THIS FILE IS MADE AVAILABLE TH RDLIGH THE DEGLASSIFIG ATIGN AND RES EARGH THE BLAEH IS THE LARGEST FREEDGM DF AGTIGGVERNHENT REGDRD ELEARING IN THE THE RESEARCH HERE ARE FDR THE DEGLASSIFIGATIDN GF THDUSANDS DGGUMENTS THRGUGHDUT THE U FDRWARD THIS DDGUMENT TDUR FRIENDS EILJT PLEASE THIS IDENTIFTING IMAGE AT THE TDP IDF THE SD GTHERS MIDRE1 OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1400 DEFENSE PENTAGON DC 20301- 1400 $21 FEB 1997 Ref PUBLIC I Mr Robert Wampler The National Security Archive Gelman Library Suite 701 2130 Street NW Washington DC 20037 Dear Mr Wampler This responds to your November 8 1995 Freedom of Information Act FOIA request Our November 21 1995 interim response refers Searches for the information you sought were conducted by the Joint Staff and the Office of the Director Net AsseSsment The enclosed record located as a result of those searches is provided as responsive to your request Portions of the document contain information concerning military plans or operations and vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems projects or plans relating to the national security Mr Andrew W Marshall Director Net Assessment an Initial Denial Authority has determined that this information is currently and properly classified in accordance With Executive Order 12958 Sections 1 5 and Other portions of this record pertain to inter and intra agency records that are deliberative in nature containing internal advice recommendations and subjective evaluations that if released could damage the decision making process Accordingly this material has been withheld pursuant to 5 USC 552 b l and You have the right to appeal Mr Marshall s decision to withhold this information Any such appeal should offer justification to support an additional release and must be received in this Directorate within 60 calendar days of this letter' 5 date Fees associated with the processing of this request have been waived in this instance Sincerely H Passare Director Freedom of Information I and Security Review Endlosure As stated a i OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY or DEFENSE a WASHINGTON 20301 July 15 1992 '99 JUL 3 OF THE may 55 1315 5 4 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Tyree val-f DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE THROUGH UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE POLICWU3 le I 6 1992 FROM DIRECTOR ASSESSMENT 4 SUBJECT The Military-Technical Revolution MTR I I PURPOSE INFORMATION - To provide an assessment of the Military- Technical Revolution DISCUSSION An MTR occurs when the application of new technologies into military systems combines with innovative operational concepts and organizational adaptation to alter fundamentally the character and conduct of military operations A strong consensus exists that such a revolution is now underway and that we are in its early stages This assessment also focuses on - The nature of the current MTR - Possible changes in military operations as a consequence of the - What countries might participate in the military-technical competition Strategic management issues raised include Identifying appropriate innovations Promoting the process of' innovation The Defense acquisin'on process The role of U S allies cc 5199436 1 MW Prepared by LTC Andrew F Krepinevich 15 1992 a WHEN macmm ARE DETACHED 0 4 4 4 an-l nu l b ng 4' 2 WEN 2 37462 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY or DEFENSE WASHINGTON D C 20301 MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE THROUGH UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE @0le all 5 m2 SUBJECT Assessment of the Military-Technical Revolution U U Attached is an assessment of the military-technical revolution MTR The next several decades wem likely to be a period in which wchnology brings about a fundamental change in warfare a change comparable in scope to the introduction of armor and airplanes or nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles Such changes in warfare come about through the creation of new concepts of operation and the evolution of new force organizations to exploit the technological developments This is what we are calling a military-technical revolution adOpting this term from Russian military theorists U This assessment is focused on four questions - Is a military-technical revolution underwaythe beginning middle or end - What is the nature of this revolution What technologies ate causing it what changes in the nature of warfare may we expect to see 0 Who are likely to be the other participants over the course of the next 20 years U This assessment is our rst effort and our conclusions must be somewhat tentative Nevertheless there is a surprising degree of consensus that a military-technical revolution is undWay and that we are just at the begirming Desert Storm had a major role in creating this consensus There is also considerable agreement on the technologies that are driving the revolution How warfare may change has been most fully explored for warfare in a large land-air theater There has been far less thought on future changes in war at sea and in space and in power projection forcible entry and strategic long- range warfare Information warfare a new - and possibly dominant - area of warfare has not been de ned as such 0r received much attention until very recently U There may be more thinking about these areas than surfawd in the working groups we formed to explore the four questions listed above I believe that this is the case Only recently I became aware that the Navy has created a new doctrine command This memorandum is unclassi ed upon removal of attachment SE to expand air-land battle doctrine to include the maritime aspects The Navy has also recently created a new organization to address space-electronic warfare and issued a doctrinal statement for that newly de ned area of warfare While some good things are happening we need to identify ways to stimulate this kind of thinking on a broader scale U Much like our situation in the early 1920s we appear to be in the early stages of a military-technical revolution uncertain how and when it will develop with no major enemy and a prospect of low defense budgets But our position appears very favorable We are ahead in most of the relevant skills and in the development of the appropriate concepts for some operations The most capable potential competitors are our allies who currently have no strong incentive to compete with us The Russian military would like to compete but are in no position to do so now They are unlikely to be able to compete effectively for a decade or more We have time therefore to think through how we want to proceed U For the next couple of years the highest priority will have to be given to downsizing the forces without demoralizing and destroying them and focusing on the implementation of our regional strategy But two or three years from now assuming budgets have stabilized and the drawdown process is completed we will want to focus on innovation and on experimentation with new concepts of operation U In the last section of the assessment we raise four strategic management issues for your consideration 'Ihat four-page section begins on page 50 I urge you to read it I would like to meet with you and talkabout some of the things that you might do if you nd this assessment and these strategic management issues of interest Attachment SW This memorandum is unclassi ed upon removal of attachment THE MILITARY-TECHNICAL REVOLUTION A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT U JULY 1992 Etgw nan may 5- 0% 933 3m ATE PREPARED BY CLASSIFIED BY MULWFLE SCURCES ANDREW F KREPINEVICH JR 0N1 OADR OF NET ASSESSMENT 703 697-1312 1 sep r vor iv THE MILITARY-TECHNICAL REVOLUTION TABLE OF CONTENTS U I Introduction 3 H Military-Technical Revolutions Past and Present A Military-Technical Revolutions An Historical Overview 5 B Russian Perspectives on the MTR 6 c The Present MTR 9 Assessment MTR Elements 10 A Technological Change 10 B Military System 14 C Operational Innovation 18 InformationDominance 22 Space Control 23 Air Control 24 Sea Control 25 Sustained Land Operations 26 Strategic Strikes 27 Strategic and Theater Defense 28 orcible Entry 29 Strategic Mobility 30 Unconventional Warfare 31 D Organizational Innovation 3 22' Innovation in the Interwar Period 33 Innovation and the Emerging MTR 35 E ecting Organizational Innovation 37 IV The Competition 38 A US Objectives 39 B Technologies and Systems Acquisition 40 C The Long-Term Competition 42 D Identifying Core Competencies 44 E Assessing the Competition I 45 F One Possible Threat 46 V Issues 50 A Introduction 50 B Issue I 51 C Issue II 51 D Issue 111 52' E Issue IV 53 sg ET zNgt yRN THE MILITARY-TECHNICAL REVOLUTION U I Introduction U U Over the next several decades the systems and operations characteristic of present-day military establishments will probably be superseded by new far more capable means and methods of warfare This military- -technical revolution MTR is the subject of this assessment It rs not clear how quickly this change will come about particularly since the level of competition that spurred military innovation during the Cold War appears unlikely to recur at least 1n the near future Nonetheless our initial examination of the MTR strongly supports the hypothesis that sooner or later leading military powers will exploit available and emerging technologies making major changes in the way they prepare and conduct operations in war and realizing dramatic gains in military effectiveness U The idea of a military-technical revolution comes from Russian military writings of the 19805 and is used there n01 only to describe likely future developments in militarytechnique but to identify earlier eras in which such fundamental transformations of warfare took place Historical examples of past military-technical revolutions make clear that technological change by itself is insuf cient to bring about a military-technical revolution Innovative operational concepts and organizational innovations designed to exploit new technologies are crucial to a military's ability to realize large gains in military effecdveness This assessment provides some speculation as to the kinds of operational and organizational innovations that may become necessary or appropriate over the next several decades The intention is to provoke further thought and study of what innovations will prove more advantageous and how they might be fostered in the U S military Given the uncertainties our suggestions must be very tentative However our initial view is that the fullest exploitation of new and emerging technological opportunities will require profound changes in how we plan and conduct military operations in our organizational structure and in our systems acquisition process U This assessment is an initial effort designed to guide an effort to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the current military technical revolution This assessment has four objectives First we try to clarify what a military-technical revolution is and to judge whether one is under way and its nature Second this assessment attempts to ascertain how far along we are in the transition from one military-technical regime to another Third it endeavors to lay out the parameters of a future long-term military-technical competition as well as to assess those states or groups that might participate in such a competition and how Fourth it attempts to raise a few selected major strategic management issues that senior defense of cials will face over the coming decade firm 3 11 Military-Technical Revolutions Past and Present U U A Military-Technical Revolution occurs when the application of new technologies into military systems combines with innovative operational concepts and organizational adaptation to alter fundamentally the character and conduct of military operations Therefore such revolutions are characterized by - Technological Change - Military Systems Evolution - Operational Innovation - Organizational Adaptation These elements combine to produce a dramatic improvement in military effectiveness and combat potential The rate of transition into a new military-technical regime will also be in uenced by the geopolitical environment and the nature of the military- technical competition Our initial work reveals that we are now entering a period that may see military capabilities increase as much as an order of magnitude'or more over similar forces that existed over the past 10-20 years U Due to the many factors involved in bringing such a revolution about the transition from the Cold War period of warfare to a new military-technical era may take seVeral decades For example the revolution from relatively immobile positional warfare in World'War I to mobile mechanized warfare in World War II took a generation The emergence of nuclear weapons and doctrine took roughly 10-15 years U What is revolutionary is not the speed with which the change takes place but rather the magnitude of the change itself At some point the cumulative effects of technological advances and military innovation will invalidate former conceptual frameworks by bringing about a fundamental change in the nature of warfare and thus in our definitions and measurement of military effecriveness For example at various times between 1917 and 1939 many political and military elites realized that the nature of land warfare had changed dramatically and that an entirely new kind of operation Strategic aerial bombardment -- was possible Many also understood that a new surface naval weapons platform -- the aircraft carrier -- could effect dramatic changes in naval warfare Those countries whose leaders realized the possibilities of these changes and acted upon them by adapting operationally and organizationally accrued major advantages in the conflict that followed U Because the current rate of technological change is accelerating the time intervals between future military-technical revolutions could be progressively shorter for capable states that choose to compete energetically If this occurs it will stress competitor states' abilities for operational and organizational innovation It also will have signi cant implications for the defense acquisition system system obsolescence will occur more rapidly and the importance of timely production of defense systems will increase A Military-Technical Revolutions An Historical Overview U U There appear to have been at least two previous MTRs in this century and probably two in the 19th century Between the Napoleonic Wars and the American Civil War railroads telegraphs ironclads and ri ed muskets and artillery dramatically transformed the nature of warfare the way in which military forces are organized equipped and employed to obtain maximum military effectiveness Union and confederate generals who retained the taCIics and operations of the Napoleonic era exposed their men to fearful slaughter as at Fredericksburg and Both sides did adapt eventually The Campaigns of 1864 and 1865 were marked by a dramatic increase in entrenchments and eld forti cations over what had been the practice only a few years before Arguably many of the major battles toward the war's end bore a greater resemblance to operations on the western front in the middle period of World War I than they did to early Civil War battles like Shiloh or First Manassas U The machine gun airplane submarine and the Dreadnought class of ships dramatically altered conflict again between the mid-19th century and the early 20th century Again military leaders who ignored technological changes and failed to adapt risked their men and their cause One recalls here the mutiny of the French army after the futile and bloody Nivelle Offensive and the destruction wreaked on British shipping by German submarine warfare operations Toward the war's end however new operational concepts were developed to exploit new technologies and military systems On land massed frontal assaults preceded by long artillery preparations gave way to in ltration of troops and brief artillery preparation fires At sea elaborate convoy operations were established to counter the U-boat threat U Between 1917 and 1939 internal combustion engines improved aircraft design and the exploitation of radio and radar made possible the blitzkreig carrier aviation and strategic aerial bombardment After a scant 20 years the nature of con ict had changed dramatically and those -- like the French -- who failed to adapt suffered grievously U The early years of World War II in some respects like the Napoleonic revolution -- demonstrate what can happen when only one power makes the correct choice concerning how advances in technology will change the nature of warfare In this instance Germany proved far more adept than France Britain and Soviet Russia at operational and organizational innovation on land At sea both the United States and Japan saw the potential of carrier aviation forces and acted upon it Thus although the nature of war at sea shifted dramatically as it did on land neither the Americans nor the Japanese realind the kind of dominance Germany enjoyed in land warfare from 1939- 1942 In the air Germany's failure to exploit emerging technologies thoroughly left it at a significant disadvantage in strategic aerial bombardment as for example during the Battle of Britain U Finally in mid-century nuclear weapons especially after their mating with ballistic missiles brought the prospect of near-instantaneous destruction of a state's economic and political fabric into the strategic equation Here was a shift in technology- so radical it convinced nearly all observers that a fundamental change in the nature of warfare was at hand U Several observations are suggested by these historical examples - First sometimes the participants in a military-technical competition are slow to observe and exploit the full potential of potentially revolutionary technologies and systems as occurred in the American Civil War Neither side gains a major advantage in military effectiveness although the nature of war is changing - Second there are instances where one competitor realizes and exploits the potential of emerging technologies to gain a decisive military advantage as occurred with Germany and the blitzkrieg Third it is possible for several competitors to exploit new advanced technologies and systems adopting new operational concepts and organizational structures and thereby to realize tremendous gains in military effectiveness This happened in the U S -Japanese naval competition between the two world wars - Fourth as in the case of nuclear weapons the potential military application of a technology or system may be suf ciently clear and its pctential payoff so profound that competition quickly develops among those having a perceived need and the ability to compete The development of nuclear weapons and perhaps the combat potential embodied in the H M S Dreadnought are examples of this case U In summary to realize fully the possibilities of a military-technical revolution it is necessary to exploit all the elements that characterize such revolutions Oftentimes the failure to realize the great increase in military effectiveness was not so much a case of the political and military leadership of a state ignoring technological change as it was a failure to see and initiate new operational concepts and organizational innovation B Russian Perspectives on the MTR U There are some writings that attempt to describe the military-technical revolution that n0w appears to be underway Much of this work was done by the former SW Soviet General Staff The Soviets who accorded great emphasis to military theory wrote extensively beginning in the late 19705 about a new revolution in military affairs And the Russians continue to emphasize the issue Their focus on the MTR stems in part from the anxiety of watching a more technologically advanced United States develop new technologies and move to incorporate them into new military systems the US Assault Breaker defense concept in the 19705 Consequently the Soviets began to speculate on how US forces might organize themselves to exploit the military potential of these advanced technologies and systems and on what kind of operational concepts would emerge U The Soviets and now the Russians assert that advanced technologies especially those related to informatics and precision-guided weaponry employed at extended ranges have brought the military an to the point where quality is becoming far more important than quantity revolutionizing the nature of warfare They foresee this revolution as the rst stage in a two stage progression with the second stage witnessing the employment of even more advanced technologies lasers particle beams robotics high-powered microwaves etc U They assert that this revolution's first stage will see far greater reliance placed on rapidly acquiring processing and moving surveillance and targeting information than during the Cold War era thereby increasing the value of space-based systems unmanned systems and automated detection and engagement The Russians view the mix of ranged- re systems information systems and the growing ability to exercise automated troop control as dramatically changing the nature of warfare When integrated these components form the basis for what they call a reconnaissance-strike complex RSC This network of networks command and control data acquisition fusion and dissemination and weapon systems can theoretically engage a wide array of critical targets at extended ranges with a high degree of accuracy and lethality U The growing capability for rapidly executed extended-range engagements employing nonnuclear weapons implies in the Russian view that in crisis or in war warning time is becoming progressively reduced and that time will become an increasingly scarce commodity in future con icts Entire countries will become the battlefield The distinction between front lines and rear areas will be blurred beyond recognition In future wars there will only be targets and non-targets In other words it is becoming ever more practical to contemplate near-simultaneous operations against the entire array of high-priority enemy targets a dramatic change from the traditional sequential nature of Operations As this occurs we will see the lines between tactics operational art and strategy disappear U Much of what the Soviets and Russians have written focuses on what we would term air-land operations However more recent writings increasingly acknowledge the growing ability -- and necessity -- for forces operating in one environment sea to in uence operations in others land air and space Thus they see Operations becoming increasingly joint in nature Some recent Soviet and Russian military writings are emphasizing so-called aero-space or strike operations RN 7 These operatiOns would be conducted by a reconnaissance-strike complex comprised principally if not solely of aircraft and missile systems supported by a network Of space systems that would provide reconnaissance surveillance and target acquisition RSTA support The success Of aerO-space operations would also be highly dependent upon electronic strikes by friendly air and space systems against enemy defenses U Based on what the Russians have written on the subject and what they are telling us in a growing number Of personal exchanges their general observations on the changing nature of warfare include the following The rate of technological change is increasing placing a greater premium on the ability Of military organizations to adapt quickly to remain competitive on the battlefield - The ability to move information rapidly -- while denying the enemy that capability -- is becoming ever more important perhaps decisive Space-based communications systems are seen as being extremely important in this process The electronizatiOn Of warfare is proceeding apace and modern warfare will witness the emergence of a new kind of operation the electronic-the operation - Modern warfare is based on the delivery of extended-range nonnuclear strikes throughout an opponent' entire territory destroying or threatening to destroy an opponent's key political economic and military targets - Nonnuclear strategic warfare will assume increasing importance since RSCs are becoming a reality and because they rather than nuclear weapons can pOtentially provide either a temporary or a nal victory in war 4 With the elding of RSCs comprised 'Of increasingly reliable systems time will become an increasingly precious resource in future warfare The defensive side will progressively lose its ability to prevail in war if it begins defensive operations only after the onset Of aggression Consequently modern defensive operations could well be initiated with preemptive strikes as the only option for blocking aggression or successfully countering a first-strike offensive capability - Tactics are becoming increasingly like Operational art in that success at the tactical level now requires the increasing integration Of an increasingly heterogeneous mix Of systems Similarly the Operational art is itself becoming progressively more complex with the mix Of systems required for effeCtive Operations also increasing substantially - U These writings are thought-provoking Still we must think through the MTR phenomenon ourselves before we can say how many of the Russians' premises we are-prepared to accept C The Present MTR U U Given the experience of history and contemporary Soviet Russian writings on the subjeCt what can we infer concerning the possibility of a new military-technical revolution emerging U Where are we on the continuum stretching from one military-technical regime'to anOther from the old regime to the new one Our initial work indicates that we are probably in the early stages of a change that could run another one or two decades We have yet to witness the kind of military event like France in 1940 the Battle of Britain or the Battle of the Coral Sea that clearly demonstrates a revolution in warfare has taken place U One could posit that the current revolution probably began on the technological level in the 19505 with the invention of the transistor The revolution was probably rst realized in terms of military systems in the 19605 and early 19705 with the arrival of reliable ballistic and cruise missiles the deployment of a military satellite network and the arrival of precision-guided munitions which made their appearance in the Vietnam War The revolution seems to have arrived operationally at least in part in the Gulf War in 1991 There various sy5tems and networks began to realize the enormous potential of integrated operations to the point where the reconnaissance-strike complex predicted in Soviet writings may have made its rst appearance albeit as an element of the U S expeditionary force A key breakthrough however will occur when we have succeeded in integrating the information networks we have developed for reconnaissance surveillance tracking and target acquisition RSTA and battle-damage assessment with the network s of weapon systems sh00ters U As stated earlier information and simulations capabilities grew dramatically in the 19805 Their potential along with that of extended-range precision-guided munitions PGMs was dramatically demonstratedin the Gulf War This leads to the question Have we reached the flat of the curve _ in this MTR with little reason to pursue additional gains in military effeCtiveness Some viewing the overwhelming U S victory in the Gulf War might be tempted to answer in the af rmative U This would be a mistake for as was noted abOve at this point we are probably near the beginning of the revolution The Gulf War revealed much concerning the potential utility of applying technological advances to warfare Yet it took nearly six months for the United States to achieve a level of systems integration that realized only a fraction of their combat potential Furthermore there are many unsophisticated steps the Iraqis could have taken to challenge U S advantages in information warfare and extended-range precision strikes and we can anticipate that future competitors will exploit available technologies to degrade our effectiveness further U It is clear that there is great room for improvement in U S capabilities For example the Gulf War exposed shortcomings in U S command and control arrangements Battle damage assessment BDA capabilities have improved little in the past few decades There appears to be much room for imprOvement in terms of systems integration In the Gulf War the problem was not that the United States had not won the information war rather it was that the United States did not come close to its potential to move the most useful information rapidly to those who needed it most The answers to these problems lie not so much in new technologies or systems but rather in system integration and organizational innovation U One other fact supports the hypothesis that we are in the early period of this revolution There has been to date relatively little writing that lays out operational concepts for exploiting the kinds of systems that are emerging -- or that could emerge -- from the'advanced technologies at the root of this military-technical revolution In the absence of such an operational road map to guide systems development and organizational innovation progress toward a military-technical revolution will likely be retarded signi cantly U Thus the Gulf War showed us a glimpse perhaps in a way similar to the Battle of Cambrai near the end of World War I of the potential in uence Of this revolution on combat effectiveness To employ an analogy we may be in the early 19205 with respeCt to this MTR The transition proceSs will be dynamic The Gulf War has already set in motion the hunt for countermeasures to ameliorate the problems created for defenders in a world of rapidly improving information technologies and advanced RSTA and weapon systems Assessment MTR Elements U U In trying to understand how a fundamental change in the nature of warfare might be underway it is helpful to examine each of the elements that typically combine to bring about a military-technical revolution This section addresses these elements and offers some insights based on initial research on their role in effecting a contemporary MTR A Technological Change U U Three central areas of technological progression may be laying the foundation for a military-technical revolution First there is the growing ability to gather process and disseminate information especially information concerning potential targets far more rapidly than ever before This advantage accrues when the information gained is used to identify prioritize and' attack effectively the military functions that comprise an enemy's center of gravity' Here the term center of gravity is defined as that set of targets which if destroyed will fatally compromise a state's ability or will to block its adversary from achieving its political objectives This advantage may be extended by a rapidly growing capability either through active or passive measures to deny the enemy information he needs to attack effectively the friendly center of gravity Thus the potential exists to create an information gap between friendly and enemy forces both in terms of peacetime competition and wartime operations U In peacetime it may be possible to use a growing ability to collect information along with a rapidly expanding simulations p0tential to establish detailed pro les of the military and civil functions of potential adversary states A functional 4 pro le is the combination of an identified set of targets and the knowledge of how many of these target links and or nodes must be damaged or destroyed to prevent that enemy function from being performed effectively for the period of the crisis or con ict Through simulations and other analytic means it may be possible to identify more clearly those target sets that must be engaged to satisfy a range of political objectives depending upon the circumstances that lead to crisis or con ict These center s of gravity may include such diverse targets as a state's leadership or an individual leader command and control fusion nodes energy or communications grids and key military assets U A comprehensive undersranding of a state as a political social economic and military organism could prove crucial in defusing a crisis as well as in achieving war objectives should con ict occur Indeed this exploitation of advanced technologies could ameliorate the problem of searching for an enemy center of gravity as occurred during the strategic bombing campaigns againsr Germany during World War II and against North Vietnam during the Vietnam War This is easier said than done More recently the United States has been surprised at what it did not know about a variety of Iraqi assets Scud missiles nuclear weapon facilities etc that would likely have been included in any pre-war assessment of those targets comprising Iraq's center s of gravity The American military also was somewhat taken aback by the great uncertainties it found in assessing battle damage of enemy targets In war establishing and maintaining information dominance that will allow U S forces to engage the enemy's center of gravity while denying him to the maximum extent possible knowledge of the location of assets that comprise our center of gravi will occur in a namic environment U Operation Desert Storm has led many states to begin developing countermeasures to blunt the military effectiveness of new technologies For some acquiring nuclear weapons will be seen as an effective countermeasure Cover and concealment tunnelling underground electronic countermeasures ECM and mobility could offset to some extent the gains realized through the employment of advanced technologies Similarly states employing these advanced technologies will attempt to develop counter-countermeasures to preserve their growing competence in future military operations - U Second complementing these dramatic increases in information capabilities are the major improvements in the range accuracy and lethality of conventional munitions that may allow us to destroy large numbers of targets over the length and breadth of the theater of operations These munitions are perhaps the most mature representatives of the three areas of technological progress having made their debut during the later stages of the Vietnam War Extended-range advanced conventional munitions ACMs when combined with the information revolution may permit the simultaneous engagement of the enemy throughout the theater of operations blurring the distinction between tactical operational and strategic operations and forces U The effect could be to drive conventional military operations from sequential engagements toward a single simultaneous engagement focused directly on the enemy's center of gravity Combined with the right intelligence on the essential elements of any enemy target base it may be possible to attack directly those functions the enemy values most rather than focusing primarily on his forces Thus future con icts could witness military forces Striking directly at the enemy's jugular or central nervous system at the outset of a conflict without first having to defeat the bulk of his military forces Conventional operations could produce relatively prompt strategic consequences But this requires the integration of technologically intensive combat and information systems either globally or within a theater of operations to achieve a critical mass of military effectiveness 1 U Third advanced simulations -- from individual system simulators ight simulators to large-scale field exercises those at the National Training Center to distributed node combat simulations the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency's SIMNET Simulations Network system which creates visual images of all players' hardware on a net that may be distributed on a global scale to computer-assisted design and manufacturing CAD-CAM -- offer the potential some of which is already being realized for employing human and material resources far more ef ciently and effectively than ever before Identifying and gaining a better understanding of one s own center s of gravity through simulation and other forms of analysis also could prove extremely important in the event of conflict In a sense simulations will help establish a kind of learning curve dominance whereby the conditions under which military formations and equipment will have to operate is simulated in advance of the actual operations and in so doing the optimum means for achieving objectives can be identi ed U Joint operations and network integration at progressively higher levels will probably be central to this MTR However due to limitations on time resources and training sites it will be increasingly dif cult if not impossible to establish pro ciency in these areas through traditional eld exercises Simulations can provide a great service by helping to mitigate this problem For example aside from improving the capabilities of individuals and small formations though individual simulators simulations will help train far more peOple in far larger more realistic exercises Consequently when large forces engage in joint or combined training exercises or when they go to war they can achieve the maximum effectiveness with the resources at hand Short of war the ultimate test of such simulations is validating their ndings through by realistic eld training exercises which are themselves simulations supported by information systems It should be noted however that one can generate and execute more simulations and - excursions or variants of simulations employing computers than can be addressed in a eld exercise Computer simulations offer the user the ability to weed out unprornising alternatives while gaining important insights Field exercises can then be used to validate further the most promising alternatives U Simulations also are providing us with a greatly improved capability to assess large-scale military operations to include the effects of command and control a variety of Operational concepts and new force structures and military systems Major progress also has been made employing simulations in integrating technology and training to create environments in which individual soldiers and weapons and combat units to include provisional formations can be trained and evaluated against enemy forces in conditions that go beyond eld training and approximate reality The use of electronics from ight simulators to interactive wargames is crucial in simulating these environments U Simulations also can enable us to identify and solve command control and intelligence problems in advance of aCtual military operations improving our capability to adjust plans rapidly while information is fresh and the opportunity to exploit it is still present Perhaps most important simulations may be the training aid that allows us to develop a mastery of how various systems and networks must be integrated to realize their full potential They also will help by allowing us to test technologies weapon systems and Operational concepts in a combat environment thereby providing us with insights on how we can adapt our organizations effecrively to exploit new technologies systems and operational concepts Furthermore simulations techniques are being employed in computer-assisted design and manufacturing CAD-CAM allowing us to validate certain design elements without building expensive prototypes and improving the manufacturing process U While technological progress in these three areas is fueling the current revolution the overall pace of technological change is much greater now than compared with earlier revolutionary periods If one examines the MTRs of the past two centuries the trend toward ever shorter intervals between revolutions is clear We may be moving away from a time when these revolutions can be described as discrete events and toward an era of continuous overlapping military-technical revolution There are technologies on the horizon -- for example in the areas of biotechnology robotics and directed energy -- that could inn-ude on this revolution or perhaps supersede it far more quickly than this revolution is supplanting the previous military-technical regime Indeed the number of technologies experiencing rapid development is increasing Thus we may tentatively conclude that these phenomena will permit shorter periods between revolutions or perhaps even overlapping MTRs if those States who have the capability to pursue an active competition decide to do so B Military Systems U U To realize their potential technologies central to this Military-Technical Revolution must be incorporated into military systems or munitions Because of the nature of this revolution the ability to integrate military systems into -- and across -- networks of systems or system architectures will be of great importance if they are to achieve a dramatic increase in military effectiveness U With the advent of the potential for systems to perform reconnaissance surveillance tracking and engagement functions at greatly extended ranges in near-real time several observations obtain First establishing information dominance or an information gap over one's adversary at the strategic and operational level will be increasingly important to the success of military operations U Second warfare will become more of a competition between hiders and finders Targets that can be identi ed and tracked if they are mobile will run a high risk of being destroyed not only at or near the forward edge of the battle area a term which itself may be on the verge of becoming an anachronism but over the entire breadth and depth of an enemy State or coalition U Third as our ability to track the characteristics of Other states' societies leadership and economies increases it may be possible to identify a relatively small number of targets that when successfully engaged or engaged or a recurring basis lead to the crippling of an enemy's military effectiveness or capacity to resist This would open up opportunities for attacking an enemy's critical functions such as battle management as opposed to a group of similar facilities U In exploiting this potential military forces will ineluctably move to develop the ability to conduct deep-strike operations against the full array of enemy targets This will involve three elements First we will witness the use of space platforms unmanned air-breathing aircraft high-speed computers and a variety of sensors to gather process and move huge amounts of relevant information to those that require it This information would pertain not only to targeting but to other matters like terminal guidance and battle damage assessment as well U Second extended-ranged re systems will be employed to exploit the advantages provided by near-real-time targeting information and long-range precision- 14 guided munitions PGMs Third those competitors attempting to exploit these systems will move toward the coupling or integration of information systems to shooters When integrated these systems would comprise what many Soviet writers have called a reconnaissance strike complex or perhaps what we would call a deep-strike attack network Once this capability is realized military operations will probably become increasingly simultaneous and less sequential in their execution Of course integrating information systems with extended-range PGMs will also be employed for defensive purposes for example in strategic or theater defense architectures U At the same time that the nders are gaining an advantage through the exploitation of advanced technologies the hiders will seek to negate that advantage as best they can Thus the struggle to establish information dominance in an environment where to be seen is to run a high risk of being destroyed The sunrise systems in this revolutionary period -- those systems that are likely to increase signi cantly the military effectiveness of the force structure -- will differ from Cold War-era systems in that they will tend to Be smaller to avoid detection and destruction Rely more heavily on low-observable and stealth technologies - Rely increasingly on electronic warfare and passive deception measures to gain and maintain information dominance Trade reduced physical protection to gain increased mobility - Be designed to increasingly rely for their effectiveness on being integrated into ever more sophisticated networks of systems - Become more open-ended in their architecture enabling them to incorporate quickly improvements in military capabilities and also allowing them to be readily integrated within a network of weapon and information systems - Rely increasingly on automated operations to gain maintain information dominance by minimizing the expenditure of time Employ non-line-Of sight res to exploit the advantages of having achieved information dominance at their level of operation Emphasize the non-lethal disabling of enemy capabilities thereby increasing the range of political and strategic options for the use of force in achieving national objectives U Does the United States need to scrap its present inventory of sunset systems and move to field a military force that is heavily orientedon sunrise systems in the immediate future Probably not for several reasons First at present the United States has the luxury of having no peer competitor a state having the advanced enabling technologies of this MTR having the ability to develop and integrate systems based on these technologies and who is actively attempting to do so Second the United States retains a large capital stock of weapon systems that currently compare very favorably against the Cold War-era forces of near-term potential adversaries U Third as will be discussed in the section on operational concepts it should be possible to operate effectively in the emerging con ict environment with a force that comprises a high-low mix of defense systems To provide analogies with earlier revolutions not every division in the Wehrmacht had to be a panzer division to execute the blitzkrieg docu'ine nor did every naval task force have to be a carrier task force to exercise sea control or to conduct power-projection operations Fourth the accelerating rate of technological change will make it imprudent for the United States to eld a high- tech force only to have to replace it in relatively short order as the next technology wave am'ves U What systems comprise the sunset systems of this revolution That is to say what systems could be either dramatically or signi cantly less effective as advanced technologies are exploited to their fullest potential Given the trends cited above it may be possible to suggest such a list of sunset systems e platforms that Are highly specialized and inflexible that cannot be integrated quickly and effecuvely into networks of systems and that are incapable of quickly and effectively incorporating new technologies 0 Are not highly mobile both tactically and strategically - 'Do not incorporate low-observable or stealth technologies - Require a large vulnerable logistics support system to operate effeCtively those that are lift fuel munitions or manpower intensive and therefore which can be relatively easily neutralized by attacks on this support system U Given these characteristics the following types of systems will likely become progressively less central to military operations U Tanks and other heavily armored combatants One might question whether as the capability for extended-range engagements grows it will be desirable to close with the enemy to destroy him It may be more advantageous to create an information gap between ourselves and our enemy and employ extended-range munitions to accomplish the required levels of destruction Direct- re engagements are thus avoided since by allowing them to develop the enemy can reduce partially and perhaps significantly the information gap we have spent time and resources to create U Ground forces may be increasingly centered around formations of highly mobile extended-range non- -line of-sight LOS systems rather than tank heavy 7 5 16lj forces This is not to say that armored forces will become irrelevant rather they will assume less of a central and more of a supporting role For example even if ground operations come to emphasize ranged fues direct fire systems will continue to provide an important capability for several reasons First it can be argued that such forces may eventually have to close with the enemy to take and hold terrain Having a mechanized 'vehicle that offers protection against residual enemy capabilities seems to make gbod sense Second it may not always be possible to fight at extended ranges For example the Israelis cannot afford to trade space on the Golan Heights in attempting to develop ranged- re engagements Nor can United States forces engage in such a practice along the DMZ in Korea U Third one must expect adversaries to offset their disadvantages in deep-strike capabilities by trying to hug these forces as close as possible perhaps emphasizing infiltration tactics thereby making direct- re engagements unavoidable if not predominant The end result may be a rede nition of the nature and the role of tanks and other heavily armored combatants Adversaries would also attempt to make successful ranged- re engagements more difficult through countermeasures like increased hardening mobility and deception This problem could be addressed by developing counter-countermeasures or by reliance on direct-fire forces acting as screening forces or more likely by a mix of both measures - U Manned aircraft It is not clear that achieving information dominance during conflicts in future wars will require the kind of emphasis on manned air systems charaCteristic of the 1940-1990 period Nor is it clear that manned aircraft will be required to engage targets especially xed targets -- or do battle damage assessments to the degree they are at present We are only beginning to tap the potential of long-range munitions cruise missiles unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs and their linkage to space systems in what may be a new form of military operation the aerospace operation It may be that unmanned systems and standoff munitions perhaps coupled with U S -based strategic stealth aircraft will constitute the tip of the spear in future conflicts These systems could disable the enemy s ability to resist attacks by more traditional manned systems We could have a transition period in which sunrise systems are introduced while the large capital stock of Cold War systems is gradually phased out or mothballed A similar transition would occur with space land and naval forces As with heavily annored syStems one issue concerns how much emphasis to place on systems whose utility may well be in relative decline to the neglect of developing those sunrise systems that have the potential to boost military ef ciency substantially over comparable military formations that were elded during the Cold War era U Large surface combatants Any system that presents a large signature will be increasingly vulnerable to deteCtion and destruction This applies to large surface combatants Consequently in looking at surface naval forces it might be possible to de-emphasize substantially the role of carrier and other surface battlegroups in maritime Operations As missiles UAVs and space-based platforms come to substitute increasingly for missions executed by aircraft the role of carriers and their many escorts could diminish Just as bombers are becoming relatively less important than the ordnance they carry so too might surface warships which could evolve to become barges with some perhaps operating below the surface for advanced conventional munitions that can strike pre-designated targets at extended ranges U Over time one would expect that the information revolution will allow us to reprogram rapidly cruise missiles guidance systems and to provide them with in- ight target updates from UAVs and satellite systems and with terminal guidance as - well Battle management functions could gradually shift from the eet to CONUS-based elements linked to the force through the satellite communications network U Again the question arises given a large capital stock of Cold War- era systems to what extent should we continue to support and operate them at the expense of developing our ability to exploit the potential of sunrise systems It is somewhat analogous to asking the question in the interwar period of what relative emphasis was to be placed on battleships at the expense of developing carrier aviation U Large satellites With the migration of many information and perhaps some engagement functions to space-based systems it may be that the relatively large very soft satellites that we now deploy will comprise a space Sunset System as we progress beyond the mid-tem future and into the long term This is because as satellites become increasingly important to the effective conduct of military operations they also will become very lucrative targets encouraging potential adversaries to develop ASAT systems to threaten our network of space systems To offset the risk to a key element of our information network our space-based assets may have to emulate terrestrial-based military systems by becoming more survivable through a variety of means that include electronic warfare Stealth miniaturization and proliferation This last element may require a rapid replacement satellite launch capability - U We have examined ways in which systems might evolve to exploit advances in technology It also is important to identify how such systems are to be integrated into the operational concept that will shape of the nature of future warfare C Operational Innovation U U Having advanced technological capability and military systems does not guarantee success for those states seeking to realize a military-technical revolution The manner in which these capabilities are employed also will determine whether their full combat potential is realized U Dramatically different operational concepts to include doctrine and tactics must be developed to derive the full military potential from advances in technology In a sense when a military-technical revolution occurs the rules of the game are fundamentally altered For example naval operations that focused on the battleline and crossing the of the enemy eet and which were highly appropriate at the Battle of 1 8 Jutland in 1916 were wholly irrelevant at the Battle of Midway in 1942 The operational rules had been changed Similarly the elaborate eld forti cations and massed infantry assaults supported by massed artillery that characterized the static warfare during World War I proved for the most part irrelevant to countering the operational concept of blitzkreig U Both the Germans and the French possessed planes tanks and radios in 1940 However it was the manner in which the Germans integrated these systems within a new operational concept that led to their shockingly quick victory over the French Layering new systems on old doctrine merely allows you to become more effective at the margins within the old Operational paradigm of con ict In 1940 the French were prepared to use their aircraft armor and radio communications gear to wage World War I more effeCtively U As noted above operational innovation interacts closely with technological development Technological advances feed forward potential improvements in combat potential to those in the eld Just as there is a technological push from the laboratory to forces in the eld there is also a conceptual pull operational concepts emerge that cannot be implemented with existing technologies However operational concepts have seldom predated technological breakthroughs Thus a simultaneous push-pull relationship should be sought Over the mid- and long-term future systems development can be heavily influenced by operational concepts An effective approach to realizing a military-technical revolution therefore requires constant interaction between those developing military technology and systems and those engaged in planning the operational concepts that will exploit the combat potential of these emerging technologies and systems U There is probably more than one way'in which sunrise systems can be exploited to bring about a revolutionary change in the nature of warfare One thinks here of the developments during the 1917-1939 period which saw revolutionary developments in land or air-land warfare the blitzkreig and war at sea carrier air operations and modern amphibious assault operations There also emerged an entirely new military operation in a relatively new medium strategic aerial bombardment U Our initial work indicates that operations in the emerging military-technical regime will likely be characterized by - An increasingly greater reliance on information and electronic warfare systems as an element of military effectiveness and combat potential Given the considerable potential that exists for the United States and other competitors to improve their military effectiveness as time progresses we will likely see a dynamic competition centered oncreating or denying an information advantage or gap though a variety of means This will include pre-war acrivities like establishing in advance very speci c target sets packages that comprise an adversary's center of gravity to be destroyed as quickly as possible at the onset of hostilities - The ability to integrate at ever higher levels of sophistication Full exploitation of advanced systems' potential will require integrating technologies into systems systems into networks and across network architectures themselves to execute operational concepts In fact this capability is the foundation of the reconnaissance- strike complex described by the Soviets as being at the heart of this MTR - A continuing and perhaps accelerating trend toward simultaneous vice sequential military operations where an enemy's center of gravity can be disabled without having to engage in the intermediate Operations that characterized military operations in all earlier MTRs save the nuclear revolution - Increased emphasis on campaign planning involving the joint and combined application of force over a time-phased sequenced plan of events that is intended to achieve political and military objectives through discriminating attacks on enemy centers of gravity - The progressive blurring of the distinction between -- and the increasing fusion of -- space air land and maritime operations to the point where most operations become multidimensional in nature - The relative grOWth in importance of so-called nonlethal and electronic neutralization of targets in lieu of their destruction by res This could lead to a capability to disable an enemy s combat potential with great discretion - The growing importance of space as a major medium for conducting and supporting military operations The emergence of aerospace operations the linking of space syStems with extended-range air systems UAVs cruise missiles and a variety of sensors in an entirely new type of military operation - The increaSe in non-LOS res relative to LOS res As discussed earlier direct contact will generally be avoided by those who have achieved information dominance and who possess the means to exploit it U How should we order and evaluate the new operational concepts that could be employed to optimize military effectiveness in future con icts The traditional examinations of ground sea and air campaigns appear more anachronistic now than they did even during the Cold War era For example as technology provides us with the ability to gather intelligence at extended ranges and to strike targets at great distances it becomes increasingly inappropriate to speak of maritime or even air-land operations Space-based systems exert increasing in uence on land sea and air operations Land- based aircraft and ballistic missiles are exerting an increasing in uence on maritime operations Strategic bombardment now encompass sea-launched strikes of aircraft and cruise missiles and deep-Strike land-based systems as well In sum the trend toward greater sophistication of combined arms operations at ever lower levels of combat seems 20 we both clear and likely to continue through this MTR blurring the old geographic-based distinctions between land air and maritime operations U War ghting doctrines will likely move away from an emphasis on the physical occupation of key terrestrial areas toward a far greater emphasis on maneuver by fu'es The growing potential of extended-range weapons combined with RSTA systems will act as force multipliers by quickly providing or augmenting the combat power required to hold key terrain New concepts of operations to exploit this shift will almost certainly be necessary As will be discussed a shift in emphasis toward the employment of integrated ranged res also will require organizing military forces in ways signi cantly different from their current con gurations For example it may be best to organize our forces around major functional capabilities space control air superiority sea control forced entry etc than along traditional Service lines Joint and combined operational doctrine would then be developed to exeCute the missions characteristic of these functional areas Indeed one would expect Service doctrine to be progressively supplanted by joint doctrine as the shift through this revolution reached maturity U Given the trends elaborated above how might we evaluate operational concepts for a new era of warfare One method that appears promising is rst to order the discussion around mission requirements A list of missions might comprise the following - Information Dominance Space Control Air Control Sea Control Sustained Land Operations Forcible End-y Strategic Strikes on Centers of Gravity Strategic and Theater Defense Strategic Mobility Unconventional Warfare U In most instances these functional requirements will entail joint and combined operations Many will be full-dimensional operations in the sense that they involve fOrces operating in all four elements air ground sea and space In war our armed forces may be required to meet one some or all these requirements Depending upon the contingency these operations may be executed sequentially or simultaneously For example information superiority space control air control and strategic strike operations may be executed in a nearly simultaneous manner On the other hand occupation of a hostile state may require both simultaneous and sequential operations establishing information superiority sea and space control and conducting strategic strikes followed by strategic mobility followed by air control and forcible end-y operations followed by sustained land Operations - 21 RN U How will military forces employ advanced technologies and the systems employing these technologies within new operational concepts to revolutionize the nature of warfare Will operational concepts differ appreciably in waging wars against peer competitors as opposed to wars against lesser competitors who lack the means to realize the full bene ts afforded by access to and exploitation of advanced technologies At this point we can at best provide only a notional sketch of the operational concepts that might be appropriate for these mission areas This is partly due to the fact that we are in the early phases of this military-technical sea change and also because it is dif cult to idenu'fy how competitor states will approach the competition It also is due to the relative lack of emphasis accorded this issue in professional military circles with few exceptions Information Dominance U U Establishing information dominance could well be the sine qua non for effective military operations in future con icts Information dominance as used here is de ned as a superiOr understanding of a potential adversary's military poliu'cal social and economic structures to include their weaknesses locations and degrees of interdependence while denying an adversary similar information on friendly assets Information dominance is relevant to all levels of con ict from the grand strategic to the tactical Ideally it is established in peacetime and sustained in pre crisis and crisis periods and in war At the strategic level information dominance is concerned principally with providing continuing data on the location of targets comprising the enemy center s of gravity as well as of those targets that might threaten friendly assets that can maintain or widen the information gap U In pre-crisis and crisis situations it may be possible to deter a potential adversary state from taking a threatening course of action if that state realizes that it cannot compete for information dominance or even information denial Achieving - information dominance in war will likely require a full-dimensional operation with a key element involving establishing and maintaining space control see below Strategic strikes to include so-called electronic strikes and special operations forces strikes against an adversary's terrestrial information networks would ideally be carried out simultaneously with space control operations U For military forces organized trained and equipped to take complete or nearly full advantage of advanced information systems and networks we will call them peer competitors establishing information dominance will likely be considerably easier against non-peer competitor states those states that can take advantage of only a fraction of the potential offered by advanced technologies Several factors argue for this conclusion First peer competitors will almost certainly have an information advantage over non-peer competitors prior to hostilities Thus a peer competitor will seek to widen an information gap that already exists Second peer competitors should have an advantage in ranged- re systems Thus the instruments to widen the information gap are available The non-peer competitor's prospects for redressing this unfavorable ORN situation are likely to derive from striking rst recall the Russian observations on pre- emptive defense and from mission asymmetries the possible willingness of non- peer competitors to accept a state of information denial for both sides as opposed to seeking information dominance U In con icts between peer competitors the absence of a signi cant information gap will probably make both sides anxious to strike rst especially if it is believed that an adversary's informationnetwork or subelements thereof do not degrade gracefully Active and passive defensive measures stealth electronic warfare deception cover and concealment mobility air and missile defenses etc employed to protect friendly information systems will likely play an important role in widening or narrowing the information gap and in facilitating mission accomplishment U In summary since esrablishing information superiority could be the decisive operation in future con icts and since this objective could be achieved early in the war we should expect that increasing emphasis will be placed on achieving surprise As this revolution matures the day may come when the forces of peer competitor states evolve to a hair-trigger posture characterized by a trend toward automated engagements with forces ready to re on little warning To adopt a less threatening posture could be seen as inviting a pre-emptive attack against friendly information networks allowing the enemy to establish information dominance which would quickly lead to the progressive inability of friendly forces to execute the highly integrated information-intensive military operations that will be crucial to success in war Space Control U U Space is becoming inexuicably linked to war on land in the air and at sea It is possible to imagine the continued migration of C31 functions into space with many downlinking functions being performed by airborne platforms especially unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs As space assets become more valuable especially in establishing information dominance they will inevitably become lucrative targets for destruction This will be especially true for satellites in low earth orbits and possibly for space-based strategic defense assets as well Today's large soft satellites will likely become increasingly vulnerable to attacks from both peer and non-peer competitors While peer competitors will likely seek to control space as part of their operation to establish information dominance non-peer competitors will probably set space denial as their objective much in the manner in which inferior naval powers have traditionally sought sea denial as opposed to sea control U Peer competitors could employ both aCtive and passive or so-called non- lethal means to disable an enemy's Space assets while protecting their own These means would probably include terresuiahbased and space-based strategic defenses that could double as antisatellite ASAT systems and electronic countermeasures The struggle for space control between peer competitors will be dynamic in nature Countemieasures could witness the miniaturization of satellites the incorporation of stealth technologies into satellite design mobility deception and the increased use of electronic warfare to protect satellites and to disable them As satellites become smaller and launch costs decrease and as satellites become increasingly important to military operations the option of crisis or wartime rapid replacement launches could emerge as an increasingly attractive option U Commercial satellites or the satellites of neutral powers could acquire special signi cance in a battle to establish control over space Warring powers may have to face hard choices with respect to waging unrestricted space warfare in a manner similar to that faced by Germany in the two world wars with respect to the issue of unrestricted submarine warfare U Non-peer competitors will likely settle for a condition of space denial This objective may also apply to peer competitors who have lost the battle for control of space Employing electromagnetic pulse EMP attacks againSt an adversary may be an attractive option for these belligerents especially if EMP strikes can be employed discriminately Air Control U U Establishing air control will probably rely heavily on the creation of a favorable information gap In a situation where peer competitors oppose one another the combination of establishing information dominance and employing ranged- res using PGMs ASATs and'strategic and theater defenses could if employed quickly and effectively fracture an opponent's information deep-strike and air defense networks This combined with the preservation of friendly active and passive air defenses would assure air control Mastering control of the air is thus based on three factors rst establishing information dominance second exploiting it through the employment of ranged res to disable enemy offensive and defensive air networks and third possessing active and passive defenses adequate to protect friendly air assets U In the case of conflict between two peer competitors and in the absence of dramatic improvements in active and passive defenses that outstrip improvements made in offensive capabilities a great advantage will probably go to the side that strikes rst This will especially hold true if the strike corresponds to simultaneous operations that lead to establishing or preserving information dominance U Electronic warfare deception cover and concealment mobility and hardening of key assets will be employed by peer competitor and non-peer competitor states to minimize their vulnerability to detection and destruction Peer competitors also can be expected to employ stealth technology to this end These countermeasures will receive relatively greater emphasis from non-peer competitors because of their inability to compete for information dominance and also because of their limited ability to employ nonnuclear ranged res to signi cant effect Peer competitors on the other 24 hand will likely put considerable effort into developing an assured second-strike capability U Once air control is achieved it could be possible for peer competitors to populate the skies with additional information platforms ranging from UAVs to sunset systems like JSTARS and AWACS and with so-called brilliant conventional munitions that can loiter on station until cueued by RSTA systems to engage a target The result will be a widening information gap and increasing leverage for friendly ranged- re systems Sea Control U U World War II saw the intrusion of aircraft on military engagements at sea The Cold War saw the range of aircraft extended and the deployment of large numbers of anti-ship missiles Future con icts could well see a considerable increase in PGMs and overhead information processing added to this mix The result will likely be a major increase in the vulnerability of surface ships to attack and destruction by ranged- re attacks Just as maritime forces are threatened from forces on land at sea in the air and in space establishing sea control will require the integration of forces from each of these dimensions U In a con ict between peer competitors targets at sea could be identified and tracked by space systems and UAVs and engaged by naval forces or by extended-range land systems or by intercontinental nonnuclear strikes As with forces based on land naval forces will likely have to become smaller and more mobile to survive also relying on other active and passive defensive measures as well Just as some force elements on land will find themselves burrowing underground to enhance their survival new underwater platforms will probably be among the sunrise systems in this MTR The strucrure of surface force elements may evolve to comprise a number of small support ships Operating as far as possible from an adversary's engagement envelope each sustaining a handful of smaller highly mobile surface effects ships SES Both the 81585 and underwater platforms would be modular in nature and could be recon gured with various packages to perform a variety of missions sea-launched cruise missile UAV launches special Operation forces' insertion helibome raids minelaying and rninesweeping non-LOS fire support etc U In addition to surface and subsurface Operations it may be possible to seed areas with sensors to establish passive barriers or cordon sanitaires These barrier regions could be activated by the emplacement perhaps remotely by ranged- re weapons -- of smart mine fields that could impair mobility or restrict access to key straits or coastal regions the Persian Gulf These sea-denial zones could be monitored and enforced not only or even primarily by surface or subsurface eet elements but by space-based and land-based systems to include aircraft and extended- range ballistic and cruise missiles OR 25 U The placement of sens and mine barriers covered by ranged- re systems will probably become an increasingly attractive option for non-peer competitor belligerents that are attempting to enforce sea denial in coastal waters or perhaps in strategic straits located in their region In establishing sea control in these areas peer competitor states would likely rely primarily on their advantages in RSTA ranged- re systems missile and air defenses and electronic warfare to provide cover for mine senor countermeasure operations Sustained Land Operations U U The recent land operations that occurred in the Gulf War relied heavily upon strategic strikes air control superiority air support and space- and sea-based assets for its success The growing effectiveness of extended-range strikes by air and maritime forces with advanced cruise missiles will likely increase the role of these forces in land operations Thus land forces and operations will probably have to change signi cantly to maximize their military effectiveness in future wars U In a con ict between peer competitors there likely will be a strong incentive to shoot rst to support efforts to gain information dominance primarily on the tactical and operational level Success in this effort would make the accomplishment of subsequent objeCtives signi cantly more manageable If a favorable information gap is created ground forces would likely have Strong incentives to abandon their traditional role of closing with and destroying the enemy in favor of employing ranged res as the decisive element in combat Line-of-sight LOS weapon systems -- principally armored forces and helic0pters -- would be employed in the traditional role of cavalry They would screen enemy forces that having lost the information assets necessary to employ deep strikes at least against most friendly mobile targets would have to rely on direct- re engagements in conducting ground combat operations U Thus peer competitor land forces will likely place signi cantly more reliance on a combination of space-based systems UAVs extended-range precision-guided missiles and special operations forces SOF and far less emphasis on armored systems Furthermore to minimize reliance on large vulnerable logistics bases which could be subjected to enemy deep-strike attacks and to enhance mobility the importance of PGMs advanced highly fuel-ef cient engines and lightweight composite protective materials will increase further U In summary a future land campaign might involve ground forces initially I supporting information dominance operations and conducting ranged- re strikes on enemy center-of-gravity targets while screening enemy LOS systems Only after this preparation of the battle eld occurred would friendly land forces begin sustained offensive operations conducted in conjunction with forces operating in the other dimensions of con ict to eliminate residual enemy resistance On the other hand a peer competitor facing either a peer competitor that has lost the battle for information dominance or a non-peer competitor may encounter an adversary that will attempt to 26 redress the imbalance through some innovative operational concepts for land operations One such concept will be discussed presently Strategic Strikes U U It was observed that advanced technologies may provide the means for elding an integrated group of networked systems or architectures that could execute conventional strategic strikes againsr an adversary There has been some discussion particularly in the Soviet Russian literature that this could oCcur through the employment of so-called aerospace operations whereby airborne and space information and perhaps weapon platforms provide real-time targeting information to long-range precision-guided advanced conventional munitions which may be land- air- or sea- based If a suf cient information gap can be created it may be possible to strike the entire range of enemy strategic targets comprising their center of gravity in a relatively short period of time without rst having to defeat the bulk of an enemy's military forces Thus strategic strikes would be expeCted to either coincide with or follow on the heels of operations to achieve information dominance and perhaps air and space control as well Strategic strikes would focus on a relatively small set of enemy targets -- those comprising its center of gravity -- those targets that when disabled will deny an enemy state the ability or the will to block an opponent from achieving its military objectives U Furthermore at some point in this revolution it may be possible through the use of advanced simulations to test su'ike a small subset of a target base observe the effects -- perhaps even matching the data obtained with simulations -- and then deciding whether and how to continue eliminating the entire class of targets designated for destruction or to identify more promising alternatives There are two potential advantages to employing test strikes First they may allow a peer competitor to preserve time and resources critical to achieving its military objectives The intent would be to avoid the situation the United States found itself in during previous strategic bombardment campaigns in World War II and the Vietnam War In the former case in the European theater the United States focused on several target sets air frames before nding Germany's weak point During the Rolling Thunder campaign against North Vietnam a progression of target sets was attacked transportation oil electrical without achieving the desired results The importance of time and the high cost of advanced conventional munitions places a high premium on getting it right the rst time in extracting the desired results from a chosen target set Second such an approach allows a peer competitor to avoid creating undesirable damage to the enemy state Such unwanted damage may complicate war prosecution one thinks here of the effect on domestic and world public Opinion war termination will such damage stiffen the resolve of the target regime or its people and postwar plans reconstruction U In a war between peer competitors it seems 'clear that unless an assured second-strike capability is established the side that can execute its strategic strike operations rst stands to bene t most assuming that it retains suf cient information on the enemy target base and overcomes active and passive defenses to conduct its strikes effectively This is an'important point since it is not yet clear that forces engaged in strategic strikes will have the requisite level of RSTA and battle-damage assessment BDA data or that they will be able to negotiate successfully all enemy - countermeasures Therefore in a war between peer competitors it may not be possible I to execute decisive strategic strikes especially if the defender retains a suf cient level of its information structure intact to enable it to conduct an integrated coordinated defense U As for nuclear weapons they may become signi cantly more discriminate Micronuclear weapons might be able to destroy targets with little collateral damage that conventional syStems could not eliminate at an acceptable cost While their employment may be useful in a purely military sense there are obviously strong political factors and precedents for not employing nuclear weapons save in extrernis However nuclear weapons in the hands of radical regimes that possess ballistic or cruise missilesgcould emerge as the poor man 5 counter against peer competitor states Strategic and Theater Defense U U Another mission area requiring attention concerns strategic and theater defense which comprises defense against ballistic missiles and air-breathing systems like cruise missiles and attack aircraft As states exploit the advanced technologies that appear likely to move the world into the new military-technical regime strategic and theater defenses will not only have to contend with weapons of mass destruction but with extended-range precision strikes employing nonnuclear munitions as well The latter defense requirement will be the most likely and will almost certainly focus on the protection of point targets satellite networks data fusion centers key military industries senior political and military leaders etc A symbiotic relationship will exist between the Strategic defense systems network and the information systems network U Establishing information dominance will likely be as crucial to conduct of effective strategic defensive operations as it is to supporting other military operations At the same time the ability to maintain information dominance in the face of enemy attempts to fracture friendly information networks will probably depend to a significant extent on the ability of strategic and theater defenses to protect those networks This dynamic reinforces the earlier discussion on the importance of creating an information gap between friendly and enemy forces and the incentive to strike fust -- especially in a war between peer competitors -- before the friendly information network comes under attack It also reinforces the incentives for peer competitors to develop an assured second-strike capability of which strategic and theater defenses could be a major component U Early in the next decade much of the early and middle Cold War era military technology will have diffused to those non-competitor Third World states that have the means and the desireto acquire it These states could well have military forces equipped with such T'late-model technologies as nuclear weapons ballistic missiles cruise 28 missiles and satellites In sum they may have dramatically increased their ability to identify and destroy targets at extended ranges For many Third World states this will be a military-technical revolution in the sense that they are entering the Cold War era MTR Ten to fteen years from now or perhaps sooner a peer competitor having to project its power to protect its interests may nd that the nature of the threat it faces has probably changed dramatically from the late Cold War and early post-Cold War era Unless a peer competitor has moved to a higher military-technical plain -- unless it preconstitutes to exploit the potential of the current revolution it is unlikely that it will be able to prevail as quickly and antiseptically as for example the United States did in the Gulf War A more extended discussion of this challenge is found in the section dealing with the competition U To deter and if necessary conduct effective military operations against this kind of emerging Third World threat a peer competitor will have to develop the means to neutralize this threat One possible option involves some form of strategic and theater defenses These defenses will probably offer protection for the homeland and also for forward-deployed forces and coalition partners that lie within the range of an enemy state's conventional weapons and its weapons of mass destruction U The required level of strategic defense pro ciency will depend on several factors to include the military capabilities of enemy the nature of friendly forces the circumstances or contingency under which the defenses are stressed and the strategic posture adopted by the two sides With respect to this latter point several options are open to a peer competitor opposed by a non-peer competitor all of which were debated in the early days of the Cold War when the emerging nuclear power was the Soviet Union It was true then and is today that a strategy of preventive war and perhaps pre- emptive war as well places less stress on strategic and theater defenses than a strategy of deterrence and a willingness to accept the fust blow in war Or it may be that an optimum mix of simultaneous operations comprising information superiority air superiority strategic suikes and strategic defense will be the most likely initial phase of future conflict If a peer competitor fails to come to grips with the issue of strategic defenses it may nd itself deterred from exercising military power against a non-peer competitor even though the peer competitor may have dramatically improved its combat potential as a consequence of the military-technical revolution orcible Entry U U As peer competitors become increasingly pro cient in exploiting advanced technologies and deve10ping sunrise syStems and as many Third World states acquire more destrucrive extended-range weaponry the conduct of forcible-entry operations will likely change dramatically For peer competitor states operating against non-peer competitor states the threat environment could require that forcible enu'y Operations be initiated at extended ranges although they may be supported by covertly inserted special Operations forces For peer Competitors the ever-increasing engagement envelopes of non-competitor states combined with the post-Cold War reduction in forward-based assets will likely require peer competitors to project a higher proportion of their military power -- although not necessarily a greater absolute ambunt of tonnag -- than was the case during the Cold War U Using the United States as an example in many forced-entry operations whether against peer or non-peer competitors once information dominance is established the focus will probably turn to space air and sea control operations These would be coupled with strategic strikes probably by CONUS-based and perhaps sea-based systems all supported in part from space Their objective would be to take out those capabilities constituting the enemy's center of gravity and they would employ - conventional munitions If these strikes proved successful the need for forcible entry and follow-on operations might be reduced or eliminated These strikes would be followed by combined strikes against forces that might oppose the forced entry This could establish the conditions for forcible entry operations and follow-on sustained land operations if required U These deep-strike forces would be the tip of the spear the high end of a high-low mix of sunrise and sunset forces Their suikes would open the way for the application of more traditional forms of military power Of course the entire force would be integrated into the military's information network structure To employ an historical analogy the spear tip of a peer competitor would be akin to the German panzer corps and tactical air arm in the blitzkreig -- the force that breaks through the enemy's main line of resistance thereby allowing more traditional forces the infantry and artillery to operate with greater effectiveness Strategic Mobility U U Gaining information dominance and air and sea control can facilitate the movement of force to areas where it is needed By combining advanced technologies with innovative applications peer competitors could develop the ability to move relatively large amounts of combat potential per unit of weight compared with Cold War era capabilities There are several reasons for this First many C31 functions could migrate into space Second the increased employment of PGMs should reduce ammunition tonnage requirements Third as systems become smaller and lighter hopefully benefitting from advanced composites and improvements in fuel ef ciency lift requirements will be further reduced Fourth the increased use of strategic su'ikes to disrupt and fragment enemy plans and military effectiveness should result'in a reduced combat burden for those forces projected into the theater of operations Conversely reliance on forward-based assets will likely be reduced both for geopolitical reasons as well as military-technical necessity The former speaks to the changing international environment now that the Cold War is over the overseas base structure of many states will almost certainly shrink signi cantly The latter speaks to the dangers of placing forces within range of adversaries whose ability to conduct pre-emptive attacks at extended ranges will likely increase significantly in the mid- to long-terrn future 30 U The information revolution combined with business practices that rely heavily on information technologies also can be used to minimize the drain on logistics - - and to allow logistics centers to be as small and mobile or hardened as possible to escape detection targeting and destruction These centers also may be increasingly remote -- out of harm's way -- as the reliance on stand-off munitions and ranged- re engagements increases U Computer-assisted design and manufacturing and computer-suppOrted simulations will be essential elements of research and development efforts designed to produce highly ef cient engines and to develop light-weight ceramics and stealthy designs to provide 'a new generation of systems that will employ a variety of countermeasures to dilute the effectiveness of peer competitor forces Progress in these areas could dramatically reduce the demand on logistics support for fuel and on strategic lift requirements as well Computer-aided management principles can be used to minimize stockage levels and insure the logistics system provides quality support as demonstrated by the just in time business practices currently in vogue Finally as was recently demonstrated in the Gulf War information technologies can help establish a more ef cient organization for the movement of large military forces and their associated logistics as part of a major power-projection Operation thereby maximizing combat power for a given amount of logistics expended Unconventional Warfare U U Non-competitor states -- those States that can only realize a fraction of the potential of advanced technologies and systems to change the nature of warfare will likely attempt to make up for their technological inferiority by devising unconventional operational concepts For example during the period 1940-1990 technically sophisticated military forces were frustrated on several occasions by unconventional operations Examples include the Soviet use of scorched earth warfare against Germany 4 in World War II and the Vietnamese Communists' use of People's War against the United States in the Vietnam War and Islamic fundamentalists' employment of terrorist operations against the multinational force in Lebanon in the early 19805 U Low-intensity warfare comprising primarily but not exclusively insurgency terrorism and subversion has been the most prevalent form of con ict in the post-World War II era It seems likely that these con icts which are characterized by unconventional operational concepts will continue as a dominant form of warfare in the post-Cold War era It also is highly probable that non-peer competitors will engage in low-intensity warfare employing the unconventional operational concepts characteristic of those kinds of con icts albeit modi ed somewhat by the infusion of more advanced military systems as a means of fruStrating peer competitor adversaries Time is often as precious in this kind of con ict as it is in the kinds of operations that may characterize the emerging MTR In the case of unconventional warfare however the objective typically is not so much to beat the enemy to the punch rather it is to protract the con ict while employing an indirect approach to weaken that portion of the enemy's Icenter of gravity that rests on the will to resist Thus unconventional operational concepts can be considered a countermeasure to those operations described above that will likely become increasingly possible for peer competitors U With the continued movement toward a global economy and the rapid breakdown in the barriers impeding the ow of information peer competitor states will probably have to address the more subtle but important implications of these phenomena on military operations in crisis and in war This issue is elaborated upon in some detail in the section addressing the US competitive posture over the next 10-20 years Unfortunately a more detailed examination of this issue -- including an assessment of peer competitor countermeasures -- was outside the scope of this initial effort U In summary it seems very likely that as peer competitors identify the best methods for employing the products of advanced technologies and the military systems they are making possible and as both peer and non-peer competitors react to this phenomenon that military operations will likely experience a revolutionary change in nature For peer competitors they will almost certainly be increasingly dominated by the need to establish information dominance as a prerequisite to effective execution of other operations Furthermore these operations will typically involve a myriad of forces they will be joint combined and or full-dimensional operations Operations by peer competitor forces will probably be increasingly characterized by the application of force at extended ranges to exploit the advantages of information dominance Integrated with advanced information systems the forces conducting these operations will closely approximate what the Russians have described as reconnaissance suike complexes or what we might call deep-strike task forces The key operative term here is integrated and the key variable is time The peer competitor will almost certainly look to integrate quickly the various information and strike systems that together will be employed to establish information dominance and accomplish national military objectives U There are probably considerable gains in military effectiveness to be derived from translating technological advances into operational concepts and in modifying military structures to execute these concepts effectively From the above discussion this clearly implies the likely need for a major restructuring of a peer competitor's armed forces and acquisition system if such a state desires either to dominate the competition or remain a major competitor D Organizational Innovation U U We are likely at the beginning of a period of revolutionary change in warfare This change will probably occur over an extended period of time perhaps 10- 20 years or longer A major factor in determining the length of this transition period will be how adept competitors are at fostering and nurturing innovan'on For those states that intend to develop the capability to wage war effectively in a new era of conflict it is 1 important that they begin to think through how they will organize themselves to promote the innovations -- in terms of technologies systems and operational concepts -- that will be required for a successful transition In short possessing potentially revolutionary technologies and associated military systems and a blueprint for an innovative 'operational concept to best exploit those assets is not sufficient to effect a military- technical revolution - Innovation in the Interwar Period U U The British clearly demonstrated this point during the interwar period Then despite having been on the cutting edge of mechanized warfare in World War I despite the input of British strategists like Fuller Hart Stuart and Broad despite the strong desire to avoid the carnage of static positional warfare characteristic of the Western Front and despite the need to develop a more mobile form of ground warfare for potential operations in areas like North Africa the British could not effect the organizational change necessary to create a blitzkreig capability of their own Thus it is possible to have cutting-edge technologies systems that exploit these technologies brilliant innovative concepts for their application and still fail to realize the pctentially revolutionary gains in combat potential and military effectiveness that they promise Evidence indicates that if a market cann0t be created among a state's civilian and military leadership for organizational adaptation and innovation then that state probably will not succeed in its attempts to promote such innovation U One also however cannot discount the in uence of other factors on these trends The British for example after their losses in World War I were determined to avoid a grinding war of attrition by not elding ground forces for deployment on the Continent Although they did establish an independent tank corps to test and develop operational concepts it was overshadowed by an overall effort to escape the horrors of World War I U The Germans victims of a war of attrition also saw the need to avoid that kind of war However they could not realistically consider the option of opting out of the next major war on the Cominent They therefore looked for a way to win quickly and avoid a stalemate so as to avoid losing a war of attrition as they had in 1918 Furthermore the Treaty of Versailles having limited the German Army to 100 000 men led to an increased focus on mobile operations for defense as opposed to the static defenses that characterized World War I Finally stripped of their planes and tanks by the treaty the German military could think more freely about what types of weapon systems would best be suited for future conflicts It was not burdened by a large capital stock of defense equipment Since the Germans could not in many instances actively train they also had a greater opportunity to think through how they would approach future con icts The result was that the Germans developed the capability to wage a war of maneuver that offered them the prospect of winning quickly before France and England could fully mobilize their war potential and before a naval blockade could strangle Germany 33 U Another example of organizational rigidity frustrating a peer competitor is the concentration of the British air assets in the Royal Air Force which led to the anomalous result of RAF aircraft existing as tenants on Royal Navy aircraft carriers The retardation of British carrier air operations development followed Again however in the case of the British eet air arm other factors like geography come into play as well The British seeing their island as a huge aircraft carrier off the Continent did not feel the need to develop the carrier's power-projection potential as strongly as did the United States and Japan U The United States on the other hand did see a need to project power across the entire Pacific a mission that would require projecting power and seizing advance bases An innovative cadre of U S naval of cers appreciated the role carrier-based aircraft could play in meeting these requirements They oriented-the U S Navy's performance objectives around the ability to maximize the number of aircraft sorties it - could generate Their British counterparts on the other hand focused on detection and warning for British battleships sailing and navigation as determinants of carrier pro ciency The U S Navy's use of carriers to extend the battle space and support forward offensive operations in austere environments paid big dividends in World War II while British carriers played a relatively minor role U Resources can be constrained but that need not impose an insurmountable barrier to innovation Revolutionary changes occurred between 1919 and 1939 in an era of severe resource constraints for most military organizations especially in the United States Yet the U S Navy was able to develop the concept of carrier task forces the U S Marines modern amphibious operations and the U S Army Air Corps the foundations for strategic aerial bombardment all remarkable accomplishments U However one must also acknowledge that the interwar period was also different in signi cant ways from the situation in which we currently nd ourselves For example during this time some sectors notably aviation benefitted from dramatic industrial growth and a supportive public policy During the interwar period over eighteen aviation companies were formed including most of our major aviation corporations now in existence Moreover despite limited resources government development and acquisition management supported the development and ight-testing of over ten medium and heavy bombers and more than two dozen ghter and trainer aircraft each Thus despite signi cant resource constraints the United States successfully preconstituted for World War II During the interwar period however there was considerable overlap between the technologies associated with commercial aviation and the automotive industry and those required for military'systems The extent to which this kind of relationship exists today between the commercial and the defense sectors could influence signi cantly a competitor's ability to innovate U Another challenge in effecting organizational innovation is that frequently when new weapons and organizational structures are teSted the results do not compare favorably with existing methods of waging war This is because there often are technical bugs that need to be worked out in new weapons and the integration of the various players in a new concept of operation often proceeds in ts and starts This combined with the heavy weight of bureaucratic inertia in organizations is often suf cient to frustrate innovation The use of simulations may be a way out of this problem permitting a variety of organizational structures to be examined and tested before they are actually put into place But simulations can be and have been rigged to produce the desired answers Innovation and the Emerging TR U U Innovation is critical to the success of any attempt to compete effectively in a new era of warfare In the Cold War era U S decisions about forces hinged to a considerable extent on the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the need for organizations that could focus on adapting or innovating for the mid- or long-term potential threat took a back seat to the need to fucus on the threat at hand In the emerging geopolitical and military-technical environment great uncertainty surrounds both the identity and nature of the mid- and long-term threats to US security and the nature of future warfare In this environment the ability to innovate and adapt quickly would logically assume a much greater priority than it enjoyed'during the Cold War The fate of military enterprises and of nations and coalitions may well depend on military and acquisitional structures that are able to innovate faster than their competitors or their enemies Much of the need for organizational innovation will stem from the information revolution U To take but one example a major problem of the Gulf War was moving the right amount and the right type of the enormous quantities of infomiatiOn collected to the people who needed that information to fight the war Commanders frequently were overwhelmed by the amount of information at hand much of it irrelevant to their needs In addressing this problem over the years we have tended to increase the size of our staffs hoping that they would be better able to manage the incoming ow of information fusing it into information packets which are then sent on to those who need it In practice this has not worked U What has worked especially in the business world is the streamlining of organizations by eliminating unnecessary organizational levels This has had the effect of removing information bottlenecks by allowing more people direct access to the information they need This is made possible by the information revolution in which huge quantities of information can be quickly and deftly manipulated and organized in a manner tailored to the needs of its individual users It is in this area -- systems integration and information fusion -- that we are only beginning to scrape the surface of the potential gains in military effecriveness To put it bluntly wehave state-of the-art information systems harnessed to antiquated military organizations Ironically the corporate structure that emerged with the indusrrial age in the 19th century emulated the hierarchical military organizational structure now it may return the favor by providinga model for military organizational change U Changing existing organizations to better exploit the bene ts of the information revolution proved dif cult in the business world It will likely prove even more dif cult in military organizations given what the considerable body of knowledge on large-scale organizational change has to say on the matter In this instance we are talking about taking away a major element of the hierarchy's power its authority to withhold or distribute information to subordinate organizations The integration of information systems to better exploit the information revolution and establish information dominance in warfare may require fundamentally different command relationships than what we have traditionally come to expect U Although the information revolution is responsible for much of the need for organizational innovation this same revolution can also help organizations to make the required innovations as ef ciently and effectively as possible As noted earlier organizational change is one area where the dramatic advances in simulations capability may prove highly useful It could well be possible to examine the potential effectiveness of new organizational arrangements through a hierarchy of simulations U The simulations could begin with a consideration of f'u'st-order organizational issues by a relatively small group of individuals If the initial analysis proves feasible further organizational prototyping could be accomplished through more elaborate simulations and eventually eld simulations or exercises Simulations can be employed to test the sensitivity of current organizations to changes in the geopolitical or military-technical environment In this way the feed forward -- feed back interaction mentioned earlier can be extended to organizational innovation as well Simulations can assist in evaluating organizational change in wartime as well as in peacetime During war the feedback from real-world experience would in most cases provide better inputs to simulations examining the ef cacy of organizational restructuring options U There may also be a cultural disposition toward innovation sometimes referred to in the United States as Yankee ingenuity During the Gulf War the ability of US forces to innovate to devise ad hoc solutions to problems relating to their inability to move the information at hand was a key factor in the United States' success This innovation ran the gamut from the most basic to the most sophisticated information systems For example literally tons of maps were sent to the war zone yet most didn't lter down to the level where they were needed There were instances where commanders and their staffs were operating with rough grids sketched Out on paper serving as maps The U S forces also had to jerry- rig their linkages with the Global Positioning System GPS satellites The technical literacy and initiative of American human resources will likely be a great advantage in U S efforts at establishing information dominance Conversely we would expect hierarchical societies to be at a disadvantage in attempting to adapt to the new military- technical regime U The potential for peer competitor states to conduct highly effective nonnuclear strikes to the depths of a theater of operations and to disrupt or destroy C31 36 networks will likely produce a chaotic battle zone and not only at the front lines Military operations will likely have to become highly decentralized while unencumbered rapid access to needed information grows by leaps and bounds The need to reorganize the command structure to function in this manner is clear At the same time lower-level commanders and their subordinates will have to remain informed of their role as part of a highly integrated joint military campaign The result will probably be neither a horizontal nor vertical organizational structure but a hybrid of sorts U Indeed to execute the kind of operational concepts that could dominate a new military-technical era -- those emphasizing both the importance of acting quickly yet within ever-higher levels of complexity -- organizations will likely have to emphasize decentralized execution and centralized control Junior commanders will need to know how their operations support the senior commander's overall plan how to integrate their operations within various elements of a full-dimensional concept of operations and how to react quickly and often independently to a rapidly changing con ict environment The latter two requirements will likely necessitate a atter less hierarchical organizational structure with junior commanders and their staffs having direct access to information that was formerly rationed out by higher headquarters ffecting Organizational Innovation U U Having stated that innovation is a key element in realizing the full potential of military forces in a period of revolutionary change the question must be posed how is organizational innovation fostered and nurtured to a successful conclusion Our initial research indicates that the most dif cult part of the transition will come in the area of organizational innovation Large-scale organizations -- especially military organizations including perhaps their requirements and acquisition components and industrial base as well with their high regard for tradition and the limited availability of feedback -- are often highly resistant to change U Typically a major military innovation comes about in- peacetime only when two conditions are met First there must exist military leaders who recognize the need for innovation and who support its implementation In examining cases of U S military innovation in this century it was discovered that senior military leaders in the Services played the crucial roles Second these leaders must be able to institutionalize the innovation The latter requirement is accomplished primarily by atu'acting talented young of cers to the cause However these of cers are unlikely to risk their careers supporting innovation unless their mentors are able to protect and promote them The redirecrion and institutionalization of human resources appears to be the crucial element in effecting peacetime military innovation U The United States may nd the process of innovation a dif cult one High- level political overrides imposed from above rarely occur for the simple reason that the tenure of the senior leadership is so brief and its attention diffused The United States like France and Britain after World War I has emerged victorious from its most recent war Defense resources are being cut dramatically The response thus far however has primarily been to cling to the sunset systems and forces that characterized the Cold War era and the requirements acquisition and intelligence structures whose focus is on speci c near-term problems rather than on the general longer-term competition U In fact this preliminary study nds little evidence that the United States defense establishment is preparing for or even considering large-scale innovation For example our acquisition system is structured to respond to speci c guidance on requirements provided early in the acquisition process This may have been appropriate during an era in which their was a clearly de ned threat and a well-defined international order But this is no longer the case What is needed now -- especially in a period of declining resources -- is a requirements system that looks much further into the future that explores a variety of alternatives again simulations can play a major role here and that works with the acquisition system through the feed-forward and feed-back process described earlier to identify -- not only sunrise systems -- but sunrise network architecrures as well Finally we need an acquisition system thatis highly agile and exible that can react quickly to an emerging threat that at present remains unknown and that is already positioning itself to compete successfully in the next military- technical revolution U Given the importance of systems and network integration and the growing role of all-dimensional operations that require the interservice integration of a variety of systems and networks it is' unlikely that a single Service's senior leadership will be able to effect signi cant innovations by itself Before a Service can innovate successfully its leadership may also have to convince its counterparts inthe other Services of the merits of innovation This brings up the issue of whether the United Statesrequires a professional joint or general staff with the authority to deal with these matters on a continuing basis with a signi cantly higher degree of expertise than is currently available IV The Competition U Mistory is any guide we can ex ect a competition to arise among states organizations and loose coalitions to realize the enormous potential gains in nu itary ecuveness that characterize military-technical revolutions At present the United States is the clear leader in this competition having bene tted from the efforts made during its long-term military-technical competition with the Soviet Union Mmough defense budgets are declining in most major states as the interwar period demonstrates there are still opportunities for exploiting advanced technology experimenting with new systems and testing of innovative operational conce ts and organizational structures Several states of groups of states -- - have the technological base and necess resources to particiEate fully in this competition at the present Others -- may emerge to full competition over the next twenty years Furthermore many states ave learned from the Gulf War and regardless of their ability to compete at a high level they are already looking for countermeasures to frustrate possible peer competitor advanced operational concepts A U S Objectives U U What are our goals in this We are the de facto leader in the competition at this point It may be possible in the short- or even mid-term future to extend the U S near monopoly in military capabilities for advanced warfare by dissuading potential competitors Still maintaining a long-term'monopoly on this type of capability would seem impractical Other advanced industrial nations now have or could soon have the technologies required to compete Over the long run a realistic U S objective probably would be to dominate key sectors of the competition much as a large corporation might seek to dominate key markets or business sectors while actively examining ways to move on to the rst military-technical revolution of the let century U Or perhaps our goal will be more modest to merely remain competitive or perhaps to await events and react to the competition If we desire to remain the dominant player however we must consider ways to shape the competition and to deter potential competitors from entering the eld or to compete effectively against them if deterrence fails We also cannot fail to consider those who cannot compete but who will attempt to degrade our effectiveness through innovative uses of widely available advanced technologies or by employing innovative operational concepts U We nd ourselves in a position somewhat analogous to the one we ocCupied in the late 19405 Then as now the United States was the only country in the world that possessed the capability to conduct a dramatically different kind of war One difference between the immediate post-World War II era and the immediate post-Cold War era is that there 'is no hostile major power competitor to the United States We do not now face an obvious equivalent to the Soviet challenge that existed in the late 19405 We may therefore be blessed with a window of opportunity that will allow us to think carefully about what our goals should be In summary there are three possible courses of action available to the United States for competing in the military-technical revolution 1 dominance in Virtually all arcaS 2 dominance in certain key areas and 3 awaiting events and reacting to the competition as it emerges The second course is probably the most prudent It acknowledges both the constraints on the nation's resOurces as well as the demands of its security requirements B Technologies and Systerm Acquisition U U As noted above the United States has a lead in a signi cant number of advanced military technologies and often an even greater lead in their application to military systems The barriers to entry into full competition -- technological sophistication a substantial economic base and the political will to compete -- are likely to be substantial for most states Advanced data-processing systems sophisticated space platforms advanced sensors and low-observable stealth platforms are a sampling of the sophisticated high-technology assets that will likely be required for full participation in the military-technical revolution Most of these technologies are beyond the near- and mid-term capabilities of most states The technologies underwriting these systems may be relatively easy to buy but they are very expensive to integrate both in terms of nancial and human technical resources U The advanced technologies of interest to competitors will increasingly'be developed rst in the commercial secror vice the military-industrial sector of national economies for three reasons First because many of the technologies associated with the MTR have their origins in the commercial sector Second because the end of the Cold War has weakened international controls on military and dual-use technologies Third defense is declining relative to commercial and there are no indicators that this trend will abate in the foreseeable future U Given the requirements imposed by the emerging geopolitical and military- technical environments two observations can be made concerning military systems developed to exploit advanced technologies in what will likely be a rapidly changing con ict environment First they must be produced in numbers suf cient to permit the validation of Operational concepts to cover immediate contingencies and to train the force struCture in their use The Germans could not have wrought the blitzkreig with one panzer division nor the Navy the revolution in naval warfare with one carrier U Second given the changing and uncertain geostrategic environment it must be possible to produce on relatively short notice suf cient numbers of key sunrise systems to cope with a major contingency The Iraqi Equivalent state we face in ten years will almost certainly be more formidable than the threat posed by Iraq in 1990 It will likely possess many late-model Cold War era systems and munitions ballistic and cruise missiles access to space platforms smart munitions etc and have mastered the nuclear revolution As noted earlier such a threat probably will have developed countermeasures to minimize its vulnerability to sunrise systems and the kinds of operations that would likely characterize this latest military-technical revolution If it is to retain the ability to concentrate overwhelming military force against such states the United States will have to stay at least one revolution ahead of them U As noted above the systems we produce also must be exible enough through incorporation of open-ended architectures to incorporate new munitions or and to facilitate systems integration This implies the need for major organizational changes in the manner in which defense sysrems are developed and produced Just as a competitor seeks to get inside an adversary's decision or information cycle he also must be able to operate inside an opponent's production and innovation cycles Maintaining U S dominance in system design simulation the employment of computer-assisted design and manufacturing -- CAD-CAM may be a crucial element in this area of the competition U An adaptive exible and innovative acquisition system will become increasingly important as the rate of technological change increases The ability to produce a critical mass of syStems that can be employed for operational concept validation and training is needed to save time in the event of crises or con icts The ability of the defense industrial base to transition into production -- or to adapt and prototype systems based on rapidly changing technologies -- will also be crucial in winning the race for time and establishing information dominance U Furthermore it may become increasingly necessary to view the acquisition process in terms of packages or integrated sets of key sunrise systems Just as effective operations in warfare increasingly require us to conduct joint operations so too will we have to do a better job of integrating a series of systems and munitions together to operate effectively within a very different military-technical regime The process described here can best be termed preconstitun'on rather than reconstitution reflecting a commitment to preparing for conflict in a new military-technical regime against potential adversaries who are themselves moving ahead and mastering Cold War era technologies and systems In this way we can retain an ability to exercise overwhelming force against those states who are still developing the potential of Cold War era technologies and systems and we also can position ourselves to discourage potential peer competitors from actively participating in this MTR U We cannot discount the importance of civilian systems to successful competition Just as the Military Airlift Command relied on the Civil Reserve Air Fleet so too will we and our competitors likely come to rely on priority access to commercial satellites and other components of the MTR in the event of crisis or war A key issue for consideration concerns our ability to exercise this kind of coupling in peacetime to obtain maximum effectiveness from it in crisis or in war U Nor can we discount the potential importance of relying on off-shore components As technological and nancial interdependence increases our ability to employ aforce capable of executing Operations under the emerging revolution may be constrained by the policies of Others For example an ally may have the potential to place us in a position analogous to that which Great Britain occupied in the 1956 Suez Crisis we may find ourselves risking or incurring a technological veto by a third party supplier state To what extent should we rely on off-shore technologies and systems to support our efforts to transition to a higher military-technical regime Will suchdependence push us in the direction of having to adopt a short-war posture to avoid being leveraged by potential technology and system embargoes 41 C The Long-Term Competition U U Ought we to look forWard to a spirited competition for dominance in the new form of warfare Probably if history is any guide But as noted above there are ways in which the United States could shape the competition or dissuade or deter competitors First the United States could offer to extend security guarantees to those friendly states that eschew competition Second we might consider offering to loan-out selected elements of the MTR For example we could employ satellites UAVs information fusion centers etc to give a friendly State key advantages over its enemies in a con ict as was done to some degree during the recent Falklands and Iran-Iraq wars U Third the United States could deter potential competitors as a result of the high entry price into the MTR competition A state that has access to the relevant technology and skilled manpower base may still not choose to compete because of the formidable costs involved in developing both an MTR infrastructure and a critical mass of MTR systems that allow for a dramatic shift in military operations U A crucial element of the technological cdmpetition for the United States may be the ability to reverse the erosion in competitive advantage by positioning itself to leap ahead to a higher level of competition For example the Soviets spoke of a second phase portion of the MTR Thus it may be possible for the United States to dissuade competitors in the military-technical sense the same way businesses do in the commercial sector by being one product line ahead of the competition U As observed earlier the scramble for competitive advantage will almost certainly be dynamic in nature There will be a continuing search for countermeasures and counter-countermeasures This phenomenon is of course not unique to this MTR as can be seen from the Battle of the Atlantic during World War II It also is possible that commercial high-technologies could allow marginal competitors to degrade signi cantly the advantages accrued by full competitors U It will be important for the United States to determine those advanced technologies it should develop in the defense sector those it can rely upon domestic civilian rms to provide and those in which it is willing to cede dominance to other states Although the importance of commercial technologies to the MTR is likely to grow there will probably be some technologies and applications data fusion and battle management that remain primarily in the defense sector Furthermore it will be the integration of a variety of technologies and systems with human techniCal expertise serving as the glue into network architectures that ties together the systems that create and exploit the information gap U The advantages that accrue to followers as opposed to leaders in identifying and developing key advanced technologies warrant an examination Being ahead can confer certain advantages In some instances for example long lag times occur before others can emulate the technological breakthrough In other instances 42 however it may be that the leader incurs high costs to penetrate technological baniers that can then be quickly and cheaply penetrated by competitors U An important element of consideration will be the competitiveness of our defense acquisition process and industrial base Given the dramatic changes in the geopolitical as well as the military-technical environment they will probably have to undergo a revolution of their own If the United States adopts a goal of competitive dominance it will probably require much greater emphasis on research and development of key technologies and sunrise systems than is currently the case To compete effectively we also will likely have to be able to procure advanced systems quickly inside a competitor's acquisition cycle when needed or adopt a short-war posture with all its inherent dangers Capabilities for preconstitution and prototyping will likely assume an increased saliency Innovation will be more easily accomplished with weapon systems that are inherently exible Products of this approach would include systems that incorporate open-ended architectural designs to accept follow-on electronics or weapons suites U We will have to invest significant resources in the defense industrial base to maintain its future viability This investment may be covered in part through reconstitution efforts However maintaining an industrial base capable of preconsn'tuting for future conflicrs will require substantial additional funding to encourage support for experimentation and innovation U On a more positive note the dramatic pace of technological change especially in the area of information technologies -- is also in uencing dramatically the business operations of those rms that comprise the defense and commercial industrial base The technological and operational revolution these businesses are experiencing may offer some solutions to the problem of retaining a healthy defense industrial base that can support preconstitution and innovation in a new military-technical era It is a proposition worth exploring U There are three additional interesting aspects of thiscompetition The rst concerns the requirement for a technologically literate manpower base to exploit fully the fruits of the MTR This is almost certainly the case now however this requirement may erode somewhat in the future if technological advances can create highly user friendly and maintenance friendly weapon systems There are advantages to developing systems that are very simple to use the Stinger missiles employed by Afghan resistance forces In so doing however we run the risk of ceding our advantage in human technical resources Simply put many potential competitors could nd it relatively dif cult to operate and integrate the kinds of systems characteristic of_ this revolution This may be a barrier to entry we want to preserve by limiting the user friendly levels of MTR systems However a major component of this revolution involves the ability to integrate systems and networks at ever higher levels of sophistication Given this the issue of how user friendly a given system is may be of only marginal import 43 U Thus while potential competitors might be able to duplicate or acquire a speci c technology or a speci c weapon this may not endanger our long-term competitive advantage if we recognize and protect our core competency in managing and integrating multiple technologies systems and networks The issue of core competencies will be addressed presently The most dif cult capabilities for a competitor to emulate are almost certainly those that depend upon this kind of inter- network integration which itself is also a function of organizational adaptability human technical competency and training Correspondingly advantages that rest solely on a single technology are likely to be ephemeral U Second will advanced technologies allow us to maintain an equivalent level of combat potential with signi cantly fewer systems and people If so does this make competition more manageable by lowering the manpower entry price since the force structure's critical mass is much reduced from Cold War era levels How does this in uence the target base that we or our potential adversaries present in the event of a con ict These issues warrant close examination U The third point relates to the asymmetry that will likely exist in terms of competitor goals and objectives If we retain our Cold War era objective of being a global power we will nd that the military-technical needs of many competitors whose ambitions are regional are likely to be far lower than ours Many such competitors will probably have the far less ambitious and far less demanding goal of information space sea and air denial as opposed to seeking control or domination Thus national objectives will help de ne a competitor's requirements and its level of success as well D Identifying Core Competencies U U If the United States intends to dominate key sectors of the competition as its goal how does it pursue that goal As noted above while we would like to be able to control the pace and the evolution of potential threats to US security it will be very dif cult if not impossible to accomplish this by regulating access to technologies We also nored the possibility of providing states with incentives and disincentives for not competing U Another way to examine the question of dominance is by identifying what core competencies the United States will want to maintain in this competition This involves identifying those functional or mission areas it can divest itself of without incurring unacceptable risks to its security A core competency comprises a complex combination of technology manufacturing base skilled manpower training organizational adaptivity and operational experience that permits a military organization to do something of strategic importance better than its competitors or adversaries By something of strategic importance is meant a capability that is seen by opponents as being crucial in determining the outcome of competitions or confrontations with the United States a capability in which America is either preeminent Or has the capability to be preeminent By core is meant a capability that applies to a number of different missions and that permits the competitor to adapt its missions and capabilities to the changing security environment more rapidly than its potential adversaries Implied in the de nition is that if a core competency were lost it would be extremely dif cult to regenerate Examples of U S core competencies during the Cold War are carrier air operations and nuclear force operations U To dominate the key aspects of the military technical revolution the United States will likely have to establish or maintain core competencies in reconnaissance surveillance tracking and acquisition of targets to include space surveillance information fusion electronic warfare and communications security ranged- re Operations simulations and in the prompt ef cient production of related sunrise systems In other words the United States must maintain a dominant capability to create an information gap between itself and a competitor and to exploit that gap through the use of advanced extended-range munitions The United States also must be able to bring these capabilities to bear wherever they are required around the globe Finally protecting these assets their ability to project US power and avoiding the prospect of being self-deterred will likely require that the United States also be dominant in strategic and theater defenses In Soviet parlance this is the capability to task organize reconnaissance-Strike complexes with a global reach U Examples of sectors of the defense business that the United States may wish to consider de-emphasizing are large mechanized armor land operations large forward-presence surface naval operations the primacy of manned aircraft systems and nuclear operations Note that the term dc-emphasize does not imply abandonment rather it suggests a signi cantly reduced focus Examples of sectors of the defense business that the United States may want to dominate are Space operations strategic defense operations extended-range complex operations and innovative power-projection operations perhaps as part of an emerging aerospace operation E Assessing the Competition U can be grouped into three general categories Category I comp es those states that have the necessary resources -- human economic and technological -- to compete now if they choose to do so One wo probably place in this group with Other possible members being is probably the only supranauon organizationt at can claim membership int 1s group F Category II would comprise MTR wanna be competitors those states that could acquire some of the technological trappings of the MTR and whose human resource base is somewhat competitive but who currently lack the ability to compete on a qualitatively equal basiswith the Category I states discussed above These states might begin competing in signi cant ways in the mid-term future i e in 10 years or so Possible Category II members would includ Other States that would almost certainl be in this category would be_ amongo ers U Category is made up of those states that cannot hope to compete to any signi cant degree in the technical dimension of the over the next twenty years but who will compete by looking to adopt strategies that negate the effectiveness of Category I and II participants We have encountered these kinds of competitors in the past Countries like North Vietnam and Iran sought to prosecute their con ict with the United States in ways that denied us the ability to employ our strong suits against them Such strategies might make selective use of off-the-shelf advanced technologies They also would exploit geography avoiding desert terrain for example while concentrating assets in jungles or in urban areas and weather These states might well tend to view the possession of nuclear weapons as a poor-man's substitute for an inability to compete in the current revolution Of course innovative concepts designed _to frustrate our exploitation of the MTR will not be the exclusive province of Category competitors U Aside from their capabilities how do we evaluate the intentions of potential competitors How do we know when they are moving to enter the competiu'on We should deve10p a list of warning indicators that can be used to identify a state's intentions with respect the competition We probably ought to use these benchmark indicators to help guide the collection and analysis efforts of our intelligence community There also may be considerable overlap between deve10ping warning indicators and the notion of pre-targeting potential competitors or adversaries U Once a potential competitor becomes an active competitor how should the United States pursue that competition What core technical competences will be emphasized How will they be applied in the form of political objectives operational concepts and force structure Finally how can we deter the competitor from taking actions inimical to US interests and how would we defend these interests if deterrence failed F One Possible Threat U U Although it will have to take into account the possible emergence of peer competitors arguably the most formidable threat the United States will face over the next 10-20 years as this MTR develops more fully will be a Third World competitor that combines some of the 50phisticated technologies of the Cold War era with the unconventional strategies and operational concepts of a Category state Technologically speaking this state might have nuclear weapons old technology originally developed in the 19405 cruise and ballistic missile systems again relatively old technology advanced guidance systems for cruise missiles and advanced conventional munitions laser- and optically guided bombs access to commercial satellite communications networks chemical and biological munitions and late- generation traditional systems tanks aircraft surface warships Assume also that this state is energized by an ideology hostile to our values or by a radical theocratic 46 RN leadership This combination might produce a state a state willing to accept a disproportionate amount of punishment to include collateral and environmental damage if necessary to accomplish its strategic objectives U Such a threat while pursuing objectives hostile to US interests would not want to confront the United States Rather it would have every incentive to learn from the lessons of the recent past avoiding the direct approach practiced by Iraq in the Gulf War while exploiting the successful indirect unconventional approaches followed by Iran since the late 19708 and by North Vietnam in the Second Indochina War U A Street ghter State would pursue its plans for aggression by emphasizing the social dimensions of strategy That is to say the aggressor would attempt to exploit those aspects of the US social culture that would inhibit the effective application of American military power Speci cally acts of aggression would be low-intensity in nature and ambiguous in execution with emphasis on terrorism subversion and insurgency The objective would be to commit acts of aggression in such a way that they fall beneath the threshold that would trigger a US military response If the Street ghter State does not have the patience or the time to conduct a protracted war of ambiguous aggression it may be forced into a fall-back smash-and-grab campaign analogous to Iraq's conquest of neighboring Kuwait in the Gulf War This kind of aggression of course would be far more likely to trigger a US response If forced to confront the United States directly the Streetfighter State would probably try to make the war as sanguinary and as protracted as possible again focusing on the social dimension of strategy U In either case to reduce the prospect of a US response the aggressor would initiate propaganda warfare againsr potential opponents and appeal to world opinion prior to and during the act of aggression A primary target would be the US public's respect for legal and moral norms The Street ghter State would attempt to place the burden of proof for establishing the case of aggression on the United States especially in instances where ambiguous aggression is being practiced The aggressor would encburage negotiations through various international fora while aggression continues or while gains are consolidated The Street ghter State's objective here becomes one of protracted litigation through a h05t of supranational organizations to include the United Nations World Court and relevant regional associations Arab League Organization of African Unity U The revolution in commercial information systems will allow an aggressor State to take its case directly to the pe0ple of all democratic states An important goal will be to fracture any budding coalition of states that might be forming to conduct military operations against the aggressor Furthermore threats of direct aggression terrorism ASAT strikes or the use or propaganda may enable the Street ghter State to deter key states or blocs or organizations from joining or supporting a U S -led coalition If states like Japan are deterred in this manner the United States could encounter signi cant problems with access to commercial Space systems or to off- shore defense components crucial to the success of its operations U Still there is no guarantee that either the practice of ambiguous aggression or the consolidation of gains through protracted litigation will prove successful The Street ghter State may nd itself opposed by a U S -led coalition prepared to take military action In this instance asymmetric mission requirements could make an aggressor with Category II levels of technology and an early Cold War era integration capability a formidable adversary The Street ghter State would not seek information dominance but readily accept an information neuu'al environment Its missions would involve denying United States' military forces control of space the air and the sea rather than attempting to control those media itself This could be accomplished by launching primitive ASATs and by detonating nuclear weapons in space or the upper atmosphere thereby generating electromagnetic pulses that would work far more to the disadvantage of US information and weapon systems than to those of the aggressor U Still let us assume that US forces manage to avoid these active and passive defenses American forces prepare for deep-strike operations on key enemy targets It is discovered however that these targets may have become exceptionally dif cult to strike even with advanced conventional munitions and near-real-time intelligence There might be several reasons for this First many key targets have been provided with a human shield of hostages ideally American or coalition but perhaps including indigenous enemies of the regime as well Second key elements of the enemy military force could have been positioned in densely populated areas In some instances these elements would be co-located alongside nuclear reactors or power plants or industrial plants that utilize significant quantities of highly toxic chemicals as part of their manufacturing process Bhopals in waiting Can the United States risk attacking these forces even with precision U The United States also would face the prospect that even if the attacks are successful there is a strong likelihood that the enemy will destroy several of these dirty targets himself while accusing the United States of causing the catastrophe The overall aim would be to prevail by employing a superior strategy capable of defeating a technologically superior force even at a cost in human and material resources that would be unacceptable when viewed from the value system of advanced western industrial states Once these targets are self-detonated the enemy would either retaliate in kind or attempt to exploit the social dimension of strategy by appealing to the U S and international opinion to stop the war If the former course is chosen attacks by mobile ballistic missile or cruise missile systems or by sabotage teams could be conducted against targets in the region or even in the West - U Let us further assume that the United States overcomes this obstacle as well and conducts successful forced entry operations that are preceded by extended-range strikes that neutralize most enemy long-range systems and their corresponding C31 network If US forces must conduct sustained ground operations to physically control the country their problems could well continue First the enemy might initiate unconventional warfare operations against American forces These Operations might includeenvironmental warfare destroying water supplies detonating industrial 48 plants that employ toxic chemicals detonating oil wells buming large tracts of forest in a literal scorched earth campaign etc insurgency terrorism and subversion The likely objectives of such operations would be to raise the costs to U S forces especially in time and blood To this end the enemy might also establish sanctuaries either in remote areas of the country or in neighboring states that are willing to act as benevolent neutrals From these locations the enemy could support unconventional operations and 'could also stockpile weapons like cruise missiles that are dif cult to nd but which can strike effectively at long ranges U The above is probably a worst-case scenario for U S employment of MR- capable forces It assumes a number of things about the Category Street ghter State aggressor that may or may n0t be realized such as its leadership's ability to exploit U S weaknesses by executing an innovative strategy a people wholly committed to the regime and opposed to the United States and the regime's ability to coordinate the strategy through the people in a very chaotic environment What also has not been addressed but must be is the potential of Category I competitors to re ne their operational concepts introducing counter-countermeasures to offset the Street ghter State's innovative attempts to counter their Operations For example to what extent can the Street ghter's strategy of aggression be offset by a satellite rapid replacement launch capability or by strategic and theater defenses or by special operations forces covert operations in advance of the U S military response V Issues U A Introduction U U A strong consensus exists that a military-technical revolution is underway This revolution is being driven primarily by advances in microelectronic technologies that vastly increase our ability to gather process and disseminate information support the development and employment of advanced precision-guided conventional munitions and permit major advances in simulations techniques But while new technologies are the ultimate cause of a military-technical revolution they are not themselves the revolution The revolution is fully realized only when innovative operational concepts are perfected to exploit systems based on new technologies and when organizations are created to execute the new operations effectively Such a revolution creates new military capabilities that dominate previous modes of warfare U We are probably in the early stages of a transition to a new era of warfare Our prospect now resembles our situation in the early 19205 Then we were in the early stages of a military-technical revolution but with no clear enemy low defense budgets and with no clear idea of how or when the revolution would be fully developed 4 B Issue 1 Identifying Appropriate Innovations U C Issue II Promoting the Process of Innovation U U In addition to the intellectual task of identifying and understanding new ways of warfare there is the practical task of getting military organizations to adopt those new ways and even to adapt themselves to those new ways Although the innovative operational concepts that became known as the blitzkreig were rst described by British strategists J F C Fuller and Basil Liddell-Hart it was the Germans who were willing to adapt their military force structure to execute those concepts U In the 19205 there was no overarching structure guiding innovation in US forces rather it took place within the Services The innovations were not driven by speci c threats but by perceived changes in the security environment and by technological developments Innovation owed from speci c new requirements the need to acquire advance bases in wartime to support naval operations in the western Paci c Military leaders recognized the need for innovation and institutionalized innovations by attracting talented young of cers to new combat arms through a variety of incentives including the creation of new lines of promotion to the most senior positions in the Services D Issue The Defense Acquisition Process U U So much time and effort has been expended in recent years to make the Defense acquisition system more efficient and effective that we are reluctant to suggest still another look at it Yet if we believe that we are in a period of military-technical revolution then we need a system that allows experimentation and innovation Our concepts of operation will be evolving as part of an extended learning process involved in the exploration of a variety of alternatives E Issue The Role of US Allies U 53 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu