SECRET UnlT D STA TBS STRATBGIC COMllAllD FOIA review completed on 12 January 2017 Portions of this document no longer meet the classification standards of E O 13526 Section 1 4 As such I am downgrading specific portion-marked paragraphs as UNCLASSIFIED Partial classification downgrade executed by DANIELL KARBLER Major General U S Army Chief of Staff U S Strategic Command CDRUSSTRA TCOM OPLAII 8010-08 U GLOBAL DBTBRRBKCB AND STRIKB U 1 l'BBRU ARY 2008 COPY _ _ _ OJ' _ _ _ COPIBS Dedwd from MaltlpJe 8oaroe8 Deo•••lfJ' oa 1 hbraar7 2018 KATIOKAL 8BCURITY llll'ORllATIOK Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions SECRET INTENTIONALLY BLANK SECRET 20180201 HEADQUARTERS US STRATEGIC COMMAND OFFUTI' AIR FORCE BASE NE 68113-6500 1FEB2008 SUBJECT CDRUSSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-08 U SEE DISTRIBUTION 1 U CDRUSSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-08 fulfills a requirement established in Appendix B to Enclosure D CJCSI 3110 0lE Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan JSCP 05 and is effective for planning purposes only until Secretary of Defense SecDef approval and plan implementation scheduled for 1 February 2008 U 2 -f -Upon SecDefapproval and plan implementation CDRUSSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-08 supersedes USCINCSTRAT OPLAN 8044-98 dated 25 Jan uary 2001 CDRUSSTRATCOM Global Strike Interim Capability OPORD dated 08 September 2004 and CDRUSSTRATCOM Strategic Deterrence Interim Capability OPORD dated 10 May 2005 in their entireties Strategic forces will continue to be capable of providing a credible response to any attack at any time The nuclear attack structure and all developed Global Strike Support Documents in existence on 1 February 2008 will remain in effect 3 U CDRUSSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-08 was coordinated with USTRANSCOM USJFCOM USSOCOM USPACOM USEUCOM USCENTCOM USNORTHCOM USSOUTHCOM the Joint Staff the Services and supporting component and task force commanders during preparation 4 U The supporting plans listed in Base Plan paragraph 3b Tasks must be prepared and forwarded to this headquarters for review within 60 days of SecDef approval of CDRUSSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-08 FOR THE COMMANDER DISTRIBUTION AnnexZ Derived from Multiple Sources Declassify on 1 Februazy 2018 i SECRET 20180201 •• OPLAN 8010-08 1 FEB 2008 INTENTIONALLY BLANK ii 80201 SECRET 20180201 HEADQUARTERS US STRATEGIC COMMAND OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE NE 68113-6500 1 FEB2008 CDRUSSIRATCOM OfLAN 8010-08 M U SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS AND RECORD OF CHANGES U 1 f8t-'nle long title of this plan is CDRUSSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-08 Global Deterrence and Strike 'nle short title is CDRUSSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-08 2 U This document is classified SECRET to protect information revealing opera ti on plans of the US military Information in OPLAN 8010 must be disaeminated only to those agencies and personnel whose official duties specifically require knowledge of the plan including those required to develop supporting plans 3 U This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws title 18 of the United States Code sections 793 and 794 'nle transmi88ion or revelation of information contained herein in any manner to an unauthorized person is prolubited by law 4 U Reproduction of this document in whole or in part without permission of _ this headquarters is prohibited except as required for the preparation of supporting plans Derived from Multiple Sources Declassify on 1February2018 iii SECRET 20180201 SEGRET 20180201 OPLAN 8010-08 1 FEB2008 REGORP OF CHANGES CHANGE NUMBER DESCRIPl'ION iv SECRET 20180201 EFFECTIVE DATE SEGRET 20180201 HEADQUARTERS US STRATEGIC COMMAND OFFUTI' AIR FORCE BASE NE 68113-6500 1FEB2008 US$TRATCQM OPLAN 8010-08 M Executive Summary U 1 U Situation a 'fEijo General Commander US Strategic Command CDRUSSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010 responds to Contingency Planning Guidance FY 05 and CJCSI 3110 0lE and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 06 JSCP FY 06 tasking that directs development of a Global Deterrence and Strike Plan The se of OPLAN 8010 is to rovide national leadershi with typical Geographic Combatant ' 'eo --m-m_an_d G 'cc d evet- -o-ped- -p lan- - The -- basi- c-a___ nnexes will describe how USSTRATCOM's capabilities will be used to address each adversary Not all described activities will be appropriate in all circumstances but CDRUSSTRATCOM will choose each as required to achieve the objectives and effects forrx 1 soc 1 4l• 05sc I In addition for this plan to be successful planning coordination must occur betwee n each affected hie Combatant Command during the ·• Al grp---- 1 I· tion · of · Finally the development and implementation of strategic themes and messages that support the identified actions mrx · I »Jfsoc 1-4 • lis eaaential for the identified deterrent action be U l 't t Politica1-Militarv Environment Threats to the United States and its vital interests are diverse and cannot be fully predicted Numerous nations and non-state actors are aggressively pursuing Weapons of Mass Destruction WMD Derived from Multiple Sources Declassify on 1 February 2018 v SEGRET 20180201 SEGRET 20180201 OPLAN 8010-08 1FEB2008 and associated delivery systems as a means to advance their interests through intimidation and coercion Within this dynamic and uncertain security environment OPLAN 8010 supports the National Defense Strategy's ways of assuring allies and friends dissuading potential adversaries deterring aggression and defeating adversaries Modem challenges reqwre a new concept o cc p wi revised joint force capabilities that provide a wider range of e military deterrent options Effective deterrence is adversary dependent each advers has a unique decision calculus that guides behaviors and actions ese strategies and actions span daily operations as w as all phases of conflict Our awareness and understanding of the current global security environment our need to assure allies and friends and the requirement to deter and ssibl defeat our adversaries all dictate the status and o rational readineS 1 Sec 1 a SC Effective eterrence operations convince versanes not to e actions t n US vital interests by decisively influencing their decision-making Decisive influence is achieved by credibly demonstrating the will and means to deny benefits and or impose costs while encouraging restraint by convincing the actor that restraint will result in an acceptable outcome Because of the uncertain future security environment new threats to US vital interests may emerge OPLAN 8010 deterrence strategy anc i planning are sufficiently robust and flexible to accommodate these changes when they occur 3 -fSj Global Strike GS Execµtion Per the DO JOC GS is the capability to plan rapidly and deliver limited-duration and extended-range attacks to achieve precision effecbo apinfi in llW DOrt of naljnnal f iipm@nder obiectiycs r llllhll lllll ll'l ill IP- ' r vi SECRET 20180201 SECRET 20180201 OPLAN 8010-08 1 FEB2008 Combatant commanders will normall conduct G esu and suppo comman on ps wt are eated in paragraph 5 Command and Control and Annex J Command Relationships Combatant commanders may use in-theater capabilities and global capabilities · individually or in concert with each other but the defining characteristic of GS will be its unique blend of military capabilities without reaort to large numbers of general purpose forces traditionally associated with major combat operations U b 'iSt-Area of Concern CDRUSSTRATCOM has no geographic area of responsibility AOR for normal operations and will not exercise those functions of command associated with area responsibility CDRUSSTRATCOM will be the supported commander for OPLAN 8010 courses of action COAs development in full partnership with the affected acc The CDRUSSTRATCOM's area of interest AOI for military operations is global particularly involving operations that transcend ace boundaries CDRUSSTRATCOM must be to support operations aa directed by the President and Secretary of Defense SecDeJ as well as to support combatant commander requests for OPLAN 8010 planning option execution or operational support OPLAN 8010 forces will operate on a global basis as necessary to satisfy national or theater objectives threaten US freedom of action vital tary cap ties oca m dill'erent geographic AORs and across multiple domains CDRUSSTRATCOM's global responsibilities coupled with the OCCa' adversary focus demands a unique adversary-specific plan construct for Global Deterrence and Strike efforts interests an 1 U Adyersary-Specific Campeion Plannipg U b 18tPlan objectives encompass a comprehensive range of effectsbaaed options that are tailored to specific scenarios Each appendix contains enemy courses of action and desired regional end-states and strategic objectives originating from USG policy and reflect combatant command collaboration T tiese appendices translate strategic objectives into desired effects tailored to potential political military contexts 'Ibey also translate effects into a spectrum of options that work in concert with an integrated communication campaign to shape vii SECRET 20180201 SECRET 20180201 OPLAN 8010-08 1FEB2008 adversary perceptions intentions and actions across all campaign phases as well as influence other regional and global actors c 1Bt Depending on the level of planning each option contains U d f8t-Adversary appendices are designed for use by all commands and agencies d U Friendly Forces 1 U Center of Gravity The nation's ability to deter aggression or coercion rests on both the perception and reality of its capabilities and political will The perception of the nation's capability and will is crucial for influencing adversary decision making as it affects that adVersary's calculation of costs and benefits and the consequences of restraint while the reality of that adversary's capability and will determines the likelihood of successfully defeating its offensive capability Due to the inseparable nature of national capability and will in deterrence they represent a single center of gravity supported by the following critical capabilities global situational awareness command and control forward presence security cooperation and military integration and interoperability force projection active and passive defenses and strategic communication US critical vulnerabilities on adversarv capabilities and therefore · varv fl'om to ad rttt ' Jbx1I SOc ussc arebased r I C · 2 U Strength and composition CDRUSSTRATCOM has Combatant Command Command Authority COCOM for forces delineated in Forces for Unified Commands liY 06 and Global Force Management Guidance liY 05 CDRUSSTRATCOM will plan with all forces reasonably deemed essential to meet objectives e U kgaj considerations Legal review is· required in the development of strike options and prior to option execution to ensure compliance with the US Constitution applicable US statutes international treaty agreement obligations to which the US is a party the Law of Armed Conflict LOAC customary international law rules of engagement ROE and national policies The use of any weapon kinetic or non-kinetic must satisfy the key principles of LOAC military necessity avoidance of unnecessary suffering proportionality and viii SECRET 20180201 • SECRET 20180201 OPLAN 8010-08 1 FEB2008 discrimination or distinction All of these factors must be taken intO account during COA development and execution f U Riak Mjtjptim U 1 18t'Risk Deterrence fails Mitjgtion Develop readily executable or adaptively planned response options to de-escalate defend against or defeat hostile adversary actions 2 U Risk Unintended second and third order effects on assurance dissuasion and deterrence efforts focused on other actors Mitiption Cross-indexing proposed deterrence actions and activities across the decision calculus of other adversaries and allies to detect and address potential second and third order effects Develop MOE MOP to determine deterrence cause and effect on adversary actor behavior and perception shift 3 U Bilk Adversaries misperceive messages MjtiptiQA Constantly a ssessec l culturally app1opriate eommUnication strategy tightly integrated through the interagency process 4 U Military Operatinngl Risk Due to the adversary and scenarios c nature of military operational risk these factors are detailed in each rxi USSc I CD ofmilitmypowerand II synchronized with other elements of national power in order to assure friends and allies digu@de undesirable military competition 5im agression particularly agression employing WMD defend US vital interests and upon order swiftly defeat adversaries and terminate conflict on terms favorable to the United States 3 U Execution· a U Oyerall plep Obicctivea U l i t-Deter at @pg apinst US vital intereats This plan focuses on detening a disaete set of adversaries from attacking US vital interests and in a broader context preventing all WMD attacks on US vital interests The following objectives support this objective denying benefits imposing costs and encouraging adversary restraint Strategically communicated effects complement and reinforce deterrence actions In the development of these effects the actions ix SECRET 20180201 SECRET 20180201 OPLAN 8010-08 1FEB2008 must seek to align the adversary's perception with US objectives Collaboration within the US Government and coalition partners is essential For the message to be credible the words and actions must be integrated and consistent 2 st Defeat f t@qks against US vital interests This objective focuses on defeating attacks particularly WMD attacks by a discrete set of adversaries possessing the capability and intent to threaten US vital interests or those potential adversaries with capabilities so great that regardless · · 1 · must account for them This ob'ective also includes K1 s c ·4 • b 'fSt Conceot of Operations This OPLAN employs the JP 5-0 six-phase model as a planning framework As the strategic context requires USSTRATCOM will modify the phasing model and objectives to reflect the supported commander's concept of operations For each phase of the campaign the following paragraphs describe general activities that relate to each phase and assign specific tasks to USSTRATCOM The description of the phases and the associated activities are general in nature and may or may not apply to all adversaries OPLAN 8010 and its supporting annexes describe the conceptual framework processes and procedures necessery to effect global deterrence and strike operations in support i P aR c cctiye n 0p w the how g E · rmation taiy Pr range matic economtc law enforcement DIMEFIL actions focused upon creating effects in the o ational environment to su rt adver -s · c o ·ectives ussc Cularly con u y ua and assesses the strategic environment As circumstances require planners group activities into COAs for CDRUSSTRATCOM's decision These COAs are comooi of the strat c context-appropriate activitiesrk i soc 1 4l·i f6W1 ·'1• ossc land span all elements of national powerEFIL For those aspects o e approved COA that fall within USSTRATCOM's purview CDRUSSTRATCOM issues orders to the appropriate subordinates for those activities that fall to interagency partners he engages the SecDef and or the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff CJCS to cany them forward to the applicable poll · forum Should the prospect for armed conflict increase Phases 2 and 3 K1 1• • 1 reconstitutes x SECRET 20180201 SECRET 20180201 OPLAN 8010-08 1FEB2008 assure the nation's friends and allies and dissuades and deters other actors and adversaries The common end state for all threats is a Phase 0 environment where US vital intereats·are neither attacked nor su ect to the threat of lmlDll ll mrmrm CDDWl Ym' tn l Vl'llelllm mll•m«m t purposes e of activities and tasks in a logical and anticipated sequence Some activities from a specified phase may continue into subsequent phases 1 18 Phase 0 Sham CDRUSSTRATCOM's goal is to keep all activity in Phase 0 Day-to-day operations andf _ w_1i_soc _ u_1• oss c_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Assure Disauade and Deter activities and actions using predominantly diplomatic informational economic financial intelligence and law enforcement resources with the goal to convince the adversary to adopt or maintain a nonthreaten ng posture toward US vital interests Day-to-day operations also include the identification of new emergent threats monitoring and tracking existing threats ongoing cyberspace operations Information Operations IO SC and the routine employment of forces for planned deployments training and exercises The transition point to Phase 1 is when a specific crisis arises 2 1et Phene 1 fDete The situation has now moved outside of norm al day-to-day operations with the emergence of a crisis Emphasis remains on Assure Dissuade and Deter activities and ons with new actions building on those initiated during Phase 0 with a higher level of intensity and exercising a higher level of military activity but generally short of using force CDRUSSTRATCOM in con·unction with the licable hie commander The transition points for this phase are either is achieved thus allowing a return to Phase 0 de-escalatory or the current level of activity is ineffective in achieving end state and there is an increase resource allocation and employment of forces thus moving into Phase 2 escalatory ' 'rl - e - cn m s -1 s - re so ' l Tc- - en r'state U 3 fhem 2 fRrrim the Ipffiatiyn As the situation enters Phase 2 the emphasis of deterrent operations moves from diplomatic informational and economic efforts to military engagement USSTRATCOM leads a collaborative SEGRET 20180201 SECRET 20180201 OPLAN 8010-08 1FEB2008 etlort with the joint force component commands the service components the combatant commanders and the Joint Staff in order to develop and or refine options that rapidly deliver the desired kinetic and non-kinetic effects The Commander's Estimate is based on collaborative activity to facilitate active participation of the affected combatant commanders As tensions mount CDRUSSTRATCOM offers the President and SecDef a range of options designed to meet designated objectives and tailored to the current world situation The transition points for this phase are either the crisis is resolved and the adversary de-escalates thus allowing a return to Phase 0 or Phase 1 de-escalatoiy or the current level of activity is ineffective in achieving end state and the global security environment warrants decisive operations thus moving into Phase 3 escalatory The President or SecDef when d __ _ _ _ _ _ Likewise continued assessment of adversary capabilities and intent may result in new or continued employment of deterrent options The transition to Phase 4 occurs when the current level of Dominate Phase activity is excessive for achieving the end state the adversary capitulates or as otherwise directed by President or SccDef the l hVJ 5 18t fhase Phase 4 n t i multiple lines of activity 1 centered around sec • This phase begins after forces have been employed m ase 3 however e ginning of this phase does not dictate that Phase 3 activity has ceased Forces can be recovering and regenerating while other forces are in the Dominate Phase In general the objectives of regenerate reconstitute and consequence management are in a postattack and post-employment environment However this phase can end with the recovery of employed forces while not necessitating the achievement of recovery reconstitution and consequence management objectives Employment of capabilities during this phase shapes the information environment to support deterrence Operations ensure combat forces are available to provide a credible response to any adversary contemplating or executing an attack on US territocy the xii SECRET 20180201 SECRET 20180201 OPLAN 8010-08 1FEB2008 forces allies or coalition partners The transition to Phase 5 occurs when civil authority attains neceaaary capability to assume responsibility U 6 pb 5 fEnpb e Ciyil Autl1orityl During this phase USSTRATCOM will continue to recover and reconstitute its forces In addition USSTRATCOM will provide support to the affected GCC as required for consequence management activities As in Phase 4 conduct of operations will set the conditions that ensure combat forces are available to provide a credible response to any adversary contemplating or executing an attack on US territory forces allies or coalition partners The end state to this phase is that the global security environment is stable and balanced US vital interests are neither attacked nor threatened by attack and US support of civil authority in adversary state is minimized 4 U Adminittration and Logistics a U Security logistics personnel and administrative support will be furnished by supporting commands in accordance with service directives command arrangements agieements CAA memoranda of understanding MOU Task Force TF operating instructions and the logistics concept for support operations outlined in CDRUSS'IRATCOM plans and directives b U ace and USSTRATCOM components will coordinate with and support lateral and subordinate unit commanders in maintaining a daily capability to support the OPLAN 8010 execution U c 18t'USS1RATCOM will perform a logistics supportability assessment and logistics risk aaaessment to identify any potential logistics shortfalls prior to OPLAN 8010 execution 5 U Command and Control a U Command R ' lptionahins The affected ace other combatant commanders agencies and USSTRATCOM components will participate in collaborative planning in order to provide appropriate close timely coordination during option development The ace will normally execute subsequent GS operations as the supported commander in their AOR The President or SecDef' will designate supported and supporting relationships for execution upon option selection See Annex J Comman1 Relatipruthins for the pmmjzetionel stru ctu td · executiOn' _ •li1 _ c to · ml'ff 1 r'-'exl8 __ypng __ ___ __ _ ___ -- _ - r sSC examine command relationships by scenario through co tion will SECRET 20180201 N1 b 1 sCommtaln Control ommunications and Com uter C4 3 SC OPLAN 8010-08 1 FEB 2008 tans SECRET 20180201 HEADQUARTERS US STRATEGIC COMMAND OFFU1T AIR FORCE BASE NE 68113-6500 1FEB2008 US8TRATCQM OP AN 8010-08 fUJ CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE U U REFERENCE U US Strategic Command Strategic Target Planning Sec urity Classification Guide 1 Oct 2006 S U 'iGt-This clasaification guidance provides users with general categories of subjects and levels of protection The level of protection listed represents the highest probable level of protection required by these subjects If a document derived from this plan contains particular portions that are unclaaaified when standing alone but classified information will be revealed when they are combined or associated those portions shall be marked as unclassified and the page shall be marked with the highest classification of any information on or revealed by the page An explanation will be added to the page or document identifying the combination or asaocia tion of information that neceaaitated the higher classification Y SUBJECT REO llRING PROTECTIQN CLASSIE •r H_l_l U Operation code word s U Concept of nuclear operations including order of battle execution circumstances operating locations reaourcea required tactical maneuvers deployments actions and objectives s U Classification guide s U Participating nuclear units including types vulnerabilities locations quantities readiness status deployments redeployments and details of movement of US and friendly forces s U DEFCON status and meaning u U DEFCON changes s U Location itineraries and travel mode of key US and friendly military and civilian leaders s Derived from Multiple Sources Declassify on 1Februacy2018 xv SECRET 20180201 SECRET 20180201 OPLAN 8010-08 1FEB2008 l UBJECT LASSIE REQUIRING PROTECTION ICATION s U Limitations and vulnerabilities of US forces U Characteristics and capabilities of US weapons and related sustainability S FRD U US vulnerabilities and limitations s U Status and details of US alliances including status of forces deployment right privileges airfield use and port availability s U Estimates of operational effectiveness including intelligence s counterintelligence rescue and reconnaissance U Target area weather information s s s U OPLAN 8010 Change effective date u U Communications effectiveness sustainability and limitations U Planning assumptions U OPLAN 8010 Change effective date and effective time Note 1 U C U Employment parameters that could be used to bound capabilities or limitations of the OPLAN 8010 planning process c U General descriptions or specific parameters used in planning nuclear sorties i e airspeeds altitudes distances generation times Note 2 s U Any planning guidance used to limit OPLAN 8010 nuclear aircraft route of flight either directly or through relationships with other aircraft s U Any tactic or procedure either defensive or offensive which reveals an exploitable OPLAN 8010 aircraft missile weapon limitation or capability s xvi SECRET 20180201 SECRET 20180201 OPLAN 8010-08 1 FEB2008 a n SUBJECT REQUIRING fRO'I'ECTION LAS§lf 1 - U Bombers tankers and reconnaissance assigned dispersal FoIWard Located Aircraft Generation bases s U Identity of bases capable of being assigned as Directed Planning Option DPO bomber post-strike recovery Note 3 U S U The country where DPO post-strike rec Overy bases are located Note 4 'f8Actualf A1J' OC 1 4 8 U '- • -• • -- I j Notes 5 6 7 s TSRD F RD l-48 Plannedr '' 1 1•1u IDK1 - 1 oJ ' 4 iiSSc S TS I note 01 U Actual displayed routings or flight plans for individual tanker aircraft or all tanker aircraft assigned to one unit supporting s nuclear sorties U Actual displayed routings or flight plans for two or more tanker units supporting nuclear sorties U Listings of all OPLAN 8010 cninm tted nuclear bombers with mated tankers U Listings of all committed tankers and mated nuclear bombers with rendezvous information e g times track omoad etc U Listing of individual nuclear aircraft cells bombers and mated tankers or those nuclear cells assigned to a single unit with TS s TS s rendezvous information e g times track omoad etc U Listing of total number of tankers and nuclear bombers committed to OPLAN 8010 s U Listing of tanker degrades per OPLAN 8010 s U E-6B peacetime operation areas OPAREAs u xvii SECRET 20180201 SEGRET 20180201 OPLAN 8010-08 1FEB2008 LASSIF fill SUBJECT REOYJRING fBOTECTION U Rll IOc U ial O§ R I A TION I s Uf6 U lee t4 l• Cl C I TS s s U The country in which a TERCOM map is located Note 9 U Flexible targeting capability of strategic nuclear forces U That OPLAN 8010 consists of various attack options Note 10 i8tf6R1 Sec 1 4 a Dssc Note 11 U S TS I - U DPO Note 12 U S TS U S TS I S ecifi bRI l §00 1 411 O§§C 1nsoc alOssc j Note 13 I S TS PLAN 8010 force coordination Note 14 S TS U Existence of a Secure Reserve Force SRF Note 15 u U Targeting techniques Note 16 s U Termination methodology and techniques Note 17 U fDHlJ 1 4 8 VOO 111n1J iiec ___ U S TS I I TS U Information revealing operational plans and capabilities of reconnaissance forces Note 18 s U A reference to a particular reconnaissance unit's objectives and dispersal or deployment location Note 19 s U Reconnaissance objectives associated with any attack option TS U Reconnaissance sorties associated with any attack option TS U OPLAN 8010 Reconnaissance Plan priority Note 20 S TS xviii SECRET 20180201 ' SECRET 20180201 OPLAN 8010-08 1 FEB2008 CLASSIF Tr ATION il SUBJECT REOUIRINg fROTECTIO ti U Classification of ballistic missile employment parameters that could be used to bound capabilities or limitations should be marked in accordance with the specific weapon system security classification guide Note 21 S TS U Fact that USSTRATCOM or an alternate site is currently conducting adaptive nuclear planning Note 22 U S U Fact that adaptive nuclear planning has occurred in the pa st or will occur in the future Note 23 U S U Individual component nuclear planning timeline i e time to accomplish weapon application U Tha tf Im IOC 1 4 a aE support o OPIAN 8010 U Location of CONUS survivable Alternate Recovery Bases ARBs U The number of OPIAN 8010 nuclear committed sorties units Note 24 xix SECRET 20180201 c u TS S TS SECRET 20180201 OPLAN 8010-08 1FEB2008 U Notes 1 U Effective date and time for Interim Changes other than start of OPLAN 8010 are UNCLASSIFIED 2 U Common lmown procedures or general guidelines that do not reveal exploitable data are UNCLASSIFIED Nuclear weapons employment data is SECRET RD FRD as applicable 3 U The concept of bomber post-strike is UNCLASSIFIED Identity of bases actually assigned as DPO bomber recovery bases is TOP SECRET until declaration of A-hour Identity of an OPLAN 8010 post-strike recovery base assigned to a specific OPLAN 8010 nuclear sortie is SECRET Knowledge of the nuclear Post-strike Recovery Base Plan is limited to Armed Forces personnel civilian employees and contractors employed by the Department of Defense DOD in support of military programs The concept of Recovery and Regeneration is UNCLASSIFIED 4 U Knowledge of the nuclear Post-strike Recovery Base Plan is limited to Armed Forces personnel civilian employees and contractors employed by the DOD in support of military programs 5 U Upgrade to RD FRD with weapons data lis TS NC2-ESI An actual 7 mplete data Of af6X 1 Seo l 4 e Ossc f6ki S9Cr 4 • ssc land is TS information Refer to protection of the OPLAN 8010 directives for specific category xx SECRET 20180201 SECRET 20180201 OPLAN 8010-08 1FEB2008 rr _ _ - p _ __________ jis TS _ _ ___ land is TOP SECRET 10 U The fact that OPLAN 8010 consists of various nuclear attack options is UNCLASSIFIED The number of nuclear attack options is SECRET The details of nuclear attack options are TOP SECRET l l i8t The term FM1 s c 1 4 • ossc is rouo by itself - 'Iba --1' 'o PLAN - s 'o '1 0-conm- · -ts_o a1111•H 1J• unt Jr'lllaallll' - Iis s EC RET ___ Specific nuclear option objectives are TOP SECRET 12 U The term Directed Planning Option• DPO is FOUO by itself The total number of DPOs is SECRET The definition purpose is TOP SECRET e 13 -f8to Details associated witl k1JSOc UfaiOssc 1 s o T 4 ossc jare classified TOP s EC- imT - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' 14 U Specific nuclear attack option structure methodology and targets are classified TOP SECRET 15 U The purpose of the Secure Reserve Force SRF is SECRET The exact composition of the SRF which identifies specific numbers is TOP SECRET 16 U Specific nuclear targeting techniques are classified TOP SECRET 17 tbc ofanQPIANBOl f · jis pecilic erm I on instructions are classified TOP SECRET 18 U l jssendnate only to those agencies whose official reconnaissance force duties specifically require knowledge ectiVes 20 U TOP SECRET with description SECRET 20180201 SECRET 20180201 OPLAN 8010-08 1 FEB2008 21 U See specific weapon systems security classification guide for proper classification 22 U The conduct of a nuclear adaptive planning exercise is UNCLASSIFIED Any association with the date sortie target etc is SECRET 23 U Any association with the date sortie target etc is SECRET 24 U Nuclear forces committed for each individual leg of an OPLAN 8010 nuclear sortie is SECRET If combined with other force commitment data such as patrol areas or commit times the numbers are TOP SECRET When force commitment data for all three legs is combined the information is TS xxii SECRET 20180201