INSPECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE ALEXANDRIA VIRGINIA 22350-1500 November 14 2018 Ref FOIA-2015-00480 SENT ELECTRONICALLY TO 16924-26960477@requests muckrock com Mr Shawn Musgrave Muckrock P O Box 55819 Boston MA 02205-5819 Dear Mr Musgrave This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act FOIA request for a copy of report DODIG-2015-100 Information Operations in a Contingency Environment Summary of Weaknesses Identified in Reports Issued from October 6 2006 Through November 7 2013 We received your request on March 27 2015 and assigned it case number FOIA-2015-00480 The Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Audit conducted a search and found the enclosed document responsive to your request After coordinating a review of the report with the Office of the Secretary of Defense Joint Staff and the United States Central Command we determined that certain redacted portions are exempt from release pursuant to 5 U S C § 552 b 1 which pertains to information that is currently and properly classified in accordance with Executive Order 13526 sections 1 4 a 1 4 b 1 4 c 1 4 d and 1 4 e If you consider this response to be an adverse determination you may submit an appeal You can appeal in writing to the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General ATTN FOIA Appellate Authority Suite 10B24 4800 Mark Center Drive Alexandria VA 22350-1500 Any appeal must be postmarked within 90 days of the date of this letter must clearly state the adverse determination being appealed and should reference the file number above I recommend that your appeal and its envelope both bear the notation “Freedom of Information Act Appeal ” For more information on appellate matters and procedures please refer to 32 C F R Sec 286 9 e and 286 11 a for further information on administrative appeals You may seek dispute resolution services and assistance with your request from the DoD OIG FOIA Public Liaison Officer at 703-604-9785 or the Office of Government Information Services OGIS at 877-684-6448 ogis@nara gov or https ogis archives gov You may also contact OGIS via regular mail at National Archives and Records Administration Office of Government Information Services 8601 Adelphi Road – OGIS College Park MD 20740-6001 Please note that OGIS mediates disputes between FOIA requesters and Federal agencies as a non-exclusive alternative to litigation November 14 2018 Ref FOIA-2015-00480 If you have any questions regarding this matter please contact this office at 703-6049775 or via email at foiarequests@dodig mil Sincerely Mark Dorgan Division Chief FOIA Privacy and Civil Liberties Office Enclosure s As stated 2 I Report uhunh II I nun unn- INSPECTOR GENERAL US Department ofDefense March 27 2015 U Information Operations in a Contingency Environment Summary of Weaknesses Identified in Reports Issued From October 6 2006 Through November 2013 I f I 4- IIL UCIICIGI IUI 7 INTEGRITY EFFICIENCY ACCOUNTABILITY EXCELLENCE JI bl l II I unnl Released by BOB OIG FOIA office under FOIA request FOIA-2015-00476 INTEGRITY EFFICIENCY if ACCOUNTABILITY if EXCELLENCE Mission Our mission is to provide independent relevant and timely oversight of the Department of Defense that supports the war gh ter promotes accountability integrity and e iciency advises the Secretary of Defense and Congress and informs the public Vision Our vision is to be a model oversight organization in the Federal Government by leading change speaking truth and promoting excellence a diverse organization working together as one professional team recognized as leaders in our eld Fraud Waste Abuse Department of Defense dodig mi1 hotline eoo 424 soae For more information about whistleblower protection please see the inside back cover FY Pnr'rr I ll ul Ul l U Results in Brief U Information Operations in a Contingency Environment Sum mm of Weaknesses Identi ed in Reports Issued From October 6 2006 Through November 7 2013 March 27 2015 U What We Did U We summarized information operations challenges in Afghanistan Iraq and Africa identi ed in audit reports issued by the Of ce of Inspector General OIG U What We Found U Since 2006 OIG issued six reports on 10 projects in Afghanistan Iraq and Africa The reports identi ed areas of compliance with rules and regulations to conduct 10 use contractors to perform and award contracts for 10 However 01G also identi ed weaknesses in planning executing and assessing Speci cally these reports identi ed 0 U communication activities that were not optimal at the operational level in Afghanistan 0 U a set of contracts with a statement ofwork that did not properly differentiate the intended audiences for military information support operations M180 and public affairs in Iraq 0 U weaknessesin planning and executing civil-military operations CMO and properly integrating MISO in CMO in Africa 0 U a lack of a fully integrated capability in Afghanistan Visit us on the web at dodig mil 0 U inadequate contract oversight in Iraq 0 U the need for strengthened controls over 0 assessments in Afghanistan U The recurring weaknesses indicate that there is an opportunity to apply lessons-learned for 10 to future operations and can serve as a reference for personnel overseeing and conducting IO U What Was Recommended I U Two of the OIG reports contained no recommendations and 4 reports contained 13 recommendations Overall the recommendations addressed contract administration contract surveillance planning future MISO requirements staf ng 0 positions and properly identifying roles and responsibilities All 13 recommendations were closed We will not make additional recommendations because recommendations were contained in the previous DOD OIG reports INSPECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 4-800 MARK CENTER DRIVE ALEXANDRIA VIRGINIA 22350-1500 March 27 2015 MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY COMMANDER U S CENTRAL COMMAND COMMANDER U S AFRICA COMMAND COMMANDER U S SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND STAFF AUDITOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SUBJECT Information Operations in a Contingency Environment Summary of Weaknesses Identi ed in Reports Issued From October 6 2006 Through November 7 2013 Report No We are providing this report for information and use This report relates to the overseas contingency operation Operation Inherent Resolve and was completed in accordance with the 000 Of ce of Inspector General s oversight responsibilities as described in Section 8 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 as amended This report compiles weaknesses identi ed in six Office of Inspector General reports on information operations especially military information support operations in Afghanistan Iraq and Africa The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy the Commanders of U S Central Comm and U S Africa Comm and and U S Special Operations Command and the Director of Joint Staff should read this report to be aware of challenges and opportunities for improvement This report contains no recommendations for action We did notissue a draft report and no written response is required We appreciate the courtesies extended to the stall Please direct questions to me at 703 604-9187 664-9187 Michael J ark Assistant Inspector General Contract Management and Payments lil Ulcontents Introduction 1 Ob ective 1 Background 1 Information Operations 1 Definitions of Information-Related Capabilities 2 Information Operations Responsibilities 3 ReSuitiS 5 01G Reports Identified Weaknesses in Planning Executing and Assessing IO 5 10 Weaknesses Identified by BOB OIG 6 Better of Communication Needed 7 Statement of Work for Set of Contracts Did Not Differentiate Intended Audience for M150 and PA 7 Weaknesses in Planning and Executing CMO and Properly Integrating MISO in CMO 8 Lack of Fully Integrated IO Capability 8 Complied With Laws and Regulations When Officials Awarded Contracts and Used Contractors to Execute MISO But Better Oversight is Needed 9 CENTCOM In I I -H l MISO in Iraq Were Effectlvelo I Improved Descriptions Needed to Identify Roles and Responsibilities for M180 Assessment 11 IO Vital to Operations 11 Status of Recommendations 12 SEW U 13 U Scope and Methodology 13 Use of Computer-Processed Data 14 Prior Coverage 14 U List of Classified Documents 15 U Acronyms and Abbreviations 16 SEW i liztil-zxritta11j-iat U Introduction it Objective We summarized information operations 10 challenges in Afghanistan Iraq and Africa identified in audit reports issued by the Office of Inspector General Since October 6 2006 OIG issued six reports related to 0 projects in Afghanistan Iraq and Africa U Background This report relates to the overseas contingency operation Operation Inherent Resolve and was completed in accordance with the oversight responsibilities as described in Section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978 as amended The weaknesses identified in the six OIG reports indicate that there is an opportunity to apply lessons-learned for 10 to future operations and can serve as a reference for personnel overseeing and conducting IO U Information Operations 10 is a key component of all military operations According to the 10 joint publication 1 ID is the integrated employment during military operations of information-related capabilities working with other lines of operation to in uence disrupt corrupt or usurp seize the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own are the tools techniques or activities that joint forces use to affect the ability of a target audience2 to collect process or disseminate information before and after they make decisions and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directives delegate authorities to use IRCs to components Based on these directives the combatant commanders have the authority to conduct joint and they may delegate authority to a subordinate joint force commander Generally 10 staff IRCs plan an action execute an action and assess the effectiveness of that action Each action is de ned by the IO joint publication 1 Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations November 27 2012 incorporating change 1 November 20 2014 U 2 The individual or group selected for influence seen-5W seen-133W ii i 0 staff coordinate and to accomplish the jFC s objectives The integration and of the IRCs require participation from not just information operations planners but also organizations across multiple lines of operation and lines of effort Uncoordinated IO efforts can compromise complicate negate and pose risks to the successful accomplishment of objectives Therefore objectives require early detailed planning by 10 staff to and integrate IRCs Planning Begins at the earliest stage of the operational planning process 0 planners seek to create an operational advantage that results in coordinated effects that directly support the IF C s objectives Part of the planning process includes developing measures to determine the effectiveness of l0 actions also known as assessment Executing Occurs during the operations phase with a mission or action using IRCs An execution authority is the authorityto use lRCs Normally the is designated in the execute order as the execution authority Assessing IO staff analyze and inform on the performance and effectiveness of activities to provide relevant feedback to decision makers so they can modify activities to achieve the desired results Assessment can also provide relevant information about the return on investment and operational effectiveness of IRCs U Definitions of Information-Related Capabilities There are many military capabilities that contribute to 10 and should be considered during the planning process Specifically this report focuses on two IRCs military information support operations and public affairs ii 02ij In forms or 8' uppo rt Jpn i on 5 According to the M150 joint publication 4 MISO are planned operations that convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to in uence their emotions motives objective reasoning and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments organizations groups and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator s objectives 3 Formerly known as operations or PSYOP 4 Joint Publication 3-132 Military Information SupportOperations November 21 2014 sis-Wesson comma-seen- Elm 0 degrade the enemy s combat power reduce civilian interference minimize collateral damage and increase the population s support for operations 0 provide joint force commanders with ways and means to in uence political military economic social information and infrastructure aspects of the operational environment that may be as critical to operational success as the traditional orientation focused solely on enemy and adversary military capabilities U Public xii fairs According to the PA joint publication 5 PA 0 is public information command information and community engagement activities directed toward both domestic and international audiences with interestin 0 U distributes timely truthful and accurate information regarding U S intentions and actions 0 U places operational actions into context 0 U facilitates the development of informed perceptions about military operations I helps undermine adversarial propaganda efforts and 0 contributes to the achievement of national strategic and operational objectives through responsive release of accurate information It is critical that PA and 10 especially MISO their communications efforts with respect to the adversary due to the uidity of the information environment U information Operations Responsibilities and Chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff directives delegate authorities to components Based on Directive 3600 01 Information Operations and Chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3210 01 joint Information Operations Policy the authority to conduct joint ID is vested in the combatant commanders who may delegate authority to a subordinate The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy oversees and manages DOD-level 10 programs and activities The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence develops coordinates and oversees the implementation of DOD intelligence policy programs and guidance for intelligence activities supporting IO U 5Joint Publication 3 61 PublicAffairs August 25 2010 6W odm l'irm The Joint Staff is the joint 10 proponent The Deputy Director for Global Operations 5 serves as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff s focal point for and coordinates with the Joint Staff Combatant Commands and other organizations that have direct or supporting IO responsibilities The Uni ed Command Plan provides guidance to combatant commanders assigning missions and force structure as well as geographic or functional areas of responsibility l5 llso known eel-39 DDGO tiff-1U U Results U OIG Reports Identified Weaknesses in Planning Executing and Assessing l0 7 U Since 2006 001 01G issued six reports on IO projects in Afghanistan Iraq and Africa that identified areas of compliance with rules and regulations to conduct 10 use contractors to perform 10 and award contracts for 10 However 01G also identified weaknesses in planning executing and assessing IO Speci cally these reports identified U communication activities at the strategic level but not optimally communication at the operational level which resulted in a lack of fully coordinated efforts between all levels of command in Afghanistan U a set of contracts with a statement of work that did not properly differentiate the intended audiences for M180 and PA which resulted in contracts that may not have met user needs in Iraq U weaknesses in planning and executing civil-military operations CMO and properly integrating MISO in CMO in Africa which resulted in 0 U underutilized MISO soldiers 0 U missed opportunities to maximize the benefits of MISO to support CMO and 0 U potentially blurring the traditional lines of separation between public affairs M150 and their respective audiences the lack of a fully integrated IO capability which limited Do D s ability to effectively conduct ID in Afghanistan compliance with applicable laws and regulations in the award of contracts and the use of contractors to execute MISO in Iraq and Afghanistan However improvement was needed in contract oversight which resulted in a lack of personnel to ensure the contractor performed adequately in Iraq l_ Results M ii 14 3 U Of the 6 reports 2 reports did not contain recommendations and 4 reports contained 13 recommendations Overall the recommendations addressed contract administration contract surveillance planning future MISO requirements staffing 10 positions and properly identifying roles and responsibilities All 13 recommendations were closed U IO Weaknesses Identified by BOB OIG U Since 2006 DOD 01G issued six reports on 10 projects in Afghanistan Iraq and Africa that identified areas of compliance with rules and regulations to conduct 10 use contractors to perform IO and award contracts for 10 However 01G also identified weaknesses in planning executing and assessing 10 See the Table below for a summary of the 10 areas identi ed in each OIG report UL Table 10 Areas Iden I ed in DOD OIG Reports U OIG Reports U IO Areas U 0-2010-033 U 0-2011-051 U Doors-2014-oos U U Planning U Executing U Assessing U NOTE 1 See Appendix A for a complete list ofthe reports we summarized U NOTE 2 Shaded fields represent weaknesses GEE-FEW I j Result U Better of Communication Needed U OIG Report No 17 stated that communication activities at International Security Assistance Force Headquarters strategic IeveIJ including PA 10 and traditional communication were generally However communication activities were not optimally at the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command operational level I 4 e _This occurred because there were vacancies in key 10 positions cross-functional teams made coordination dif cult and the Combined Joint Operations6 Task Force was not fully integrated into IIC As a result coordinated effort between all levels of command was not fully realized communication efforts were critical to strengthen support forthe Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and inform and explain coalition objectives to the people of Afghanistan U Statement of Work for Set of Contracts Did Not Differentiate Intended Audience for MISO and PA U DOD OIG Report No 02009-0919 stated thatloint Contracting Command Iraq Afghanistan of cials awarded a set of contracts that did not clearly differentiate between M180 and PA Speci cally the contracts statement ofwork included both ISO and PA requirements but did not differentiate between the intended audiences for M150 and PA U The PA joint publication states that PA can be disseminated to both US and foreign audiences however MISO can only be disseminated to a foreign audience The contracts did not differentiate the audiences for M180 and PA because the original scope of work was for M150 but contracting officials incorporated PA services into the solicitation U 7 DOD OIG Report No 0 2011 051 Needs Communication Activities and an Integrated Information Operations Capability in Afghanistan March 21 2011 U operations are now called military information support operations 9 OIG Report No 0 2009 091 Information Operations Contracts In Iraq July 31 2009 eta-W 11 During the audit we did not obtain evidence that MISO were intended for a U S audience However the contract requirements were not clear which resulted in a set of contracts that were not optimal and may not have met initial ISO requirements or user needs U Weaknesses in Planning and Executing CMO and Properly integrating MISC in CMO Report No 1010 reported weaknesses in planning and executing in support of CMO Specifically the report stated that Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa of cials did not adequatelyintegrate MISO when they planned and executed CMO as required by the CMO joint publication 11 Instead they referred to strategic communication 12 as a form of MISO Of cials did not clearly de ne the mission and responsibilities of MISO soldiers embedded in civil affairs teams to support CMO This occurred because command publications such as the U S Africa Command Theater Campaign Plan and East Africa Campaign Plan 13 contained only broad guidance and CJTF-HOA officials did not develop and disseminate formal guidance to further direct the activities of MISO soldiers embedded in civil affairs teams As a result of cials did not fully use MISO soldiers and missed opportunities to maximize the benefits of MISO to support CMO In addition without effective integration soldiers could be perceived as conducting activities other than MISO which may unintentionally blur traditional lines of separation between public affairs M180 and their respective audiences Without adequate guidance CJTF-HOA could not ensure that the M180 capability was adequately integrated into CMO U Lack of Fully Integrated IO Capability OIG Report No D-2011-051 identified personnel challenges Specifically the report stated that several organizations provided 10 support to fill capability gaps in Afghanistan however they faced challenges in obtaining personnel for both and MISO positions For example in 1 DOD OIG Report No 32013-110 Guidance Needed to Adequately Integrate Military Informah'on Support Opera ons in Civil-Military Operations in the Horn of Africa July 26 2013 11 Joint Publication 3-57 Civil-Military Operations September 11 2013 On November 28 2012 the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs issued a memorandum stating that the term strategic communication causes confusion and the more accurate terminology is communication The memorandum further states that most things previously termed strategic communications are PA responsibilities 13 Campaign plans are intended to contain strategic-level guidance that creates the need for additional guidance to detail how to integrate MISO into lCit IO GEE-HEW ll licsniig September 2009 US Central Command of cials submitted a request for forces to support International Security Assistance Force Headquarters and HG in public alfairs strategic communications and for an 10 unit However of the CENTCOM lel 4 a U Complied With Laws and Regulations When Officials Awarded Contracts and Used Contractors to Execute MISO But Better Oversight is Needed DOD OIG Report Nos 3-2007-001 D-2009-091 and D-2010-03315 reported that multiple organizations in Iraq and Afghanistan complied with applicable laws regulations and guidance when of cials awarded contracts and used contractors to conduct MISO However OIG Report No D-2010-033 reported that contract oversight controls could be improved through more efficient identification of contracting officer 5 representatives D00 0 Report No D-2010-033 stated that the lack of contract oversight controls occurred because according to a Joint Contracting Command Iraq Afghanistan official there was a high volume of contracts to administer but a lack of trained contracting Aof cer s representatives to provide contract oversight In addition contracting officer s representatives were not trained before arrival in Iraq A Operations Task Force of cial stated that it is important to train contracting of cer s representatives before arrival Specifically he noted that individuals often do not complete the necessary training and gain experience until their tour began As a result contracts did not have the appropriate personnel or appropriately trained personnel to conduct oversight to ensure the contractor performed adequately U 14 Report No 0-2007-001 nformau'on Operations in Sou thwactAsia October 6 2006 15 D00 OIG Report No D-2010-033 Informau'on Opera dons in Iraq January 11 2010 mar-0mm Ii lira-mill DOD OIG reported in DOD OIG Report No D-2010-033 and DONG-2014430816 CENTCOM NH 4 a Speci cally OIG Report No D-2010-033 reported that Multi-National Forces Iraq assessments showedanmcreaseinsuppm-to_- DOD 01G Report No stated that Military Information Support Task Force Afghanistan of cials did not prepare performance work statements quality assurance surveillance plans or procedures that contained speci cs on the roles and responsibilities of the contractor in the assessment process of MISO WW MISO in Iraq Were Effective Willa-W Report No D-2010-033 stated that statistics gathered by Multi-National Forces-Iraq to measure the perceptions of the Iraqi people and gauge the contributions of MISO showed a positive trend The data were categorized in these ve areas 0 1 4m I I 4 a According to Multi-National Fortes Iraq officials MISO products contributed to an increase in support forth ammo In addition Multi- National Forces Iraq and Multi-National Corps Iraq general officers stated that MISO had a big impact on the turnaround in Iraq The Commanding General Multi- National Forces Iraq noted that MISO was a cri cal resource of commanders in Iraq to enhance security which saved lives The Multi-National Forces Iraq Director for Strategic Communications noted that the US has learned the limits of kinetic lethal operations in counterinsurgency and MISO efforts contributed to the decrease in violence in Iraq 15 Don OIG ReportNo 2014008 Contract and Controls Over Information Operatlons Assessments Afghanistan Should Be Strergthened November 7 2013 seen-Wm Hui-um W improved Descriptions Needed to identify Roles and Responsibilities for Assessment DOD OIG Report No DODIG-2014-008 stated that Military Information Support Task Force Afghanistan officials did not prepare performance work statements quality assurance surveillance plans or procedures that contained specifics on the roles and responsibilities of the contractorto assess MISO Military Information Support Task Force Afghanistan s officials used informal procedures to de ne the different responsibilities of development and assessment personnel and began to formalize the procedures in December 2012 Without a clearly defined assessment process it may appear that the contractor was assessing their own work which increased the risk that the objectivity of the assessments may be questioned t0 Vital to Do Operations 10 is a vital capability for IFCs According to the IO Joint Publication the ability to share information in near real time anonymously or securely is a capability that is both an asset and a potential vulnerability to the United States its allies and its adversaries Information is a powerful tool to in uence disrupt corrupt or usurp seize an adversary s ability to make and share decisions As the strategic environment continues to change so does 10 The Secretary of Defense now characterizes ID as the integrated employment during military operations of in concert with other lines of operation to in uence disrupt corrupt or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own If 1 FCS adequately plan execute and assess 10 they will more effectively conduct 10 in the full range of operations to achieve their objectives Although organizations generally complied with rules and regulations to award contracts for ID and use contractors to execute IO and effectively used 10 DOB OIG Reports identified weaknesses in 0 U communication 0 U identifying roles and responsibilities in contracts 0 U planning and executing CMO and properly integrating MISO in CMO 0 integrating the ID capability and 0 conducting contract oversight it Results U These weaknesses indicate that there is an opportunity to apply lessons-learned for 10 to future operations and can serve as a reference for personnel overseeing and conducting IO U Status of Recommendations Ofthe 6 OIG reports 4 reports had 13 recommendations and 2 reports17 did not have recommendations Overall the recommendations addressed contract administration contract surveillance planning future MISO requirements staffing 10 positions and properly identifying roles and responsibilities Speci cally U OIG Report No D-2009-091 recommended that officials improve contract administrati on U DIG Report No D-2009-091 and D-2010-033 recommended that officials improve contra ct surveillance Report No D-201D-0 33 recommended that officials plan and assess future MISO requirements and determine how those requirements would change with the withdrawal of US Forces from Iraq - Report No D-2011-051 recommended that officials adequately staff 10 to fill vacancies and integrate personnel to operate and plan 0 and OIG Report No DO DIG-2014-008 recommended that officials modify the contract performance work statement to describe contractor roles and responsibilities and to include measurable performance standards All of the recommendations were closed We will not make additional recommendations because recommendations were contained in the previous 01G reports OIG Report No D-2007-001 and U Appendix U Scope and Methodology U We conducted this summary work from January 2015 through March 2015 We followed generally accepted government auditing standards except for the standards of planning and evidence because this report summarizes previously released reports We believe the information obtained provides a reasonable basis for our conclusions based on the project objectives This report summarizes DOB 0 challenges in Afghanistan Iraq and Africa identified in six reports issued by BOB OIG from October 6 2006 through November 7 2013 To prepare this summary we reviewed the six OIG reportsReport No DODIG-2014-008 Contract and Controls Over Information Operations Assessments in Afghanistan Should Be Strengthened November 2013 Classified Report No DO DIG-20 13-110 Guidance Needed to Adequately Integrate Military Information Support Operations into Civil-Military Operations in the Horn of Africa July 26 2013 Classi ed Report No 51 Needs Communication Activities and an Integrated Information Operations Capability in Afghanistan March 21 2011 Classified Report No D-2010-0 33 Information Operations in Iraq January 21 2010 Classi ed Report No D-2009-091 Information Operations Contracts in Iraq July 31 200918 Report No D-200 7-00 1 Information Operau ons in Southwest Asia October 6 2006 Classified We reviewed the findings and conclusions from these reports We did not review the supporting documentation forthe reports 18 This unrestricted DOD OIG report can be accessed at see-mm Appendix U Use of Computer-Processed Data We did not use computer-processed data for this report U Prior Coverage U During the last 5 years OIG did not issue reports summarizing problems specific to 10 in Afghanistan Iraq and Africa We did not consider reports from the Government Accountability Of ce Army Audit Agency or Air Force Audit Agency mm Uni i U List of Classi ed Documents OIG Report No D-2007-001 Information Operations Activities in Southwest Asia SECRET Declassified Date X-4 Generated Date October 6 2006 OIG Report No D-2010-0 33 Information Operations in Iraq SECRET Declassified Date February 11 2019 Generated Date January 21 2010 OIG Report No D-2011-051 Needs Communication Activities and an Integrated Info rmation Operations Capability in Afghanistan SECRET Declassified Date March 17 2035 Generated Date Marth 21 2011 OIG Report No DO DIG-201 3-110 Guidance Needed to Adequately Integrate Military Information Support Operations into Civil-Military Operations in the Horn ofAfrica TO USA ACGU Declassified Date October 10 2037 Generated Date July 26 2013 OIG Report No DODIG-2014-008 Contract and Controls Over Information Operations Assessments in Afghanistan Should Be Strengthened SEC RE 0 F0 RN Declassified Date January 23 2038 Generated Date November 7 2013 19 Actg ggeydAbbreviations a CJTF-HOA CMO IJC M rrurgfriir m-z'i Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa Civil-Military Operations International Security Assistance Force Joint Command Information Operations Information-Related Capability Joint Force Commander Military Information Support Operations Office of the Inspector General Public Affairs Whistleblower Protection US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 requires the Inspector General to designate a Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman to educate agency employees about prohibitions on retaliation and rights and remedies against retaliation for protected disclosures The designated ombudsman is the DOD Hotline Director For more information on your rights and remedies against retaliation visit For more information about IG reports or activities please contact us Congressional Liaison congressional@dodig mil 703 604 8324 Media Contact 703 604 8324 Update dodigconnect-req Reports Mailing List dod ig_re port@listse rve com Twitter Hotline JI hl l I I Ul l DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE I INSPECTOR GENERAL 4800 Mark Center Drive 22350- 1500 mw dodig mi I Defense Hotline 1 800 424 9098 I-rnr-rl II I