E s-u HQ-nu My mm m STUDY 3-467 THE EVOLUTION OF US STRATEGIC COMMAND AND CONTROL AND WARNING 1945-1972 L Wainstein Project Leader C D Cremeans I11 K Moriarty v 1 5 ii In Ponturo To a I June 1975 $57529 The work reported in this documant was conducfed under Contract DAHC1573C 0200 Fan-the Departmant of Defenge The publication af s IDA Study does no indicate endorsement by the De ent Iof Defense nor should be content be '3i x agg gf-3 r a reflecting the of cial position of that 1 Ad my 3 1 an f'h r 0- 5'1 - Aim out' Ij l 0 u J Winn C 3 m n' I INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES INTERNATIONAL AND SOCIAL STUDIES DIVISION 400 Army-Nay Drive Arlington Virginia 22202 Contrac r DAHCI 5 73C 0200 Task 1 I i I I I I I In E DEFENSE SUPPORT PROGRAM to j H The newest and most sophisticated addition to the'mis sile warning network was the satellite-based infrared-detect ing surveillance and warning system presently known as the Defense Support Program DSP It was an outgrowth of over a decade of experimental first with the Missile Defense Alarm System MIDAS of the late 19503 and early 1960s and then with the highly sensitive and controversial follow-on Programs #61 9H9 and more recently 6 7i a series of techno- logically difficult expensive and for many years operationally uncertain efforts to develop an orbital infrared detection sys tem that could detect missiles in the poweredwlaunch phase It remained a developmental and demonstration effort until 1971 when the first operational satellite was orbited 16 E was many years in reaching fruition satel lite-based infrared detection promised the earliest possible warning of missile-attacks within minutes of launch extending potential warning time for north polar ICBMs from the 15 min- utes of BMEWS to perhaps 27 minutes providing improved and more flexible coverage than BMEWS including coverage of FOBS or other circumventing systems increasing the credibility of other warning sensors by adding correlative evidence confirma tory or not from an alternative system and adding to the accuracy and reliability of information as to the source magnitude and with tracking the nature of an attack Al- though the program was beset with serious reliability and cost problems and pushed hard at the limits of infrared descrimina- tion and other technologies it continued to attract strong support throughout the 1960s 17 kg of the strong underlying themes in the arguments supporting the various precursors of the DSP and one that illuminates an important strategic command and control issue of the 1960s concerned its utility not merely for attack warning but also for attack assessment The system was 345 important perhaps even more than other systems for providing time for decisionmakers to take measures for survival includ - ing possibly relocation to the NEACP or elsewhere it could provide extra time for them to perform essential retaliatory command functions including more opportunity to ascertain the situation and consider desirable alternatives By providing usable warning time the system was also important for enabling the strike forces to undertake precautionary or other actions that might be vital to the effectiveness of any response J j fTime alone even minutes was considered of crucial Significance for such purposes 18 But the DSP-type systems held out hOpes for even more They promised more information better information more accurate and reliable information i and timelier information as to the source magnitude and ob jectives of an attack as to whether one or a few weapons im pacts were accidental or the first of a salvo whether it was a controlled or indiscriminate attack whether it was an attack directed against military targets pOpulation centers or both whether it was an attack that included or excluded governmental control centers and so on The systems promised in short it to improve the capability to assess an attack and even evaluate the likely intentions of an attackerwide margin over other warning and surveillance systems 19 Even with BMEWS and exercises showed national authorities were required to make retaliatory decisions in the absence of any real knowledge of the nature of an attack- at best in the knowledge only that some more or less large numberilu of warheads was en route to the United States a rough approgt mation of their impact times and areas and perhaps a crude estimate of the country of origin 20 This was hardly the 3 quantity and quality of information required for a choice amo a the flexible response options desired by decisionmakers It was hardly sufficient for the decisions called for in the Decision Handbook prepared by the JCS for the President the orar 3146 nu - - Vice President the Secretary of Defense the CINCs and them- selves Whether to execute and if so- to execute strikes against nuclear threat targets only against nuclear threat plus other military targets or against nuclear threat plus other military plus urban-industrial targets of a country To execute or withhold strikes against the Soviet Union China or other individual Communist countries To execute or with hold strikes against military and government controls in the Moscow area To execute or withhold strikes against nuclear delivery and storage sites in China To execute or withhold strikes against military-government control targets in the Peking area 21 DSP-type systems promised for the first time- nearly a decade after programs were initiated to develop suf ficiently flexible strategic forces and sufficiently flexible command and control systems and a sufficiently flexible SIOP war plan--to make flexible response options more than a remote possibility This was their chief attraction during the 1960s far more than the extra minutes of warning time alone and it continued to be their chief attraction as they came into oper ation during the l970s Not warning alone but warning time and attack assessment became the keys to strategic flexibility 3H7 COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS 1963-72 U In the course of the twenty-seven years covered by this study an elaborate and enormous command and control structure had evolved This chapter presents a pftture of the end prod uct of that evalutionary process The command and control structure as it existed in 1968 did not change significantly in the next four years U Operational control of US strategic forces was exercised in different ways by the three levels of command involved see Figure 1 namely 1 The National Command Authority level consisted of the President and the Secretary of Defense Operating through the Chairman JCS and the NMCC at the Penta gon the ANMCC at Fort Ritchie or the airborne command post NEACP on ground alert at Andrews AFB 2 The GINO level consisted of the SIOP-committed CINCPAG GINGLANT and GINCEUR sec for example operated through the SAC underground come mand post at Offutt ABE the SAC airborne command post LOOKING GLASS or the SAC alternate command posts at the 2nd and 15th Air Forces or their airborne alter nates on ground alert 3 The weapons leveleethe Titan launch control centers the Minuteman ground and air launch control centers the SAC bombers and the A THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND SYSTEM U The heart of the myriad systems for strategic operations was the National Military Command System consisting of the facilities equipment doctrine procedures personnel and communications supporting national authorities in the exercise of their military Operational command function It included 383 mm l I an ss'r d'g bu-nu It n - Attack Information targeting of an att The CINCNORAD command post is data are assembled processed committed CINCs and for brief Information on th ack against United States or its allies size origin and primary location where such and transw tted to the ing the RCA I NMCC and Alternates NMCC ANMCC CINCLANT and Alternates 0 CINCSAC and Alternates Bombers ICBMs Carriers Figure 1 Leffl TRANSFER or STRATEGIC FORCES EXECUTION OF US The President or his NEACP successors Sp bial Procegures I CINCEUR and Alternates CINCPAC and Alternates SLg s Carriers INFORMATION AND AUTHORITY FOR 0 38M - em a - 1 3 the National Military Command Center in the tentagon which served as the primary center of command for the highest levels of military command including the President the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff It also included the fixed underground Alternate National Military Command Center at Fort Ritchie a mobile National Emergency Command Post Afloat on a naval vessel off Annapolis until 1970 and a mobile National Emergency Airborne Command Post in an aircraft based at Andrews AFB At the beginning of this period all were con tinuously manned and ready for use by the NCA or their alter nates or successors All were supposed to be linked to each other and to the unified and specified commands by reliable secure and surVivable communications so as to provide for a nonninterruptable or at least rapidly recoverable national command 0 pability at all times C9 L d gipporting the NMCS were a series of systems designed to control the tactical forces or to provide warning through ballistic missile'taotioal warning and attack assessment systems The command systems were designed to ensure that_the orders of the NCA and the unified commanders would reach SAC and naval SIOP forces both the Polaris boats and the carriers There were also Air Force and Navy LF-VLF communications systems linked to the NMGS The Air Force Special Purpose Communications System and the Navy LF-VLF communications net for the Polaris fleet were combined along with SAC's Emergency Rocket Communications System EROS into a Minimum Essential Emergency Communications NetWork MEECN Also included was the teletype net from the JCS to all unified and specified commanders called the Emergency Actions Teletype System EMATS need for such a minimum essential communications -backup to primary and alternate facilities supporting the com mand and control structure was first acknowledged in February 1963 when the Secretary of Defense directed a study on how to use the spectrum to meet such a requirement The pain fully slow process of planning for and developing the MEEON was 385 i3 3 Kg u j z rxr-I u vu- - r-gtypical of much in the command and control area It was not until 1963 that a procedural plan was promulgated and central ized direction was established nder the JCS only in May 1969 The MEECN System Engineer was not designated until May 1970 more than seven years after the Secretary's study request 1 B SAC U The SAC command control structure was divided into pre- attack and post-attack systems it the beginning of this period the prenattack system consisted of the primary alerting system the high frequency single side band net the telephone and teletype nets and the SAC Automated Command and Control System SACCS These were all considered nonwsurvivable systems primarily intended for day-to-day operation but they as would be costly for an enemy to attack because of the extensiveus ness of the facilities involved U Automated Command and Control System had attain- ed a full operational capability by January 1968 It was dew signed to furnish CINCSAC with the data necessary to assure effective control of the SAC force It provided automated assistance in information submission secure high-speed trans mission and automated routing processing and display of information By the time SACCS was completed however the computers the HSSL were already obsolescent and a program change for new ADP equipment was requested by the Air Force immediately after the system Went into operation Q tel Concern over SACGS survivability and quick-reaction capability led to the development of a separate Post Attack Command and Control System PACCS This system included air borne command post and communications relay aircraft the Sure vivable Lowarequenoy Communications System the Air Thorns Launch Control System ALGS the Emergency Rocket Commun ications System and the GREEN PINE UHF radio 386 ML 9 mumbasic post-attack system was composed of 14 air borne command posts and 18 communications relay aircraft During peacetime one SAC command post aircra t QOOKING GLASS from Offutt AFB was continuously airborne On board was an alternate CINCSAO and a battle staff At each numbered air force in BAG 1 command post aircraft was on 15 minute alert and 2 communications relay aircraft were on 15 minute alert at Grissom AFB Ind Ellsworth AFB S D and Minot AFB N D In periods of tension or in the event of attack the alert air craft would be launched to provide a line of sight link with the National Command Authorities and from CINCSAC to the num bered air forces the SAC strike force and Headquarters NORAD SAC could launch its Minuteman missiles by command from PACCS aircraft using the Airborne Launch Control System Such a pro cedure was to be used in the event that missiles became isolated from their parent launch control centers through loss of come munications All Minuteman stations were to be equipped for airborne launch by 1970 f0 Le The second SAC post-attack system was the Survivable Low Frequency Communications System capable of transmitting teletype messages which would be used to transmit the go code and other operational messages to waiting aircraft Tests had indicated that low frequencies could be used during and immedi ately following nuclear detonations with relatively little loss of signal strength During emergencies the SAC network could become part of the Minimum Essential Emergency Communica tions Network which would permit preemptive use by the JCS Complete operational capability for the was planned by mid l970 Emergency Rocket Communications System 494L bee came operational in December 1967 Designed to disseminate the go code to bombers subsequent to their launch it con sisted of communications transmitting equipment substituted as warheads on six Minuteman missiles The ERGS recorders would - 38 3mm accept a 30 to 90 second voice message for broadcast over two UHF transmitters a message that would be repeated during the ballistic trajectory of the missiles The EROS had been developed to provide a reliable and survivable means of trans- and post-attack communication from CINCSAC to SAC forces The coverage included SAC control elements SAC aircraft launched under positive control SAC forces operating along airborne alert routes in the North Polar3 and Mediterranean areas SAC ground command elements and alert forces in Europe the Pacific and North America and SAC mis sile forces in the United States jj pea The GREEN PINE system was a dedicated voice network consisting of la UHF transceiver sites 13 located along the 70th parallel from Alaska to Iceland and in Sardinia These were connected to the SAC command post by diversely routed leased landlines The primary use of the system would be to relay the go code to SAC aircraft under positive control pro- cedures The GREEN PINE stations could receive the transmis sion of the sees and the execs 2 C STRATEGIC COMMAND AND ARRANGEMENTS LU dS In 1968 a Special problem in command and control of strategic forces existed in the delicate interface with NATO of the US force of nine Polaris submarines that supported NATO The force represented a unique case in both strategic command organization and communication Three of the Polaris boats were assigned to SAGEUR and six to CINCEUR All other boats in the Atlantic fell under the command of CINCLANT and operv ated under him normally except when special arrangements were made a boats Operated out of Beta Spain or Holy Loch Scotland and normally patrolled the Mediterranean The assigned boats actually did half of their patrol in the Atlan tic while on route from Holy Loch to the Mediterranean1 3 I cud-nu - an 1' n as went on alert from the time they left Scotland The boats were controlled by CINCLANT for administrative safety and naviga-I tional purposes while passing through Atlantic waters but this arrangement did not change their release procedures Lg The SAGEUR boats Operated dayuto day under US national command Specifically under the US submarine force in EUCOM CTF which was under USNAVEUR and thus under CINCEUR The STE 6 also commanded the six CINCEUR-assigned boats while on patrol It should be noted that the command arrangements described above for both the and CINCEUR assigned boats pertained only to actual patrols While the boats were in Holy Loch or Rota for refitting they were under the command of CINCLANT kip had targeting and alerting responsibility for his three boats and even though normally under national com mand the SACEUR boats were at all times officially under SAGEUR's releasewmessage control SACEUR could declare a higher state of readiness for his boats at his own discretion but any release message still required a US authenticator 0 Met the declaration of Reinforced Alert three teats came under NATO operational control but in actual fact ene change was more apparent than real With Reinforced Alert and the general switch of EUCOM to NATO command CTF SH would become a command designated CTF 1M2 under the Commander Strike Force South Commander Sixth Fleet In effect the command structure would remain the same except for a change of hats eds The six boats assigned to CINCEUR were also earmarked for NATO When directed specifically at Reinforced Alert this dual requirement removed any automaticity of action by the US command the boats were switched to NATO operational control and came under CTF 4H2 There was a degree of fiction in this command relationship because the GINCEUR boats were targeted in accordance with SIOP and even though switched to NATO control 389 9 they remained targeted for US-designated targets and under US release authority The specific weapons release procedures called for the release message to go to the via SAGEUR However the concept of SACEUR release had meaning only if the SACEUH scenario of a general nuclear war in'EurOpe without a US-Soviet strategic exchange were to come to pass Otherwise the boats would fire on US orders at 810 targets and by the time the message went through SACEUR the missiles would have been 1 unched In sum a command and control arrangement had been evised for the CINCEUR and SACEUR submarines that recognized the boats as belonging to but at the same time it was difficult to conceive that operation of the boats would actually follow the Specified procedures when war came There were clearly unresolved command and-control problems in the operation of the NATO boats but the question inevitably arose although not formally admitted as to how much effort should be expended in an attempt to solve these problems when it was generally recognized that the arrangements Were essentially inal change in system was being discussed in 1971 whereby the assignment of Specific boats to NATO would be ended and replaced with assigned missiles instead These assigned missiles could be on any number of boats instead of Just three and all the missiles could be constantly on alert since there would not be the loss of alert status as under the existing system when a specified boat was being refitted 3 D CINCPAC STRATEGIC COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS LU As one of the SIOP committed unified commanders 3 controlled strategic forces that included at this time 'seven fleet ballistic missile submarines with 112 missiles plu- nuclearwcapable generalwpurpose forces carriers and Army surfacexto snrfaceamissiles 390 a - J- a had an airborne command post manned and equipped to perform essential SIOPwrelated command and con trol functions The command post had been maintained on air- borne alert status through the l960s but it was reduced to ground alert at the end of 1969 for budgetary reasons The CINCPAC TACAMO aircraft designed to function as a continuously airborne VLF communications relay to the PACOM fleet ballistic missile submarines constituted a highly survivable link for transmitting SIOP execution messages but it Was not intended - to be a true alternate command center 'Generally PACOM pron visions fon alternate emergency command arrangements and facili ties for continuity of command under general war conditions were considered to be inadequate E COORDINATION OF NUCLEAR OPERATIONS earlier problem of coordination of nuclear opera- tions which had once posed such difficulties was well in hand by 1968 Under the DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 the USAF had been relieved of managerial responsibility for the Joint Coordination Centers JUGS but SAC had continued to operate them for the JCS through field representatives FEE for Europe and FREE for the Far East 1969 the 3003 which had become redundant with the ore tion of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff in 1961 had been under review for some time The Far East JCC had moved from Tokyo to Kunia Oahu in 1957 and Headquarters SAC was proposing that the JGC Europe be moved from England to the United States rIt was decided to consolidate the two JGCs in to one coordination center and to relocate both at Fort Ritchie and in April 1971 Fort Ritchie assumed responsibility for both Henceforth it was to be the $00 and the supporting Coordinaa tion of Atomic Operations Communications Network CROCOMNET was realigned accordingly s 391 a onREORGANIZATION OF THE MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM U The procedures and systems for the command of strategic nuclear forces were tied into the World wide Military Command and Control System The mission was to provide the National Command Authorities with the infor mation on world situations needed for accurate and timely decisions to include the communica- tions required for reliable transmission of those decisions with a minimum o delay under all con ditions of peace and war for the national direc- tion of the US military forces 6 U The supported the requirements of the chain of command from the NCA down to and including the component com manders of the unified and Specified commands and such contin- gency commands as existed or might be established The consisted of communications equipment facilities personnel and procedures that provided 1 the operational and techni- cal support required to control US forces 2 the means by which the President Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs could receive information selected responses and apply mili tary resources and 3 the means for the NCA to direct the unified and specified commands U The many of its basic problems nuance the result of the 1958 Amendments to the National Security Act Ehose amendments retained the existing concept of a decentralu ized military structure Operational command of the forces was given to the unified and specified commands while the services retained their role in the development generation and support of the military forces Both groups remained sub Ject to the direction authority and control of the Secretary of Defense who later delegated to the JCS the duties of serv- ing as his advisers and as his military staff in the chain of commandit'o anoint 1 s- UNCLASSIFIED U The command and control systems that were developed to support the unified and specified commands were formally incor porated in the 1962 directive This step was intended to give the commands a greater voice in deveIOping and imple menting a command and control system in the interest of making the system more responsive to the needs of the NOA Basically standardization and cosperation of service aimed and oriented command and control systems were to be enforced through controls over the Operational specifications of the systems but the specifics of requirements and management were left open for later resolution U Many of the major problems and deficiencies of the were clearly the result of its structure and management The in 1968 still consisted of a number of independent sub systems comprising 37 activities It was not a totally inte grated system by any definition it constituted a network of primary and alternative command facilities and interconnecting communications that served the various commanders and head- quarters comprising the system see Figure 2 In general the structure accommodated the chain of command from the JCS who were then integral to the NCA through the unified and Speci- fied commands to their service component commanders At the same time it recognized and interfaced with the separate service chains of command While the composite reflected the functioning of command relationships established by the National Security Act and subsequent amendments it did not appear to lend itself to the trend toward centralization of command of the forces which had characterized the crises and Operations of the previous decade U The was six years old in 1968 and by that time had accumulated a large number of resources The Washington nerve center alone was supported by two major fixed command centers three airborne command posts and two major natal vessels CINCSAG maintained one of five EG-135 command 393 UNCLASSIFIED u dE er Nationa1 M111tary Command System Unified and Service Defense Specified A Commands qs genc1es Service Component Commands I I I I I TacticaI Forces Figure 2 COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM RELATIONSHIPS U 391i UNOLASSIFIED - - 474W 4 posts continuously airborne and had an elaborate underground but unhardened command post CINCONAD had a much more slab- crate command center at Cheyenne Mountain Colo Other commands had made similar investments in command centers and communi cations and tactical warning systems circled the globe Auto matic data processing was becoming more important and more evident in many command and control functions U The problems of the were made evident by three contingency episodes in 1967-69 uthe USS Liberty the USS Pueblo and the reconnaissance lac- 121 incidents In all three inci- dents there were serious failures in command and control While not involving the strategic forces and their command systems the episodes carried great impact because of their implications These concerned not only national prestige and the capacity to act in such minor contingencies but_also the vastly more serious matter of strategic nuclear operations The episodes raised questions concerning the enormous amounts of money expended on command and control in View of the inw efficiency demonstrated and no doubt made the lines between tactical and strategic command and control seem less sharp in the view of those in authority However response to these episodes in terms of steps to improve the in a major way were very slow U One major source of weakness in the concept was the lack of single agent responsibility for the mace in the period from 1962 to 1970 This was intentional and the result of the clash of interests between the services and OSD toward a systematic effort to improve the was given impetus when the JCS received the Staff Study 153 which suggested an overall study plan for com mand and control problems Then in July 1970 came the Blue hibbon Defense Panel Report see Chapter which criticized the loose decentralized management of the The report provided some additional impetus to change the although 395 1 new-v - I 'o v does not cause any specific major change by itself Then i in February 1971- Report 159 was submitted and in the words of an 0303 historian it caused consternation in the OJGS because of the bleak but largely accurate picture it painted of the U a really major influence was the interest developed in command and control by Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard while he was a member of the washington Special Actions Group as a result of their mutual interest Packard and the Chairman of the JCS Admiral Moorer worked'together in the fall of 1971 to rewrite the directive The Deputy Secretary sought to stress the primacy of the needs of the National Command Authorities as expressed through the NMCS and he wanted the Chairman JCS to be reaponsible for running the NMCS He specifically stated that instead of unified commanders having as their first priority the design of a command system to meet the requirements of their mission they were instead to design -a system that met first the requirements of the NMGS and secondly those of their own mission U The new directive issued in December 1971 differed from the 1962 version in three principal respects 9 First the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was given overall responsibility for the system under the direction of the Secu rotary of Defense He was directed to operate define its scope and components develop and validate its requirements maintain cognizance of all programs and capabilities and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to insure I the responsiveness functional interOperability and standardi zation of U Second the directive provided for an Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Telecommunications a step that re- flected the widespread concern in the defense community and the government at large about strategic communications and the problems involved in their centralization and coordination 396 1 I I I u 5 Third a Council made up of the Deputy Secretary of Defense the Chairman JCS and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Intelligence and Telecommunications was established to provide policy guidance for the development and operation of the and to evaluate its overall performance 1 Laf although Deputy Secretary Packard and Chairman Moorer seemed to have worked out a mutually satisfactory understanding on the new directive there was disagreement among the military on four major aspects of the document 11 The first had to do with the redefinition of the National Command Author- ities to exclude the Joint Chiefs of Staff who had been in cluded under the previous directive The decision reportedly was based on an 08D legal office opinion that the National Security Act of implied that only the President and the Secretary of Defense could control US military forces an affirmation of civilian primacy and the subordinate role of the military 12 major issue considered concerned the redefini- tion of the insofar as it affected resource management responsibilities of the military departments The third issue was the apparent exclusion of the chiefs of the services from the chain of command by making the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs an independent agent for the implementation of the orders of the National Command Authorities for 810 execution The serv ice chiefs through the CJCS should have been designated the executive agent of the Joint Chiefs The final issue was that of responsibility for development The new directive assigned this responsibility to the Chairman so the issue again was that of the services against the Chairman How serious these issues were at the time is difficult to deter mine It would appear that such problems as might have existed had been taken care of by mutual agreement between the Chair man and the service chiefs Nevertheless the combined support for the directive by the Deputy Secretary and the Chairman of - 397 I rr l 5 the oint Chiefs assured the promulgation of the document in the form in which they had conceived it 1 398 - u CONTINUING PROBLEMS IN THE COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE A THE BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL REPORT U A major study of overall defense matters in this period was the July 1970 Report to the President and the Sec retary of Defense by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel The Panel formed by the Nixon administration in the summer of 1969 was made up of a group of distinguished citizens who were charged with reviewing the organization of the Department of Defense in all its ramifications U The Panel s report which received considerable offiu cial and public attention included a top secret section on National Command'and Control Capabilities and Defense Intel ligence which began by stating in effect that US policy and doctrine complicate the matter of command and control It is stated U S policy to retaliate only in the event of unmistakable attack only by dew cision of the President or his constitutional successor and with discrimination according to 'the source magnitude and type of But in evaluating the capability of the NMCS to perform as desired it is well to emphasize that its continued functioning in the uncertain environment of nuclear war would be extremely difficult at best Yet the possibility of a disruption of command which would either immo bilize retaliatory forces subject them to piecemeal destruction or bring about a weak or uncoordinated response which an enemy might feel he could cope with might offer an aggressor too tempting an obqective and thereby dangerously weaken deterrence vl' 665 In essence the Panel had this to say about particu lar aspects of the command and control system On theuimportanoe of warning and the difficulty of providong it Short of confirmation of nuclear detonations it is possible that no President could be sure with the present warning system configure tion that an attack was in progress or that retalie ation was 0n survival of presidential authority One of the most uncertain conditions if not the'most uncertain 0n command centers The NMGC and its alternates are vulnerable to attack The NEACP would be survivable if airborne but the size of the existing NEACP limits its usefulness 0n communications All media are vulnerable to electromagnetic pulse EMF and transient radiation effects on electronics systems On the subject of communications the'report went on to say that after an attack had begun there would be little if any capability to provide information in time for a rapid decisionJ Hence the feasibility of present plans and preparation% is questionable certainly for attacks in which command and communications facilities are targeted 3 U Perhaps the most interesting thing about the Blue Ribbon Panel report was that it did not go on from the point just noted to the proposition that in a limited strategic con flict command and communications facilities might not be tar gated possibilities that were being examined in the ongoing discussions of the concepts of a limited strategic option and a flexible response Nor did the Panel mention the growing arguments in the defense community to the effect that command posts and communications probably could not be sufficiently hardened to provide effective protection against nuclear weap- ons on if it were decided that that was the best course it The recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Panel were that the Secretary of Defense should direct as a matter of urgency a comprehensive and objective analysis of the 1 08 I un a and communications President Nixon for example was quoted I requirements for the National Military Command System in the next decade and that the analysis should address the con tinuity of political authority as well as the facilities equipment and concept of operations needed to provide maximum support to the National Command It also recommended that a Strategic Command be created joining the existing-Strategic Air Command the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff the Continental Air Defense Command and the fleet ballistic missile submarines Q2 cite The first of these recommendations went right to the heart of a problem that remained moot throughout the period under investigation a matter that seemed to be discussed less often than its importance warranted that often indeed seemed to be put aside on the unspoken assumption that the highest authorities did not want to make a public decision because of the political and practical problems that any delegation of authority might raise The second recommendation for a single strategic command was similarly ignored While on the whole a surprising number of its recommendations were ultimately implemented the Panel's influence on major issues of command and control was probably not great B COST AND PERFORMANCE PROBLEMS U If the development of doctrine with respect to command and control was a difficult and perplexing problem for those involved maintenance of the actual operating command and con trol system seemed at least as difficult as full of dis appointments and as seldom marked by breakthroughs The defense community and the government as a whole were aware of the importance of speed and efficiency in command control by a Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee as saying when a war can be decided in twenty minutes the nation that is behind will not have time to catch up ti M09 0 a a m U In its report the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel noted the difficulty and costs of maintaining command and control systems Command Control and Telecommunications tech nology is changing more rapidly than almost any other discipline and there is no indication that the rate of change will slow in the fore- seeable Current annual expenditures are in the two to four billion dollar range More than 1 000 people on payrolls spend full time in Command Control and Telecommunications activities in locations around the world The Panel then made recommendations aimed at increased economy concluding that even if only ten percent improvement flows from the implementation of these recommendations that equates to $200 000 000 to $ 00 000 000 savings annually based on current levels of activity 5 U It is probably impossible to more than estimate the amount of resources invested in command and control systems A JOB study of the made the Judgment that by 197 the was consuming between 2 and 10 percent of the total I defense budget 'depending on how one charged costs It should' be noted that these estimates refer to the entire not to the strategic operational elements alone It was difficult if not impossible to isolate the nuclear and nonnuclear ele- ments since many elements especially communications were designedly dual purpose were certainly possible but tne problem was not that easily resolved As the Secretary of the Air Force observed in a memo to the Secretary of Defense as is commonly known Command and Control does not readily lend itself to quantifiable cost-effectiveness analysis You will note that our approach is primarily a qualitative comparison 5 U As noted earlier three major communications failures -eduring contingencies between 1967 and 1969 aroused the CongreSs and the public and raised questions about the entire worldwide1 militaryacommunications system The USS Libertyintelligence collection ship was caught in the cross fire of the 1967 war and brought under heavy attack by Israeli forces The intention had been to get the ship out of the war none but orders to leave the area had been delayed in transmission sent the wrong way round the world delayed again and then sent to the wrong addressees In January 1968 another communications intelligence ship the USS Pueblo was captured by the North Korean forces The confusion in US military communications that attended this incident Was still being investigated when an electronic intelligence aircraft a Navy EC lzl was shot down by the North Koreans in April 1969 Communications -hardware procedures and personnel - again seemed to have failed badly U The systems involved in these three incidents were of course not those involved in strategic command and control but the widespread concern the congressional investigations and the difficulty of explaining the complex system made it hard to provide reassurance about the reliability of US command and control The importance of these incidents for command and control was the resultant focus 6f attention on all communications systems and the complete review that it brought about U Other and more practical though still highly complex problems persisted through the period in question There had always been concern about the functioning of electronic sys tems in a nuclear environment but in the 1968-72 period in creased attention was turned to the question of Electro Magnetic Pulse EMP and Transient Radiation Effects on Elecu tronic Systems TREES both the consequence of nuclear explo- sions Most of the exploration of these effects of course had to be theoretical but the best informed students of these phenomena were convinced that there was something there to worry about Some felt that a few wellutimed nuclear bursts 11 11 could be used to pin down launch vehicles The problem was a persistent one and no solution appeared or seemed likely to appear 0 eef Still another problem was that of communications with strategic missile carrying submarines Complicated systems involving low frequencies the use of special aircraft that relayed communications to the boats TAGAMO and the use by 'the boats of long trailing wire antennas produced an end result that was not entirely satisfactory The Sanguine antenna system was one recommended improvement but problems of cost and public opposition delayed implementation A cone tinuing difficulty too lay in the lack of interoperability among he various communications systems 9 Throughout the period reports on the shortcomings of the strategic command control and communications system more continuous Typical was the memorandum written for Secretary McNamara on the weaknesses of the system as indicated in WSEG Report 123 on HIGH HEELS 67 the worldwide exercise carried out in a simulated strategic crisis The report made the following observations concerning the mechanics of strategic operations Low precedence traffic was generally controlled during the course of the exercised but procedures did not seem adequate to control the increased volume of high precedence Operational traffic 2 Alerting procedures'fcr changes in Defcons were rapid but the implementation process by GINCs does not insure that the objectives of the uniform readi ness conditions can he met 3 major delays occurred in staffing selective rem lease requests for nuclear weapons CINCs took considerable time to reformat and re transmit decisions to forces once a decision at the national level use made 1213 National Security Study Memorandum NSSM 64 see discussion in Chapter also produced numerous gloomy comments on the state of the command and control system The following extracts were typical 1 HIGH HEELS repeatedly demonstrated that the masses of communications and reports which are designed for crisis management or for idem aliaed operating conditions will quickly over whelm the actual Command and Control structure 5 2 The National Command Authorities today ihave a limited capability for ascertaining the itype of attack which the U S is experiencing 3and therefore probably would have insufficient -information to determine with confidence the preper type of reaponse 3 Capabilities did not exist to obtain accurate reconnaissance of targets struck by U S strategic weapons within any reasonable and useful time Span within a week at the most M The current capability for ad hoc planning and for retargeting of strategic weapons is limited and time consuming Capa- bilities are greater where strikes are small i and retargeting is not required 5 5 The programmed U S command and control structure will degrade significantly following any heavy nuclear attack even if command and control itself is not targeted 6 Replanning capability will be reduced significantly even if command and control is not attacked 7 Following a heavy nuclear exchange effective awar termination capabilities are marginal a g The same message was contained in a memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense from entitled Improve- ment of C3 for Strategic Forces The current system is critu ically deficient the memorandum said in these respects 1 The growing Soviet SLBM threat could catch many of our bombers on the ground Improvements in tactical warning have not kept pace because of the division of responsibility M13 as f a 1 o'l g 6 I 2 We are deficient in our ability to assess the nature of a nuclear attack on the United States Our entire system for collecting and assessing attack data is fragmented and under-exercised 3 Communications to submarines and bombers are fragile and vulnerable H Our ability to plan limited strategic strikes is cumbersome 5 healistic plans have not been developed for deliberate devolution of presidential authority g U Lafiln early 1972 the ASD Telecommunications reported to the Secretary of Defense on a study of the Vulnerability of Strategic Command and Control Communications Minimum Essential Emergency Communications The results are extremely disquieting With less than one percent of the Soviet Strategic Forces the USSR can take out Command and Con trol to eighty percent of our strategic forces By take out is meant forces never get the Go word By spending about $4 billion over about 5-10 years these figures could be 10% to 50% respectivelyu better but hardly The results understandably are producing shocks throughout the Council JCS Systems Analysis etc Counterreaction will result in re study and checking but the results are most unlikely to change from bad to good 10 At the bottom of the page is a note written by Secretary Laird want to talk to Eb Eberhardt about this - I don't think Joint Chiefs are as aware as should he of this problem- We must convince them and SAC and then the Congress 1 Laird's comment after three years as Secretary of Defense seems to reflect the frustration of those who were working to improve strategic command and control After all their efforts the same problems remained IMPROVING THE SYSTEM Response to NSSM the Blue Ribbon anel'ree port and other developments in 1970 stimulated the interest rzrte 1 a I vi of Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard in command and control They were also having their influence on the military The Director of the Joint Staff Lt Gen John Vogt and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Moorer became more and more aware of the importance and timeliness of the subject and of the interest of the Deputy Secretary of Defense 12 And so a subject that had received major attention in the early 1960s and then had been pushed into the background by the war in Southeast Asia again became the preoccupation of key figures in Washington As noted earlier mr Packard and Admiral Moorer became deeply involved in the development of new poli cies and new procedures in command and control and rewrote the Department of Defense directite on the fundamental US gover ent document on the subject 9 The Deputy Secretary accepted Special responsibility for the matter of command and control in the Defense Department He became the most frequent recipient of memorandums and spe- cial studies on the subject and his own memorandums and cor respondenoe show his interest and'concern It was however not an easy subject to grasp or to do anything about In a July 1969 memorandum on the Draft For Comment of the Draft Presidential Memorandum Packard outlined possible command and control improvements that were being evaluated 1 Providing pre planned options for the NOA for additional selective responses against military and industrial targets 2 Providing the procedures data proces sing equipment and computer programs for plan ning new selective responses on a timely basis during a crisis on 3 Installing higher power transmitters in TAOAMO aircraft H Maintaining an option to defend washing ton D 0 with the Safeguard ABM system 5 Improving the sensitivity and surviva- bility of our Satellite Early Warning System Program 6H7 6 Providing a survivable satellite commu nications system to replace our more vulnerable HIS I i toground transmitters and provide a more versa tile means of communicating with our strategic forces 13 In April 1971 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs sent the Deputy Secretary of Defense a memorandum entitled Nationa Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy and Command and Control Survivability which summarized the results of a Joint Staff study that had reviewed the vulnerability of US command and control systems and iovestigated ways to guarantee delivery of retaliatory weapons Requirements for the latter were 11 Survivability and availability of presidential authority 2 Availability of adequate survivable command cen ters for the NOR and SIOPuoommitted CINCs 3 Availability of reliable oommunioations fpom the NOR to the commands Communications to fleet ballistic miSSile sub marines for 810 execution The memo reported that the study effort revealed that a full survivable perfect Command and Control system is not attainu I able it then went on to list some actions that would help to overcome the most severe limitations 1 Establishing a dedicated survivable 810 some munications satellite system 2 Acquisition of an advanced airborne command post AABNGP and improvements to the of CINCEUR and GINCPAC Improved LF-VLF systems on TACAMO and ABNCP aircraft In addition the Chairman reported that he had 1 Requested the Chief of Staff of the Air Force to determine the feasibility of providing the with additional ground entry points into the AUTOVON Polygrid Network and selected FAA ground air communications facilities and using drones for relay of messages to Minuteman launch control centers l6 Ll53 - - m_ in 2 Requested the GNU to determine the feasibility of nuclear submarines as command centers 3 Reevaluated HF propagation in a nuclear environment 4 Forwarded a memo requesting release of available information on the procedural interface between civilian and military authorities during nuclear Uattack Another development of importance that resulted_from Packard's and Moorer s interest in command and control was the dissolution of the Joint Command and Control Requirements Group and the assignment of the Plans and Rem quirements functions to the Director for Operations There had been a division within the JCS over and NMCS functions Now both and NMCS requirements were the responsibility of the Deputy Director for Operations Command and Control 15 U Deputy Secretary Packard played the leading role in the Defense Department's attempt to reorganize command and control in the years from 1969 to 1972 When he left the Department early in 1972 he did so with a keen awareness of the problems that remained in the command and control field He made this point in an interview published in the Washington Star on 20 March 1972 The article in the Star said The U S might not be able to respond at all to a surprise attack from the Soviet Union because of weaknesses in control over the nation s strategic nuclear forces according to former Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard Pack ard said in an interview here that he had concluded the weakest link in the nation's strategic force was in Command and Control Shortly before leaving the Pentagon Packard had signed the order making the Chairman of'the JCS the link between the NOR and the strategic forces for strategic operations The change had been brought about at Packard's initiative impressed as he was with the institutional barriers to JCS decisionmaking H17 I Inn n ammwm urn m - le ell-M- u Hg 5-5 h sum- 00 o' He wanted an individual responsibility and in this the GJGS supported him Curiously resistance to the step from the Joint Chiefs themselves was not as strong as had been eXpected Interservice rivalry he said is one reason some times the Joint Chiefs hevehdiffioulty in making a good decision If one of the Chiefs feels very strongly about an issue there s no mechanism to override it or the other Chiefs simply won t override it unn- This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu