http www airpower au af mil Distribution A Approved for public release distribution unlimited Let Us Know What You Think Leave Comment Joint Targeting in Cyberspace Maj Steven J Smart USAF America relies on our digital infrastructure daily and protecting this strategic asset is a national security priority —President Barack Obama 2010 S ecurity in cyberspace is a clear na­ tional priority but the role of the US military in this new domain is not so clear With the activation of US Cyber Com­ mand in 2010 debate concerning the milita­ rization of cyberspace and the conduct of cyber “warfare” has taken center stage among US government policy makers 1 Complicat­ ing matters is the uncertain practice of gov­ erning behavior in cyberspace by applying domestic legal and policy guidelines as well as international treaties based on kinetic warfare 2 Despite this uncertainty Depart­ ment of Defense DOD policy requires that DOD components “comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts however such conflicts are characterized and in all other military operations ”3 Although it re­ mains to be seen what roles and responsi­ bilities policy makers in Washington DC will carve out for the military the DOD should prepare to conduct military opera­ tions in the cyber domain To do so effec­ tively the department should apply with slight modification time-tested joint target­ ing principles to military operations in cyberspace 4 This article explores the effi­ cacy of Joint Publication JP 3-60 Joint Tar­ geting as applied to military operations in cyberspace and proposes recommendations for joint targeting doctrine for cyberspace 5 Winter 2011 65 Disclaimer The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression academic environment of Air University They do not reflect the official position of the U S Government Department of Defense the United States Air Force or the Air University Form Approved OMB No 0704-0188 Report Documentation Page Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response including the time for reviewing instructions searching existing data sources gathering and maintaining the data needed and completing and reviewing the collection of information Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Services Directorate for Information Operations and Reports 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway Suite 1204 Arlington VA 22202-4302 Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number 1 REPORT DATE 3 DATES COVERED 2 REPORT TYPE 2011 00-00-2011 to 00-00-2011 4 TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a CONTRACT NUMBER Joint Targeting in Cyberspace 5b GRANT NUMBER 5c PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6 AUTHOR S 5d PROJECT NUMBER 5e TASK NUMBER 5f WORK UNIT NUMBER 7 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME S AND ADDRESS ES 8 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER Headquarters US Air Force Office of the Judge Advocate General Pentagon Washington DC 20301 9 SPONSORING MONITORING AGENCY NAME S AND ADDRESS ES 10 SPONSOR MONITOR’S ACRONYM S 11 SPONSOR MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER S 12 DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release distribution unlimited 13 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14 ABSTRACT 15 SUBJECT TERMS 16 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF a REPORT b ABSTRACT c THIS PAGE unclassified unclassified unclassified 17 LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT 18 NUMBER OF PAGES Same as Report SAR 11 19a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Standard Form 298 Rev 8-98 Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 Smart Foundational Principles of Joint Targeting Before we can address the adequacy of applying JP 3-60 to cyber targeting we must understand the foundations of its principles the reason for its application and the relationship between doctrine and law “Joint doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of US military forces ” and “ commanders at all levels must ensure their forces operate in accordance with the ‘law of war ’ ” which is “binding on the United States ”6 Joint doctrine incorporates what the United States has agreed to follow in international law as well as operational best practices The “law of war” consists of conventional international law treaties and agreements between nation-states and customary international law based on state practice 7 The latter develops from state practice— namely official governmental conduct re­ flected in a variety of acts including pub­ lished doctrine Thus joint doctrine not only reinforces binding legal obligations but also advances the development of cus­ tomary international law For simplicity the primary canons that set the foundation for the modern law of war are divided between rules for the con­ duct of war and the treatment of parties to the conflict and its bystanders the Hague and the Geneva conventions respectively 8 Additionally the Charter of the United Na­ tions outlines obligations of the organiza­ tion’s member states with regard to the “use of force” against other states 9 Domestic law federal statutes and judicial decisions US government policy joint and service doc­ trine as well as rules of engagement ROE specify how US military forces will comply with these international obligations We must understand that neither military doc­ trine nor ROEs whether standing or mis­ sion specific replace or supersede the laws of war Rather they represent US imple­ mentation of agreed-upon international principles to a specific situation 66 Air Space Power Journal We can distill this vast body of rules regu­ lations and doctrine to five simple principles that apply to any specific operation First the use of force presupposes the existence of military necessity a valid military reason to use force necessary to carry out the mis­ sion 10 Second the proposed employment of force must not cause the civilian popula­ tion or the targeted enemy force unneces­ sary suffering 11 Commanders must apply this principle—the basis for later conven­ tions that outlaw certain types of weapons and munitions e g chemical weapons — not only to potential “collateral damage” incidental loss of civilian life or damage to civilian property but also to the intended object of attack Third the employment of force must discriminate or distinguish be­ tween combatants and noncombatants as well as forgo intentional attacks against ci­ vilian populations not directly participating in hostilities 12 In short the operator must use a weapon capable of being aimed and must distinguish between civilians and ad­ versaries—the underlying principle that guides joint targeting analysis explored in greater detail below Fourth the proposed military operation must be proportional— that is it must avoid excessive collateral damage in light of the expected military ad­ vantage 13 Finally the parties in the armed conflict must maintain chivalry or a “certain amount of fairness and a degree of mu­ tual respect and trust ”14 Applying these principles guides the employment of force in general and individual targeting deci­ sions in particular In military circles the term targeting of­ ten describes an action of a military force engaging or preparing to engage an ad­ versary Officially joint doctrine defines targeting as “the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appro­ priate response to them considering opera­ tional requirements and capabilities ”15 This definition—specifically the process of selecting the target and matching the ap­ propriate response to it—most directly en­ tails obligations under the law of war Tar­ get selection is the primary premise upon Joint Targeting in Cyberspace which the principle of discrimination rests Military objects are lawful targets but forces should not attack civilians intention­ ally and should spare them from collateral effects as much as possible 16 Therefore the law of war holds the military commander and operator responsible for identifying functionally characterizing and attribut­ ing to a combatant—as accurately as practi­ cable—the intended object of a proposed military operation Military doctrine sets forth principles to guide forces in carrying out their obligation of discrimination JP 3-60 includes the overarching targeting principles for conducting combined or joint operations Military ser­ vice doctrine such as Air Force Doctrine Document AFDD 2-1 9 Targeting comple­ ments joint doctrine with principles specifi­ cally designed for the individual service’s primary responsibility 17 These principles derive from best practices drawing on the collective experience of the US military and its allies during previous military cam­ paigns and operations Because no military service has primary responsibility for the cyberspace domain and because little if any collective best practice for military op­ erations in cyberspace exists current doc­ trine for other war-fighting domains shapes cyber operation planning and informs cyber targeting decisions 18 Therefore JP 3-60 is by default the current foundational publica­ tion on joint targeting in cyberspace Application to Cyberspace Applying existing military doctrine spe­ cifically targeting and law-of-war principles to operations in cyberspace is easy in theory but may prove extremely difficult in prac­ tice Cyber warfare differs fundamentally from traditional armed conflict Unlike the conduct of past warfare opponents includ­ ing state actors criminals terrorists and hackers can wage cyber warfare from far reaches of the globe rapidly cheaply anony­ mously and devastatingly Current military doctrine looks to the experiences and theo­ ries of kinetic warfare between nation-states in battlespaces that exist almost exclusively in a physically recognizable and under­ standable area air land sea and space Cyber warfare by contrast occurs in “a realm located simultaneously at logical and physical layers that intersects activities in through and concerning the electromagnetic spectrum which seamlessly crosses other domains as well as geographic and recog­ nized political boundaries ”19 The extent to which cyber warfare differs from kinetic warfare and represents a para­ digm shift in modern military affairs is a contentious subject best suited to academic historians However differences exist be­ tween the actors and the means methods of armed conflict in the physical world and their counterparts associated with conflicts in cyberspace These variations illustrate the complex challenges of applying current law policy and military doctrine to key­ strokes and mouse clicks First participation in cyber warfare is not limited to agents of the nation-state Un­ like conventional military attack conduct­ ing a strike in cyberspace does not require government sponsorship 20 Second the at­ tacker does not need expensive traditional weapon systems—only a computer an In­ ternet connection and basic cyber exper­ tise 21 Third unlike attributing an attack in the kinetic world identifying the source of a cyber strike is extremely difficult For ex­ ample finding the aggressor nation respon­ sible for a missile attack is relatively easy because key “fingerprints” such as the mis­ sile’s size speed range and type of war­ head point to a relatively small list of coun­ tries that have the technology will and expertise to conduct such an attack A cyber attack however can originate from any­ where and with anyone including statesponsored “hacktivists ” nonstate actors or “free lancers packing a politically motivated laptop punch ”22 The key differences between cyber war­ fare and its kinetic cousin raise pertinent questions First is it realistic to expect even state-sponsored cyber operators to Winter 2011 67 Smart comply with legal principles and military doctrine based on traditional notions of kinetic war in this new domain Second do we need a new joint publication specifi­ cally dedicated to cyberspace targeting to account for these differences Despite disparities in the operational do­ mains cyber warriors are fundamentally the same as their counterparts on land at sea and in the air Both rely upon their knowledge of the domain operational envi­ ronment and weapon system capabilities The complexity of war fighting resists any attempt to reduce it to a formulaic checklist for commanders Astute leaders may dis­ cern and apply enduring truths of war in­ cluding the framework for its legal use within the context of a particular opera­ tional or strategic environment With a few modifications cyber operators can apply legal principles and military doctrine based on traditional kinetic warfare to cyber op­ erations and still produce the intended ef­ fects Similarly with only slight adjust­ ments for cyber nuances JP 3-60 can continue to serve as the US military’s foun­ dational publication for both kinetic and nonkinetic targeting Military Doctrine in Cyberspace In the recent past only one joint publica­ tion concerned itself exclusively with con­ ducting military operations in the cyber do­ main 23 JP 3-13 Information Operations identified information operations IO as “the integrated employment of electronic warfare EW computer network operations CNO psychological operations PSYOP military deception MILDEC and opera­ tions security OPSEC in concert with specified supporting and related capabili­ ties to influence disrupt corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own ”24 Doc­ trinally CNO including computer network attack CNA and defense CND repre­ sented just a subset of a larger category of arguably dissimilar activities Doctrine as­ 68 Air Space Power Journal serted the centrality of these capabilities to IO as a whole noting that they would help the joint force commander influence an ad­ versary But grouping them together sug­ gested that IO itself is a war-fighting spe­ cialty capable of rapid integration into a joint task force Unfortunately this is not the way the services train their personnel Rather they currently train an individual in one or two competencies such as EW or PSYOP Within CNO only rarely does a per­ son have both CNA and CND proficiency Therefore an IO cell at the joint task force level may be composed of “cylinders of ex­ cellence” i e individuals well versed in their narrow field of training but possessing little understanding of the other capabili­ ties This is particularly true with regard to the concept of targeting JP 3-13 does not contain guidance on the topic Assuming the “core” nature of these ca­ pabilities why does JP 3-13 include no in­ struction on targeting Three reasons come to mind First targeting is so essential to war fighting that nearly every military member has a general understanding of the concept However targeting that success­ fully attains both military and political ob­ jectives is an extremely complex process that relatively few individuals have mastered Simply put most military professionals know what targeting means but few of them know how to do it Second JP 3-13 does not address the specifics of core capa­ bilities Rather it refers the IO planner to other publications for guidance suggesting that these capabilities are not as closely linked as JP 3-13 asserts Instead in the minds of conventional military planners they are merely several unique unconven­ tional military activities difficult to inte­ grate into an operations plan Finally many planners believe that “targeting is target­ ing ” no matter the platform or domain Most cyber operational planners would declare that they understand the general concept of targeting as contemplated in the official doctrinal definition and as outlined in JP 3-60 However their application of the concept and definition to their core IO ca­ Joint Targeting in Cyberspace pability may mean something very differ­ ent For example a proposed PSYOP activity might “target” a foreign audience whose be­ havior and actions targeteers want to influ­ ence but an EW operation might target sig­ nals from a radio tower JP 3-13 suggests that the five types of IO functions listed above are operationally interrelated yet of­ fers no guidance on how to target the adver­ sary using these functions specifically 25 The IO planner or operator must then refer to another subject-matter-specific publica­ tion for guidance 26 The fact that JP 3-13 represents the only joint guidance on net­ work operations complicates matters for the CNO planner 27 Thus CNO planners at the joint level must often look backward to ser­ vice doctrine for such guidance The Air Force recently released AFDD 3-12 Cyberspace Operations which differen­ tiates between cyber and information op­ erations 28 This document represents the service’s best effort to understand organize train and guide Airmen in cyberspace op­ erations Basic enough for the cyber novice yet comprehensive enough for the expert AFDD 3-12 provides technically sound and operationally relevant guidance to Airmen in the absence of guidance at the joint level—a particularly remarkable feat Even more impressive the document relates principles of joint operations to cyberspace operations offering input across the range of military operations and outlining funda­ mental principles for the Air Force cyber warrior 29 Arguably AFDD 3-12 is the most comprehensive document on cyber opera­ tions in the DOD indeed the joint force would be well served by a joint publication having its breadth and depth Admittedly even though AFDD 3-12 discusses many issues useful in cyber targeting such as technical relationships in cyberspace infrastructure information assurance compressed deci­ sion cycles and the anonymity and attribu­ tion challenge it does not specifically ad­ dress cyber targeting per se 30 In fact the document refers readers to JP 3-60 suggest­ ing that the joint publication’s principles guidance and theory properly apply to Air Force operations in cyberspace On the one hand the subject of targeting seldom appears in current DOD joint or service doctrine on cyberspace perhaps be­ cause the military has only now begun for­ mally organizing its cyber forces or because the services do not have a large collective cyber-targeting experience from which to draw 31 On the other hand DOD leaders may simply believe that JP 3-60’s principles of targeting are so sound that they translate easily to military operations in the cyber domain Whatever the rationale JP 3-60 re­ mains the seminal joint publication on tar­ geting in cyberspace despite the fact that it makes no reference to the domain itself Review of Joint Publication 3-60 Organized in three main sections—funda­ mentals of targeting the joint targeting pro­ cess and duties and responsibilities—JP 3-60 proceeds logically from defining the term target through target development target engagement and damage assess­ ment to command responsibilities and oversight A targeting novice can quickly grasp the fundamentals of this concise well-written document For example one simple chart fig II-1 the Joint Targeting Cycle conveys the essence of combat tar­ geting 32 To understand the cycle is to understand targeting The joint targeting cycle quickly out­ lines the who what where when why and how of adversary engagement 33 After the joint force commander announces an end state and objective planners develop and prioritize targets toward that end Target se­ lection drives weapon capability pairing which ensures successful engagement while minimizing collateral damage The particular weapon selected determines force assignment which informs mission planning and drives execution after which an assessment tells the commander whether the mission has fulfilled the ob­ jectives or whether additional targeting is Winter 2011 69 Smart necessary as determined through evalua­ tion of predetermined measures of effec­ tiveness and measures of performance Skipping steps in the cycle jeopardizes mission effectiveness adding steps outside the cycle is superfluous From a legal per­ spective adherence to the joint targeting cycle process and to other fundamental principles in the publication coupled with sound command judgment virtually as­ sures compliance with the laws of war Thus JP 3-60 appears to be a “plug and play” guidebook for targeting in any domain Unfortunately analysis which assumes that the cyber domain shares essentially the same characteristics with air land sea and space fails to account for its uniqueness Like the other domains cyberspace occu­ pies an area is subject to exploitation by governments and entrepreneurs and serves as a medium for the exchange of commerce among corporations nations and individuals Yet this unique medium “has to be appreci­ ated on its own merits it is a man-made construct ”34 Computers enable actions in near real time and may provide near ano­ nymity for the user The fact that criminals terrorists and state actors use the same cy­ ber infrastructure employed by commercial enterprises and individuals to conduct their operations adds a “social context” to mili­ tary operations in this domain 35 In the air space and sea domains relatively few ad­ versaries are competent enough to effec­ tively threaten or challenge the United States and its military By contrast the cy­ ber domain is crowded with actors capable of pressuring confronting or intimidating the United States its allies and each other This congested battlespace complicates us­ ing JP 3-60 as a guide to cyber targeting in five key areas 1 positive identification of targets 2 location of targets 3 attribution of attack 4 capability target pairing and 5 assessment of potential collateral damage First positive identification of a potential cyber target is complicated by the intricacy of the dual-use global cyberspace infrastruc­ ture The two sections of JP 3-60 that ad­ dress target identification—chapter 2 “The 70 Air Space Power Journal Joint Targeting Process ” and appendix E “Legal Considerations in Targeting”—make clear that a valid and lawful military target requires a degree of distinctive identifica­ tion and characterization conducted during either a normal or time-sensitive targeting cycle Neither section addresses the fleeting nature or uniqueness of cyber targets or notes that the latter exist almost exclusively in a dual-use medium To illustrate suppose that planners nomi­ nate three targets to a joint targeting coordi­ nation board a group that “facilitates and coordinates joint force targeting activities to ensure that the joint force commander’s priorities are met ”36 The first nominated target is a tank the second a website and the third an online “persona ” Initially the board might validate the tank as a military target but hold that neither the website nor the persona qualifies as a valid military tar­ get as contemplated by JP 3-60 or the laws of war because it is not a physical object but a formulaic composition of ones and zeros— an incorrect assessment In fact JP 3-60 does not limit a target to the physical world instead defining it as “an entity or object considered for possible engagement or ac­ tion It may be an area complex installa­ tion force equipment capability function individual group system entity or behavior identified for possible action” emphasis added 37 This broad definition encompasses both the website and persona The lawfulness of engaging an adver­ sary’s tank is clear because of that weapon’s exclusive purpose of destroying and killing within the confines of armed conflict but a law-of-war analysis of the website and per­ sona must go one step further Both the website and persona would have to meet a “use” rather than a “purpose” test—that is at the time of the proposed attack is the adversary using them to further his warfighting or war-sustaining capabilities If so then they may be the lawful objects of mili­ tary attack The exact timing of when these dual-use objects entities or behaviors in and through cyberspace actually contribute to the adversary’s cause makes engagement Joint Targeting in Cyberspace difficult Unlike the validation of targets during kinetic warfare the process with cy­ ber targets demands both consistent updat­ ing of the validating intelligence and posi­ tive identification in near real time Second the location of a cyber target presents unique challenges JP 3-60 and the laws of war address target location in the context of physical encroachment on a sov­ ereign nation Neither the doctrine nor the law contemplates one target existing in sev­ eral different places around the globe at the same time or causing effects in multiple theaters of conflict as can happen in cyber­ space For instance an adversary can con­ duct command and control through websites hosted simultaneously on servers in different countries and can thwart attack by moving those websites frequently Problem­ atically the particular ROEs applicable to the military planner and operator may pre­ clude actions in certain places outside the joint operations area even though the ad­ versary uses an ever-changing global net­ work to deliver effects there This dilemma leads to a significant and an important de­ bate What is the target Is it the adversary physically located in the joint operations area or is it his globally distributed com­ mand and control network If location pre­ cludes engagement then the military plan­ ner naturally reassesses the exact target Is it the fielded forces or their networks Third attribution of cyber capabilities equipment and usage to a particular de­ clared hostile entity is demanding in cyber­ space Even though attribution may fall un­ der positive identification this article treats it as a separate issue to illuminate differ­ ences between offensive and defensive cy­ ber targeting 38 The anonymity afforded by cyberspace allows an enemy to mask his actions and falsely attribute them to a non­ combatant or any other entity An adver­ sary could hijack the computers of innocent civilians groups or governments and use them as a “bot net” to launch a cyber attack Once the victim of the attack conducts rudi­ mentary forensics attribution of the attack would point to the innocent noncombatants rather than the true perpetrator Strictly speaking depending upon the amount of damage the law of war could view such an attack as the war crime of perfidy Practi­ cally speaking if the attack were continual e g a distributed denial of service must the victim obtain positive identification of each target in essence attributing it to a de­ clared hostile entity prior to launching de­ fensive measures at the “attacking” comput­ ers Fortunately as mentioned above the law of war recognizes the inherent right of self-defense focusing on location of the threat and does not require positive identi­ fication of the attacker But in cyberspace even a purely defensive response to an at­ tacking computer could have severe cascad­ ing unintended consequences for the global cyber infrastructure—not to mention the political nightmare of counterattacking against the wrong party Fourth the pairing of capability and tar­ get in cyberspace entails unique issues Offensive action may call for precision ca­ pabilities to avoid significant collateral damage A defensive posture or crisis re­ sponse may necessitate the use of power­ ful counterattack and deterrent capabilities against a broad range of attackers—creat­ ing more of a broad firewall rather than a pinpoint strike Fifth the arduous process of assessing potential collateral damage in cyberspace demands significant intelligence and the interconnectivity of networks and the re­ dundancies in systems require meticu­ lous planning At present we have no for­ mal methodology of collateral damage estimation for cyber targeting 39 Applying kinetic formulas would be problematic be­ cause cyberspace exits at both physical and logical levels Despite these unique challenges to tar­ geting in cyberspace JP 3-60 provides a suf­ ficient doctrinal framework for the military cyber operations planner 40 There is how­ ever room for improvement and clarifica­ tion with regard to cyber operations par­ ticularly in the areas of collateral damage estimation and battle damage assessment 41 Winter 2011 71 Smart Recommendations Improvements to existing cyber-targeting doctrine should start with a declaration in the next edition of JP 3-60 that the funda­ mentals described in the publication apply to targeting in the newly recognized cyber do­ main Such a statement would have the two­ fold purpose of recognizing the importance and uniqueness of military operations in cyberspace and affirming the universality of the publication’s combat-targeting principles As mentioned above JP 3-60 should pro­ vide an overview of how to conduct collat­ eral damage estimation and battle damage assessment in cyberspace perhaps includ­ ing tactics techniques and procedures for identifying other hostile and civilian websites located on a server or tracing potential second- and third-order effects and their likely geographic location In reality be­ cause most offensive cyber operations would not cause physical damage JP 3-60 should describe methodology for determin­ ing collateral effects in cyberspace by distin­ guishing between effects and damage in cyberspace This distinction should use “ki­ netic damage” physical destruction or deg­ radation caused by a cyber operation as the determining criterion Any cyber opera­ tion that does not cause physical destruc­ tion would yield only “effects ” Planners would collect battle damage assessment only for actions that cause physical damage to intended targets and nontargeted sys­ tems and would measure collateral effects much as they do for other cyber operations An updated JP 3-60 should contain a brief section about the complexity of the cyber domain utilizing the “Understanding Cyberspace” and “Operational Environ­ ment” sections of AFDD 3-12 as an excel­ lent template 42 Such a discussion would al­ low the joint planner to recognize the unique additional considerations of delib­ erate and time-sensitive targeting in and through cyberspace Furthermore the next version of JP 3-60 should pay careful attention to the differ­ ences between offensive and defensive 72 Air Space Power Journal cyber targeting—specifically the level of attribution necessary for positive identifica­ tion of a cyber target For offensive cyber operations e g CNA attribution of a computer network website persona or infrastructure should approach complete certainty a true representation of positive identification so as to comply with the law of war’s principle of discrimination Appli­ cation of the principle of self-defense to cyberspace allows greater flexibility for the joint planner having the goal of repelling an attack or imminent strike against friendly computer systems The recom­ mended course of action for cyber defense would involve implementing a sliding scale of adversary attribution whereby the confi­ dence level is commensurate with the level of anticipated damage or effects produced by the response At one end of the scale a response whose scope duration and inten­ sity will likely cause significant kinetic damage would demand almost complete certainty of attribution At the other end a purely technical—perhaps even auto­ mated—administrative self-defense action not really amounting to a use of force would require no attribution Such cyber “countermeasures” include detecting quar­ antining and removing a virus or simply blocking malicious traffic and disrupting network connections between the attacking and targeted computers Finally an updated JP 3-60 should intro­ duce the concepts of an adversary’s cyber center of gravity and a cyberspace joint opera­ tions area An adversary’s cyber presence consists of computers information systems hardware online personas and so forth which may be geographically separated from his physical center of gravity Once planners identify the cyber center of gravity a critical point—a source of power for the adversary’s cyber operations they can tar­ get it The joint task force commander would establish both the physical and logical boundaries of a cyber joint operations area and specify targeting ROEs for that area Partitioning cyberspace in this manner Joint Targeting in Cyberspace minimizes the potential for cascading col­ lateral damage and effects In conclusion JP 3-60 offers the joint cyber war fighter adequate targeting guid­ ance applicable to the cyber domain With slight modification and incorporation of domain-specific guidance however that publication will become even more useful to cyber warriors   Notes 1 Wesley R Andrues “What U S Cyber Com­ mand Must Do ” Joint Force Quarterly 59 4th Quarter 2010 117 http www ndu edu press lib images jfq-59 JFQ59_115-120_Andrues pdf 2 Tom Gjelten “Extending the Law of War to Cyberspace ” National Public Radio Online 22 Septem­ ber 2010 accessed 4 October 2010 http www npr org templates story story php storyId 130023318 For the purposes of this article kinetic means physical actions traditionally associated with military combat 3 DOD Directive DODD 2311 01E DOD Law of War Program 9 May 2006 incorporating change 1 15 November 2010 2 http www dtic mil whs directives corres pdf 231101e pdf 4 This article uses the term principles 1 within the context of targeting to describe the primary be­ liefs accepted best practices and military philoso­ phy for producing desired operational effects and 2 within the legal context to describe core tenets of law Synthesized in joint publications these meanings are broken out here to highlight certain differences between traditional kinetic military ac­ tion and potential cyber operations 5 Joint Publication JP 3-60 Joint Targeting 13 April 2007 https jdeis js mil jdeis new_pubs jp3_60 pdf 6 JP 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States 2 May 2007 incorporating change 1 20 March 2009 I-1 I-21 http www dtic mil doctrine new _pubs jp1 pdf 7 The law of war is “a branch of public inter­ national law and comprised of a body of rules and principles observed by civilized nations for the regu­ lation of matters inherent to or incidental to the conduct of a public war ” Black’s Law Dictionary 6th ed St Paul MN West Publishing 1990 1583 8 International Conferences The Hague Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land 18 October 1907 http www icrc org ihl nsf full 195 Hereafter Hague IV See also Hague Convention III Relative to the Opening of Hostilities 18 October 1907 http www icrc org ihl nsf FULL 190 OpenDocument Hague Convention V Respecting the Rights and Du­ ties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land 18 October 1907 http www icrc org ihl nsf FULL 200 and Geneva Conventions I–IV 12 August 1949 International Committee of the Red Cross http www icrc org eng war-and-law treaties -customary-law geneva-conventions index jsp 9 Charter of the United Nations Article 2 4 26 June 1945 http www un org en documents charter chapter1 shtml 10 Hague IV Article 23 g 11 Hague IV Article 23 e 12 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2444 XXIII 19 December 1968 as cited in Inter­ national Committee of the Red Cross Weapons That May Cause Unnecessary Suffering or Have Indiscrimi­ nate Effects Report on the Work of Experts Geneva Switzerland International Committee of the Red Cross 1973 13 http www loc gov rr frd Military _Law pdf RC-Weapons pdf 13 See Geneva IV Articles 4 and 27 14 Judge Advocate General’s School Air Force Operations and the Law A Guide for Air Space and Cyber Forces 2nd ed Maxwell AFB AL Judge Advo­ cate General’s School 2009 21 http www afjag af mil shared media document AFD-100510-059 pdf See the introduction to Hague IV “The inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience ” 15 JP 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 8 November 2010 as amended through 15 May 2011 362 http www dtic mil doctrine new_pubs jp1_02 pdf 16 See MAJ Keith E Puls ed Law of War Hand­ book Charlottesville VA International and Opera­ tional Law Department Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School US Army 2005 139–42 http www loc gov rr frd Military_Law pdf law -war-handbook-2005 pdf Winter 2011 73 Smart 17 Air Force Doctrine Document AFDD 2-1 9 Targeting 8 June 2006 http www e-publishing af mil shared media epubs AFDD3-60 pdf 18 Cyberspace is a global domain See JP 1 Doc­ trine for the Armed Forces of the United States GL-7 and Cheryl Pellerin “Cyberspace Is the New Domain of Warfare ” U S Air Force AIM Points 18 October 2010 accessed 20 October 2010 http aimpoints hq af mil display cfm id 41748 printer no 19 Maj Steve Smart “Warfare in the Cyberspace Domain” thesis Air Command and Staff College Maxwell AFB AL 2010 3 This is the author’s pro­ posed new definition of “cyberspace domain ” The characterization of cyberspace as an operational domain is sensitive and controversial See the un­ classified “White House Guidance Regarding the Use of ‘Domain’ in Unclassified Documents and Public Statements ” 14 March 2011 FOUO 20 Christina Mackenzie “Do No Harm ” Aviation Week Defense Technology International—Cyber War Issue September 2010 37 21 Ibid 22 Michael Dumiak “Casus Belli ” Aviation Week Defense Technology International—Cyber War Issue September 2010 31 23 The undersecretary of defense for policy and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will revise IO policy and doctrine documents to reflect directed integration of IO into military operations and away from a focus on its core capabilities This shift marks a significant step toward “mainstreaming” cyber operations See Robert Gates secretary of defense memorandum subject Strategic Communication and Information Operations in the DOD 25 January 2011 http www carlisle army mil dime documents Strategic%20Communication%20 %20IO%20Memo %2025%20Jan2011 pdf 24 JP 3-13 Information Operations 13 February 2006 I-1 http www dtic mil doctrine new_pubs jp3_13 pdf The new definition of IO is “the inte­ grated employment during military operations of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence disrupt cor­ rupt or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own ” See Gates memorandum 2 25 JP 3-13 Information Operations II-1 26 See JP 3-13 1 Electronic Warfare 25 January 2007 https jdeis js mil jdeis new_pubs jp3_13_1 pdf and JP 3-13 2 Psychological Operations 7 Janu­ ary 2010 https jdeis js mil jdeis new_pubs jp3 _13_2 pdf 74 Air Space Power Journal 27 This is not to suggest that the DOD offers no cyber guidance but to make the point that little warfighter guidance exists See DODD 3600 01 Informa­ tion Operations IO 14 August 2006 http www dtic mil whs directives corres pdf 360001p pdf and DODD O-8530 1 Computer Network Defense CND 8 January 2001 28 AFDD 3-12 Cyberspace Operations 15 July 2010 2 http www e-publishing af mil shared media epubs AFDD3-12 pdf 29 Ibid 16–20 22–28 30 See AFDD 3-12 Cyberspace Operations 31 US Cyber Command is working various roles and missions in the cyber domain and is building a “unified vision ” Mark V Schanz “Cyber Command Working Out Roles and Relationships ” Daily Report airforce-magazine com 21 October 2010 http www airforce-magazine com DRArchive Pages default aspx The 460th Space Wing at Buckley AFB CO completed its first exercise focused exclusively on cyber issues MSgt J LaVoie “A First-of-Its-Kind Cyber Exercise ” Daily Report airforce-magazine com 29 October 2010 http www airforce-magazine com DRArchive Pages default aspx 32 JP 3-60 Joint Targeting II-3 33 Ibid 34 Martin C Libicki Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar Santa Monica CA RAND Corporation 2009 11 http www rand org pubs monographs 2009 RAND_MG877 pdf 35 See Timothy L Thomas Cyber Silhouettes Fort Leavenworth KS Foreign Military Studies Of­ fice 2005 19 36 JP 3-60 Joint Targeting III-2 37 Ibid I-2 38 A policy debate is in progress among cyber professionals and government leaders about the necessity of positive identification for all cyber op­ erations and its feasibility during crisis responses 39 See United States Joint Forces Command Joint Fires and Targeting Handbook Suffolk VA Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Norfolk VA Joint Capability Development Joint Integrated Fires 19 October 2007 http www dtic mil doctrine doctrine jwfc jntfiretar_hdbk pdf 40 Maj Kevin Beeker acting J2T US Cyber Com­ mand and MSgt Dustin Dargis US Cyber Command interviews with the author 2–4 November 2010 41 Ibid 42 AFDD 3-12 Cyberspace Operations 2–5 Joint Targeting in Cyberspace Maj Steven J Smart USAF Major Smart AA Wentworth Military Academy Junior College BS John Brown University MA Air University JD Gonzaga University School of Law is the chief of strategic communications Office of the Judge Advocate General Headquarters US Air Force Pentagon Major Smart previously served as the chief of targeting and operational law at US Cyber Command and its predecessor organizations Joint Functional Component Command–Network Warfare Joint Task Force Global Network Operations where he advised the commander and Joint Inter­ agency Task Force on the law of war rules of engagement and international law during the planning of military operations in cyberspace He was the primary legal adviser for targeting and cyber attack teams crisis and contingency planning cells and cyber response planners During his career Major Smart has served as a mili­ tary prosecutor and defense counsel as well as a procurement and environmental law attorney He also served in a leadership role as deputy staff judge advocate Major Smart is a 2011 graduate of Air Command and Staff College where he won the Lt Gen Michael Hayden Research Award for contribution to the advancement of information operations including influence electronic warfare and network warfare operations Winter 2011 75