a c January 13 1979 MEMORANDUM FOR The President FROM Dr Brzezinski SUBJECT General Huyser's Report I include an interesting cable from Huyser I believe he is following his instructions correctly though I feel uneasy about his list of desirable governments marked in red I do not believe we can afford to go down the slippery slope of one civilian government followed by another somewhat more to the left The armed forces will be demoralized and we will have no more leverage If Bakhtiar fails we must make a decisive choice and Huyser's will have to be implemented with U S backing I believe that is consistent with your original directive and with your permission I would like to communicate that corrective to General Huyser It is important that he and his Iranian colleagues not entertain any illusions of what may have to be done in the event Bakhtiar falters Precisely because no one wants a military coup it is important for the Iranian military to support Bakhtiar fully and not become entangled in a disintegrative political game DLCL ASSMED Per Rae Prolect 5-2-41 g m om 12M locdlm casm a an tonic-43 1w 3 rim- AD Tic Jazz934 329203 PAGE 1 INPUT COSN DNAess AA TOR 1219232 JAN 79 1219242 JAN 79 - I UNASSISNED FLASH UNASSISNED Avg I xJi 41S797 8151856 GEE I i CABLE 25 5 ELLE Eu HAS-EDI A CJCS HASHDC - A EH ET 0 PL 25Sme A r12 cm3 1 mar THIS IS SUPPLEMENTAL To OUR PHONECON 12 JAN 79 INS EAONS FOR THIS HSG - FIRST To CLARIFY SOHE POINTS AND SECOND DDITIDNAL INFORMATION GAINED DURING THE NIGHT AND THIS MORNING 1 I HOULD LIKE TO MAKE CLEAR HY POSITION AS IT RELATES TO KHOHEINI OF GETTING SOHE COOPERATION OF TYPE FROH KHOHEINI IS OF ALL TASKS BY HE IRANIAN LEADERS THEY ARE OF AN OPINION THERE ANNOT 8E PROGRESS HADE BY THE BAKHTIAR GOVERNHENT WITHOUT HIS INGREDIENT - I SHARE THESE VIEWS AS IT PERTAINS TO BEING 0 HIGHEST PRIORITY THEY ARE ALSO OF A UNANIMOUS OPINION T0 PAVE KHOHEINI COHE BACK COUNTRY NOULD BE DISASTROUS NCLIHED TO AGREE HON NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONDUCTED HITH KHOHEINI I f3 a llggum 5 125 a l i f NARA Daiew I an 1 -5- i - URGENT m- QNLY PAGE 2 OF HY EXPERTISE AND ABOVE HY PAY GRADE BUT I DO CONSIDER 3 33 IN HY CONVERSATION NIGHT OF II JAN 79 THERE SEEHED TO BE SOHE DOUBT IN YOUR HIND As TO HY UNDER- STANDING 0F U-S POLICY AND HY INSTRUCTIONS I BELIEVE I THOROUGHLY UNDERSTAND AND I AH FOLLDHING THEH TO THE LETTER FOLLONING IS ABBREVIATED OUTLINE - A VITAL T0 U S AND IRANIAN PEOPLE TO HAVE STRONG AND STABLE GOVERNHENT FRIENDLY TD U S THE IRANIAN HILITARY THUS FAR HAS DEEPLY IHPRESSED OUR PRESIDENT - HE BELIEVE BEST INTERSTS OF ALL CAN BE BEST REALIZED BY A STRONG STABLE CIVILIAN - A CIVILIAN GOVERNHENT HUST HAVE FULL SUPPORT OF NILITARY 2 THIS SUPPORT CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED IF HILITARY LEADERS STICK T0 THEIR JOBS THE HILITARY SERVICES HOST REHAIN INTACT AND HORN AS ONE TEAN a NE HILL FROM THE PRESIDENT OONN REHAIN STRONGLY BEHI - THEN THE ONLY NPLIFICATION I HAVE GIVEN BUT NHICH I CONSIDER INSIDE THE UIDANCE A-u ALL PLANS SHOULD BE BASED ON HINIHUH BLOODSHED I HAVE IHFLIED TO THEH THAT THEY HUST FIRST EXERT EVERY EFFORT TD INSURE SUCCESS OF THE BAKHTIAR NENT IF THEY ARE TO-REALIZE FULL U S SUPPORT IN OTHER ALTERNATIVES I AH USING THIS TO BACK THEH ANAY FRDH ONLY SIDERING A HILITARY COUP I HAVE TOLD THEH THAT I CONSIDER A HILITARY CDUP AS AN ABSOLUTELY LAST RESORT I HAVE EXPLAINED TO THEH THERE ARE DEGREES BEFORE THAT SO THEY COULD UNDERSTAND I HAVE HADE IT A THREE STEP APPROACH FOR IHHEDIATE FUTURE FIRST STEP a BAHHTIAR HAY SUCCEED UNDER SOHENHAT NDRHAL GOVERNING PROCEDURES SECOND STEP a IF THAT FAILS BAKHTIAR COULD USE HILITARY IN VARYING DEGREES HE COULD HAVE TOUGH HARTIAL LAN OR HE COULD ORDER HILITARY TAKE OVER OF FACILITIES SUCH AS PONER OIL ETC THIRD STEP a ONLY IF EVERYTHING FAILS CONSIDER MILITARY TAKE OVER - 4 TBA NOT THE EXPERT IN THIS FIELD BUT SO YOU HILL HNON A HOH HY HIND Is FUNCTIONING HERE ARE HY THOUGHTS ON THE TYPES OF GOVERNHENT DESIRED - LIST FROH BEST UNDER CURRENT CIRCUHSTANCES TD HORST I A - SUCCESSFUL BANHTIAR GOVERHENT a BAKHTIAR OPERATES HITH SOHE SUCCESS FOR A PERIOD OF TIHE MONTHS BUT FAILS ANOTHER CIVILIAN GOVERNHENT APPOINTED SHAH IS OUT OF COUNTRY THAT Is HORE ACCEPTABLE TO KHOHEINI AND THE RELIOUS FACTION THIS ALTERNATIVE COULD REPEAT ITSELF UNDER CERTAIN 2 a A HILITARY COUP A KHOHEINI GOVERNHENT a ISLAHIC A COHHUNIST GOVERNHENT 5 187 AS YOU KNOH I HET HITH GEN TOUFANIAN UNTIL LATE NIGHT I HET HITH GEN RABII THIS MORNING BOTH HAVE PRESSED 1E HARD THAT THE HDHENT THE SHAH LEAVES THERE SHOULD BE A 1ILITARY TAKE OVER THEY STATE THE REASON BEING 1 4 1 I o I Fran Tuna NSJH O - TIME 1 It p1 rm 'lg gg I THE UNDERTAINTLT OF NHAT HILL HAPPEN TO THE HILITARY FORCESPAGE 3 ON DEPARTURE THEY THINK BAKHTIAR HILL SUCCEED AND THEN THEY HAVE THE MILITARY CAPABILITY TO TAK I EELIEVE EACH HAS HIS REASONS THIS IS MY OPINION Dr HHY ARE PUSHING GEN TDUFANIAN IS TORN BETNEEN PERSONAL THOUGHTS AND DEDICATION TO HIS COUNTRY HE IS ON THE LIST THE GOVERNHENT HA5 FOR THOSE TO BE PUT ON TRIAL FOR CORRUPTION - AND IS VERY CONCERNEO ABOUT HIS FUTURE HE ALSO SAYD HE HAS IN HIS HEAD THAT IF EXTRACTED NOULD BE DANGEROUS TO THE REST HE IS ALSO CONGERNED ABOUT FUTURE OP IRAN GEN RABII IS EXTREMELY DEDICATED TO THE SHAH THEREFORE THE CLOSER- WE GET TO THE DEPARTURE THE HORE UNCERTAIN HE GETS AND PREDICTS LOSS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL WHEN THE SHAH EPARTS GEN TOUFANIAN HAS ALSO PRESSED HE HARD TO AGREE TO HIS DEPARTURE PRIOR TO THE SHAHDEPARTING I HAVE-TOLD HIH IT IS HIS DECISION BUT THAT NOT CONSIDER HIS DEPARTURE AS BEING IN THE BEST INTEREST OF HIS COUNTRY OVER u 1- 5 ITS DO MY BEST TO KEEP THEH STABLE IN COUNTRY GIVE 1 FULL SUPPORT TO BAHHTIAR AND NOT JUHP-INTO A MILITARY GDUP AS THE DEPARTURE GETS CLOSER AND HHEN HE OEPARTS THEY 2 HAY OUIT LISTENING I HOPE THIS HAPPEN 7 TSJ THERE ARE STILL DEHONSTRATIDNS BUT THEY ARE NOT VIOLENT NOT DESTRUCTIVE KNOH FOR A FACT THE INSTRUCTIONS THEY GET IN THE HOSOUE IS TO DEHONSTRATE BUT BE ORDERLY AND NOT DESTRUCTIVE THERE IS A LARGE ANNUAL DEMONSTRATION SCHEDULED ON 19 JAN 79 HE HAVE BEEN INFORMED THEY HILL BE INSTRUCTED TO MAKE IT PEACEFUL 8 TONIGHT HITH AN UPDATE BEST HISHES - i 1- u- asxgg This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu
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