g 4 2141113 proved for Release 2017 11 30 CO 32752 93flI-j' r it2 pw 5 5 I CONTROLLED DI NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 30-63 The Arab-Israeii Problem Submitted by an DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Concurnd In by UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD A Indicated evaded 23 JANUARY 1963 ET cm A - pproved for Rae 201 1 3 000332752 E0 'ri i 13526 3 3 h 2 NIE 30-63 - 23 January 1963 5 32752 111 3 - por1 lveorRlea59207110 00033275 1 V - 4 C003 Rank The allowing intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations at the Depart ments of State Defense the Army the Navy the Air Force AEC and NSA Concurring Director of intelligence and Research Department at State Director Defense intelligence Agency Assistant Chlei oi Stalt for intelligence Department at the Army Assistant Chief of Naval Operations intelligence Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Stall intelligence USAF Director for intelligence Joint Staff the Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB Director at the National Security Agency Abstaining i'he Assistant Director Federal Bureau of Investigation the wbiect being outside of his WARNING This material contains Information a ecting the National Defense of the United States i - within the meaning of the espionage laws Title 18 USC Secs 793 and 794 the trans- mission or revelation of which In any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited an GROUP Included tram automatic downgrading and deciassilicetion - I s' a A it pproved for Release 2017 11 30 0003355272 000332752W f I NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 30-63 The Arab-Israeli Problem a I - fr Release 2017 1110 000332752 4 27 j hi' 5 pprovedforReIease 2017 11 s' an' 14 @3313 C033 30 C00332752 m TABLE OF comems I nurul-Ooll'lcuouluo-n-rnup- tuna CONCLUSIONS DISCUSSION I or PROBLEM TheWoridstage II POLITICAL ATTITUDE AND mom 11 POINTS OF FRICTION mammrder Jordan Waters A mm SITUATION 15 15 ANNEX B 25 I for Release 2017 11 30 00033752 C00332752 THE - PROBLEM THE PROBLEM To estimate present attitudes and future trends in the Arab- Israeli problem over the next few years CONCLUSIONS A Israel will probably retain its overall military superiority vis-a-vis the Arab states for the next several years As long as - the present balance of forces remains substantially unchanged we believe that neither side is likely to initiate major hostilities However the possibility will remain that incidents growing out of such main points of friction as the Israeli-Syrian border and - Israel s diversion of Jordan waters could escahte into serious ghting Paras 17-19 21-23 - B In general Israel will probably continue to pursue a hard policy demanding that any settlement be on the basis of essential maintenance of the status quo Any easing of tensions in the Arab-Israeli quarrel rests primarily on the passing of time de- velopments in inter-Arab relations and perhaps to some extent on the in uence of the great powers We believe that there is some chance that su lcient probing and pushing of the principals may - in the next few years produce the beginnings of a refugee settle- ment Paras 10 34-36 38 3 C The Israelis consider they have compelling reasons for I developing a nuclear capability which would vastly improve their i n military posture against the Arabs While we do not have posi- tive evidence that the Israelis are engaged in nuclear weapons production their nuclear energy program could if sufficient fuel - i g' elements and separation facilities are available achieve a limited secnsL 1 I - pprovedforRelease 2017 11 30 33 in 2 2 fro Release 2017 1 1 30 300332752 w I 1 5 'n nuclear weapons capability based on aircraft delivery In about 1967-1968 Indeed we believe that the Israelis unless deterred by outside pressure will attempt to produce a weapon sometime in the next several years No Arab state will be'able to develop a nuclear weapon for many years to come Paras 24-29pproved for Release 2017 11 30 C00332752 f CO 0 3 32 7 52 - 3_ Wove fr 00033 DISCUSSION I OF THE PROBLEM In the Middle East 1 The Arab-Israeli problem has plagued the Middle East and the great powers for fteen years now The fundamental attitudes of both Arabs and Israelis are still bitterly antagonistic and mutually incom- patible The Israelis believe that the Jewish people have a moral and historic right to the land from which the Jews were dispersed some eighteen hundred years ago and that Israel has eniorced this claim by arms and by building up a modern state in what was an impoverished land They insist that the Arabs must recognize their right to an independent existence and feel that the return of any large numbers of Arabs would jeopardize it The Arabs deny the right of Israel to' exist and see the Israelis as Western-backed intruders who by trickery and force have conquered territory held' by Arab-speaking peoples for many centuries and have driven a million-Arabs into exile They refuse to negotiate directly with Israel In Arab eyes no general settlement is possible unless it gives the refugees the option of returning to 0c- cupied Palestine 2 The roles of the various Arab states considerably in the Arab-Israeli quarrel The UAR Jordan and Syria bear the principal military burden they share common borders with Israel and their armies have done most of the past ghting However cooperation among the three is seriously hindered by mutual antagonisms Iraq and Saudi Arabia while their hatred of the Jewish state is active and implacable are also deeply distrustful of Nasser and in any case have little opportunity or ability to in uence the quarrel directly Lebanon ln this as in other Arab problems attempts to follow a policy of non- invoivement The North African states the Sudan and the Arabian Peninsula principalities contribute to the propaganda campaign against Israel for example Algerian Prime Minister Ben Bella s threat to send 100 000 men to fight Israel but these groups have relatively little direct interest or involvement in the problem In general each of the Arab regimes is concerned to see that its Opponents in domestic as well as intra-Arab quarrels gain no political advantage from the Palestine problem - 3 The most hnportant confrontation is that between Israel and the UAR Each is convinced that the other will seize every opportunity to humiliate it or it it were possible even destroy it Consequently both have engaged since 1955 in an arms race While scornful of past Arab military performances the Israelis fear that some day the Arabs under pproved for Release 20171130 000332752 62 93 5 32 - - pproved for Release 2017 11 30 C00332752 1 f UAR leadership will be able to use effectively the formidable weapons they have acquired The Arabs remember their defeats of 1948 1949 and the Israeli retaliatory raids to which they have been subjected over the - years In the UAR especially there is the fear that something like the - Israeli-French-Britlsh attack in 1956 could happen again - Tho World Siege 4 The role or the great powers is an important aspect a the Arab- Israeii quarrel Britain and the US have been major sources oi political and economic aid for Israel and the Arabs particularly Nasser believe that the Us would step in to save Israel ll it were invaded France has been Israel s closest collaborator among the Western governments since 1954 aiding Israel with modern arms and with nuclear technology and giving it close support in the attack on Egypt in 1956 West Genaany has been a major source of financial aid to Israel through its restitution and reparation payments although it also has extensive commercial rela- tions with the Arab states 5 The Soviet Union actively encourages and assists Arab nationalist governments as a means of reducing Western in uence and encouraging - neutralism in the Near East It is the chic source of arms for the UAR Syria and Iraq but has retrained from committing itself to backing their use in a war to wipe out Israel Most of the Arab states also receive economic and in some cases military aid from the West How ever neither the Arabs nor the Israelis have allowed acceptance oi this aid to have any signi cant effect on their attitudes toward each other - B The UAR and the Israelis seek support among the uncommitted 4 and underdeveloped countries to bolster their respective positions and to gain support in UN forums The UAR appeals chie y to neutralism Islam and nationalism and provides some military and technical help Israel pursues a vigorous policy of technical aid and education and pro- motes the theme that small but dynamic countries should help one another Neither side has been able to score a clear-cut advantage over the other in this competition 7 The UN has been deeply involved in the Palestine question ever since the vote for partition and the establishment or a Jewish and an - Arab state in November 1947 Its truce supervision teams try with x monumental lack of cooperation in most cases to maintain the status quo on the borders Its Emergency Force along the Egyptian border in Gaza Sinai and the Gui of Aqaba serves the purpose or providing the UAR with a plausible excuse for not taking aggressive actions The 3 UN Relief and Works Agency has carried the main burden of aid for the Arab refugeespproved Rleasez 2017 11 3o C0 0 3 32 7 5 2 - 1- ll POLITICAL AUITUDES AND INTENTIONS lsrael 8 Since independence Israel has followed a hard line of claiming everything possible under the Armistice Agreements and the various UN resolutions oi selective retaliation with force against border inci- dents and of pressing every opportunity to force the Arabs to recognize Israel and come to terms with it For a number of years Egypt has loomed as the principal enemy Since the rise of Nasser and the arming of Egypt with Soviet weapons Israel has seen a potential union oi Arab states under Nasser's leadership as the main threat to be conironted As a consquence Israel has urged the Western powers to back Nasser's conservative Arab rivals and has favored anti-Nasserlst forces elsewhere 9 The Israelis have learned to live at least for the time being within the limitations imposed by their physical boundaries Israel's present population pressure is not such as to compel it to seek more land New settlements in the Negev and growing industry appear adequate to absorb the growing population which is augmented by a continuing in ow of immigrants Deepite a heavy in ux from North Africa and Rumanla in the last two years immigration has been relatively moderate since 1952 There are now only two major concentrations oi Jews out- side Israel in the USSR and in the Us The former has permitted no migration nor do we believe it is likely to and the Jews in the latter generally have shown no desire to migrate 10 The government will continue to give top priority to a policy of preserving the state's integrity by maintaining suf cient force to deter any would-be attacker The Israelis will continue to try to extend their control over the demilitarized zones I which they regard as Israeli territory However we do not believe that in present circumstances they contemplate taking any initiative to acquire additional territory e g the West Bank or the Gaza strip While there are elements such as the right-wing Herut Party and even some younger members of the Mapai Party who would like to expand the state they are not likely to have dominant in uence in the foreseeable iuture Should Ben Gurion pass from the scene his place would probably be taken by a collective leader- ship drawn from the old-line Mapai establishment a group which would continue the present attitude toward the Arabs The or Neutral Zones ins along the Israeli borders were estab- lished by the Armistice Agreements of 19 9 Contrary to the provisions or the agreements Israel claims sovereignty over all the series and has gradually ex- panded its area of control and cultivation The tone along the Syrian border has been the most troublesome a I a pproved for Release 2017 11 30 000332752 5 000332752 77' f_f- - pprovedor Release 2017 11 30 3 3314- L 11 There may well be a strengthening of Israel's recurrent tendency to try to convince the West and the US in particular that Nasser and the Soviets are as one in the Middle East As a support against the threat of Nasser-led Arab unity Israel will probably endeavor to achieve the closest possible relationship with the US and to maintain a special rela- tionship with France The Ben Clarion government sees substantial long-term benefits in a relationship which would place it at the side of the US in the latter's worldwide confrontation with the Communist bloc in return for US reliance on Israel as a principal any in the Middle East On the other hand mindful of the more than two million Jews in the Soviet Union Israel will remain careful not to ailront Moscow directly The Arabs 12 The antagonism to Israel remains so strong in the Arab world that no one who values his political life can openly suggest that the Arabs ought to come to terms with Israel As a result of this attitude Arab leaders continue to belabor each other with charges of being soft on Israel The Arabs direct virulent propaganda against Israel and the UAR and Iraq have each organized small numbers of Palestinians into so-called liberation forces Syria is the most violent of Israel s Arab neighbors and its truculent army on the heights commanding the northern Jordan Valley has been quick to shoot when there have been- real or fancied Israeli violations of the Armistice lines 13 One thing which bothers the Arabs generally is the Israeli policy of ingathering of the erdles Although we do not believe that in fact immigration will be enlarge as to pose a serious population problem for Israel the Arabs fear that massive immigration will force Israel to conquer more land The Israelis are aware of Arab fears on this score and have deliberately played down the currently sizable immigration from North Africa in order not to Jeopardize the flow of immigrants 1 14 Over the years the Arabs have recognized that Israel is not going to vanish just for the wishing and have given some thought to ways and means of adapting to this reality It is within this framework that the various Arab states concerned agreed to the technical provisions of the 1955 Johnston Plan for division of the Jordan Valley waters although none for political reasons could publicly and o iciaily accept it for this would have meant recognizing the existence of Israel The long- standing Arab boycott of foreign firms doing business with Israel has been relaxed on occasion by one Arab state or another when such relaxa- tion has bene ted that state Nasser has stated publicly that the battle against Arab reaction must be won before the Arabs can take on Israel The UN Emergency Force patrolling between Israel and Egypt has con 5 pproved for Rtaeleas 2017 11 30 000332752 1 7 43 5 tributed to six years of quiet there and the Egyptians at least would be loath to see it go The Israelis and Jordanians have taken care to keep the Jordanian West Bank virtually free of incidents for years The same is true of the Lebanese-Israeli border POINTS OF FRICTION 15 Within the general Arab-Israeli confrontation there are a number of situations and developments which constitute particular impediments to any settlement and some of which could evolve into lighting of a more or less serious nature One of these s the military balance which is discussed in section IV Three important situations are the Refugees - the Syrian Border and Jordan Waters The Refugee 18 The million or so Palestine refugees are one of the primary factors in exacerbating Arab-Israeli tensions The Israelis feel they cannot accept any large number of returnees who they believe would constitute a major security problem for the state They have however indicated a willingness to pay some compensation for preperty the refugees once owned in Israel The Arabs insist that as a condition for not object- ing to a refugee settlement the refugees must have the option of returning to their former homeland The refugees themselves espe- cially those who live in UNRWA-supported camps are subjected to all sorts of propaganda and it is doubtful if anyone lmows what they would do if confronted with a choice of returning to Israel or else- where While not likely to be a direct cause of hostilities the refugee question will continue for the foreseeable future to aggravate the Arab- lsraeli situation The Syrian Border 17 The situation on the Israeli-Syrian border is more immediately critical Here Syrian army runs head on into Israeli deter- - mination to extend control over the entire zone and to have unrestricted use of Lake Tiberius The Syrians in the past have not resorted to raids across the border and we do not believe they will do so The pattern of events usually has begun with an exchange of gun re over a tractor working in an and questionable area or a fishing boat on Lake Tiberias If a series of such incidents results in Israeli deaths the Israeli government has usually responded with a reprisal raid against Syrian positions It is likely that clashes of this nature will go on from time to time and may involve more troops and more territory Although Syria is irritating and troublesome Israel does not consider it as the chief threat especially since the breakup of the union with Egypt-4nd we do not believe that full scale hostilities are likely to arise out of those clashespproved for Release 2017 11 30 C00332752 set - COO332752 as or pporved or elease 2 0 1 7 1150 I 3 Jordon Waters 18 Israeli-Syrian differences will be aggravated by Israeli diversion of large quantities of the Jordan River waters scheduled to start in late 1963 The Israeli Government has assured the US that it intends to keep its use of Jordan waters within the limits set by the Johnston Plan of 1955 For their part the various Arab governments have announced that they would regard diversion of water from the river to areas outside the Jor- dan valley as a casus hem The three Arab states sharing the Jordan waters Lebanon Syria and Jordan have also threatened to divert those sources of the Jordan which lie in their territory to prevent Israel irom getting Arab waters but they have made no provision to date to nance the extensive construction which would be needed to do this job All things considered while the riparian states will make a great deal of propaganda and may move to take the question to the UN we do not believe they will take more than token action to deny the Jordan Favors sources to Israel Jordan will be able to claim for intro-Arab propaganda purposes that its irrigation projects east of the River are denying Arab water to Israel 19 However the approaching deadline on this project will serve to accentuate the already tense situation along the Syrian-Israeli border Especially if the withdrawal of water causes a demonstrable lowering of the Lake Tiberius water level the chances that Syria might attempt to put the main pumping station at the Lake out of action by military means will go up The Israelis will remain alert to this contingency and their military capabilities will tend to inhibit the Syrians Nonetheless conditions will be very tense along the border for the coming year or so with a likelihood of more shooting a rays than usual and Israeli re- prisals While we do not think it likely that other Arab states would give Syria effective aid it is possible that an incident could escalate to include other Arab forces Other Problems 20 There are a number at lesser controversies which will continue to engage the attention of Israel and the Arab governments from time to time e g bickering over the appropriate alignment of a tense in the Jerusalem no-man's land Israeli salt pan encroachments onto Jor- danian territory south of the Dead Sea Arab smuggling and spying operations by both Arabs and Israelis We do not believe that these problems are likely to result in lighting More dangerous over the long term is the quarrel over the Strait of Tim Should the UNEF be withdrawn from the Egyptian side of the Strait or should a new radical government come into power in Saudi Arabia either Cairo or Jldda might try to reestablish a blockade of Israeli shipping in the Gulf of Aqabapproved for Release 201 11 30 m3 2753rf i 25 000332752 Am However in view of the virtual certainty that Israel would act rapidly to reopen the Strait by force we believe neither the Egyptians nor the Saudis would be likely to attempt such a move IV THE MILITARY BALANCE 21 Individually and collectively the armed forces of the Arab states are interior in quality to those at Israel although they are superior in numbers and equipment II here is no joint command machinery in suf cient state of organization to coordinate effectively Arab military e ort in the event of hostilities with Israel The Ismail ground forces can launch limited attacks simultaneously on all ironts or hold on three fronts while mounting a major offensive on the fourth The Israeli air iorce is operationally superior to those of the Iterabs but suffers from a shortage of air elds We believe that overall israeii military superi- ority will obtain for the next several years 22 As long as the balance of forces remains roughly as it is at present the likelihood of either side starting a major war is very small We believe the several Arab states recognize that they could not attack Israel and win We also believe it highly unlikely that there would be any effective cooperation if two or more Arab states happened to get into con ict with Israel Israel which in 1956 assured its access to the Red Sea but tailed in its principal objective of unseating Nasser has little to gain by an offensive war against any of its neighbors In addi- tion both sides are aware or the likelihood of Western intervention to prevent the continuance or spread of hostilities 23 During the next few years at least we believe the'most likely occasion of an outbreak of large-scale hostilities would be a major shill in the political structure or the area which brought one or more of Israel's neighbors into Nasser's orbit In particular should Jordan undergo a change or regime which brought a nationalist pro-Nasser government into of ce the Israelis would be greatly tempted to seize the West Bank of the Jordan New Weapons 24 Nuclear The Arab-Israeli arms race has broadened with attempts by Israel and the UAR to acquire advanced weapons The Israelis be- lieve they have compelling reasons for taking every possible opportunity to strengthen their military posture vis-a-vis the UAR Foremost among the steps which the Israelis might take despite the high costs involved is the development of a nuclear capability an acidevement which Cairo could not hope to match for a decade or more Possession at a handful oi weapons would vastly improve the military power balance already favorable to Israel and would give it an immensely valuable weapon 'aee Military Annex A for details pproved for Releas 2017 1 30 000332752 I warfare in its day to day confrontation with the Arabs It would also have the advantage for the Israelis of making the Arabs feel they were in a permanent imbalance 25 The French-designed reactor at Dimona is now expected to go into operation by 1964 but it is possible that it could become operational by the late fall oi 19633I If operated at its maximum capacity for the production of weapon-grade plutonium the reactor could produce suf- cient plutonium for one or two weapons a year starting one year after the reactor goes into operation However the availability of this plutonium for weapons production would depend on the construction of adequate separation facilities In addition to a supply or fuel elements In regard to the latter Israel has the capacity to produce some uranium concentrate locally and is endeavoring to buy concentrate from abroad without restriction on its use We have no evidence to con rm or deny the existence of separation facilities but the plant in Dimona is large enough to include them and Israeli industry is probably capable of con- structing them 26 The lack of space in Israel for conducting tests and the low rate of plutonium production would tend to slow down a weapons program There are 0 course many technical problems but Israel has significant technical resources We do not know the full extent of French col- laboration Further Israel's ability to acquire intelligence information on what has been done in other countries is considerable On balance however we believe it unlikely that even a very limited nuclear weapons capability based on aircraft delivery could be achieved until two or three years Le 1967-66 after weapon-grade plutonium rst became available This period could be shortened if Israel obtained from an- other country weapon testing facilities or weapons designs which obvi- ated the need for tests 27 While we do not have any positive evidence that the Israelis are engaged in nuclear weapons production the size and secrecy of their nuclear energy program suggest that at least they intend to put them- selves in a position to be able to produce such weapons relatively quickly after a decision to do so Indeed we believe the Israelis unless deterred by outside pressure will attempt to produce a weapon sometime in the next several years 26 The Arabs particularly the UAR would be greatly alarmed if they behaved Israel was about to acquire a nuclear capability How- ever they would recognize that no satisfactory course of action was available to them The UAR would realize that an attempt to destroy the Israeli complex at Dimona e g by air strike would call forth a vigor- ous Israeli military counteraction The UAR would probably seek nuclear weapons irom the USSR or any other potential source It might also See Annex for additional detail on the Israeli nuclear energy programproved for Release 201 7 1 1 30 000332752 ase 2017 11 30 000332752 0 32 7 5 2 3315 1777 a ll' 1 it s i proved for seek to establish facilities for developing a nuclear weapons program but carrying it out would take many years In these circumstances the Arabs would be forced to turn to such unpromising devices as call- ing in the UN or otherwise for a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East with inspection of Israeli nuclear facilities 29 No Arab state now- has any capability to develop nuclear weapons While Iraq and the UAR each have a small nuclear research reactor and an associated research program these are so small as to preclude their having any potential lor nuclear weapons development 30 Missile Programs Both Israel and the UAR are engaged in mis- sile programs aimed at develbping domestically produced surface-to- surface missiles In the course of the July 1962 celebrations of the Revolution the Egyptians red four missiles and paraded twenty more of two sizes through Cairo's streets The missile program is heavily dependent on private foreign assistance German rocket specialists de- signed the missiles German technicians supervised their construction and many essential components were purchased abroad The UAR is proceeding with development of a missile test range We estimate that the larger Egyptian rocket could carry a 500 pound payload to a range of about 200 miles and that the Egyptians might deploy a few by mid- 1964 31 The Israelis have test-fired only one mum-stage sounding rocket to date They also appear to be working on a shorter range tactical weapon of some 30 n m range Their program has so far been carried out largely with domestic resources It is likely that the Israelis would choose to carry out a surface-to surface program in concert with any planned nuclear developments They are now trying to hire foreign technicians and acquire foreign technology With such assistance and a major short they could probably have a few 200 300 n m missiles in three to four years but it would probably take longer to acquire com patible nuclear warheads 32 For the near future neither of these programs appears likely to have a signi cant cheat on the purely military balance The number of missiles would be too few and the absence of nuclear warheads would sharply limit their effectiveness The programs would of course be valuable to both sides for propaganda purposes and for warfare - 33 Both Arabs and Israelis have turned to outside sources for other types of missiles The USSR is in the process of supplying surface-to- air missiles to Iraq 5 battalions and the UAR 8 battalions TheUShasagreedtomake available to Israel the Hawk surface-teak missile and has offered to consider requests for it from the Arab states The UAR has recently received from the USSR three Komar class guided missile patrol boats 11 ppderoveforRelase 2017 11l30 000332752 000332 eouippcd with 10-15 am range cruise missiles The Soviets have tur- nished FIBHBEDS MIG-21 equipped with air-to-air missiles to Iraq and the UAR and are training local forces in their use V THE OUTLOOK 34 For this decade at least an overall settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute is virtually impossible To be acceptable to Israel a settlement would have to provide substantial maintenance of the status quo for the Arabs it would have to include provisions for the refugees which would at least have the appearance or a concession to the principle of repatriation It is highly unlikely that a formula combining these elements could be devised in the foreseeable future In effect however disguised a settlement would be a defeat for the long-standing Arab position of total hostility to the existence of Israel and the Arabs are not yet ready for this 85 However attitudes on both sides of the dispute are slowly begin- ning to moderate at least to the extent of a tendency to accommodate to the status quo Within Israel there is growing recognition that it is necessary to improve the lot of the Arab minority In the Arab world as the older leaders who experienced the violence of the Palestine conflict are replaced by men interested in modernization and other immediate problems of the current world much of the steam will go out of the drive to recover Occupied Palestine Accordingly in the next several years there may be some cautious moves toward casing speci c irritants and toward creating conditions which would make eventual settlement possible 36 The UAR Lebanon Jordan and probably Syria are moving toward a recognition that they must eventually accommodate themselves to a solution 0 the refugee problem This trend will be strengthened it they became convinced that the West intends to mduce or eliminate aid to the refugees While the Israelis categorically rejected the John- son Pian for refugees the Arabs were less intranslgent and showed interest in its possibilities The Plan itself is unlikely to go forward but some of the points it has made will probably be the basis for a start on the problem We believe that there is some chance that sumaent probing and pushing of the principals may in the next few years produce the beginnings of a refugee settlement Both Israel and the UAR have compelling reasons to maintain large military establishments However modern weapons are becoming ever more costly and complex We do not believe that Nasser and Ben Gurion would agree formally on an arms limitation Nevertheless there may be an outside chance despite their mutual distrust and suspicion that both could be brought to adopt some form of mutual restraint 12 I pproved for Releasezo17 11 30 000332752 sir- 0003327523 mg a' I a as I - 33 7' 31 42 3i 11 A roved for Re ase 2017 11 300025'03372 38 Any easing of tensions tn the Arab-Israeli quarrel rests primarily on the passing of time developments in inter-Arab relations and per- haps to some extent on the in uence oi the great powers The Arabs in particular are not likely to take any initiative toward easing reis- tions with Israel but might respond say in the case of the refugee prob- lem to a lead by the West The US through its assistance programs in Israel the UAR and Jordan has only a modest ability to in uence those countries In no case is the Western capability such as to be able to lorce either side to do something to which it strongly objects The Soviets cannot be expected to contribute to a settlement oi the Arab- Israeli situation Indeed they have an interest in maintaining tensions in the area that can be exploited against the West and so produce more opportunities for displacing Western in uence pproved for Release 2017 11 30 300332752 300332752 - ANNEX A THE MILITARY SITUATION A General Individually and collectively the armed forces of the Arab states are inferior in quality to those of Israel though superior in total numbers and hardware See Charts I II and IV They trail Israel in quality and experience of leadership in the level of general educational and technical background among the enlisted ranks in mobilization ca- pability and in incentive to fight There is no joint command and staff machinery in suf cient state of organization to coordinate effectively Arab military effort in the event of hostilities with Israel Proposals for the creation of a Joint Com- mand put forward at Arab League Defense Council meetings have been unproductive Persistent local interests and frictions particularly be- tween Egypt on the one hand and Jordan Saudi Arabia and Syria on the other preclude the likelihood of a workable joint command being established in the near future 3 Israel 1 Ground The average strength of the Israeli army is estimated at 50 000 but varies widely due to call-ups of reserve units economic con- siderations and border tensions In addition the 5 000 man quasi-mili- tary NAHAL forms the first line of defense on the frontier Israel re- mains capabie of mobilizing to a strength of 250 000 troops within 48 hours The Israeli ground forces can maintain internal security could defend successfully against simultaneous Arab attacks on all fronts launch limited attacks simultaneously on all fronts or hold on any three fronts while mounting successfully a major offensive on the fourth Against a major power they could offer elfectlve delaying action 2 Air The Israel Defense Force Air Force IDFAF is an effective and caps is air force in spite of limited resources and air facilities In its combat aircraft inventory Israel is presently estimated to have 162 French jet ghters 16 Vautours all-weather 26 Mirage 38 Super Mysteres 54 Mysteres 5 Meteors ali weather 25 Ouragans and 24 Vautour jet light bombers It is behaved that about 80 per cent of these aircraft are combat ready The Mirage 1110 supersonic ghters are the first of about 40 that have been ordered from France Israelis estimated to have at least a 90-day level of POL stockpiled for emer- gency use seesek 15 Eagle is a pproved for 000332752 300332752 35 3% r r'a -3 I 't'f'i'm my 1 proved to Israel when compared to the UAR continues to be at a disadvantage so far as numbers of aircraft and air facilities are concerned however the de ciency in numbers is counterbalanced by the superior quality of the Israeli air staff pilots and technicians It is estimated that the JDFAF could defeat the Egyptian Air Force EAF if an effective de- fense of Israel's air facilities could be maintained Despite superiority in pilot and ghter quality the Israeli air defense system has several major weaknesses Capability to provide an effective defense against a night or bad-weather attack is poor because of a shortage of ail-weather ghters The radar network is vulnerable to jamming tactics and also has dif culty detecting low-level penetrations Acquisition of the Hawk missile would improve Israel s air defense capability Israeli air defense doctrine also places major emphasis on using offen- sive air Operations to ease defensive problems Offensive capabilities are good IDFAF pilots are well-trained to carry out all types of offensive missions including close support of ground forces About 700 para- troopers could be dropped in a single operation 3 Navy The Israel Defense Force Navy IDF Navy is a well-trained and ghting force combat effectiveness is superior in that of any of the Arab states navies Ship strength of the IDF Navy is 2 ex British destroyers DD 2 err-British submarines SS 1 err-British patrol escort PF 1 err-U3 submarine chaser large PC and a num- 'ber of lesser craft Most ships are based at Haifa although a few are in the Gulf of Aqaba All ships are normally maintained in active operational status and in a high state of readiness their material con- dition is good to excellent Personnel strength is approxhnateiy 3 700 Ships normally operate with reduced crews but in event of hostilities about 5 000 trained re- serves are available for mobilisation within 43 hours C Arab States i United Arab Republic Egypt a Ground The UAR army a conscript force numbering approxi- mately 6 000 of cers and 94 000 enlisted men is the largest Arab army Mobilization to an estimated maximum strength of 190 000 would require six months In addition to being re-equipped with Bloc weapons the army has I adopted modi ed Soviet tactical doctrine and has been partially re- organized along Soviet lines signi cantly increasing organic firepower in the infantry formations Bloc assistance in training and the supply of materiel continues Training is intensive and has reached division - level Several combined arms exercises have been conducted employing is i pproved for Releae 2017 11 30 000332752 'r C0033275 - large forces of all services but in general combat efficiency remains low primarily because of weak senior leadership Disaiiection of some ofiicers toward the regime and the military involvement in the Yemen have further reduced combat ef ciency The army is normally deployed in the Cairo area the Canal Zone and Sinai Sinai forces number between 15 000 and 20 000 and are deployed defensively with the heaviest concentrations in the El Arish- Abu Aweigiia area and the Gaza Strip The UAR army is not capable of sustained offensive ground operations but it could mount an attack of short duration by one to two divisions with the possibility of achieving limited success In the event of a full- scale Israeli attack it would lose Sinai but could probably contain'the attack at the Suez Canal D Air The Egyptian combat aircraft inventory is estimated to con- tain 211 Soviet-origin jet fighters 45 FISHBEDS with air- to-air missiles as FARMRS MIG-19 98 FRESCOS MIG-17 30 FAGOTS BEAGLE IL-23 jet light bombers and 20 BADGER medium bombers Twenty-eight oi the FRESCO aircraft are equipped for all-weather operations It is believed that about 50-60 per cent of these aircraft are combat ready Although some Soviet personnel are currently employed in ying and maintaining the BADGERS and FISHBEDS M1041 EAF pilots and air- crews arc-i becoming fairly competent in the operation of these aircraft Egyptian air facilities the most extensive in the Middle East excluding Turkey can easily support the combat aircraft It is estimated that at least a 120-day supply of POL is stockpiled for emergencies but only small stocks are immediately available to tactical units Despite improvements in the combat capability of the Egyptian Air Force EAF since the 1956 Suez campaign the air defense system is not capable of caping' with a determined large-scale assault because of the minimum scramble time available the lack of a defense against radar jamming and the inferior quality of EAF personnel as compared with the Israelis The Soviets are in the process of supplying eight surface-to-air SA-2 missile battalions to the UAR - Offensive capabilities against fixed targets such as air-fields military and industrial installations and transportation facilities are fairly good The addition of more BADGER jet medium bombers in 1962 has in- creased the offensive striking power considerably With its present offensive resources the EAF has the capability to carry out a damaging surprise attack against Israel provided the EAF staff could plan and initiate such a move without Israeli detection - About troops could be airdropped in a single operation is adequate ghter cover could be provided 17 300332752 5 - 'v I Ch in I - a 7 evno Navy The only signi cant Arab naval force is that at the United Arab Republic Egypt It consists of 6 destroyers DD at which 4 are ex-Soviet and 2 are err-British 10 ear-Soviet submarines 3 Komar class guided missile boats err-British patrol escorts 18 to 2 eat-Soviet motor torpedo boats several roinesweepers and lesser cralt Pearsonnel strength of the Egyptian Navy is approximately 7 500 there is virtually no reserve oi trained personnel for recall in event at mobilisation In event of an attack by the Israeli navy-wot any other well-trained naval force of comparable size the Egyptians could o er only token resistance or some type of delaying action until outside assistance was received The Egyptian navy poses no very serious threat to Israel and does not at the present time have the capability of initiating and 8118- taining a successlul blockade of the coast of Israel or the approaches to the Gulf of Aqaba It is capable of conducting Iairly eilective shore bombardment but the Egyptian destroyers lac adequate antiaircralt sell-defense armament and the submarines are capable or only harassing operations 2 Syria a around - The Syrian army numbers approximately 4 000 of cers and 56 000 enlisted men Mobilization to a top strength oi 96 800 would require a months Organized reserves consist of 8 partially equipped lnlantry brigades totaling about 26 000 men The army is approxi- mately 85-90 per cent equipped with Soviet Bloc arms mostly of World War 11 design but including some more modern types The irilantry and armored brigades have been reorganized along Soviet lines during the past three years and Soviet tactical doctrine - has been adopted and tailored to the army's needs and capabilities 5 Organization and doctrine emphasize repower mechanization and 3 mobility but the army has no sustained o ensive capability Its de - ciencies spring from a weak under-strength and inexperienced officer - - corps which is broken into a number or political sections as well as 3 from a shortage of personnel having sophisticated military skills inade- quate training low maintenance standards and inef cient logistical systems It could mount limited objective attacks employing two or three brigades and achieve some limited success The strength and depth of its defenses on the Israeli border coupled with favorable terrain - would provide formidable obstacles to an Israeli attach b Air Syria has an estimated 48 Soviet-supplied - jet fighters and 2 BEAGLE IL-28 jet light bombers _r A Air capabilities both defensive and offensive are poor Although an z is secsek pprovd for Release 2017 11 30 000332752 c0 03 2 7 52 network equipped with Polish and Soviet radars exists defense or the Damascus area against a sizable Israeli air assault is believed impossible largely because of the short reaction tithe available to scramble lighters and to intercept an enemy force whose takeoff point is less than 100 miles away To oilsct partially the aircraft losses and the decrease in air capabilities incurred upon the dissolution of the union with the UAR Syria concluded a Soviet aid agreement in early 1962 which provides for FISHBEDS MIG-21 during 1963 as well as surface-to-air missiles and possibly jet bombers c Navy The Syrian navy consists 01 a small number at err-French and ex Soviet vessels many at which are non-operational It does not have a signi cant combat capability 3 Jordan a Ground The total strength of the Jordanian army is 37 400 At present 14 000 regulars supported by about 9 000 armed National Guardsmen mostly stationed within border villages guard Jordan's frontier with Israel The remainder of the army is deployed in East Jordan with the largest concentration near the capital Amman Disaiiection of some army of cers from the monarchy has made the reliability or the army questionable It is incapable of sustained often- sive combat Delenaively it could probably contain attacks by any one neighboring Arab army but could not defend West Jordan against an Israeli attack for longer than six to ten days is Air Following the recent defections to Egypt oi the Royal Jordanian Air Force Commander and two Hawker Hunter pilots wi 11 their aircraft Jordan now has 21 Hawker Hunters and 8 Vampire jet lighters The air force has virtually no combat capability with respect to Israel and what capability there exists is limited by a shortage of pilots and poor morale 4 a Ground The strength of the Iraqi army excluding the organic air forces is about 70 000 organized into four iniantry divisions and one armored division Soviet equipment has been largely absorbed resulting in some improvement in effectiveness logistical limitations and internal security considerations preclude the commitment of more than 12 MOD-15 000 troops to the west for possible action in the Jordan-Israel-Syrla area The involvement of the Iraqi any in attempting to suppress the Kurdish rebellion makes even that car we itment unlikelypproved for Release 20171 1 30 000332752 1 o n 3 0003327 1 ts 52 SE all weather operations 5 Lebanon and Saudi Arabia relatively quiet of forcibly separating the two sides Wk 1 pproved for Release w' 7 113 00 '9 033275 b Air The Iraqi Air Force IAF combat aircraft inventory is esti- mated to consist of 90 Soviet-supplied jet fighters 16 FIBHBEDS MIG- 21 with air-to-air missiles 18 FARMERS MIG-19 29 mac-as mo- 17 12 Hawker Hunters 9 Venoms and Vampires '10 BADGER TU- 16 jet medium bombers 2 equipped with cameras and 14 BEAGLE IL-28 jet light bombers Fifteen of the FRESCOS are equipped for The Soviet military aid agreement negotiated by the Iraqi delegation in Moscow during October 1981 includes 3 BEAGLE IL-28 reconnaiso sance jet light bombers 8 MIDGET and 15 MAX trainers for delivery during 1962 as well as 5 battalions of surface-tour missiles and P-30 radar units Soviet instructors and advisers con- tinue to participate in the domestic training program and a number of Iraqi pilots are undergoing flight training in the Soviet Union The MP now has sufficient quali ed pilots to y all of the aircraft in its inventory with the possible exception of the FISHBEDS and BADGERS is currently capable of attacking xed targets such as air elds military and industrial installations and transportation facilities Ac- quisition of higher performance aircraft additional electronics equip- ment and 5 battalions of surface-teak missiles will increase Iraq's air defense potential IAF capabilities are limited by the low standard of the average Ira-1i pilot a shortage of experienced maintenance techni- cians and poor logistic support IAF transports are capable of airlifting 430-440 troops and its helicopters could short-haul about 150 The armed forces of Lebanon and Saudi Arabia have no signi cant capability for oifensivc operations against Israel The ground and air forces oi Lebanon possess a limited defensive capability The Saudi Arabian armed forces would be incapable of organized resirtance against a modern army except for desert harassing operations 1 UN Forces The United Nations Emergency Forces UNEF on the Israel-Sinai border have a total strength of about 5 000 8139 Chart II I in ll for details Although border crossings and minor incidents continue to be reported the situation along the Gaza and Sinai frontiers remains The presence of the UNEF is a deterrent to a major MAR Israeli con ict The UNEF does not have the military capability -L-- pproved for Relese 2017 11 30 00033252 - CLIART I SELECTIVE ARMAMENTS INVENTORY Auto Tanks Artillery Medium Ami- allk Assault Guns Misc 5 Armored Vehicles UAR EGYPT JORDAN SAUDI TOTAL ARAB 5'685 517 362 I38 IO-I I 500 5119 493 I24 I Certain obsolete Items hnva been omitted Includes armored cm pemonnel and wupom carriers Includes 50 l30mm rocket launchers 32 tube In UAP Egypt 24 In Erin and 24 132mm rocket hunch-rs 16 tube in Iraq Includes 850 88-10 dunk guided mutual 000332752 err-proved foi Release 01171113 00033275 u v COO332752 'l t'i'kv CHART II STRENGTH OF DEPIDYED IN VICINITY OF ISRAELI BORDERB Current M-HB Hrs UAR EGYPT 10 000 85 000 SYRIA 10 500 31 000 JORDAN 23 000 40 000 LEBANOH 2 700 7 000 TOTAL ARAB 03 200 118 500 ISRAEL 55 000 350 000 Includes Iranian UAR EGYPT 121 300' 70 100' 00 000' rm gure includes quasi-military personnel on acme duty UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE EGYPT AS OF 10 SEPTEMBER 1003 BRAZIL 010 CANADA 025 DENMARK 559 INDIA 1 247 NORWAY 591 pproved for Release CHART AIR FORCES As of 1 January 1983 humans Bananas Tuxsmm Harlan-cu Pis- Tow AF um Ptuosxu PisSAUDI l3 90 TOTAL 409 06 Nor- yahlo L I I - CHART IV SAVAL FORCES Koxun Mum In - szu Cums Mama Wmma smur- PR Gunman Tamper Sim-s can DD PC Mummy Bum PT MI-3F 5 2 Bum UAR 4 lit- JORDAN TOTAL My 55 45 9 ISRAEL -1 I I I Figures in pan-utiuw-n indicate ilmrliw hum n-wrn- lhwe in owrhaul - C00332752 'll bulky ouhln SAUDI ARABIA 0 Sum mm Imu CO 03 3 7 13 - -o 17 11 30 cio 1 map-- 35 - ANNEX THE ISRAELI NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM 1 Israel began its nuclear energy pragram in 1952 with the establish- ment of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission IAEC under the juris- diction of the Prime Minister The IAEC is closely related to the Israeli Ministry of Defense 2 Israel has is small 1-5 megawatt reactor fueled with enriched uranium-235 in operation at Nahai Soreq aka Nabi Rubin on the Mediterranean coast near Tel Aviv This was built by an American rm under a Us-Israeii bilateral agreement It is used for research training and the production of isotopes It has no potential for pro- duction of weapons-grade ssionabie material 3 The larger Israeli reactor site is near Dimona in the Negev Here the Israelis are building with the assistance of the French and pre- sumably under the terms of the 1953-54 French-Israeli agreement the terms of which are unknown to us a 2i megawatt heavy-water mod- erated and cooled reactor which is a modi cation of the French design The Dimona site includes laboratories for handling hot and cold radioactive and non-radioactive materials a uranium-metal pilot plant and associated facilities for workshops health and safety and administrative needs 3 300 2 'f 1 5 The Israelis have been very careful to keep the nuclear energy ro ram out of the ublic as much as ible The Israelis have from domestic production and from a small amount bought from Argentina su icient uranium concentrate for four or ve loadings of the reactor if they have facilities to produce and fabricate uranium metal We lmow they have attempted to buy uranium concentrate from South Africa without restriction as to use We have had reports that the French had agreed to supply large quantities of uranium The Israelis have said that they have facilities for producing uranium metal in laboratory quantities at Dimona and will fabricate the fuel elements for the Dimona reactor at the site Zack 25 95 515 5 Balm y pproved for Release 2017 11 30 000332752 3 tJ glrf - 9 l it 394 33 - - 5 Vi se 217 11 30 0093332752 1 I A stcaekh We do not know that the Israelis have facilities for separation of plutonium from the irradiated fuel or whether they intend to build such facilities US scientists visiting Dirnona in 1981 were told that aspara- tion facilities were planned but in 1982 the Israelis stated they had no plans for constructing such facilities The Israelis do have the technical - and industrial ability to construct them however The Israelis have shown an interest in the separation of uranium for the production of uranium-235 particularly by the ultra-centrifuge method We know of no Israeli effort in the eld of 0-235 separation The ultra-centrifuge method is in its early experimental stages and country is expected to undertake large scale application for several yearspprved for Relas 207 11 30 000332572 c003327523 CENTRAL INTELUGENCE AGENCY DISSEMINATION NOTICE i This document was disseminated by the Central intelligence Agency This copy is for the information and use of the recipient and oi persons under his lurisdiction on a need to know basis Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments a Director oi Intelligence and Research for the Department oi State is Director Deiense intelligence Agency ior the Of ce at the Secretary of Defense Assistant Chief oi Stafi for intelligence Department of the Army for the Department at the Army d Assistant Chief of Naval Operations intelligence for the Department of the Navy e Assistant Chief of Stati intelligence USAF fer the Department at the Air Force i Director ior Intelligence Joint Sto 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Atomic Energy Commission Federal Bureau of investigation 1 9 a - pproved for Release 2617 11 30 000332752 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu