UNCLASSIFIED o - OFFICE OF tJ 1 1 ' liASHINGTON D C 20 2 7 0 - ' 71 - - o I - o RELEASED IN FULL ' o' r ' 'o - 1 ' '0 ' - I o ' FROM James L t alo airman - o oProllfer- tion a ' ' i Re'commend tion SUS TEC'l' ordinating committee for Reagan Administration Non-Proliferation Policy o - I A ehed is the Recommendation for Jeagan Admi 1istration - _ 1 - PfQ- i r ation Polic which has beeb prepared by' the Non o i 't-rb l -ife ct tion Coordinat1 nq Committee This report represents views D f industry groups such a s the eric n Nuclear Society tf GBPbe tQmic t dustrial Forum an ncorporates tJ e positions r ecommen ded' hy the- Subcommittee on Nuclear Power and Electric u-i il$''ties of GO ernor Reagari's' Ene rqy Policy Task Force which was commi s ioned before the election j I I ' J'olicy changes recommended by the' forme r Ambassador and - _ S p_e i al -present tive for Non -Proliferat i on hen he left _ - - fGBPice wa e 'ills available 0 ' the Coord ina tinq Commi tee and 4i' j - l ia e been drawn upon in preparing th report Ambas sador ' eith Gl tnnan -a for mer u -s Representative to t he International i A' tom c Eit rgy ind former Administ Cato of N ASA contributed - -to the repo rt o ' tar II oo _ 1 o or_ _ Mr n neth Davis participated a ively in the preparation _ X - _is epe as a specia advise to - he C o r dinating Committee o - ' - --w Day_ s liad be n comnd ss1 oned by_ Will1am T1mmons fo_ r the - a W i$ q Qffice to consult with outstand q e rts in the - - - o iil r a c ity and pro v de r'ecommetld Qps on t ers - -GBP -i _ geo n c ies with mtcl e r ene gy resJ Ons'ibl 1tl es for the -- ti n _ea ms In adaition the new Olief Counsel of f i ena if E'il' rgy Commi sio participat d actively- i he - ark o the Coordinating rconunittee and in -preparing l S repOJ t o or o o ' t it - t h s ' coorJ i tth -wl the tran it-ion been teams Ur the Sta nepartment t he Department - of Energy the _Nuclear Regulatory Commission ana the Arms Control and Disatmament Agency ' J 1 d' - s to be integral part of the teporta of each of those UNIT MftliHs DEPARTMENT OF STATE o n REVIEW A-UTHORITY WILLIAM J GEHRON jEtCAsE m 06 DEC20G5 zooso21sz UNCLASSIFIED 'o - - o UNCLASSIFIED RECOMMENDATION FOR THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION NON-PROL tF RATION POLICY Focl ls of US Non-Proliferation Efforts ' The need to stop the spread of nuclear explosives is one of the greatest challenges facing the Ur ii'ted States in the 1980s and o beyond The non-proliferation policy of the prev ious Administra tion failed to reduce the potential of additional countries for o taining nuclear explosives The previalis policy mphasized roadly-appli d measures to prevent mi use of the nuclear fuel cycl for elec rical power generation These measures which includ ecF attempts to reverse the repr ocessing programs of advan' ed i dustrial states alienated those nations whose support is' vital to combatting proliferat on in regions where i t potential is a serious threat Immediate nd effe ctive s eps should b taken to redresa this situation and to restore us ctedib-ility and influence The effec iveness of the us 1' -prolif er tion effort wO uld thereby be greatly enhanced f - em Recognizing that the United States js becoming isolated m jor non-prolife ation and nuclear uel cycle ssues - bbe re shou -d -be an immediate us effort tp rebuild the inter natiQnal consensus on th se questions Turther it is important 1 o - t t the ni ted States treat proliferation primarily as a saturity _'p roblem The unnecessary OS efforts aimed at countries I pos i g no risk should be discontinued parti_ c ularly in view of intelin t ional eraergy security needs Regarding nations where the pote-nti l for acquisition of nuclear e xplosives is a risk to US ecurity interests OS efforts should be vigorously increased _ as e'ilch situation requires In particular the United States should concen t rate on unders't anding and d eaiing with the motivations and technical efforts of nations now seeking nuclear exp'l c isiveso ' - - - r Fur h r discussion of the needed redirection of US policy is contained in the paper at Tab A -set forth below are _the bas -i c cri te'ria which should be adopted by the President-elect as o t le basis for the non-proliferation policy of his Administration o Non-Proliferation Policy Criteria 1 The Unite States should make every effort to restore its credibil ty and reliability as a nuclear supplier By enhancing the US role 'i n international nuclear commerce the United States il the eby strengthen its ability to achieve its non-proliferation objectiv s through and with the coope ration of other nations o t gencies with responsibilities for non-proliferation poJ_icy s ould be restructured to the extent necessary to provide for central zed formulation and implementation ' of such policy This criterion is more fully discussed in the paper at Tab B the three most critical elements are as follows The NRC responsibility for the issuance of export licenses should be transferred to the State Department In the future international activities at the NRC CLASS UNCLASSIFIED - - - - - - I' ' - - o I o _In th State Deeartment a bureau $hould be established - _h aving sole responsibility within the Department and -l-ead action within the Administration for nuclear ffairs ' The new bureau should be led by an Assistant S c etary reporting directly to the Secretary of State o - _ o f Offici-als appointed to po ition s with tesponsibility for nQn-p _oli feration matters should share the' view of the PresiQent-elect that nuclear energy is vieal not only to '- is nation's energy security but to that of us trading partners should 'bEt determin d 3 - r - r o Non-proliferation pol1 cy and i plemented -r i Jl t - c_o_rit x_t_ of overall s _international secur1ty requlrements --' v_ -2- should be limited to cooperation regarding health and safety matters safeguards and physical protection With respect to export licensing the NRC could contribute its technical expertise in areas such as safeguards and physical protection ' but its role should be a consultative one nly - - - r - - o ' 'b oo ofP - r ingl l the policy of denial of US nucl ar supply Id be applied o ly to countries ppsing a threat US international security interests _ - Exi$ting international arrangements such as the Inter f ' -na tion a l A tomic Energy Agency IAEA and the Non-Proliferation 4- J Treaty NP1'J regi-me should' be affirmed as the - most cred-ible - inst t ut on al approach to dealing with proliferati'on These _ ii -inst i tutions should be further strengthened and given gre ter us supJ ort provide for an improved universal regime 9r the k S -c oh't rol of interna-tional nuclear commerce US support to the IAEA in the form of financial contributiQn manpower and technical adv1ce should be increased significantly ' - - INFCE findings hich stress fur he developmeQ of strong international institutions should be endorsed as the preferred means of control ing proliferation International exercises under the au plces of the IAEA s ch s he effort to develop o internationa plutonium storage regime should be vigorously supported Development of improved expert is in the safe g uard ing of ad vanc ed reactor fuel cycles and enrichment reprocessing - rid plutonium ha-ndling facilities 'should be sought through US support to the IAEA in furtherance of the need to adequately safeguard new and more sophisticated facilities which will be deployed in the coming decades 5 o The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and the Atomic Energy Act sboul d b rev sed as soon A_hs ress the in dequ_ cies - - _ ----- - - - -- --- ------ -- - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - ---- - - - -- UNCLASSIFIED f f - ' ' ' _ - '- 3 0 o I _ t o t' ' liciy of the last _ four years Such s'tatot9 ' reform t p ' r o am'6ng other things should ' Remove retroactive application of new condi ons for I 4 ' ' y -- export with respect to previous supply - - f ' conuy l ctrten ts' ' o ' 'o r ' o R s tore us parUcip a tion in t he l ernational 'cit'evelop and management of the nucl r fuel cycle and ment Affi J m that existing supply commi tme ts' willo be - honored and that there will be continul ty of suppLy o - 6 o condition of s upply r ' ' o ' bisavo ' unilateral imposition of new con ois as a ' o - ' o' Pen fng ac Ji vement of ne ded legislative action severa-l - iJD Dedi te ac ions furt er discussed on' p ges 1 -5 o 'r e establish - us tredi ility and reliability should be tak e n including the foll li i g - ' i o ' ' - - - - o ' r uests ' for retransGBPer of nuclea material fqr reproces s1ng in France or he United Kingdom should b ' approved without elay in ccordanc e with ta utory 'requiremen-ts ' r _ 1 ime co traints f r processing e teP rt ction - n the x cut ve branch shoU ld be strictly followedc and o Following Executive branch approYal pf an application for an export license the u Port should be' a uthoriz by Executive Order in -each c se that- the NRC f i ls t q ret withi n the time provided by law o ' ' r ' o -#' ' 7 Tn e u n jted States shouid seek to develop new and expanded - -- 9mmerci l r J ations in the field of nucl-ear energy with ' nations h ch sh r e n9n proliferation objectives us ooo t o o o - Pursu t 'of l egi imate energy securit y objectives by o'ther nations s C uld onot be hampered by us inte r f erel ce l n uch - ' -- i gn ma t'tek-s s imi larly us nuclear energy ptog rams should o B' en our_ag d _to proceed an should be- -s upported in accor dance - I''w P l US ene rgy security needs and us international environmental o - - poj4fcy ' o ' _ Pas-t US attempts l ' to thwart civ l l repro essing t pz ogl 'ams of several m a j or industrialiied na tions Al_ l o 1 i ' an 2 to resolve domestic en'liro ehtal probetems in _ So e recipient states hat5 no real effect 011 controll _ 1ng f x Olite-zration and only served' to i jure US iQ ' ernatioqal k relations These practices should be disa owed - 8 r f I Development of the breeder and other advanced nuclear fuel cycies enlargement of enrichment capacity and construction ant5 operation of reprocess ng and recycle facilities should be upport d to provide for long-tern ps ene'rgy needs As PJ roer iate such technology should UNCLA S - UNCLASSIFIED - o -4- be shared with nations demonstrating a legitimate ne d In addition US programs to further improv e the safeguardability of facilities incorporating such tech ology should be increased and the results of such programs made available to other nations w here needed and to the IAEA o ' - ' Immediate Actions Policy Direction The President-elect should advise each ofohis principal advisers and appointees who will be concerned wit nuclear matters of the elements of his policy These elements would form the basis for positions appointees would take during confirma ion hearings and serve as interim guidance for ' Executiv branch agencies After January 20 the President's non-proliferation policy should be announced and adequately spelled out in an appropriate forum at the earliest possible time Th i s would serve to rebut the April' 1977 statement and set the tone and framework for implementation of the new policy L gislatlve Action Statutory change and reorganization should be sought to permit the unimpeded execution of the new policy Reorganization authority valid until April 1 1981 could be used to effect some of the changes Principal elements o a reorganization plan or a bill to amend t he Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act an the Atomic Energy Act are contained in a paper at Tab C US Nuclear Programs r Existing nuclear programs should be redirected to enhance the use of nuclear power for US and international security needs us Export Licensing o Legislative action should be sought to transfer licensing authority to the State Department and this is further de cribed in a paper at Tab D Pending statutory changes if the Executive branch approves a license and it is not issued by the NRC within statutory time periods the President should authorize the export by Executive Order as provided in the law This sho ld be done routinely if license applications are not processed on a timely basis by the NRC 0 Us of general licenses on a broader scale to facilitate nuclear commerce should be given immediate consideration UNCLASSIFIED -- - UNCLASSIFIED J - u -so o - o1 Streamlining of the export license process should - contin e with emphasis on greater efficiency and issu nce of licenses for longer terms and generic programs Order 12114 and the Unified Procedures thereunder should be termi atea thus obviating the need for the preparation of an environmental document in connection with issuance of expqrt licenses o Execu ive ' Consultat -o ns with Other Nations ' Consultat ions should be undertaken with appropriate officials of major _indust rialized nations and le _ding develqping countries tcJ- restore a constructive dialogue- regarding non-prolif ration - obj@ ives and international nuclear commerce including supplier 'Con trol over reprocessing and plutonium use Views of such -flat ions sh9ul'd be accorded proper wei ghJt in final policy revisions i o _ Retransfe r MB-lOs and Reprocessing Approvals A policy guideline should be announced as soon as possible Q rovjde tne basis for issu nce of us approvals in a more effe'ctive manner which should include the -following elements I _o - Requ ests for retransfer for reproc ssing in the United ingdom or France will be approved without linkage to othe issues and consideration will be given to providing _such approvals- on a generic or _programmatic basis - o Reproce si_ng of us-supplied material in a country of l no proliferation risk such as J ap_a n will be approved when a need for such procit ssing such as for waste management recycle or advanced reactor use is established o o' o t ll o Pending legisla ive action once a encies including the have been consulted as required by statu e regarding DO ntention tq approve such r quests DO E approval and State Department concurrence should be impl mented Congressional notification and Federal Register noti ce Without delay _ N C oo -- To facilitate this process ACDA should nform DOE on a generic basis that it does not i ntend to prepare any Nuclear Prolifer tion Assessment Sta te111 n t NPAS for such retransfers Failure of the NRC to provide timely comments regarding the- proposea approval should not delay its tss ance UNCLASSIFIED -- - - f - -6- Use - O ' o I 1 111 1 _ o ' 1 o 1 Pse of plutonium separated in the united Kingdom or Franc e ean'be-approved for use in recycle or advanced reactor programs 1 in those co ntries on a programmatic ba is and 2 tn other EURATOM nations that pos e no _ proliferation r i sJ c on a case-by-case b iS and after furth_e r review on an agreed prog ammatic basis o o -U e of plutonium separated in other nations adhering to __ - the NPT th'a t pose no proliferatio ris_k e g Japan __ a be apP rov d - for use irr recycl and adv nced reactor - p_rogra t s on a case-by-case basis oarid after- further - - review on B J - agreed prog rammatJ q bas_is o - 'l j t o - of o o o o 0 I o o o I - ' Ei ry eff'ort -should be made to develop 'ia common pc sitiori on o 'r o th se ma-tters wi th other key nation s o z - oo w o ements f or Coope ration o - '' ' _Pel ding enac ment of changes in tpe ' NPA na the Atomic - n gy Act the statutory prog-ram or negc ftiat1on of agr ements - '#i endll ents to existing agree iients shquld be pro p ly reviewed - _d ' Us n'egot1 tng pos-itions shoul be -made consiS tent with the t p9'llcy of th'tf'l eW Administrat i on o Cooperatio n under the US'-EURATOM agrJiements shoul continue by ex ercise of the iaiver 'pro sion - Jrri e law prior tQ March 10 19'81 - o -- - - gr chment Contracts r oo J oo o l -' t - - -o - o c o - - ' - _ o Ne c ontract s will provide a ear us obligation tq del iver enriched material - in acc org nce with an agreed delivery sch'edule Such co tine t to deliver will include issuance o f all- necessary l icenses for xpq i so tb t _ the rec pient n at lon will have no -- g eater burden than tha t fdlposed upon domestic customers UNCLASSIFIED ' ' J oo Criteria will ontinue to p vide desirable pricing and l xibility and to the extent possib e be made more a-ttractive ' a ggr essive P t OgMm should be developed immediately to prov ide t h - b s1s for concluding 1l'ddi t ional enrichment cQ n tracts wi th recipient nations which' s-h ould include the following - - 'o I ' An i J o o Exi$ n 9 9 tracts should be reformed where necessary C f SiStent with Statutory requ i rements to relieve ahd rec_ipi ri-t na'tions _ 9f obligat-ions if ex rt licenses are n_ot th unit d States due to i mpositio- of new ' 'o I A policy gu deline should be announ c ed as soon as 'possible to pr ovide the basis for issuance o f US a-pprovals which could incl de the following elements ' _- ' o r o _ J' J 'o - -- -- - 4 - - - - - o o _ - s oo o a j' ' '' ' ' -- o O O - - o z oo o o- - ' UNCLASSIFIED - -- TAB A Needed Redirection for us Policy Non-Proliferation Efforts - I Denial of nuclear supply and other sanctions have proven to be weak-instruments for preventing nations from acquiring cap'abili ies for expl sives manufacture _The United States should aepen on these measures less than heretofore and give gr ater weight to reducing motivations to acquire weapons If denial and sanctions are to be useful at all success will depend on concerted efforts by the other majo industrial nations and by Ehe non-industrial uranium producers This dep ndence and the importance of others in collaborating on se c _rity guarantees and resolution of cUsputes calls for early e orts to resolve differences vith us allies on energy and proliferation matters here are only a few states of near-term concern There are others of a longer term- concern a in these cases vigorous intelligence efforts should monitor the situation closely here should be no concern about those industrialialized na tpns with substantial and expanding commitments to nuclear ei-ectric power e g Japan and th Federal Republic of Germany _ ' The United States should continue to discourag th e indis c iniinate -s pread of sensitive nuclear technology and facilities H'o ever the United States should conside-r cooperation in such areas ei ber in a multinational effort or bilaterally with those nations demonstrating a legitimate o need and where proliferation poses no risk Slowing the unde irable spread of sensitive facilities should be directed primarily to reaucing nations' J'I'Otivations to acquire them To the extent tha t the iotivabl 'on is concern atiout ti-mely acce s to adequate amounts of t an1um or nrichment services at competitive -p rices stockpiling road pf f esh fuel could be a promisi g alterna iv Willingn ess by the united States to s tore or reprocess foreign spent fuel would reduce the motivation to acquire a national reprocessjn9 capability- A us commitment to as lst in the development of fue1 cycle s pport facilities worldwide e g a reprocessing fac ity in Japan and an enrichment plant in Australia would also support th i s objective Re cogniz ing that reprocessing is going to occur on a large s ale in some countries and that development of at least - o pilot-scale '_Jacilities is likely in some others the United States ahoulcJi -- Vi9orously support development of an international plutonium atorage IPS system acknowledging that the price of widespread acceptance of such a aystem will be less strict release conditions than desirable but that widespread acceptance o JPS will pede the deployment of separated plutoni under national cont ol1 UNCLASSIFIED ----------------------------------------------------UNCLASSIFIED -- Recognize the limited value of otimely wa ningo as the predominant criterion for npn-proliferation policy not be ause otimely warningo ' is irrelevant but because past responses t proliferation developments suggest limited opportunities to make use of i tJ ' ' 't o r h -- 0 4' ' ' ' the se k universal acceptance of full-scope safeguards as a c ondition of new commitments of nuclea r supply and J ' ' -2- Supp rt the proposition that IA A safeguards feasibility be demonstrated in the des ign -stage of sensitive facilities Cowmercial and technical involvement in the nu lear power pr gr s 9f other countries will pe rmit the United States to infl ence the content of those programs o '' lhq l'd uc ar Supply Arra gements to require hers to taccept US unil aterallychanges in existing agreement for nuclear cooperation Dl ' supply coJNnitments as a condition for ontinued commerce ha b one pf the mQst offensiv elements in the previous Admini 0 st I Ation polic' Yo Attempts to implement t his objective have ad a'dye ro se eff cta on the image of the United States as a world le Jer wi th t e's pect not only tp nuclear matters but to commerce ana foreign poli generally he decision -de entiined us problems in this respect with EURATOM and Japan are Qf'f jpeci al concern and require early res olution By t he terms of _t le US-Japap agreement ''for coopera'ticm US apro al must be o'bta'in d pr1Qr to reproc ssi ng of us s'uppli d reac'tor fuel or use of pl Qnium separated during s uch processing The United tates should e tablish with Japan a cooperative basis that -take$ safeguards and physical protection into account for g neric approvals for reprocessing and pl tonium use to support Jap pese nuclear energy programs o ' The United s t ates is required by the NNPA to seek trom 'ATO prior pproval tights over 1 reprocessing of us- auppli d material and 2 ' use of the plu bnium separ d in such Pt Qcesslng I - ' o- _ In the interim before the r g h t to control reproces- s f o-t u s supplied material ia obtaitled nuclear cooperation wi t b Eu 'l' OM countries can continue OlllY under an aJlnual Pres i- dentia l wAiver In the ret'legotiating tl e ps-EURATOM agyeements Of Qthe tw1 se r aching a tlucl ar settlemen the tJn1ted States 'Shbul -'-a b'l iat the principl e of os conoe t _rights but agree wi b TOM Qn the criteria for exer c l j ng these r gt -ts predictably and on a basls that aeeta the needs of EURATOM countries which could include programmatic ap rovala o - The United States must be particularly sensitive to the inte es s of th other major industrial nations particularly tho e most committeeS to nuclear power b cause their support UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED t p i ' - - -- 'h 1 ' t - 4 o - ' _ _ is - ssential to deal with '-- i clud ing prol feration - -3- security problems of all kinds The United States canno - e xl ect_ t ese_ '- o co triea- - o - no proliferation _risk tq_ ccep - qs _ ef1ned 11mi ts o on _ th lr na ional nuclear nergy decis on The ity be prepared l -- - to phast r P toe ssing nd _plutonium use so that a umulation of ' _ P tx tPI i stoCks will e cqnsistent wi h near-term_ needs f ' o - ludi g v_hat they judg e to be adequate buffer stocks But it - _ - is unrealisti c to expect them to agree to forego thermal recycle - - or to constrain reprocessing- iDore severely - o t - 'inte nat i Q al Programs t o ' The l 'AEA is the paramount international organiz tion - o o --1 fEJt- ' excharige o technical information on nuclear safety and pea ce u t u c le r appli'cat ons It is also entruste9 wit h - - resJ Ons' 'iJ ty -_ for ensuring through its safeguards activities _ - h t n ucleor ma'terial and f _ a c ilities intended for p eace ul USeS o o J ' are not diver d from such declared purpose To co tin ui to be s Uctess u l the IAEA must meet the needs of all its members in a balanc ' a y yet for a variety of reasons the present balance oo t b etween tljlt _ gency's technical and safeguard programs is under -' - allenge 'by an increasingly active coalition ' of non aligned na jons _ T focus of US efforts regarding the IAEA should be to ' I o' _ o - - R ev r se the trend of the increasing opoliticization of the i AEA - res9urces to strengthen its international safeguards prpgrani in view of the increasing demand on _the_ regime and o ' In fe se support for soun prog r ams of technical assistance particularly to develbping c untries o ' o ' o Contribute greater financial technical and manpower - The UnGBP'ted St4_tes should play a key role in selecting the nex Direc o General of the IAEA scheduled to be elec ed in 1981 The u s choice for this position should be able t o support be above objectives o In Virious international -studies now under way under on plutonium storage spent fuel manag t tment nd assuranq s of supply- -- the United s ates has op r unities t l estore ind expand a conse sus on nuc lear fuel cycie-iand - - non-prolife r ati o n questions 'l'he t Jnited s tates should -1 ake a leading role in these studies to achieve thts end and to -ensure ' j h_a t the es u lts contribute to atronger internati nal energy and ' noi -prolife ra-tion regimes Wi tb respect to US domestic nuclear programs con lderation should be given to ways in which the Poitled States can contrib _ te to related internatio nal efforts in such areas as health safety aafeguar s and physical protection IA A auspice - t UNCLASSIFIED ____ _ ' -- a o - - ---- --- UNCLASSIFIED r 1 o - - - - -------- -- - -- -----o o - - - - ' 'r o - - - The other major international regime -- the NPT -- commands wide support Certain aspects of recent US non-proliferation poiicy however have led to greater question ng o the continued validity of- the NPT and have threatened to erode its future viability US policy and export activities should fulfill t be us- obligat i on under Article IV regarding the ofullest possiole exchangeo of nuclear supply for peaceful purposes and shQuld recognize that a nation's membership in the NPT regime represents its most important ommitment to non-pr-oliferation Similarly the United States should weigh ts obligations under A rj icle VI of the NPT as well as other possible non-proliferation advantages in formulating negotiating positions for nuclear a s control agreements The NPT regime will suffer - dem nst ably if by the next review conference in 985 significant progress has not been accomplished in limitations on nuclear weapons testing and deployment by the nuclear weapon states I o' ' _ UNCLASSIFIED ____ ___ i _ - oA t -0 0 - - - 1 oooooo - _ - __ - - - - 4 - - - - -- - -- ------------- - -- - - UNCLASSIFIED TAB B o Non-Proliferation Policy Implementation In the Executive Branch ' J ' FQrmulation and implementation of non proliferation policy Jl ve suffered during the last four years d e to the existence of o number of offices in the State Department and in other agencies hich had dverlapping responsibilities elatedly certain off cials wero iven high level mandate ut operating staffs 111ere -assigri d to differ_ent offices Th following restructuring of the ag ncies involved will permit unified leadership within the Administration STATE DEPARTMENT ' 4 - A Bureau of Nuclear Affairs should be 0reated in the State Department und r 'a n Assist t S'ecret ry for _Nuclear Affairs which will have t respons ibility for al-l non-proliferation nuclear energy a11c1 nuelear weapons matters which are now lodged the Bureau of Qceans and International Envirdnmental ancl Scien tific ffa rs OES and the Bureau of Poiitico-Military Affairs PM as well as in cer-tai-n other units in State and in certain units in DOEI ACDA an the NRC o o Tbe Assistant Secretary for Nucl a ffairs would have th nuclear responsibilities onow otcribed tQ the OES A rsistaht Secretary and the PM Dfrector and formerly to tne Am'bassador a t larg a nd pecial Represeritati ve of the P resident for ' Non-Proliferation Matters and the voeputy t o the Under Sect etary for S ecurity Assistance and Science and Technology o o ' i The Assistant Secretary for Nuclea Affairs would repoz -t t o the Secretary of State an a would have leac3 responsibility within the State Department on nuclear affai-r s o Three -Deputy Assistant Secretaries under the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Affairs would be responsible for i policy development and implementatio ii COIJimerc al relations and iii nuclear weae9ns and mi itary application Non7prolife ation and ' inter-national nuclear energy responsibi-lities now - it hin the oc partment of Energy or the Arms_- Control and Disarmament gency which are duplicative of the esponsi ilities of tbese Dt-puty Assistant Secretaries would be merged into appropriate offices of the new bur- u 0 'file us Representative to the I AEA would report to the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Affairs The recommendation regarding the future role of the NRC is discus ed in he paper at Tab D UNCLASSIFIED t ililit ' o k' ' - ' ' - - -- - 'o o o ' -StateD partmen t would be placed in the Bureau of Nuclear Affairs in a separate operat ions office headed by a Director who would report to the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Affairs i ' ' - - _ cf o NRC and DOE export functions wnen transferred to the - I -2- ' '' DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DOE '1 o _ - f' _ o All r esponsibility for non-proliferation and inter _ - - o n t-iOl 1 nuclear _affair now si tuat e d i various offices - r o __ _ - - i DOE _ should be entralized preferably under he DOE t Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy NE o -After a d dt't_i opal review it may be deemed deldrable to transfer all exp t responsibilities other than those pel ting to - - rt s trie ted Data to the Bureau of uclear Af a1rs in the - - tate Department -Such tr nsfer will requ'ire lfiOdifications -t the A omic Energy A t The Office of N clear Affai s under the DOE Assistant Secretary for International Affairs IA c ould be tran ferred to the DOE Assistant secretary for _-Nu clear Energy - - f - ltesp nsibility for approval of retransf r MB lo - ' fo - - o' _ l ond reprocessing requests and exer-cise of other US controls under agreements- for cooperation could be transfe rred from the IA Office of Nuclear Affairs to the Bureau of Nuclear Affairs in the $tate_ Department -' - o o -- ' ' o oo Responsibility for approval of technology transfers -- other than those involving Restricted Data should be _remoyed from the D Q Offi e of In er at_io _ l - curity 'Affairs under the ssistan S e cretary of Iref ense M r - Pro9ra s DP and could be'p aced in the Bureau of Nuclear Affairs in the State Department o - o oo _ i_ Re sponsibility for non-prolifeJ ation now in varying degtees vested in the lA Office of Nuclear At fairs the O ffice ol Energy Re s arc1 _ th DP Office p -- ''_ - t -i ri te_ ation l Security Affair and the NE Office of o- - Non-Etoliferation and Environmental Affairs should be _ _ - c htralized preferably in an office unCier the DOE o o Asli- stant Secretary for Nuclear Energy or- 1 ' - _ -- r - - - ' ' I - Res nsibil ty for conclusion and imple mentation of technical aEJsistance agreements _and enrichment ahd oth'r aupp ly contracts and ofor IAEA techri cal suppor ac tiv tJes shoul be centralized _ preferably in an of flee under tbe DOE Assistant Secretary of Nuclear Energy - 'i l-e' national - UNCLASSIFIED --- -3- ACDA o NO -PROLIFERATION o j Nuclear fuel cycle activities now undertaken in the Nuclear Energy Division should be transferred to an appropriate office under tb DOE Assis tant Secretary for Nuclear Energy Responsibilities of the ACDA NP Nucle ax Exports Pivision should b e partially transferred to t e Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Affairs in the Sta e Department Intelligence activities as well as a certain segment of the export activities of the Nuclear Exports Division should remainr along with the ACDA NP Safeguards Divisipn under one or more appropriate ACDA Assistant Directors The remaining unit and positions will be' used to implement ACDA statutory acti v ities in he e x port process and to be av ailable as a source of safeguards and verification advice to the Bureau for Nuclear Affairs n the State Dep rt ent A DA NP WHITE HOUSE I BUREAU A member of the NSC staff should be assigned responsi bility for all nuclear mattera ana should coordinate policy issues or reques s for P esidential approval The NSC staff hould not act as a point of policy formulation which could interfere w ith the timely execution of policy by State Department officials o The resident should establish a White House nuclear committee with responsibility for advising the President on decisions with respect to 1 major or sensitive nuclear supply commitmentso 2 the issuance of EKecutive 0Fders when required under the law to achieve overriding US n n-proliferation objectives 3 the termination of nu l ar supply for national security reasons1 and 4 other major non-proliferation issues UNCLASSIFIED - - ' - - - UNCLASSIFIED _ TAB C ' - - - - o oo - t ' Revisions to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act NNPA and the Atomic Energy Act The Act - Immediate steps should be taken in coordination with apprQpriate members of Congress a nd their staffs to seek revi- si ns in the present statutory framework _ g overning international nuclp ar cocper tion Desired revisions should be agreed and a d a t bill prepared at the ea liest date possible This approach sho ld be coo dinated with the Congress to avoid the intrQduction o f mu ltipH bill ' Elementd of the bill should include o' - o A statement of policy that 4 ' _ 'The United S a tes recognizes aod supports the legitimate energy needs of other nations US supply commitments will be honored t o - New conditions for nuclear 'supply will not be imposed unilaterally or retrpact'ively and -- The United States will provide materiaJ equipment an technology to nations which present no prolifera'tion risks on a continual and timely ba sis ' o o r - '' o If not accomplished by implementation of a r organ- iz tion plan transfer of the NRC export licensing funtt on to the State Depar ent and discontinuance of ther NRC international act vities other than cooperatiqn related to health and safety physical protection and - saf guards Thus for example NRC would no onger comment -on HB-10 requests or other subsequent arrangements o_ Subject to further consideration possibly the transfer fio DOE to the _State Department of responsibility for pp oving 1 retransfer MB-10 and repro_cessing reque ts and exercising other controls under agreeme ts or coop eration and 2 exports of nuclear technology other than Restricted Datal o Elimination of redundant responsi ilities vested in different agencies so that each conc ned agency would continue to participate in consideration of export matters only to the extent necessary to provide advice consiste'nt with its statutory mandate Provision for an enhanced us contribution to the Intern tion al Atomic Energy Agency I A o -- To permit further development of the IAEA as -an institution which could more effectively monitor international nuclear commerce and relieve the need for bilateral control arrangementar and - UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED - -2- - - - o o - ' of te rms and ri-ter t a -and a learer the juri diction of the Commerce Department to li Cense coJDmodi ties which have a dual use ' Jrovt ion for a more specific commibment by the United s ates -to international fuel cycle endeavors o ro o o Clarifi ation defin tion of o - ' To provide for further developm e Qt f the international sa feguards program in-c luding more effective monit oring of sensitive facilities and war-ning of dive-rsion or misuse in a more real time environment o -Minimization of the need for Con gressibnal' review of -Executive branch actions O LlmU ation or te r mination of nuclear cooperation only ' '' ' A - in eve t of 1 a detonation of a nuclear plosive 2 _'il n AEA determinati o of an abrogation or material _y ' v tion of a safeguards a re eflt or 3 a material J _ 'o r - V l a tion of an agreement for cooperation or other r ' ' ' interna ional agreement to wMc h the United State -1 o o o Li is a party In this r espect similar modificat'io'n should ' be made to the Symington a nd Glenn Amendments to the - ' to ign Assistance Act h o O o I o o o Re' i sion of cri t _ria for ne w ot amended -agreements for coop ra tion to require onlY those controls necessary to insure conformity with non-pro liferation policy of the o ' w Administration -- - - '- - o onanges in the approaGBPh to concluding an agreement for cP OP ation to Streamline the process o - 'tteat the negotiations as a trade matter and - - t o Provide for COmmitments to restore us ' credibility a a supplier 1 artd l I - ' '' ' j ' oo 't _ t o o ' t o 4_ - _ o' of s tate and his transmittal of the agreemeri't to the ngress for a rev ew period which could also be Short--ened 1 and ' o -- Fc u approval df the a reement by the Secreta ry I I the proee ures to shorten the time frame for r-irrg ng an agree ent for cooperation into force such as by providing - Revision of 0 Th t preparation of the NPAS should be discretionary onc ' -t hat the sc9pe of the NPAS be more narrowly defined o UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED - o -4 r - s _ o o NRC ROLE IN EXPORT LICENSIN lSSUE _What NRC in the nuclear export licensing process should be the role of the BACKGROUND o o At the time f its creation in 1975 the HRC inherited from its predecessor ag ncy the AEC the function of issuing e port licenses f9r nuclear power reactors ou c lear fuel and major components sold abroad for peaceful uses The ministerial function performed by the regulatory licen ng staff of the AEC has been broade ed end the NRC has taken on 1 major policy role in the aecision king process for hich subject to Presidential override it is the final authority the Nuclear NonProliferation Act of 1978 NNPA confinned this role for the NRC From January through October 31 1980 the NRC'issued 464 export licenses and amendments to eJ'isting licenses including requests for amendments Of the 464 - licenses i$$ued lOS were major licenses in three categories special nuclear terial source snaterial and reactors The expor licenses considered to be minor include 84 for small quantities of special nuclear material 31 for o source ma rfal 60 for byproduct material and for components NRC also iss ued 24 import licenses inclu ing amendments Approximately eight staff personnel ire engaged full-time in this function Both the Kemeny and Rogovin Commissions investigating TMI recommended that the export licensing function be removed from the NRC because it tended to distract attention from the prim ry health and safety functions Others have argued that it should be transferred to the Executive Branch presumably the Department of St te since it involves decistons which are essontially foreign policy decisions for which the agency has no direct responsibility or competence On t - other ha do ft fs argued that the agency has competence 1n matters of o safeguard$ and p s1cal protection which are important determinants in dec1ding whether export l censes should be 1ssued and that this comp tence should be bro ght to bear Stro 'g Congressional forces in both houses ha ve supported a continued ole for the NRC in export licen ing but there also are strong forces led by Se ator McClure who feel o_thentiseo There i$ little doubt that the present NRC role fn the export licensing process involves tbe Commissioners i ettly in the d cisionmaking process on tters in w fch they st rely heavily ff not exclusively on the judgments of the Executive Branch p incipally the Department of State This role also necessitates a oajor commitment of time on their par t Moreover o there is at least s evidence that the NRC role introduces o measure of uncertainty' in the export'ltcensing process which detr1cts f the desired u s image as a y-el iable supplier UNCLASSIFIED - - ---- ' - _ o ----- -- - UNCLASSIFIED o - - -- - o o J irl' - o r COHCLUS IOHS - - 2- _oo - o oo The tmpartant tontrfbutton of the ICRC to tJie ltcensfng process o r- shoulcl -be in e orea of its t stc expertise 1 e safeguards ' and physi l - pro ction -This 6oes not requ1re that tt be a final o t h -- -- authori -1 n the decisi onnaking chain _as presently is the case _ - Rather tt should serve fn a consultative role subject to strict time lim1tations - To place the responsibility for lfcense t suance tn the Executive B anch f e the Deparbnent of State woulit re uire amendment of the Nuelear NonProliferation Act Mitch r o uld be accoinpl bhed efther bt o dfrect amendment legislatively or'by a Presidential reorganization pursuant to the Reorganization Act - ndmeQi of the HHPA by legislative I Ction his the advantage at t could be accomplished within th ramework qfl broa er package of revisions to the Act lt kely tO emerge in connect ion with the ndated Congressiona1 revi- t of the Act this year A P res1denf1al reorganization conceivably tould be accomplished EOre quic y but unless tt was part of a_broader reorganization pickage- it would risk becoming a 1 fghtning rod for opposition in 11gl t of tts narrow focus A reorganizat1on proposal also would be considered by e Gover ent Operations Committee of the Senate where s trong opposition from S nator Glenn could be expected o congress n Zablocki Bingham and Clarence Long are also likely to vigorously oppose 1 1 sh1ft 'of licensing responsibilities o - - UNCLASSIFIED This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu