INSPECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE ALEXANDRIA VIRGINIA 22350-1500 September 14 2018 Ref FOIA-2015-00062 SENT VIA EMAIL TO 13856-93683485@requests muckrock com Mr Shawn Musgrave Muckrock P O Box 55819 Boston MA 02205-5819 Dear Mr Musgrave This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act FOIA request for a copy of report DODIG-2015-004 Assessment of DoD Long-term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities Phase II We received your request on October 17 2014 and assigned it case number FOIA2015-00062 The Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence and Special Program Assessments conducted a search and found the enclosed document responsive to this request We determined that certain redacted portions are exempt from release pursuant to 5 U S C 552 b 5 which pertains to certain inter-and intra-agency communications protected by the deliberative process privilege 5 U S C 552 b 6 which pertains to information the release of which would constitute a 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I'professional team recognized as leaders in our eld Fu rad Waste Abuse at Department of Defense dociig miilhotiine For more information about whistlebiower protection please see the inside back cover SEW itii Eesemmenetiens We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence develop an overarching policy to prioritize the competing intelligence requirements resulting from the issuing of Guidance for Employment of Force and oint Strategic Capability Plan joint planning tasks to the Combatant Commands CCMD We also recommend that the Director Defense Intelligence Agency BIA in collaboration with the oint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence develop a formal IIPOE training program establish familiarity with processes as a foundational all- source analyst training requirement and ensure adequate training funding is programmed for CCMD assigned Finally we recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence the Director Defense Intelligence Agency and the Uniformed Services address the shortfalls in G'Giibm m and in the DIE establish specific intelligence planning training requirements for both uniformed and civilian intelligence analyst professional education programs and establish career development policies to promote the sustaining of these DIE core competencies enegement Cemments and er Eespense The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy the Under Secretary of Defense for intelligence the Director Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director oint Staff provided comments to this report Management either concurred or partially concurred with all the recommendations Two recommendations still require action plans for implementation Report No i Recommendations Table Under Secretary of Defense for Policy A Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence A 3 1 Director Defense intelligence Agency 3-1 3 2 A Director Joint Staff 3 1 A Please provide comments by October 24 2014 Report No October 10 2014 MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CHAIRMAN IOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF SUBJECT U Assessment of Long Term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities Phase II Report No DODIG-2015-004 U The Deputy IG Intelligence and Special Program Assessments ISPA is providing this report for your information and use We considered management comments on a draft of this report when preparing the final report Comments from the Of ce of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Office of Under Secretary of bill 4 Ci Defense for Intelligence were partially responsive for recommendation A to Mia HM- Jig Therefore we request a plan of actions and milestones on recommendation A as indicated in the recommendations table by October 24 2014 U Comments from the Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Director Defense Intelligence Agency and the Vice Director Ioint Staff were also partially responsive for recommendation B 1 but require a for joint training policy and standards as indicated in the recommendations table by October 24 2014 U Comments from the Director Defense Intelligence Agency were also partially responsive for recommendations B 2a and B 2b but we request speci c details on agency plans for incorporating Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment into analyst training programs as indicated in the recommendations table by October 24 2014 U Please provide comments that conform to the requirements of Directive 7650 3 If possible send your comments in electronic format Adobe Acrobat le only to Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization We are unable to accept the Signed symbol in place of the actual signature Classi ed electronic format comments must be sent via the loint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System IWICS to_ or over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network SIPRNET t Report No DODIG-2015-004 iv seeks- omen U Your comments should state whether you agree or disagree with the recommendations If you agree with a recommendation clearly state that you concur or concur with comment and describe what actions you have taken or plan to take to accomplish the recommendation and include the completion dates of your actions Send copies of documentation supporting the actions you may have already taken If you disagree with the recommendations or any part of them please clearly sate your non-concur and give speci c reasons why you disagree and propose alternative action if that is appropriate ill-F6683 We appreciate the courtesies extended to our staff Please direct questions to me a- 10 i DOIG i nos or w at-_ns Report No Doom-20154104 I Contents it U Background 1 U Objectives 1 U Scope and Methodology 2 Finding A U The eiense Enterprise Needs a PrietitEtetien Plan tn GnEne Ail Seance Aneigtie Reg ufce Al aatigno DWI DGBODBEBBEEBEI 86 I m 89009980009008993080900 09989033 U Current Planning Guidance for 3 U Recent Fiscal Decisions Affecting IIOC Analytic Capability - 4 U How the DIE previously supported oint Operation Planning Processes for Contingency Planning 4 U How the IIOC DIE is now supporting 0th Operation Planning Processes for U The DIE faces dif cult Choices 6 U Conclusions 7 7 U Recommendation Management Comments and Our Response Finding B U inint Prenetetlen et the Onetetienei Eneitnnment is Net Anegneteiy in Ieiense lnteiligence Enternrise Aneiytie Training ti U Requirement for JIPOE Training Across the DIE 11 U IIPOE Training History and Current Status 1 2 U DISAP and Joint Intelligence Training Standards 13 U Conclusions 1 3 U Recommendations Management Comments and Our Response 14 Findng C U The efense intelligence Enterprises Ptneiding Adennete Aneigticei Sennert tn the Ieienee Acneisitien Presets nut Cenld ne 17 U The Defense Acquisition System and Intelligence Support 17 U Continued Analytical Support to the Acquisition System 18 U Structural Analytical Challenges in the Acquisition Cycle 19 Report No vi SEW Increasing Analytical Requirements Limited Analytical Resources 21 Conclusions 23 U @Ehe 2Q - Observation A ib E0 35 3 ic L-Itg IAN U Management Comment 74 U Observation DUB Olqi bm i - in the DIE 74 U Conclusion 75 Ml Appendix A 25 U Scope and Methodology 26 U Limitations 78 U Appe dox 29 Background 29 U Conclusion 30 Ma ageme t C mmentg 31 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 31 Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 32 Director Defense Intelligence Agency 33 Vice Director Joint Staff 36 Acrenyms and 37 ReportNo vii SEW Introduction U Introduction U On August 5 2013 we published Assessment of Long-Term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities which addressed the impact of a 10-plus-year focus on crisis and current intelligence support for activities on the Defense Intelligence Enterpr ise s DIE long-term intelligence analysis capability The assessment captured some of the root causes behind the widely-held View in that over the past decade the DIE had lost long-term analysis production as well as analytic capability We found that the DIE reallocated analytic resources to support the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as other contingency type operations However we found that any assessment of the enterprise s capability to perform long-term intelligence analysis was much more complicated than just competition for analytic capacity U During our interviews for the Assessment of Long-Term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities multiple organizations highlighted the signi cantly diminished science and technology DIE expertise and the prioritizing of analytic efforts to support defense acquisition processes A number of Combatant Commands also expressed concern that certain Defense Intelligence Analysis Program DIAP policies were out Of with the current Guidance for the Employment of Force GEF and joint Strategic Capability Plan USCP -mandated Operations Plan 0PLAN Contingency Plan CONPLAN intelligence production requirement Because our assessment s original scope and methodology precluded us from gathering objective data about both of these issues we included them as Observations I and II respectively in the original report and initiated this follow-on assessment specifically dedicated to these issues now called Assessment of Do Long-Term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities Phase II A detailed discussion of the background to this project is attached as Appendix B Objectives U Assess if the degrading of the long-term intelligence analysis highlighted in Phase I of this project specifically affected analytic intelligence Sapport Report No 1 sewer aim Introduction required for DOD acquisition and campaign planning program requirements We assessed how A U The DIE supported the acquisition mission area with intelligence analysis and was responsive to Directive 5000 01 The Defense Acquisition System 20 November 2007 and Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170 01H Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 10 January 2012 directives B U The DIE addressed the planning mission area with intelligence analysis and was responsive to the joint planning series of directives to include the GEF and ISCP Ni geope and ethodoogv A detailed discussion of our scope and methodology is attached as Appendix A Report No 2 Finding A Finding A The Ieiense nteiigence Enterprse Needs a Prinritizatnn to aide lingource Anaytlc Resource Eiocataon Simultaneously organic CCMD analytic- capacity is shrinking due to recent personnel reductions that fiscal guidance required This requirement- capability mismatch forces each CCMD to reach out to the greater DIE for all- source analytic support From the CCMD perspective each request for outside support should be a high priority for the DIE to address While a collaborative intelligence analysis effort across the DIE would seem a practical response to increased CCMD demand the DIE lacks a prioritization plan at thedepartmental level to guide analytic resource allocation As a result Current I Piannin Guidance Eor U The Joint Planning series of directives--DOD Series Guidance for Employment of Force August 2012 CICSI 3110 01B joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 10 October 199 6 and CICSM 3130 03 Adaptive Planning and Execution 18 October 2012-- specify the policies procedures and formats to be used in the planning required-to conduct military operations across the spectrum of con ict The GEF is the Secretary of Defense s written policy guidance issued through the Office of the Under Report No i 3 SW Finding A Secretary of Defense for Policy for the preparation and review of contingency plans The Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff issues the ISCP to provide guidance on preparation and review of contingency plans which conform to policy guidance from the President and the SECDEF Our interviews with CCMD 1-2 1-3 and 1-5 personnel revealed concerns about the intensifying scope and complexity inherent in the current GEF and ISCP planning and the ability of their organic analytic workforce to provide the desired intelligence crucial to addressing these requirements Specifically the personnel described how the DoD s added emphasis on significantly increases the demand for high-quality intelligence analysis--both in quantity and on topics not necessarily correlating with subject matter experts normally resident at the CCMD 110C level Recent nnalytic CCMD IIOC analytic manpower has been decreasing since the mid 20005 Previous enisinns Affneting i manpower reductions were directed as a result of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence s Re-Balance initiative in the 2008 2009 time frames as well as the Ef ciencies initiative begun in 2010 bull Lug QSDIJS bill Lila 0 new the ii WEE ininf Ineratlnn Planning Precesses Cnntangeney Planning The Joint Operation Planning Process UOPP is initiated when planning guidance is provided to the The IIOCs were responsible for developing JIPOE 3 Report No 4 SEW FindingA analysis pertaining to potential contingencies and significant characteristics of the operational environment resulting from the planning tasks At the same time DIA produced a Dynamic Threat Assessment for each top priority plan identified in the GEF and continuously updated each DTA when changes were made to relevant aspects of the operational environment CCMD intelligence continuously monitored the situation updated existing JIPOE products and initiated new intelligence collection or production requirements to the greater DIE to support the traditional contingency plan being developed OPLAN or CONPLAN Wl How the 3W is new eupportng ioint Iperantin Pannin Proeesses tor OIG lb THE Finding A interviewees in the 1-2 and 1-5 at the stated that the older model of identifying intelligence gaps during the planning process requesting intelligence production from the DIE and then waiting over a certain time period for products was no longer operative Addressing the new TCP planning requirements and responding to I faces ghoices DIA interviewees stated that every CCMD now submits analytic support requirements based on their tasking to develop as their number one priority which forces DIA to prioritize analytic production for the CCMD competing requirements without clear guidance on departmental priorities OSDIJS Multiple DIA senior intelligence managers said that Simultaneously we noted that no senior analytic intelligence manager disputed the need for plans and planning to address but these same managers also mentioned challenges with Report No 6 Finding A At the same time the DIE is also constantly challenged to support the policy community and other national requirements Li Cenclueiens U We agree with the 9 11 Commission Report which stated that importance of integrated all-source analysis cannot be overstated Without it it is not possible to connect the dots No one component holds all the relevant information U Combatant Commanders exercise control over an impressive array of assigned allocated and attached intelligence collection and analytic capabilities Nevertheless these capabilities alone cannot satisfy all the joint force s campaign planning intelligence requirements The CCMDI-Z will have to rely on other elements of both the DIE and the IC for support in order to provide the CCMD with the most accurate intelligence possible in support of their planning tasks As our interviews with both Geographic and Functional CCMD staffs have highlighted are tasked more than ever before with planning for a greater variety of strategic objectives These staff officers also do not foresee any reduction in the demands for a wide spectrum of intelligence analysis necessary to support these planning challenges U Our evaluation identified the desire of senior intelligence managers at the and within the greater DIE for a framework for allocating limited analytic resources to support the ever-increasing planning requirements If every planning task is expected to be a number-one priority DOB U Recemwendatien mar eseenee U Under Secretary of Defense for Policy USD in conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence USD the Director of the Ioint Staff the Combatant Commands and the Defense Intelligence Agency develop and issue an agernent meme end overarching intelligence prioritization and guidance for the Report No 7 SEW Finding A Defense Intelligence Enterprise to improve ail-source analytic intelligence support to Department of Defense planning tasks U Under Secretary of Defense for Policy USD P concurred with the concept that a clearly stated set of integrated intelligence priorities is critical to effectively managing limited analytic resources Because the CCMD planning community represents one of many components of the Department s intelligence customer base they said its priorities must be appropriately integrated with those of other Department customers in arriving at our overall set of integrated intelligence priorities Accordingly they said a product that integrates the intelligence requirements derived from a wide range of sources including from would be valuable to the development of these integrated priorities The USD deferred to the USD on matters of intelligence USD P said they will support USD efforts to ensure that the priorities of all of the Department s intelligence stakeholders are accounted for as part of the intelligence analysis process U Under Secretary of Defense for In telligence The USD 1 concurred that a clear set of integrated priorities is critical to managing analytic resources They also concurred that a product integrating the intelligence requirements from the Guidance for the Employment of the Force and the Joint Strategic Capability Plan would be a valuable input to the deveIOpment of these integrated priorities Accordingly they fully support the USD efforts However they state thatythe CCMD planning community represents only one component of the Department's intelligence customer base and their priorities must be integrated with those of other Department customers in arriving at our overall set of integrated intelligence priorities U Director Defense Intelligence Agency 587941-133 The Director Defense Intelligence Agency Report No 13013102013004 8 seen-yam Finding A L4H U Vice Director joint Sta r The Vice Director Joint Staff concurred with our report and provided inputs from the on the recommendation Eight of nine concurred with our findings and recommendations and one non-concurred 0f the eight who concurred two provided specific inputs on the recommendation agreeing that there is no prioritization plan at the Department level to guide DIE analytic resource allocation One recommended clarifying the recommendation to read and issue overarching intelligence prioritization and guidance to improve all- source analytic intelligence support to Joint Planning The command who non-concurred said that the- serves as an effective prioritization plan for the DIE They also said that the real issue is that many OlosibmiiE - DOD Olelb 7llE - This command felt that was entirely appropriate U Our Response Comments from the joint Staff and the are responsive and while the majority of the agreed with our finding and recommendation we acknowledge the differing viewpoints on intelligence prioritization for joint planning requirements We encourage the to engage with OSD to refine the process for determining joint planning requirements and subsequent intelligence analytic production needs Report NO 9 FindingA Comments from the USD P and USD were partially responsive We accept that the planning requirements are just one component of the Department's intelligence customer base But we also agree with the BIA Director that since 3 that additional guidance is needed from USD in order for the DIE to proceed effectively We believe that a prioritization product jointly prepared by the OSD policy and intelligence offices in coordination with DIA that differentiates between the competing joint planning tasks would enhance intelligence production oyerall efficiency Therefore we request that both USD P and USD provide a program of actions and milestones on recommendation A as indicated in the reCommendations tableon page by October 24 2014- Report No DODIG-2015-004 10 SEW Finding Finding ieint Intelligence e'f the Eneirenment Is Net in efenee intelhenee Enterprise enelytIe Training Prererne U DIE all-source analyst training programs inadequately emphasize and prioritize JIPOE training-which is primarily a result of the misalignment of formal JIPOE training responsibilities subsequent to the US Joint Forces Command As a result itl Requirement fer iiP-E Treinmg eernse the BEE U Joint Publication 2-01 Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations January 5 2012 states that the primary purpose of JIPOE is to support joint operation planning execution and assessment by identifying analyzing and assessing the adversary s center of gravity critical vulnerabilities capabilities decisive points limitations intentions course of actions and reactions to friendly operations based on a holistic View of the operational environment Joint Force Commanders and their staffs are responsible for ensuring that all JIPOE products and analyses are fully integrated into the joint force s operational planning execution and assessment 4 efforts This joint doctrine presents the fundamental principles that guide employing U S I military forces in coordinated and integrated action toward a common objective and promotes a common perspective from which to plan train and conduct military operations U The CJCS issues this doctrinal guidance through the Universal Joint Task List UJTL The UJTL is a common-language menu of tasks that serve as the foundation for joint Report No 11 SEW Finding operations planning across the range of military and interagency operations The UITL supports DOD in conducting joint force development readiness reporting experimentation joint training and education and lessons learned and is the basic language used to develop joint mission essential tasks and agency mission essential task lists are specifically tasked with UITL Strategic Theater 2 4 1 which is called Conduct Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment The Defense Intelligence Analysis Program which DIA manages establishes policies procedures and responsibilities for providing timely objective and cogent military intelligence to all US government customers In the DIAP IIPOE analysis is a speci ed responsibility of geographic CCMD IIOCS While CCMD IIOCs have primary staff responsibility for planning coordinating and conducting overall IIPOE production they must proactively solicit and exploit all possible assistance from other DIE elements interagency partners academia and multinational sources to inform the analysis Ni Traning History and Eurrent Etatus U Prior to 2012 IIPOE training for assigned to as well as other DIE personnel was responsibility This training in the form of a mobile training team MTT was eliminated with disestablishment The balance of funds primarily contract dollars was transferred to DIA and its training element the joint Military Intelligence Training Center which is DoD s school for all-source intelligence training intention was to developka computer-based training CBT course to replace the MTT The IMITC on line course catalog as of April 2014 still lists IIPOE as an additional CBT planned for delivery in FY13 U In addition to the planned CBT DIA Training and Education personnel told us that an introduction to IIPOE was to be included in the new Professional Analyst Career Education Program PACE PACE was introduced in late 2013 to replace current entry-level analyst training program known as the Defense Intelligence Strategic Analysis Program I DISAP However the current PACE 16-week program of instruction allocates only four or five hours of IIPOE discussion interspersed Report No 12 SEW Finding throughout other analytic blocks of instruction and does not present IIPOE as a stand- alone foundation of the CCMD planning construct i sag and joint inteliience Trainng grandards DISAP governs analytic training and certification standards for DIA all-source intelligence to include those assigned to CCMD IIOCS DIA interviewees stated that DISAP was primarily developed to carry out Director of National Intelligence DNI Intelligence Community Directive 203 Analytic Standards However analytic standards for the conduct of IIPOE are speci ed by the CICS through Joint Publication 2- 01 3 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment 16 lune 2009 As previously stated despite being a DIAP task to perform IIPOE the all-source analytic training program for assigned to the DIE does not formally address IIPOE or other joint intelligence standards for analysis to fully satisfy the requirements of the efficiently or expeditiously WE Cenclusions U According to ISCP 2010 the dynamic global security environment requires a exible adaptive approach to planning for the use of military forces to accomplish U S national security objectives must balance and integrate efforts to shape the current environment with preparing to respond to potential contingenCies U The IIPOE process employed by organic CCMD all-source intelligence and supported by other DIE elements provides the basic data and assumptions regarding potential U S adversaries and other relevant aspects of the operational environment that help the and staff execute their assigned planning tasks U The has a mechanism already in place to address the seemingly con icting DNI and joint intelligence analytic training standards The USD 1 has chartered the Intelligence Training and Education Board to lead in collaboration with the intelligence and security components the integration of the training education and professional development program of the DIE One of the specified responsibilities Report No 13 sewer-em Finding of the DITEB is to coordinate with other components and non-DOD elements on issues of common concern U Recommendations Comments and 0 Response U Recommendation 3 1 U Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence develop and issue enterprise standards for analytical professional development programs encompassing the educational requirements for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Training for the Defense Intelligence Enterprise This action should be accomplished in coordination with the Director Joint Staff and the Director Defense Intelligence Agency U Under Secretary of Defense for In telligen ce Hy-12939 The USD I agreed with the need for appropriate JIPOE training for Defense intelligence and concurred with the recommendation that JIPOE training requirements be integrated into the standards for analytic professional development programs However they noted that while USD 1 oversees the joint intelligence training process the Joint Staff is responsible for developing joint analytic training standards As such the Director Joint Staff not the USD 1 was the appropriate designee in coordination with the Director Defense Intelligence Agency to implement this recommendation They also recommended that the phrase enterprise standards be replaced with joint standards U Director Defense Intelligence Agency The Director DIA partially concurred and agreed that such an initiative is needed However in accordance with the Agency's responsibility for developing DIE- Report No 14 SEW Finding l3 wide analytic training standards the Director DIA is the appropriate designee to implement the recommendation U Vice Director joint Sta The Vice Director Joint Staff concurred with the report and commented that standards for training of the Joint Force are set by the Joint Staff J7 in collaboration with the Services and stakeholders and implemented by the Director DIA U Our Response Comments from the USD Director DIA and the Joint Staff are partially responsive and we accept the suggestion from the Joint Staff to rephrase recommendation 8 1 However we still believe that the Department lacks clarity on who has the ultimate responsibility of ensuring joint analytic intelligence training standards are established and incorporated into Defense Intelligence Training programs It is beyond the scope of our evaluation to adjudicate any dispute over primary OPR responsibility between the Joint Staff and the Director DIA as the Functional Manager for Intelligence Analysis within the DIE for analytic training standards Therefore we request that the USD Joint Staff and the Director DIA develop a on revised recommendation 3 1 as indicated in the recommendations table on page by September XX 2014 U Revised Recommendation 3 1 U We recommend that the USD 1 develop policy mandating joint intelligence standards including JIPOE be incorporated into Defense Intelligence training Joint intelligence standards should be established by the Joint Staff incorporated into overall DIE standards in conjunction with the Director DIA as the Functional Manager for Intelligence Analysis and training executed as required by the functional organization responsible U Recommendation B 2 A U Director Defense Intelligence Agency complete the development and dissemination of the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Report No 15 sewer-9w Finding Environment Computer Based Training in CY 2014 and make it readily available to all Defense Intelligence Enterprise all-source U Recommendation 3 2 3 U Director Defense Intelligence Agency develop a to expand highlight integrate and emphasize the critical role the loint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment process plays in the Department of Defense Campaign Planning environment during initial all-source intelligence analyst training either in the Professional Analyst Career Education Program or the Defense Intelligence Strategic Analysis Program I U Director Defense Intelligence Agency The Director DIA partially concurred with our recommendations DIA believes that the entry-level PACE program s current treatment of is adequate particularly given the breadth of topics requiring coverage in PACE and because IIPOE is specifically a CCMD responsibility However DIA will explore adding JIPOE to the advanced PACE program currently in development and agrees with the recommendation for a IIPOE specialty course for those needing a more comprehensive treatment of the subject DIA will also explore a IIPOE computer-based training course for DIE all source U Our Response Comments from the Director DIA are partially responsive We agree that the entry- level PACE program s current treatment of IIPOE satis es the intent of our recommendation However we request more specific details on the plan for incorporating a more comprehensive treatment of IIPOE into the advanced PACE program currently under development and therefore request a program of actions and milestones as indicated in the recommendations table on page by October 24 2014 DIA did also agree to explore a JIPOE computer-based training course but our recommendation B 1 indicated that the IMITC course catalog listed this as a planned 2014 action We request more information on whether the computer-based training course will be a stand alone capability or will the content be incorporated into either the entry-level or advanced PACE programs I Report No 16 seen-women Finding Finding The Ieiense Intel enee Enterprise is Eree dnf Qdeeuate Qhaletieai Suepert tn the IQfensQ Acqellstien Erotess but Ceeid he mprened U We found no evidence that the analytical shortfalls identified in our Assessment of DOD Long-Term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities report have resulted in a significant negative impact on the support that the DIE provides to the defense acquisition process While our interviews with senior Service Acquisition decision makers revealed overall intelligence-related shortfalls in the acquisition system we could not determine a specific linkage to our Phase One findings Furthermore most of the individuals in the organizations we interviewed were satisfied with the quality of support they received from the DIE the Acquisition System and intellgence Suepert The Defense Acquisition System as defined by 5000 01 is management process by which provides effective affordable and timely systems to the users The specific support requirements for the DIE are found in 5000 02 Operation of the Defense Acquisition System 8 December 2008 Currently the scope of intelligence support to acquisition programs is determined by the program s size with the largest- Acquisition Category ACAT 1 programs--receiving the most support For these programs intelligence analysis is provided at almost every stage of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System ICIDS process U The ICIDS process is very specific and involves many milestones and stages through which an acquisition program proceeds before it enters production and becOmes operational While a thorough description of the ICIDS process is beyond this report s scope it is a well established process that the DIE has historically supported This Report No 17 SEW Finding support typically consists of analyzing intelligence collected on foreign weapon system developments that may threaten the US system s ability to conduct its mission once operational and then throughout its life cycle U Intelligence threat analysis is conducted at different stages in a program s development A The analysis in an early stage takes the form of a Capstone Threat Assessment providing an overview of threats to such areas of potential warfare as air and land warfare and information operations OnCe a material solution is identified threat analysis concentrates on a general assessment of the environment in which the system will operate and is embedded in such various requirements documents as the Initial Capabilities Document 1CD the Capabilities Development Document CDD and the Capabilities Production Document CPD As the weapon system takes shape and is further refined and its capabilities and operational parameters are determined the threat analysis becomes more speci c and tailored to the individual program For larger programs this analysis has typically been provided in the form of a System Threat Assessment Report STAR U The DIE also supports the defense acquisition system with other intelligence products such as intelligence mission data IMD and engineering and test phase intelligence analysis These other types of products overlap--putting them in categories would be oversimplifying matters Often raw intelligence data must be analyzed before it can be used in weapon system testing or be provided in the form of IMD For this report s purpose we focused our efforts on the intelligence analysis that the DIE produced and did not examine the provision of IMD to acquisition programs as it was beyond this project s scope Our objective was to determine if our Phase One findings had a direct causal relationship to providing intelligence analysis that the defense acquisition community requires U Cnntunued Anaytcai tn the Acauisiten System U We interviewed senior leaders in each Service Acquisition office to gain insight into how the DIE was currently providing analytic intelligence support for new systems development We also interviewed senior representatives from offices responsible for Report No 1300102015004 18 sewer-sari Finding system requirement development and those associated with program development and sustainment to include the Program Executive Offices We found no substantive evidence that the DIE provided a systematic reduction in the quantity or quality of analytic support Our interviewees were uniformly satisfied with the analytical intelligence products provided for their programs However they did identify some aspects of their analytical requirements that were not completely satisfied For example one organization stated it had problems getting intelligence collection for speci c electronic warfare signals to meet program testing requirements In this case the individuals interviewed could not identify why a requirements shortfall existed or if it only involved a case of con icting intelligence collection priorities Another organization said the analysis it received on foresee weesses systems U This assessment was to determine if any of these identified shortfalls could be directly attributed to the Phase One findings -a lack of subject-matter expertise or a misalignment of production priorities in DIAP Our evaluation determined that these issues are part of the ongoing challenges of addressing competing priorities in the entire national intelligence community and not a systematic breakdown in analytic support due to the DIE focus on satisfying crisis-intelligence requirements til atructural Analytical Challenges in the eceulsitlen Wale U Our evaluation did reveal one issue that many Of the organizations identified as an evolving problem area During the earliest phases of the acquisition process a determination is made whether or not to seek a material solution to a potential gap in capability Once a material solution is selected it is further refined and eventually becomes a weapon-system program of record At the initiation of Milestone in the acquisition process the weapon system is usually assigned a program office and enters the engineering and manufacturing development phase By this point in the developmental cycle major changes to the weapon system are highly unlikely without considerable risk to the acquisition and funding time-table Many of the organizations Report No Dome-20150041 19 seen-seesaw Finding we interviewed identified a basic structural issue with the intelligence analysis provided Early in the acquisition process when intelligence information can have the biggest impact in shaping overall system development Service Intelligence Centers managers told us that havedif culty providing the desired intelligence insights because the weapon system is still in a conceptual phase They said that significant analytic challenges are associated with comparing actual and or potential adversarial capabilities against a conceptual program with evolving capabilities For example one DIE organization stated that assessing the capabilities of As a result the requirements community is forced to make decisions on developing weapon systems based largely on generic intelligence regarding the potential threat environment When the re ned weapon system has known capabilities and operating parameters the DIE will then be able to refine the threat analysis to account for actual specifications Using the previous example once actual system data is available regarding radar cross section and counter-measures - the DIE provides tailored intelligence analysis comparing foreign threats to actual weapons system capabilities However a number of PEOs stated U Users of analytical information agreed that the DIE could help matters by providing more speci c information earlier in the developmental process when it can better shape requirements However to achieve this end the organization's developing system requirements will have to work more closely with its DIE counterparts to better identify its critical intelligence needs As an example of where this is already working one U S Navy Program Office stated that the Office of Naval Intelligence 0N1 is producing- This now routine Report No 000164015004 I 20 Finding interaction ensures that the intelligence better understand the requirements under development throughout the acquisition cycle US Navy requirements personnel were able to highlight the significance of intelligence gaps and refinement of intelligence collection that would not have been readily evident to intelligence in the greater DIE We were unable to visit every Service program of ce to determine if this intelligence program office interaction was a common practice The Service Acquisition Intelligence Directors told us that this high degree of interaction was rare and that in fact the levels of interaction greatly varied--usually with increases occurring in conjunction with large program decision milestones or in support of major documentation such as STAR development increasing eneyticei Requirements Limited Analytcal Reseercee U One other concern several organizations raised involved the level of analytical effort required to support acquisition decision processes In most cases the service intelligence elements supporting their acquisition program offices are rather small-- sometimes consisting of only_ intelligence These small organic elements are usually only a conduit to the greater DIE for general analytical intelligence production These small groups of are responsible for re ning the general intelligence products based on their detailed knowledge of program-specific requirements Many of our interviewees expressed concern that the workloadto support ongoing and future acquisition programs with refined intelligence analysis will 31 5 only increase However these Service intelligence elements also told us Several factors were highlighted pointing to future requirement growth U A relatively new requirement being levied against all developmental systems is for Intelligence Mission Data IMD 5250 01 Management of Intelligence Mission Data 22 January 2013 defines MD as intelligence used for programming platform mission systems in development testing operations and sustainment including but not limited to the functional areas of signatures electronic warfare integrated reprogramming order of battle systems characteristics and performance Report No DODIG-2015-004 21 Finding and geospatial intelligence While reviewing the actual IMD process was not an objective of this evaluation several intelligence organizations stated that the Senior Service Intelligence Center managers told us that the OSDLIS analytic community U 5000 02 Operation of the Defense Acquisition System 8 December 2008 mandates that a full STAR be written only for ACAT I programs A shorter System Threat Assessment was required for ACAT 11 programs For ACAT ill and below no specific threat assessment was required beyond those inputs to such requirements documents as the Capability Development Document and Capability Production Document Senior Intelligence Managers said bl l5 These managers told us that this requirement would result in a One Service intelligence organization told us that the number of STARS it supports in a year could 5 jump from Finally the development timeline of larger weapons systems has increased and once operational these systems have much longer life-cycles which present a unique challenge to the DIE to estimate potential threats to these weapon systems much farther into the future--in some cases extending out to 30 years Report 22 SEW-RN Finding WE Cenciusions U The DIE appears to have weathered the increased demand for all-source intelligence analysis to support the Global War on Terror while at the same time providing an adequate level of intelligence to the defense acquisition community Our project scope was to determine if any perceived shortfalls were due to a lack of subject-matter expertise or a misalignment of production priorities in the DIE We found no evidence to support that hypothesis therefore our evaluation results do not support any speci c recommendations for this nding U We arrive at this judgment partially due to our view that the DIE is an integral component of the current acquisition community and processes for conducting intelligence analysis for acquisition programs are well understood Also the requirements for intelligence collection and analysis supporting new weapon system development usually falls into the category of traditional military intelligence analysis to include the deciphering of capabilities of potential adversarial weapons systems Fortunately the DIE today has extensive experience and the resident expertise for 0 1 ng this type 0f intelligence U Finally the Commander Air Force Life Cycle Management Center said at a recent forum for acquisition leaders that rate of technology advancement and proliferationis increasing The importance of intelligence that enables mission capability and ensures our systems can meet the emerging threat has never been The new and Addressing this iSsue starts during concept development and continues throughout the full life-cycle of modern weapons systems Management of intelligence as a component of acquisition programs is important to ensuring our modern weapon systems are in fact intelligent Report No 23 serene- em Other Observations U Other Observations ml DIA lel 1 4m 1 4lgll I L461 1 4m 1 4 34 hill l4t L413 leH 9 4tg management iemment 34 11 1 4 bill insematien to U Intelligence Planning expertise and capacity have been significantly reduced in the DIE We were also informed by CCMD and Joint Staff representatives during the 080 IS MKS maul assessment that much like Report No 5 004 24 ens-W Other Observations QUE Concleson U We believe action should be taken to comprehensively address Our observations track closely with previous Service Joint Staff Combat Support Agency Review Teams and General Accounting Of ce reports that already documented these serious shortfalls Therefore the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence should immediately begin working with the Director DIA and the Uniformed Services to address these shortfalls The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence should DOD establish specific nd intelligence planning training requirements for both uniformed and civilian intelligence incorporate these standards in the DIE professional education programs and establish career development policies to promote sustainment of these DIE core competencies Report No 25 sewer-elm Appendixes U Appendix A Ni gmne and ethndoegv U The evaluation was conducted from February 2013 to November 2013 in accordance with Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation that the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Ef ciency issued Those standards require that we plan and perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient appropriation evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our evaluation objectives U To achieve our objectives for the review of Intelligence Analysis support to Acquisition we 0 U Reviewed policy and directives and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions and Defense Intelligence Enterprise procedures regarding intelligence analysis required to support the Defense Acquisition System 0 U Interviewed U S Army U S Navy and U S Air Force Service Acquisition Authority Principals and staff to obtain their perspectives 0 U Interviewed U S Army U S Navy and U S Air Force Service Acquisition Management Commands responsible for Research Development Test and Evaluation to obtain their perspectives 0 U Interviewed U S Army U S Navy and U S Air Force Service Program Executive Office Principals and staff to obtain their perspectives 0 U Interviewed U S Army U S Navy and U S Air Force Command future service requirements representatives to obtain their perspectives U Interviewed U S Army U S Navy and U S Air Force Command intelligence representatives to obtain their perspectives Report No 26 95W Appendixes U Interviewed U S Army U S Navy and U S Air Force Service Intelligence Centers to obtain their perspectives U To achieve our objectives for the review of Intelligence Analysis support to Campaign Planning we U Reviewed and Office of the Director of National Intelligence ODNI policy and doctrine regarding intelligence preparation of the operational environment National Unified Intelligence Strategies Defense Intelligence Strategies intelligence community-wide lessons- learned papers Ioint Strategic Capabilities Plans and Defense Planning Guidance U Interviewed USSTRATCOM USPACOM and USTRANSCOM General Officers Senior Executive Service and Directors from the Operations Plans and intelligence Directorates for their Views on the current state of intelligence analysis in support of their tasked planning requirements U Interviewed Under Secretary of Defense for Policy OUSD representatives from Strategy Plans and Forces to obtain their perspectives U Interviewed Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence OUSD representatives from Warfighter Support and Intelligence Strategy Programs and Resources to obtain their perspectives U Interviewed ODNI National Intelligence Managers to obtain their perspectives U Interviewed CJCS 1-2 1-5 and 1-8 Directors and Staff Officers to obtain their perspectives U Interviewed Service Intelligence Personnel to obtain their perspectives Report 27 Appendixes 0 U Interviewed Defense Intelligence Agency representatives from the Directorate of Analysis Defense Intelligence Office Ioint Warfighter Support Collection Management Of ce of Training Education and Development and multiple Regional Intelligence Centers to obtain their perspectives Limitations U We did not evaluate the actual intelligence analysis that the DIE produced for on- going acquisition programs or operational CCMD planning efforts Our efforts were focused on identifying whether the key findings from Phase I of this project also affected the intelligence community's ability to provide intelligence analysis to these two key DOD mission activities ReportNo 28 SEW Appendixes U Appendix U achground U This assessment was originally initiated in response to requests recommendations from multiple CCMD staffs and was intended to complement the then-draft 2012 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Intelligence Review of Defense Intelligence Analysis Representatives from OUSD 1 Defense Analysis and this office met early in 2 012 to decon ict focus areas in order to minimize duplication of effort U During our initial project s field work multiple leaders in the DIE expressed concern about the - expertise that the DIE possesses and the prioritizing of analytic efforts to support defense acquisition processes U Our interviews with Service Intelligence Centers and selected DIA of ces revealed that me he_ Our interviewees offered subjective and anecdotal reasons for these shortfalls In addition to concerns expressed about analytic capability to support current and future acquisition efforts _ these same interviewees also felt that OSDMS U Multiple also expressed concerns that certain DIAP analytic time-frame reporting requirements were inconsistent with the Joint Strategic Capability Plans and Guidance for Employment of Force-mandated intelligence production requirements U Our assessment interviews revealed general concerns from CCMD 1-2 1-3 and 1-5 personnel about the current DIAP management guidance for the Geographic CCMD GCC Speci cally these representatives detailed how ee Jeep and see ReportNo DODIG-2015-OO4 29 SEW Appendixes requirements During our interviews we were unable to solicit specific instances where the DIAP guidance affected a command s development Therefore we made no judgment at that time on the validity of these concerns Coneiusion U Because our assessment s original scope and methodology precluded us from gathering objective data about shortfalls in specific acquisition intelligence analytic programs we felt it appropriate to capture their concerns as Observation I in the final report U We were also unable to gather objective data about Specific CCMD intelligence analytic requirements and potential shortfalls But we captured these concerns as Observation II in the nal report U This assessment was therefore initiated to specifically address these two issues and is hereby referred to as Phase II of this project Report No 30 SEW Management Comments Management Comments Dneier geeretnry oi eiense for Policy OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON D C 20301-2000 POLICY August i9 2014 SUBJECT Response to Dot IG Drtt Report Assessing the Long-Term intelligence Analysis Capabilities Phase This memorandum responds to the request for comments on 00D 0 Project No D20i2- 000000-0186 0l Assessment ol Long-Tenn Intelligence Analysis Capabilities i hnse ii 08 Policy was requested to comment on Finding recommending an overarching policy to prioritize competing intelligence requirements We concur with the concept that it clearly stated set of integrated intelligence priorities is critical to effectively managing limited analytic resources Because the Combatant Command planning community represents one of many components of the Department's intelligence customer base its priorities must be appropriately integrated with those of other Department customers in arriving at our overall set of integrated intelligence priorities Accordingly we believe as product that the intelligence requirements derived from a wide range of sources including From Combatant Commands Would be valuable to the development of these integrated priorities 'ihe Oilice of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy deters to the Of ce of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence on matters of intelligence OUSDP will continue to support efforts to ensure that the priorities of all or the Department's intelligence stakeholders are accounted for as part or the intelligence analysis process ut our comment please contact DOD u to ctr-mm Dr Mara Kcriin Principal Director Force Development Attachment As stated Report No 31 SEW Management Comments OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HOOD DEFENSE PENTAGON DC 20301 8000 Aura MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS SUBJ U Response to Dratt Report Assessment of Long-Term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities Phase Project No Ul m Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the subject report Our comments below are keyed to those recommendations calling for action by I ll W Recommendation A Intelligence prioritization guidance We concur that a clear set of integrated intelligence priorities is eritieai to managing analytic resources We also concur that a product integrating the intelligence requirements from the Guidance For the Iimpioyment ot tlte Force and the loint Strategic apahility Plan would be a valuable input to the development of these integrated priorities Accordingly we will fully support the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy's efforts However it is important to routine that the Comhalant planning community represents only one contponent ofthe I epartment s intelligence customer hate and their priorities must be integrated with those of other Department customers in arriving at our overall set oi integrated intelligence priorities 0 WW Recommendation BJ Joint intelligence Preparation oi the Operational Environment JIPOE training standards We agree with the need for appropriate Jil mi training for Defense Intelligence and concur with the recommendation that training requirements be integrated into the standards for analytic professional programs However while the oversees the joint intelligence training process the Joint Stati is responsible for developing joint analytic training standards As such the Director Joint Staff not the USDU is the appropriate dcsignee in coordination with the Director Defense intelligence Agency to implement this recommendation We also the phrase enterprise standards in line two of the recommendation be changed to joint standards osoos mm 4m Lac We would also like to comment on Observation A regarding 1 4m DH it L-Itni digit 1 4m Hie kit s 4 Derived from Multiple Source-s on zit Jul 2024 Report No DODIG-2015-004 32 Management Comments Under Eeammw a ame Em I Iran Thank a_ain fort L My point ofcomact is DOD 0'93 ML HM Higgins Director for Defense Intelligence Intelligence Security Report No 33 SEW Management Comments eienee lntellgenee A eney DEFENSE AGENCY or Erma-sum 05 2014 To Ms Margaret R Posa Acting Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Intelligence Evaluations Department of Defense Of ce of the Inspector General 4800 Mark Center Drive Alexandria VA 22350-1500 Subject Defense Intelligence Agency Response to the Department of Defense Inspector General Report Assessment of Del Long-Term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities Phase I i Reference c Department of Defense Inspector General Draft Report Assessment oi Dot - Long-Term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities Phase July 7 2014 Document is W I As requested in the Reference the Defense Intelligence Agency DIA provides the following comments regarding report recommendations A B l and 8 2 2 Recommendation A The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence USDUD DIA the Combatant Commands and the Joint Staff develop a policy to prioritize competing intelligence requirements resulting from Guidance for Employment of Force Joint Strategic Capability Plan planning tasks DIA t3 5 USC 3tlZ-lti 3 Recommendation B I USDU develop and issue Enterprise standards for professional development and analytic professional development programs encompassing cducntionnl requirements for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment JIPOE Report No 34 SEW-RN Management Comments Erector Deiense nteligenee Agency I training This action should be accomplished in coordination with the Director Joint Staff and the Director DIA a DIA partially concurs with this recommendation DIA agrees that such an initiative is needed However in accordance with the Agency s responsibility for developing DIE- wide analytic training standards the Director DIA is the appropriate designee to implement this recommendation 4 Recommendation 3 2 DIA complete development and dissemination of computer- based training in calendar year 2014 and make it readily available to all DIE all-source DIA develop a plan of action and milestones to expand highlight integrate and emphasize the role JIPOE has in the campaign planning environment during the initial all-source analyst training either in the Professional Analyst Career Education PACE program or the Defense Intelligence Analysis Program a DIA partially concurs with this recommendation DIA believes that the entry-level PACE program s current treatment of IPOE is adequate particularly given the breadth of topics requiring coverage in PACE and because JIPOE is speci cally a CCMD responsibility However DIA will explore adding IPOE to the advanced PACE program currently in development and agrees with the recommendation for a JIPOE specialty course for those needing a more comprehensive treatment of the subject DIA will also explore a JIPOE computer-based training course for DIE all-source 5 -oint of contact for this matter i_ Directorate for Analysis 9 1H6 9 4 David R Shedd Acting Director Report No 35 clamor-ens Management Comments THE JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON Dc Reply Zip Code DJSM 0222-14 20318-0300 8 August 2014 MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUBJECT Draft DODIG Department Ol Defense Long Term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities Phase Juiy 7 2014 1 Thank you for the opportunity to review the subject report Based on a review within the Joint Staff and at the Combatant Commands the Joint Staff concurs with the report and offers one comment 13115 t7ltE DOD llU ll 1 3 i have enclosed the responses from the for your consideration My point for this Rear Admiral Pnul Becker Deputy Director for intelligence Joint Staff 703-695 tee RUDESHEIM Major General USA Vice Director Joint Staff Attachment CCMD Responses Unclassi ed when separated from attachment ReportNo 36 Acronyms and Abbreviations U Acronyms and Abbreviations ACAT CBT CCMD CDD COA COG CONPLAN CPD DIAP DIE DISAP DNI DTA DoDi GCC EF AcouisitiOn Category Computer Based Training Combatant Command Capabilities Development Document Course of Action Centers of Gravity Contingency Plan Capabilities Production Document Defense intelligence Analysis Program Defense Intelligence Enterprise Defense Intelligence Strategic Analysis Program Director of National Intelligence Department of Defense Directive Dynamic Threat Assessment Department of Defense instruction Geographic Combatant Command Guidance for Employment of Force intelligence Community Initial Capabilities Document Inspector General Intelligence Mission Data Joint Capabilities integration and Development System Joint Force Commander Joint intelligence Operations Center Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Joint Military intelligence Training Center Joint Operational Planning and Execution System Joint Operational Planning Process Joint Strategic Capability Plan Report No 37 Acronyms and Abbreviations MIP MTT ONI OPLAN OSD PACE SCMR STA STAR DIG TIA UJTL Military Intelligence Program Mobile Training Team Office of Naval Intelligence Operations Plan Office of the Secretary of Defense Professional Analyst Career Education Program Strategic Choices and Management Review System Threat Assessment System Threat Assessment Report Theater intelligence Assessment Universal Joint Task List sewer-eme- Report No 38 Whistleblower Protection S DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 requires I lib-the Inspector General to designate a Whistleblower Protection 'I-I-Ombudsman to educate agency employees about prohibitions I on retaliation and rights and remedies against retaliation for disclosures The designated ombudsman is the Hotline Director For more information on your rights and remedies against retaliation visit dodig mil progrems whistleblower - more information about 1G i reports 01' aCtivities please contact us Congressional Liaison 703 604 8324 Media Contact public affairs@dodig mil 703 604 8324 Update Reports Mailing List Twitter Del Hotline dodigmil hotline SEW-FERN I gigging 7 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu