3 114 $55 955 15 alri'ir' Iii-9EIELELGEN mag 131193 151 at I l1 1 1 11131 nip-11 1 1171 rip-M Iri- - I IFI -I I I - 1 1 '31 4'5 1'4 I r I if-I- 3011499653 It a gf uu - 13$ B lam nll 33133 i Wufnng puma e- ThiI' Cngrul' gouty Inpd 3341' I ll urgupim 3% 5 33 __ma_'nn mm natanm ha Armr In Humm- Fw 1 - 5 I r -II- - 13 319- - I 3 431 10 _nIfI Ininl gm-mnd Runnmh Dapu man If Half-10' w Defense Im han - I ssl dni Id lm Fr- uf Jenny Chief iirg iauncaj w 3 913 ILracIar for Int-Ingmar 43am Energy Cummhdufl If 13% Nuthmug ncy Ill-In ll 1 51-5 11 If C0114 9 653 SEAVH I A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 30 2 63 The Advanced Weapons Programs of the UAR and Israel CQ114 9 653 5E ET THE ADVANCED WEAPONS PROGRAMS OF THE UAR AND ISRAEL THE PROBLEM To estimate likely developments in the advanced weapons pro- grams of the UAR and Israel over the next several years and the probable consequences of such programs CONCLUSIONS A We have no positive evidence that the Israeli nuclear pro gram is aimed at achieving a nuclear weapons capability How- ever the size of the program what we know of its nature and the amount of uranium concentrate acquired all suggest that Israel intends at least to put itself in a position to be able to produce a limited number of weapons relatively quickly after a decision to do so Indeed we believe the Israelis unless deterred by outside pressure will attempt to produce a weapon sometime in the next several years We believe that in the most favorable circumstances Israel could detonate a domestically developed nuclear device by late 1965 but a more likely date would be some- time in 1966 Developing the device into a weapon which could be delivered by aircraft would require a year or two more 1967 1968 though this period could be virtually eliminated if Israel obtained from another country detailed and tested weapons designs Paras 3-10 B We believe that Israel is undertaking the development of a 250 300 nautical mile surface-to-surface missile SSM system A wholly independent Israeli effort to develop and pro- duce such a missile with a payload of 2 000 to 3 000 pounds would probably require three to four years and great expense How ever there is evidence that Israel expects to rely on France for substantial assistance If Israel acquires full access to French technology components and test facilities it probably could SENET 'l C01149653 produce a limited number of missiles with a range of about 250 a payload of some 4 000 pounds and an elementary guidance system in about two years 1965 By 1968-1969 it probably could produce a few compatible nuclear warheads Paras 11-15 C The United Arab Republic UAR alone or in combination with other Arab States does not have the capability of producing a nuclear weapon in the foreseeable future The UAR is attempt- ing to develop a SSM with a range of about 200 um Despite the many dif th problems the UAR faces in its missile program it may be able to deploy a small number of these weapons by mid-1964 assuming continued help by the West German tech- nicians and a continuing supply of foreign components We estimate the payload of this missile at only about 500 pounds and its CEP as large The military value of such a weapon would be small However the UAR has a missile program going and has gained experience in the production of missiles With access to outside help and components it probably could in a few years produce a more effective weapon Paras 18 24 D DeSpite continuing accusations by both the UAR and Israel that the other is deve10ping chemical biological and radiological weapons of mass destruction we have no evidence to con rm these charges Both countries could however produce small quantities of chemical or biological warfare devices designed for clandestine use Neither country can produce radiological war- fare weapons Paras 16-17 25 E The purely military signi cance of any missile system either Israel or the UAR could produce is likely to be modest for some time to come although if Israel develops a nuclear bomb its military capability will be greatly increased The political and impact of the advanced weapons programs is more important than the purely military effect and is already being felt If Nasser could not devise a counter to an Israeli nuclear threat on his own he probably would turn to the USSR to try to ensure his protection and the Arabs would blame the West in- cluding the US for the increased Israeli threat Israel likewise would become increasingly activist in its dealings with the Arabs The factors which have inhibited a new outbreak of Arab-Israeli 2 C01149653 smear hostilities in recent years still apply Nevertheless as the ad vanced weapons programs progress tensions will probably rise on both sides In an atmosphere of this kind there would always be the possibility that one or the other side would initiate hostile action to safeguard its ultimate security Paras 26 33 DISCUSSION I INTRODUCTION 1 The Arabs and Israelis have remained bitterly antagonistic since the establishment of Israel 15 years ago While all the Arab States are hostile in some degree to Israel the most important confrontation is that between Israel and the United Arab Republic Egypt They have engaged in an arms race since 1955 While scornful-of past Arab military performances the Israelis fear that some day the Arabs under UAR leadership will be able to use effectively the formidable weapons they have acquired principally from the USSR These fears have almost certainly grown as a result of the recent coups in Iraq and Syria and the subsequent progress toward Arab unity The Arabs in turn are conscious of their military inferiority as proved by their defeats of 1948 1949 and in the Sinai campaign of 1956 2 The arms race has broadened with attempts by Israel and the UAR to acquire advanced weapons No other Arab State has a pro- gram to develop advanced weapons The UAR is engaged in an at- tempt to develop surface to-surface missiles SSMs which it hopes will increase its ability already considerable in view of its jet bomber force to strike at targets inside Israel There is also evidence that Israel is attempting to develop SSMs The most important step which Israel might take however is the development of a nuclear capability Possession of even a few nuclear weapons would vastly increase Israel s present military advantage Beth Israel and the UAR have charged the other with developing biological chemical and radiological weap- ons II THE ISRAELI PROGRAM 3 Nuclear Our evidence on the Israeli nuclear program is limited and there are many aspects on which we cannot speak with con dence Aside from the small 1-5 megawatt research reactor at Nahal Soreq which has no potential for production of weapon grade ssion- able materials the only known reactor is that under construction at Dimona Here the Israelis are building with the assistance of the French a 24 26 megawatt reactor moderated and cooled by heavy 5 1 3 C01149653 I SENET water and fueled with natural uranium it is a modi cation of the French design The Dimona site includes laboratories for han- dling radioactive and nonradioactive materials a uranium-metal pilot plant and associated facilities for workshops health and safety and administrative needs These facilities are either completed or are ex- pected to be completed by the time the reactor is in operation 5 The Dimona reactor is now expected to go into operation by late 1964 but if the Israelis can obtain the remaining needed equipment and materials the reactor might go into operation by mid- 1964 If the Israelis operated the reactor at its maximum capacity for the production of weapon grade plutonium they could produce enough plutonium for one or two weapons a year with enough plutonium for a rst device becoming available about one year after the reactor goes into operation 6 In order to produce weapon grade plutonium Israel must have uranium fuel elements and adequate plutonium separation facilities The Israelis already have from domestic production and from small amounts bought from Argentina without safeguards as to use sufficient uranium concentrate to provide uranium metal for four or ve loadings of the reactor This amount would be enough to operate the reactor for research purposes for about eight to 10 years or it would permit the operation for production of weapon grade plutonium for two or three years South Africa has recently contracted to supply uranium concentrate with safeguards We have also had con icting reports re- garding French agreement to supply fuel for the Dimona reactor The Israelis have said that they have facilities for producing small quantities of uranium metal from concentrate at Dimona and will fabricate the fuel elements for the Dimona reactor at the site We have no evidence to con rm the existence of plutonium separation facilities However the plant in Dimona is large enough to include them and Israeli industry probably is capable of constructing them 7 Aside from the production of weapon grade plutonium there would be many technical problems to resolve before Israel could produce a nuclear device let alone a weapon However Israel has a signi cant number of scientists with competence in the releyanL eid s m1 ng t through collabgration with the French a 4 SE RET CQll49653 SECRET U A R AND ISRAEL SYRIA CYPRUS 19 29 nautical Mi LE MEDITERRANEAN SEA Tel Aviv-la a NAHAL IAII - @ ll li Minna-la atnzuau mnlu In HANG Ii SAUDIARABIA I UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC MD SEA 5 A 3151 5E1 C01149653 The development of a weapon in the absence of proven designs would require testing Nuclear testing could be carried out in Israel in the open or underground but such testing would raise serious problems An above ground test in the relatively small area of Israel would present the danger of fall- out both to Israel and its neighbors underground testing aside from the inherent prob- lems of a suitable location and terrain would provide more limited test data 51 to con diic t t e test mama on its own Territory ght not do so until it had accumulated enough ssionable material for more than one device so as not to be left without any after the test The slow rate of plutonium production of the Dimona reactor would in these circumstances delay testing 9 All things considered we believe that in the most favorable cir- cumstances the Israelis could detonate a domestically developed nuclear device by late 1965 but a more likely date would be sometime in 1966 Developing a weapon which could be delivered by aircraft would require a year or two more until 1967 1968 This latter period could be virtually eliminated if Israel obtained from another country detailed and tested weapons designs 10 We have no positive evidence that the Israel nuclear en gy p_ro- jrani is aimed at ach ing a nuclear weapons capabilig 'The size 61' the program what we know of its nature and the amount of uranium concentrate already acquired all suggest however that Israel at least intends to put itself in a position to be able to produce weapons relatively quickly on to do so Indeed we believe the Israelis will attempt to produce a weapon sometime in the next several years 11 Missiles We believe that Israel decided by late 1962 to undertake th_e development of a SSM system C01149653 12 Israel has already acquired some experience in the missile eld as a result of its efforts to develop sounding rockets 1 Following at least one unsuccessful attempt the Israelis successfully launched the Shavit a two-stage sounding rocket in July 1961 We believe the rocket had a solid propellant weighed approximately 900 pounds and reached an altitude of about 50 n m where metallic sodium was exploded to form a cloud Although there have been frequent reports that additional rings in the Shavit program would occur none has been con rmed The Israelis have also acquired valuable information on the theoretical aspects of missile technology from research done by Israel under con- tracts with the US Department of Defense An Israeli of cial stated in 1961 that a tactical missile with a range of 30 n m had been de veloped but we have no information on the production or development of such a weapon Despite its research to date and the high level of scienti c and technical skills available any wholly independent Israeli effort to develop and produce a 250 300 with a payload of 2 000 to 3 000 pounds would probably require three to four years 1966- 1967 and great expense 13 In order to obtain a 250-300 n m missile as soon as possible we believe that Israel has decided to rely on considerable foreign assistance and our limited evidence indicates that Israel is relying on France for such assistance We do not know the extent of French support nor do we know the scope or degree of success of the Israeli program for hiring foreign missile experts Israel would have extreme dif culty in establishing a 250 300 mile test range in its limited territory and so might be forced to test at shorter ranges and probably would look to France to provide a missile testing range 14 The French program for SSMs is in a relatively early stage and is designed to produce a medium-range 1 500 missile which could carry a nuclear warhead The solid propellant second stage of this missile has been ight tested Adapted to a surface-to-surface role this second stage could deliver a 1 000 pound payload about 120 n m We believe that the liquid fueled rst stage will be ight tested by the end of this year We further believe that the characteristics of the rst stage are such that if adapted to a surface-to-surface role it could carry a payload of some 4 000 pounds to a range of 250 n m 15 If Israel acquires full access to French technology components and test facilities we believe it could produce a limited number of missiles with a range of about 250 miles a payload of some 4 000 Israel has made no effort to develop surface to-air missiles but is rely- ing on acquisition of US Hawk missiles for air defense 7 C01149653 SE ET pounds with an elementary guidance system in about two years 1965 Any limitation on the availability of French resources would proportion- ately lengthen the time required for the Israeli capability By 1968 1969 they probably could develop a few compatible nuclear warheads 16 Biological Chemical and Radiological Warfare Israel is ex- tremely competent in the microbiological and biological sciences and has sun icient personnel and facilities to develop a modest biological warfare program However there is no evidence of an Israeli research and development program for offensive biological warfare BW weapons Israel also has impressive research capabilities in the field of chemical warfare CW Research has been done on chemical agent aerosol dissemination the and reaction mechanisms of toxic organo- phosphorus compounds and other poisons Future efforts probably will include the of agents that have a CW potential Israeli defensive CW research apparently emphasizes the development of CW agent detectors and antidotes However Israel is neither pro- ducing nor stockpiling CW defensive equipment nor are toxic CW agents produced or stockpiled Israel has no known BW or CW eld testing facilities and the Israeli military apparently are skeptical of the efficacy of using CW weapons However Israel could produce small BW or CW devices designed for clandestine use in the event of war and may do so 17 Israel does not have the reactor capacity to produce more than small amounts of radioactive isotopes and we have detected no signi cant shipments of such material to Israel These factors combined with the difficult technical problems involved in the development of suitable radiological warfare weapons and the uncertainty of their potential make it unlikely that Israel will even attempt to develop such weapons THE UAR PROGRAM 18 Nuclear The UAR nuclear energy program is con ned to basic research and the production and use of small quantities of radioactive isotopes it is limited by the severe shortage of personnel materials and capital Under a 1956 agreement with the Soviet Union the UAR obtained a two megawatt research reactor which is located at the Atomic Energy Establishment at Inshas It has virtually no capability of producing ssionable material 19 Exploration for uranium originally done with Soviet help is now being carried out with Yugoslav assistance Very small quantities of uranium have been produced by limited exploitation of black sand deposits in the Nile Delta There are no known signi cant uranium deposits in the UAR or other Arab countries There is no uranium plant in the UAR and none is envisaged at present Negotiations for the con- struction of a heavy water plant with a capacity of about 20 tons an- 8 6qu c01149653 SET nually have been going on for several years with a West German rm but it is not known if the plant will be built UAR of cials approached both West Germany and the US in 1961 for assistance in developing a nuclear power program and West German scientists conducted feas ibility studies at that time Under present plans invitations to bid for the construction of a nuclear power reactor with a design capacity of 100 250 megawatts are to be issued about May 1963 Such a nuclear power reactor would take at least four years to construct 20 Even after the completion of such a power reactor diversion of the reactor to the production of plutonium for a nuclear weapons program would require adequate fuel supplies without safeguards as to use and the construction of chemical separation facilities In ad- dition the UAR would have great dif culty in designing even a crude device In view of these limitations as well as Egypt s generally limited scienti c and technical resources it is clear that the UAR will not have the capability of developing a nuclear weapon in the foreseeable future The addition of Syria and Iraq to the UAR would not increase the UAR's capability to any signi cant extent 21 Missiles The UAR has shown an intense interest in acquiring guided missiles in recent years and has approached most of the missile- producing nations of the world at one time or another The Egyptian approach has included outright purchase licensed manufacture in Egypt and the recruitment of Western European technicians For example the UAR has purchased sounding rockets from the US has acquired short-range tactical naval missiles air-to-air missiles and SAMs from the USSR and has acquired the services of 10-15 West Ger- man scientists and engineers to develop SSMs capable of reaching Israel 2 22 During the July 1962 celebrations of the tenth anniversary of the Egyptian revolution the UAR red four liquid fueled single-stage rockets and paraded 20 'more of two sizes through the streets of Cairo These were sounding rockets deve10ped in Egypt since early 1960 by West German scientists utilizing material and components procured in Eu- rope Static testing started early in 1961 and during 1961 there were apparently several unsuccessful as well as a few partially successful rings The UAR apparently is attempting to convert the larger sound- ing rocket the Conqueror into a SSM The versions in the parade differ from those red and appear to represent the initial con- version efforts As a SSM the Conqueror probably could deliver a 500 pound payload a distance of about 200 n m We believe that this missile will have an unsophisticated guidance system and that its CEP will be large We have no information that a military version of this rocket has been ight tested gThe balance of the German scientists and technicians in the UAR are engaged in the production of jet engines and aircraft or in nonmilitary projects SE RET 9 C01149653 SEXKET 23 The UAR faces many dif cult problems in its missile program Work on the guidance system and the ground-support equipment ap- parently is still in an early stage The UAR has a test range in northern Egypt but we believe that it is not instrumented the Egyptians are currently attempting to purchase instrumentation in the US The mis- sile effort is totally dependent on outside assistance and withdrawal of the West Germans or inability to secure materials and components abroad would make it impossible to carry out the program in the fore- seeable future Even under present conditions the reluctance of many of the best quali ed European rms to supply components probably makes quality control dif cult Despite these obstacles the UAR may be able to deploy a small number of the military version of these weap- one by mid-1964 assuming continued help by the West Germans and a continuing supply of foreign components and parts However with its relatively small payload and large CEP its military value would be small Nevertheless the UAR has a missile program going and if it were to have access to outside help and components it could probably produce in a few years a more effective weapon 24 The smaller rocket the Victor is a facsimile of the French sounding rocket Veronique Both were designed by the same German scientist As a surface-to-surface rocket the Victor would have a range of about 250 however its small payload about 130 pounds and the lack of a guidance system would make it virtually useless as a weapons system 25 Biological Chemical and Radiological Warfare The chemical industry of the UAR- is small and while it is' being expanded with for- sign including Soviet help scienti c and industrial resources are severely limited The UAR has a military CW establishment and may have produced such items as napalm and amethrower fuels Further the UAR may have some World War II toxic munitions left behind on the evacuation of the British bases While the UAR also makes certain industrial toxics such as phoSgene and hydrogen cyanide we do not believe that the UAR is now capable of signi cant research and devel- opment of more sophisticated CW agents We have no evidence that the UAR is trying to produce CW weapons Similarly the ability to produce signi cant quantities of BW agents is extremely limited and we have no evidence of any program to do so In neither the case of CW5 or of BW do we know of any program or facilities for conduct- ing tests of military applications It is possible of course that in either eld the UAR could produce small quantities of CW or BW agents which might be used for clandestine operations The UAR has no capability of producing radiological warfare agents and we know of no attempt to procure isotopes in the quantities which would be needed for this purpose 1 0 C01149653 55% 1V IMPLICATION OF ADVANCED WEAPONS PROGRAMS 26 Military The armed forces of the Arab States have long been inferior in quality to those of Israel though superior in total numbers and equipment-3 Even when one or both sides come into possession of a SSM system its purely military signi cance is likely to be modest for some time The UAR's missiles will be of little military value without nuclear warheads and we see no prospect of the UAR's producing such warheads in the foreseeable future If Israel develops a nuclear bomb deliverable by aircraft its military capability will be greatly increased Possession of missiles with nuclear warheads would further increase Israel s military superiority but the Israelis probably will not be able to achieve this for several years During the next several years both sides are likely to see any advanced weapons primarily as deterrents against aggression 27 Economic Our t1'_1es_e is 52am - are arisen a rough estimate of the cost of Israel s missile program but we believe the cost will be substantial While the Israeli Government is no doubt loath to see such resources diverted from economic development the burden appears to be within Israeli capacity 28 The total costs of the missile program probably have been modest thus far but a large part has been payable in foreign exchange Since the supplies of foreign exchange are relatively small the drain of the missile program together with the costs of the much more expensive jet aircraft program constitutes a signi cant burden on the UAR 29 and Political Although the missile program does not appear to have great military signi cance it has had a consid- erable effect on the Israelis who are acutely conscious of the compactness of the target which Israel provides to a potential enemy Moreover the Israelis see these missiles as weapons against which they have been unable to provide a defense While the Israelis almost cer- tainly do not fully believe the claims they have made regarding the progress of the UAR missile program and the threat of chemical bio- logical and radiological warheads the steps they have taken to frighten the German technicians out of Egypt the vigor of Israeli propaganda aSee NIE 30-63 The Arab Israeli Problem dated 23 January 1963 for details of Arab and Israeli military capabilities maker ll 419653 and the apparent launching of a high priority missile program are evidence of a real fear of future developments 30 We believe the motivation of the Israelis for acquiring nuclear weapons to be primarily defensive Ever conscious of the great nu- merical superiority of their Arab enemies and of the frequently reiter- ated Arab threat to drive them out of the Near East the Israelis would regard possession of nuclear weapons as a powerful deterrent to any Arab aggression Possession of nuclear weapons would however en courage them to be bolder in the use of their conventional resources - both diplomatic and military in their confrontation with the Arabs The Israelis might also see the possession of nuclear weapons as con- fronting the Arabs with such overwhelming force that the latter would give up hope of imposing their will on Israel 31 In seeking to develop SSMs Nasser has been in part motivated by a desire to acquire prestige for himself and the UAR views such weapons as supporting the UAR's claim to a place of leadership among the Arabs and among the nonaligned countries generally It is pos- sible that Nasser and the military leaders are not conscious of the military limitations of their missiles However they may be aware of such limitations but see the missiles as the best they can do at present and as a rst step toward the development of more effective missiles 32 The factors which have inhibited a new outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities in recent years still apply Nevertheless as the advanced weapons programs progress tensiOns will probably rise on both sides If either country came to feel itself in iminent danger it might go to' extreme to maintain its security If Nasser could not devise a counter to an Israeli nuclear threat on his own he probably would turn to the USSR to try to ensure his protection While the Soviet Union might increase its military aid to the UAR including such advanced weapons as SSMs capable of reaching Israel we do not believe the USSR would provide nuclear weapons Israel likewise would grow more edgy becoming increasingly activist in its dealing with the Arabs In an atmosphere of this kind there would always be the possibility that one or the other side would initiate hostile action to safeguard its ulti- mate security a pre-emptive UAR air strike against Dimona 33 Acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel would add greatly to Arab hostility toward the West The US as well as France would receive much of the blame in the eyes of the Arabs Moreover failure of the US to force Israel to give up its nuclear weapons would be regarded as a result of deliberate US policy and there would be a growing tendency for the confrontation in the Middle East to take the form of the Bloc and the Arabs against Israel and the West 1 2 5 18 I c 1 115aIIn'vIIr' rum in padmunflran'c'n' Bapartmam 51qu I9 55 71 'i I m 511' ngnd 1 511 11 py'gh i nfuriuhw d'usn'g lh 1 115111 han 1la a u nq 1' aan'd LIEII Ip 'fIlnI l l Undan'hh deI Ii dInum'InnIu'n' 111' Inf- 191m ext 1 I- IEF - brag-hf 1 3711 I 3111151111 nf Suntan-r 11H - 55 11 - '1 'tl'ui15 111351 11 11 1131- - chI 'r'uI Biir'ehif - I - I - 1111 - 13' '1 11 1 13151' 11 --I f w I - I lfia nv pr aqE-I' 1 11 1'11 11 J- I 1211' - 111 1 -- 1 41 war-1'5 1 4-1 1 I 11'-IIpr-n- - Li h'ijtl 1 1 - raga '15 l Lin-31 3 59 tic-1hr C01l49653maniaIm f - 1 - till r - - mug I a-i This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu