3 ' TTBT 3FDT 3FDT P U 1' # # G Date 09 24 98 Page 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY PFIAB RECORD NUMBER 206-10001-10007 RECORDS SERIES PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD AGENCY FILE NUMBER DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS PFIAB MINUTES OF BOARD MEETING OF AUGUST 6 AND 7 1964 08 06 64 11 AGENDA FOR AUGUST 6 AND 7 1963 MEETING SUMMARY OF DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS AUGUST 6 AND 7 1963 MEETING PAPER TEXTUAL DOCUMENT TOP SECRET IB 1C RELEASED WITH DELETIONS 08 06 98 i R - ITEM IS RESTRICTED II y fY Va u hi vI q a m s s v T p a a o ' s ih TM ouvn m 030000 s iXrfj lX A j 7 4 1 ' CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION ANOfcR RELEASE OFTWS DOCUMENT AU s V v o oiV ii M I NvU'iTy E S o- v wv- B O A R D 0 F M E E T I N G 's 0 F A U G U S T 6 a n d 7 1 9 6 4 f e 'o W ' m 3$P I v' Vy tcGBP v r-l JV 4Vi o U %L GBP Ac r w 'v aamssvx aa F S3AIH3HV TVNOUVN 3 H i IV 0 3 0 n 0 0 a d 3 8 rA oo J o o A -V ' hMo no UiiJcuiiOri jTQ o ffibtilffilCATlOH AN DIOR 'S r o F PRESIDENT S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD AGENDA 1 J August 5 1964 0 - - V viA i I 8 30 2 11 00 P M CST approx P M Depart Andrews AFB via Special Mission aircraft Constellation M l $ i i It ' ' ' o j Arrive Offutt AFB Remain overnight at Offutt Inn August 6 1964 I Item Tlmo 1 8 00 - 9 30 2 9 30 - 10 00 3 10 30 - 11 00 Intelligence War Planning 4 11 00 - 12 15 Soviet Bloc Threat -i-iT - Subject i Intelligence Warning a F c %ov Information Deficiencies Coverage Deficiencies Impact on the Single Integrated Operational Plan SIOP Lunch Continue with Item 4 -Depart Offutt AFB 9 10 approx 9 00 - 9 30 V - 'r V iVt-V Arrive Andrews AFB August 7 df 1964 Chairman's Time Current Intelligence Briefing on the Situations in South Vietnam North V i e t n a m Laos Cambodia Communist China Cyprus Conp o Cuba ____ ____________________________ Mr Ray Cline Deputy Director of Intelligence CIA x Handle V i a f l H M f t Control System - o - ySSV S' r ' i r n n n cyrp prp Agenda For August 7 Item 3 Continued Time Subject 10 15 - 3 2 - 15' 1 ' 'i 4 i i rl 5 - 12 00 o 7- 5 6 7 12 00 - 12 45 v ' GBP 12 45 -o -1- C0 ' U 'o5 X x Q Q - 2 00 -- o o' ' o' Lunch - The White House Mess I ou r v o V Executi anSes3ion GBP s u t J k s 7 V 0 o ' 4 I 1 Audio Surveillance Collection and C o u n t e r measures Efforts of the Intelligence Community oooo o' j '4 USIB conclusions and recommendations on the organization and management __________________ o f the effort Mr fom Karamessines CIA Mr Robert Eannerman CIA b Ns Final USXH assessment of audio p e n e t r a t i o n s of U S E m b a s s y Moscow_________ Mr Howard Osborn Clft o Mr G Marvin Gentile Department of State 2 0 0 - 2 1 5 Executive Session o2- 5 - 3 1 5 Status Report on Developments Fertaining to the Defense Intelligence Agency_______ Lt General Joseph F Carroll USAF Agency r Director Defense Intelligence Agenc i t fy 'W P liA Handle via frAP fife3 FT GBP J o $ 2 L 11%L 'o V oamssvToaa S3AIH3HV TVNOUVN 3 H 1 IV Q 3 0 n 0 0 b d 3 a ' v IV -i i f CPO P1 S C g R f i g Agenda For August 7 I Item Continued Time Subject 3 15 - 4 00 Status Report on the Implementation of Prior Board Recommendations_____ Mr Ash 3 30 1 S S - 5 30 12 Discussions with the Director- of o Central Intelligence_____ Mr John A McCone 5 30 - End of Bay o Vr ' o t o Executive Session 'f A - y jy G r C d s J 1 c U f a 2 7 t ' 4 S ' - 7 O 4 9 A ' o I 1 i- d 6 t ' f f l A A ' s - s iJ t j v T T l f e Auoipnv aamssvnpaa S3AIH0HV TVN0U VN 3H i iV Q 300Q 0bd3a $ o Va A o -h vj VJ ' o H oo 3 ' GBP NV 4%1 i 'v -W TMfl doctmoct cir i'o ic Coptot# S i77 Ho ol JAP QgeUBT-- t iv THE WHITE H O U S E v'hT # W A S H IN O TO N W v V SUBJECT u$$ v - ' ' MEMORANDUM FOR THE PILE August 6-7 1964 Meeting of the President 8 Foreign Intelligence Advisory Bcird 6 August 1964 o CIA MAS MO OBJECTION TO j DECLASSIFICATION AND OR j RELEASE OF THIS DOCUiVlENt AS SANITI2ED j' f c 9c If -v o1 ' 1 o j rf o y V ' c -o o 'o i m %v The first day of this scheduled 2-day meeting of the Board was devoted to an all-day visit at SAC Headquarters Offutt AFB Omaha Nebraska on August 6 xi attendance were Messrs Clifford Doolittle Langer Pace Gray Land and Coyne Board members Murphy and Baker were unable to join the meeting at SAC o j v August 7 1964 On the second day of its meeting the Board convened at 9 00 a m on August 7 at the Board's offices in the Executive Office Building Washington D C Present wore Messrs Clifford Doolittle Murphy Langer Pace Baker and Gray and Messrs Coyne and Ash Board membor Land Joined the meeting a little later on V s n o 0 - i o oi o i T j 1 i IS Hr Gray asked for the DCI's views on the capability'of the intelligence estimating mechanism to avoid being influenced by the wishful-thinking of responsible officials as in the case of the erroneous estimate on Cuba prior to the Soviet missile crisis in 1962 Mr McCone said that a better example than Cuba was the estimate on Brazil which was bitterly resisted by people in Government who nevertheless later saw the accuracy of the estimate proved by developments K o W V o oV'H o V j# % 1 l oj i In response to Mr Murphy's query about Cuba the DCI said that an estimated 5 000 Soviets had departed since May 1 leaving 2 000 on the island The Cubans now have control of air defense and coastal defense but the question is whether they have unlimited control of the SAM sites I m Vg CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION ANOOR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT Q o m P 7 s i f t THE WHITE HOUSE 8 -GBP E G R GBP R WASHINGTON wt e 1 PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD vv tm Y August 3 1964 J MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD SUBJECT Audiosurveillance Collection and Countermeasures Efforts of the Intelligence Community In Executive Session Mr Ash will brief the Board on significant developments relating to the subject which members may wish to keep in mind when USIB representatives discuss the matter with the Board Following Mr Ash's briefing Mr Tom Karamessines Assistant to CIA s Deputy Director for lans and Mr Robert Bannerman of CIA's Deputy Directorate for Support will brief the Board on the U S Intelligence Bo ard's conclusions and recommendations on the organization and --management of the audiosurveillance-effor-t On 'Jun'e 26 1964 following 'the Board s''recommendations to the President Mr Bundy requested the Director of Central Intelligence as Chairman of the USIB to present coordinated proposals for the most effective possible organization management and coordination of the intelligence community s resources and capabilities for research and development and the operational application of techniques for audiosurveillance collection and audiosurveillance countermeasures The organization and management aspects of this problem are indicated by the fact that under present arrangements l research and development of audiosurveillance collection and countermeasure devices and techniques are pursued separately by State Defense and CIA 2 the coordination of audiosurveillance collection operations is the responsibility of the FBI in the U S and is the responsibility of the DCI overseas and 3 the coordination of audiosurveillance countermeasures activities is the responsibility of an NSC nteragency committee chaired by the Dep tment of State Next Mr Howard Osborne Director of CIA's Office of Security and Mr G arvin Gentile Director of Security at the Department of State will bring the Board up to date on the USIB's final assessment of the audio and electromagnetic penetrations of the U X S Einbassy Moscow which were discovered ' in April ' ir v f A 4 4 V '-v m 4 m a a 4 4 m a ID a t s n oo m 1 a 1 # 4 4 Vi vt a m i l V v osojissvTDaa S3AIH0HV TVNOUVN 3H1IV Q30n00 d38 y penetrations Subsequent to the last meeting the President requested the Chairrusn USIB to provide a final assessment of damage in time for consideration by the koard at its August 6-7 meeting ' -W tyy ' ov o t o Y $5 % ' o I o oyi S a AA- o ' ' m o -4 V 1 Nrv i Addendum Enclosed for the information of the Board is a memorandum entitled Bugging of the U S Qnbassy Moscow which was submitted to the Chairman by Dr Jerome Wiesner following his oral presentation to the Board subsequent to his on-the-scene examination of developments at the Embassy in Moscow vvv ooinssvTDaa S3AIH0HV TVNOU VN 3H 1IV Q 300Q 0bd3d 4 % ' '- - A v v r h I GBP GBP 2 GBP GBP 'v-V7 i-vV iN o 0 oo'v ' vAe- V#- GBP THE WHITE HOUSE WASH INGTON June 24 1964 I MEMORANDUM FOR Mr Clark M Clifford Chairman President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory eBoard SUBJECT Bugging of the'U S Embassy Moscow o During my recent trip'to Moscow I visited the American Embassy and had a number of conversations with Mr Musser who has the responsibility for assuring that the building is secure against listening devices I also examined a number of key offices in the Embassy building including several in which microphones had been found and examined the special secure rooms that have recently been installed I formed the following judgments regarding the present situation 1 There is no convincing basis for concluding that additional listening systems do not exist in the building 2 The soundproof rooms and the special room containing the teletype equipment appear to be secure though the former are not electrically shielded The lack of shielding is probably not serious because the rooms are in the interior of the building and under guard at all times so that the use of microphones or of electromagnetic listening devices in them would be extremely difficult 3 # The physical security of the building seemed a--v bit less than adequate -'For'example it was possible for w us to go in and out of the room-housing the telephone switch- ' board with no one but the telephone operator-- who I believe was a Russian girl-- seeing'us 'I understand that at night no one is in the room Physical 'security is complicated somewhat by the fact that the building is also the residence for Embassy employees and by the fact that the local guardstaff is very small none the less this is a problem that should receive attention GBP4 ' o '' 1 '1hr- ys 4 Mr Musser is extremely competent but the -taskiat f o any-i the Embassy is more than any one personaeould-handle a t ''this time I would recommend the following measures v ' 1 Provide Muose some help from the Ame L 11% L b Virf tv qanmssvTDag S3AIH0HV TVNOU VN 3H1IV a30nQ08d3a ytt- I V'' I o ooV SvV1 -ooo v 1 T oJ tir lv 'oo oo'o' 'oC SY ' o'-J 7 I # vv JI t 1 vtr ' ov i k r i 1 v j a H5 f i s i ' at 'xti i sm M o i n time but when I was there he was working by himself Because of the housing shortage the'Embassy'is reluctant to add to the staff The fact is as'I have already said in spite of Musserf8 outstanding ability'he caxlriot do'the job that'now must be done without substantial continuing assistance He also needa additional equipment 2 A very complete physical examination must be made of any room that is to be used'for'confidential conversations This should include x-ray'or 'netitrori examination of the walls floors and ceilings if possible Possibly other techniques can be found which would alsq help locate hidden equipment 3 If x-ray examination is not feasible physical examination of the outside of the building should be considered 4 In critical areas riewwall surfaces should be provided Expert advice is needed to determine whether plastering or paneling would provide the best protection 5 Dr Land s proposal for inducing masking sounds into ' ' introduce the walls should bepurstied 7 It should be possil such sounds directly into'the walls without creating'objectionable sound levels in the r66ms vWThis should be investigated before a decision is made regarding new wall covering 6 Screening should be provided against electromagneticreflection listening devices 7 The possibility 'of providing'continuous 'monitors for signals from such devices should be investigated 8 More'effort should be made to understand the purpose of the microwave 'signal directed t the Qribassy or failing in this to stop it ' It id hard to understand why we have been so unconcerned about it y Vii-- V o o -o 9 An effort''should'be Vmsute't6'insure that 'the 'telephone system cannot be used as a distribution system for listening 2 ' '- -L devices 10 I understand thaitVtiekdTdetsaM microphones'existthat permit secure conversations ' though they may be awkward they should be used for'confidential discussions held outside of the secure rooms until greater confidence oan be established i $11 m r professional group in the' government to develop protective teohni'iues for our embassies oo'Such a group should work'with or at Least have full access 'td'a group whose task is to develop sophisticated penetration devices so that its work is effectively directed against all of the real threats that can be Imagined -f ' -f r o Co otea - 0 o% t v- GBP I oVr ' -V o 5 ViCY H M - v qauissvTDaa S3AIH3HV TVNOUVN 3H i IV %y Jf 030fl00ad3a This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu