2d Marine Division Jacob Brewer Marines fire howitzer at targets near western Baghdad Obstacles to Effective Joint Targeting to strategic targeting vulnerabilities that military and policy leaders would do well to appreciate Indeed to succeed in joint warfare commanders and staff must understand both the critical need for effective joint targeting and its inherent limitations Notwithstanding the most precise and capable weaponry ever any targeting effort absent coherent strategy or executed outside the art and rules of war can spell campaign defeat—even amidst tactical successes In analyzing Operation Iraqi Freedom Operation Enduring Freedom and the war on terror the varied methodologies employed across Services components headquarters and intelligence centers demonstrate several challenging obstacles to achieving the aims of joint targeting efficiency effectiveness and strategic success 1 U S Army Gary Kieffer US Navy John Taucher Doctrinal Problems Sea Sparrow missile launches from USS Bataan after locking onto target during exercise By J o h n P a t c h Soldiers fire FGM–148 Javelin antitank missile T argeting in the good old days was relatively simple Physical technological and informational limitations meant that most bombs missed their targets Warfighters shrugged off inevitable misses and the media did not play up unintended civilian deaths Even as recently as Operation Desert Storm warriors and statesmen did not confront today’s com- bination of complex weapon systems amorphous nonstate adversaries restrictive rules of engagement and the real-time impact of ubiquitous press coverage The contemporary potential strategic impact of a single errant munition simply was not a factor Indeed no foe can beat the modern-day American military machine in combined arms warfare yet this machine is subject Commander John Patch USN is a Naval Intelligence Officer currently assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence 74     JFQ    issue 45 2 d quarter 2007 Ample joint and Service targeting fires doctrine currently exists but no single document or compendium establishes universal standards or integrates proven concepts and methods across Services or at the different levels of warfare 2 In addition not all warfighters follow or are even aware of joint doctrine ostensibly the U S military benchmark and Joint Staff directives do not necessarily shape combatant command targeting efforts Joint doctrine also focuses almost exclusively on air-to-ground munitions while Service publications concentrate on indigenous weapons systems platforms and tactics techniques procedures TTPs Army targeting doctrine for instance centers on field artillery and establishes a methodology dissimilar to the joint targeting cycle Similarly terminology differences across Services and between operators and intelligence analysts create confusion high-value target means completely different things in different targeting fires publications Extant doctrine also fails to address adequately the post-9 11 lessons such as the limitations of U S heavy weapons in urban warfare—demonstrated vividly in Army and Marine operations in Najaf and Fallujah The myriad publications spend far too little time emphasizing the most important aspects of the targeting cycle the crucial first and last phases Excessive focus on weapon selection mission planning and execution occurs while target categories critical nodes and individual targets are developed often before strategic objectives are even identified n d upress ndu edu Form Approved OMB No 0704-0188 Report Documentation Page Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response including the time for reviewing instructions searching existing data sources gathering and maintaining the data needed and completing and reviewing the collection of information Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Services Directorate for Information Operations and Reports 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway Suite 1204 Arlington VA 22202-4302 Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number 1 REPORT DATE 3 DATES COVERED 2 REPORT TYPE 2007 00-00-2007 to 00-00-2007 4 TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a CONTRACT NUMBER Obstacles to Effective Joint Targeting 5b GRANT NUMBER 5c PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6 AUTHOR S 5d PROJECT NUMBER 5e TASK NUMBER 5f WORK UNIT NUMBER 7 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME S AND ADDRESS ES 8 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER Office of Naval Intelligence 4251 Suitland Place Washington DC 20395-5720 9 SPONSORING MONITORING AGENCY NAME S AND ADDRESS ES 10 SPONSOR MONITOR’S ACRONYM S 11 SPONSOR MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER S 12 DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release distribution unlimited 13 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14 ABSTRACT 15 SUBJECT TERMS 16 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF a REPORT b ABSTRACT c THIS PAGE unclassified unclassified unclassified 17 LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT 18 NUMBER OF PAGES Same as Report SAR 4 19a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Standard Form 298 Rev 8-98 Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 Pat c h If distilling the varied Service and mensuration joint TTPs While joint targeting doctrine becomes publications the Joint Staff provides targeting too hard then it will not be oversight it does not have true spend too followed especially in the highenforcement powers the authority little time tempo combat environment to set standards outside DOD or emphasizing the personnel to staff a contingency Doctrine must balance the most change and continuity as joint targeting organization 6 The important dynamic warfare environments semiannual Joint Staff Military emerge 3 In the end applied aspects of the Targeting Committee is not operational art not doctrine targeting cycle enough alone must stress the critical the crucial first importance of asking the two Targeting Mission Creep and last phases key questions associated with Traditional targeteer tradethe first and last steps Is this a craft revolves around a narrow valid target in keeping with the area of expertise kinetic ordnance commander’s intent U S national security typically delivered by aircraft Since 9 11 strategy and American values Was the some Service joint task force staffs morphed desired effect achieved and did it contribute targeting fires cells into effects-based EB to the strategy entities simply by expanding missions and requirements outside kinetics often without Minimal Joint TTPs the requisite training or capabilities While The various Services and warfare comnonkinetic fires and other EB efforts are munities develop and use different targeting important developments within defense transsystems and TTPs and do not train enough formation and a critical component of any toward joint operations which occasionally strategy attempting to turn targeteers into “EB translates into ineffective and inefficient tarwarriors” is inherently unwise It is like asking geting fires in combat Furthermore Service a psychiatrist to conduct dental work and joint “train and equip” headquarters do Furthermore EB organization leaders not effectively incorporate real world lessons often have not attended basic targeting and into predeployment training and force strucfires training alongside other EB curricula ture equipping 4 No military or civilian body The JDAM is but one tool in the effects at a level above the Department of Defense arsenal but expert advice on delivering one DOD enforces targeting TTP standards For efficiently and effectively is inherently the instance the Joint Targeting School JTS targeteers’ responsibility Foisting nascent and while an ideal forum for reinforcing common arcane mission areas on targeteers will only doctrine and TTPs is not truly joint Despite distract them from their already complex and the “purple” JTS staff Navy and Marine specialized work personnel are the main attendees Some Army fires personnel do attend but Air Force Service Legacies targeting instruction focuses on a separate Almost 20 years after Goldwatercurriculum across the country—attended by Nichols pervasive Service legacies that hinder few if any Army Navy or Marine personnel efficient and effective targeting endure 7 SepaAnother example is the inconsistent use rate procurement development and fielding of the modernized integrated database MIDB of target acquisition systems and munitions— across the Services combatant commands some of which are incompatible with other and interagency community U S Central Services8—remain a barrier to successful joint Command USCENTCOM for instance uses targeting Furthermore dissimilar aircraft MIDB as the authoritative source of registered weapons targeting systems and predeploymensurated aim points whereas other comment training result in operational forces batant commands do not The Services also learning about inter-Service dichotomies only use at least three separate systems to derive amidst the melee of real world combat mensurated coordinates5—each with separate Legacy single-Service targeting practices funding training and hardware software promote parochialisms that inhibit joint fires One need only imagine the result of imprecise In components where one Service is predomicoordinates for a 2 000-pound joint direct nant such as the Air Force at the Coalition attack munition JDAM in an urban center Forces Air Component Command CFACC to emphasize the importance of common Service legacy systems and perspectives hold ndupres s ndu edu sway over targeting and fires Moreover the Air Force closely guards its ground-based link to air support via the Joint Terminal Air Controller JTAC cadre ensuring that nuances of airpower remain an arcane art to most Soldiers Service legacies exacerbate competing joint priorities and rivalries—at extremes manifested by motivation for sole Service recognition Repeat general flag officer allegations of divergent component targeting fires priorities amid combat operations provide historical examples Subjective postconflict munitions effectiveness assessments due to Service biases are another Few Qualified Targeteers Some personnel serve in targets billets without essential training and operational experience becoming targeteers overnight Targeting itself also means different things to different Services and warfare communities A Special Forces targeteer may be an expert at fixed-wing gunship fire support wall breaching and time-sensitive targeting during small-scale operations but may have zero ability to develop and employ a targeting strategy against an adversary integrated air defense system Similarly JTACs may be qualified to call in precision weapons from Air Force aircraft to support troops in contact but may have little understanding of joint targeting principles or may not have ever accomplished a collateral damage estimate Warfighters at all levels should apply scrutiny to those calling themselves targeteers A true targeteer should ideally have attended JTS or the Air Force equivalent have a proven operational targeting record and demonstrate proficiency in joint Service targeting systems software applications and weaponeering fundamentals Targeting cell leaders should also have completed joint professional military education and be able leaders and managers of large organizations under real world crisis operational tempos The art and science of targeting revolves around mastery of highly specialized areas such as the law of armed conflict weapons physics delivery parameters and fusing statistics target development nodal analysis all-source intelligence fusion and geodesy Of note an especially dire shortage of qualified battle damage assessment BDA analysts exists BDA efforts are often doomed to failure and few targeteers seek to specialize in it Finally a weaponeer is not a targeteer whereas tarissue 45 2 d quarter 2007    JFQ        75 Joint Targeting Overreliance on Technology Quantum leap technological advances have vastly improved the fidelity and rapidity of target prosecution Compressed timelines associated with fleeting high-value targets however drastically reduce the ability to make objective assessments of all data for informed recommendations to commanders A pilot for example identifies an antiaircraft artillery piece via a targeting pod and seeks permission to drop immediately deeming the piece a threat to friendly aircraft Current electrooptical infrared targeting pods allow aircrew to discern potential targets not identifiable only a few years ago headquarters can even receive still images of the “threat ” Suddenly the commander himself is virtually on the trigger more empowered to grant prompt weapons release What is sometimes missing however is the targeteer who can pinpoint target location give a confidence level to target identification and provide situational context that is assess threat collateral damage estimate military advantage and probability of destruction based on weapon delivery platform If an antiaircraft artillery piece was within a civilian neighborhood and the only weapon available was a 2 000-pound JDAM or if target data came from a pilot who is unfamiliar with the terrain and threat from a single pass at 20 000 feet at 500 knots what might the consequences be Visual data no matter how obtained is still “single source” information A sufficiently informed commander might deem the threat not so dire that munitions should be employed without due diligence Herein lies the critical value-added input of the targeteer Other advances in targeting command control such as the Automated Deep Operations Coordination System9 and secure voice over Internet protocol telephony vastly enhance connectivity and awareness among joint headquarters and the interagency community but more knowledge available to more people does not necessarily translate into more informed decisionmaking Targeting technology absent the targeteer is inherently 76     JFQ    issue 45 2 d quarter 2007 dangerous when considering the potential consequences of a bad drop Poor Operations-Intelligence Integration Joint planners cannot effectively perform the intelligence targeting cycle steps when operations centers fail to integrate targeteers While targeteers are sometimes guilty of stovepiped analysis behind the “green door ” operators also occasionally exclude targeteers from planning decision circles and risk uninformed decisions A recurring real world example is the “broken” combat assessment phase of campaign targeting when coherent BDA becomes impossible because the next weapon release typically receives the weight of intelligence and operational effort not the last one s While the warrior ethos clearly has a place in combat units ignoring targeting recommendations because of a lack of understanding or respect for the importance of this often inglorious detailed targeting “nug-work” can chance collateral damage fratricide or even mission failure Dropping a weapon is tactical targeting is not Warfighters obviously direct targeting fires cells but few can actually claim themselves to be qualified targeteers Many have pulled the trigger or released countless weapons in combat but few seem to appreciate the nuances and rigors of a targeting cycle properly applied at all levels of warfare Targeting truly has esoteric aspects typically absent from most general and flag officer career paths or specialties Take for example aim point mensuration few warfighters fully understood the fact that JTAC-derived coordinates may work effectively in Iraq but would put weapons far off target at elevation in Afghanistan When nontargeteers advise general and flag officers on targeting a recipe for operational miscalculation exists Sadly it is rare to witness staff challenging flawed general flag officer targeting assumptions or related operational decisions Careerism and either intimidation from or loyalty to seniors should not be the guiding force behind operational targeting and fires neither noble intent nor “asking forgiveness vice permission” represents targeting due diligence The best targeteers are sometimes those willing to disagree ardently with the boss Neither rank nor combat experience inherently conveys a complete understanding of targeting Hubris is a dangerous alternative to sound targeting U S Air Force Brian Ferguson geteers typically master the ­fundamentals of weaponeering True targeteers are rare high-demand low-density assets Many operators are surprised at the expansive targeteer training and qualifications it truly is and should remain a career specialty Airmen using Joint Precision Air Drop System during mission over Afghanistan Poor Interagency Cooperation Notwithstanding the post-9 11 national mandate for better collaboration and cooperation stovepipes and enmities persist between DOD and the interagency community Even the accidental 1999 Chinese embassy bombing in Belgrade has not served to institute procedures to prevent strategically significant targeting errors Currently interagency coordination is occurring most optimally at the operational level via Joint Interagency Coordination Groups JIACGs 10 and tactically at deployed task forces JIATFs Yet these entities have proven transitory with a relatively narrow mission focus the larger targeting fires communities have not adopted effective JIACG JIATF joint TTPs Furthermore the alphabet soup of targeting-related agencies serves different masters and suffers from the typical bureaucratic ills that limit collaboration 11 Multiple disparate interagency DOD targeting cells have different roles missions and levels of operational expertise Repeat postconflict lessons learned since Operation Desert Storm continue to highlight this obstacle Unfortunately because of the preceding factors what typically happens with the standup of a new JTF staff and even standing task force staff rotations is that well-intentioned initiatives drive targeting fires cell TTPs not institutional expertise Wasted resources and redundant efforts to reinvent targeting with operational ad hocery are the result 12 In fairness warriors run targeting fires cells and they answer to other warriors with stars Task force staffs however typically do not have a core of fully qualified targeteers joint fires personnel and recurring headquarters unit rotations simply overextend the small joint targeteer cadre The ad hoc approach might also involve adopting conventional targeting and fires doctrine TTPs that is those needed during the combat phase of operations at a point in the conflict when it is neither effective nor appropriate Phase IV operations in Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom are good examples n d upress ndu edu Pat c h 28th Test Squadron Michael Ammons F–16CJ drops 2 000pound JDAM during test mission From this discussion several recommendations are obvious a few have been reflected in some fashion in every lessons learned assessment since Operation Desert Storm Naval joint and policy decisionmakers should consider them in the post-9 11 strategic environment n Combine all Service targeting fires courses at JTS under U S Joint Forces Command USJFCOM n Establish a rigorous qualification process with Joint Staff oversight for all joint targeting fires cadre adopt USCENTCOM best practices as the model and mandate targeting personnel qualification standards across all combatant commands and Services n Organizationally keep targeting cells intact under larger EB umbrella staffs n Establish or maintain existing Service targeting and fires career specialties with requisite promotion potential to O–6 E–9 vouchsafe the targeting specialty n Establish an executive targeting fires curriculum taught in the Capstone course with a focus on real-world targeting errors and consequences n Combine relevant joint and Service doctrine into a “Targeting Bible ” with sections applicable to each level of warfare and sufficient attention to BDA n Establish a National Targeting and Fires Center13 under Joint Staff auspices to consolidate and enforce targeting fires joint TTPs with authoritative representation from the joint operations intelligence legal and interagency communities—with targeting standards enforcement authority 14 n Consolidate the best aspects of Service legacy targeting systems into a single targeting systems package such as the Joint Targeting Toolbox with Joint Staff authority to enforce inter-Service standardization n Establish and monitor predeployment joint targeting measures of effectiveness under USJFCOM n Establish Joint Staff oversight of a career joint combat assessment specialty designation and mandatory Service quotas Naturally strategic success entails achievement of clearly articulated political-military objectives and ndupres s ndu edu operational success accomplished at an acceptable cost while maintaining the integrity of Western humanitarian and warfare principles Efficient and effective joint targeting supports strategic success which is achievable with the requisite emphasis As weapons system capabilities increase exponentially decisionmakers would do well to ensure that joint targeting cadre systems and joint TTPs are established and sustained The art and science of targeting as a discipline has four key goals hitting the right target for the right reason at the right time and place with the right weapon This implicitly brings human intellectual judgment into the equation a critical element within the contemporary DOD “cognitive transformation” effort Targeteers fundamentally appreciate that ordnance and hardware alone will not win wars—that “weapons on target” is not an end in itself DOD must address the obstacles above to create the conditions in which joint targeting efficiency and effectiveness can become integral to the American way of war America could wield its military supremacy for naught absent coherent enlightened strategy weapons brandished by uninformed commanders are better left in the armory JFQ NOTES 1 Admiral Edmund P Giambastiani Jr USN testimony before the House Armed Services Committee October 2 2003 available at www jfcom mil newslink storyarchive 2003 pa100203 htm 2 David Deptula Gary Crowder and George Stamper Jr “Direct Attack Enhancing Counterland Doctrine and Joint Air-Ground Operations ” Air Space Power Chronicles 17 no 4 Winter 2003 available at www airpower maxwell af mil airchronicles apj apj03 win03 deptula html 3 David Jablonsky “U S Military Doctrine and the Revolution in Military Affairs ” Parameters 24 Autumn 1994 18–36 available at https carlislewww army mil usawc Parameters 1994 jablonsk htm accessed 4 Headquarters USMC “Concepts and Programs 2005 Chapter 4 Current Operations and Lessons Learned ” 222 See also Chuck Harrison “How Joint Are We and Can We Be Better ” Joint Force Quarterly 38 July 2005 14–19 available at www ndu edu inss Press jfq_pages 0638 pdf 5 That is generated aim point coordinates that are sufficiently accurate for weapons guided by global positioning systems 6 U S Joint Forces Command USJFCOM is championing the development of a standing joint force contingency headquarters but the extent of targeting fires systems capability and personnel expertise is limited 7 Jeffrey K Gruetzmacher Michelle Holtery and Jonathan Putney “Fratricide The Ultimate Cost of Joint Interoperability Failure ” Joint Forces Staff College Joint Combined Staff Officer School June 11 2002 available at www jfsc ndu edu current_students documents_policies documents jca_cca_awsp fratricide doc 8 A 2004 Government Accountability Office GAO assessment cited this as one of four key barriers to joint targeting improvement See “Military Operations Recent Campaigns Benefited from Improved Communications and Technology but Barriers to Continued Progress Remain ” GAO Report GAO-04-547 Washington DC GAO June 2004 available at www gao gov htext d04547 html 9 Automated Deep Operations Coordination System is a joint mission management software application with tools and interfaces for horizontal and vertical integration across battlespace functional areas such as joint time-sensitive targeting See www gdc4s com content detail cfm item 34425bdb-6226-4f5a-991c-cccafbc412d9 10 Matthew F Bogdanos “Joint Interagency Cooperation The First Step ” Joint Force Quarterly 37 April 2005 10–18 available at www ndu edu inss Press jfq_pages 0437 pdf 11 For example the Defense Threat Reduction Agency Director of Central Intelligence J2T Joint Technical Coordinating Group–Munitions Effectiveness Defense Intelligence Agency and Joint Warfare Analysis Center among others 12 Charles E Kirkpatrick “Joint Fires as They Were Meant to Be V Corps and the 4th Air Support Operations Group during OIF ” Institute of Land Warfare Paper No 48 Arlington VA Institute of Land Warfare October 2004 2 On the V Corps drive to Baghdad in 2003 staff essentially developed ad hoc procedures to handle fast-paced close air support and deeper direct attack requirements 13 See also Mark C Christian and James E Dillard “Why We Need a National Joint Targeting Center ” Air Space Power Chronicles January 6 2000 available at www airpower maxwell af mil airchronicles cc Dillard html 14 The recent USJFCOM establishment of the Joint Fires Integration and Interoperability Team is a step in the right direction but neither incorporates all aspects of targeting nor possesses enforcement powers issue 45 2 d quarter 2007    JFQ        77