SECWFORN 5le 87 2-62 11 April 1962 A LBJ Pi Mandatory vie Case at Ml Document SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE Number 87 2 62 The Situation and Prospects in British Guiana Submitted by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Concurrad in by the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD As indicated overleaf APRIL 1962 APPROVEDFORRELEASE SECWORN N9 2 SEP 11 1997 SECRET QRN The foIIowmg organizattons participated In the preparation of this estimatesfigfj- - i The Central Intelligence Agency ana'the-'inteI-Iigence organizatiohs of the Depart- ments of State Defense the Attny the Navy the Air Force The Joint Staff Concurrmg Director 'of and Research Department of' State Director Defense Agency Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Army - Assistant Chief of Naval Operations InteIIigence Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence USAF 1 Director for Intelligence Joint Staff 3 I I Assistant Director FederaI Bureau of Director of the National Secunty Agency I I a-ge laws TitIe I8 USC Secs 793 and 794 the trans- 1 iri any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited - mug W secMor-ORN THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN BRITISH GUIANA THE PROBLEM To estimate the short-term outlook for British Guiana with particular reference to the political orientation of agan and his party the likely outcome if new elections were to be held and the nature of possible alternatives to the Jagan government CONCLUSIONS 1 Racial con ict is likely to continue to be the basic factor in the political situation in British Guiana The two major political parties represent the nearly equal East Indian and Negro communities and party rivalry has increasingly taken on a racial character The British who have exercised a stabilizing in uence will almost certainly withdraw and grant independence not later than mid-1963 since they ap- parently foresee strong adverse reactions with unpleasant in- ternational connotations if they try to extend the period of their authority in the colony Paras 5 13 14 2 Premier Cheddi Jagan and the People s Progressive Party represent the East Indians who are more nu- merous than the Negroes and who have been consolidated politically by the February 1962 disturbances Jagan and the are likely to maintain control of the government whether or not new elections are held However any one of a number of likely developments could precipitate another period of violence Paras 5 11 15 18 SECRWORN 1 SECRWFORN 3 The leadership has a clear record of Communist association and of Communistdine policies but the evidence does not show whether or to what extent they are under international Communist control We believe however that agan is a Communist though the degree of Moscow s con- trol is not yet clear A agan government in the postinde pendence period would probably follow a policy of nonalign- ment in international affairs but would probably lean in the Soviet direction Its associations with East and West would be highly opportunistic and strongly in uenced by its interest in obtaining aid for British Guiana Its domestic program would be radically socialist and reformist Paras 6 7 19 4 The People s National Congress PNC led by L Forbes Burnham is supported by a large proportion of the Negro population but by almost no one else A PNC majority in the legislature even with the support of the small United Force party UF is unlikely under presently foreseeable circumstances If the PNC were to come to power its policies would probably be leftist and neutralist though somewhat less radical and pro-Bloc than those of the Paras 8 9 15 2 SECWN SECRE FORN DISCUSSION I BACKGROUND 5 For over a decade political life in British Guiana has been marked by the racial split between East Indians who make up about half of the population and Negroes who ac count for a somewhat smaller proportion The most powerful political force has been the People s Progressive Party led by the government s East Indian Premier Cheddi Jagan The derives its strength mainly from East Indians most of whom live in the but also has found some support among the Negroes In the August 1961 elec- tion the won about 43 percent of the popular vote thereby gaining a 20-15 ma- jority in the legislature 1 Since the elections it has demonstrated considerable political in- eptitude and has failed to make headway against the enormous economic dif culties of the colony 6 On the basis of available evidence it can- not be determined whether or to what extent Jagan and other leading figures are un- der the control of international communism However Jagan and many of his colleagues in both the and the government have long associated with and indeed shown a predilec- tion for persons and organizations identi ed with the Communist cause abroad A num- ber of them have traveled to the Soviet Bloc and to Cuba where they have made a variety of of cial and semiofficial contacts On occa- sion they have publicly espoused the Commu nist line Several of Jagan s associates in his party and cabinet have been more clearly identi ed as Communists than has he For example Ranji Chandisingh the Minister of Labor Health and Housing was once a mem- The election in one constituency was set aside by court decision as a result of irregularity and the majority is now 19-45 ber of the British Communist Party and agan s wife Janet has a long record of Com- munist association agan has shown himself to be highly susceptible to in uence by his advisers In general the pattern of behavior of the whole group suggests a deep attraction to the Communist way Jagan s behavior can be interpreted as that of a national reformer of Marxist persua- sion who has been led by the assiduous efforts of Communists to see hope for his country in Communist programs and associations but who has not committed himself to the com- plete discipline of a higher Communist au- thority Alternatively it can be explained as that of a convinced Communist who pur- posefully refrains from acknowledging his commitments and who seeks to maintain a neutralist posture in order to maximize possi- bilities for Western aid secure independence for British Guiana and ward off Western in- terference We cannot read the evidence to give conclusive support for either of these two interpretations We believe however that Jagan is a Communist though the degree of Moscow s control is not yet clear 8 The principal opposition party is the People s National Congress PNC of L Forbes Burnham a Negro who is a radical reformer and who until 1954 was one of Jagan s lieu- tenants in the and an advocate of ex tremist measures in government The PNC is supported by most of the colony s Negro population in the cities including most gov- ernment employees and in the bauxite min- ing areas Outside Negro ranks it has vir- tually no following and among many middle class Negroes its support is not firm In the 1961 election it polled 41 percent of the vote and won 11 seats in the legislature PNC policy has been largely that of opposing the What we can say of PNC policy if it were to form a government must be based largely on Burnham s statements and on the content of his party newspaper The PNC in of ce would probably feature a more mod- erate policy of domestic socialism than the Likewise in the foreign eld it would also be neutralist but somewhat less pro Bloc than the Burnham has a reputation for opportunism and venality His racist point of view so evident in the past forbodes instability and con ict during any adminis- tration under his leadership 9 An additional opposition party is the United Force UF which seeks to be multi- - racial It is based largely on the small com mercial class including the Portuguese mi nority which fears that Jagan would trans- form the country into a Communist state after independence It won four seats in the 1961 election Had the UF not run the PNC might have won some of these seats but prob ably not all In any case it would not have gained a majority ii FEBRUARY RIOTS 10 A tremendous increase in the racial tension in British Guiana and in the poten- tial for con ict came as a result of a week of strikes and riots which shook the capital city of Georgetown in mid-February 1962 The immediate cause of the strikes was Premier Jagan s budget bill but the riots were also rooted in the longstanding racial antagonism and in the dissatisfaction of many urban groups notably public service employees and businessmen with the policies of the government As the disturbances spread they took on the character of a struggle be tween the Negro urban community and the East Indian Government and its rural sup- porters 11 Paradoxically the February crisis strengthened Jagan by consolidating the sup port of his East Indian followers At the same time it reduced his stature and tar- nished his prestige as a national leader His economic and nancial problems are more acute now than before the riots His govern- ment is hard pressed to meet current expendi- tures Whereas before the riots almost 20 percent of the labor force was out of work an even larger number are now unemployed as a result of the destruction in Georgetown Jagan s plans for economic development have been set back partly because he has been forced to trim his tax measures and partly because uncertainties about his country s po- litical stability are inhibiting the ow of out- side public assistance on which development is heavily dependent The February events have discouraged foreign investment 2 Ex- tensive capital ight is in progress and foreign investors are doing no more than attending to existing operations A good many city merchants East Indians among them are in- clined to cut and run rather than to stay and rebuild 12 On the other hand the crisis also left the opposition with reduced prestige Its several leaders acted recklessly and in the end tended to neutralize each other Those un- ions which are predominantly Negro actively collaborated with the opposition parties but the rank and le of the largest single union chiefly East Indians did not There have been rumors of dissension in the and re ports that the opposition might try to win some of Jagan s legislators away from him but suf cient defections to cause the legisla- tive defeat of the Jagan government are not considered probable in the near future under existing circumstances Ill PROSPECTS 13 The British presence is a check on the violent political forces that seethe near the British foreign investment in Guiana amounts to between $400 and $500 million and is mainly in sugar production Canadian investment about $80 million and US investment about $30 million is mainly in bauxite and sugar 4 SECWORN SECWFORN surface in British Guiana British departure will be the prelude to a period of uncertainty and possibly of violence during which the country will be establishing its international orientation Nevertheless the British appear determined to get out They are not anxious to continue to put money into British Guiana and they calculate that the present cost to them of $7 million a year would be increased to $20 million per annum if they reirnposed direct government They assert in private that British Guiana is in the US not the UK sphere of interest and they probably consider that its future is not properly their problemthe same time Lon- don is less inclined than is the US to believe that communism will achieve dominance in the colony Finally it fears that to delay in- dependence very long would arouse indigna- tion in many parts of the world where colonial- ism is a sensitive issue 14 The British may see t to hold on for a time by postponing the May 1962 conference which was to have discussed plans and timing of independence Even if the conference is held on schedule independence may be de- ferred Jagan has agreed to an investigation of the recent riots by a Commonwealth com- mission but the the scope of the inquiry is such that it is not likely to necessitate much delay Independence might also be delayed by the failure of agan and opposition leaders to get together on a new constitution A vote of no-con dence in the government could also hold up proceedings but we believe that Jagan will move cautiously on matters of domestic policy to assure control of his ma- jority in the legislature In any circum- stance however we do not anticipate that the British will delay much beyond the end of 1962 15 For any of the above reasons the UK may nd it desirable to bold new elections New elections held on the same basis as were those in August lQGl with the same parties and same electoral system would probably return a Jagan government again even in the face of a PNC-UF electoral coalition The PNC is urging a proportional representation system under which it believes it could turn the out but the latter is unlikely to ac cept any form of proportional representation that would seriously prejudice its electoral chances 16 After independence Jagan is unlikely to be over tender about guarantees of constitu- tional rights for the opposition With the British mediator gone he will probably seek to move toward consolidation of his control over the country No subsequent election is likely to be as free as those that were held under the watchful of the British 17 Nevertheless Jagan will be under some restraints not to ride roughshod over the wishes of the public Negro as well as East Indian The size and potential strength of the Negro community were well demonstrated by the February riots and agan will fear to bring the Negroes into the streets against him again He is also aware that the rank and lee of his party end indeed the East Indian community as a whole is not Communist and may react against unpalatable Communist or socialist measures Furthermore he has the problem of developing and controlling a se- curity force 3 He has apparently been con- sidering a largely East Indian security force of some kind but must be aware of the dan- gers implict in such a move especially since the existing police force is principally made up of Negroes Jagan s impetuous enthu- siasm for his own reform programs and the temptation to work through and for the East In addition to the 1 500-man local police the security forces in the colony now include a Volun- teer Guard of about 500 some 200 British troops normally stationed near Georgetown and about 600 of those brought in at the time of the disorders agan has threatened to recruit his own police or to create a national army and in response the British are proposing to enlarge the local police by 500 SECWORN 5 Indian community may be moderated by the realization that if the country is to be held together important concessions must be made to the Negroes Still his recklessness and impulsiveness are notorious and could at any time overrule his judgment 18 We do not believe that we can project our estimate very far beyond the period of independence Jagan will almost certainly maintain his predominant position in the and can probably prevent an opposition government from taking over However any one of a number of likely developments could precipitate another period of disturbance like that of last February We see no prospect for a coalition of moderates of both parties and both races 19 We believe that a Jagan government in the postindependence period would be likely to identify itself as it has in the past with anticolonialist and independence movements It would probably follow a policy of nonalign ment and seek to bene t from relations with both the West and the Communist countries but would probably lean in the Soviet direc- tion For some time Jagan has been seeking trade and aid from the West and he has ex- pressed interest in joining the Organization of American States and in participating in the Alliance for Progress He has also been seeking trade and aid from the Bloc He has just signed a trade contract with East Ger- many and other deals with Bloc 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