UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016- 07743 Doc No C06480661 Date 02 12 2018DEPARTMENT OF STATE wunmpon 0 0 70520 1 October 1 1979 7 7ka DISSENT CHANNEL I 01 21FROM B5 5 SUBJECT The Letelier Mof itt Assassinations Policy Toward Chile We use the Dissent Channel to register our disagreement with the policy of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs concerning relations with Chile as they are affected by the prosecution of the Letelier Moffitt case We ask that this document be distributed to at a minimum Assistant Secretary Vaky the Secretary the Deputy Secretary the Under Secretary for Political Affairs L and Ambassador Landau in Santiago We recommend that a copy be made available to Assistant 0 8 Attorney 8 Lawrence Barcella Department of Justice who is in charge of the prosecution of the case Our request to be heard rests upon our recent experience in dealing with the case and with Chilean policy A _was B6 Deputy Assistant Secretary in ARA from September 1977_ to December 1979 During that time he held principal supervisory responsibility within ARA for dealing with the case served as a Political Officer in Santiago from August 0 April 1976 and as Country Officer for Chile from August 1977 to April 1979 was Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter- American Affairs rom 76 until 1978 and has continued to work _Qn_ledal aspeCts of the case following transfer to in 1978 was an attorney in Specializing in extradition who worked on the case in 1977 and has continued with this work following transfer to in 1978 EXEMPT - E 0 12065 l#301 d - WOULD HAVE A SEVERE EFFECT ON RELATIONS WITH A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT seesaw GDS w qv-r S Department of State Case No F- 2016- 07743 Doc No 006480661 Date 02 12 2018 lia_l 1 4 1- 12111wt UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 DOC No 006480661 Date 02 12 2018 2 Orlando Letelier a Chilean Socialist in exile in the United States was killed on September 21 1976 by a bomb placed in his car An American citizen Ronnie Moffitt died coincidently in the same blast Investigation Attorney' 5 office in Washington D C produced evidence sufficient to show that the assassination was ordered and carried out by the Chilean secret police and intelligence organ known as DINA A jury in this city convicted three anti-Castro Cubans on the basis of this same evidence It is equally clear that this assassination was only one of a number of attacks on prominent Chilean exiles who had the potential to lead an effective opposition movement The DINA launched a campaign of international terrorism as an extension of the violent stage of repression within Chile from the coup in 1973 through 1976 It is probable that President Pinochet ordered the assassinations of Letelier and others There can be no question that he knew such actions were being taken by his security forces and did nothing to stOp them Intelligence reports indicate that General Contreras who was head of DINA and is now subject of our request for extradition has threatened to implicate Pinochet in this and or other unsavory matters if he Contreras is extradited or placed on trial in Chile The Supreme Court of Chile had our request for extradition Contreras and two of his subordinates in DINA under considera- tzon since September 1978 It has now ruled against extradition and has left the matter to the discretion of the military courts Chile The ARA position over the last year accepted as the policy of this Government has been to entrust the matter to the Chilean Supreme Court It appears now that having seen that court bow to government pressures and evade its responsibilities we are to place our hope for justice in the military courts of Chile courts which have steadfastly refused for six years to punish military offenders clearly guilty of murder torture 24 other atrocities Our argument is not with the decision see if the Chilean civil courts could act honestly and 3ependent1y however unlikely we knew that to be We partici- in making that decision and supported it There is no tional hope however that the Chilean military courts will 5uct a meaningful investigation or trial of this case we 2 see only delay and evasion Our only hope for justice is the U S to take firm action to bring it about 'thzv 13 - - 113 11 11 n a a arm-n gn' 1 - 4' 1 996 5535 th -- 31 '57 UNCLASSIFIED S Department of State Case No F- 2016- 07743 Doc No 006480661 Date 02 12 2018 UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No Doc No 006480661 Date 02 12 2018 pressure of effective sanctions that the military courts a 311 conduct a meaningful investigation and trial ARA would not - - as The underlying ARA policy is that the Letelier Moffitt case should be considered as only one of several allegedly important - U S concerns in Chile Cited at various times have been 5 -- Chilean cooperation in the UN and other multi- lateral fora and concerns -- Potential adverse political developments in Chile 2 should the Pinochet regime be weakened or replaced 3 -- Continued economic development in Chile along what q are seen as free-market lines 1 a Protection of U S private investment and trade The need to maintain stability in the face of ii potential regional conflicts 35 Danger of nationalistic regression by the regime into renewed harshness toward internal dissent if 31 pushed too far by U S sanctions t -- Danger of irreparable damage to our relations with Chile defined as the Chilean nation or people if_ 53% we place high priority upon the Letelier Moffitt t i u case and use strong sanctions Zyrf We understand that ARA proposes to respond to the rejection i3 of our extradition requests by continuing to place faith in gg g the Chilean courts ARA would take the Supreme Court decision ng as an acceptable expression of justice and urge without the contemplate pressures upon the Pinochet regime which might $3373 provoke damage to any of our other perceived interests in Chile l j gg We believe this policy is based upon misunderstanding of the Chilean situation and serves neither U S nor true Chilean interests We offer these points in explanation and in support of our 53% recommendations big -- Every major policy study CASP etc has concluded guzg that the U S has no vital interests to protect in g sv Chile 3 273115% 1 seeme 605 1 1 5 529 33 Sh ii and U S Department of State Case Nof di iwas UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 006480661 Date 02 12 2018 39-9132 4 -- The 1973 military coup was inevitable and the continued rule of the military institutions in Chile through a short transition period to civilian government probably serves the best interests of the 0 8 and the majority of the Chilean people -- The government of the military institutions is distinguishable from the personal position and power of Pinochet The intelligence community has concluded that the removal of Pinochet would result in his replacement by any one of several generals and present policies would be continued with the probability of a somewhat more rapid transition to civilian government His departure would also remove the primary symbol of Chilean repression and permit much greater political flexibility in dealing with Chile -- A majority of Chileans regard the military regime as a short term necessary evil and the 0 8 as a vital source of pressure upon the military to make the transition period as short as possible -- Intelligence reports make clear the belief of Pinochet that he can delay any genuine action on the case until U S interest wanes and that the present 0 5 Administration is too weak to take a forceful stand Experience with this case has shown that the Pinochet regime will cooperate and allow the courts to fulfill their role only under severe pressure without that pressure nothing it will do -- The record of the military courts and civilian for that matter since 1973 is one of farce and injustice providing no reason to expect action on this case unless forced Finally failure of the U S 'to react to this outrage and defiance of our law and power can only- bring us into contempt in Chile and elsewhere Others would not be discouragedfrom officially- sponsored terrorist acts in our country by govern- ments trying to suppress opposition in exile communitiesl stw' l' HM M49 14 - - 3 1 4% 0- - v-ez t-h-J - m2 1 UNCLASSIFIED us Department of State Case No F-2016-O774 - 7 - Nd A 13cl 29 4 3 DOC No 006480661 Date 02 12 2018 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No C06480661 Date 02 12 2018 332 2 We believe that we have no interests in Chile which require us to accommodate the defiance of Pinochet and Contreras Chile will not and cannot turn to the Communist world or to another domestic government of the far Left It will not and cannot attack U S investment and trade interests upon which it has based its economic recovery and from which it draws resources to substitute for foreign aid The possibility of conflict with Argentina - and possibly Peru - makes Chile desperately dependent upon our goodwill and influence If we are skillful a majority of Chileans will understand and accept measures we direct against a Specified target Pinochet and the security apparatus he created and misused not the Chilean military as a whole Both our international standing and the interests of this Administration require priority be given the Letelier Moffitt case in our relations with Chile Our policy should encompass Condemnation of the handling of the case by the Chilean courts which we had hoped might redeem themselves to some degree after years of passivity in the face of massive violations of Chilean law by the present Government -- Refusal to Continue the game of delay and defiance while Pinochet seeks to wait out the Carter Administration -- Instruction to Ambassador Landau to inform the Chilean Government that we cannot accept this outcome and cannot carry on normal relations with a regime v udiharbors international terrorists Public declaration that we hold Pinochet and his security apparatus responsible for the Letelier Moffitt murders based upon the full range of information intelligence sources available to us Careful differentiation public and private between our view of Pinochet and DINA and our view of responsible military government in Chile Institution of a series of steps to include indefi- nite withdrawal of the Ambassador termination of aid reduction or ending ovaptional programs such as Peace'Corps and the annual UNITAS naval exercise reduction of Embassy staff presentation of the case to international fora and coordination of sanctions with other democratic governments so inclined GDS a UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-O7743 Doc No 006480661 Date 02 12 2018 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No Doc No C06480661 Date 02 12 2018 rur zhn'Fj-Y' if 4 6 Holding out to the Chileans the prospect of repair and definite improvement in our relations when and if a more responsible leadership is installed and satisfactory measures are taken to judge and punish Contreras gt We think it probable if this policy is carefully thought out and implemented that the pragmatic majority of the Chilean military the Chilean Establishment and the still- democratic majority of the Chilean peeple will accept the need and see the benefits of forcing Pinochet to step down submitting Contreras to a real trial in Chile and moving ahead in closer cooperation with the 0 3 under a less controversial military leadership Thus Chilean interests and ours will be served Subscribed in substance and draft by before departure for B6 Manila as InspectorViv- - nitUNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No C06480661 Date 02 12 2018 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu