DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNITED STATES CYBER COMMAND 9800 SAVAGE ROAD SUITE 6171 FORT GEORGE G MEADE MARYLAND 20755 NOV 2 8 2018 Michael Martelle The National Security Archive Gelman Library Suite 701 2130 H Street N W Washington D C 20037 Dear Mr Martelle Thank you for your September 9 2018 Freedom oflnformation Act FOIA request for the briefing on the Joint Intelligence Operations Center given November 30 2016 As the initial denial authority I am partially denying portions of the document under 5 U S C § 552 b l The denied portions include classified national security information under the criteria of Executive Order 13 526 labeled as b 1 If you are not satisfied with our action on this request you may file an administrative appeal within 90 calendar days from the date of this letter by U S mail or email If you submit your appeal in writing please address it to ODCMO Director of Oversight and Compliance 4800 Mark Center Drive ATTN DPCLTD FOIA Appeals Mailbox #24 Alexandria VA 223501700 If you submit your appeal by email please send it to OSD FOIA-APPEAL@ mail mil All correspondence should reference U S Cyber Command case tracking number 19-R012 Additionally you may contact the Office of Government Information Services OGIS which provides mediation services to help resolve disputes between FOIA requesters and Federal agencies Contact information is 8601 Adelphi Road- OGIS College Park MD 20740-6001 OGIS may also be reached at ogis@nara gov 202-741-5770 and 1-877-684-6448 ROSS A MYERS Rear Admiral U S Chief of Staff USCVBERCOM JIOC ' IlfllCOMBAT TARGETS DIVISION f1' Improving Targeting Support to Cyber Operations 30 November2016 The overall classification of this briefing is UNCLASSIFIED f GYG ' r ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 28 Nov 2016 Version 1 J2T _ As of 8 September 2016 UNClASSIFIED FOR OFFl IAL l J§E O ll¥ • Targeting in the Digital NOT Industrial Age Targeting Processes must 1 Enable Cyber Operations against agile dynamic fleetin g elements in the cyber domain 2 Facilitate an operational level Commander's timely effective and relevant decision-making 3 Add value to IC understanding of our targets UNClASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL l l§E OPIL¥ 28 Nov 2016 Version 1 J2T 2 • Cyberspace Operations z 0 - How do we get here SECONDS I- u L J X L J 0 MINUTES -zz z s DAYS Q - _ __ E ·cAUI ·- I 0 fl IRAPco j Joint Targeting Cycle WEEKS SIGINT Development L J E j Capability Developmen - I- MONTHS Intelligence e·porting 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 28 Nov 2016 Version 1 J2T 2017 2018 2019 2020 3 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL YSE O IL¥ • Two Major Considerations 1 When do we need to use the Joint Ta rgeting Cycle • JTC adds necessary structure and rigor but does not apply to all cyber operations We should not use the JTC when we do not need it 2 When we do use it use it smartly to achieve our goals • Targeting entities in the cyber domain requires a better application of targeting structures and processes UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL YH OIi iL¥ 15 Nov 2016 Version 1 J2T 4 • Terminology and Processes • U Target Development • Systematic examination of potential target systems to determine the necessary type and duration of action that must be exerted on each target to create an effect that is consistent with the commander's specific objectives • JP 3-60 • TS SI REL to USA FVEV SIGINT De·velopment • kb 1 Sec 1 4 a • • • I S SI H L to U A- b H Network Technical or Social Functional • U FOUO Battle Damage Assessment • The estimate of damage or effect resulting from the aP plication of lethal or nonlethal military force Battle damage assessment is composea of physical damage assessment change assessment functional damage assessment and target system assessment • CJCSM 3162 01 • U FOUO Cyberspace Temporary Effects Assessment C-TEAR • USCYBERCOM Joint Target Intel Assessment Guidance for temp degradation or disruption Similar terminology from different disciplines adds to confusion 28 Nov 2016 Version 1 J2T s • Additiona l Considerations • U JTC is optimized for lethal effects • Therefore JTC is sub-optimized for non lethal and temporary effects • U FOUO Integration of non-lethal fires and information-related capabilities is mostly a planning problem • Desire for deconfliction and synchronization does not dictate use of theJTC • U What is the cost benefit analysis of using the JTC 28 Nov 2016 Version 1 J2T 6 UNCLASSIFIED FOOG • Joint Targeting Cycle JP 3-60 End Sta'te and CDR's Objectives Targeting Assessment Mission Planning and Force Execution Capabilities Analysis CDR's Decision and Force Assignment U NCLASSIFIED FOOG 28 Nov 2016 Version 1 J2T 7 SECRET REL TO 1 JSA F CE¥ • Joint Targeting Cycle USCYBERCOM b 1 Sec 1 4 a SECRET REL TO lcl§A1 F Elf 28 Nov 2016 Version 1 J2T 8 SEGRE Tl REL TO USA FVEV • Targeting at USCYBERCOM U All lAW CJCS Directives No such thing as a cyber target U USCVBERCOM Target List examples R I Facility fb 1 Sec 1 4 a R I ndividua l- b J 1 is e c 1 4 l I • R I -Virtual· fb 1 Sec 1 4 a • S REL quipment fb 1 Sec 1 4 a • S REL Organization rb 1 Sec 1 4 a • U For further discussion Utility of a Network Target category • • I __ _ _ __JI SEGRE Tl REL TO USA FVEV I As of 10 August 2016 mm Sec 1 4m 1 4 31 1 4m 28 Nov 2016 varsion 1 JZT JD 1 4 a nuv Luxu Version 1 JZT LI b 1 Sec 1 4 a - • - - --- __ - __ - - r' r- -- - b 1 Sec 1 4 a ' r i -- - 28 Nov 2016 Version 1 J2T Sec 1 4 a 310 1 365 1 4 3 28 Nov 2016 Version 1 J2T 15 UNCLASS IFI ED • Target Development Relationships 1 End State and Commander's Objective - -Target System 2 1 Target Development and Prioritization 3 Target System Component Target Element Capability Analysis UNCLASSIFIED Product Taxonomy 28 Nov 2016 Version 1 J2T Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Target Systems Analysis Electronic Target Folder 14 UNCLASSIFI ED • Taxonomy and the 'Art' of Targeting 1 End State and Commander's Objective 2 Target Development and Prioritization Taxonomy Examples '1 - b 1 Sec 1 7 e Target System Component Target 3 Target Element ------------ Capability Analysis UNCLASSIFIED 15 UN CLASSIFIED f GJd • Problem Adversary VOiP Network b 1 Sec 1 7 e UNCLASSI FIED 28 Nov 2016 Version 1 J2T 16 Using Existing Guidance bin Sec 17 - As a Network Target hm Sec 13 UNCLASSIF IED f GltJG • Takeaways and Recommendations • Don't use the JTC when you don't need it • Examine criteria for what constitutes fires When do OCO constitute fires • Take EW problems SOis out of JTC • Take MISO problems out of JTC • JTC is useful insofar as it provides a synchronizing function at the operational level of war • Targets should be relevant to an operational level commander • e g fb 1 Sec 1 7 e I • Network Target category would facilitate targeting in the cyber domain • Rendering a network as a set of fully developed and associated equipment facility virtual and organization targets will never lead to effective operations • Risk of unbounded network is mitigated by non-lethal nature of OCO • Automated system i e MIDB is not designed for cyber elements Nor is it necessary • Narrower category than broad loosely defined virtual target category • Widely applicable to cyber operations • Joint Targeting Cycle is sound We must apply it selectively and smartly UNCLASSIFIED f GltJG 28 Nov 2016 Version 1 J2T 19 UNCLASSIFIED USCC Targeting Way Ahead • • Re-open 'Network' entity discussion with Targeting Enterprise • Joint Staff Target Intelligence Working Groups • Semi-annual Military Targeting Committee • Incorporate C-ISIL lessons learned into doctrine • Joint Publication 3-60 - Joint Targeting • CJCSI 3162 - Battle Damage Assessment • Coordinate iterative process improvements within USCC • Cyberspace Temporary Effects Assessment Report C-TEAR • · Work with J3 to improve Concept of Operation CO NOP generation • What we can't change • • External processes that add overhead to execution e g RAPCO CAUi PPD-20 update UNCLASSIFIEO H JG 28 Nov 2016 Version 1 J2T 20