DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER UNMANNED AVIATION AND STRIKE WEAPONS RADM WILLIAM A MOFFETT BUILDING 47123 BUSE ROAD BLDG 2272 PATUXENT RIVER MD 20670-1547 5230 Ser 7-183 tn z From Program Manager Navy Marine Corps Small Tactical Unmanned Aircraft Systems PMA-263 To Small Unmanned Aircraft System Program Managers SUAS-PM Subj OPERATION RISKS WITII REGARDS TO DJI FAMILY OF PRODUCTS 1 Background New counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems UAS technologies have been elded to counter the increasing use of commercially available small UAS by our adversaries To support training and Tactics Techniques and Procedures development associated with these counter UAS systems operational forces require threat representative Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems SUAS The most prevalent of these SUAS arc the DJ I family of quadcopters While these systems are commonly available and low cost the has minimal technical information to thoroughly understand the impact of their use The following operational risks have been identi ed and should be acknowledged prior to employment of these commercially procured SU AS assets for CONUS-based training 2 Omrational Risks 3 Cyber vulnerabilities A thorough study of the cyber vulnerabilities of these systems is not available at this time Additionally due to the rapidly changing con gurations and open nature of the available software cyber threats will continue to evolve Of particular concern is the data link between the aircraft and the ground station While open source research indicates numerous techniques available to passively view the video and metadata from the air vehicle as well as assume control over the air vehicle by adversaries Also the typical Ground Control Station GCS con guration includes a COTS transmitter controller phone or tablet utilizing WiFi or DJ I proprietary Open source research indicates when the transmitter controller tablet or phone is connected to the web images video and ight records could be uploaded to unsecure servers in other countries via live streaming or transmitted once the air vehicle is connected to a computer using the assistant application Overall the system should be considered highly vulnerable in the cyber security realm and employed accordingly Recommended mitigations 0 Conduct training operations in areas that limit the potential of adversaries to be in reception range of the GCS and Air Vehicle signals 0 Conduct training in areas that are not operationally sensitive 0 Do not connect the GCS to military networks using wired or wireless connections Subj OPERATION RISKS WITH REGARDS TO DH FAMILY OF PRODUCTS Avoid connecting the GCS to the world wide web using wired or wireless connections but if necessary ensure all images video and ight records are deleted om the GCS cache and micro-SD cards prior to connection to the web The Air Vehicle has the capability to store imagesr video on a micro- SD card when installed in the GCS the air vehicle or a combination of both Due to the potential for loss of the air vehicle operation with the SD card installed is NOT RECOMMENDED The DH platforms can perform all necessary ight functions without the use of recording media This means both GCS internal memoly cache and external memory Cover the camera when not in use using the plastic gimbal support included in the kit Do not use Personal Phones Le Network or Hot spots to access Map Data b Electromagnetic compatibility To date a thorough investigation of electromagnetic susceptibility has not been conducted on these systems therefore the potential to experience interference is high Interference can disrupt or preclude operation of the system and potentially loss of control of the air vehicle Recommended mitigations Operation should be conducted with maximum practical standoff distance between the Vehicle and other RF transmitters to reduce the potential for unintended interference Closely monitor link quality indications OPS signal strength to minimize possibility of loss of link c Low reliability While these systems are commonly available anecdotal evidence demonstrates that they are not highly reliable when employed in typical military environments Loss of the air vehicle through damage or malfunction should be considered highly probable over time DJI systems are expendable 3 Training and Technical Support The Group 1 Unmanned Aircraft System Training and Readiness Manual require completion of the course of instruction speci c to the system assigned to operate It also requires that the SUAS Operators be designated by the unit commanding of cer before being authorized to operate a SUAS on the Lmit s table of equipment or other elded equipment Formal training and limited technical assistance is available for I systems procured by PMA-263 are available at the Training and Logistics Support Activities TALSA located on Camp Leieune and Camp Pendleton No supply support will be provided beyond the spare parts delivered with fielded systems Subj OPERATION RISKS WITH REGARDS T0 FAMILY OF PRODUCTS Recommended mitigations insure SUAS operators are certi ed and designated prior to operating the systems 0 Commanders should allow operators to build experience with the systems under controlled conditions prior to employment in more complex training scenarios 0 Care should be exercised in operation to minimize damage to the systems in order to prolong the life of these assets to the maximum extent practical 4 PMA-263 requests that these risks be reviewed and unit operators complete applicable formal training Any questions concerning this letter should be addressed to the Group I amnesia a or at COL USMC This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu