' 1 ' SECRB UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT OReON '- The soviet War Scare President's Foreiqn Intelliqence Advisory Board February 15 1990 Classified by Multiple Sources Declassify OADR PFIAB Control # - 90 Copy # 4 DECLASSIFIED IN PART PER E O 13526 Ol - -M l 5lS WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON 'fOp SBGIlE'P- UMBRA GAMMA ID fILl 15 'ieP SBQRIilIJ S UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON Never perhaps in the postwar decades has the situation in the world been as explosive and hence more difficult and unfavorable as in the first half of the 1980's Mikhail Gorbachev February 1986 WHINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON 'lap SBemR UMBRA GAMMA Af fp SBGIlB'P UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORH NOCONTRACT ORCON CONTENTS Executive Summary u s Handling of the War Scare The Estimative Process Early Perceptions of the Soviet War Scare British Assessment u S perceptions Entrenched An Alternative Opinion The Rebuttal Hew Information Perceptions Evolve But Doubts Remain The Last Word The Record MUddied Conclusions The Estimative Process And Unfinished Business o o PART I PART II The Soviet War Scare Introduction Origins of the Scare VUlnerability of Soviet Nuclear Forces to a US Surprise Attack Soviet Analysis of the US-USSR Strategic Balance The War Scare Late 1970's Changing Soviet Perceptions of US Intentions 1980 Heightened Concern 1981 Reducing VUlnerabilities 1982 Strategic Preparations 1983 Nearing the Precipice Growing pessimism Additional Precautions Mounting Tensions WNIHTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON -IP9P SEGRBIP UMBRA GAMMA iii IfIlfp BQR W UMBRA GAMMA WNIN'l'EL NOFORH NOCONTRACT ORCON - Able Archer 83 1983-1984 Winter of Crisis Summer 1984 Preparations for War Autumn 1984 Reason Restored The Legacy Implications for Today This document is classified mp SBQRBQ UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORH NOCOHTRACT ORCON in its entirety WNIN'l'BL ROFORM ROCONTRACT ORCON 'PeP SBGRB'R UMBRA GAMMA iv 'Poi' 9BE Rfi UMBRA GAMMA WHINTEL NOFORM NOCOtrrRACT ORCON Executive Summary Fraa the late 1970'S to the mid-1980's the military forces and intelligence services of the Soviet union were redirected in ways that suggested that the soviet leadership was seriously concerned about the possibility of a sudden strike launched by the United states and its NATO allies These changes were accODlp8nied by leadership statements -- some public but many made in secret meetings -- arguing that the us was seeking strategic superiority in order to be able to launch a nuclear first strike These actions and statements are often referred to as the period of the -war scare The changes in soviet military and intelligence arrangeJllents included improvements of Wa rsaw Pact combat readiness by recalling reservists lengthening service times increasing draft ages and abolishing many draft deferments an unprecedented emphasis on civil defense exercises an end of military support for gathering the harvest last seen prior to the 1968 Czech invasion the forward deployment of unusual numbers of SPETSNAZ forces increased readiness of soviet ballistic missile submarines and forward deployed nuclear capable aircraft massive military exercises that for the first time emphasized surviving and responding to a sudden enemy strike a new agreement among Warsaw Pact countries that gave soviet leaders authority in the event of an attack to unilaterally commit Pact forces creation within the GRU of a new directorate to run networks of illegal agents abroad an urgent KGB and some satellite services' requirement that gave the highest priority the gathering of politico-military indicators of US NATO preparations for a sudden nuclear attack establisbaent of a special warning condition to alert Soviet forces that a surprise enemy strike using weapons of mass destruction was in progress and the creation of a special KGB unit to manage a ltN INTEL NOFORM NOCON'l'RACT ORCON -IJ I9P SBeRM UMBRA GAMMA v If SP SBGRBW UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRAC'l' ORCON computer program the VRYAN model that would objectively measure the correlation of forces and warn when Soviet relative strength had declined to the point that a preemptive soviet attack might be justified During the November 1983 NATO wAble Archer w nuclear release exercise the Soviets implemented military and intelligence activities that previously were seen only during actual crises These included placing Soviet air forces in Germany and Poland on heightened alert The meaning of these events obviously was of crucial importance to American and RATO policyaakers If they were simply parts of a Soviet propaganda campaign designed to intimidate the US deter it froll deploying improved weapons and arouse US domestic opposition to foreign policy initiatives then they would not be of crucial significance If they reflected an intemal soviet power struggle -- for example a contest between conservatives and pragmatists or an effort to avoid blame for Soviet economic failures by pointing to exaggerated military threats -- then they could not be ignored but they would not imply a fundamental change in soviet strategy But if these events were expressions of a genuine belief on the part of Soviet leaders that the US was planning a nuclear first strike causing the Soviet military to prepare for such an eventuality -- by for example readying itself for a preemptive strike of its own -- then the Wwar scare W was a cause for real concern During the past year the President's Poreign Intelligence WNIlft'EL ROFORN ROCONTRACT ORCOR If9P SBeRiR UMBRA GAMMA vi ftJIa SBeRft UMBRA GAMMA WNIN'l'EL HOFORH NOCONTRACT ORCON Advisory Board bas carefully reviewed the events of that period to learn what we the u s intelligence coJllDlunity knew when we knew it and how we interpreted it The Board has read hundreds of documents conducted more than 75 interviews with American and British officials and studied the series of National Intelligence Estimates HIB's and other intelligence assessments that have attempted over the last six years to interpret the war scare data Additionally we have offered our own interpretation of the war scare events We believe that the soviets perceived that the correlation of forces had turned against the USSR that the us was seeking military superiority and that the Chances of the us launching a nuclear first strike -- perhaps under cover of a routine training exercise -- were growing We also believe that the us intelligence community did not at the time and for several years afterwards attach sufficient weight to the possibility that the war scare was real As a result the President was given assessments of Soviet attitudes and actions that understated the risks to the United states Moreover these assessments did not lead us to reevaluate our own military and intelligence actions that might be perceived by the soviets as signaling war preparations In two separate Special National Intelligence Estimates SNIBrs in May and August of 1984 the intelligence community said We believe strongly that soviet actions are not inspired by and Soviet leaders do not perceive a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the united states Soviet statements to the contrary were judged to be npropaganda The Board believes that the evidence then did not and certainly does not now support such categoric conclusions Even without the benefit of subsequent reporting and looking at the 1984 analysis of then available information the tone of the intelligence judgments was not adequate to the needs of the President WNIN'l'BL NOFORH NOCONTRACT ORCOlf Il'QP SBeRft UJIBRA G ANMA vii 'l'8P SBQBBIlI UMBRA GAMMA WHINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON A strongly stated interpretation was defended by explaining away facts inconsistent with it and by failing to subject that interpretation to a comparative risk assessment In t1 me In an annex to a February 1988 NIB analysts' views changed analysts declared aOUring the late 1970's and early 1980's there were increasing soviet concerns about the drift in superpower relations which some in the soviet leadership felt indicated an increased threat of war and increased likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons Tbese concerns were shaped in part by a soviet perception that the correlation of forces was shifting against the soviet Union and that the United states was taking steps to achieve military superiority a The soviets' VRYAN program was evaluated as part of an effort to collect data and subject it to computer analysis in a way 'that would warn the USSR when the US had achieved decisive military superiority Reporting from a variety of ' t sources including Oleq Gordiyevskiy a senior KGB officer who once served as second in C01lDlland in the London Residency and who bas since defected to Great Britain taken as a whole strongly indicates that there was in fact a genuine belief among key mambers of the Soviet leadership that the United states had embarked on a prograJI of achieving decisive military superiority that might prompt a sudden nuclear missile attack on the USSR Although some details of that belief becaae lcnowD only recently there was at the time evidence -- fr01ll secret directives and speeches by Soviet authorities -- that a major change in soviet political and strategic thinking had probably occurred For example we knew by 1984 at the latest that a Soviet general had interpreted President carter' s PO-59 as preparing us strategic forces for a preemptive strike that the Head of the KGB's First Chief Directorate General Kryuchkov had told key subordinates that the KGB must work to prevent the US from launching a surprise attack that KGB and Czechoslovak intelligence Residencies had been WNINTEL NOFORN ROCOHTRACT ORCON ' I9P 9J1CRB1lL UMBRA GAMMA viii 'fb SBCRBlI UMBRA GAMMA lOIIHTEL NOFORN ROCONTRACT ORCOR tasked to gather information on us preparations for war and that missile submarines had been placed on shortened readiness times Many of these facta were summarized in a memorandum fram the Rational Intelligence Officer for Warning NIO W to DCI Williaa casey in June 1984 a Il8JIlO that Casey then forwarded to the President position of the intelligence community as expressed in the Kay 1984 SNIB ancl as reasserted in almost identical lanquage in the August 1984 SNIB Analysts will always have legitimate disagreements over the meaning of inevitably incomplete and uncertain intelligence reports Moreover part of the confidence that PPIAB has in its own assessment of the war scare derives from information not known at the time our purpose in presenting this report is not so JlUch to criticize the conclusions of the 1984 SRIB's as to raise questions about the ways these estimates were made and subsequently reassessed In cases of great importance to the survival of our nation and especially where there is important contradictory evidence the Board believes that intelligenoe estimates DUst be cast in teras of alternative scenarios that are subjected to comparative risk assessments This is the critical defect in the war scare episode By alternative scenarios we mean a full statement of each major possible interpretation of a set of intelligence indicators In this case these scenarios might have included the following 1 soviet leaders had not changed their strategic thinking but were attempting by means of propaganda and intelligence deceptions to slow the US military build-up prevent the deployment of WNINTBL ROFORN ROCONTRACT ORCOR AMP SBQRBII UMBRA GAMMA ix 'ft ft SEeR1ft' UMBRA GAMMA WlfINTEL NOPORH NOCONTRACT ORCON new weapons and isolate the US from its allies 2 Soviet leaders mayor may not have chanqed their strateqic thinkinq but a power struqqle amonq Kremlin factions and the need to deflect blaae for poor economic conditions aade it useful to exa qqerate the military intentions and capabilities of the US 3 Soviet leaders had cbanqed their strateqic thinking and in fact belieVed that the US was attemptinq to qain decisive strateqic superiority in order possibly to launch a nuclear first strike By comparative risk assessment we mean assiqninq two kinds of weiqhts to each scenario one that estimates the pro ility that the scenario is correct and another that assesses the risk to the united states if it wronqly rejects a scenario that is in fact correct In 1984 one miqht reasonably have qiven the hiqhest probability of being correct to the first or second scenario even though as we arque in this report we believe that would have been an error o But having' done this it would surely have been clear even then that if the third scenario was in fact correct and we acted as if it were wronq the risks to the united states would have been very qreat -- qreater than if we bad rejected a correct first or second scenario As it happened the military officers in charqe of the Able Archer exercise miniaized this risk by doing notbinq in the face of evidence that parts of the Soviet armed forces were movinq to an unusual level of alert But these officers acted correctly out of instinct not informed guidance for in the years leadinq up to Able Arcber they bad received no quidance as to the possible siqnificance of apparent cbanqes in Soviet military and political thinkinq By urqinq that some major estimates be based on a comparative 1ININ'l'BL NOFORH NOCONTRACT ORCOH 'lap SBeRBIf UMBRA GAMMA x 'fap SBeRB'I' UMBRA GAMMA '-' WNINTEL NOFORM NOCONTRACT ORCON assessment of fully developed alternative sce ios we are not arguinq for competitive analyses or greater use of dissenting opinions An intelligence estimate is n t the product of a' governmental debating society in which institutional rivals try to outdo one another in their display of advocacy skills We are arguing instead for adopting the view that since it is vert hard to understand the present much less predict the future it is a mistake to act as if we can on the most important issues it is difficult if not impossible to say with confidence that w know what is happening or will happen We can however say that' there are a saall number of possibilities each of which has a rough probability and each of which presents to the policymaker likely risks and opportunities When analysts attempt to arrive at a sinqle strong concll1sion they not only run the risk of being wrong they run two addii1 ional and perhaps more worrisome risks They are likely to underestimate the possibility of change the safest prediction is alwaY$ that tomorrow vill be like today and they are likely to rely on _lrrorimaginq our adversaries think the way we do In this era of unprecedented breakneck change the first error grcws in importance And since we cannot know what individuals will next hold power in the USSR or when it is an especially grave error to assume that since we know the US is not going to start World War III the next leaders of the Kremlin will also believe that - and act on that belief In short our criticiS1l of the 1984 SHIEls though in part substantive is in larger part procedural We do not think -there is any simple organizational chanqe that will correct that procedure If strategic intelligence estimates are to give policymakers a better sense of risks and opportunities it will only happen if policymakers insist that that is what they want and refuse to accept anything less WHIN'l'EL ROFORM ROCONTRACT ORCOlf AReP s eeRM' UMBRA GAMMA xi -'lGP SHeRer UMBRA GAMMA WHIHTEL HOFORN NOCON'l'RACT ORCOH This review of the war scare period also suggests ther lesson It is quite clear to the Board that during the criftical years when the Kremlin was reassessing us intentions tJjle us intelligence community did not react quickly to or think deeply about the early signs of that cbanqe 'l'he war scare indi tora began appearing in the early 1980's the first estimate to a ess this was not written until 1984 At the time it was writ the US knew very little about Kremlin decisionmaking authors wrote confidently about -soviet leadership intentioqs We recommend that the National security Council overtJee a reassessment of the intelligence community's understandl g of Soviet military and political decisionmaking both in general iterms and in light of the judgments made in the 1984 estimates own leadership needs far better intelligence reportinq on and a ess- ments of the mindset of the soviet leadership -- its ideol ical political instincts and perceptions As part of this reasses t it should exploit the current opening in the Iron Cl1rta n to interview past and present Bast Bloc and soviet Officials abolit the I sources and consequences of the war scare in order to ob in a better understanding of the perceptions and inner conflicts of Soviet decisionmakera Finally we suggest that the US review the way in whi it manages military exercises its own intelligence colleption efforts 1m t o i n s ure '-- th --a t ' th e s e a r e -- -- -- responsive to indications and warning for war In 1983 we may have inadvertently placed our relationsi with the soviet Union on a hair trigger Though the current thaw In USSoviet relations suggests that neither side is likely in th near WNIHTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON 'PGP SReRIft' UMBRA GAIOIA xii lfeP SBeRB'f UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORM NOCONTRACT ORCON term to reach for that trigger events are moving so fast that it would be unwise to assume that Soviet leaders will not in the future act fro misunderstanding or malevolence in ways that puts the peace in jeopardy WNINTBL NOFORH NOCONTRACT ORCON 'fep SBeR 8'f UMBRA GAMMA xiii taP SBeRIR UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCOHTRACT ORCON PART I US HANDLING OF TIlE WAR SCARE TIlE ESTIMATIVE PROCESS INTRODUCTION The Board has divided its presentation into two part The first Part One deals with a review of what the US JPY the British thought about the war scare both at the t and subsequently It also swmnarizes some of the key characttclstics of the estimative process and offers our conclusio I for improvement The second half part Two summarizes the evldence that leads to the conclusion that the Soviet leadership g inelY developed a war scare in the early 1980's We believe is to be a plausible version of events based upon new informa on as well as a reconsideration of evidence known then Iney i ably there is some duplication between the two parts but is is necessary in order to tell the story in an orderly way i Part One then is a sUllDaation of what we knew when knew it and how we interpreted it It is not a competitive estimate I Rather than catalog the actual events in detail we chd e to s1DlJllarize them and to focus instead on how the intelllfgence COJDJDunity reacted as manifested in its analysis Our concl sions mirror our profound diSJDaY at what we believe to W the intelligence community's single largest failing -- the fail e to provide policymakers with an adequate understanding of th i risks and consequences associated with alternate scenarios in1rqlving uncertain events of grave import i I I There were many other directions that we given un1 ited time would have liked to embark Intelligence issu that I impacted upon our review of the war scare are identified the I WNIHTBL NOFORR ROCON'l'RACT ORCOR 'J I8P SBeRB'f' UMBRA GAMMA 1 SBE RM UMBRA GAMMA NNIMTEL HOFORM HOCOH'l'RACT ORCON final section of Part one We regret that these important issues received short shrift we encourage a complete review of em so that US indications and waming might be improved as we entet into the evermore complex polycentric and uncertain 1990's EARLY PEBCBPl'IOlfS or THE SOVIET WAR SCARI- As the carter years wound to a close America's bil teral I relationship with the USSR was on the downswing from the _4rlier detente The soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan b ught bitter NATO condemnation and SALT II languished unratifi As the new Republican Administration took up the reins Pr ident Reagan announced in his State of the Union speech a' major peacetime military buildup By May 1981 the -era of self-1i ubt a I personified by the failed Iran hostage rescue attempt had ded United States foreign policy took on a new assertiv ess President Reagan declared that arms control treaties we e no substitute for military preparedness and characterized the 4oviet Union as an evil force the antithesis of the US oviet meddling in Afghanistan Poland Central America and el where increasingly proved a constant irritant to th new Adainistr tion and seemed only to reinforce its get tough posture i i Recriminations flew between Moscow and Washington and relations continUed to slide As the Administration settl into its first tera an intense war scare theme began to em e in the Soviet media and in private fora accompanied by anomalQ s and often provocative USSR behavior I At first such activity was easily dismissed as pred table Soviet responses to US efforts to deploy IHP missiles in Eut in order to counter soviet SS-20's and to modemize its strateg c and conventional forces United states officials understandabl were I suspicious of Soviet motivations as Washington struggled gain I public support in Western Europe and in the US for these force WRIHTEL NOFORR ROCOHTRACT ORCOR If P 9BeRIPP tnmltA GAMMA 2 Tl JP 8BeRft UMBRA GAMMA WHIN'l'EL HOFORN HOCOHTRACT ORCOH improvements 1 In 1983 soviet rhetoric bad sharpened Moscow had a cused President Reagan and his advisors of nmadness n nextremis - and ncriminality in the conduct of relations with the USSR I The united states vas portrayed as a nation singularly pur inq a first-strike nuclear capability as a prelude to erad ting communism Westerners including some well-known experts the soviet Union reported alarming conversations with soviet c izena and officials that indicated a large portion of the oviet population believed nuclear war was dangerously close As diplomatic relations ebbed to near a postwar low us an lysts attributed Soviet anxieties and belligerence to a n r of factors initiation of IIfF deployments a strong us postqre in e START talks US action in Grenada deployment of Mari es in Lebanon US aid to insurqencies against Soviet client r im es the Reagan Administration's perceived political nexploitatJ nn of the HAL shootdown and the Administration's pe eiVed unwl lingI ness to acknowledge the legitimacy of the soviet regime r to 2 treat the Kremlin with the superpower- deference it desired I I o 1 Moreover US analysts concluded that certain develQ ments could have heightened Moscow's uncertainties about its lo -tera geostrateqic position o A possible adverse shift in the overall strategic batance precipitated by resolute US aoves to significantly bolste its strategic posture as well as its conventional capabilities i los officials detected a vigorous soviet -active campaign intended to thwart US strategic objectives me uresn i 2Grey Hodnett's eaorandwa of Dec 22 1983 entitled tiet Thinking on the Possibility of ArJaed ConfrGntation with the ited states n Foreign Policy Issues Branch Policy Analysis Di sion Office of Soviet Analysis Central Intelligence Agency WHIHTEL NOFORN lfOCOR'l'RACT ORCON 'lap 8BeRfi 11MBRA GAMMA 3 M SEeRB'I UMBRA GAMMA WNIHTBL HOFORlf NOCONTRACT ORCON o The perceived lower priority accorded by the a9an Administration to arms control negotiations as evidenced y its unwillingness to accommodate soviet interests and i ts ap rent intention to proceed with weapons programs Moscow may have ught were on bold I i o The end of the aVietnaa syndrome- and readin 4s of Washington to use force once again in the Third World ei r by supporting insurgencies against Soviet client regimes ds in Nicaragua or acting directly as in Lebanon and Grenada 3 I Although us analysts aptly identified signs of emotio and paranoid Soviet behavior and offered an analysis of the po tial causes they reasoned that Moscow was fundamentally conce not about any hypothetical near-term us nuclear attack but ut possible shifts in the strategic balance five-to-ten years l nce It was easy to distrust the USSR they reasoned because ' S iet leaders had many plausible aotives for trying to c erlY manipulate Western perceptions I o To foster the peace 18OVement in Western Europe sc rs to derail INF deployments and encourage neutrality within lfA'l'q 1 I o To portray President Reagan as an incompetent as to deepen cleavages among nations in the West i warmo so i o To increase public pressure in the united stat_4 for providing a more conciliatory posture toward the USSR vi lower defense spending arms control concessions and less ibterventionist a policies I I i iR agan Analysts also estimated that for the Soviets the Administration was the least loved of any Us Adainistratio ince 3 Ibid o WNIN'l'EL NOFORlf lfOCOR'l'RAC'l' ORCOlf IJ IE P SHeRE UMBRA GADA 4 I i'eP SBeRIft' UMBRA GAMMA WlfDITEL HOPORa HOCOHTRAC'l' ORCOH that of President Truman It would be just like thea to nundercut the President's reelection prospects oo 4 abnoraal emotional soviet behavior could be and was essentially in political teras in minor analytical products char At the saae tille US analysts often tended to Soviet leadership decisionmaJeing as rational even omn united States intelligence clearly did not have sufficient s to derive a precise picture of the Kremlin's decisiq ng process nor did it have a thorough understanding of the aging leadership's strengths and weaknesses united states ysts nevertheless described Soviet policy as ndriven by IP dent calculation of interests and dogged pursuit of objectives even in the face of great adversity rather sudden swells of fear or anger - Furthermore analysts cdn lude4 that However disturbed soviet policymakers might be y the Reagan Administration they also have a sense of the i strengths and of US vulnerabilities o o o the perceptip the Kremlin is by no means one of unrelieved gloaa - o cov's economic probleas while described as -taut - were jUd9Ja not likely to deter thea from accelerating the pace of Jdtitary spending to challenge the Us 5 I J Undeterred by what was termed the -Soviet pr ganda campaign- and very concerned about the threat posed by thia Ilarge numbers of S8-20 deployments America continued to firm p her defenses by for le deploying cruise aissiles and in Europe adopting a forward-based military strategy rking on a path of force modernization and improved readine J and invigorating a strong continuity in government strategy db igned to protect US leadership during a nuclear exchange J WHIHTEL HOPORR HOCONTRACT ORCOH ' f9P 8BC1tM' UMBRA GAMMA 5 'reP SBQRBIl UMBRA GAMMA WHIIft'EL HOFORH HOCOH'l'RAC'r ORCON As the second Reagan Bush campaign swung into high g ' intelligence analysts began to compile solid evidence from the soviet bureaucracy of growing concern about nuclear wa o In a briefing to soviet and East European officials i fall of 1983 a soviet diplomat warned that the world brink of war was l GRU IJIIlIlediately following Brezhnev' s death ICGB o Residencies in soviet missiona abroad received orders to nitor us installations for indications of us military mobilizati o i o Shortly after the second inauguration Moscow enjoi Residencies worldwide to work to detect any sign that the I nited I states and its allies were about to unleash a first strike l n the USSR Already in mld-1981 reporting on possible us prepa tiona to launch a first strike had been added to ICGB coil ion requirements worldwide In early 1983 Moscow warn KGB residencies that the United states was positioning itself f i o In early 1983 Soviet ailitary intelligence created a new directorate to organize and manage illegal networks worldwide Tbe urgency of this ove reportedly re perceptions of an increased threat of war working-level officers subject war could break out at any moment while preparedness for war was not a new not tlo it bad taken on a senae of urgency not seen in the past Dir1 ives from GRU Headquarters constantly reminded field eleme to prepare for war As a result all Residency operationS I geared to work under both peacetime and wartime conditions - -- o o WHIN'l'BL HOFORH IfOCOH'l'RACT ORCON 'l'8P SReRIft' UMBRA GAMMA 6 I p SBQRB'f UMBRA GAMMA WHINTEL HOFOD HOCON'l'RACT ORCOH IO' '-'-'- -----i - ___ _ ' '__ _ __ ' J -- '- - --- J had been task obtaining information on a major HATO exercise believeci Able Archer 83 This order rf 'portedly followed froa priori ty requirement 3 6p by Moscow a yea to look for any indication of US preparations for a nucle r strike Warsaw Pact leaders reportedly were convinced th Reagan Adainistration was actively preparing with to be highfore first t - I I By the fall of 1983 the beat of Soviet War scare- d almost lost in the cacophony of the international thunde s Massive demonstrations erupted in Germany and other NATO to protest the DlF deployments The Soviets shot down the Marine barracks in Beirut was bombed and the US Grenada ext was ora tries 007 Against this backdrop NATO held its annual co post exercise to practice nuclear release procedures in early R r 1983 This recurring exercise known as Able Archer In luded HA'l'O forces from '1'I1rkey to England Although past Abl er exercises were monitored by Soviet intelligence the rea ttn by Warsaw Pact military forces and intelligence services to tib 1983 exercise was unprecedented Ai armies in East Germany and land placed on alert __ _ _ ' - At the same time the Is acre reconnaissance flights tib in previous years and sent special intelligence requirement 0 1GB I 1INXNTBL HOFORN HOCON'l'RACT ORCOIf 'ReP SBeRB9 ' UMBRA GADA 7 - - - - - - - - - --' - - - - -- - - -- - - - -- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - -- UP SBeftBIl GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORM NOCONTRACT ORCOH '- and GRU Residencies in western countries to report any military activity that might signal an impending NATO s attack usual rise This a nor al SOViet behavior to the annual anlllOllDC Able Archer 83 exercise sounded no alara bells in the US and Warning system United states commanders on the not aware of any pronounced superpower tension and the activities were not seen in their totality until long a exeX'Cise was over For example while the US nheightened readiness n among was not known oo weeks had passed after the completion of the exercise ThEi air force standdown had been in effect for nearly a we wgj U fully armed MXG-23 aircraft were noted on air defense East Germany - There were plenty of reasons why the soviet military J'lej iSJ DSle to Able Archer was missed there was no context by which the behavior First Moscow's nwar scaren activity was the focus of intelligence or policy attention soviet intelligence requirements against the exercise were not leamed jao Moreover the air standdown was not at perceived abnoraally because it occurred during the Revolution holiday about midway -- --- --9 -'- '-'- J ' ' ' - - information evaluated the SOViet response as unusual but not significant Analysts reasoned that more indicators been detected if the Soviets Were seriously concerned about WMINTEL ROFOD NOCONTRACT ORCOR 'CP SReRIft' UMBRA GAIDfA 8 ep SBeRB'l' UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL HOFORH HOCONTRACT ORCOR attack ' But beyond the puzzling soviet reaction to the Able 83 exercise us analysts by spring of 1984 had also a clear trend Soviet forces over the past decade had an effort to respond more rapidly to the threat of war and to ' the capability to manage all aspects of a nuclear war n7 I Soviet exercise activity in 1983 highlighted nthe continu GBPell1 ing of concepts necessary for avoiding surprise attack o o o o Common to all these exercises were the themes of continued cOlllCE rn over force readiness and vulnerability to attack ensuring that dispersal and launch orders were complied with nd previously had been paper or small-scale wartime concept$ actual operational conditions using larger numbers of Analysts estimated that the attainment of the above obj could increase the soviet military's capability to respond I I L I LJ' to an enemy surprise attack or launch an attack of their LlI BRXTISH ASSESSMENT By March the issue of the war scare broke into 'In fact a potentially dangerous analytic assumption apparently at work Despite indications of increased with some units other units upon which no positive existed regarding readiness were assumed to have ngt readiness 7 SRIH 11-10-84 -Implications of Recent Military-Pol ' '- GL' Activities n WNIRTBL NOPORa HOCOHTRACT ORCOR 'f9P SBE RE lJJIBRA GADA 9 ifr6p SHeRR UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL HOFORH HOCOHTRACT ORCOR Despite -- or perhaps because of -- its disturbing WHIN'l'BL NOFORH ROCOHTRACT ORCOR W9P SBeRft UMBRA GAMMA SllCJe 10 m SBE Rft' UMBRA GAMHA WNIN'l'EL -NOFORH NOCONTRACT ORCON was not well received in the Additionally some officials Defense were also skeptical The British Foreign Ninistry however was sure that something was Ulisa The Bri tish AIIba sador to the US visit to the state Department's Under Secretary for Pol 'l IIoiCII Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger to discuss the iasue But according to the responsible briefing official fro State's BUreau of Intelligence and Research IHR INR's position at the time and thus state's position was that the soviets were a The IHR officer massive propaganda campaign Eagleburger a skeptical version of events designed in his -Wk rd s to discourage the British The British case apparently helped by the Ambassador's presentation he was not ' entirelY about events and his intelligence aide most familiar with scare was out of country There was even suspicion in American quarters that the Foreign Office was siaply capita on a good political occasion to force President Reagan down his rhetoric and delay deployments of the DIP DDI-I - a Thus the Foreign Office's expressions of worry fell on deaf o us PEBCEPlIOHS ElfTRENCIIIQ In May 1984 US intelligence addressed for the first a nationa estimate the possibility that the Soviets were of a preemptive first US nuclear strike -- a full six month$ the Able Archer NATO exercise Despite the evidence of ' SI9C r1I directives and speeches by Soviet authorities to sudden nuclear attack and of unique Soviet military acti WHIH'l'EL NOFORH NOCONTRAC'l' ORCON WOP SBc aEW UMBRA GAMMA 11 -wP SBE Rft UMBRA GAMMA tlNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRAC'l' ORCaN the issue was not treated as an evolutionary process In fact several intelligence officers told the Board that the estima e was undertaken essentially to explain a series of short-tera Jormal events rather than to examine the accumulated long-tera rePc rting on the war scare In the estimate's Key JUdgaents Lthe intelligence community noted During the past several mon a number of coincident Soviet activities have created conce that they reflect abnormal soviet fear of conflict with the nited states belligerent intent that might risk conflict or som e other underlying Soviet purpose The coincident activities coil isted of o Large-scale military exercises -- including a majo naval exercise in the Norwegian Sea unprecedented SS-20 launch ctivity and large-scale SS8N dispersal o Preparations for air operations against Afghanistan o Attempts to change the air corridor regime in BarIl o New ailitary aeasures described as responsive deployments and o Shrill propaganda attributing a heightened to US behavior united States analysts categorically concluded n strongly that Soviet actions are not inspired by and i OYiet leaders do not perceive a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United states This judgment is ad on the absence of force-wide combat readiness or war preparation aoves in the USSR and the absence of a tone or belligerence WHINTEL NOFOU NOCOHTRACT ORCOlf 'J 'ep SBeJHlIl UMBRA GAMHA 12 -rep SBeRB'I UMBRA GAMMA 1IlUH'lEL ROFORH NOCOHTRACT ORCOR Underlining added 9 The estimate boldly declared that ecent soviet war scare propaganda o o o is aimed primarll y at discrediting US policies and mobilizing 'peace' pressures various audiences abroad In a more piecemeal fashion t was judged that Bach soviet action has its own ailitary or political purpose sufficient to explain it Tbe accelerated t - of soviet live exercise activity was explained simply as a refl ion of along-tera soviet military objectives lamong The soviet reaction to Able Archer 83 was dismissed as a counterexercise but analysts acknowledged that the soviet reaction was somewhat greater than usual a Warsaw Pact intelligence services KGB admonished ato look for any indication t b the United states was about to launch a first nuclear s ike analysts concluded that by confining heightened readi e selected air units Moscow clearly revealed that it did n in fact think there was a possibility at this time of a NATO attack Tbe assessment bowever was not specific about what type of defensive or precautionary SOViet activity mi9 t be expected -- and detected -- were they preparing for an off ive RATO move Same intelligence officials have since told that the West could very well have been witnessing a careful eliberate Soviet defensive posturing designed to achieve ba readiness for attack while not simultaneously tensions As for leadership inst ility again analysts rejectje hypothesis that weak central leadership could account for S actions While acknowledging that either a Soviet ilita WlfDTBL ROFORH II0c0HTRACT ORCOR 'l8P SBemR' 1JMBRA GAMMA 13 -BP SBeRM UMBRA GAMMA WNDITEL NOFOD NOCOHTRACT ORCON hard-line foreign policy faction could possibly exert more influence on a weak Cbernenko the experts concluded that th s was not in fact happening It is unclear what evidence fo this conclusion was used since the estimate admitted that the e was inadequate infor ation on the current mind-set of the oviet political leadership and on the ways in which i itary perations and foreign policy tactics may be influenc by political differences and the policy process in the Kremlin II Finally analysts dismissed on the war scare including the KGB's ormal tasking to its Residencies Thia war scare propagand baa reverberated in Soviet security bureaucracies and emanated tUCJh other channels ' 1 We do not belie e it reflects authentic leadership fears of imminent confli o Instead analysts viewed the soviet talk about increased likelihood of nuclear war as well as military actions as desi speak with a louder voice and show firmness through a trolled display of JRWICle Such judC llents were made even the analysis was tempered by sOlle uncertainty as to Soviet leadership perceptions of the united States by con uncertainty about the Politburo decisionmaking processes by our inability at this point to conduct a detailed examinat how the Soviets aight have assessed recent US NATO mi exercises and reconnaissance operations -- which of included the previous Able Archer exercise In other wo analysts were unsure of what the KreDllin leadership thought it made decisions nor had they adequately assessed the S JPYiet reaction to Able Archer 83 This notwithstanding the est te concluded We are confident that as of now the Soviets s e not an imminent military clash but a costly and -- to some ext t more perilous strategic and political struggle over the reht of the decade But these bets were hedged Deep in the body of the as esa- WHIHTEL IIOFORlf NOCORTRACT ORCON 'ReP SHeDIR tJMBRA GAMMA 14 cMp 9BeRM' UMBRA GAMMA WNIHTEL HOFORN HOCOHTRACT ORCOR Ilent analysts conceded It is conceivable that the Soviet 'war scare' propaganda reflects a genuine soviet worry about a near-future attack on thea This concern co 14 be inspired by soviet views about the depth of anti-Soviet inte tiona in Washington COJDbined with elements of their own iii itary doctrine projected onto the United states such as the virt es of surprise striking first and masking hostile initiati s in exercises Some political and military leaders have stress the danger of war aore forcefully than others suggesting that there Ilay have been differences on this score -- or at least how t talk about the issue -- over the past half year AM ALTERNATIVE OPINION One Ilonth later in June 1984 DCI casey sent t President a Ilemorandum with a differing view of events Unc whether the soviets were preparing for a crisis or merely to influence events in the United states casey attached a stunning array of indicators of an increasing aggressiv Soviet policy and activities Prepared by the Del' s Ha ional Warninq Staff the events studied were described as longer tera than those considered in the May HIB In the warning S view the Soviets have concluded that the danger of greater and will grow with additional IMP emplacements a the reduced warning time inherent in Pershing II has 1 ered Soviet confidence in their ability to warn of sudden aitaak These perceptions perhaps driven by a building US defense bJdget new initiatives in continental defense improvements in IfOrce readiness and a potentially massive space defense program Jay be propelling the USSR to take national readiness measures at a deliberate pace The indicators of abnormal Soviet behavior ranged in scope from domestic to international They included WHDlTEL HOFORH HOCOll'l'RACT ORCOR 'f9P SBeRiftl UMBRA GAMMA 15 fOP SBeRfi UMBRA GAMMA WNIHTEL ROFORH ROCOHTRACT ORCOR o Preparing soviet citizens for war through activities and media broadcasts o Tightening of security procedures against westerners sucb as increased travel restrictions and isolation from the Bloc populace o Conducting political harassment o Improving military logistic systems o Shifting the economy more toward a wartime footing such as terminating military support to the harvest convert in farm tractor plants to tank production and reducing comm roial aircraft production in favor of military transportsl o Conducting out-of-the-ordinary military activities such as delaying troop rotations increasing deployments of S NAZ forces and expanding reservist call-uPs as well as ext nding active duty tours I and o Promulgating extraordinary intelligence directives f r the purpose of warning Casey advised nIt is important to distinguish in this category those acts which are political blustering and those whicb may be but also carry large costs o o o The military behavi rs we have observed involve high military costs in terms of vu nerabi1ity of resources for the sake of improved national mi itary power or enhanced readiness at the price of consumer disco tent or enhanced readiness at the price of troop dissatisfaction Rone of these are trivial costs adding thereby a dimension of ge ineness to the Soviet expressions of concern that is oft not reflected in intelligence issuances WNIH'l'EL HOFORH ROCONTRACT ORCON IP9P SBeRB'l UMBRA GAMMA 16 SHeRR UMBRA GAMMA WHIlfTEL ROFORM ROCON'rRACT ORCOR - According to former Rational Security Advisor McFarlane President Reagan expressed surprise the casey memorandwa and described the events as areally However McFarlane himself was less convinced He ques Soviet motivations and wondered if their actions were part of an effort to drive a wedge in Europe to counter the Administr SOl objectives He also found it difficult to ' believe Soviets could actually fear a nuclear strike from the US s knew how preposterous that was McFarlane wondered if scare was real why had the Soviets not raised it through matic channels in Washington Yet even the President personal emissary dispatched to Moscow months earlier ith a message for Chernenko was frozen out of the Kremlin On the other hand McFarlane was aconcerned about he had received fro US citizens returning from the Soviet during the early 1980' s Many of them told of extreme paranoia over us intentions In fact one close friend W 0 had visited Moscow said that the soviets spoke of agoing to quarters W during the 1983 to 1984 time frame McFarlane AV'I w- a ased surprise to us about the Rovember 1983 Able Archer exerci could remember hearing othing about it including the during his tenure at the N __ __ Security council Ro President' s Daily Brief during this mentioned it either A- - In a memorandum to Director casey in June 1984 IIc called for a new intelligence estimate that would hypotheses to -anticipate potential soviet political or m challenges during the coming six months a Clearly the Administration vieWed the indicators of unusual Soviet acti ity in the context of athe utility to the Soviets of interfer nq in various geographic trouble spots a One month later the lcasey memorandum of indicators was leaked to the WAshington TiWL It was fully reported as aRussia at high level of battle read ess w WHINTEL HOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCOK IfQP 8BeRft UMBRA GAMMA 17 - i '--' 1 6P 9BeRW UMBRA GAMMA WNIHTEL HOFORH HOCONTRACT ORCOH --- Tbe following day the Hasbington Times reported a controversial split of opinion within military and intell gence circles over the significance of the Soviet behavior sayi 9 eLl officials tended to downplay it TIll REBUTTAL Some officials on the Hational Xntelligence COupci were upset over the sey memorandum After all they had just addressed the war scare in May through a fully coordinat SHIB that determined it was purely propaganda - The Casey memo andua was not coordinated refuted the SNXB and yet had re ived Presidential attention August 1984 the estimate called for by McFarla e was completed Entitled Soviet Policy Toward the united sta es in 1984 it was far more comprehensive than he initially A central concern of the estimate was the possibility of _jor soviet initiatives to influence the November election si the motivation for Soviet policy o o o lies in the perception o o o current US Administration is a more consistently h opponent of the USSR's interests and aspirations than it has faced in many years Thus the Soviets could be expected to n llbat and if possible deflect US policies and create a more sive environment in which soviet relative Ililitary power and world influence can continue to grow By Tbe war scare characterized in the SHIB as propaganda which blames the united states for an increased of war and for diplomatic rigidity o o o is used to put Administration on the defensive where possible and to opposition to Washington's policies In fact such hos toward the west was judged to serve Soviet leaders conven for exhorting greater discipline sacrifice and vigilance soviet home front o o o o Analysts were again catego angar a us cite ility ently n the ie in WBDITEL HOFORH HOCON'l'RACT ORCOH f'8P SBQR W UMBRA GAMMA 18 cfGp SBeRM UMBRA GAMMA WHIH'lBL HOFORR HOCOHTRACT ORCOH their conclusion danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the Onited states Also we do not believe that soviet war talk andl0ther actions 'JI8sk' Soviet preparations for an bmdnent ave award confrontation on the part of the USSR Underlining added While acknowledging that athere aay be debates among aviet leaders about tactics toward the united States analysts as erted that current soviet policy o o o is based on consensus n the Politburo Xn fact there vas indirect evidence of oviet leadership debate over future policy direction largely the fora of varying lines on the danger of war o o o o The es iaate admonished that such debates should not be taken to indicate sharp controversy in the Politburo because showdown were avoided in order to protect the Kremlin's hold on Gorbachev was lumped with ROJIlanov Ogarkov and Ligach v as differing from their elders only in the belief that th can pursue traditional Soviet aims aore skillfully and successfu ly at home and abroad Analysts readily acknowledged that the previous six had seen extraordinary unprecedented Soviet activities scale ilitary exercises anomalous behavior during the rotation withdrawn ilitary support for the harvest las seen prior to the 1968 Czech invasion new deployed weapons s stems termed in response to IMP deployments and heightened in emal vigilance and security activities were noted These however were judged to be in line with long-evolving pIa and patterns rather than with sharp acceleration of preparatio for a aajor war The HXB authors professed high confidence in the intell genae community's ability to detect widespread logistics suppl and defense-eeono ie preparations obligated by soviet war doctri and WHDrl'BL HOFORH HOCONTRACT ORCOlf ' reP SBeRJft' UMBRA GAMIfA 19 IJ I6p SB tJMBRA GAMMA WHIMTEL NOFOD NOCONTRACT ORCON operational requirements Such indicators they insisted were noteworthy by their absence In seeming contradiction however the authors pointed out that US strategic warning indicators and methodologies are oriented toward providing -warning of war within a short period of time at most one to two months But -because we give less eaphasis to defense-economic and other hoae front measures that might provide strategic warning o o o and beca e a pattern of such activities is inherently difficult to detect in their early stages o o o we have less confidence in longer' range warning based on military and defense-related activities alone - Nonetheless the authors asserted that even without the capability to detect such indicators the developments in soviet foreign and domestic affairs 1I8de it -very unlikelythat they were preparing for a war Both NSA and National Warning Staff officials confirmed to us recently that US technical systems in particular were not in fact tuned to long-range military economic and defense-related activities at the time The estimate concluded with a list of indicators detected at the time that strongly suggested unusual Pact military activity Rearly all of thea were dismissed as explainable for ordinary reasons The Board did not conduct a retrospective of each indicator but we believe that such a review would prove useful to the continued validation of the assessment We believe that same of the explanations given at the time will be found to be mistaken For example the estimate explained the appearance of high-level Warsaw Pact command posts in 1984 as part of a one-time exercise The command posts remained in operation however long after the estimate was published and the exercise was completed In reviewing both estimates the Board was struck by how categorical and unqualified were the judgments made about the likelihood of the war scare particularly given the extremely important consequences of those assessments In fact the RIO for Warning in 1984 aade the same point in his commentary on the draft WlfIRTBL ROFOD NOCONTRACT ORCOR IPeP SReRIft' UMBRA GAMMA 20 9BeRIR UMBRA GAMMA WMINTEL NOPORH HOCOHTRACT ORCOH August estimate Ai though unable procedurally to comment in the estimate itself he sent a memorandum to the HIE drafter arguing This episode highlights a latent conflict between Soviet analysts and warnillCJ specialists Host intelligence officers involved in the warning process are not necessarily trained soviet experts indeed the staff tends to come from a military pool for a two-year rotational assignment Within the intelligence community an assignment to the warniDCJ Staff has not always been viewed as career-enhancing Disputes with geographic or other nsubstantive R analysts are often not resolved in favor of the warning officers We have been told by senior intelligence officials that the problem of establishing credibility for warning experts particularly in the Soviet affairs arena is one that is '1_ 1IRINTEL HOFORH HOCONTRACT ORCOH ftemll lJMBRA GAMMA 21 'ffJp SHeRR UMBRA GAMMA WHIlrl'EL NOFORH NOCONTRACT ORCON recognized but not solved easily lO conversely Sovietologists are not often likely to have a deep grounding in warning issues HEW IHFORMATIOK The Board found that after the 1984 assessments were issued the intelligence community did not again address the war scare until after the defection to Great Britain of KGB Colonel Oleg Gordiyevskiy in July 1985 Gordiyevskiy had achieved the rank of Acting Resident in the united Kingdom but he fell under suspicion as a Western agent Recalled to the soviet Union he was placed under house arrest and intensely interrogated Able to flee his watchers Gordiyevskiy was exfiltrated from Moscow by the British Secret Intelligence Service During lengthy debriefing sessions that followed Gordiyevskiy supplied a fuller report on the Soviet war hysteria This report coaplete with documentation froa KGB Headquarters and entitled KGB Response to Soviet Leadership COncern over us Nuclear Attack II was first disseminated in a restricted manner within the us intelligence community in October 1985 Gordiyevskiy described the extraordinary KGB collection plan initiated in 1981 to look for signs that the us would conduct a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union He identified and reviewed the factors driving leadership fears Based on the perception that the US was achieving a strategic advantage those in the Kremlin ware said to believe that the US was likely to resort to nuclear weapons much earlier in a crisis than previously expected They also were concerned that the us might seek to exploit its first-strike capability outside the lOwe note that the Rational Warning Staff does tend to view events with a long-range perspective Clearly we believe this to be an asset in evaluating the soviet war scare WHnr rEL ROFOD NOCORTRACT ORCON 'J 'ep SBeRM ' UMBRA GAMMA 22 If8p SEeRIPI UMBRA GAMMA WHXNTEL NOFORM NOCOHTRACT ORCON context of a crisis probably during a military exercise Be described the leadership's worries of a decapitating strike from the Pershing II'S and its belief that the US could mobilize for a surprise attack in a mere seven to ten days He explained how the London Residency responded to the requirements and the effects that reporting had back at Moscow Center in reinforcing Be described conversations he had held with soviet fears colleagues frOll center and frOll the GRU The next month President Reagan held his first summit with Mikhail Gorbachev and relations began to thaw EERCBPlIOlfS EVOLD Some in the intelligence community have argued that the war scare was a assive Soviet propaganda and deception campaign that not only included attempts to manipulate public opinions but intelligence CODDIlUDity perceptions as well Central to this theory is that the Soviets intended for secret intelligence directives -- like the taskings sent froa Moscow Center to London Residency -- to become known to the us In July 1985 a Rational Intelligence Estimate entitled Denial and Deception in soviet strategic Military Programs Implications for us Security NIB 11-11-85 however dasbed cold water on this assumption Analysts judged We strongly doubt that the Soviets intended for official documents to reach intelligence sources Furtber Soviet reliance on verbal disclosures of secret COJDIIlUJlications was also judged unlikely The uncertainty of the potential for such disclosures o o o combined with the lack of control over tilling and content probably would have led the Soviets to conclude that sucb a device represents an unreliable means of coJlDlunicating with the West The estimate concluded that The intelligence directives probably represent efforts by the Soviet intelligence services to respond to concerns of soviet leaders that since at least 1980 worsening relations with the united states increased the danger of war WHDft'EL ROFORM ROCONTRACT ORCON If8P HeRB' UMBRA GAKMA 23 'ftlP SBeRM UMBRA GAMMA WNXN'l'EL NOPORH NOCONTRACT ORCON Although Gordiyevskiy's reporting remained closely held by June 1986 assessments giving more credence to the legitimacy of the war scare began to surface in intelligence products 1 By August the hsbingt on Post broke Gordiyevskiy's story the American public 12 The article quoted informed sources as aying that many high-level officials with extensive experience inlEast ' i West relations were still unaware of Gordiyevskiy's inform tion It maintained that many western specialists same with a s to the Gordiyevskiy material attributed soviet anxieties in the early 1980's to genuine apprehension about Reagan Administ ation policies and to a tactical decision to exploit that cqncern through propaganda channels The CIA then downgraded aD1i rereleased the Gordiyevskiy material Despite the public disclosure and the broader circulation of Gordiyevskiy' s material itbin government channels the issue remained strangely dormant as a national intelligence topic other w __ - sources supported Gordiyev kiy's reporting the Ilost iaportant information on the war scare came -------- ---- available in the spring of 1987 a KGB ter model called VRYAN meaning Sudden Nuclear lIissile Attack 0 ' and how it was used as a tool to predict US strategic intenti in the early 1980's At the same time the accOJlP nying Pact-wide eaphasis on collecting strategic intelligence a ainst the US including efforts to enhance illegal agent operati to detect US plans for a sur prise uclear attack the seemingly improbable but apparently widespread Soviet lief that the US leadership would attack first to a deeplY-Bleated Soviet fear of foreign invasion 1lwarsaw Pact lIilitary Perceptions of NATO Nuclear Initiajtion CIA Intelligence Assessment 12Defector told of Soviet Alert Aug 6 by Murrey 1Iard - WHINTEL HOFORN HOCOH'l'RACT ORCOH II9P aBc IUPR UIIBRA GAMMA 24 WI SBQRIft' UMBRA GAMMA WNIN'l'EL NOFORH NOCONTRACT ORooN '1h o I CIA o s science and WeAPOns Daily ReyieX in which analysts declared We believe that the existence of the VRYAH model is likely an4 that it may have contributed to a 'war scare' in the soviet GoVetnment from 1981 until about 1985 BUT DOUBTS REMAIN o o o Conflicting opinions on the validity of the war -scare continued to raqe within the intelligence community An- lysts stated in the NIB entitled Soviet Forces and capabilities for strateqic NUclear Conflict Tbrouqh the Late 1990's 111 3-8 issued in December 1987 'l'ak1nq all the evidence into consideration we judqe that some leaders may have become more concerned in the early 1980's that the united states had lowered the threshold somewhat for nuclear escalation but that th tag leaders on the wbole did not believe a surprise nuclear attAPk on the Hest in peacetime had beCOme a serious prospect The authors made clear their views of the war scare o o the at t$pted manipulation o o o is hiqhly dist urbing as an indication o the potential for irresponsible behavior by some prominent Sbviet leaders in dealinq with the qrave issue of nuclear ar Underlilling added Moreover t he authors repeated phrases froa their earlier estimates including one in 1984 They said that the soviets were confident that the open nature of us society made unlikely a successfUl US surprise strike Analysts' assess ents then of Soviet leaders belief on the survivability of 1 heir strateqic forces differs markedly from recent analysis of theisame period see Part Two paqe 46 In fact analysts at the time assessed that the Soviets had confidence that their forces would be capable of mountinq massive retaliatory strikes after IA us surprise attack -- an interpretation now viewed to bave been probably erroneous WNIN'1'BL NOFORH NOCORTRACl' ORooN r'f9P SBenB'I UMBRA GAMMA 25 8BE RM UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOroRN NOCOHTRACT OReoN THE lAST BORQ By 1988 the intelligence community had received re rting in some detail -- on soviet fears of a surprise US ' ItriJte during the early 1980's from 1 A new asse$S1Ient was evid t in a NIB ' Soviet Intellig nce caPabilities NIB 1-2188 that clearly accepted the validity of the reporting on 'RYAN While acknowledging that available information was incomplet the community said We consider the information we have o be reliable and consistent In providing a comprehensive an lysis of the VYRAN program the estiJaate made explicit its vijew of leadership involvement in the war scare and of the Kreml -KGB It is essential to note o o o that the VRYAR relationship collection requirement resulted from high-level polit ical concern and was not solely an intelligence initiative f As for the VRYAN computer model the authors said KGB analysts working on VRYAR operated under the preaJ se the united states when it had decisive overall superiority mi ht be inclined to launch an attack on the soviet Union In li t of this assumption and because the program was supposed to deteJj-a1ne in a quantifiable way when such a situation might be approa ing they believed it could provide strategic warning when the US$R was in a critically weak position relative to the United states and conditions therefore were potentially conducive to a US a tack These views reflected a widespread soviet belief that defiriitive I us superiority over the soviet Union was inherently unst le w The authors also believed that w o o it is possible tha the results of this analysis from the VRYAH computer odel themselves were a factor in the air of immediacy surroundi 1GB Headquarters' concern over the possibility of a US sUJiPrise nuclear strike I However this estimate received extremely limited diss inaWHIHTBL NOFORM NOCOHTRACT OROOK IJ eP 8BE RB l' UMBRA GAMMA 26 fiJp SBE RIR UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL HOFORH HOCOMTRAC'l' ORCOR tion Access to the publication was strictly need to know this was the first estimate of its kind and US assessments of $oviet intelligence capabilities would be of keen interest to th KGB Moreover the discussion of the VRYAN prograJll was contained in an annex that was even aore tigbtly controlled than the estimate itself The more widely disseminated and most recent edition Of NIB 11 3-8 soviet Forces and Capabilities for strategic clear Conflict Througb the Late 1990's issued in December of 1988 failed to reflect the presumably changed co_unity position While this edition acknowledged that Soviet intelligence ices bad been tasked to look for indications of US preparations for a surprise nuclear attack it nonetheless ecboed doubts expres$ed in earlier publications Soviet leaders failed in any event te take certain precautionary measures that would appear to bave b$en an appropriate response to such a situation It did note b ever under the section entitled Soviet Concern OVer a US sutPrise Attack From a Peacetime Posture that in a mid-1980's Soviet classified military discussion Soviet expectations of a q risis stage were described as potentially being as short as a few bours o This marked a change in normal expectation stages frOJa several days to months THE RECORD MUDDIED The last most definitive intelligence community word Qn the soviet war scare seemed destined to languisb in an annex to a National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet intelligence capabi ities that was unintended for policymakers' eyes However in J uary 1989 former DIA Director Lieutenant General Leonard Pe oots sent -- as bis parting sbot before retirement -- a letter outlining bis disquiet over the inadequate treatment of the $oviet war scare to among others the DCI and this Board eral Perroots personally experienced the war scare as Assistant Chief DINTBL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCOR 'I9P SBE3t1fil UMBRA CAIOlA 27 'fOp SHeRE UMBRA GAMKA WNIHTEL HOFORH HOCOHTRACT ORooH of staff for Intelligence us Air Forces Europe during th$ 1983 Able Archer exercise Following the detection of the Sovi t Air Porces' incre sed alert status it was his recommendation _de in ignorance not to raise us readiness in response -- a fortu tous if ill-informed decision given the changed political envi nment at the time The Board was puzzled by the intelligence COJDJIlU$ity's response to the Perroots letter In March 1989 the Ha1 ional Intelligence Council HIC sent a lIlemorandum to the Deli that seemed to reflect unresolved opinions In the covering note the Chairman of the HIC acknowledged that the 1984 SNIE on e war scare concluded while Moscow was very unhappy with nald Reagan's policies it was not gearing up for a Dd itary confrontation II Expressing his personal view he said lithe failing here was not grave However the thoroughly researched commentary that followed portrayed the judgments of the K$y and August 1984 SNIE' s -- which downplayed the war scare - as synonymous reached the same broad conclusions wi the judgment of the 1988 National Intelligence Estimate $oviet Intelligence Capabilities that said the war scare was real In fact it was noted that the 1984 estimates judged t the Soviets displayed a heightened sense of concern o o o becaujae o o o of the leadership instability in the OSSR from the spcces sive deaths of three general secretaries between 1981 and 1985 -- an illlpossibility since Chernenko did not die until seven ontha after the last 1984 SNIE was issued It was noted th t the Perroots letter neither raises new issues nor contains newI data that change the strategic judgments already written Bu in a reversal from previous coordinated judgments written abo t the significance of USSR military developments during the war care and in refutation of the covering NIC note itself the c ntary included The Soviets had concern that the West might d de to attack the USSR without warning during a time of vulnerabil ty -such as when military transport was used to support the haziyest WNINTEL NOroD HOCONTRACT OReoN 'l8P SBeJ tBY UMBRA GAMMA 28 'fOP 8Beim'l UMBRA GAMMA WNXNDL HOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCOH - thus compelling the Soviets to consider a preemptive strike at the first sign of US preparations for a nuclear strike Moreover it noted Prom Brezhnev's death in 1982 through late 1984 the soviets ordered a number of unusual military and civil defense measures not previously detected except during periods of crisis with the west o o and The cwaulative effect of these o o o was to reduce the soviet and Warsaw Pact vulnerability to a surprise attack mBCWSIOHS TUB ESTIMATIVE PROCESS In ironically December 1983 the Del's Senior Review Panel ' CSRP issued a prescient study of intelligence judgments preceding i significant historical estimative failures We believe key parts of that report merit reiteration In the estiJIates that failed there were a number of recurrent co_on factors which in retrospect seem critical to the quality of the analysis o o o each involved historical discontinuity and in the early stages apparently unlikely outcomes The Board is deeply disturbed by the US handling of the war scare both at the time and since In the early stages of the war scare period when evidence was thin little effort was de to exaaine the various possible Soviet JIlOtivations behind some very anomalous events Later when enough intelligence existed on the abnormal Soviet behavior to create conflicting views within the community no national intelligence assessments were prepared until ' after tensions began to subside Wben written the 1984 SHIB' s ' were overconfident particularly in the judgments pertaininq to Soviet leadership intentions -- since little intelligence human ' or technical existed to support them In its review of previous i estimates the SRP was equally troubled by this very suae process WNIHTEL NOPORN NOCORTRACT ORCON 'f8P 9BeRft 1JMBRA CAIIMA 29 ------------------------_ - - - - ---- -- TOPSECREf- - '9F 9 mmRA GAMMA WlIINTEL HOFORN NOCOHTRAC'l' OReON The basic problem in ea was to recognize 'qualitative change and to deal with situations which trend continuity and precedent vere of axginal ir not counterproductive value Analysts o o o clearly lacked a Cloctrine or a model for coping with ilaprcmable outcomes o o o and wer unchall by a requirement to analyze r clarify sUbordinate and lesser' probabilities o Too lIIaIly of the analY$8S were incident-oriented and episc cS1c too few ' adc1x'essed the processes tbat produced the incidents or speculated t underlyinq forces and trends' o o o addic ion to singleoutcOlle foreaast ing defied 'Path esti mative odds and JIlUCh recorded history zt reinforced SQJlll8 of the wor st analytical haz status quo bias and a prejudice towards continuity of previews trends 'playing it safe ' lIIirrorimaging and predispositions eanscmsus intelligence Reasopable people can disagree aboUt the conclusions of the fbe PFIAB does disagree with lIIimy of thea Hore worrisome to us however is the process by which the estimates were made and subsequently reassessed Although both estimAtes were reportedly reviewed' by outside readex-s - and both but partlaqlarly the first contained alternative s ios - atronqly worded interpretations were defended by explaining away facts inconsistent with them Consequently 'both estimates contained in' essence single outcOlle for castinq based in large part on nearterm anomalous behavior Hereover neither alerted the reader to the risks of erroneously rejecting tlre correct scenario 1984 SH tE's Archivist's Note This page is not present in the LP-GB original It was added by ISCAP during their review WNINnL HOFORH NOCOHTRACT ORCON IJ 'OP SEClm'l' lJHBRA GAMMA TOPSEORET 30 'f8P SBQRBIl UMBRA GAMMA WNIHTEL NOFORIf NOCOHTRACT ORCON We understand that analysts will always have leqi imate disagreements over the meaning of inevitably incomplete and uncertain events This is as it should be But we believe that when analysts attempt to arrive at a single strong conclusioDi they not only run the risk of being wrong they run two adcUtio l and perhaps more worrisome risks They are likely to underest e the possibility of change the safest prediction is alwaysi that tomorrow will be like today and they are likely to rely on mlrrorimaging our adversaries think the way we do In this ra of increasing instability in the USSR we cannot know who may long retain or quickly assume the mantle of Soviet leadership W ll he understand that US leaders are not going to start World w r III and behave as if he understands Again from the SRP report The world will s tay a chancy and changeable place and the only rule is perhaps that there is an inevitability of uncertainty which we ignore at our peril Information at best will always be in some part fraCJDlentary obsolete and ambiguous The Board believes that in cases of grave importance ito us survival intelligence estimates must be cast in te of alternative scenarios that are in turn subjeCted to campa ative risk assessments This is the most critical flaw in the warlscare episode By alternative scenarios we mean a full statea nt of each major possible interpretation of a set of intelltgence indicators In this case these scenarios might have includecll but not limited to the following soviet leaders had not changed their strategic th nJting but were attempting means of propaganda and deception t slow the US military build-up prevent the deployment of new we4POns and isolate the us fro its allies 1 WNINTEL NOFORH NOCONTRACT ORCON IJ I8P SBeRM UMBRA GAMMA 31 'felt' SBeRHi' UMBRA GAMMA -- WHINTEL ROFORM ROCONTRACl' ORCOR 2 Soviet leaders mayor may not have changed their stra egic thinking but a power struCJCJle among Kremlin factions and the i need to deflect blame for poor economic conditions made it usefUl to I exaCJCJerate the military intentions and capabilities of the Uoo 3 Soviet leaders bad changed their strategic think and in fact believed that the US was attempting to gain dec sive strategic superiority in order possibly to launch a nuclear irst strike ncomparative risk assessment we mean assigning two inds of weights to each scenario one that esti ates in t-ough I n approximation like nslightly better than even n or ntwo to tbe probability that the scenario is correct and a second j tbat assesses the risk to the United States if we wrongly reje the correct scenario While any of the three scenarios or a po ion thereof could bave been true to some degree a risk assesFment I could bave belped focus subsequent US actions If Soviet leflders did not believe a US attack was possible and we erronepusly i1lPuted that view to thEda then it is unlikely we would bave taken actions that would have increased the risk of war If S iet leaders did have that belief and we wrongly denied that the had it then we could have materially but inadvertently increas the risk of war by for example conducting provocative il tary exercises or redeploying forces in ways that would triCJCJe I the Soviet indications and warning system By rna We emphasize that we are not arguing for ncompetjitive analysis n greater use of dissenting opinions or policy gu ance from the intelligence community Rather in special cases like the Soviet nwar scare n it is less important to arrive at a illCJle i consensus than it is to identify a small number of possibi ities associated with rough probabilities that allows policymakets to I understand the risks and opportunities WNl NTEL ROFORR ROCONTRACl' OReOR 'I8P SReRIB' 1lMBRA GAMMA 32 jp SBQRBIlI UMBRA GAMMA WHINTEL ROFORH ROCONTRAC'l' ORCOR We also want to emphasize that by comparative risk ana ysis we do not wish to encourage the formulation of watered-down bland assessments whereby the reader is unable to determine what c nclusions the authors have drawn Instead we urge that when information is inadequate to allow reasonable people to draw concl sions relating to our adversary's intentions analysts should wi stand the pressure to arrive at a single judcptent and thereby avoid turning an acknowledged collection deficiency into an an lytic problem i I The SRP report recommended that estimates incorporate at we I view as an extremely vital ftroad-mapft perspective for policym4Jters A list of future indicators should invariably be included Its aim should be to underline those contingent developments decision points and future policy crossroads which could affect the durability of the analysis alter its major judgments or influence the odds on outcomes full-force mobilization an4 more the BRIE analyses of e war scare unfortunately did not offer such signposts Moreover the SoViet response to Able Archer 83 was dismissed as an exe iBe despite an acknowledged inability to conduct a thorough examizkation of the event s Again the BRP report -- - -- - I It the problem was compounded by what the British call 'perseveration' a tendency for judgments made in the ' early stages of a developing situation to be allowed to affect later appraisals and an unreadinesB to alter earlier views even when evidence requiring them to be revised becomes available which WNDITEL HOFORR HOCONTRACT ORCOR p SBQRBIlI UMBRA GADA 33 '1'6P SKCRBW UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORM NOCOHTRACT ORCON narrowed collection requirement and froze their priorities to overtaken analytical frameworks The practice invited failure After 1984 and as new evidence started rging that ' I l_-an intell ence clarif y ing an01D8 lous soviet behavior succeeding analyses seesawed between giving credence to the war scar and completely dismissing it Despite the conflicting vie no comprehensive intelligence collection requirements vere levi that might have revealed even more information i I i 1 When the intelligence community did offer a revised co ity position in 1988 it was buried in an annex of a tightl held assessment not authored for policymalters Harrow in scope t did not-include a comprehensive review of the political milita and economic factors impacting the soviet Union at the time n did it attempt to match US activities with anomalous soviet beh ior Thus it is incOllPlete Despite laudable individual effo address VRYAH -- and the iJaportanca of a-real n war scare t our understanding of the soviet union today -- it has never beco the subject of a national intelligence assessment since the lier 1984 judgments 13 I I j I A recent piece of reporting on dangerous soviet during the Andropov period maintains that many soviet off were discussing the possibility of a USSR preemptive despe strike to level the playing field - The Chairman of the Ha Intelligence Council was right to point out to us that -the' of this material would occasion politically very unfo charges that the AdJainistration is either fabricating or cone frightening perceptions of the USSR We understand the poli sensitivities associated with this study At the same ti 13see Special Program Intelligence Nuclear Missile Attack- authored by - - -- - -- - - -- WHIlft'BL HOFORM HOCONTRACT ORCON 'ftP SBeRBt' tDIBRA GAlOfA 34 cftip SBeRB'l UMBRA GAMMA WlfINTEL ROFORM ROCOHTRACT ORCON believe the implications of the war scare period -- cbiefl that soviet leaders despite our open society might be capabl of a fundaJaental misunderstanding of US strategic motives and ease the likelihood of nuclear war -- need to be brought the I attention of senior US policymakers Honest intellectual discfourse RUSt take place using all available data about the pivot4l and dangerous period of US-USSR relations in the early to id-l 80'S Lessons learned fro these events cannot be truly underst nor course corrections made until such analysis takes place inc uding a possible dialogue with the soviets I AND UNPIIUSHED BUSIRESS o o o During the course of our study we identified a related intelliqence issues that in our judgment could of not obtained this piece of intelligence the Able Archer ext rcise likely would have been viewed in even more benign ways than i was We believe this calls into question the kinds of signals e are likely to get from national technical eans when in tutes of internal Soviet crisis the USSR military behaves in a def ive reactive manner particularly to US or NATO maneuvers j I We noticed a tendency for most to describe the annua Able Archer exercise simply as na command and control n exercis and thus clearly nont hreateninq to the Warsaw Pact Not only wa Able Archer 83 unique in so e significant ways from earlier on s it also incorporated live mobilization exercises from some US mi I itary forces in Europe For example we are told that some US aitcraft practiced the nuclear warhead handling procedures inciuding taxiing out of hangars carrying realistic-looking dummy war ds I I t I WNINTBL ROFORM ROCORTRACT ORCOR 'Ie HeRB'f UMBRA GAMMA 35 CfeP 8BeRJRI UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL ROFORlf NOCONTRACT ORcaR We are concerned about the human intelligence coll$ction effort regarding the Soviet war scare particularly the l ck of coordinated intelligence cOJlDBUllity strategy in the exploitat on of double agents For example we found evidence that whi the Warsaw Pact intelligence services changed their targeti and collection in significant ways in response to soviet lead rship fears this information derived fraa double agent operatio was not linked to the national warning system' s key indicators list Moreover the FBI noted In some double agent operatio UScontrolling agencies have supplied materials that bear on ent or proposed military programs or strategies that could be fnterpreted to imply US capabilities and intentions to init te a preemptive attack D I I We now know that KGB Headquarters tasked the Residency n the US with extensive requirements to find evidence of an imminent US attack which in turn necessitated the creation of a large IlVRYAH unit within the Residency While the FBI did not dete the establisbment of the new unit it did note an increase in $oviet targeting and collection of US military plans beginning in 11982 Domestically it also was aware of a aarked and aggressive incrrease in Czechoslovak intelligence efforts to obtain indicatio and warning data particularly during 1983 and 1984 However this information did not find its way into community analysis Similarly many US officials have described an inabil ty to equate US secret or blue forceD activity with Soviet activitf that aight be in response united states military COIIIIIilnders ad a great deal of autonomy to exercise their forces in ways th y saw best -- some more aggressively than others we are told The IBoard did not specifically match blue force red force activity or iprobe us strategic deception programs underway at the time w did however learn enough about them to realize such a review w ld be highly helpful to the study of the Soviet war scare I WHINTEL NOFORIf NOCON'l'RACT ORCOR 'l'8P SBQRBIlL tJMBRA GAMMA 36 cfBP SBQRBIl UMBRA GAMMA WHIHTEL HOFORH HOCOHTRACT ORCOH PART II - THE SOVIET WAR SCARE IHTRQDUCTIOH OVer the last year as PFIAB endeavored to come to a tter understanding of events surrounding the war scare epis it examined intelligence available at the time as well as co ider- able subsequent reporting of direct relevance While soae f the anomalous Soviet behavior that remains unclarified by subs ent reporting can be explained in singularly unthreatening wa s we chose not to assume thea as individual events Rather e see th se anomalies as a pattern which taken in totality st onglY indicates that the war scare was real at least in the mi of some Soviet leaders The following discussion therefore is what we view as a plausible interpretation of events based upon a siZable but incomplete body of evidence It tries to put into conte and I draw parallels among developments inside the Soviet pol tical hierarchy the intelligence apparatus and the ai itary 1 establishment that to us strongly point to genuine oviet concern and preparations for hostile US action We also to show that soviet media pronounceaents of the dang r of with the US -- dismissed by US analysts at the time as propa a -probably did in fact mirror private and secret com anmicati ns by senior Soviet Officials The Board does not intend this discussion to constitu the final word a on the war scare Instead we hope it pxjompts renewed interest vigorous dialogue and rigorous reanalysls of the events WNIH'l'EL IfOFORR IfOCONTRACT ORCOIf IfOP 8Bf BB'l UMBRA GAMMA 37 f OP SBQRBI P UMBRA GAMMA WHINTBL BOFORN NOCONTRAC'l' ORcaH ORIGINS or THE SCARI VUlnerability of Soyiet lfuclear Forces to a US s$prise Attack AI though the Soviet strategic nuclear force in th late 1970's was powerful and versatile over 7 000 strategic npclear weapons it was nonetheless highly vulnerable to a us s rise attack -- a so-called bolt froa the blue Deficiencies n the early warning network an inadequate highly centralized nd and control system and a strategic force that was never a full readiness left sizable chinks in the USSR's strategic rmor until the latter half of the 1970' s the Soviets did not a ar to be overly concerned about this shortfall probably in part cause they did not see a US surprise attack as a likely scenario or the outbreak of hostilities Tbe USSR may have felt confident that the open nature of US society and soviet intelligence capabilities made any pros ct of the us achieving complete surprise quite reaote Whatev r the underlying reasons Soviet military doctrine at the time gen rally posited that a strategic nuclear war would probably ocqur in escalating stages from a major political crisis to conven ional conflict to theater nuclear war to intercontinental exc ge The Soviets' early warning system COJDJDalld and control ne ork and strategic forces were geared accordingly coaplete w ime readiness could be achieved only after several days of prrparation Nevertheless as prudent planners they hedged p of I their s trategic forces particularly silo-based ICBM's were always held at a high-level of readiness 14 I 14ror originator a complete listing of reference WNDlTEL ROFORH NOCONTRACT ORcaH p SBGRJIIR UMBRA GAI4MA dOCWRents see 38 'l6P SEeRHI' UMBRA GAMMA WHIHTEL NOFORM NOCONTRACT ORCON strategic Warning System Before the early 1980's the Soviet early warnillCJ stem probably could not provide its leaders with much advance w rning of a surprise us nuclear attack outside the context of a pol tiaal crisis Ballistic missile early warning 8MBW radars l ted along the periphery of the Soviet Union were probably ab e to give about 13 minutes of warning against us ICBM's and abouti 5 to 15 minutes against SLBK's 'l'be soviets apparently caDle to recoqnize that they wou14 need much more time to initiate a response They began s eral improvement programs in the late 1970's including the additton of several new BMEW radars -- to extend coverage to nearly all eat corridors -- as well as the development of two over-the-hqrizon OTB radars and launch-detection satellites 'l'be completion of the OTB radars in 1981 an the comprehensive coverage of us XCBH fields by launch-det ion satellites in 1983 significantly increased warning time -- iahout 30 minutes for US ICBN's and a little over 15 minutes for $LBK's attacking Moscov However the introduction by NATO of Pershing I IX missiles into Europe in late 1983 by soviet calcullktions probably reduced their warning of a US first strike on MOSqaw to about 8 minutes -- less time than they had before their improvement program began 15 15The Pershing II missile 1800 km range would not have r$ached Moscow from planned deployment sitea in West Germany wars8 Pact sources however attributed to this system a range of 2500 an accuracy of 30 aeters and an earth-penetrating warhead ith a range of 2500 ka the soviets feared it would have been le to strike coJJUaallCi and control targets in the Moscow area with little or no warnillCJ t WNDfTBL NOFOD NOCORTRACT ORCON I'9P 8BatB'l' UMBRA GAMMA 39 'l'8P SBQRBIR UMBRA GAMMA WlfINTEL MOPORlf MOCOH l'RACT ORCOM Command and COntrol once warninq of an intercontinental nuclear strike is received Moscow's ability to initiate a response depends n how quickly the leadership can authorize a retaliation and coamuPicate the orders 3 1 10 the soviet nuclear release process it hinqes directly on the survival and indeed performance f the top leadership Probably no more than three political lead s can authorize the use of nuclear weapons Under severei tiae constraints -- such as a short-warninq preemptive strike or a -launch on tactical warninq- -- that authority probably r ides with only the General Secretary and the Minister of Defense When response time is extremely It ited the General secretary l alone may order a launch Tbere is no evidence that nuclear r lease authority has devolved to the General Staff or the nuclear force commanders This strict centralization along with a n11clear warfiqhtinq strateqy undoubtedly was a prime reason f r the elaborate measures the Soviets have taken over the last 30 ' years to ensure leadership survival -- particularly the construct on of numerous hardened underground command posts in and around M scow In respondinq to a surprise us attack the soviet dec sion- makinq process would be extremely compressed After confir ation of an incoainq attack the Soviet leadership in most circums1 ances may have no more than ten inutes to decide on the appro riate response In that time they would need to confer come 'to an aqreement and issue commands to the General Staff Whil this process was under way if near the Kremlin they would prob 'ly be movinq to one of the nearby underground command posts If the leadership failed to initiate the appro riate authorization procedures the USSR's strategic arsenal would probably sit by helpless With reqard to strateqic ais$iles WNIH'l'BL NOFORlf NOCONTRACT ORooN -Af9P SIKlRB' UMBRA GAMMA 40 '8P SBE RBIl UMBRA GAMMA WHDrl'EL NOFORM NOCONTRACT ORCON only the top leadership can release special -unlocking- codes that permit launch Sillilar procedures are in place for the other Soviet strategic nuclear forces ODee a decision to launch is made however orders tiO the operating forces would be transmitted quickly and accurately The soviets introduced several automated communication networJta to ensure rapid and reliable command dissemination at the same tiae they were upgrading their early warning system All nuqlearcapable elements of the soviet armed forces would r$ceive launching orders I land-based missiles under the control of the strategic Rocket Forces SRP ballistic and cruise JIllssile submarines in the Navy and bombers of the Strategic Air Force SM Theater nuclear forces would also receive strike cOl$mands to counter the anticipated NA'IO offensive ill Europe We believe the evidence therefore strongly indicate that Soviet nuclear release authority during the war scare period 1980-198 was held captive to the tumultuous seri s of leadership successions at the very top The post of party G$leral Secretary changed hands three times in three years 16 The only constant in the line of authority was Defense Minister Us1tinov who also died in late 1984 SOJIle high-ranking soviet ailitary leaders at the i time apparently doubted Whether the political leadership was up o the task Marshal Ogarkov chief of the General Staff in the early 1980 s seemed to question whether the aged and ill Soviet leadership would be willing or able to meet its str tegic decisionmaking responsibilities in times of crisis He s faoed this issue publicly on three occasions during the waning J$ontba of Brezbnev's rule during Andropov's short tenure and fol oving 16Brezbnev died 10 November 1982 Andropov died 9 P ruary 1984 Chernenko died 10 March 1985 WNINTEL NOPORH NOCONTRACT OReON If8P 8BStff UMBRA GAMMA 41 fiP SJK RIIIlI UMBRA GAMMA WHIN'l'EL HOFORlf HOCONTRACT ORCOK Cbernenko's accession Through these conspicuous art cles Ogarkov may bave been arguing in a veiled way for some predelegation of nuclear release authority to the general staf Force Readiness During the late 1970's and early 1980's Soviet force best able to respond to a surprise attack were the silo-based IqBM's Tbe US estimates that 95 percent of this force approxi-'tely 4 500 weapons then was ready to launch within several mi utes' notice In strategic war 'exercises during this time some oviet silo-based missiles were launched within three minutes of ceipt of the order In most simulations of a US first strike without surprise the force was usually able to leave its silos fore notional us warbeads struck 'l'hese quick reaction times b01 ever occurred during exercises when missile crews anticipated o ers Tbey could be much sl o wer in a real-life situation wberei a US surprise aissile strike was already inbound I We believe the bigb readiness of the silo-based aissil vas compensation for the higb vulnerability of the other parts f the Soviet strategic arsenal a soviet long-range bombers vere extremely vulner le to a US surprise attack They were and are still kept at a low state of readiness -- none were on strip alert Many hours perhaps days probably would bave been needed to prepare a 'large number of bombers for a wartime footing Tbe soviets JBay well bave assumed that their entire force would be destroyed in a su rise strike a Tbe soviets probably believed that their ballistic subJBarines would not fare much better Koraally most of the iforce were in port I only about 15-18 percent were on COJIbat patrol or in transit to operating areas During this period several dajs may I _INTEL HOFORM KOCON'rRACT OROOK laP SBeRII f UMBRA GAMMA 42 ' felt 8Be RM' UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL MOFORN MOCOHTRACT ORCOM have been required to bring the in-port force to full read ness Moreover the soviets probably had grave concerns abOU the survivability of their subJaarines on patrol -- they were le to learn much about us successes at tracking their submarine Imovei ments through the Walker-Whitworth espionage ring I o The soviet theater nuclear forces were stallarly vu1nerable Dispersing missile and artillery units fro ga ison I and supplying them with nuclear weapons would have en ailed considerable logi tic support Por example it would have taken six deploy all of the missiles and warheads stored at a missile base -- soviet Analysis of the US-USSR strategic Balance I A major factor influencing Soviet leaders' perceptions about us surprise attack probably was their reliance on one liar intelligence analysis during the war scare their vere highly dependent on a computer model the KGB developed the JROdel in the lDid-197 's to measure pe ived changes in the correlation of forces tI Put on-line in 197 the model o s foremost function was identifying inherently table political situationa in which a deterioration of Soviet power might tempt a us first strike - -- - -- -- the model became for the JmB an increasingly important analytic tool Western scientif c and technological advances as vell as the growing complexity f USUSSR relations vere evidently making accurate assessments f the US-USSR strategic balance increasingly more difficult e KGB reportedly advised the Politburo in the late 1970's that V thout I such a model it would be unable to provide such evaluationsL The - -- I l WlfYRTBL HOPORlf ROCOH'l'RACT OReoR 'l9P 8Be1Uft' UMBRA GAMMA I I 43 '--' SBQRBIlI UMBRA GAMMA - ' WNINTEL HOFORH HOCOHTRACT ORCOR Politburo subsequently approved the computer concept The computer model program was called VRYAlf an acronllJl for nSurprise Nuclear Missile Attack w KGB analysts responsib e for assessing American strategic intentions operated under the p eaise that if the US ever obtained decisive overall superiori it might be inclined to launch a surprise attack on the soviet nion Because the program was supposed to determine quantitativel when such a situation might be approaching analysts believed it iwould accurately provide strategic warning I I I The KGB computer moc lel was reportedly developed by ai itary and economic specialists Consisting of a data base of o 000 weighted elements its core was a complex software proqr that processed and continually reevaluated the data Although e are not privy to the i n dividual data elements they reportedl were based on those military political and economic factors th t the soviets assessed as decisive during World War II VRYAlf clearly had a high priority far beyond the corrid rs of the KGB A special component of the KGB consisting of abo1 lt 200 employees was responsible for inserting fresh data Pr nent economists and military experts from other elements of the oviet government assisted In addition the State Planning committee submitted classified data on the Soviet econemy such as dJtails I on the state budget the labor pool Soviet natural resource and currency reserves The cost of building and maintaining a computer was presumably very high particularly given the s te of soviet computer technology in those years ch The model reportedly assigned a fixed value of 100 tp the combined economic-military-political power of the United s tes On this scale the program experts believed that the USSR W ld be safe against a US first strike at a value of 60 i e 60 t of overall us power though they felt that a level of 70 ould I i WNDlTBL NOFORH NOCONTRACT ORCOR il9P SBeRJPlI UMBRA GAMMA 44 'l8P SBeRIftI UMBRA GAMMA IOIIH'J 'EL HOFORH NOCOHTRACT ORCON provide a desirable aarqin Tbe data base was constantly u ated I and force correlations could be assessed at any time R ports derived from VRYAH reportedly were sent to the Politburo a month Before lonq VRYAIf beqan spewinq very unwelcome news -- jwbich brought dire predictions Initially there was some optiiJaisa within the KGB that with technological progress the sovie lunion would gradually improve its position vis-a-vis the us uoJever by 1984 VRYAIf calculated that soviet power had actually d l1ned to 45 percent of that of the united states Forty percen was viewed as a critical threshold Below this level the oviet Union would be considered d8llCJerously inferior to the nited states ' 1 1 if the Soviet atinq fell below 40 percent the KGB and the military leadership ould inform the political leadership that the security of the I USSR could not be guaranteed the USSR would aunch a preeaptive attack within a few weeks of falling below 40percent mark -- -- -- -- The extent to which VRYAH vas driving Politburo thinkilnCJ is I not clear The coaputer model apparently was not tied tp any military operational plans nor is there evidence tha the Politburo ever established any contingency plans based o its l assessments Nevertheless Politburo deliberations on only a few members o ------ - ---- -ro- --____ J ' We believe that if VRYAR accurately depicted the str teqic balance of the time it would have shown the USSR ighly vulnerable to a US surprise attack Recent us intell CJence I WNIR'lEL HOFORH NOCOH'l'RACT ORCOR l 8P SHeRE UMBRA GAMMA 45 'f8P SSE RJftI UMBRA GAMMA WlfIHTEL NOroD NOCONTRACT ORCON computer simulations approximating the VRYAH model sugges that the Soviets would have expected only a fraction of their str teqic nuclear forces to survive a coordinated us attack Figure i for example shows how soviet military planners aay have view the status of their forces if caught by surprise and forced t ride out a massive attack We believe the VRYAH model would have i shown that after such an attack soviet strateqic forces coul have delivered only about a quarter of the 6 100 warheads necess ry to achieve wartime military objectives I Although it may seem absurd to some that the Soviets would put lIUch stock in a computer JIOdel to assess something as lex as the strategic balance we suspect this approach may hav been especially appealing to top Soviet leaders at the time lmost all were formally trained as engineers A computer model lwbiCb I purported to be scientifically based and capable of quant fying the seemingly confusing strategic balance may therefore have had a high degree of credibility particularly during a perilod in which the Soviet leadership seemed genuinely and increasinglt wary of a us surprise attack I We believe soviet strategic doctrine also played a ket role in how the leadership reacted to VRYAIf assessments Soviet imilitary writings consistently assert that overwhelming advantag lies with the side that launches massed nuclear strikes first In their exercises and classified writings the soviets r larlY depict the transition from conventional to nuclear war in Europe occurring when Soviet forces preempt an imminent RATO largetscale nuclear strike Tbe inherent danger of this doctrine of p eemp- tion is that in a period like the war scare strong misperce tions could easily precipitate a strong ill-founded reaction nTHB WAR SCARE Late 1970's Changing sgyiet Perceptions of US Int tions WlfIHTBL HOFORH HOCOHTRACT ORCON 49P SBeRBI lI UMBRA GAMMA 46 SEeRET NOFORN Figure 1 Soviet Strategic Retaliatory Capabilities Given a US Bolt from the Blue Number of Soviet Strategic Warheads 12 000 10 000 r--------------- Soviet Force Posture 8 000 ' to Total Forces ooooooo Alert Forces 1tt '- '- - 0 6 000 o ' 4 000 Global Targeting ReCJlireIaent Soviet Forces After US Attack Alert QnlY Putent1al on Target 2 000 1978 1981 1983 YEAR SEeREl NOFDAN 1985 '- 4fOP SBQRBIP tJMBRA GAIIMA WHIHTEL HOFORH HOCONTRACT ORCQH Although Soviet leadership anxieties about US aiiitary I intentions reached a crescendo in 1983-1984 concern aay hav been aanifest by the late 1970' s when detente began to unravel Long I before the invasion of Afghanistan soviet political l ders I publicly charged that us policy seemed a1aed at -apPlyi the brakes to detente and increasing the level of competition with I the soviet union This shift they argued began during th id1970's and intensified during the last few years of the dec4de The Soviets' public response to us punitive measures following the Afghanistan invasion seeaed to highlight a concern and confUsion about the direction of us-$oviet relations 17 reports indicate that they were genuinely surprised at the intensi ty of the us reacti n to Afghanistan -- they apparently thought that Washington would 3 1 l recognize their security concerns as legitimate reporting also suggests that the Soviet leadership was seriously perplexed by the perceived shift in us policy 'Pl it a continuation of the tougher tactics they had been witnessi for some time or did it reflect a calculated turn away fraa d tente and toward increased confrontation I crtowlng i I United States nuclear force modernization plans may have been particul a rly vexing to Moscow In the late 1970's the U made public its plans to field new generations of ICBII's XX LBII's D-5 and intercontinental bombers stealth The Soviets apparI ently viewed these new systems as highly lethal against their silos and most other hardened targets providing the US wi more strategic nuclear power than was necessa for its l0rnf-held strategy of mutually assured destruction Evidence from sensitive reporting suggests soviet analysts calculated that the US iniended I I i DINTEL HOFOlUf HOCOR'rRACT ORCOH I8P SBeRB1' UMBRA GAMHA 47 'f'8P SBQRBIP UMBRA GAMMA WNIHTBL ROFORM NOCOH l'RACT ORooN them as a means for developing a firs -s rike force In add ion the Soviets perhaps calcula ed tha RA 's decision fie 600 I Pershing II's and cruise missiles was no o coun er their IS S-20 force bu ye another s ep oward a firs -s rike capabilit i I Party Secretary Suslov and Defense Minister us inov the senior guardians of Sovi ideology and national security j were among the first o express these apparen misgivings In an address before the Polish party congress in February 1980 IOV asserted that there was a profound interconne ion to rec t USinspired a ions the aggression by China agains Vietnul the HATO decisions waiJDed a a new arms race the deplo t of enormous numbers of US araed forces around Iran the -training and sending of armed errorist groups in Afghanls an Several days la er ustinov condemned alleged US and cJinese interference in Afghanistan US delay in ratifica ion of SALT II trea y the RA thea er nuclear force decision the buildup of US naval forces in be Persian Gulf as in erco ed elements of an aggressive us policy - th4 i Not long after Premier Kosygin a more moderate r of the top leadership echoed the same misgivings Be charge4 that US policy had become a -fully defined poli ical policy calcdlated I to undermine detente and provoke conflict situations We 4annot but draw the necessary conclusions from this for our practtical a ivitiea n As a CIA analyst has pointed out Kosygin's r k s may have mirrored the uncertainty underlying many Politburo I members' percep ions of US intentions and behavior in the postAfghanistan period on the one hand he seemed o be j ining Suslov in suggesting that reactionary forces had gain the upper hand in US policyaaking and were determined o fo ce a confrontation on the other hand he seemed o be fez4en lY reassuring dOJRestic and Bast European audiences that this not necessarily the case and that US policy could moderate w s j WHINTEL ROFORM NOCOHTRACT ORooN 'l8P 8BeRH UJIBRA CAMMA 48 clf8P SBeRIJIlI UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL ROFORN ROCONTRAC'l' ORCOR It must be said that realistic representatives of the ruling circles in the west not to mention broad sections of the population are concerned with the consequences of the present course of the US Administration o o o o Clearly it would be wrong to assume that in the united states there are no soberainded politicians who are aware of the significance of detente 18 I i I' I I I I iI 1980 Heiahtened Concern I i By the summer of 1980 soviet public pronouncements n the future of US-USSR relations had soured Ilarkedly A 23 June C Committee resolution referred to adventuristic actions 0 the united States which it asserted led to a heightening the danger of war Claiming the united states was unde ning de ente attempting to form an anti-soviet alliance with ina and refusing to acknowledge legitimate Soviet security int ests the resolution c lled for constant vigilance and al11round strengthening of defense Public and private statements by top soviet leaders SU ClU ast ed that many did not expect any near-term improvements in US -SC Wl relations In June Politburo member Andrei Klrilenko al _ the need for augaenting the country's economic and potential because imperialist circles primarily those the united states are causing considerable complications international situation In a private meeting with v Indian communists in July Kirilenko and other officials re poll tt adl y described the world situation as grim and accused WNIH'l'BL NOFORlf NOCOHTRAc r ORCOR f lt SBaRBP mmRA GADA 49 MP SSeRIB' UMBRA GAMIIA WHl HTEL lfOFORH lfOCONTRACT ORCOlf Administration of creating a war psychosis by trying to iS lata and encircle the Soviet Union In a June address to the heads of government of the council of MUtual Bconomic Assistance K sygin seemed to be preparing his audience for the possibility that iKAroWarsaw Pact tensions might require greater Bloc expenditj for military programs Be charged that the United states has a ready embarked on a course hostile to the cause of detente a c of cranking up the arms race leading to the intensification j f the war danger in the world Brezhnev seemed to be alo e in expressing limited optimism In August for eX8Jllple he not that I sooner or later the US would conclude that sabre rattling rmuld fail After the us Presidential election the soviet leadershi sent out feelers to determine if the tough speeches delivered duri g the campaign indeed indicated the future course of Reagan Admin stration foreign policy In a 17 lfovember 1980 speech Brezhne said that he would not dwell on statements made by the President elect during the heat of the election struggle and would wel any constructive steps on ways to improve US-Soviet relations This opening was repeated privately by Soviet diplomats official and foreign policy analysts who stressed to their US contacts that Moscow was interested in bilateral exchanges and a good s in businesslike relations united States-Soviet relations were dealt a blow in December however with the death of the u allY DOderate Preaier KOBYgin 19 i i Behind the scenes the soviet intelligence services ' were giving equally dour assessments on the future of US-S iet relations A secret soviet intelligence docwaent prepar in 1ftfDTEL lfOFOlUf lfOCONTRACT ORCOH 'R9P SBeRM UMBRA GAMMA 50 dJ I9p SBe ftBIf UMBRA GAHMA lftfIHTEL HOFORlf HOCONTRACT ORCON October for General Ivashutin Chief of Soviet military intelligence the GRU stated that the US and NATO rather than maintaininq the approximate parity that bad developed were trying to tip the strategic balance of forces in their favor 'l'he document also assessed a US Presidential directive PD-59 signed by President carter as a new nuclear strategy intended to enhance the readiness of US strategic nuclear forces to deliver a sudden preemptive strike against o o o the soviet Union and Warsaw Pact Vladimir Kryucbkov then bead of the KGB's foreign intelligence directorate evidently sbared this evaluation In a secret speech in late 1980 be reportedly declared that nus imperiali is again becoming aggressive and is striving to change the strategic balance He also revealed that the party bad admonished its intelligence organs not to noverlook the possibility of a US issile attack on our country n Meanwhile the Soviet Navy beqan to implement steps to reduce the missile launch readiness of duty status submarines Prior to 1980 submarines were required to be able to launch their missiles within 4 hours after receiving orders In the summer of 1980 a much reduced launch readiness perhaps as low as 30 ainutes was being considered by Northern Fleet commanders By October 1980 they had achieved a readiness of 3 hours and sometime between 1982 and 1985 duty status submarines were able to launch wi thin 20 ainutes 1981 Reducing VUlnerabilities By early March 1981 the soviet leadersbip aay well have concluded that a period of US-Soviet confrontation bad arrived Moscow's trial balloon suggesting an early sWlDlit never got off the ground The US declared that Brezhnev's proposals on arms control did not provide a basis for serious negotiations and insisted that 1ft1INTEL HOFOlUf NOCONTRACT ORCON 'l8P SBeRE UMBRA GADA 51 9BQRBII UMBRA GAMMA WHIlfl'EL HOFORH HOCONTRACl ORCOR future talks would be contingent upon Soviet bebavior in Poland Afghanistan Central America and other trouble spots Moscow's response was bard line 'l'be first salvo appeared in Prayda on March 25 in an article by I Aleksandrov -- a pseudonym signifying leadership endorsement It attacked US foreign policy on a broad front -- the first such barrage since the Reagan Administration bad entered ffice Increasingly strident attacks followecl in April and Hay Brezhnev took the US to task in major speeches on 7 and 27 April as did his protege Cbernenko at a Lenin Day address on 22 April Brezhnev's delivery cOJDJDeBlorating Soviet VB day charged that the Reagan Administration no longer belonged to the sober-minded- forces in the west and that Washington had made military superiority its main political credo -- while relegating arms control to the bottom of the priority list senior Soviet officials with high-level contacts said that during this time Soviet leaders formally cautioned the bureaucracy that the new US Acbdnistration was considering the possibility of starting nuclear war and that the prospect of a surprise nuclear strike against the soviet union had to be taken seriously In AUgust 1981 Brezhnev met secretly in the crimea with each of the Warsaw Pact leaders to obtain signatures on a strategic war planning document that streamlined the decisionmaking process to CJO to war Dais top secret accord in essence codified the Soviet Union' s authority to order Warsaw Pact forces to war without prior Pact consul tat ions o It included a discussion of likely Soviet responses to possible changes in the correlation of forces Soviet preemption of an attempted US surprise attack was one of the scenarios depicted the Soviets had become concerned that there might be little time to react in a fast-moving political crisis and that the upper hand could be lost militarily if Pact consultations were required before committing forces WHINTBL HOFORR HOCONTRAC'l' ORCa cpep SBeRJfr 11MBRA GAMMA 52 reP SB9RJftI UMBRA GAMMA WNIHTBL NOFORH HOCONTRAC'l' ORCON Probably reflecting the rising concern among the political leaders the soviet intelligence services clearly began girding its officers for difficult times ahead In a secret February speech Vladimir Kryucbkov -- on this occasion to a group of Jddlevel KGB officers -- stressed that R o o o the political situation world-wide is going from bad to worse and there is no end in sight o o o China continues to be a threat o o o the general situation in East Europe both politically and economically is not good o o o the soviet economy is currently in a poor position resultil CJ from poor harvests bad planning and a general lack of discipline He also exhorted all KGB Residencies to work to prevent the US and its allies from deciding to make a first strike attack on the soviet Union and the KGB By the spring unease at the top of the political hier rchy evidently bad became so pronounced that it called for extraordinary efforts from its foreign intelligence apparatus In late Kay then KGB chief and Politburo ember Yuriy Andropov declared to a major KGB conference that the new Us Administration was actively preparing for war and that a nuclear first strike was possible Andropov disclosed that in response the KGB was placing strategic military intelligence at the top of its collection priorities list The KGB had always been tasked to report on us political intentions but this was the first time it had been ordered to obtain such strategic military information Thus VRYAH took on a new dimension and now both the KGB and the GRU had as their foremost mission the collection of intelligence to protect the USSR from strategic nuclear attack Kryuchkov and several of his key officers in the Firs Chief Directorate -- including the Chief of the nUS Department- -increasingly became strong VRYAR proponents WHIHTEL NOFORH NOCORTRACT ORCON -4fQP SBeRft mmRA GAMMA 53 --- 'feP seeRR' UMBRA GAMMA WHINTEL NOFORM NOCONTRACT ORCON The rank and file began to respond While many senior 1GB specialists in us and military affairs apparently had serious reservations about SODle of Andropov' s views on this matter there reportedly was general accord on two important points First KGB officers in the center agreed that the United states might initiate a nuclear strike if it achieved a level of overall strength aarkedly greater than that of the Soviet Union And many apparently were convinced that events were leading in that direction A group of technocrats advising Andropov reportedly persuaded him that the USSR would continue to fall behind the US in economic power and scientific expertise Second there was common concern that the Soviet domestic situation as well as Moscow's hold on Eastern Europe was deteriorating further weakening soviet capacity to compete strategically with the US 20 Andropov hastily ordered a special ftinstitute ft within the 1GB to implement the new strategic military intelligence program The institute was told -- despite protestations for more tiae -- to quickly define the task develop a plan and be ready to levy the initial collection and reporting requirements to KGB Residencies by NoveBlber 1981 Same KGB officers in the field reportedly felt that the short arbitrary deadlines for developing VRYAR requirements resulted in poorly conceived requirements 21 As the KGB mobilized it also began pressuring its Bast European allies for strong su rt Both Andropov and Kryuchkov actively lobbied the Czechoslovak intelligence service on this score Andropov approached Czechoslovak Interior Minister Obzina early in 1981 regarding the VRYU collection effort - presenting it as an unprecedented KGB collection effort that demanded the ftbest intelligence techniques 'ft He followed up with a private visit to WNIHTEL NOFORM 'NOCONTRACT ORCON MP SSeRBi' tDIBRA GAMMA 54 1'OP SBQRBlt mmRA GAMMA WHIH'l'EL HOFORM HOCOHTRACT OReON Prague where he expressed strong disappo ntment with the Czechoslovak response and solicited the direct intervention of senior intelligence officials Andropov's efforts at personalizing the issue evidently paid off Obzina subsequently gave an emotional presentation to the Czechoslovak Politburo describing the immediacy of the threat from the US which he said sooner or later would result in a surprise nuclear attack Reflecting Koscow's urgency Obzina described the requirement as the biggest and most important strategic task the Czechoslovak service had ever undertaken Hot long after Prague issued to its field offices a Minister's Directive of 'lop Priorityn to collect VRYAH-related data on five substantive areas -- political economic military science and technology and civil defense ooo DeVelopments within the soviet military meanwhile also strongly suggested a growing apprehension about a possible US strategic first-strike Military leaders began to improve the readiness of nuclear forces most vulnerable to surprise attaCk in Jfay 1981 for example Soviet Navy officials initiated a program to shorten launch times for ballistic missile submarines in port Submarines undergoing repairs were ordered to be ready to launch within 48 hours notice as opposed to 8 days and boats awaiting redeployment were told to be ready to launch within 3 to 4 hours Lowerlevel Navy officials reportedly viewed these new readiness times as unrealistic because they would strain maintenance capabilities and be diffiCult to sustain indefinitely In addition the Navy began experimenting with missile launches from submarines pierside reportedly achieving a notice-to-launch time of one hour -- -- Furthermore the Soviet military took several steps during WHIH'l'EL NOFORIf HOCOH'l'RACT ORCON ' reP aBaRM UMBRA GADA 55 SBeRB P UMBRA GAMMA WHINTEL HOFORH HOCOHTRAC'l' ORCOR this time to improve their theater nuclear forces All-weather capable 80-24 bombers were deployed in East Germany Poland and HUngary greatly enhancing the availability of nuclear strike forces in the forward area The soviets for the first time also deployed nuclear-capable artillery to the front-line ground forces opposite HATO 22 1982 strategic Preparations Signs of disquiet within the soviet military hierarchy over national strategic vulnerabilities became more openly pronounced in 1982 Marshal Oqarkov in particular publicly expressed his concern over the readiness of Soviet society to respond to us challenges Hotably he called for moving soviet economic priorities from business-as-usual to a prewar footing In his book History Teaches Vigilance he sternly admonished his countrymen The element of surprise already played a certain role in World War II Today it is becoming a factor of the greatest strategic illpOrtance The question of prompt and expeditious shifting of the Armed Porces and the entire national economy to a war footing and their mobilization deployment in a short period of time is much more critical today o o o coordination between the Armed Porces and the national economy as a whole is required today as never before especially in o o o ensuring the stability and survivability of the nation' s entire vast economic mechaniSJll Essential in this connection is a constant search for improving the system of co-production among enterprises producing the 22 aminq of War in Europa In 4-1-4 WHIN-J EL NOFORH NOCONTRACT ORCON ftP SBemft' UMBRA GAMMA 56 ' l'eP SBeRM' UMBRA GAMMA WHIMTBL HOFORM HOCOHTRACT ORCOH principal types of weapons o o o to establish a reserve supply of equipment and materials in case of war The view of impending nuclear war with the United states was apparently seeping into the mid-level officer corps A soviet emigre who attended a 1982 training course at the Moscow Civil Defense Headquarters quoted one instructor -- a lieutenant colonel -- as sayinq that the Soviet Union intended to deliver a preemptive strike aqainst the united States using 50 percent of its warheads The soviet leadership convened a conference in late October perhaps in part to reassure the military Top political deputies ministry officials marshals service commanders regional military commanders and commanders of soviet forces rOlld were ' in attendance Defense Minister ustinov in his introduction of General Secretary Brezhnev declared that the acute intensification of the aqgressive nature ot imperialism threatens to incite the world into flames of a nuclear war In his address to the conference Brezbnev promised the Soviet armed forces that the Central Committee would take measures to meet all your needs 23 Meanwhile KGB Headquarters had issued formal instructions to KGB Residencies abroad to strengthen siqnificantly their work on strategic warninq these instructions were sent first to KGB elements in the US and within a month an abridqed version was sent to Residencies in western Europe Reflecting the same concerns expressed by Andropov at the March 1981 KGB conference the tasking from Moscow primarily focused on detecting US plans to launch a surprise attack 23FB1S TV Report 28 October 1982 WHnr rEL ROFORlf HOCOIITRACT ORCOH 'IQP SHeRIff UMBRA GAMMA 57 If9P SHeRE UMBRA GAMMA WNIHTEL NOFORH ROCOHTRAC'l' ORCOR The current international situation which is characterized by a considerable strengthening of the adversary I s military preparations as well as by a growing threat of war requires that active and effective steps be taken to strengthen intelligence work dealing with mili tary-strategic problems It is of special importance to discover the adversary I s concrete plans and measures linked with his preparation for a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR and other socialist countries The cable went on to specify information to be collected in direct support of the VRYAN requirement including NATO war plans preparations for launching a nuclear missile attack against the USSR and political decisionmaking leading to the initiation of var see Figure 2 for VRYAN requirements 24 Indeed KGB bosses seemed already convinced that US war plans were real A former KGB officer said that while attending a senior officer course be read an order to all departaents of the KGB's foreign intelligence ara -- but especially those targeting the US and RATO -- to increase their collection efforts because there vas information indicating NATO was preparing for a -third world var The reactions of Soviet intelligence to the death of General secretary Brezbnev on November 10 suggests to us that there vas serious concern that the USSR was militarily in jeopardy and that the US migbt take advantage of the confusion concomitant with a leadership change @ l KGB and GRU Residencies in at least two Soviet missions abroad were placed on WHIHTEL NOFORH ROCONTRAC'l' ORCOlf ARe 8 eRft UMBRA GAMMA 58 'f9P SReRIft' UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL ROFORM ROCONTRACT ORCOR Figure 2 VRYAIf Collection Requirements ThroUghout the early 1980's VRYAH requirements vere the DUIIber one and urgent collection priority for soviet intelligence and subsequently SOJIlB Bast European services as veIl They were tasked to collect Plans and JlBasm eB of the United states other IIATO countries Japan aDd China directed at the preparation for and 1Dl1 eashhag of war against the -socialistcountries as vell as the preparation for and unleashing of armed conflicts in various other regions of the world Plans for hostUe operational deployaents and mobilizations war Plans for hostile operations in the initial stage of priJaarily operations to deliver nuclear strikes and for asS eSSJMmts of aftereffects Plans indicatiDg the preparation for and adoption aDd implementation of decisions by the HATO political and Jdlitary leadership deali ng with the UDleashing of a nuclear war and other ar ed conflicts Same specific tasking concerning the United states included inforaation on President Reagan's -flying headquarters - 1Dclnding iDdividual airfields and logistic Any data succession and matters of state leadership to include atteution to the Fec1eral BIIergeDay lfanagement Agency XnforJRation fX'OJI the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary on up at the DeparbIent of state as it vas hel ieved that these officials aight tal lt lIonitoring of ctivities of the IlatioDal Security Council and the Vice President's crisis staff lIoDitoring of the flow of aoney and gold on Wall street as vell as the aoveaent of high-grade jewelry collections of rare paintings and s bdl ar it a s This vas regarded as useful geoatrategic infonaation WlfIlf'1'EL ROFORN ROCONTRACT ORCOR Cf8P SBQRBII' UMBRA GAIIHA WP SBeRIJ' lI UMBRA GAMMA WHIN'l'EL HOFORH HOCOHTRACT ORCOH alert Intelligence officers were tasked with monitoring US installations both military and civilian for indications of us military mobilization or other actions which might portend a aove against the USSR and to report frequently to Moscow This alert '''''' ' continued until Brezbnev was buried on considerable anxiety within the soviet military during this time over who had nuclear release authority in case of a feared US surprise attack '--'-'-'--- ooo Yuriy Andropov settled into the General secretaryship soviet strategic forces continUed to iJBprove their readiness posture In December for example the Strategic Air Force commander-in-Chief authorized a plan for the improvement of the combat readiness of Arctic air bases ' this initiative provided greater flexibility in dispersing the soviet bomber force and reducing the flight time for attacks on the US 25 Moreover beginning at about this time and continuing through 1985 Soviet bomber training vas devoted largely to the problem of enemy surprise nuclear strikes One solution that evolved vas launching aircraft on tactical warning As 1983 Hearing the Precipice Growing Pessimism Additional Precautions The new soviet leadership's public reaction to two major US Presidential speeches early in 1983 seems to indicate that its concern about American strategic intentions was mounting markedly In response to the President's so-called wevil empire- speech on 25soyiet Forces and capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the Late 1990's HIE 11-3 8 December 1987 WHINTBL HOFORH HOCONTRACT ORCOH IJ 9P SBeRlH mmRA GADA 59 -WP SBeRJIIl UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL HOFORM HOCOHTRACT ORCOH Karch 8 the soviet press charged that R agan -can think only in terms of confrontation and bellicose lunatic anti-cOJlDlWliSJI Later that month Andropov responded in Prayda to the President's strategic Defense Initiative speech the face of it layman JlAy even find it attractive since the President speaks about what seem to be defensive measures o o o o In fact the strategic offensive forces of the united states will continue to be developed and upgraded at fUll tilt and along quite a definitive line at that namely that of acquiring a nuclear first-strike capability On In the early 1980's many civilian- soviet foreign affairs experts apparently looked upon us actions as aggressive and diplomatically hostile but not necessarily as precursors to strategic war By early 1983 however these specialists probably realizing they were out of step with Soviet officialdom also seemed to take a bleaker view of the US-USSR relationship In January the soviet Institute of the us and canada IUSAC held a conference on strategic stability and the overall aoo4 was characterized as pessimistic ' 'he group appeared particularly disturbed by the planned Pershing II deployaents and underlying us aotivations The Pershing II with a flight of 5-6 minutes represents surprise and cruise missiles in great numbers also are first-strike weapons But SOIDe optimisa prevailed Evidently expressing the views of many of his colleagues one participant reportedly commented strategic stability is being disturbed in the 1980' s but is not broken I Also early in the year Harshal Ogarkov began to eam a reputation his pessimism toward relations with the us was almost unequalled among senior Soviet officials Ogarkov's strident advocacy for increased military expenditures to counter the us WNINTBL HOroD HOCOHTRACT ORooH II9P 9BeRB'f UMBRA GAMMA 60 lf8P SBeRB'f UMBRA GAMMA IOIIN'l'EL ROPORN NOCONTRAC'l ORCON military buildup led one to call hill a ftdangerous _an ft 7n a February press article he cited the us ftDefense Directive of Fiscal 1984-1985 as proof of fthow far the 'hawks' have gone ft and implied that procurinq new sophisticated military hardware had to proceed apace in the USSR Sometime thereafter in a meetinq with a Deputy Minister of Defense 7ndustry he urged that Soviet industry begin preparinq for war In a speech in Karch Oqarkov revealed that his pressure on the political leadership seemed to be havinq an effect The CPSU Central COJDlllittee and the Soviet Government are implementing important lIleasures to further increase the defense potential and the mobilization readiness of industry aqriculture transport and other sectors of the national economy and to ensure their timely preparation for the transfer to a war footinq o o o o By late summer General Secretary Andropov's own attitudes seemed to be increasinqly accentuated by the same forebodinq judginq from the siqnals he apparently was sending Washinqton 7n August he told a delegation of six US Democratic Senators that nthe tension which is at this time characteristic of practically all areas of our relationship is not our choice The United states' rationale in this is possibly clearer to you ft Moreover in a comment to the Senators but probably directed at President Reagan Andropov warned Tbere may be someone in Washinqton who believes that in circumstances of tension in a 'game without rules ' it will be easier to achieve one's objectives 7 do not think so 7n the qrand scheme of thinqs it is not so at WHDI'l'EL NOPORN 1I0c0H'l'RAC'l ORcoa 'R8P 9BeRB'R UMBRA GAHIIA 61 Cf8P SBQRBIlI UMBRA GAMMA WNIHTEL NOFORN NOCOH'l'RACT ORCOR all It will not work for one side to be the dominant one Would the United states permit someone to achieve superiority over them I doubt it And this is why we would not tolerate it either 26 ooo And there apparently was little doubt at the top of the Soviet intelligence services about where US policy was beading In February KGB headquarters issued anew compelling operational directive to the KGB Residence in London as well as to other Residences in NATO countries Tbe nPermanent Operational Assignment to uncover NATO Preparations for a Nuclear Attack on the soviet union n reaffirmed the Residency's task of discovering promptly any preparations by the adversary for a nucl r attack RYAH on the USSR n It also included an assessment of the Pershing II missile that concluded that the weapon' s sbort flight time would present an especially acute warning problem Moscow empbasized that insight on NATO' s war planning had thus become even more critical Immediate preparation for a nuclear attack begins at the moment wben the other side' s political leadership reaches the conclusion that it is expedient to usa military force as the international situation becomes progressively more acute and makes a preliminary decision to launch an attack on the soviet Union o o o the so-called nuclear consultations in NATO are probably one of the states of 26oangerous stalemate superpower RelationS in Autumn 1983 a Report of a Delegation of Eight senators to the Soviet Union September 1983 WHINTEL HOFORH NOCONTRACT ORCOH 'l8P SBeR1ff 1JMBRA GA1IMA 62 WP WHIN'l'E SBeRft UMBRA GAMMA NOFORM HOCON'l'RACT ORCON immediate preparation by the adversary for VRYAN The time between NATO's preliminary decision to launch a surprise attack and when the strike would occur was assessed to be 7-10 days Residents were also requested to submit reports concerning this requirement every two weeks -- regardless of whether there was any new informatione This marked the first time that KGB Residencies were required to submit negative collection reports The immediacy Of the threat also peraeated GRU reporting requirements Directives from SOYiet military intelligence headquarters stated that war could break out at any JIlOment Residencies were constantly reminded that they must prepare for war and be able to recycle their operations to a war footing in a moment's notice About the saJIle time the GRU also took direct steps to ensure that intelligence reporting would continue after the outbreak of war It created a new directorate to oversee illegal agents assets operatinq in a foreign country without diplomatic or other official status e This unit 3 l was tasked to move quickly to form agent networks that could COIIIlWlicate independently with headquarters in Moscow The idea of creating such illegal nets vas not new but I '-'-- - ----J the urgency was b 1 the urgency reflected soviet perceptions of an increased threat of war o o o Throughout the summer of 1983 Moscow pressed KGB and GRU Residencies bard to collect on the VRYU requirement A June dispatch from KGB Center in Moscow to the Resident in London for example declared that the us Administration is continuing its preparations for nuclear war and is augmenting its nuclear potential KGB and GRU Residents world-wide were also instructed to increase operational WHnrrEL NOFORlf NOCOHTRACT ORCON Jf8P SHeRE UMBRA GAMMA 63 9 eP SBeRer UMBRA GAMMA WHINTEL NOFORH NOCOHTRAC'l' ORCON coordination with each other and defineR their relationship with ambassadors and chiefs of mission that this was designed to improve the overall effectiveness of the intelligence effort In August the center dispatched additional VRYAN requirements soae quite specific It alerted Residencies to increased NATO intelligence activities submarine operations and counterintelligence efforts But not everyone was on board some KGB officers overseas during this time became increasingly skeptical of the VRYAN requirement Its obsessive nature seemed to indicate to soae in the London KGB Residency for example that something was askew in Moscow None of the political reporting officers who concentrated on VYRAN believed in the immediacy of the threat especially a US surprise attack In fact two officers complained to the Resident that Moscow was mistaken in believing the United states was preparing for a unilateral war They felt that the Residency itself Ilight be partly to blame - it had willy-nilly subaitted alaraist reports on the West's lIilitary preparations intensified ideological struggle and sbailar themes to try to satiate Moscow's demands for VRYU reporting --- ' '-'-- ooo Inside the Soviet armed forces commanders evidently had sufficiently voiced alara regaE-ding their forces' state of preparedness against a surprise attack In January 1983 Moscow issued a new key element to its military readiness system a condition called Surprise Enemy Attack Using Weapons of Mass Destruction in Progress It augmented the four existing levels of readiness 1 Constant Combat Readiness 2 Increased COmbat Readiness 3 Threat of War and 4 Full Combat Readiness This fifth condition could be declared regardless of the readiness stage in effect at the time It involved a wide variety of immediate defensive and offensive measures -- such as dispersing forces WRINTEL HOPORH HOCONTRACT ORCOR 'f8P HE RJH 1JlIBRA GAMMA 64 fttP SHeRR UMBRA GAMMA WlfIN'l'EL NOFORM NOCOHTRAC'l' OROON taking sbel ter and preparing to launch forces Probably in response to new US and NATO strateqies and equipment upgrades the Soviet military forces also initiated a number of steps to reduce vulnerabilities to attack o A crash prograa to build additional ammunition storage bunkers at Bulgarian airfields This would improve capabilities to preposition air ammunition for Soviet aircraft deployed to support the air defense force against an improved NATO air threat on the Southern Front o The institution of a new requlation to bring tactical missile brigades frma peacetime conditions to full readiness within eight hours In the late 1970's a day or more was needed Moreover improvements were introduced at nuclear warhead storage facilities that halved the time needed to remove warheads o Creation of a unique soviet naval infantry brigade on the Kola peninsula to repel amphibious landings -- probably a direct response to the US Navy's new forward maritime strategy o For the first time a test of cOJlbat and airborne C01lllland post aircraft in a simulated electromagnetic pulse EMP environment soviet planners evidently had come to recognize the serious EMP threat to their cOJDJDalld and control systems posed by a us nuclear strike Reflecting the heightened emphasis on defense preparedness Moscow increased procurement of military equipment in 1983 by 5 to 10 percent apparently by reducing production of civilian goods Commercial aircraft production for example was reduced by about 14 percent in favor of military transports To OVerCOJD8 this particular shortfall the Soviets reportedly bought back airframes fr01l East European airlines They also converted soae vehic1e WBINTEL NOFORM NOCON'l'RAC'l' ORCOR -' feP HeRE UMBRA GAMHA 65 -9SP SBGRiPR UMBRA GAMMA WHINTEL NOFORIf NOCON'l'RACl ORCON plants from tractor to tank production One such plant -- at Chelyabinsk -- bad not produced tank chassis since World War II Mounting Tensions By September 1983 in a sign probably reflecting perceptions at the top that the USSR was increasingly in peril military officers began assuming more of a role as official spokesmen Marshal Ogarkov for example was the Soviet official who offered explanations for shooting down KAL-007 In the past high-ranking officers rarely COIIIIIlented in public on major defense issues ' 'he increased public role of the military particularly by Ogarkav coincided with the deterioration of Yuriy Andropov's health The General Seoretary was suffering frOll long-standing hypertension and diabetes complicated by kidney disease Kidney failure in late September led to a long period of illne s s which ended in his death in February 1984 Typical of the Soviet military attacks against US poli-cy during this period Marshal Jallikav COlImander of the Warsaw Pact warned in Prayda that the deployment of US Pershing II and cruise missiles could give rise to an irresistible temptation in Washington to use it against the socialist community countries An Ogarkav rAY article on 22 September in which he warned that a sudden strike against the USSR would not go unpunished vas particularly vitriolic ' 'he USA is stepping up the buildup of strategic nuclear forces o o o to deal a 'disaX'JDing' nuclear blow to the USSR ' 'his is a reckless step Given the present development and spread of nuclear weapons in the world the defending side will always be left with a quantity of nuclear means capable of responding to the aggressor with a retaliatory WHIHTEL HOFORM HOCONTRACl ORCON -Af9P SBc RKW UMBRA GAMMA 66 --m SBeRBI' UMBRA GAMMA IOfIRTBL NOFORM HOCONTRACT ORCOH strike causing an 'unacceptable damage' Be further warned that only suicides can stake on dealing a first nuclear strike in the present-day conditions o o o and o o o new 'Pershings' and cruise missiles in western Europe are a means for a first strike - Perhaps most ominous however was the comparisons Ogarkov ade between the us and prewar Nazi Germany The conspicuous public appearance of Soviet military leaders and their relentless often crude attacks on US policy seemed to spread the fear of war among the population Zn Moscow programs highlighting the seriousness of the international situation and the possibility of a US attack were broadcast on radio and television several times a day At least some westerners living in Moscow have said that these programs appeared not for external consumption but to prepare Soviet citizens for the inevitability of nuclear war with the us The propaganda campaign seemed to work Conversations by westerners with soviet citizens at the time revealed that the war danger line was widely accepted 27 -- --- -- - From september onward the Kremlin offered up increasingly bitter public diatribes against the us zts language suggested that there was almost no hope for repairiDg relations SOViet spokesmen accused President Reagan and his advisors of -madness extremiSlll - and -criminality By this time Moscow evidently ecognized that its massive propaganda campaign to derail the pershing ZZ and cruise missile deployments had failed According to press reports soviet officials had concluded that the Reagan Administration deliberately engineered the HAL incident to poison the international atmosphere and thereby ensure the missiles would be deployed -- i e a d nstration of resolve Yuriy Andropov 27Soyiet Thinking on the Possibility of Armed Cpnfrontation with the United states CIA 22 December 1983 WHIMTBL HOFORM HOCOHTRACT ORCOR AfGP SBeRB'fI UMBRA GAMMA 67 IJ 9P SBE flBIl UMBRA GAMMA lOIINTEL HOFORM NOCOHTRACT ORCON commenting in late September on the 007 shootdown wrote in Prayda I1Even if someone had illusions as to the possible evolution for the better in the policy of the present Administration the latest developments have finally dispelled thea By late sumaer the leadership appeared to be bracing the population for the worst for signs were being posted everywhere shoving the --- '-------- --------- location of air raid shelters Factories reportedly were required to include air raid drills in their normal work plans Moreover a Western visitor to Moscow reported that Andropov sent a letter to all party organizations declaring that the motherland was truly in danger and there was no chance for an improveaent in relations with the United states This letter was reportedly read at closed party meetings throughout the country In october Marshal Ia1l ikov announced that preparations for deploying new nuclear missiles to Czechoslovakia and East Germany had begun 'l'be US invasion of Grenada brought a renewed shrillness to the Soviets' public attacks on the US 'l'be Kremlin said it held the President personally responsible for what it described as a llbandit attack and a warble against peace and humanity Also toward the end of the year clear evidence of the Soviet military's preoccupation with readiness again surfaced 'l'be 4th Air Army in Poland received orders to reduce arming times for aircraft with nuclear missions This apparently stemmed from a new readiness directive issued in October which ordered several procedural reviews including the tiae needed to prepare nuclear weapons for transport the time needed to transport nuclear weapons frda storage sites to the aircraft and the time needed to hand lOIlHTBL HOFORM ROCOB'l'RACT ORCOR 'fOp SHeRE UMBRA GAIDJA 68 M SBeRft UMBRA GAMMA WHIN'l'EL NOPORN NOCONTRACT ORCON over nuclear weapons to aircraft crews The instructions also included maximum allowable times for loading nuclear weapons onto aircraft -- 25 Jlinutes for one weapon 40 minutes for two In october the 4th Air Army apparently exercised these new procedures during an inspection by Marshal Ogarkov Within the Soviet leadership another crisis of transition vas in the offinq Andropov apparently becue gravely ill and sometime durinq October may have had one of his kidneys removed His failinq health very likely caused the cancellation of a state trip to Bulgaria -- even though the official reason given was the intense international climate The seriousness of Andropov' s condition was apparent when he failed to appear in Kremlin celebrations on November 7 cOlDlllemorating the 1917 Bolshevik 1 ' This event code-naJRed RAbIe Archer occurred at a time when soae soviet leaders seeaed almost frantic over the threat of war o According to press accounts Politburo eaber Gregory Ro1IanoY griJaly stated in a speech at the Kreal in on the same day that Able Archer co_anced RThe international situation at present is white hot thoroughly white hot R Able Archer 83 Prall 7-11 lfoveJlber NATO conducted its annual ccmmaand post exercise to practice nuclear release procedures This is a recurring event that includes NATO forces from Turkey to Bnqland WHDfTBL HOFORN HOCON'lRACT ORCaR If ' SBeRB9 UMBRA GAMMA 69 CfeP SEeR1ft' UMBRA GAMMA WNIHTEL HOFORH NOCONTRACT ORCOR and is routinely monitored by soviet intelligence Typiaal soviet responses in the past have included increased intelligence collection and increased readiness levels at select military garrisons Tbe 1983 version of Able ArCher however had some special wrinkles which we believe probably fueled soviet anxieties NATO tested new procedures for releasing nuclear weaponry that emphasized command communications frena headquarters to subordinate units In addition unlike previous scenarios wherein NATO forces remained at General Alert throughout the 1983 plan featured preexercise communications that notionally moved forces from normal readiness through various alert phases to a General Alert Soviet intelligence clearly had tip-offs to the exercise and HUMXHT elements underwent a major mobilization to collect against it on 8 or 9 November Moscow sent a circular telegram to KGB Residencies in Western Europe ordering thea to report on the increased alert status of US military bases in Europe Residencies were also instructed to Check for indications of an impending nuclear attack against the soviet union the London KGB Residency interpreted this as a sign of Moscow's VRYU concern Similar messages to searcb for US military activity were received by GRD Residencies 28 other Warsaw Pact intelligence services reacted strongly as well intelligence officer intiJRated that during the Able Archer tiJae frame he had been particularly occupied trying to obtain information on a major NATO exercise o o o The officer said that his efforts were in response to a year-old high-priority requirement from Moscow to look for any indication that the United states was about WHINTBL HOFORH NOCON'l'RACT ORCOR dfeP BeRM' tJMBRA GADA 70 SBE RJftI UMBRA GAMMA WNIN'l'EL NOFOD NOCON'l'RACT ORCON to launch a preemptive nuclear strike against the countries of the Warsaw Pact The Pact also launched an unprecedented technical collection The soviets also conducted over 36 intelligence flights significantly aore than in previous Able Archers These included soviet strategic and naval aviation missions over the Norwegian Borth Baltic and Baren Seas -- probably to determine whether US naval forces were deploying forward in support of Able Archer Warsaw Pact ilitary reactions to this particular 'exercise were also unparalleled in scale This fact together with the timing of their response strongly suggests to us that Soviet military leaders may have been seriously concerned that the US would use Able Archer 83 as a cover for launching a real attack The soviets evidently believed the exercise would take place sometime between 3 and 11 November but they initiated significant military preparations well in advance Beginning October 20 for These t3 lb 3 were highly unusual Most notably they probably WlfINTBL NOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCOR 98P SBetUH UMBRA 'GAMMA 71 SEeRIff UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORM NOCONTRACT OReoM o 'l'ransporting nuclear weapons fro storage sites to delivery units by helicopter o A standdown or suspension of all flight operations fraa 4 to 10 November -- with the exception of intelligence collection flights -- probably tq have available as many aircraft as possible for combat o Invoking a lO-minute around-the-clock readiness time and assigning priority targets similar measures were taken by about a third of the Soviet WND1TBL NOFORM HOCOHTRACT ORCOR 4IOP 8BeRJ111' UMBRA GAMMA 72 reP 8 eRM' UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRAC'l' ORCON There were a number of other unusual soviet military aov8S that taken in the aggregate also strongly suggest heightened concern WHDTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCOlf 'I'OP SBSRJRI UMBRA GAMMA 73 Cf8P SBE Rlft' UMBRA GAMMA WHINTEL ROFORlf ROCONTRACT ORCOR November 11 the soviet alert evidently was withdrawn Flight training by soviet Air Force units in Bast Germany returned to By On the same day that Soviet forces returned to noraal status Marshal Ustinov delivered a speech in Moscow to a group of higbranking military officers that in our view offers a plausible explanation for the unusual soviet reactions to Able Archer 83 Calling the us reckless and adventurist and charging it was pusbing tbe world toward nuclear catastropbe ustinov implied that the Kremlin saw us military actions as sufficiently real to order an increase in soviet combat readiness pinally possibly referring to the use of an exercise to launch a surprise attack be warned that no enemy intrigues will catch us unawares Ustinov also voiced bis apparent conviction that the threat WHINTEL ROFORlf ROCON'l'RACT ORCOR 'ReP SBeIUn UMBRA GAMMA 74 ep SBeRB'P UMBRA GAMMA WHINTEL HOFORN HOCOHTRACT ORCOH of war loomed heavy ExhQrting his forces he declared that the international situation -- nthe increased danger of an outbreak of a new world warn -- called for extraordinary measures We must actively and persistently foster high vigilance and Ilobil ze all servicemen both to increase combat readiness o o o and to strengthen military discipline There is little doubt in our minds that the soviets were genuinely worried by Able Archer however the depth of that concern is difficult to gauge On one hand it appears that at least some soviet forces were preparing to preempt or counterattack a HATO strike launched under cover of Able Archer Such apprehensions stemmed in our view from several factors o us-soviet relations at the time were probably at their lowest ebb in 20 years Indeed the threat of war with the us was an ever-present media theme throughout the USSR especially the armed forces o Yuriy Andropov probably the only man in the soviet Union who could authorize the use of nuclear weapons at a moment s notice was seriously ill - ---- Pact exercises to counter a NATO surprise attack always portrayed NATO njumping off- from a large training maneuver before reaching full combat readiness Soviet doctrine and war plans have long posited such a scenario for a Warsaw Pact preemptive- attack on NATO on the other hand the US intelligence community detected no evidence of large-scale Warsaw Pact preparations lftfINTEL BOFORN BOCOB'l'RAC'l' ORCOB 'ReP SBQRBIlI mmRA GAMMA conventional 75 _ 'MP SBeRIR' UMBRA GAMMA WlfDfTEL BOFOU BOCOHTRAC'l' ORCOB thinking assumes that the Soviets would probably undertake such a mobilization and force buildup prior to a massive attack on NATO The Board questions whether we would indeed detect as The amixed B Soviet reaction may in fact directly reflect the degree of uncertainty within the Soviet military and the Kreal in over US intentions Although the Soviets usually have been able to make correct evaluations of US alerts their increased number of intelligence reconnaissance flights and special telegrams to intelligence Residencies regarding possible US force obilization for example suggests to us serious doubts about the true intent of Able Archer To us Soviet actions preceding and during the exercise appear to have been the logical steps to be taken in a period when suspicions were running high Moreover 1I8ny of these steps were ordered to be Jl8 de secretly to avoid detection by US intelligence Dais suggests that Soviet forces were either preparing to launch a surprise preeaptive attack which never occurred or making preparations that would allow them a minimua capability to retaliate but at the same time not provoke the attack they apparently feared This situation could have been extremely dangerous if during the exercise -- perhaps through a series of ill-timed coincidences or because of faulty intelligence -- the Soviets had misperceiVed US actions as preparations for a real attack Winter 1983-84 Winter of exisis by December 1983 -- -- ------ -- -------- rumors of imminent war were circulating at all levels of Soviet society For eXaJlPle at the Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers' Conference in sofia Pact commander KUlikav characterized the international situation as prewar B Be called for more active WBIHTEL HOFORH HOCONTRAC'l' ORCOB ' I 8P SBeRift UMBRA GADA 76 4'8 SeeJURI UMBRA GAMMA WHIHTEL ROFORH ROCONTRACT ORCOR reserve training as well as stockpiling of ammunition food and fuel in case of an emergency In Moscow a respected US expert on the USSR after extensive conversations with Soviet government officials came away convinced that there was an obsessive fear of war an emotionalism and a paranoia among his contacts Hevertheless the General Secretary continued to participate actively in foreign policy matters In late Hovember he sent a toughly worded letter to Margaret Thatcher calling the cruise 1Rissiles slated for Greenbaa COJIJIon a threat to the soviet Union that had to be removed This letter undoubtedly a last ditCh effort to prevent cruise missile deployments in England was characterized l '3 3 b1 11 as resentful to the point of anger and even threatening When the first Pershing II's arrived in west Germany in December Andropov reportedly ordered his negotiators to leave the Geneva strategic arms talks and not return until the Bdssiles were removed Andropov's lengthy infirmity very possibly left the USSR with a feckless leader for several aonths thereafter a situation that could have exacerbated any uneasiness among his colleagues over WHINTEL ROFOlUf ROCONTRACT ORCOR 1J 19P SBE RB'R UMBRA GAMMA 11 mP SBQRBIJ I 1JMBRA GAMMA WHXNTEL HOFORH IfOCOHTRACT ORCOIf Be died on 9 February Konstantine Chernenko' s ascent to power left the reins of the USSR in the handa of another seriously ill man Cbernenko had long suffered from emphysema complicated by pulmonary cardiac insufficiency as well as fram chronic hepatitis His weak condition was clearly visible during his televised speech The change at the top had no outward effect on the leadership's apparent preoccupation with the danger of war The media campaiqn intelligence collection efforts and military preparations in fact appeared to accelerate in Chernenko's first months in office Speeches by Soviet military leaders in February continUed to warn that US policies were flirting with war The major theaea qave notice to Waahinqton that a surprise attack would not succeed and exhorted the Soviet population to steel itself for a possible confrontation Marshal ICulikov warned in a 24 February Red stat article that WlfXNTEL HOFORIf HOCOIf'J 'RACT ORCOR 'PQP SBE RIIIJ UMBRA GAMMA 78 ' ftIP 8BeRB r UMBRA GAMMA WHIIITBL NOFORM NOCONTRACT ORCOH When the united states and NATO play with fire as they are now doing theirs is not simply an irresponsible activity but o o o an extremely dangerous one o o o the US-NATO military and political leadership must realize that whatever they create and whatever eans they elaborate for unleashing an 8CJC r8ssive war and conducting cODbat operations the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies will be capable of a fittinq response o o o o Two days later in a statement COIIDleDlorating the Soviet araed force Marshal ustinov aade public in vague but pointed language efforts underway to bolster the national defense The CPSU Central cODDDittee and the soviet government have adopted the necessary measures to strengthen the country' s defense enhance the araed forces' combat readiness and do all they can to ' prevent the forces of aggression from wrecking the ailitary equilibrium which bas been achieved Be also quoted General secretary Cbernenko as justifying these aeasures -to cool the hot beads of the bellicose adventurists Judging fraa his exhortations to the soviet bureaucracy ve conclude that Chernenko probably shared bis predecessor's apparent concerns In early March for example a circular telegram to soviet diploaats abroad continUed to emphasize the same war scare themes Cbernenko was quoted as declaring -The present tension in the world is caused by the sharply stepped-up policies of the 1DOre aggressive forces of Aaerican imperialism a policy of outrigbt ailitariSJll of claims to world supremacy - Be reiterated earlier charges that the US deployment of nuclear aissiles in WRINTEL HOFOlUf NOCOllTRACT ORooN 'f8P SHaRE- UMBRA GADA 79 rfeP SBeItE'f UMBRA GAMMA WHIN'l'BL ROFORlf ROCONTRACT ORCOR Europe bad seriously increased the threat of war ooo Intelligence collection on VRYAH also continued apace during this period ' 50 KGB officers wera assembled into a new strategic section II expressly to process VRYAH information At a special BGB conference in January the VRYAH requirement received special empbasis In bis spe to the conference General ICryucbkov told BGB officers that the threat of nuclear war bad reached IIdangerous proportions Tbe White House is advancing on its propaganda the adventurist and extremely dangerous notion of osurvival in the fire of a thermonuclear catastrophe This is nothing else but psychological preparation of the population for nuclear war o o o Urging the KGB officers to increase their efforts be added Everything indicates that the thresbold for using nuclear weapons is being lowered and the significance of the surprise factor baa sbarply increased For the Intelligence service this means that it must concentrate its efforts to the aaxbnDl extent on the principal task to be pursued -- it must not fail to perceive direct preparation by the adversary for a nuclear missile attack against the USSR nor overlook the real danger of war breaking out The fear that seemed to grip the KGB leadership evidently bad a bold on aany lover-level officials as well 1IIIDrl'EL ROFORlf ROCON'l'RACT ORCOR AReP SSeRIft' UMBRA GAMMA 80 reP seeR1ft' --' tnmRA GAMMA WN nrrEL HOFORN HOCON'l'RACT ORCON a KGB official - 3 told him in April 1984 that the US and USSR were on the brink of war This same official also confided that it was very important that the Soviet Union guard against surprise nuclear attack Hoscow center generated even more often curiously esoteric VRYAH tasking to the field The Residency in London received instructions to watch for _government efforts to build up anti-soviet feelings among the public monitor activities at Greenham CODIJIonl and conduct surveillance of military and civilian groups as well as banks slaughterhouses and post offices There was also a clear signal of VRYAN's significance among the high echelons of Soviet government Xoscow dispatched a circular telegram to all ambassadors and chiefs of mission instructing thea not to interfere in or obstruct the work of KGB or GRU personnel iX ' this cable signed by Foreign Xinister Gromyko was unprecedented Indeed a self-reinforcing cycle seemed to have taken life wherein leadership concern was provoking more VRYAH reporting and increased VRYAH data in turn was adding fuel to leadership anxieties Because Hoscow continUed to demand every tidbit of information that might bear on HATO war preparations many of the London KGB Residency' s reports contained information that had at best only tenuous connections to real military activities Ambiguous information went to Hoscow without clarification and as is customary in KGB field reporting without specific sourcing In Karch for example the KGB Resident in London instruCted the officer in charqe of VRYU data to forward a report on a cruise missile exercise at GreenhaJI Co_on Although the Residency had gleaned the story from a British newspaper the report arrived in Moscow as a top-priority cable marked Wof strategic importance w - - the first use of this format by the Residency in over three years That same month London Residency WNDrl'BL HOFOD NOCON'l'RAC'l' ORCON IP8P SBeRBIlL UMBRA GAMMA 81 rfep SBE RIftb-UIIBRA GAMMA IfNINTEL NOFORIf NOCOHTRACT ORCON sent a second II flash message to Moscow this time on the initiative of a junior officer who had been listening to a BBC report on cruise missiles Because VRYAN reports were very selective and usually not put into context they tended to corroborate Headquarters' fears further building the case of HATO war preparations Even innocuous information from overt sources found their way into the data base c one such story about a local campaign for blood donors met a VRYAR requirement to report evidence of blood drives and the information was duly submitted And Moscow kept stoking the fire In praising the London Residency for its VRYAH reporting in Karch 1984 Headquarters cited the blood donor report as especially interesting Even though by this time most Residency officers had grown increasingly skeptical of the VRYAH effort they nonetheless adopted a can do approach forwarding any evidence they could find still London Residency often failed to submit its mandatory bi-week1y reports and Moscow repeatedly had to issue reminders The center BOIletimes tried to spur on London Residency by sharing information from other sources On one occasion it offered an assessment of a RATO document that called for improvements in crisis-related COJDDlunications links According to the Center this was yet another significant sign of preparations for a sudden nuclear missile attaCk against the SoViet Union and socialist countries Moscow also heaped praise on its allies' efforts - --- the head of the KGB' s VRYAH program singled -- -- out Czechoslovak reporting on the US Federal Emergency Management Agency as priceless 1I ' 'he same official a l so lauded Prague for its collection of allitary intelligence which he said helped make its civilian service second only to the KGB in fulfilling the WHDTBL ROFORIf HOCOHTRACT ORCOR t MP S BeRIR UMBRA GAMHA 82 'faP SBeRfi UMBRA GAMMA WHIN'l'BL NOFOU NOCOHTRACT ORCON VRYAH requirement The Bast Germans reportedly placed third In addition GRU Residencies geared up In fact there were some indications that Residencies were about to be placed on -- As a result Residencies put as many agents as possible in direct radio contact with Moscow This measure was intended to ensure that HeadCIlJarters could handle the agents directly should a rupture in diplomatic relations occur and an embassy had to be abandoned To timely monitor military developments abroad the GRD implemented a special 24-hour watch staff at Headquarters These tasks according to GRU training were to be implemented during time of war Moscow's emphasis on wartime preparedness was reflected in training exercises throughout 1984 For the first time that year the Soviet strategic forces training proqraa concentrated on surViving and responding to a surprise enemy strike This seeminq obsession with wartime preparedness really came to the fore in March and April the Soviet armed forces conducted the most comprehensive rehearsal for nuclear war ever detected' Indeed several of the component events were by themselves the largest or most extensive of their type ever 'l'his activity The naval exercise involved over 148 surface ships and probably close to 50 submarines At one stage approximately 23 ballistic missile submarines were activated making it the most extensive dispersal of its JdJid ever detected The Northern and WHINTBL NOFOU NOCONTRACT OReoN p seeRM' UMBRA GAMMA 83 WP SBeJtBtf' tJHBRA GAMMA WNINTEL HOFORH IfOCONTRACT ORCOR Baltic Fleets were especially active conducting dispersals defensive maneuvers anti-submarine operations siJRUlated reactions to nuclear attack and offensive nuclear strikes The naval exercises ended just a8 the strategic Aviation and strategic Rocket Force maneuvers jumped off of effort was impressive Here too the level o The Strategic Rocket Force exercise and associated naval activity involved 33 missile launches including SLBH's HRBK' and o The Soviet Strategic Aviation exercise involved at least 17 bombers deployed to various staging bases On one day alone over 80 bombers conducted a large-scale strike exercise Summer 1984 Preparations tor WAr In mid-May Ustinov in response to a series of questions published by C Ontinued the media attack against the us by accusing Washington of trying to -achieve military superiority- to blackmail the Soviet Union He warned that -any attempts at resolving the historical dispute with socialism by aeaDS of ailitary force are doomed to inevitable utter failure - In addition he reemphasized the military's readiness theme by quoting Olernenko Ho military adventure of imperiali vill take us by surprise any aggressor will i_ediately get his deserts - And he called upon the Soviet people to work even more -perseveringly- and -purposefully to strengthen the economy Finally Ustinov revealed that -the Army and Navy are in permanent readiness for resolutely repelling any aggressor About this time Olernenko' s leadership position Ilay well have been significantly impacted by his declining health WNIHTEL HOFORH ROCOHTRACT ORCOH If'8P SBeRft UMBRA GAMMA 84 i' P SHeRIff UMBRA GAMMA WHIH'l'EL HOFORH NOCON'l'RACT ORCOH ration and lack of stamina could well bave accelerated the accumulation of power by younger Politburo members namely Mikhail Moreover according to a public statement by the then Deputy Director of IUSAC Gorbacb ev during this period assumed the responsibility for ftstrategy formulation- on defense aatters -u We do not know how strongly Gorbacb ev subscribed to the SaJIS view on the threat of a surprise attack apparently held by aany of his Politburo colleagues There are same very slim pieces of evidence suggesting the opposite some officials in Soviet intelligence believed he was less bellicose toward the US and might even ftsurrenderft if conditions in the USSR continued to deteriorate L -- '- ______ by -surrender ft 3 1 1 meant retreat or withdrawal from an expanding Soviet empire not military submission -- Gorbachev's speech to the people of Smolensk in late JUne betrayed no obvious obsession with the war scare He was there to award the city the order of Lenin for ita citizens I bravery during WlfIN'l'EL HOFORH HOCONTRACT ORCOH 'ReP 9BQRIJIlI UJIBRA GAMMA 85 t6p SBeRIft' UMBRA GAMMA WNXHTBL NOFORN NOCOH'l'RACT ORCON the Second World War -- presumably a good setting in which to attack the US publicly The speech however focused prillarily on iJDproving the economy and the standard of living Rather than exhorting the people to increase military readiness he called for the mobilization of creative potentialities of each person the further strengthening of discipline and the increase of responsibility at work and the implementation of school reform and an integrated solution to the contemporary probleas of education Nevertheless the fear of a US attack apparently persisted among some Soviet leaders into the fall the Politburo secretly forbade the Minister of Defense the Chief of the General Staff and other responsible military and KGB leaders from being absent from their offices for any length of time General Akhromeyev then First Deputy Minister of Defense was quoted during this period as saying that war was imminent Akhrameyev reportedly compared the situation in Europe to the weeks preceding the lIasi attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 Be asked GRU Chief Ivashutin whether in case of war there were sufficient agents in place in NATO' s rear areas Be also asked whether the GRU bad agents in NATO General Staffs who could give twenty days warning of hostile action -- 3 rn fact Soviet military actions into the early fall suggested continued deep concern about western hostility Presumably at the behest of the Soviet military leadership Warsaw Pact security services increased harassment of western attaches and imposed greater restrictions their tr a v e I J l WHIH'RL HOFOmt ROCORTRACT ORCOR IfeP SBQRB1P lD1BRA GAMMA 86 fep SBeRBI' UMBRA GAMMA WHDTBL NOFORM NOCOR'l'RACT OROOR Through early summer Moscow' s phasis on preparedness evidently led to a number of military developments aimed at increasing the Warsaw Pact's ability to go to war o Xn March to avoid reducinq readiness aJIlOnq combat troops the Politburo decided for the first time since the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia not to use military trucks and personnel to support the harvest Xn April the East German aJDlunition plant in Luebben increased to 24-hour production and more than doubled its output o o Xn Kay Polish women in several cities were called up for a short military exercise Xn SOJae faailies with young children both husband and wife were called Reservists were told that readiness alerts would be expanded and occur more frequently in factories and relief organizations o Xn Hungary a recall reservists was conducted in Kay o of an undetermined nWlber of Xn June during the previous 6-12 JIlOnths additional SPETSNAZ troops had arrived in Hungary an increase of SPE'l'SHAZ forces in Hunqary and Czechoslovakia as well as an onqoing aggressive indoctrination- of Warsaw Pact forces - w o Also in June the soviets conducted their largest ever WHDft'EL NOPORM ROCONTRACT ORCOR 'f8P SBeRBI ' UMBRA GAMMA 87 tMP S eeRJIIlI UMBRA GAMHA WNIN'l'EL HOFOD ROCONTRACT ORCOH unilateral combat exercise in Eastern Europe At least 60 000 soviet troops in Hunqary and Czechoslovakia were involved o A mobilization exercise in June in Czechoslovakia involved the armed forces territorial forces and civil defense elements o During the spring according to western press reports soviet civil defense associations were activated Volunteers were knocking on apartment doors explaining what to do when sirens go off o For the first time in 30 years soviet railroad troops in the Transcaucasus conducted an exercise to test their ability to move supplies to the forward area while under air attack o abolished draft deferments even at defense plants o Both the soviets and Czechs separately practiced modifying mobilization procedures in exercises to facilitate call-up of civilian reservists earlier in the force readiness sequence o In Poland the length of required military service for new reserve officers was increased from 12 to 18 months o In an effort to limit contact with foreigners the Supreme soviet decreed effective 1 JUly that soviet citizens who provided foreigners with housing transportation or other services would be fined o since 1983 men up to 35 years old bad been drafted without consideration of family difficulties or their profession WNIlftBL HOFOD ROCONTRACT ORCOR '1'6 SEeR1ft' UMBRA GAMHA 88 M SBeRBIR UMBRA GAMMA WHINTEL NOFORN NOCON'l'RACT OReoN Inside the intelligence bureaucracy however there were signs by midyear that attention was shifting away froa surprise nuclear Moscow Headquarters attack continUed to press for VRYU reporting but the previous sense of urgency had dissipated Both in London and at Moscow center KGB officers were beginning to sense that official guidance on VRYU was becaaing ritualistic reflecting less concern KGB officers returning from Moscow to London had the clear impression that the primary strategic concern was focused on the possibility of a US technological breakthrough This was expressed in tasking to both the KGB and GRU Information on us scientific-technical developments that could lead to a weapons technology breakthrough began to assume a high priority 30 - -- -- ---- -- Autpmn 1984 Reason Restored late smmaer there were public hints of possible differences inside the Kremlin over how to deal with washincJton on strategic matters In an interview on September 2 ernenko omitted any reference to the reaoval of US Pershing II or cruise missiles as a condition for resuming strategic arms talks Gromyko however reiterated this condition in a tough speech to the UK on 27 September on 6 october GrOllyko gave a characteristically harsh speech to the united Nations in which he attacked the Reagan Administration's reCkless designs and obsession with achieving military superiority Chernenko's interview with the Washington Post on 17 october was lighter in tone By that time a nwaber of factors may have prompted sOlle serious reflecting within the Politburo Probably most bIportant the imminent us nuclear attack -- expected for more than two years By WHDfTEL HOFORN HOCON'l'RAC'l ORCOH IJI P 8BctUft' UMBRA GAMMA 89 p GRQRBII UMBRA GAMMA WNIHTEL NOFORH NOCONTRACT ORCON -- did not materialize Likewise the massive VRYAN collection effort we presume ultimately did not yield the kind of concrete indicators of US war preparations for which the soviet leadership was searching other events that also aay have prompted some policy reexamination included Tbe ineffectiveness of ncountermeasuresn in slowing US IHF deployments or significantly stimulating the West European peace movement Moscow's inability to match the US military buildup because of severe economic prOblems Growing concern for possible US technological breakthroughs in space weaponry soviet perceptions of the increasing President Reagan's reelection likelihood of In addition several leadership personalities perhaps most suspicious of us intentions departed the scene Notably Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov whose public statements on US-USSR relations were particularly onerous was sacked and reassigned Although we do not know for certain Ogarkov aay have been the casualty of a changing Politburo which seemed to want improved relations with the US and control over the military the iJapetus for improved 08USSR relations was coming from the younger- generation -specifically Gorbacbev Romanov and Aliev -- whose views had prevailed over those of Gromyko and Ustinov __ ____ ____ --J was replaced with Akhromeyev to make the soviet military JIOre flexible on arms control issues WlfINTEL NOPORH ROCONTRACT ORCON 'l'eP SBeRIflI UMBRA GAMHA 90 p SEeR1ft' UMBRA GAMMA WHIHTBL NOPORR HOCONTRACT ORCOH Hot long after Ogarkov was dismissed Dimitry ustinov -another key believer in the US surprise attack -- became seriously ill with pneumonia His condition worsened in the late fall and he died on December 20 Ustinov' s demise was paralleled by a softening in the Kremlin's arms control policy In late Hovember Chernenko abandoned Andropov' s vow not to return to the Geneva talks as long as US IHP missiles remained in Europe and agreed to resume talks in January 1985 Attitudes were also changing inside soviet intelligence By late 1984 a new KGB collection requirement levied during the summer for scientific-technical intelligence bad acquired equal standing wi th VRYAH By early 1985 L' -- _--- _ 3 ti _i l _ -- - - ilU ' ' the threat of surprise nuclear attack was not being taken seriously at all in the KGB even within the Pirst Chief Directorate on a visit to Koscov in January 1985 the Acting Resident from London reportedly attempted to discuss the VRYAR requirement with a senior Pirst Chief Directorate friend but was put off by a strong Russian expletive Officers at the London Residency reportedly welcomed the decline of VRYAH because it would diminish the possibility of aisperceptions about us preparations for nuclear attack 31 -- o c- By early 1985 soviet leadership fears of a US surprise attack seemed to evaporate steadily Cbernenko's health eroded throughout the early months of 1985 and he died on Marab 10 Within hours Gorbachev became General Secretary o Por some time after Gorbaabev a ssumed power tensions reaained 31Ib id WHIlrrEL HOPORR HOOONTRACT ORCOH -MP SBeRM UMBRA GAMHA 91 p SBeRft UMBRA GAMMA WHINTEL ROFORM IfOCONTRACT ORCOK -' high between Washington and Moscow However soviet public expressions of fear that the US was plotting a sudden nuclear attack eventually subsided A new more upbeat mood among the leadership began to emerge In July 1985 Gorbachev delivered a speech to a group of military officers in Minsk in which according to a Western reporter he distanced himself from the policies of his immediate predecessors and placed a high priority on achieving arms agreements -- to facilitate a reduction in arms spending and help bailout the disastrous economy In the military arena however the vestiges of the war scare seemed to have a lasting effect Th soviets continued until 1981 the forward deployment of their ballistic missile submarines In late 1984 they also began conducting strategic bomber combatpatrols over the Arctic as part of their analogous- r ponse to us INF deployments And they continued to reduce their vulnerabilities to a surprise nuclear attack -- in 1985 for example by JIOving the SRI alternate COJIJIl8Jld post at Smolensk eastward to Orenburq and out of Pershing II range The Legacy Indeed the soviet military's experience during this period may weII' have had at least soae influence in subsequent liCY decisions regarding strategic force modern zation and training Soviet strategic military developments and exercises since then have particularly emphasized improving capabilities to survive and retaliate against a surprise nuclear attack Such efforts have included o The orchestration of five SRI exercises in 1986 and 1981 to test the ability of aobile missile units to respond to a us surprise attack' o Beginning in KarCh 1986 a change in strategic aviation WHINTEL ROFORM ROCONTRACT ORCON 'ReP 8BettH' tJMBRA GAMMA 92 cfep SHeRR UMBRA GAMMA - WNJ NTEL NOFORlf NOCONTRACT ORCON exercises that featured takeoff on strategic warning i e aircraft were sent aloft during the onset of heightened international tensions o Impressive iJaproveaents in the survivability of their strategic arsenal By the late 1990 IS 75 percent of the force will be l1ighly survivable mobile platforms -- compared to 25 percent in 1979 AI though much of this change reflects the introduction of land-based systems the sea-based and bomber forces have also greatly enbanced their -ability to survive a sudden first strike The legacy of the war scare however has perhaps been most obvious within the soviet intelligence establishment fr while the VRYAN collection require ent is no longer at the top of the KGBls priority list it nonetheless ranks third -- behind only 1 US RATO strategic and political-economic issues and 2 significant international political changes These updated priorities were stipulated in a paper jointly issued last summer by the new chief of the pirst Chief Directorate peD and the new KGB party secretary Moreover the PCD evidently continues to process VRYAN reporting through a situation room at its headquarters and still requires the larger Residencies abroad such as Washington -- to man VRYAR sections The same source says that the RGBls illegals and counterintelligence coaponents have became major contributors of VRYAlf eporting Inside the GRU warning of imminent nuclear attack remains the traditionally top collection objective but __ ____ a headquarters directive late last year reemphasized its importance IMPLICATIONS FOR TODAY Recent events in Europe reinforce the Board I S deep concern that US intelligence must be better able to assess likely Soviet WHl NTEL ROFORM ROCONTRACT ORCOH 'l8P SSQRBIP UMBRA GAMMA 93 Ji 'lQp 1i QRBIJ I UMBRA GAMMA WNIN'l'EL HOFORli HOCOH'l'RACT ORCOH attitudes and intentions Today the dark clouds of political instability inside the Kremlin loaa far heavier than even during those evidently precarious days of leadership transition in the early 1980 s Popular political expectations -- more often demands -- throughout the Bloc have almost certainly outdistanced even Mikhail Gorbachev's reform-ainded vision As the soviet empire in Eastern Europe crumbles prospects are very good that strongly anti-communist governments will eventually eaerqe making very likely a total realignment of the European political landscape Domestically ethnic strife threatens to rip the very fabric of the soviets' socialist -onion - The economy continues to slide while the leadership invokes so-called reforms that at best are only half-measures All the while Gorbachev is trying to project an image of control but is probably barely able to hang on to the reins And his political opposition may be preparing to pounce at the earliest most opportune moment It' s no news to our policymakers that this turaoil in the USSR makes for very unsettled and virtually unpredictable governmental relationships -- a conundrwR that will probably last for some time In such a charqed atmosphere particularly if events degenerate into a Kremlin power struggle that favors the -conservatives Ilisperceptions on either side could lead willy-nilly to tu lwarranted reactions -- and counterreactions It is clear to this Board that the us intelligence cOJllllUllity therefore has a compelling obligation to make a determined effort to minimize the chances that futur soviet actions will be misinterpreted in Washington WHIHTEL HOFORH HOCOlrfRACT ORCOR IfeP 9BeRIfll UMBRA GAMMA 94 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu