E N C E ment functions such as mobilization training and administration have been assumed by separate departments The JSD is purported to have greater representation from across the PLA's services potentially enhancing joint operational planning and execution 51 D E F E N S E CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R 27 orders to multiple units at the same time while on the move and units can rapidly adjust their actions through the use of digital databases and command automation tools The nature of these reform and modernization efforts in part resembles a Western-style joint C2 structure in which operational commanders develop force packages from units that are trained and equipped by the services The creation of a permanent joint C2 structure that places more emphasis on naval and aerospace forces along with a dedicated Strategic Support Force responsible for electronic warfare and operations in the space and cyberspace domains reflects an emerging PLA capacity to more effectively execute joint operations 54 PLA Navy sailors manning an Integrated Command Platform command post Image Source DIMOC 28 Regional and Global Operations Even as PLA capabilities have improved and units have begun to operate farther from the Chinese mainland Beijing has continued to emphasize what it perceives as a period of strategic opportunity during which it can pursue development without a major military conflict In line with this perception Beijing has implemented an approach to external engagement that seeks to enhance China's reach and power through activities calculated to fall below the threshold of alarming the international community about China's rise or provoking the United States its allies and partners or others in the Asia-Pacific region into military conflict or an anti-China coalition This is particularly evident in China's pursuit of its territorial and maritime sovereignty claims in the South and East China Seas In the South China Sea China primarily uses maritime law enforcement ships with its Navy ships in protective positions to pressure other claimants and limit access to Chinese-occupied features China's expansion of disputed features and construction in the Spratly Islands using large-scale land reclamation demonstrates China's capacity--and a shift in willingness to exercise that capacity short of military conflict--to strengthen China's control over disputed areas enhance China's presence and challenge other claimants 55 Image Source DIMOC China's maritime emphasis and concern with protecting its overseas interests have increasingly drawn the PLA beyond China's borders and immediate periphery The evolving focus of the PLA Navy PLAN -- from offshore waters defense to a mix of offshore waters defense and open-seas protection --reflects China's desire for a wider operational reach Since 2009 the PLA has incrementally expanded its global operations beyond the previously limited port calls and UN PKO missions The PLAN has expanded the scope and frequency of extended-range naval deployments military exercises and engagements The establishment in Djibouti of the PLA's first overseas military base with a deployed company of Marines and equipment and probable follow-on bases at other locations signals a turning point in the expansion of PLA operations in the Indian Ocean region and beyond 56 57 58 59 These bases and other improvements to the PLA's ability to project power during the next decade will increase China's ability to deter by military force and sustain operations abroad I N T E L L I G E N C E Luhai class destroyer Shenzhen A G E N C Y Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win D E F E N S E CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R 29 Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win Core Chinese Military Capabilities W hereas the PLA of Mao's era was ground-force-centric and lacked most modern capabilities such as mechanized troop transportation investments in modernization have expanded China's military capabilities across all warfare domains Today's PLA is still far from being able to deploy large numbers of conventional forces globally but China has developed nuclear space cyberspace and other capabilities that can reach potential adversaries across the globe I N T E L L I G E N C E PLAN helicopter operating near the Jiangkai II class Hengshui D E F E N S E Image Source DIMOC A G E N C Y CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R 31 The First and Second Island Chains East China Sea Philippine Sea South China Sea First island chain Second island chain -- - 32 Image Source DIA D3 Design Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win Although Beijing states that its intent is to serve as a stabilizing force regionally in practice the PLA's actions frequently result in increased tensions Since 2012 Beijing has routinely challenged Tokyo's Senkaku Island claims in the East China Sea China's Coast Guard frequently conducts incursions into the contiguous zone surrounding the islands to further China's claims while its Navy operates around the claims to enforce administra- Examples of incremental improvements to PLA power projection in the region are readily found in annual military exercises and operations 60 For instance in 2015 the PLA Air Force PLAAF carried out four exercise training missions past the first island chain through the Bashi Channel the northernmost passage of the Luzon Strait and through the Miyako Strait closer to Japan The Miyako Strait flights were 1 500 kilometers from Guam within range of the PLAAF's CJ-20 air-launched land-attack cruise missile LACM 61 Also in 2015 the PLAAF began flying the H-6K medium-range bomber the PLAAF's first aircraft capable of conducting strikes on Guam with air-launched LACMs like the CJ-20 past the first island chain into the western Pacific China is also developing new capabilities that will enhance Beijing's ability to project power In September 2016 then-PLAAF Commander Gen Ma Xiaotian confirmed for the first time that the PLAAF was developing a new long-range bomber that would undoubtedly exceed the range and capabilities of the H-6K Although the H-6K recently began flying with LACMs this Chinese-built airframe is the 10th design variant of the Soviet Tu-16 which began flying in 1952 62 In 2016 China and Ukraine agreed to restart production of the world's largest transport aircraft the An-225 A G E N C Y Beijing's longstanding interest to eventually compel Taiwan's reunification with the mainland and deter any attempt by Taiwan to declare independence has served as the primary driver for China's military modernization Beijing's anticipation that foreign forces would intervene in a Taiwan scenario led the PLA to develop a range of systems to deter and deny foreign regional force projection The implementation of Hu's New Historic Missions in 2004 led to the incremental expansion of the military's modernization priorities to develop a PLA capable of operating in new domains and at increasing distances from the mainland During this modernization process PLA ground air naval and missile forces have become increasingly able to project power during peacetime and in the event of regional conflicts Beijing almost certainly will use this growing ability to project power to bolster international perceptions of its role as a regional power and global stakeholder tion The PLA has expanded and militarized China's outposts in the South China Sea and China's Coast Guard backed by the PLAN commonly harasses Philippine and Vietnamese ships in the region I N T E L L I G E N C E Power Projection and Expeditionary Operations D E F E N S E CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R 33 which is capable of carrying a world-record payload of nearly 254 tons China expects the first An-225 to be delivered and operational by 2019 63 If used by the military this capability would facilitate the PLA's global reach In addition to land-based aircraft China is currently building its first domestically designed and produced aircraft carrier 64 The primary purpose of this first domestic aircraft carrier will be to serve a regional defense mission Beijing probably also will use the carrier to project power throughout the South China Sea and possibly into the Indian Ocean 65 The carrier conducted initial sea trials in May 2018 and is expected to enter into service by 2019 66 For more information on China's aircraft carrier program please see Appendix B Other areas that reflect China's growing military presence abroad include China's participation in UN peacekeeping operations 67 Separately China routinely employs its modern hospital ship Peace Ark to support HADR missions worldwide In 2015 the PLA conducted its first permissive noncombatant evacuation operation to extricate Chinese and other civilians from Yemen supported by Yemeni security forces China's efforts to enhance its presence abroad such as establishing its first foreign military base in Djibouti and boosting economic connectivity by reinvigorating the New Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Road under the Belt and Road Initiative BRI could enable the PLA to project power 34 at even greater distances from the Chinese mainland 68 69 70 In 2017 China's leaders said that the BRI which at first included economic initiatives in Asia South Asia Africa and Europe now encompasses all regions of the world including the Arctic and Latin America demonstrating the scope of Beijing's ambition Growing PLA mission areas and enhanced presence abroad may lead to an increase in demand for the PLA to protect China's overseas interests and provide support to Chinese personnel China's increased presence also introduces the possibility that the PLA could play a more prominent role in delivering global public goods in the future PLAN Anwei class hospital ship Heping Fangzhou Peace Ark Image Source DIMOC CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win D E F E N S E Image Source DIA D3 Design I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y China's Southern Theater Forces China's Southern Theater forces are arrayed to support multiple contingencies 35 Separately China's modern naval platforms include advanced missile and technological capabilities that will strengthen the force's core warfighting competencies and enable credible combat operations beyond the reaches of land-based defenses The expansion of naval operations beyond China's immediate vicinity will provide China with a diverse set of capabilities for striking targets across the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions in addition to improving defensive capabilities such as exercising control of SLOCs Improving bluewater capabilities will extend China's maritime security buffer to protect China's near- and far-seas interests more effectively China's current aircraft carrier and planned follow-on carriers will extend air defense umbrellas beyond the range of coastal systems and help enable task group operations in far seas Sea-based land attack probably is an emerging requirement for the PLAN Chinese military experts argue that to pursue a defensive strategy in far seas the PLAN must improve its ability to control land from the sea through development of a long-range LACM 71 The PLA's land-based missile and air forces enable other military assets to focus on con- ducting offensive missions such as blockades and sovereignty enforcement as well as defensive operations farther from China's shores China also focuses on enhancing the PLA's ISR capabilities which will enable improved targeting and timely responses to perceived threats Nuclear Forces and Weapons China invests considerable resources to maintain a limited survivable nuclear force that can guarantee a damaging retaliatory strike 72 73 As part of this China has long maintained a no first use NFU policy stating it would use nuclear forces only in response to a nuclear strike against China 74 75 76 There is some ambiguity however over the conditions under which China's NFU policy would apply Some PLA officers have written publicly of the need to spell out conditions under which China might need to use nuclear weapons first for example if an enemy's conventional attack threatened the survival of China's nuclear force or of the regime itself 77 Nevertheless there has been no indication that national leaders are willing to attach such nuances and caveats to China's NFU doctrine The nuclear force is a strategic cornerstone for safeguarding national sovereignty and security China has always pursued the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and adhered to a self-defensive nuclear strategy China unconditionally will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or in nuclear-weapons-free zones and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country 36 CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win China will optimize its nuclear force structure improve strategic early warning command and control missile penetration rapid reaction and survivability and protection and deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China China maintains a stockpile of nuclear warheads and continues research on and development and production of new nuclear weapons 88 The PLA probably has multiple nuclear warhead designs that are decades old and require routine observation maintenance or refurbishment to maintain effectiveness 89 China's nuclear weapon design and production organization--the China Academy of Engineering Physics--is the key organization in developing and maintaining China's nuclear force 90 It employs tens of thousands of personnel and its scientists are capable of conducting all aspects of nuclear weapon design research including nuclear physics materials science electronics explosives and computer modeling 91 92 I N T E L L I G E N C E PLA writings express the value of a launch on warning nuclear posture an approach to deterrence that uses heightened readiness improved surveillance and streamlined decisionmaking processes to enable a more rapid response to enemy attack These writings highlight the posture's consistency with China's NFU policy China is working to develop a space-based early warning capability that could support this posture in the future 84 The PLA is developing a range of technologies to counter U S and other countries' ballistic missile defense systems including maneuverable reentry vehicles MARVs MIRVs decoys chaff jamming thermal shielding and hypersonic glide vehicles 85 86 87 In addition the PLA is likely to continue deploying more sophisticated C2 systems and refining C2 processes as growing numbers of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles ICBMs and future nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine SSBN deterrence patrols require the PLA to safeguard the integrity of nuclear release authority for a larger more dispersed force D E F E N S E China is developing a new generation of mobile missiles with warheads consisting of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles MIRVs and penetration aids intended to ensure the viability of its strategic deterrent in the face of continued advances in U S and to a lesser extent Russian strategic ISR precision strike and missile defense capabilities 78 China is enhancing peacetime readiness levels for these nuclear forces to ensure responsiveness China maintains nuclear-capable delivery systems in its Rocket Force and Navy As of 2017 the Air Force had been reassigned a nuclear mission probably with a developmental strategic bomber 79 80 81 82 83 The bomber's deployment would provide China with its first credible nuclear triad of delivery systems dispersed across land sea and air--a posture considered since the Cold War to improve survivability and strategic deterrence A G E N C Y --Excerpts from China's Military Strategy May 2015 37 Image Source DIA D3 Design China Nuclear Weapon-Related Facilities China's nuclear weapons program has been supported by a number of facilities that include production processing research and development and testing 38 Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win China has consistently claimed that it has never researched produced or possessed biological weapons and would never do so 97 Beijing says China has researched only defensive biological technology necessary for China's defense 98 China acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention BWC in 1984 99 It declared the Academy of Military Science's Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology in Beijing as a biodefense research facility 100 China regularly and voluntarily submits to confidence-building measures under the BWC 101 Although China is not a member of the Australia Group China's export control regulations have been in line with Australia Group guidelines and control lists since 2002 102 103 China's biotechnology infrastructure is sufficient to produce some biological agents or toxins on a large scale 104 105 106 --Excerpt from the Australia Group's website China has declared that it once operated a small chemical weapons program for offensive purposes however Beijing has consistently maintained that the program was dismantled and all agents and munitions were used before China ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention CWC in 1997 107 Beijing also has declared two historical chemical warfare production facilities that may have produced mustard gas phosgene and lewisite 108 109 In 1998 Beijing published chemical export control regulations consistent with Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons OPCW standards It also has consistently updated its chemical control list to reflect changes made to the Australia Group chemical control list China continues to reaffirm its compliance with the CWC as well as its support for the activities conducted by the OPCW 110 111 112 Since acceding to the CWC China has declared hundreds of dualuse facilities and has hosted hundreds of facility inspections and OPCW-led seminars 113 114 A G E N C Y Biological and Chemical Warfare The Australia Group AG is an informal forum of countries which through the harmonisation of export controls seeks to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons Coordination of national export control measures assists Australia Group participants to fulfil their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to the fullest extent possible I N T E L L I G E N C E China has the required industrial capacity to enrich uranium and produce plutonium for military needs The China National Nuclear Corporation operates several uranium enrichment facilities organized under three plants 93 China probably intends the bulk of its enrichment capacity to support its burgeoning nuclear power industry but could devote some enrichment capacity to support military needs 94 China's plutonium production reactors probably ceased operation in the 1980s 95 However China's reprocessing facilities can extract plutonium from spent reactor fuel 96 D E F E N S E CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R 39 China's chemical infrastructure is sufficient to research develop and produce some chemical agents on a large scale 115 cal expertise military units and equipment necessary to detect CBW agents and to defend against a CBW attack 117 China probably has the technical expertise to weaponize chemical and biological warfare CBW agents and China's robust armaments industry and numerous conventional weapon systems including missiles rockets and artillery probably could be adapted to deliver CBW agents 116 China has the techni- Entities and individuals in China continue to supply countries of concern with technologies components and raw materials applicable to weapons of mass destruction and missile programs Such material and technology transfers could assist countries in developing their own production capabilities 118 Space Counterspace Outer space has become a commanding height in international strategic competition Countries concerned are developing their space forces and instruments and the first signs of weaponization of outer space have appeared China has all along advocated the peaceful use of outer space opposed the weaponization of and arms race in outer space and taken an active part in international space cooperation China will keep abreast of the dynamics of outer space deal with security threats and challenges in that domain and secure its space assets to serve its national economic and social development and maintain outer space security --Excerpt from China's Military Strategy May 2015 The PLA historically has managed China's space program and continues to invest in improving China's capabilities in space-based ISR satellite communication satellite navigation and meteorology as well as human spaceflight and robotic space exploration 119 China uses its on-orbit and ground-based assets to support national civil economic political and military goals and objectives Strategists in the PLA regard the ability to use space-based systems and deny them to adversaries as central to enabling modern informatized warfare As a result the PLA continues to strengthen its mil- 40 itary space capabilities despite its public stance against the militarization of space Space operations probably will form an integral component of other PLA campaigns and serve a key role in enabling actions to counter third-party intervention during military conflicts China continues to develop a variety of counterspace capabilities designed to limit or prevent an adversary's use of space-based assets during crisis or conflict In addition to the research and possible development of satellite jammers and directed-energy weapons China has prob- Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win Space and counterspace capabilities--like missile forces advanced air and seapower and cyber capabilities--are critical for China to fight and win modern military engagements To support various requirements China has built a vast ground and maritime infrastructure enabling spacecraft and space launch vehicle SLV manufacture launch C2 and data downlink Satellites China employs a robust space-based ISR capability designed to enhance its worldwide situational awareness Used for civil and military remote sensing and mapping terrestrial and China pursues parallel programs for military and commercial communications satellites COMSATs and owns and operates about 30 COMSATs used for civil commercial and military satellite communications The PLA operates a small number of dedicated military COMSATs 123 China's civil COMSATs incorporate turnkey off-the-shelf commercially manufactured components and China produces its military-dedicated satellites domestically 124 China continues to launch new COMSATs to replace its aging satellites and increase its overall satellite communications bandwidth capacity availability and reliability China uses its domestically produced Dongfanghong-4 DFH-4 satellite bus--the structure that contains the components of the satellite--for its military COMSATs 125 Even though early satellites suffered mission-ending or mission-degrading failures the DFH-4 has become a reliable satellite bus The PLA and government continue to vigorously support the program and have signed numerous contracts with domestic and international customers for future DFH-4 COMSATs The DFH-4 bus has also allowed China to position itself as a competitor in the international COMSAT market orchestrating many contracts with foreign countries to supply on-orbit satellites ground-control systems and training A G E N C Y The PLA's Strategic Support Force SSF established in December 2015 has an important role in the management of China's aerospace warfare capabilities 121 Consolidating the PLA's space cyber and electronic warfare capabilities into the SSF enables cross-domain synergy in strategic frontiers The SSF may also be responsible for research development testing and fielding of certain new concept weapons such as directed energy and kinetic energy weapons The SSF's space function is primarily focused on satellite launch and operation to support PLA reconnaissance navigation and communication requirements For more on the SSF please see Appendix E maritime surveillance and military intelligence collection China's ISR satellites are capable of providing electro-optical EO and synthetic aperture radar imagery as well as electronic intelligence and signals intelligence data 122 I N T E L L I G E N C E ably made progress on kinetic energy weapons including the anti-satellite missile system tested in July 2014 120 China is employing more sophisticated satellite operations and probably is testing on-orbit dual-use technologies that could be applied to counterspace missions D E F E N S E CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R 41 In 2008 China launched the first Tianlian data-relay satellite of its China Tracking and Data Relay Satellite constellation As of December 2017 China had four Tianlian data-relay satellites on orbit allowing China to relay commands and data to and from its satellites even when those satellites were not over Chinese territory In 2000 China launched its first Beidou satellites to test the development of a regional satellite navigation system By 2012 China had established a regional satellite navigation constellation consisting of 10 Beidou satellites and had initiated testing of a global constellation similar to the U S Global Positioning System GPS 126 As Beidou satellites continue to be placed in orbit by 2020 China will complete its global constellation of 27 Beidou satellites while maintaining a separate regional constellation providing redundant coverage over Asia 127 China owns and operates 10 domestically produced Fengyun and Yunhai meteorological satellites 128 The China Meteorological Administration supports civilian and military customers with the delivery of meteorological data and detailed weather forecasts The newer satellites house almost a dozen all-weather sensors concerning atmospheric conditions as well as maritime terrain data for military and civilian customers China's Space operations control station Image Source AFP 42 CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win membership in the World Meteorological Organization grants it free access to global meteorological data from the international organization's 191 members 129 Counterspace Image Source AFP Human Spaceflight and Space-Exploration Probes China became the third country to achieve independent human spaceflight in 2003 when it successfully orbited the crewed Shenzhou-5 spacecraft followed by space laboratory Tiangong-1 and -2 launches in 2011 and 2016 respectively China intends to assemble and operate a permanently inhabited modular space station capable of hosting foreign payloads and astronauts by 2022 133 I N T E L L I G E N C E Long March-3B SLV in midlaunch D E F E N S E China has not publicly acknowledged the existence of any new programs since it confirmed it used an antisatellite missile to destroy a weather satellite in 2007 PLA writings emphasize the necessity of destroying damaging and interfering with the enemy's reconnaissance and communications satellites suggesting that such systems as well as navigation and early warning satellites could be among the targets of attacks designed to blind and deafen the enemy 131 132 A G E N C Y The PLA is acquiring a range of technologies to improve China's counterspace capabilities China is developing antisatellite capabilities including research and possible development of directed-energy weapons and satellite jammers and probably has made progress on the antisatellite missile system that it tested in July 2014 China is employing more sophisticated satellite operations and probably is testing dual-use technologies that could be applied to counterspace missions 130 43 China is the third country to have soft-landed a rover on the Moon deploying the rover Yutu as part of the Chang'e-3 mission in 2013 China's Lunar Exploration Program plans to launch the first mission to land a rover on the lunar far side in 2018 Chang'e-4 followed by its first lunar sample-return mission in 2019 Chang'e-5 134 135 136 Space Launch China has a robust fleet of launch vehicles to support its requirements The Chang Zheng or Long March and Kuaizhou SLVs can launch Chinese spacecraft to any orbit Image Source DIA D3 Design Space Launch Sites China operates four space launch sites Jiuquan Taiyuan Xichang and Wenchang 44 CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Propellant Generation Outlook LM-2 LM-3 LM-4 series Liquid Legacy Phase out by 2025 LM-5 series Liquid Next Heavy-lift for the proposed space station and other payloads LM-6 Liquid Next Light-lift for low Earth and sun-synchronous orbit LM-7 Liquid Next Medium-lift for human spacefight and resupply to the future space station LM-11 and Kuaizhou series Solid Next Lift for emergency response Cyberspace Authoritative PLA writings identify controlling the information domain --sometimes referred to as information dominance --as a prerequisite for achieving victory in a modern war and as essential for countering outside intervention in a conflict 140 The PLA's broader concept of the information domain and of information operations encompasses the network electromagnetic psychological and intelligence domains with the network domain and corresponding network warfare roughly analogous to the current U S concept of the cyber domain and cyberwarfare 141 The PLA Strategic Support Force SSF may be the first step in the development of a cyber- force by combining cyber reconnaissance cyberattack and cyberdefense capabilities into one organization to reduce bureaucratic hurdles and centralize command and control of PLA cyber units Official pronouncements offer limited details on the organization's makeup or mission President Xi simply said during the SSF founding ceremony on 31 December 2015 that the SSF is a new-type combat force to maintain national security and is an important growth point for the PLA's combat capabilities 142 The SSF probably was formed to consolidate cyber elements of the former PLA General Staff Third Technical Reconnaissance and Fourth Electronic Countermeasures and Radar Departments and Informatization Department 143 144 For more information on the SSF please see Appendix E I N T E L L I G E N C E System A G E N C Y 137 138 139 D E F E N S E Space Launch Fleet Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win 45 Cyberspace has become a new pillar of economic and social development and a new domain of national security As international strategic competition in cyberspace has been turning increasingly fiercer quite a few countries are developing their cyber military forces Being one of the major victims of hacker attacks China is confronted with grave security threats to its cyber infrastructure As cyberspace weighs more in military security China will expedite the development of a cyberforce and enhance its capabilities of cyberspace situation awareness cyber defense support for the country's endeavors in cyberspace and participation in international cyber cooperation so as to stem major cyber crises ensure national network and information security and maintain national security and social stability --Excerpt from China's Military Strategy May 2015 The PLA could use its cyberwarfare capabilities to support military operations in three key areas First cyber reconnaissance allows the PLA to collect technical and operational data for intelligence and potential operational planning for cyberattacks because the accesses and tactics techniques and procedures for cyber reconnaissance translate into those also necessary to conduct cyberattacks Second the PLA could employ its cyberattack capabilities to establish information dominance in the early stages of a conflict to constrain an adversary's actions or slow mobilization and deployment by targeting 46 network-based C2 C4ISR logistics and commercial activities Third cyberwarfare capabilities can serve as a force multiplier when coupled with conventional capabilities during a conflict PLA military writings detail the effectiveness of information operations and cyberwarfare in modern conflicts and advocate targeting an adversary's C2 and logistics networks to affect the adversary's ability to operate during the early stages of conflict One authoritative source identifies an adversary's C2 system as the heart of information collection control and application on the battlefield It is also the nerve center of the entire battlefield 145 China's cyberwarfare could also focus on targeting links and nodes in an adversary's mobility system and identifying operational vulnerabilities in the mobilization and deployment phase The PLA also plays a role in cyber theft In May 2014 the U S Department of Justice indicted five PLA officers on charges of hacking into the networks of U S companies for commercial gain Beijing maintains that the Chinese government and military do not engage in cyberespionage and that the United States fabricated the charges 146 147 Denial and Deception The PLA uses military deception to reduce the effectiveness of adversaries' reconnaissance and to deceive adversaries about the PLA's warfighting intentions actions or major targets 148 PLA tradition emphasizes deception Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win o Concealing and camouflaging o Blending false or misleading military movements with actual deployments and war preparations o Employing counterreconnaissance understanding and evading jamming or destroying the whole spectrum of enemy reconnaissance activities against PLA units and facilities o Using deceptive maneuvers psychological ploys and unorthodox schemes to deceive confuse or otherwise manipulate an adversary into a militarily disadvantageous position 150 Skillfully employed deception can paralyze an enemy force and achieve decisive results Options range from no-warning strikes violent multiaxis strikes and envelopment to a less ambitious attempt to confuse the adversary regarding the exact timing nature direction or scope of a PLA operation 151 152 China's armed forces will develop new support means augment war reserves integrate logistics information systems improve rules and standards and meticulously organize supply and support so as to build a logistics system that can provide support for fighting and winning modern war serve the modernization of the armed forces and transform towards informatization --Excerpt from China's Military Strategy May 2015 The PLA's increased focus on developing the capabilities required to conduct joint operations under informatized conditions that began in the 1990s has spurred efforts during the past two decades to develop the PLA's capacity to supply and sustain its operations Along these lines the PLA has taken steps to modernize its defense-industrial base to ensure that the PLA is developing capabilities to meet future mission requirements Key areas of focus have included civil-military integration support to joint combat operations and high-tech weapons development Logistics According to various military officials the PLA's logistics system historically has been plagued with inefficiencies that degrade combat readiness and restrict its ability to sup- A G E N C Y Denial and deception activities include 149 Logistics and DefenseIndustrial Modernization I N T E L L I G E N C E and psychological manipulation to create asymmetric advantages and enable surprise The PLA has a longstanding doctrine for deception and claims that it regularly practices deception during training PLA sources describe military deception as a form of combat support on par with ISR meteorological support missile calculation engineering and logistic support D E F E N S E CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R 47 port and sustain modern joint combat operations 153 154 155 Since the late 1990s the PLA has invested in the modernization of its logistics system force structure and supporting infrastructure to enable a transition from a rigid command-directed and manpower-dependent system rife with corruption The overarching objective of these reforms is to build a precision logistic support system that is capable of comprehensive timely and accurate logistic support to PLA joint operations 156 157 This transformation is dependent on building high-efficiency transportation and warehouse infrastructure fielding new combat support equipment integrating comprehensive information systems and developing a new breed of officer capable of leveraging these capabilities to support rapid mobilization and high-tempo combat operations 158 159 For China logistics modernization also is heavily dependent on the PLA's ability to leverage the full potential of China's comprehensive national power to maximize combat capabilities ensure peacetime efficiencies and guarantee a constant state of combat readiness 160 The PLA has made great progress in logistics reform by improving logistics resources and procedures during the past two decades and enhancing the PLA's ability to mobilize rapidly and project support along internal lines of communication for large operations mostly disaster responses and exercises 161 162 163 164 Since 2016 the PLA has implemented structural reforms to improve command and control procedural reforms to improve civil-mil- 48 itary integration and oversight mechanisms to eliminate waste and inefficiencies that stem from longstanding corrupt practices within the logistics sector The successful implementation of these measures remains to be seen given the substantial cultural challenges of executing joint operations and reducing corruption 165 The extent to which the PLA will be able to sustain external military force projection operations effectively also remains in question because the PLA's experience is still nascent Efforts to support the PLA's first overseas military base in Djibouti may provide insight into these capabilities Please see Appendix G for more information on PLA logistics Defense-Industrial Base China's defense-industrial complex comprises both a military and a state sector governed by the CMC and State Council respectively under oversight of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee 166 The CMC's Equipment Development Department oversees weapons planning research development and acquisition RDA in conjunction with the military service armament organizations for China's Army Navy Air Force Rocket Force Strategic Support Force Armed Police and Coast Guard The State Council's State Administration for Science Technology and Industry for National Defense SASTIND is the key organ responsible for overseeing China's state-owned defense-industrial corporations and enterprises 167 168 Twelve SASTIND-subordinate Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win o Naval maritime o Aviation o Ground systems ordnance o Electronics o Nuclear During a speech at an equipment-quality work conference in 2015 CMC Vice Chairman General Xu Qiliang stressed the need to build a strong defense-industrial base to support military development Xu emphasized themes of quality innovation technology and improving combat readiness but also said it would be necessary to strengthen laws regulations and accountability within the defense industry to increase quality standards 169 The PLA initiated defense-industrial reforms in 2016 that aimed to reduce bureaucracy develop a more structured RDA and production decisionmaking apparatus streamline developmental timelines promote innovation and institutionalize civil-military integration Within an industrial context the latter entails establishing a formal relationship between A key emphasis of defense-industrial reforms is developing an innovative military industrial complex capable of delivering cutting-edge technologies to meet future PLA requirements China's research and development apparatus is designed to both identify and maximize the utility of emerging and potentially disruptive science and technology for military use Scientific and technological disciplines with military applications targeted for development include hypersonics nanotechnology high-performance computing quantum communications space systems autonomous systems artificial intelligence robotics high-performance turbofan engine design new more efficient and powerful forms of propulsion advanced manufacturing processes including additive manufacturing 3-D printing and advanced aerospace quality materials just to name a few 173 A G E N C Y o Aerospace missile China's defense and civilian industrial bases to develop a technologically advanced domestically reliant and internationally relevant defense-industrial complex 170 Key components of the initiative include the establishment of widely distributed science cities industrial parks and high-tech zones--most near China's defense-industrial corporations and commercial industrial centers large cities and provincial capitals harboring significant RDA and manufacturing capabilities to facilitate efficient logistics and supply 171 172 These reforms are expected to be implemented by 2020 I N T E L L I G E N C E defense-industrial enterprises conduct RDA and production in six distinct scientific engineering and technological domains D E F E N S E CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R 49 Underground Facilities The use of underground facilities for warfighting protection and concealment enhances China's military capacity with particular emphasis on protecting C4I functions and missile assets The PLA maintains a robust technologically advanced underground facility UGF program Given its NFU nuclear policy China assumes it might have to absorb an initial nuclear strike while ensuring that leadership and strategic assets survive China determined in the mid-to-late 1980s that it needed to update and expand its military UGF program This modernization effort took on a renewed urgency after China observed U S and coalition air operations during the 1991 Persian Gulf War and in the Balkans in 1999 The resultant emphasis on winning high-tech battles precipitated research into advanced tunneling and construction methods These military campaigns convinced China it needed to build more survivable deeply buried facilities resulting in the widespread UGF construction effort we have detected throughout China for the past decade Missions Other Than War The PLA views nonwar missions as a component of its readiness preparations broader military modernization efforts and military diplomacy These operations also reflect the PLA's increasing role beyond China's borders 174 In practice the military shares many of these missions with the People's Armed Police China's largely domestically oriented paramilitary force 50 Medical team onboard Peace Ark Image Source DIMOC China has broadened its participation in UN PKOs since 2008 to support foreign policy and military objectives by improving China's international image providing the PLA with operational experience and opening avenues for intelligence collection China provides civilian police military observers engineers logistic support specialists and medical personnel to missions In 2016 China had more than 3 000 peacekeepers deployed in support of 10 UN missions around the globe--the largest contingent of any permanent member nation of the UN Security Council--and separately committed to establish an additional 8 000-member peacekeeping standby force China has trained about 500 foreign peacekeepers and has pledged to increase this number to 2 500 in the near future In August 2017 Beijing announced that China's first helicopter unit to be deployed to a UN mission area had arrived in Sudan to support the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur 175 As of 2018 China has more than 2 500 troops police and military observers committed to UN missions Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win Beijing's increased participation in UN PKO missions particularly in terms of securing China's international image has not come without costs For instance in 2016 after three Chinese peacekeepers were killed in action and six were wounded in two high-profile attacks in Mali and South Sudan some international media reports accused Chinese peacekeepers of failing to interdict attacks on civilian foreign aid workers These reports implicitly questioned China's ability to perform as a responsible global actor In 2017 China sustained its contributions to counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden through the deployment of its 28th naval escort task force to the region since 2008 During the Image Source DIMOC same period the PLAN continued to use support for counterpiracy to justify Chinese submarine patrols to the Indian Ocean In 2016 a nuclear-powered attack submarine conducted a port call in Karachi Pakistan during an official visit by the PLAN commander marking China's first port call in South Asia by a nuclear submarine In 2017 Chinese attack submarines conducted port calls in Seppangar Malaysia and Karachi but Sri Lanka denied a port call request in Colombo 176 These submarine patrols demonstrate the PLAN's emerging capability to protect China's SLOCs and to increase China's power projection into the Indian Ocean China continues to use humanitarian and disaster relief and counterterrorism cooperation as low-threat avenues to advance military engagement with many of its foreign partners In March 2016 Beijing also proposed the creation of a maritime joint search and rescue hotline with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations probably in part as a means of assuaging regional concerns over Chinese activities in the South China Sea A G E N C Y --Excerpt from China's Military Strategy May 2015 PLA soldiers working on a school in Thailand I N T E L L I G E N C E Fulfilling international responsibilities and obligations China's armed forces will continue to participate in UN peacekeeping missions strictly observe the mandates of the UN Security Council maintain its commitment to the peaceful settlement of conflicts promote development and reconstruction and safeguard regional peace and security China's armed forces will continue to take an active part in international disaster rescue and humanitarian assistance dispatch professional rescue teams to disaster-stricken areas for relief and disaster reduction provide relief materials and medical aid and strengthen international exchanges in the fields of rescue and disaster reduction Through the aforementioned operations the armed forces can also enhance their own capabilities and expertise D E F E N S E CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R 51 Outlook Developing a Robust Force C hina's military modernization efforts have followed the broader growth and development of China as a whole The PLA has made efforts toward reducing corruption professionalizing training and education developing a science and technology base for research and development and organizing the force for effective C2 With its economic and security interests reaching around the globe Beijing perceives further modernization of the PLA as an imperative for continued stability and security of its growing interests During the past decade alone from counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden to an expanded military presence in the East and South China Seas China has demonstrated a willingness to use the PLA as an instrument of national power in the execution of historic missions in the new century Improvements 52 in PLA equipment and capabilities that have focused on generating combat power across the PLA services present Beijing with additional response options as China faces increasing global security concerns Expected advances in areas such as nuclear deterrence power projection cyberspace space and electromagnetic spectrum operations will continue to be critical components of the PLA's developing capabilities China also continues to develop capabilities for nonwar missions such as HADR and counterpiracy In the coming years the PLA is likely to grow even more technologically advanced with equipment comparable to that of other modern militaries The PLA will acquire advanced fighter aircraft naval vessels missile systems and space and cyberspace assets as it organizes and trains to address 21st century threats farther from China's shores CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win The world today is undergoing unprecedented changes and China is at a critical stage of reform and development In their endeavor to realize the Chinese Dream of great national rejuvenation the Chinese people aspire to join hands with the rest of the world to maintain peace pursue development and share prosperity Note The two centenaries is a reference to the 2021 centenary of the CCP as well as the 2049 centenary of the People's Republic of China I N T E L L I G E N C E --Excerpt from China's Military Strategy May 2015 D E F E N S E Building a strong national defense and powerful armed forces is a strategic task of China's modernization drive and a security guarantee for China's peaceful development Subordinate to and serving the national strategic goal China's military strategy is an overarching guidance for blueprinting and directing the building and employment of the country's armed forces At this new historical starting point China's armed forces will adapt themselves to new changes in the national security environment firmly follow the goal of the Communist Party of China to build a strong military for the new situation implement the military strategic guideline of active defense in the new situation accelerate the modernization of national defense and armed forces resolutely safeguard China's sovereignty security and development interests and provide a strong guarantee for achieving the national strategic goal of the 'two centenaries' and for realizing the Chinese Dream of achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation A G E N C Y China's destiny is vitally interrelated with that of the world as a whole A prosperous and stable world would provide China with opportunities while China's peaceful development also offers an opportunity for the whole world China will unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development pursue an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense policy that is defensive in nature oppose hegemonism and power politics in all forms and will never seek hegemony or expansion China's armed forces will remain a staunch force in maintaining world peace 53 CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win APPENDIX A PLA Army The PLA Army PLAA is the world's largest standing ground force with approximately 915 000 active-duty personnel in combat units 177 China's military reforms since 2015 have included creating a separate PLAA headquarters for the first time in the PLA's history In April 2017 the PLA announced the reduction of 5 of the PLAA's 18 group armies corps-sized units and the restructuring to a corps-brigade-battalion force structure This new design implemented more mobile modu- lar units and integrated maneuver elements into combined-arms brigades 178 The PLAA is also modernizing C4I systems to enhance its forces' interoperability Roles and Missions The PLAA's role is to serve as the primary ground fighting force for the PLA Accordingly the PLAA's mission falls into five areas with eight supporting capabilities Respond to emergencies and military threats 2 Safeguard the sovereignty and security of China's territory China's security interests in new domains and overseas interests 3 Participate in security cooperation and maintain regional and world peace 4 Maintain China's political security and social stability 5 Perform emergency rescue and disaster relief Required Tactical and Operational Capabilities 1 Remote maneuver actions 5 Occupation and control actions 2 Information countermeasures 6 Regional guard actions 3 Firepower strike options 7 Special operations actions 4 Mobile assault actions 8 All-dimension defensive actions I N T E L L I G E N C E 1 D E F E N S E PLAA Strategic Purpose A G E N C Y Roles and Missions 55 Major Ground Units 1' MONGOLIA Northern Theater Stu uf Japan 3 03 gsou'r Subor ate - Western heater Centre Theater Western Theater Knot Ifn mu 2 Southern Theater GsTheater Army HQ - I Airborne Corps 590 4 Hmnl- hmu h w Representationmf mmunnsere Manna Corps HQ unheated - 5 Infmmatien Theater Mummy 2 56 Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win The development of the PLAA's new-type operational forces reflects China's desire to plan and construct a force that is multifaceted with capabilities for operations ranging from high-intensity conflict to security-stability operations These forces stress the importance of ISR and leveraging information to enable future combat they can conduct three-dimensional operations Army aviation air mobility and airborne forces and can operate in a severely degraded communications environment Operations emphasize engaging the enemy from much longer distances place greater importance on protection and survivability and emphasize the employment of cyberoperations Future PLAA units will be smaller more modular and less dependent on headquarters for resources Image Source AFP This new construct envisions generating combat power and effectiveness across warfighting functions from smaller more flexible units 179 In line with the strategic requirement of mobile operations and multidimensional offense and defense the PLAA will continue to reorient from theater defense to transtheater mobility In the process of building small multifunctional and modular units the PLAA will adapt itself to tasks in different regions develop the capacity of its combat forces for different purposes and construct a combat force structure for joint operations The PLAA will elevate its capabilities for precise multidimensional transtheater multifunctional and sustainable operations --Excerpt from China's Military Strategy May 2015 A G E N C Y Units The PLAA is the world's largest army I N T E L L I G E N C E PLAA-produced publications consistently discuss new-type operations which are operations that emphasize an effects-based application of combat power to neutralize key nodes diminish the enemy's capability to effectively fight systems confrontation and achieve operational objectives quickly At the tactical level PLAA battalion training most likely includes use of precise long-range fire to maximize protection and surprise dispersion of formations of weapon platforms while relying on advanced communications technologies and increasingly lethal munitions to enable PLAA commanders to produce mass effects on an enemy D E F E N S E CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R 57 PLAA Units one-third of the Army's operational unit strength 184 The current family of modernized systems emphasizes long-range deployment firepower operations and mobile warfare-- the key attributes that the PLAA requires in its newest artillery systems 185 180 181 The table below highlights PLAA units by type and size Type and Echelon Army Groups 13 Combined-Arms Brigades 78 Artillery Brigades 15 Army Aviation Air Assault Brigades 13 Mechanized Infantry Division 1 Armor and Infantry The majority of the PLAA's armored and infantry units are organized as combined-arms brigades but the PLAA maintains a few maneuver units organized into divisions The combined-arms brigades vary in size and composition containing up to 5 000 troops Infantry units include motorized infantry those equipped with trucks for transportation as well as mechanized infantry units which can be equipped with either wheeled or tracked armored infantry fighting vehicles Equipment in PLAA infantry units varies and may include a mix of obsolete platforms from the 1960s up to some of the region's most modernized and capable platforms PLAA armored units similarly comprise a wide range of legacy tanks and modernized third-generation main battle tanks 182 Artillery Artillery is the key component of the PLAA's strike capability 183 Its primary function is supporting ground assault missions and artillery accounts for more than 58 Air Defense PLAA air defense units comprise active-duty forces and reserve forces Activeduty units provide air defense for the mobile forces These units are equipped with a mix of tactical antiaircraft missiles antiaircraft artillery antiaircraft gun and missile systems and man-portable antiaircraft missile systems An extensive reserve antiaircraft artillery force comprising divisions and separate brigades provides primarily area antiaircraft artillery protection for China's urban areas and critical economic areas 186 187 Electronic Countermeasures Electronic countermeasure ECM units are equipped with a range of modern ground-based electronic warfare systems capable of targeting large portions of the electromagnetic spectrum PLAA ECM units use HF VHF UHF radar and unmanned aerial vehicle UAV -borne jamming systems to support maneuver forces Special Operations Forces Consistent with the PLAA's recent emphasis on information- and intelligence-driven operations the PLAA's Special Operations Forces SOF have undergone substantial expansion According to PLAA doctrine SOF missions include carrying out special reconnaissance special sabotage and harassment attacks seizing and controlling key targets guiding precision Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win Logistics and Support PLAA logistics and equipment support elements exist in active and reserve units They provide field forces with all classes of supply and maintenance support as well as medical and technical support These forces normally form support groups under logistics and equipment command posts 191 The PLAA also relies heavily on civil-military integration to supplement services provided by military logistics units Official publications note the importance of integrating civilian and military production during mobilizations and the PLAA regularly uses a combination of military and civilian materiel rations and fuel equipment civilian transport vehicles vessels Equipment 192 193 Main Battle Tanks The PLAA armored corps comprises a mix of older obsolete tanks and a variety of more modern tanks The PLAA is modernizing its armored units by fielding third-generation tanks with updated armor packages larger-caliber cannons improved fire-control systems and advanced electronics and communications The most capable of these tanks are the Type 96A and Type 99 main battle tank 194 A G E N C Y Army Aviation PLA Army Aviation comprises 13 brigades These units are subordinate to corps-level units in the five theater commands The PLA considers PLA Army Aviation a newtype operational force and a priority for modernization Since 2010 PLA Army Aviation has transformed from an auxiliary transport role to that of a main combat force and has increased its regiments to brigade echelon Newly fielded and forthcoming helicopters combined with structural and operational changes under way in the PLAA indicate a pattern of development designed to mold a three-dimensional newtype Army Aviation force with all-weather dayor-night capability 190 and aircraft and facilities ports docks and hospitals during large-scale training exercises A ZTZ99 Type 99 main battle tank conducting training Image Source AFP Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles AIFVs and Armored Personnel Carriers APCs The PLAA has a large variety of wheeled and tracked AIFVs and APCs Highlighted below are two of the PLAA's most modern AIFVs o ZBD-04A The ZBD-04A is one of China's newest tracked AIFVs It is well armed with a 100-mm gun a coaxial 30-mm can- I N T E L L I G E N C E attacks conducting rescues behind enemy lines and dealing with border armed conflicts and unexpected events 188 PLAA SOF appears to focus primarily on special reconnaissance and direct-action missions 189 D E F E N S E CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R 59 non and a 7 62-mm machinegun It has a traditional layout with the engine in the front right and the driver in the front left The turret is in the middle with the troop compartment in the rear The ZBD-04A has a licensed copy of the Russian BMP 3 turret It has a three-member crew and room for seven passengers This IFV weighs about 21 tons and has improved armor o ZBL-09 The ZBL-09 often referred to as a wheeled light tank is the PLA's newest wheeled armored vehicle It has an 8x8 configuration a 105-mm gun a 7 62-mm coaxial machinegun a 12 7-mm machinegun on the right side of the turret and six 76-mm grenade launchers on each side of the turret The driver is in the front the turret is in the middle the power pack is in the rear and passive armor is fitted to the hull and turret Artillery and Rockets China continues to produce modern artillery systems aimed at advancing the mechanization of PLAA artillery while integrating information systems to increase lethality and precision The primary systems are the PHL03 300-mm self-propelled SP multiple rocket launcher the PLZ05 155mm SP gun howitzer and two tracked and two wheeled 122-mm artillery systems These new systems are likely to replace almost all towed artillery The exception to this modernization trend is PLAA coastal defense artillery which will continue using towed Type 59-1 130-mm guns and Type 66 152-mm howitzers Air Defense China has been fielding medium-range HQ-16 surface-to-air missiles SAMs with select air defense units in the PLAA as 60 PHL03 Multiple Rocket Launchers on parade in Beijing Image Source AFP part of a comprehensive upgrade of its air defense capabilities China manufactures its own variant of Russia's SA-15 and is fielding the system with PLAA air defense units supporting tracked armored forces China also manufactures a domestically designed variant of the French Crotale tactical SAM system This wheeled SAM is being fielded with PLAA air defense units supporting primarily wheeled fighting forces China's tactical SAMs have been replacing outdated large-caliber antiaircraft artillery in air defense units defending operational and large tactical-level units China is fielding a modern domestically produced SP antiaircraft gun system with select PLAA air defense units protecting larger maneuver units The PGZ-07 will provide highly mobile coverage for headquarters areas troop concentrations and key logistic support areas CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win China's domestically designed and produced PGZ-04 integrated missile-gun antiaircraft system is an upgraded version of the PGZ-95 equipped with more effective short-range SAMs The system is fielded with many PLAA armored and mechanized units for close-range air defense protection of combat maneuver elements Training In 2015 PLA leaders directed changes to ground forces training 195 These changes included a call for increased emphasis on problem solving innovation and realistic combat training replacing previously scripted training methods Leaders stressed the performance of key tasks--such as conducting joint training training in nighttime combat and training under adverse weather and geographical conditions--as essential to winning wars The PLAA makes use of a number of training locations available for its ground Recruitment and Professional Military Education Military service probably will remain a less attractive career option if China's economy stays healthy Although Chinese youth remain interested in the career field interest is not widespread 197 The PLAA relies on a 2-year conscription period along with a mix of volunteers the ratio of conscripts to volunteers is unclear Recruitment challenges notwithstanding the PLA continues to pursue efforts to cultivate new-type military personnel to retain talent and develop personnel who I N T E L L I G E N C E Image Source AFP D E F E N S E PGZ-O7 self-propelled antiaircraft system on parade in Beijing Professionalization Since at least 2012 PLAA units red forces rotating through combined-arms training centers have trained against a permanently established blue force also known as an opposition force 196 The construction of a blue force was undertaken to ensure that the PLAA would become more sophisticated in conducting realistic training scenarios Increasingly PLAA training emphasizes the need to empower lower-level leaders to conduct target-based opportunistic initiative-driven combat The PLAA has decreased the emphasis on saving face shifting toward a culture of understanding that commanders and subordinates should be allowed--and expected--to make mistakes in training A G E N C Y forces and maintains at least one sizable training area in each of China's military theaters These training areas offer a variety of terrain from coastal and flat areas to moderately hilly to high plateau and mountainous terrains The major training bases provide units with venues featuring large areas for field maneuvers artillery fires and force-on-force confrontations 61 can meet the data demands of modern warfare 198 The Army also has changed military recruitment schedules and age limits in an effort to better attract educated and talented people 199 Basic training where students learn fundamental military skills and receive political indoctrination continues to serve as the foundation for both conscripted and volunteer personnel entering the service After completing the initial curriculum trainees are sent to their respective units for additional on-the-job training Some new soldiers will go on to different locations for technical training outside their assigned units 200 PLA cadets receive political instruction Image Source DIMOC 62 CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win APPENDIX B PLA Navy Although Liu characterized offshore areas as east of Taiwan and the northern part of the Pacific Ocean stretching beyond the first island chain offshore defense was often associated with operations in the Yellow Sea East China Sea and South China Sea--China's near seas Development of offshore defense paralleled the CMC's adoption of a new military strategy that focused on local wars on China's periph- --Excerpt from China's Military Strategy May 2015 Former President Hu and President Xi have repeatedly emphasized the importance of maritime power In 2004 former President Hu's outline of the PLA's New Historic Missions encompassed new expectations for the PLAN In his report to the 18th Party Congress in 2012 Hu declared We should enhance our capacity for exploiting marine resources resolutely safeguard China's maritime rights and interests and build China into a maritime power Hu's public emphasis on maritime power and the need to resolutely safeguard China's maritime rights and interests reflect a growing consensus in China that maritime power is A G E N C Y In line with the strategic requirement of offshore waters defense and open-seas protection the PLAN will gradually shift its focus from offshore waters defense to the combination of offshore waters defense with open-seas protection and build a combined multifunctional and efficient marine combat force structure The PLAN will enhance its capabilities for strategic deterrence and counterattack maritime maneuvers joint operations at sea comprehensive defense and comprehensive support I N T E L L I G E N C E In the 1980s China's threat perceptions and growing economic interests drove a major shift in the strategic orientation and utility of naval forces In particular Chinese naval strategists sought to expand the bounds of their maritime capabilities beyond coastal defense By 1987 PLAN Commander Adm Liu Huaqing had established a strategy referred to as offshore defense 204 ery rather than a major confrontation with the Soviet Union and it focused on achieving regional goals and deterring a modern adversary from intervening in a regional conflict D E F E N S E The PLA Navy PLAN is Asia's largest navy with an inventory of more than 300 surface combatants submarines amphibious ships patrol craft and specialized units 201 The PLAN is rapidly replacing obsolescent generally single-purpose ships in favor of larger multirole combatants with advanced antiship antiair and antisubmarine weapons and sensors This modernization aligns with China's growing emphasis on the maritime domain with increasing demands on the PLAN to conduct operational tasks at increasing distances from the Chinese mainland using multimission long-range sustainable naval platforms with robust self-defense capabilities 202 203 63 essential to advancing China's interests This trajectory was carried forward under Xi and is explicit in China's 2015 military strategy The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests It is necessary for China to develop a modern maritime military force structure commensurate with its national security and development interests safeguard its national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests protect the security of strategic SLOCs sea lines of communication and overseas interests and participate in international maritime cooperation so as to provide strategic support for building itself into a maritime power --Excerpt from China's Military Strategy May 2015 In 2015 Beijing formally introduced a new naval strategy known as Offshore Defense and Open Seas Protection The new strategy contains the primary elements of offshore defense but extends China's maritime sphere of operations beyond the first and second island chains and into the high seas in support of China's growing international interests and maritime missions China relies heavily on maritime trade access to overseas energy resources and overseas employment of Chinese citizens to propel its domestic economy spurring Beijing's concern for ensuring that the PLAN is capable 64 PLAN Jiangkai II class guided-missile frigate Linyi Image Source DVIDS of pursuing open-seas protection missions The PLAN's acquisition patterns demonstrate a growing emphasis on ships that are multimission capable and large enough to sustain these types of operations Roles and Missions Given China's heavy reliance on maritime commerce Beijing now has a vested interest in ensuring the security of international trade Beijing also faces growing pressure to contribute to international security missions As an increasingly modern and flexible force the PLAN is at the forefront of addressing a number of enduring Chinese security challenges from reunification with Taiwan to asserting China's maritime claims in the East and South China Seas Today the PLAN's primary operational training and planning focus remains in the near seas where China faces sovereignty disputes over various islands maritime features territorial waters and associated mar- Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win Protecting Maritime Sovereignty A key role for the PLAN is protecting China's maritime sovereignty In the East and South China Seas Beijing faces longstanding disputes with its neighbors regarding maritime boundaries economic rights and sovereignty over various geographic features During the past few years maritime disputes between China and rival claimants including Japan the Philippines Vietnam and Malaysia have periodically intensified Image Source AFP Countering Third-Party Intervention Since the mid-1990s Chinese planners and strategists have understood that the PLAN's development of capabilities to deter delay and if necessary degrade third-party forces' intervention in a time of conflict is essential Nearly two decades later China has closed many of the gaps in key warfare areas such as air defense and long-range strike that would support countering third-party forces in regional campaigns China has built or acquired a wide array of advanced platforms including submarines China's Navy Coast Guard and Maritime Militia are increasingly visible throughout the region and Beijing has employed increasingly coercive tactics to advance its regional interests As China's naval capabilities have grown Beijing has taken steps to consolidate its maritime forces and improve its ability to respond flexibly to contingencies while avoiding escalation to military conflict and maintaining a veneer of advancing peaceful global interests China's land reclamation and outpost expansion in the Paracel and Spratly Islands include port facilities from which it can surge PLAN A G E N C Y The aircraft carrier Liaoning sailing in a formation of PLAN ships major surface combatants missile patrol craft maritime strike aircraft and land-based systems that employ new sophisticated antiship cruise missiles and SAMs China also has developed the world's first roadmobile antiship ballistic missile a system specifically designed to attack enemy aircraft carriers China's leaders hope that possessing these military capabilities will deter proindependence moves by Taiwan or should deterrence fail will permit a range of tailored military options against Taiwan and potential third-party military intervention I N T E L L I G E N C E itime rights The growth of China's diversified nonwar missions including HADR SLOC protection and PKOs has been a major driver of--and justification for--China's expanded naval strategy and operations in the far seas The following subsections highlight a few of these missions D E F E N S E CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R 65 China Coast Guard CCG and People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia PAFMM ships to better enforce maritime sovereignty claims as well as airbases to support reconnaissance fighter and strike aircraft PLAN sailor participating in visit board search and seizure VBSS training Image Source DIMOC Under Chinese law maritime sovereignty is a domestic law enforcement issue under the purview of the CCG Beijing also prefers to use CCG ships for assertive actions in disputed waters to reduce the risk of escalation and to portray itself more benignly to an international audience For situations that Beijing perceives carry a heightened risk of escalation it often deploys PLAN combatants in close proximity for rapid intervention if necessary China also relies on the PAFMM - a paramilitary force of fishing boats - for sovereignty enforcement actions Sea Lane Protection China increasingly sees a need for the PLAN to help protect its economic investments and political interests 66 around the world The security of oil import routes from the Middle East and Africa that pass through the Indian Ocean is particularly vital to China Large portions of China's critical mineral imports and trade in manufactured products and components also use these routes Since any disruption of China's trade could undermine China's economy the PLAN is placing growing importance on developing long-range SLOC protection and general naval presence capabilities For example SLOC protection and naval presence missions are among the main drivers in China's establishment of a naval logistics support base in Djibouti as well as Beijing's pursuit of additional logistics-port-access agreements In addition the PLAN's participation in counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden demonstrates Beijing's intention to protect important SLOCs Naval Diplomacy Another growing PLAN mission is naval diplomacy Since PLAN task groups began supporting counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden in 2008 the returning units have often followed the deployment with port visits across the Indian Ocean and other regions In 2017 the PLAN completed its longest goodwill deployment in October visiting 20 countries in 7 months including several port calls in Europe The PLAN also employs its hospital ship Peace Ark to support HADR missions worldwide These visits advance the Navy's international profile provide opportunities for bilateral cooperation and build the PLAN's experience in areas farther from China's coast Image Source DIMOC Nontraditional Missions In 2004 the PLAN was tasked with safeguarding China's national development and playing an important role in ensuring world peace This represented a substantial adjustment to China's national defense strategy and broadened its definition of security to include new geographic and functional areas beyond the PLA's traditional territorial security missions Missions such as naval escort in the Gulf of Aden support China's economic interests while enhancing China's international image Units The PLAN controls all of China's naval and naval aviation forces as well as seven marine brigades and has deployed naval forces in three of China's five geographically oriented theaters that conduct day-to-day operations The deputy commander of each fleet commands its respective aviation force The 2015 PLA-wide structural reforms formally separated operational control of the Navy from force-building aspects administered by PLAN headquarters and additional changes to the PLAN's structure particularly at the fleet level and below are expected in 2018 I N T E L L I G E N C E PLAN Luyang II class destroyer Xian A G E N C Y Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win D E F E N S E CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R 67 Major Naval Units l l Northern Theater FLA Navy HQ 9 Northern Theater Navy HQ 9 Eastern Theater Navy 1 HQ Southern 'I hnater Navy HQ Theater boundary I i In Htmdii- FTE Demarcatian Pr n ne i ii t fr Northern - r a Theater Qingdao CentralI f Theater Kart ti Ki 3 p ingbo 11f 1 Eastern 4' 5 Theater Li rim-1 'I'iirr' Theater 4 - Hong Kong sae imiang '1 Macau I Northern Theater Navy Aircraft Carrier Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarines Diesel-POWered Attack Submarines Destroyers Frigates Corvettes Tank Landing Ships Medium Landing Ships Missile Patrol Craft Eastern Theater Navy Diesel Powered Attack Submarines Destroyers Frigates Corvettes Amphibious Transport Docks Tank Landing Ships Mediurn Landing Ships Missile Patrol Craft 4 Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarines Diesel-PoWered Attack Submarines Destroyers FrigatES Corvettes Amphibious Transport Docks Tank Landing Ships Medium Landing Ships Missile Patrol Craft ll l t i ii 'hii-nrl rial 'IIz v In' i'iinli 'iI liri'l v Hi image Soume D5 Dough has remained relatively constant the PLAN is rapidly retiring older single-mission warships in favor of larger multimission ships equipped with advanced antiship antiair and antisubmarine weapons and sensors and C2 facilities East Sea Fleet Headquartered in Ningbo the East Sea Fleet covers the majority of the East China Sea and the Taiwan Strait It falls under the PLA Eastern Theater Command's area of operations In the initial stages of its modernization the PLAN successfully concentrated resources on improving its antisurface warfare ASUW capabilities both in surface ship and submarine development Subsequent efforts have focused on improving antiair warfare capabilities and providing modest improvements in antisubmarine warfare ASW capabilities South Sea Fleet Headquartered in Zhanjiang the South Sea Fleet is responsible for the South China Sea It falls under the PLA Southern Theater Command's area of operations Equipment Building a Modern Navy During the past 15 years China's naval modernization has produced a technologically advanced flexible force structure The PLAN has more than 300 surface combatants submarines amphibious ships and missile-armed patrol craft Although the overall inventory Artist rendition of a PLAN Renhai class cruiser Every major PLAN surface combatant under construction is capable of embarking a helicopter to support over-the-horizon targeting ASW and search and rescue Meanwhile the PLAN's submarine force remains largely concentrated on ASUW with Jin class SSBNs poised to contribute to China's nuclear deterrent once they begin strategic patrols in the near future Naval aviation is expanding its mission set by incorporating modern multirole combat aircraft along with modern special mission aircraft carrier aviation and UAVs As a whole the PLAN is becoming a force able to execute a wide variety of missions near home and far away Surface Force In the late 1990s to early 2000s the PLAN transitioned from a greenwater coastal force to one capable of operating offshore with increasing regularity During this period China imported several major combatants weapon systems and sen- I N T E L L I G E N C E North Sea Fleet Headquartered in Qingdao the North Sea Fleet is responsible for the Bo Hai Yellow Sea and northern portion of the East China Sea It falls under the PLA Northern Theater Command's area of operations A G E N C Y Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win D E F E N S E CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Image Source Wikimedia Commons 69 sors from Russia while concurrently producing and developing its own designs and modernizing older ships to employ advanced weapons By the second decade of the 2000s the PLAN was using Chinese designs for surface ships primarily equipped with Chinese weapons and sensors although some engineering components and subsystems remained imported or license-produced in country at the time Furthermore the era of past designs has given way to production of modern multimission destroyer frigate and corvette classes as China's technological advancement in naval design has begun to approach a level commensurate with and in some cases exceeding that of other modern navies Once operational the new Renhai class Type 055 guided-missile cruiser of which several are currently under construction will be one of the most advanced and powerful ships in the world boasting a large array of advanced-capability weapons and sensors developed domestically 205 Shipboard air defense and antisurface warfare capabilities are arguably the most notable areas of improvement on PLAN surface ships China has retired several older destroyers and frigates that had at most a point air defense capability and a range of just several nautical miles Newer ships entering the force are equipped with medium- to long-range area air defense missiles including the Renhai which has 112 vertical-launch cells for mixed munitions The PLAN received a total of six Luyang II Type 052C class guided-missile destroyers with the HHQ-9 SAM 55-NM range and YJ-62 antiship cruise missiles ASCMs 150-NM 70 range and six Luyang III Type 052D class guided-missile destroyers are now operational with several more under construction The Luyang III carries an extended-range variant of the HHQ-9 SAM and YJ-18 ASCM 290-NM range In addition more than 25 Jiangkai II Type 054A class guided-missile frigates are now operational with the vertically launched HHQ-16 20- to 40-NM range and more are under construction 206 These newer ships use modern combat management systems and air surveillance sensors such as the Sea Eagle and Dragon Eye phased-array radars These new units allow the PLAN surface force to operate outside shore-based air defense systems because one or two ships are equipped to provide air defense for the entire task group China's amphibious ship force has slowly grown since a modernization program began in the early 2000s Since 2005 China has built six large Yuzhao Type 071 class amphibious transport docks signaling China's development of an expeditionary warfare and overthe-horizon amphibious assault capability as well as inherent HADR and counterpiracy capabilities The Yuzhao can carry up to four of the new Yuyi air-cushion utility landing craft similar to the U S landing craft air cushion LCAC as well as four or more helicopters armored vehicles and troops on long-distance deployments Additional Yuzhao construction is expected in the near term as is a follow-on amphibious assault ship landing helicopter assault LHA which Chinese sources term the CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win The PLA Navy Naval SAM Ranges HHQ-9 Extended Range HHQ-16 HHQ-7 0 30 60 90 120 150 An expanded set of missions farther into the western Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean such as counterpiracy deployments HADR missions survey voyages and goodwill port visits has increased demands on and broadened the experience of the PLAN's fleet of oceangoing replenishment and service vessels The PLAN recently launched two new Fuyi class fast combat support ships intended to support aircraft carrier battle groups as well as the smaller Fuchi class replenishment oilers which support surface action groups and long-distance deployments These ships constantly rotate in support of China's Gulf of Aden counterpiracy deployments and regularly accompany surface groups operating beyond the first island chain At present China has at least 10 fleet replenishment ships operational with more under construction PLAN ships conducting replenishment at sea I N T E L L I G E N C E Type 075 that not only is larger but incorporates a full flight deck for helicopters Production on the LHA is expected to begin soon if it has not already begun A G E N C Y Approximate Range Kilometers D E F E N S E Image Source DIA D3 Design HHQ-9 Image Source DVIDS 71 In addition China has added a variety of oceangoing auxiliary ships in recent years including submarine rescue ships hospital ships salvage and rescue ships survey ships intelligence collection ships and various large transport ships PLAN sailors conduct VBSS training Image Source DVIDS Submarine Force China's modernizing force includes several types of submarines For its diesel-electric force alone between 2000 and 2005 China constructed Ming diesel attack submarines SSs and Song SSs and the first Yuan air-independent attack submarine SSP and purchased eight Kilo SSs from Russia Although all of these classes remain in service only the Yuan SSP is in production Over time reducing the number of classes in service helps streamline maintenance training and interoperability The submarine force comprises 6 nuclear attack submarines 4 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and 50 diesel attack submarines By 2020 the submarine force probably will increase to about 70 submarines 72 The Yuan SSP is China's most modern conventionally powered submarine Seventeen are in service with possibly three more slated for production The Yuan SSP's combat capability is comparable to that of the Song both can launch Chinese-built antiship cruise missiles but the Yuan has the added benefit of an air-independent propulsion AIP system and may have incorporated quieting technology from the Russian-designed Kilo SS The AIP system provides a submarine a source of power other than battery or diesel engines while still submerged increasing its underwater endurance and reducing its vulnerability to detection The remainder of the conventional submarine force is a mix of Song Ming and Russian-built Kilo SSs Of these only the Ming and four of the older Kilos lack an ability to launch ASCMs Eight of China's 12 Kilos are equipped with the SS-N-27 ASCM which provides a long-range ASUW capability out to about 120 nautical miles China's newest domestic submarine-launched ASCM the CH-SS-N-13 extends a similar capability to the Song Yuan and Shang classes China also continues to modernize its nuclear-powered attack submarine force although these make up a small percentage of the total number of submarines Two Shang nuclear-powered attack submarines SSNs have been launched one each in 2002 and 2003 After nearly 10 years China is continuing production with four additional hulls of an improved Shang variant These six submarines will replace the aging Han SSN on a nearly one-for- CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win one basis during the next several years After the completion of the improved Shang SSN the PLAN is expected to begin production on another modified variant of the Shang SSN class the Type 093B 207 Thereafter the PLAN probably will progress to the Type 095 nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine SSGN This class of submarine may provide a generational improvement in many areas such as quieting and weapons capacity ing AEW and logistics China's first aircraft carrier signaled a new age for PLAN aviation which is now evolving from an almost exclusively land-based force to one with a seabased component Fixed-Wing Aircraft During the past two decades the PLAN has replaced antiquated fixed-wing aircraft such as the Q-5 Fantan and the H-5 Beagle with an array of high-quality aircraft The force is now equipped for a wide range of missions including offshore air defense maritime strike maritime patrol ASW and carrier-based operations Just a decade ago this air modernization relied very heavily on Russian imports Following in the PLAAF's footsteps the PLAN is now benefit- A G E N C Y Image Source DIBMAC Report I N T E L L I G E N C E Aviation The role of PLAN aviation has evolved during the past decade PLAN combatants can now reach farther from shore and are more capable of providing their own air defense This has allowed the PLAN to concentrate on an expanded array of aerial missions particularly maritime strike as well as maritime patrol ASW airborne early warn- The JL-2 CSS-NX-14 SLBM in midlaunch D E F E N S E The PLA Navy's Jin class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines armed with the JL-2 submarine launched ballistic missile provide China its first viable sea-based nuclear deterrent and credible second-strike nuclear capability The JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile SLBM has nearly three times the range of the Xia SSBN's JL-1 SLBM which was able to reach targets only in China's immediate vicinity The JL-2 SLBM underwent successful testing in 2012 The Jin JL-2 weapon system will provide China with a capability to strike targets in the continental United States from some patrol areas To maintain a continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent the PLAN probably would require a minimum of five Jin SSBNs four are in service 73 ing from domestic combat aircraft production Today the PLAN is taking deliveries of modern domestically produced fourth-generation fighter aircraft such as the J-10A Vigorous Dragon and the domestically produced J-11B Flanker Equipped with modern radars and glass cockpits and armed with PL-8 and PL-12 air-to-air missiles PLAN J-10As and J-11Bs are among the most modern aircraft in China's inventory and are capable of extended fighter patrols beyond China's coastal areas For maritime strike the PLAN has relied on variants of the H-6 Badger bomber for decades The H-6 is a licensed copy of the ex-Soviet Tu-16 Badger medium jet bomber and maritime versions employ advanced ASCMs against surface targets Despite the age of their design the H-6s continue to receive electronics and payload upgrades keeping the aircraft viable as a long-range strike platform As many as 30 aircraft remain in service Noted improvements for the upgraded Badger include the ability to carry a maximum of four ASCMs instead of the two previously seen on earlier H-6D variants The PLAN also has modified a few H-6s to serve as tankers increasing the range of PLAN fighter aircraft With at least five regiments fielded across the three fleets the JH-7 Flounder augments the H-6 as the workhorse of the PLAN's airborne maritime strike force The JH-7 is a domestically produced tandem-seat fighter-bomber developed as a replacement for obsolete Q-5 Fantan light attack aircraft and H-5 Beagle bombers Updated versions of the JH-7 feature a more capable radar and additional weapons 74 capacity enhancing its maritime strike capabilities The JH-7 can carry up to four ASCMs and two PL-5 or PL-8 short-range air-to-air missiles providing considerable payload for maritime strike missions or the JH-7 can sacrifice two ASCMs for underwing fuel tanks increasing the platform's range In addition to combat aircraft the PLAN is expanding its inventory of fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft AEW and surveillance aircraft China has achieved significant new capabilities by modifying several existing airframes The Y-8 a Chinese license-produced version of the ex-Soviet An-12 Cub forms the basic airframe for several PLAN special-mission variants All of these aircraft play a key role in providing a clear picture of surface and air contacts in the maritime environment As the PLAN pushes farther from the coast long-range aircraft capable of extended onstation times to act as the fleet's eyes and ears become increasingly important The PLAN has also developed a Y-9 ASW variant The new aircraft is equipped with a magnetic anomaly detector boom similar to that of the U S Navy's P-3 This Y-9 ASW variant is equipped with surface-search radar mounted under the nose as well as multiple-blade antennas on the fuselage probably for electronic surveillance A small EO infrared turret is located just behind the nose wheel and this variant is equipped with an internal weapons bay in front of the main landing gear Recent pictures of the Y-9 ASW variant suggest at least some aircraft have entered operational service Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win 304 5 meters 999 0 ft Beam 70 meters 229 7 ft Draft 10 5 meters 34 4 ft Flight deck length 304 5 meters 999 0 ft Flight deck width 70 meters 229 7 ft Flight deck angle 7 degrees Aircraft launch mechanism Ski jump Ski jump angle 14 degrees Top speed 30 kn 55 6 km h 34 5 mph Range 3 850 NM 7 130 2 km 4 430 5 miles at 29 kn 53 7 km h 33 4 mph 8 500 NM 15 742 0 km 9 781 6 miles at 18 kn 33 3 km h 20 7 mph Crew 1 960 Machinery 8 boilers 4 turbines 200 000 shp 4 shafts Up to 24 J-15 fighters Aircraft 6 Z-8 helicopters and 4 Ka-31 helicopters A G E N C Y Length I N T E L L I G E N C E Aircraft Carrier Program In September 2012 China commissioned the Liaoning joining the small group of countries that have an aircraft carrier Beijing acquired the Soviet ship formerly the Varyag from Ukraine in 2002 210 211 Since that time the PLAN has followed the long and difficult path of learning to operate fixed-wing aircraft from a carrier The first launches and recoveries of J-15 fighter aircraft occurred in November 2012 with additional testing and training in early July 2013 With the first landing complete China became only the fifth country in the world to have conventional takeoff and landing fighters aboard an aircraft carrier In 2017 the Liaoning concluded its second deployment to the South China Sea for training--its first with embarked J-15 fighters--and conducted its first port visit to Hong Kong 212 213 214 The Aircraft Carrier Liaoning D E F E N S E In December 2017 the Aviation Industry Corporation of China conducted the maiden flight of the AG-600 Kunlong the world's largest seaplane 208 The aircraft is still under development but once operational the AG-600 probably will be used for both civilian and military roles such as search and rescue operations or defense needs in the South China Sea Chinese advertising depicts the aircraft as having an endurance of 12 hours and the capacity to rescue 50 people during a single flight 209 Image Source AFP CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R 75 The Liaoning's ski-jump configuration restricts aircraft takeoff weight limiting maximum ordnance loads and overall combat power The ski-jump design also means it cannot operate large specialized support aircraft such as an AEW aircraft China's first carrier air regiment will comprise the Shenyang J-15 Flying Shark The J-15 is externally similar to the Russian Su-33 Flanker D but has many of the domestic avionics and armament capabilities of the Chinese J-11B Flanker The J-15 has folding wings strengthened landing gear a tailhook under a shortened tail stinger two-piece slotted flaps canards and a retractable inflight-refueling probe on the left side of the nose China's aircraft carrier program also includes efforts to develop domestic carriers In 2017 China launched its first domestic aircraft carrier which was a modified version of the Liaoning and is expected to enter into service by 2019 215 216 Like the Liaoning the ship lacks catapult capabilities and has a smaller flight deck than U S carriers 217 The PLAN is expected to begin construction in 2018 on its first catapult-capable carrier which will enable additional fighter aircraft fixed-wing early warning aircraft and more rapid flight operations 218 Helicopters The PLAN operates three main helicopter variants the domestically produced Z-9 and Z-8 Z-18 and the Russian-built Helix The primary helicopter operated by the PLAN is the Z-9C In the early 1980s China obtained a license from France's Aerospatiale now Air- 76 Chinese Marines attend an international fleet review Image Source AFP bus Helicopter to produce the AS 365N Dauphin II helicopter and its engine The AS 365s produced in China were labeled as the Z-9 with the naval variant designated Z-9C The Z-9C is capable of operating from any helicopter-capable PLAN combatant The Z-9C can be fitted with the KLC-1 search radar and dipping sonar and is usually observed with a single lightweight torpedo A new roof-mounted EO turret unguided rockets and 12 7-mm machinegun pods have been seen on several Z-9Cs during counterpiracy deployments An upgraded naval version designated the Z-9D has been observed carrying small ASCMs The Z-8 is also a Chinese-produced helicopter based on a French design In the late 1970s the PLAN took delivery of the SA 321 Super Frelon A reverse-engineered version was designated the Z-8 which reached initial operational capability by 1989 Low-rate production continued through the 1990s and into the early 2000s The Z-8's size provides a greater cargo CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win In 2010 China purchased nine Ka-31 AEW helicopters and its E-801 radar system The Z-18J and Ka-31 provide the PLAN a serviceable sea-based AEW capability to help fill that critical gap until newer catapult-equipped aircraft carriers capable of operating fixed-wing AEW aircraft enter service capacity compared with other PLAN helicopters but limits its ability to deploy from most PLAN combatants A new PLAN helicopter labeled the Z-18 has operated with the Liaoning The Z-18 comes in three variants transport antisubmarine Z-18F and AEW Z-18J As with the Z-8 the Z-18's size limits its deployment options Variants of the Helix are the only imported helicopters operated by the PLAN In 1999 the PLAN took delivery of an initial batch of eight Russian-built Helix helicopters Five were Ka-28 Helix As and three were Helix Ds An additional 9 Helix As have been delivered and all 18 Helix are operational As with the Russian Ka-27s the exported Ka-28s can perform several mission sets but are usually used for ASW and the Ka-27PSs are optimized for SAR and logistic support missions The Ka-28 is fitted with search radar and dipping sonar and can employ sonobuoys torpedoes depth charges or mines In 2015 China's Military Strategy called for the PLA to enhance realistic military training particularly in complex electromagnetic environments diverse terrains and adverse weather conditions 220 The same year the PLAN Headquarters Military Training Department directed the PLAN to enhance the complexity of training and exercises by o Making training more realistic o Strengthening command authority and relationships through realistic opposing force training o Deepening tactical innovation o Improving training in the actual use of weapons in an electromagnetic environment I N T E L L I G E N C E Image Source DVIDS During the past decade the scope and frequency of naval training have gradually expanded reflecting the growing capabilities of China's navy The PLAN conducts year-round multimission training including robust antisurface and antiair warfare training 219 The PLAN now also participates in training exercises farther from China's coasts in areas such as the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean D E F E N S E PLAN Z-9 helicopter A G E N C Y Training 77 o Continuing far seas training o Improving training methods by avoiding formalism and scripting in exercises o Improving joint campaign-level training 221 PLAN participation in missions such as the antipiracy task groups in the Gulf of Aden provide opportunities to train in real-world situations to refine operational capabilities The Navy also makes use of shore-based simulators and vessel training centers to help maintain year-round readiness levels 222 Paramilitary Forces China Coast Guard The CCG is responsible for a wide range of missions including the enforcement of China's sovereignty claims antismuggling surveillance protection of fisheries resources and general law enforcement Maritime law enforcement responsibilities before 2013 were scattered across a number of organizations but have since been consolidated to establish more effective command and control CCG ships are subordinate to the People's Armed Police and take part in Bejing's whole-of-govenrment approach to maritime disputes China primarily uses civilian maritime law enforcement agencies in maritime disputes employing the PLAN in a protective capacity in case of escalation 223 The CCG has rapidly increased and modernized its forces improving China's ability to enforce its maritime claims Since 2010 the CCG's large patrol ship fleet more than 1 000 78 tons has more than doubled in size from about 60 to more than 130 ships making it by far the largest coast guard force in the world and increasing its capacity to conduct extended offshore operations in a number of disputed areas simultaneously Furthermore the newer ships are substantially larger and more capable than the older ships and the majority are equipped with helicopter facilities high-capacity water cannons and guns ranging from 30-mm to 76-mm Among these ships a number are capable of long-distance long-endurance outof-area operations In addition the CCG operates more than 70 fast patrol combatants more than 500 tons which can be used for limited offshore operations and more than 400 coastal patrol craft as well as about 1 000 inshore and riverine patrol boats By the end of the decade the CCG is expected to add up to 30 patrol ships and patrol combatants before the construction program levels off 224 Haixun class cutter conducting port visit to Honolulu Hawaii - September 2012 Image Source DVIDS Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win Amphibious Capabilities The PLAN Marine Corps PLANMC is the PLAN's land combat arm Its primary mission is to conduct offensive and defensive amphibious assault in the South China Sea including the Paracel Island and Spratly Island chains and potentially the Senkaku Islands 227 The PLANMC is tasked with seizing and consolidating beachheads destroying an opposing force at the beachhead and adjacent areas organizing landing areas and supporting landings by the PLAA Other missions include conducting amphibious raids seizing and occupying enemy naval bases seaports and islands building beachhead protective zones and covering the PLAA as it advances inland from the coast 228 The seas and oceans bear on the enduring peace lasting stability and sustainable development of China The traditional mentality that land outweighs the sea must be abandoned --Excerpt from China's Military Strategy May 2015 A G E N C Y A large number of PAFMM vessels train with and support the PLA and CCG in tasks such as safeguarding maritime claims protecting fisheries and providing logistic support search and rescue SAR and surveillance and reconnaissance The Chinese government subsidizes local and provincial commercial organizations to operate militia ships to perform official missions on an ad hoc basis outside their regular commercial roles The PAFMM has played a noteworthy role in a number of military campaigns and coercive incidents over the years including the harassment of Vietnamese survey ships in 2011 a standoff with the Philippines at Scarborough Reef in 2012 and a standoff involving a Chinese oil rig in 2014 In the past the PAFMM rented fishing boats from companies or individual fisherman but it appears that China is building a state-owned fishing fleet for its maritime militia force in the South China Sea Hainan Province adjacent to the South China Sea ordered the construction of 84 large militia fishing boats with reinforced hulls and ammunition storage for Sansha City and the militia took delivery by the end of 2016 226 I N T E L L I G E N C E People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia The PAFMM is a subset of China's national militia an armed reserve force of civilians available for mobilization to perform basic support duties Militia units organize around towns villages urban subdistricts and enterprises and they vary widely from one location to another The composition and mission of each unit reflects local conditions and personnel skills In the South China Sea the PAFMM plays a major role in coercive activities to achieve China's political goals without fighting part of broader Chinese military doctrine that states that confrontational operations short of war can be an effective means of accomplishing political objectives 225 D E F E N S E CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R 79 Roles and Missions The PLANMC's mission appears to be evolving beyond amphibious operations and toward a more expeditionary mission beyond China's borders This is in line with the PLA's evolving strategy as outlined in China's Military Strategy 229 230 For the PLAN the New Historic Missions mean an increased focus on diversified missions or noncombat missions Many of the tasks assigned to the armed forces in the white paper are ideally suited to the PLANMC including ensuring Chinese sovereignty claims safeguarding China's security and interests in new domains safeguarding the security of China's interests overseas and performing such tasks as emergency rescue and disaster relief rights and interest protection and guard duty 231 The PLANMC already is designated a rapid-reaction force for the PLA and has deployed on numerous occasions in response to natural disasters in China including floods and earthquakes 232 The PLANMC is the natural landbased force of choice for HADR efforts overseas In 2017 the PLA also chose to deploy PLANMC troops to the PLA's first overseas base in Djibouti reflecting the Marine Corps' growing role in China's military Elements of the PLANMC are consistently deployed as part of the PLAN's counterpiracy task groups operating in the Gulf of Aden 233 The size of the embarked force is no larger than a platoon These Marines may be regular infantry troops but more likely come from an amphibious reconnaissance group subordinate to the amphibious reconnaissance battalion They are highly trained in the tactics techniques and 80 PLA marines conduct helicopter entry exit training Image Source DIMOC procedures required for a counterpiracy mission including VBSS hostage rescue and small-team assault VBSS tactics include fast-roping or rappelling from PLAN helicopters 234 Units The PLANMC is subordinate to the PLAN and consists of seven brigades 235 Marine brigades are located in each of the North East and South Sea Fleets' areas of responsibility 236 237 Recent PLA reforms included the establishment of a PLANMC headquarters probably to oversee the administrative man train and equip functions of the growing Marine Corps and also included the appointment of the PLANMC's first commander 238 239 Each brigade has a headquarters element an armored regiment at least two infantry battalions a howitzer battalion a missile battalion a communications and guard battalion an engineer and chemical defense battalion a maintenance battalion and an amphibious reconnaissance battalion special operations 240 Estimates of the PLANMC's troop strength differ widely and have been reported as high as 35 000 but the actual number is Image Source AFP PLANMC Capabilities and Equipment ZBD-05 AIFV ZLT-05 AAG PLZ-07B SP Howitzer Weight 26 5 tons 28 tons 24 5 tons Crew 3 8 infantry 4 5 Speed in water 20 kn 20 kn UNK Speed on land 40 mph 40 mph 40 mph 30-mm cannon 4-km max range 105-mm gun 122-mm cannon 18-km max range Red Arrow antitank guided missile ATGM 2x Red Arrow ATGM Main armament I N T E L L I G E N C E PLANMC units conduct an amphibious assault during a training exercise A G E N C Y Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win D E F E N S E CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R 81 probably between 28 000 and 35 000 evenly divided among the 7 brigades 241 242 243 The PLAN provides the PLANMC with both maritime and air helicopter transport a force enabler for PLANMC amphibious warfare operations 244 The PLANMC does not have an organic air assault element and probably would rely on PLAN ground-attack fixed-wing aircraft or PLAA helicopters in a close air support role The PLANMC also has a limited logistics capability Equipment The PLANMC is a fully amphibious force capable of conducting amphibious assault operations using combined-arms tactics and multiple avenues of approach It is the most capable amphibious force of any South China Sea claimant The PLANMC can simultaneously seize multiple islands in the Spratlys It also is capable of rapidly reinforcing China's outposts in the Paracels The 82 PLANMC still faces challenges and limitations in close air support air assault and logistics sustainment for large-scale amphibious operations The PLANMC is incapable of defeating near-peer or peer countries such as the United States Japan South Korea and Russia in amphibious or ground warfare The PLANMC's primary fighting vehicles are based on a single chassis and include the ZBD05 AIFV and the ZLT-05 amphibious assault gun 245 246 Noncombatant amphibious variants of the ZBD chassis include an armored recovery vehicle and an armored ambulance 247 Additional combat equipment includes man-portable air defense systems antipersonnel mortars antitank rocket launchers and flamethrowers The PLANMC is also equipped with amphibious combat engineering equipment for obstacle removal beach improvement and construction of defenses once ashore 248 CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win APPENDIX C PLA Air Force Roles and Missions The PLAAF's role is to serve as a comprehensive strategic air force capable of long-range airpower projection 250 The above excerpt illustrates the expanding roles and missions of the PLAAF Whereas in the mid-1990s the PLAAF's primary responsibilities were to protect China's airfields urban centers transportation systems and military facilities the PLAAF is enhancing its ability to conduct both offensive and defensive air operations farther from China's borders 251 A G E N C Y --Excerpt from China's Military Strategy May 2015 I N T E L L I G E N C E In 2017 the PLAAF reorganized its force structure as part of broader PLA reforms Changes included establishing at least six new airbases and restructuring the force's previously subordinate regiments into brigades under these newly established bases by disbanding fighter and fighter-bomber divisions The PLAAF also relocated or resubordinated some units to different theater commands and redesignated the 15th Airborne Corps as the PLA Airborne Corps 249 In line with the strategic requirement of building air-space capabilities and conducting offensive and defensive operations the PLA Air Force PLAAF will endeavor to shift its focus from territorial air defense to both defense and offense and build an airspace defense force structure that can meet the requirements of informatized operations The PLAAF will boost its capabilities for strategic early warning air strike air and missile defense information countermeasures airborne operations strategic projection and comprehensive support D E F E N S E The PLAAF is the largest air force in the region and the third largest in the world with more than 2 500 total aircraft not including UAVs or trainers and 1 700 combat aircraft including fighters strategic bombers tactical bombers and multimission tactical and attack aircraft The PLAAF is closing the gap with Western air forces across a broad spectrum of capabilities such as aircraft performance C2 and electronic warfare 83 Major Air Units 9 PIAAF HQ 0 Theater Navy HQ 3 0 Theater Air Force HQ 0 Naval Aviation Division 0 Base with suboordinate brigades Navy Special Mission Division Bomber Division Theater boundary 6 Transport Division Air Force Special Mission Division Norther Theater Command 9 MONGOLIA 0 I Western Theater Command Centre Theater a Command OUT I A Eastern Theater Command 6 i NEPAL no a Southern Theater BANGL- Command INDIA Bengal I r I 5m Image Source DIA D3 Design 84 Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win The PLAAF is developing new medium- and long-range stealth bombers to strike regional and global targets Stealth technology continues to play a key role in the development of these new bombers which probably will reach initial operational capability no sooner than 2025 These new bombers will have additional capabilities with full-spectrum upgrades compared with current operational bomber fleets and will employ many fifth-generation fighter technologies in their design Early Warning Airborne early warning and control AEW C aircraft such as China's KJ-2000 Mainring KJ-200 Moth and KJ-500 are force multipliers amplifying the capabilities to detect track and target threats These aircraft extend the range of a country's integrated air defense system network In particular these systems are better suited to detecting low-altitude targets at greater standoff distances PLAAF J-11BS multirole fighter aircraft Image Source AFP Fighters Although the PLAAF still operates a large number of older second- and third-generation fighters it will probably become a majority fourth-generation force within the next several years The PLAAF has fielded at least 600 fourth-generation fighters and is already developing fifth-generation fighters Note what the U S and Western militaries refer to as fourth-generation fighters China refers to as third-generation This is because the PLA never had first-generation fighters--its first fighter aircraft were second-generation fighters acquired from Russia A G E N C Y Bombers China's bomber force comprises variants of the H-6 Badger bomber and the PLAAF has worked to maintain and enhance the operational effectiveness of these aircraft The H-6K variant which China is fielding in greater numbers integrates standoff weapons and features more efficient turbofan engines in redesigned wing roots 252 This extended-range aircraft can carry six LACMs providing the PLA a long-range standoff precision-strike capability that can reach Guam PLAAF AEW C aircraft also incorporate stateof-the-art radar technology such as active electronically scanned array radars that offer instantaneous target updates electronic beam steering advanced specialized radar modes very large search volumes and the ability to stare at a target or track thousands of targets simultaneously These features combine to provide faster target acquisition time more accurate target position data and increased ability to detect low-observable targets I N T E L L I G E N C E Equipment D E F E N S E CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R 85 Fourth-generation fighter aircraft --which include the Chinese J-10B C J-11B and J-16--are generally characterized by the following o Electronically or mechanically scanned multimode radars passive infrared search and track systems o Glass cockpits with multifunction displays MFDs improved heads-up display HUD and helmet-mounted sight HMS o High-bandwidth communications and datalinks and identification friend or foe IFF o Advanced electronic warfare EW avionics including digital jamming system radar warning receiver chaff flare dispensers and adaptive countermeasures o Engines with increased thrust and service life advanced weapons including longrange air-to-air missiles AAMs off-boresight short-range AAMs LACMs ASCMs and precision-guided munitions PGMs o Passive electronically scanned array or active electronically scanned array AESA radars These radars provide long-range radar detection and electronically scanned radar beams that enable automatic target acquisition tracking of multiple targets and highly accurate targeting data for air-to-air and precision air-to-ground engagements o Digital radiofrequency memory DRFM jammers enabling instantaneous smart jamming responses by automatically selecting jamming waveforms to counter a specific radar threat--significantly improving fighter aircraft survivability Fifth-generation fighter aircraft including the developmental Chinese J-20 and FC-31 J-31 are commonly defined by the following state-of-the-art technologies o Stealthy aircraft designs with significantly reduced radar and infrared signatures o AESA radars o Long-range multiband EO targeting systems o Sensor fusion o Advanced glass cockpits with large MFDs and HMSs o Advanced datalinks fusing data from air and ground networks o Internal carriage of off-boresight and long-range AAMs LACMs ASCMs and PGMs o Sophisticated EW suites with advanced DRFM jammers and EO defensive systems o Super maneuverability and or super cruise capability ability to fly above Mach 1 without use of afterburner o Designed with network-centric warfare technology will have potent air-to-air lethality and standoff attack capabilities in sensor-to-shooter operations U S - defined fourth and fifth generation fighter aircraft in China 86 CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win Unmanned Aerial Vehicles During the past 2 years the PLA has improved its UAV capabilities unveiled new aircraft that combine strike capability with aerial reconnaissance and deployed select platforms to new areas such as the South China Sea Examples include China's first turbine-powered armed reconnaissance UAV the Yunying Cloud Shadow and the armed ISR UAV Gongji 1 China also has sold armed UAVs to customers such as Iraq Marketing material for China's armed UAVs cites speeds of 170 mph endurance of 20 hours and payloads of two or more air-to-surface guided munitions Surface-to-Air Missiles The PLAAF has one of the largest forces of advanced longrange SAM systems in the world made up of a combination of Russian-sourced SA-20 S-300PMU1 2 battalions and domestically produced CSA-9 HQ-9 battalions In early Effective use of information is critical to strengthening the PLAAF and development and acquisition of systems and platforms are trending in this direction Information demand will necessitate a tight synchronization of C4ISR with operations By 2020 the PLAAF probably hopes to develop an ISR capability to effectively support traditional air missions including ground support and air superiority along with the PLA's emerging military capabilities in space From the PLAAF's perspective this essentially means seamlessly melding all of its air and space capabilities a significant challenge I N T E L L I G E N C E Image Source AFP D E F E N S E PLAAF KJ-2000 airborne early warning and control system aircraft Transport China's aviation industry continues to test its Y-20 large transport aircraft for introduction into the PLA's operational inventory to supplement and eventually replace China's small fleet of strategic airlift assets which includes a limited number of Russian-made Il-76 aircraft The Y-20 conducted its maiden flight in early 2013 and reportedly uses the same Russian engines as the Il-76 The large transports are intended to support airborne C2 logistics paradrop aerial refueling and strategic reconnaissance operations as well as HADR A G E N C Y 2018 Russia began delivering to China the S-400 Triumf SAM system which Beijing will use to improve its strategic air defense systems as a follow-on to the SA-20 253 The PLAAF may simultaneously develop its domestically produced CSA-X-19 HQ-19 to provide the basis for a ballistic missile defense capability 87 Aircraft Systems Characteristics Chinese Manned Aircraft U S Generation Mission Role Status Off-BoreAESA Long-Range sight A A Radar A A Missiles Missiles PrecisionGuided Munitions J-7 2nd Fighter Operational J-8 3rd Fighter Operational X Su-30 4th Multirole Fighter Operational X J-10A 4th Multirole Fighter Operational J-11B 4th Multirole Fighter Operational X X J-10B 4th Multirole Fighter Operational X X X Mach 1 8 class J-10C 4th Multirole Fighter X X X X Mach 1 8 class J-16 4th Multirole Fighter X X X X Mach 2 class Su-35S 4th Multirole Fighter Buying from Russia X X X Mach 2 class J-20 5th Multirole Fighter Development X X X X Mach 2 class FC-31 J-31 5th Multirole Fighter Development X X X X Mach 1 8 class JH-7 N A Fighter-Bomber Operational X Mach 1 7 class H-6 N A Bomber Operational X Subsonic Tactical Bomber Next Gen Fighter-Bomber Development X Strategic Bomber Next Gen Long-Range Bomber Development X KJ-2000 N A AEW C Operational X Subsonic KJ-200 N A AEW C Operational X Subsonic KJ-500 N A AEW C Operational X Subsonic Speed Mach 2 class X Mach 2 class X X Mach 2 class X Mach 1 8 class Mach 2 class X X Indicates a generation of aircraft has been partially upgraded with next-generation capabilities PLAAF literature paints a detailed picture of tomorrow's air wars battlespace It will be an uncertain hotly contested environment where decisions will be made with extreme alacrity requiring highly specialized equipment The entire battlespace will be information-driven from command staff decisions and supporting C2 all the way to the very weapons the PLAAF desires 88 CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win Training and Exercises During the past few years the PLAAF has revamped its training program and now seeks to replicate real-world combat environments as closely as possible Through its four namebrand exercises --RED SWORD GOLDEN HELMET GOLDEN DART and BLUE SHIELD--the PLAAF is making incremental improvements to its training regimen The PLAAF continues to seek engagement with foreign air forces such as by participating in the Russian-sponsored Aviadarts air-to-ground competition and the FALCON STRIKE exercise with the Royal Thai Air Force to gain exposure to foreign operational concepts and tactics The effect of these training initiatives on operational capabilities remains to be seen however the PLAAF is beginning to codify fundamental changes to the training philosophy that are expected to improve the PLA's air capa- A G E N C Y Airborne Corps As part of ongoing military reforms in 2017 the PLAAF reorganized its airborne units into a new corps--the PLA Airborne Corps--consisting of six airborne brigades a special operations brigade an aviation brigade and a support brigade Previously airborne forces fell under the PLAAF 15th Airborne Corps and were organized into three airborne divisions supported by a special operations group with both fixedand rotary-wing assets 254 The PLA Airborne Corps' main purpose is to carry out operations including parachute aircraft landing and mixed parachute and aircraft landing According to PLAA doctrine the main advantage of airborne operations is to cut across ground defense lines and topographical obstacles to unfold attacks directly inside the enemy disposition 255 These operations are designed to support main-force operational efforts seize and hold key targets and areas in the enemy's depth such as airfields and bridges block an enemy's retreat block reinforcement by enemy reserve forces and conduct raids on key targets in the enemy's depth 256 I N T E L L I G E N C E Image Source AFP D E F E N S E Two J-10 fighters refueling with an H-6U tanker Numerous professional articles and speeches by high-ranking Chinese officers indicate the PLAAF does not believe that its past training practices prepared its pilots and other personnel for actual combat Unrealistic training manifested itself in multiple ways that hindered the PLA's air combat capabilities The PLA recognizes that a gap exists between the skills of its pilots and those in the air forces of powerful nations To address training weaknesses the former PLAAF commander said that when the PLAAF trains it must train for battle instead of doing things for show or going through the motions 89 bilities during the coming years A key factor in this development is the PLAAF's use of advanced air combat maneuvering instrumentation ACMI systems which enable the force to train with more realism and learn more from each event while meeting safety requirements The ACMI system allows the PLAAF to monitor air combat training in real time and to adjudicate interactions such as aircraft maneuvering weapons employment jamming and use of chaff and flares Coupled with foreign engagements the use of ACMI in training offers the PLAAF the opportunity to accelerate its progress in training The PLAAF has also made advances in joint training Traditionally Army-only exercises now incorporate PLAAF participation and large-scale joint exercises have given the PLA opportunities to test its forces' progress toward being able to operate in a true joint environment Although more recent exercises suggest improvement and increased sophistication systemic shortfalls identified in several PLA training events--difficulty in coordination obstacles to information sharing limited realism and a continued reliance on scripting--persist as problems for PLA and PLAAF leaders hampering key functions such as air defense targeting battle damage assessment and air support to ground forces Two fighter jets during a military drill over the South China Sea Image Source AFP 90 CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win APPENDIX D PLA Rocket Force Principal Weapon Systems The PLARF has about 1 200 short-range ballistic missiles SRBMs and China is increasing the lethality of its conventional missile force by fielding the CSS-11 DF-16 ballistic missile with a range of 800 to 1 000 kilometers The CSS-11 DF-16 coupled with the already deployed conventional land-attack and antiship variants of the CSS-5 DF-21 China unveiled the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile IRBM during its September 2015 military parade in Beijing The DF-26 is capable of conducting precision strikes against ground targets and contributes to China's counterintervention posture in the Asia-Pacific region During the parade official public statements also referenced a nuclear version of the DF-26 which if it has the same guidance capabilities would give China its first nuclear precision-strike capability against theater targets A G E N C Y The PLARF operates China's strategic landbased nuclear and conventional missiles and is a critical component of China's deterrence strategy and efforts to counter third-party intervention in regional conflicts The PLARF also is charged with developing and testing several new classes and variants of long-range missiles forming additional missile units upgrading older missile systems and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses The Rocket Force is fielding conventional MRBMs to increase the range at which it can conduct precision strikes against land targets and naval ships including aircraft carriers operating from China's shores out to the first island chain--the islands running from the Kurils through Taiwan to Borneo roughly encompassing the Yellow Sea East China Sea and South China Sea The CSS-5 Mod-5 DF-21D has a range exceeding 1 500 kilometers and has a maneuverable warhead During the PLA's 90th anniversary parade in 2017 China displayed a new MRBM designated the DF-16G which China claims features high accuracy short preparation time and an improved maneuverable terminal stage that can better infiltrate missile defense systems 258 I N T E L L I G E N C E Roles and Missions medium-range ballistic missile MRBM will improve China's ability to strike not only Taiwan but other regional targets D E F E N S E As part of military reforms initiated in late 2015 the PLA Second Artillery Force was renamed the PLA Rocket Force PLARF and for the first time the force was elevated to a full service on equal footing with the PLA Army Navy and Air Force PLARF weapons systems include dozens of ICBMs and hundreds of theater-range missiles for precision strike against major adversary military and civilian infrastructure 257 91 A CSS-5 Mod 5 DF-21D antiship ballistic missile ASBM system on parade Image Source AFP The PLARF also continues to enhance its nuclear deterrent maintaining silo-based nuclear ICBMs and adding more survivable mobile nuclear delivery systems China currently has 75 to 100 ICBMs including the silobased CSS-4 Mod 2 DF-5A and MIRV-equipped CSS-4 Mod 3 DF-5B the solid-fueled road-mobile CSS-10 Mod 1 DF-31 and CSS-10 Mod 2 DF-31A and the shorter range CSS-3 DF-4 The CSS-10 Mod 2 DF-31A has a range of more than 11 200 kilometers and can reach most locations within the continental United States China also is developing a new MIRV-capable road-mobile ICBM the CSS-X-10 DF-41 92 The CJ-10 ground-launched cruise missile GLCM has a range in excess of 1 500 kilometers and offers flight profiles different from ballistic missiles enhancing targeting options Because of overlap in the kinds of targets China is likely to engage with either ballistic missiles or cruise missiles GLCMs and airlaunched land-attack cruise missiles provide key operational and planning flexibility These weapons are likely to reduce the burden on ballistic missile forces as well as create somewhat safer strike opportunities for Chinese aircrews allowing them to engage from much greater distances and from more advantageous locations This will complicate an adversary's air and missile defense problem CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win Warheads Propellant Deployment Max Mode Range km CSS-3 DF-4 ICBM Nuclear Liquid ROTL 5 500 CSS-4 DF-5 ICBM Nuclear Liquid Silo 12 000-13 000 CSS-7 DF-11 SRBM Conventional Solid Mobile 300-600 CSS-6 DF-15 SRBM Conventional Solid Mobile 600-850 CSS-11 DF-16 SRBM Conventional Solid Mobile 800-1 000 CSS-5 DF-21 MRBM Nuclear and Conventional Variants Solid Mobile 1 500-1 750 CSS-5 Mod-5 DF-21D ASBM Conventional Solid Mobile 1 500 DF-26 IRBM Nuclear and Conventional Variants Solid Mobile 4 000 CSS-10 DF-31 ICBM Nuclear Solid Mobile 7 200-11 200 CJ-10 GLCM Conventional Solid Mobile 1500 This chart does not include systems in development Rollout to Launch I N T E L L I G E N C E Type D E F E N S E System A G E N C Y PLA Rocket Force Systems 93 94 China s Conventional and Nuclear Strike Range Conventional 0 Range 3 00 to CSS-EID 0 Range CBS-5 Mod CJ-1D NuclearfConventional 0 750ka DF-ZE 4 000km Nuclear CBS-3 5 500ka 11 200ka 0 13 000ka Image Source DIA DE Design Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win The PLARF is moving away from a dependence on conscripted personnel and is developing a technically qualified enlisted force In addition the force is modifying its annual training cycle to incorporate more complicated training earlier in the year enabling PLARF units to better prepare to participate in PLA joint training in the fall The force also reportedly has implemented a rating system for unit training as well as accreditation criteria for personnel at critical posts PLARF training includes annual live missile launches that allow the missile brigades to practice all required procedures Much like the increase in complexity for other PLA training events recent Rocket Force guidance has called for the participating missile units to increase the difficulty and intensity of live launches A G E N C Y PLARF participation in joint force training has increased during the past few years and all PLA joint training events probably now include at least some level of PLARF involvement such as PLARF field operations in support of the exercise This development indicates an increased emphasis on joint firepower operations The PLARF now regularly conducts training under extreme weather and geographical conditions and in complex electromagnetic and nuclear biological and chemical environments The PLARF's goal is to train under actual combat conditions which include contending with enemy special forces satellite reconnaissance electromagnetic jamming and air attacks To that end the PLARF has worked to improve its training against a modern informatized blue force that portrays a superior adversary I N T E L L I G E N C E Training D E F E N S E CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R 95 CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win APPENDIX E PLA Strategic Support Force In December 2015 Beijing established the Strategic Support Force SSF to provide the PLA with cyber aerospace and electronic warfare capabilities 259 The SSF forms the core of China's information warfare force supports the entire PLA and reports directly to the CMC The force's formation appears to be the outcome of debate in the PLA since the 1980s regarding PLA needs in a potential conflict with peer nations According to a Ministry of National Defense spokesman The SSF will integrate reconnaissance early warning communications command control and navigation and will provide strong support for joint operations for each military service branch 260 A key aspect of the SSF is that the new body unites previously dispersed elements pro- The PLA's 90th anniversary parade in July 2017 included the participation of an SSF electronic reconnaissance formation which reportedly provides highly mobile integrated flexible multidomain information warfare capabilities The unit's mission reportedly is seizing and maintaining battlefield information control This focus on the SSF and one of its premier units suggests that the PLA is increasing the priority and prominence of the SSF and its assigned missions to tackle the military's deficiencies in controlling complex electromagnetic environments 261 I N T E L L I G E N C E Image Source Wikicommons D E F E N S E Strategic Support Force Insignia The SSF constitutes the first steps in the development of a cyberforce by combining cyber reconnaissance cyberattack and cyberdefense capabilities into one organization to reduce bureaucratic hurdles and centralize command and control The SSF also appears to be in line with PLA efforts to support and execute modern informatized warfare A G E N C Y viding more centralized command and control of China's cyber space and electronic warfare capabilities Before the 2015 structural reforms for example responsibility for space cyber and electronic warfare missions rested with offices across the former General Armaments Department and the General Staff Department GSD including the GSD Technical Department and GSD Electronic Countermeasures and Radar Department 97 CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win APPENDIX F Chinese Intelligence Services Domestic Security The Ministry of Public Security MPS is China's principal domestic security agency and is responsible for overseeing the country's domestic policing and public security activities Although the MPS is not directly involved in domestic intelligence gathering it has domestic intelligence functions including investigating corruption cases countering threats to political and social stability countering terrorism and policing the Internet 266 267 Signals Intelligence The former PLA Third Department 3PLA was one of the GSD's subdepartments but postreform has probably been renamed and subordinated under the SSF This element controls a vast signals intelligence SIGINT and computer network A G E N C Y Military Intelligence The former PLA Second Department 2PLA was a subdepartment of the GSD Postreform the 2PLA has been identified as the Intelligence Bureau of the Joint Staff Department under the Central Military Commission 271 This bureau carries out the military's overt reporting and clandestine human intelligence collection operations provides indications and warning and other analysis to the CMC leadership runs the defense attache network and manages intelligence produced by dedicated PLA reconnaissance assets 272 273 274 I N T E L L I G E N C E Civilian Intelligence The Ministry of State Security MSS is China's main civilian intelligence and counterintelligence service 264 MSS missions include protecting China's national security securing political and social stability implementing the updated State Security Law and related laws and regulations protecting state secrets and conducting counterintelligence 265 Political Work The General Political Department Liaison Department which probably was renamed the Political Work Department Liaison Bureau PWD LB during recent reforms is the PLA's principal organization responsible for political warfare and for collecting and analyzing intelligence information regarding senior-level officers from the United States Taiwan Japan and other defense establishments of interest 268 269 The PWD LB functions as an interlocking directorate that operates at the nexus of politics finance military operations and intelligence The PWD LB has few analogous counterparts in modern democratic societies 270 D E F E N S E In June 2017 China passed a National Intelligence Law specifying that state intelligence work would fall under the central national security leadership body and military intelligence work would fall under the Central Military Commission 262 The central national security leadership body may refer to an intelligence committee structure subordinate to China's Central National Security Commission 263 The PLA's national-level intelligence system is still undergoing changes as part of broader military reform efforts 99 operations infrastructure The PLA's SIGINT and cyber assets target foreign satellite line of sight and over-the-horizon communications as well as computer networks 275 276 Electronic Intelligence The former PLA Fourth Department 4PLA was a subdepartment of the GSD but postreform has 100 probably been renamed and subordinated to the SSF This element is primarily responsible for offensive electronic warfare but it is generally believed to maintain electronic intelligence capabilities 277 278 CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win APPENDIX G Military Resources Infrastructure and Logistics As part of the 2015 reorganization the CMC eliminated the GLD replacing the organization with the Logistic Support Department LSD The new LSD's strategic and administrative roles include establishing logistic policies and conducting inspections 282 The LSD also provides oversight for the general purpose supply chain military facility construction and equipment management The head of the LSD does not have a seat on the CMC unlike his predecessor in the GLD probably in part to reduce corruption and streamline PLA command and control Separately the PLA established the Joint Logistic Support Force JLSF in September 2016 charged with planning and executing integrated joint logistic support for strategic campaign operations 283 284 The JLSF oversees theaterwide supply operations while service branches retain service-specific supply responsibilities 285 The force is headquartered at a joint logistic support base in Wuhan and A G E N C Y Image Source DVIDS I N T E L L I G E N C E The PLA has gradually integrated its military and civilian sectors by drawing on private or civilian companies to supplement its logistics resources Before reforms the PLA's supply system was controlled at multiple levels The former General Logistics Department GLD provided general purpose supplies such as food shelter and fuel Specific branches of each service maintained special materiel unique to the PLAN and PLAAF Redundant service and joint supply processes created inefficiencies within the logistics system Corruption bribery and misuse of funds further reduced the effectiveness of strategic logistic support Reforms to the PLA logistics system combined with vigorous anticorruption measures are intended to both improve the efficiency of logistic support and reduce waste within the system 280 281 PLAN Fusu class replenishment ship Qinghaihu D E F E N S E The PLA's centralized control supply system uses a push-pull process for replenishment This means that supplies are pushed to the troops based on standard demand and use individual units pull supplies when they require additional materiel Shortfalls in logistic support to PLA operations even going back to China's military conflict with Vietnam in the late 1970s when troops were ill equipped and encountered replenishment problems have prompted the PLA to modernize its logistic support to match the modern requirements of its forces 279 This incremental transformation began in 2002 but also has been a major focus of the PLA's ongoing reform efforts 101 commands five subordinate support centers 286 The reorganization centralizes logistics operations under one chain of command to more efficiently support theater and strategic logistics operations Much like structural changes that separated operational control of the PLA from force-building efforts among the PLA's services the establishment of the LSD and JLSF separated logistics management from logistic support to combat operations and probably was intended to shorten resource replenishment timelines across the PLA These logistic reforms require testing to determine whether they will be effective in helping China overcome some of its combat inefficiencies and successfully support regional and national military operations The PLA will focus on developing uniform military and civilian standards for infrastructure key technical areas and major industries exploring methods for training military personnel in industries and outsourcing logistics support to civilian support systems --Excerpt from China's Military Strategy May 2015 The PLA also has continued its efforts to improve civil-military integration as a core function of logistic support to military operations under the LSD and JLSF constructs This entails leveraging civilian sector capabilities and technologies to support military logistics to improve efficiency and reduce costs 102 The PLA continues to increase its use of civilian-controlled assets in military operations and exercises most notably civilian ground transportation and ships supporting joint exercises and civilian firms providing supplies to mitigate logistic shortfalls 287 288 289 Military Transportation China has a robust transportation infrastructure and is enlarging its transportation network to keep up with the country's economic growth and increasing military demand Although most of China's rail lines roads and seaports are sufficient to support military transportation and mobilization the variability of infrastructure throughout the country is an ongoing challenge For example western China's transportation network is more limited than that of eastern China 290 291 292 Beijing is addressing this problem by initiating infrastructure projects and targeted funding allocations Future transportation network improvements will bolster the PLA's ability to mobilize by moving higher numbers of units more expediently across greater spans of the country The PLA primarily relies on rail transport to move large numbers of ground troops and large amounts of equipment 293 The Chinese rail network comprises about 100 000 kilometers of rail 10 000 kilometers of which is highspeed track supporting trains running at up to 250 kilometers per hour 294 The PLA also relies on the road network to transport troops and military equipment Traffic congestion tolls and bottlenecks limit the capacity of eastern Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win In mid-2016 China allocated $600 billion as part of a 3-year plan 2016-2018 to continue improving its transportation network and later the same year passed the Defense Transportation Law DTL authorizing the management development and production of dual-use facilities and equipment to support national and regional PLA operations 301 The DTL also regulates the planning construction management and use of transportation resources for national defense 302 Governments above the county level are required to include national defense transportation development in their China's territorial claims in the South China Sea are driving major logistic developments in the Spratly and Paracel Islands China's reclaimed territory in the South China Sea is equipped with harbors and berthing areas that are capable of accommodating large naval ships increasing the PLAN's ability to exercise control of critical SLOCs 304 China is expanding its access to foreign ports such as in Gwadar Pakistan to pre-position the logistic framework necessary to support the PLA's growing presence abroad including normalizing and sustaining deployments into and beyond the Indian Ocean China's announcement in 2015 of its intention to build military facilities in Djibouti cited aims to help the Navy and Army further participate in UN peacekeeping operations carry out escort missions in the waters near Somalia and the Gulf of Aden and provide humanitarian assistance A G E N C Y China also is improving its existing domestic airfields to handle heavier payloads constructing airfields on islands and outposts in the South China Sea and restructuring airfields to support military and civilian use 299 As of June 2016 about one-third of China's airports supported military and civilian use 300 The PLA exercises control of China's airspace filling a role similar to that which the Federal Aviation Administration plays in controlling airspace in the United States Although the Civil Aviation Administration of China administers Chinese civil aviation PLA authority takes precedence over the airspace Consequently the PLA regularly adjusts civil aviation schedules and flightpaths to avoid PLA activities such as exercises and other operations socioeconomic development plan and to give the military basic information about civil transportation tools 303 The DTL grants the PLA authority over civil transportation systems during wartime Structuring the transportation infrastructure and facilities as a dual-use system avoids the additional costs of building separate airports railways ports and roads for the military The PLA's efforts to obtain access to commercial ports in Africa the Middle East and South Asia would align with its future overseas logistic needs and meet its evolving naval requirements The PLAN is likely to use commercial ports and civilian ships to support its international and domestic logistic operations resupply replenishment and maintenance I N T E L L I G E N C E China's expressways in major cities 295 Road conditions vary from good to poorly maintained in rural areas restricting capacity and increasing travel times 296 297 China expects to build about 1 3 million kilometers of roads and 26 000 kilometers of expressways by 2020 298 D E F E N S E CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R 103 Image Source DIA D3 Design China's Outposts in the Spratly Islands China's claims in the Spratly Islands require constant resupply from the mainland Transportation is also at the heart of the Belt and Road Initiative BRI which consists of establishing roads railways and ports to connect to countries from Asia to Africa and Europe Although the BRI is marketed as primarily an effort to increase trade and develop- 104 ment China's improved domestic transportation infrastructure and access to transportation infrastructure abroad also would benefit the PLA by enhancing PLA access to transportation hubs and road systems 305 306 307 CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win o In 2016 the CMC established the Science and Technology Commission a high-level defense research body as an independent organization under the high command It also emphasized the importance of civil-military integration a phrase used in part to refer to the leveraging of dual-use technologies policies and organizations for military benefit o In March 2016 President Xi underscored this message by emphasizing defense innovation during a visit with the PLA's delegation to the National People's Congress He urged great attention to the development of strategic cutting-edge technologies for the military among other subjects The National Natural Science Foundation of China NSFC the China Academy of Sciences and the Ministry of Science and Technology fund and promote basic and applied research scientific innovation and high-technology integration throughout China's scientific engineering and civil-military industrial complex The China Academy of Sciences working closely with the NSFC is the highest academic institution for comprehensive R D in the natural and applied sciences in China and reports directly to the State Council in an advisory capacity with much of its work ultimately funding disciplines and contributing to products for military use I N T E L L I G E N C E China's defense-industrial complex continues to adapt and reorganize in an effort to improve weapon system research development and production to compensate for an estimated lag of one to two generations behind its main competitors in the global arms industry Over the past 2 years China has undertaken organizational and policy measures to reenergize the military's work on defense research and innovation through cooperation with the market sector China's 13th Five-Year Plan 2016-2020 includes the establishment of focus areas for research development and innovation Several of these have defense implications aerospace engines--including turbofan technology--and gas turbines quantum communications and computing innovative electronics and software automation and robotics special materials and applications nanotechnology neuroscience neural research and artificial intelligence and deep-space exploration and on-orbit servicing and maintenance systems Other areas where China is concentrating significant R D resources include nuclear fusion hypersonic technology and the deployment and hardening of an expanding constellation of multipurpose satellites China's drive to expand civil-military integration and international economic activity supports these goals D E F E N S E Defense Industry Reform A G E N C Y APPENDIX H Defense Industry 105 Major Production-Sector Snapshots Missile and Space China's missile programs including its ballistic and cruise missile systems are comparable to those of other international top-tier producers China's production of a wide range of ballistic cruise air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles for the PLA and for export has probably been enhanced by upgrades to primary assembly and solid rocket motor production facilities China has also purchased Russia's S-400 air defense system and received its first delivery in April 2018 308 China's space launch vehicle industry is expanding to support commercial and rapid satellite launch services and the manned space program Naval Shipbuilding China is the top ship-producing nation in the world and has increased its shipbuilding capacity and capability for all types of naval projects including submarines surface combatants naval aviation sealift and amphibious assets China's two largest state-owned shipbuilders--the China State Shipbuilding Corporation and China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation-- collaborate in shared ship designs and construction information to increase shipbuilding efficiency China continues to invest in foreign suppliers for some propulsion units but is becoming increasingly self-sufficient Armaments China's production capacity continues to advance in almost every area of PLAA systems including new versions of main battle tanks and new light tanks armored personnel carriers assault vehi- 106 cles air defense artillery systems and artillery pieces 309 China is capable of producing ground weapon systems at or near worldclass standards however quality deficiencies persist with some export equipment Aviation China's aviation industry has advanced to produce a developmental large transport aircraft modern fourth- to fifth-generation fighters incorporating low-observable technologies modern reconnaissance and attack UAVs and attack helicopters China's commercial aircraft industry has invested in high-precision and technologically advanced machine tooling and production processes avionics and other components applicable to the production of military aircraft however China's aircraft industry remains reliant on foreign-sourced components for dependable proven high-performance aircraft engines China's infrastructure and experience related to the production of commercial and military aircraft are improving because of the country's ongoing C919 commercial airliner and Y-20 large transport programs China's domestically produced WS-10 family of military turbofan engines which power the J11-B carrier-based J-15 and J-16 fighters Image Source AFP CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win APPENDIX I Arms Sales A G E N C Y China is a niche supplier of armed UAVs and has sold these systems to several countries in the Middle East including Iraq Saudi Arabia Egypt and the United Arab Emirates China faces little competition for sale of such systems because most countries that produce them are restricted from selling the technology as signatories of the Missile Technology Control Regime and or the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies 316 I N T E L L I G E N C E From the perspective of China's arms customers most of which are developing countries Chinese arms are less expensive than those offered by other top international arms suppliers They also are generally considered to be of lower quality and reliability but many still have advanced capabilities Chinese arms also come with fewer political strings attached compared with alternative sources which is attractive to customers who may not have access to other sources of arms for political or economic reasons The bulk of China's sales from 2012 to 2016 were to countries in the Asia-Pacific region primarily Pakistan China's arms sales and defense-industrial cooperation with Pakistan include selling LY-80 SAMs naval ships main battle tanks air-to-air missiles and fighter aircraft 311 312 313 In 2015 China signed an agreement with Pakistan for the sale of eight submarines Under the terms of this multibillion-dollar contract the first four will be built in China and the remaining four in Pakistan 314 315 D E F E N S E From 2012 to 2016 China's arms sales totaled about $20 billion placing China among the world's top five global arms suppliers 310 China primarily conducts arms sales in conjunction with economic aid and development assistance to support its broader foreign policy goals such as securing access to natural resources and export markets promoting its political influence among host country elites and building support in international forums To a lesser extent arms sales also reflect the profit-seeking activities of individual arms trading companies in China and efforts to offset China's defense-related research and development costs 107 China's Conventional Weapons and Missile-Related Customers 2002-2017 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 Algeria Angola Argentina Belarus Benin Bolivia Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Chad Congo Democratic Republic of 108 Congo Republic of Cuba Djibouti Ecuador Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Ghana Indonesia Iran Iraq Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Kuwait Laos Lebanon Libya Malaysia Mali Mauritania Morocco Mozambique Namibia Nepal Niger Nigeria North Korea Peru Qatar Rwanda Saudi Arabia Senegal Seychelles Somalia South Africa South Sudan Sri Lanka Syria Tanzania Over 65 countries have been recipients of Chinese arms since 2002 Timor-Leste Turkey Turkmenistan Uganda Uzbekistan Vietnam Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe Image Source DIA D3 Design Other Customers CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win CWC Chemical Weapons Convention 3PLA PLA Third Department C2 command and control 4PLA PLA Fourth Department ACMI air combat maneuvering instrumentation C4ISR command control communications computers intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance AEW airborne early warning DTL Defense Transportation Law AEW C airborne early warning and control ECM electronic countermeasures EDD Equipment Development Department AG Australia Group AIFV armored infantry fighting vehicle EO electro-optical ESF East Sea Fleet AIP air-independent propulsion EW electronic warfare APC armored personnel carrier FFG guided-missile frigate ASBM antiship ballistic missile GDP gross domestic product ASCM antiship cruise missile GLCM ground-launched cruise missile ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations GLD General Logistics Department GPS Global Positioning System ASW antisubmarine warfare GSD General Staff Department ASUW antisurface warfare BCW Biological Weapons Convention HADR humanitarian assistance and disaster relief BRI Belt and Road Initiative HF high frequency CBW chemical and biological warfare ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile CCG China Coast Guard IO information operations CCP Chinese Communist Party CDIC Central Discipline Inspection Commission IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance JLSF Joint Logistics Support Force CMC Central Military Commission COMSAT communications satellite I N T E L L I G E N C E PLA Second Department D E F E N S E 2PLA A G E N C Y APPENDIX J Glossary of Acronyms 109 JOCC Joint Operations Command Center RDA research development and acquisition JSD Joint Staff Department RMA revolution in military affairs LACM land-attack cruise missile SAM surface-to-air missile LHA landing helicopter assault SAR search and rescue LSD Logistics Support Department MARV maneuverable reentry vehicle MIRV multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle State Administration for Science SASTIND Technology Development and Industry for National Defense MOOTW military operations other than war MND Ministry of National Defense MPS Ministry of Public Security MRBM medium-range ballistic missile MSS Ministry of State Security NFU no first use NSF SIGINT signals intelligence SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile SLOC sea line of communication SLV space launch vehicle SOF special operations forces SP self-propelled SRBM short-range ballistic missile North Sea Fleet SSBN OPCW Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine SSGN PAFMM People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine SSF Strategic Support Force PKO peacekeeping operations SSN PLA People's Liberation Army nuclear-powered attack submarine PLAA PLA Army SSP PLAAF PLA Air Force air-independent attack submarine PLAN PLA Navy UAV unmanned aerial vehicle UGF underground facility UHF ultrahigh frequency UN United Nations VBSS visit board search and seizure VHF very high frequency PLANMC PLA Navy Marine Corps 110 PLARF PLA Rocket Force PWD LB Political Work Department Liaison Bureau R D research and development CH INA M ILITARY P OWE 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Training and Force Management Beijing Renmin Haijun - Report by staff reporters Liang Qingsong Zhang Qingbao Chinese language July 17 2015 204 The Chinese term jinhai fangyu is sometimes translated in English as near seas defense rather than offshore defense ONI uses offshore defense as do official English-language documents of the Chinese government such as the most recent defense white paper China's Military Strategy 205 Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2017 Office of the Secretary of Defense May 2017 206 China Naval Modernization Implications for U S Navy Capabilities--Background and Issues for Congress Congressional Research Service November 18 2005 -- December 13 2017 URL https www everycrsreport com reports RL33153 #65279 html 207 Office of Naval Intelligence China's Navy 2007 Published 2007 p 19 208 Jane's China's AG600 amphibious aircraft makes maiden flight January 04 2018 URL https janes intelink ic gov docs mags jdw jdw2018 fg_710922 htm 209 AG600 Seaplane Will Conduct Maiden Flight in China - May Become a Sharp Weapon to Protect Blue Sea Interests after Modifications Sina December 22 2017 URL http slide mil news sina com cn h slide_8_38692_59336 html#p 1 210 China's First Aircraft Carrier Could Be Named 'Liaoning' After Province South China Morning Post Online English language September 11 2012 URL http www scmp com news china article 1033680 chinas-first-aircraft-carrier-could-be-named-liaoning-after-province 211 Defense Ministry Says China's First Aircraft Carrier Enters Service Associate Foreign Press September 25 2012 URL www bbc com news world-asia-china_19710040 212 Carrier To Firmly Safeguard Nation's Maritime Rights Global Times Online in English December 28 2016 URL http www globaltimes cn content 1026248 #65279 shtml 213 J-15 Fighter Jets From China's Liaoning Aircraft Carrier Make South China Sea Debut South China Morning Post Online in English January 3 2017 URL http www scmp com news china diplomacy-defence article 2058888 j-15-fighter-jets-chinas-liaoning-aircraft-carrier-make 214 Chinese aircraft carrier formation returns to Qingdao after Hong Kong Visit The Straits Times July 16 2017 URL http www straitstimes #65279 com asia east-asia chinese-aircraft-carrier-formation-returns-to-qingdao-after-hong-kong-visit 215 China launches first home-built aircraft carrier in latest display of growing naval power South China Morning Post April 26 2017 URL http www scmp #65279 com news china policies-politics article 2090723 china-launches-firsthome-built-aircraft-carrier-latest 216 J-15 Fighter Jets From China's Liaoning Aircraft Carrier Make South China Sea Debut South China Morning Post Online in English January 3 2017 URL http www scmp com news china diplomacy-defence article 2058888 j-15-fighter-jets-chinas-liaoning-aircraft-carrier-make 217 Dong Winton China's Odyssey to Aircraft Carrier Shenzhen Daily May 9 2017 URL http english chinamil com cn view 2017-05 09 content_7593538 #65279 htm 218 Michael Martina China launches first home-built aircraft carrier amid South China Sea tension Reuters April 25 2017 https www reuters #65279 com article us-china-military-carrier china-launches-first-home-built-aircraft-carrieramid-south-china-sea-tension-idUSKBN17S06B 219 The PLA Navy New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century 2015 Office of Naval Intelligence 220 China's Military Strategy White Paper The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China May 2015 Beijing http news xinhuanet com english china 2015-05 26 c_134271001 htm 221 The PLA Navy New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century 2015 Office of Naval Intelligence 222 The PLA Navy New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century 2015 Office of Naval Intelligence 223 Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2017 Office of the Secretary of Defense May 2017 224 Annual Report to Congress Military 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china-buildsmodern-marine-corps-force 228 China Country Handbook - 2008 Marine Corps Intelligence Activity 2008 243 Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2017 Office of the Secretary of Defense May 2017 244 Office of Naval Intelligence The PLA Navy New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century p 17 229 Cortez Andrew ZBD05 ZLT05 Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicles Published September 2009 www ausairpower net APA-PLA-AAV html 230 China's 246 Army-technology com ZBD-05 Amphibious Infantry Fighting Vehicle China www army-technolog com projects zbd-05-amphibious-infantry-fighting-vehicle Cooper PLA's New Historic Missions Expanding Capabilities for a Re-emergent Maritime Power June 2009 www rand org pubs testimonies CT332 html Military Strategy White Paper The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China May 2015 Beijing http news xinhuanet com english china 2015-05 26 c_134271001 htm 231 China's Military Strategy White Paper The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China May 2015 Beijing http news xinhuanet com english china 2015-05 26 c_134271001 htm 232 Li Faxin The PLA Marines China International Press Published in 2013 233 Li Faxin The PLA Marines China International Press Published in 2013 234 Li Faxin The PLA Marines China International Press Published in 2013 235 Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2017 Office of the Secretary of Defense May 2017 236 Blasko Dennis What is Known and Unknown about Changes to the PLA's Ground Units Jamestown Foundation 11 May 2017 237 Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2017 Office of the Secretary of Defense May 2017 245 Martin 247 Li Faxin The PLA Marines China International Press Published in 2013 248 Li Faxin The PLA Marines China International Press Published in 2013 249 Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2018 Office of the Secretary of Defense 2018 250 Mark R Cozad Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga People's Liberation Army Air Force Operations over Water Maintaining Relvance in China's Changing Security Environment RAND 2017 251 Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth Allen ed 26 AUG 2015 DGI The PLA as Organization Reference Volume v2 0 pp 401 http www andrewerickson com 2015 12 a-classic-reference-with-renewed-relevance-download-the-pla-as-organization-v2-0 252 Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2017 Office of the Secretary of Defense May 2017 239 Annual Gady Russia Starts Delivery of S-400 Missile Defense System to China The Diplomat January 22 2018 Accessed online 14 Feb 2018 https thediplomat com 2018 01 russia-starts-delivery-of-s-400-missile-defensesystems-to-china Russia Starts Delivery of S-400 Missile Defense Systems to China 240 Li Faxin The PLA Marines China International Press Published in 2013 254 China Defence Today PLA Reorganises Group Armies and Airborne Corps 4 May 2017 p 1 https sinodefence #65279 com 2017 05 04 pla-reorganises-grouparmies-and-airborne-corps 238 Blasko Dennis What is Known and Unknown about Changes to the PLA's Ground Units Jamestown Foundation 11 May 2017 Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2017 Office of the Secretary of Defense May 2017 122 241 China's 253 Franz-Stefan Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win 256 PLA Publication Science of Army Operations p 171-172 June 2009 257 Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2017 Office of the Secretary of Defense June 2017 258 Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2017 Office of the Secretary of Defense May 2017 259 Annual Report to Congress Military and Security 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Oct 2014 http en drc gov cn 2014-10 23 content_18792589 htm 292 The Economist The Flow Of Things 12 July 2014 http www economist com news china 21606899-export-superpower-china-suffers-surprisingly-inefficient-logistics-flow-things 293 Armored Infantrymen Conduct Training in Frigid Environment 15 FEB 2016 http eng chinamil com cn news-channels 2016-02 15 content_6909279 htm 124 294 Railway Technology The World's 10 Longest Railway Networks 2014 http www railway-technology com features featurethe-worlds-longest-railway-networks-4180878 295 China looks to the future with major highway Oct 2011 World Highways China Looks to the Future with Major Highway Plans http www worldhighways com sections world-reports features china-looks-to-the-future-with-majorhighway-plans 296 DHL Logistics in China https www dhl-discoverlogistics com cms en course trends asia china jsp 297 Development Research Center of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Excerpt of Research On The Structure And 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New Law on National Defense Transport 3 Sep 2016 http english chinamil com cn view 2016-09 03 content_7241207 htm 304 Weifeng Zhou China Growing Assertiveness In The South China Sea 11 May 2015 http www realinstitutoelcano org wps portal web rielcano_en contenido WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT elcano elcano_in zonas_in asia-pacific ari602015-chinas-growing-assertiveness-in-the-south-china-sea 305 The Straits Times Chinese Firms Pump $20B Into Silk Road Projects 24 Jun 2016 http www straittimes com asia east-asia chinese-firms-pump-20b-into-silk-road-projects Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win 307 Puppet Masters China's One Belt One Road The Dawn Of A New Eurasian Country 4 Oct 2016 https www sott net article 330133-Chinas-One-Belt-One-Road-The-dawn-ofa-New-Eurasian-Century 308 Russia Delivers First S-400 Missile Defense Regiment to China The Diplomat April 3 2018 URL www thediplomat com 2018 04 russia-delivers-1st-s-400-missile-defense-regiment-to-china DOI 3 April 2018 Accessed 1 November 2018 309 China Confirms Deployment of New Light Tank The Diplomat October 12 2017 URL https thediplomat com 2017 06 china-confirms-deployment-of-new-light-tank Accessed 9 May 2018 318 Government document U S Department of State Worldwide Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2016 Table III https www state gov t avc rls rpt wmeat 2016 index htm Accessed 26 JUN 2018 319 Government document U S Department of State Worldwide Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2015 Table III https www state gov t avc rls rpt wmeat 2015 index htm Accessed 26 JUN 2018 320 Government document U S Department of State Worldwide Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2014 Table III https www state gov t avc rls rpt wmeat 2014 index htm Accessed 26 JUN 2018 321 Government document U S Department of State Worldwide Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2013 Table III https www state gov t avc rls rpt wmeat 2013 index htm Accessed 26 JUN 2018 310 Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2017 Office of the Secretary of Defense 2018 322 Government 311 Pakistan Navy Fast Attack Craft Missile Boat Ceremony Held at Karachi Shipyard Times of Islamabad Online in English December 29 2016 URL https timesofislamabad #65279 com 29-Dec-2016 pakistan-navy-fast-attackcraft-missile-boat-ceremony-held-at-karchi-shipyard 323 Government 312 Qian Feng Sub Sales No Cause for Worry in India Beijing Global Times Online October 15 2015 URL http www globaltimes cn content 947437 #65279 shtml 324 News 313 Pakistan PAF adds 16 more JF-17 Thunder jets Islamabad The News Online in English February 16 2017 URL https www thenews com #65279 pk latest 186724-PAFadds-16-more-JF-17-Thunder-jets document U S Department of State Worldwide Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2012 Table III https www state gov t avc rls rpt wmeat 2012 index htm Accessed 26 JUN 2018 document U S Department of State Worldwide Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2005 Table III https www state gov t avc rls rpt wmeat 2005 index htm Accessed 26 JUN 2018 Article Jane's World Air Forces 05 SEP 2017 Uzbekistan - Air Force https janes intelink ic gov docs binder jwaf jwaf48 jwafa302 htm Accessed28 JUN 2018 325 News Article Jane's World Armies 25 OCT 2017 Turkmenistan - Army https janes intelink ic gov docs binder jwar jwar44 jwara254 htm Accessed 28 JUN 2018 314 Qian Feng Sub Sales No Cause for Worry in India Beijing Global Times Online October 15 2015 URL http www globaltimes cn content 947437 #65279 shtml 326 News 315 Pakistan 327 News China to Supply Pakistan with Eight New Attack Submarines The Express Tribune Pakistan August 31 2016 URL https tribune com #65279 pk story 1173324 china-supply-pakistan-eight-new-attack-submarines 316 China A Rising Drone Weapons Dealer to the World CNBC March 05 2016 URL http www cnbc com 2016 03 03 china-a-rising-drone-weapons-dealer-tothe-world html 317 Government document U S Department of State Worldwide Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2017 Table III https www state gov t avc rls rpt wmeat 2017 index htm Accessed 26 JUN 2018 Article Jane's World Armies 01 JUN 2018 Belarus - Army https janes intelink ic gov docs binder jwar jwar44 jwara113 htm Accessed 28 JUN 2018 Article Jane's World Armies 06 APR 2018 Senegal - Army https janes intelink ic gov docs binder jwar jwar44 jwara229 htm Accessed 28 JUN 2018 328 News Article Jane's World Air Forces 04 DEC 2017 Kazakhstan - Air Force https janes intelink ic gov docs binder jwaf jwaf48 jwafa148 htm Accessed 28 JUN 2018 A G E N C Y for Security Studies in Security Policy One Belt One Road China's Vision of Connectivity Sep 2016 www css ethz ch en center I N T E L L I G E N C E 306 Center D E F E N S E CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R 125 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu