United States House Committee on Appropriations – Subcommittee on State Foreign Operations and Related Programs United States Efforts to Counter Russian Disinformation and Malign Influence July 10 2019 Dr Alina Polyakova Director Global Democracy and Emerging Technology Fellow Center on the United States and Europe Foreign Policy Program Brookings Institution Dear Chairwoman Lowey Ranking Member Rogers Distinguished Members of the Subcommittee It is an honor and privilege to address you today on this important issue Thank you for inviting me to testify President Vladimir Putin’s Russia seeks to weaken Western governments and transatlantic institutions discredit democratic and liberal values and create a post-truth world with the aim of shielding Moscow’s autocracy from liberal influence and easing Russia’s domination of its neighbors 1 Russian disinformation campaigns aim to amplify existing social divisions and further polarize democratic societies As such they don’t stop when the ballot box closes Elections may provide an ideal highimpact opportunity for a disinformation actor but the barrage of disinformation against Western democracies including the United States continues between election cycles The spread of disinformation to undermine public confidence is one critical tool in the Kremlin’s broader tool-kit of malign influence which also includes cyber-hacking illicit finance support for radical movements and parties and the use of economic warfare primarily through energy exports Disinformation as a tool of Russia’s political warfare is not new During the Cold War the Soviet Union’s main intelligence agency the KGB routinely carried out disinformation campaigns against the United States and our allies Dezinfomatsiya as it is called in Russian was part and parcel of Soviet active measures aimed at shaping the outcome of global events of interest to the Kremlin For example in the 1980s the KGB ran a disinformation campaign called “Operation Infektion” to plant the idea that the CIA invented the AIDS virus as part of a biological weapons program A news story was first planted in a small Soviet controlled paper in India It was then disseminated by Soviet outlets in the Soviet Union and globally eventually infiltrating Western media including in the United States The Soviet Union eventually dropped the story in the late 1980s after the Reagan Administration made 1 Alina Polyakova and Daniel Fried “Democratic Defense Against Disinformation ” Washington DC United States Atlantic Council February 2018 https www atlanticcouncil org images publications Democratic_Defense_Against_Disinformation_FINAL pdf 1 countering and exposing Soviet disinformation an explicit part of U S policy Eventually Mikhail Gorbachev who was seeking better relations with the West at the time reportedly apologized to President Reagan for promoting the conspiracy theory which undermined U S diplomatic efforts in the global south and damaged the U S image globally The entire disinformation cycle for Operation Infektion from initial plant to global spread and eventual end took approximately five years Today what used to take years takes minutes The advance of digital technology and communication allows for the high-speed spread of disinformation rapid amplification of misleading content and massive manipulation via unsecured points of influence This digital ecosystem creates opportunities for manipulation that have exceeded the ability of democratic nations to respond and sometimes even to grasp the extent of the challenge Russia’s democratic and pro-Western neighbors—especially Ukraine Georgia and the Baltic states— have contended with Russian disinformation attacks for years Other targets of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns—the United States and some Western European countries—woke up late to the challenge with the United States doing so only after the 2016 presidential election Indeed the Russian disinformation attack on the United States was part of a long-standing pattern of Russian political warfare honed in Eastern Europe and later deployed against the West of which the United States was another target and victim As a result Western democracies have learned that the very principles and values of open societies—plurality freedom of speech independent media—are also vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malign actors for their advantage One positive consequence of Russia’s brazen interference in the U S elections has been that it has served as a wakeup call to Western democracies in Europe and North America Since 2016 European governments the European Union Canada and the United States have moved beyond “admiring the problem” and have entered a new “trial and error” phase testing new policy responses technical fixes and educational tools for strengthening resistance and building resilience against disinformation As these efforts progress four insights have emerged 1 There is no silver bullet for addressing the disinformation challenge Governmental policy on its own will not be enough The private sector specifically social media platforms and civil society groups including independent media must be part of the solution A whole of society approach is key 2 Exposure and identification of specific malicious entities i e Russian bots or trolls or content is necessary but not enough to curb the spread of foreign disinformation As we respond the adversary’s tactics evolve 3 A democratic response to state-sponsored information warfare must be rooted in democratic principles of transparency accountability and integrity These principles should guide U S and European policy As we learned during the Cold War we need not become them to beat them 4 Malicious disinformation attacks are not limited to one country All democracies are current or potential future targets—our response is stronger with allies Like-minded governments should establish mechanisms for consistent sharing of information best practices and risk-assessment guidelines The trans-Atlantic alliance should be the basis of a “Counter Disinformation Coalition ” in which the United States should play a leading role Unfortunately the United States has fallen behind Europe in both conceptualizing the nature of the challenges and operationalizing concrete steps to counter and build resilience against disinformation The U S Congress should fill the gap In this statement I draw on two reports Democratic Defense 2 Against Disinformation 2018 and Democratic Defense Against Disinformation 2 0 2019 2 which I coauthored with Ambassador Daniel Fried in addition to my research at Brookings3 on emerging threats in the information space and previous Congressional testimonies 4 to • • • Provide an overview of Russia’s disinformation machine Provide a progress report on European and U S efforts to respond to Russian disinformation since 2016 Recommend steps that the United States and the U S Congress in particular should take to better defend against and get ahead of disinformation threats I The Russian disinformation machine Russian disinformation against democracies is multi-vectored and multi-layered consisting of overt state-funded propaganda covert social media entities and constantly evolving repertoire of fly by night websites These elements work in concert with each other to amplify and distribute content across traditional and social media outlets Overt Russian state-funded disinformation and propaganda includes RT Sputnik and other Kremlinlinked media outlets Estimates suggest that the Russian government spends approximately $300 million on RT annually RT broadcasts in English Spanish Arabic and German and claims to reach 700 million people in 100 countries 5 RT as it proudly states is the most-watched news network on YouTube claiming over 8 billion views and 3 5 million subscribers 6 YouTube statistics show 2 8 billion views however By comparison Voice of America has approximately 200 million views and 428 000 subscribers RFER RL has 32 million views and about 60 000 subscribers On Facebook RT has 5 6 million followers VOA 11 6 million and RFE RL 550 000 On Twitter RT has 2 9 million followers VOA 1 6 million and REF RL 77 000 Covert social media entities include automated “bot” accounts trolls cyborgs and impersonation pages groups and accounts used to carry out digital disinformation campaigns across social media platforms To date the Department of Justice Special Counsel report7 and the investigation’s related 2 Alina Polyakova and Daniel Fried “Democratic Defense Against Disinformation 2 0 ” Washington DC United States Atlantic Council June 2019 https www atlanticcouncil org publications reports democratic-defense-against-disinformation-2-0 3 See Alina Polyakova “Weapons of the weak Russia and AI-driven asymmetric warfare ” Washington DC United States Brookings Institution November 2018 https www brookings edu research weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare and Alina Polyakova and Spencer Boyer “The future of political warfare Russia the West and the coming age of global digital competition ” Washington DC United States Brookings Institution March 2018 https www brookings edu research the-future-of-political-warfarerussia-the-west-and-the-coming-age-of-global-digital-competition 4 “Five Years after the Revolution of Dignity Ukraine’s Progress Russia’s Malign Activities ” U S Congress Senate Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation 116th Congress statement of Dr Alina Polyakova Director Global Democracy and Emerging Technology Fellow Center on the United States and Europe Foreign Policy Program Brookings Institution https www foreign senate gov imo media doc 061819_Polyakova_Testimony pdf and “Lessons from the Mueller Report Part II Bipartisan Perspectives ” U S Congress House of Representatives U S House Committee on the Judiciary 116th Congress statement of Dr Alina Polyakova Director Global Democracy and Emerging Technology Fellow Center on the United States and Europe Foreign Policy Program Brookings Institution https docs house gov meetings JU JU00 20190620 109668 HHRG-116-JU00-Wstate-PolyakovaA-20190620 pdf 5 Elena Postnikova “Agent of Influence Should Russia’s RT Register as a Foreign Agent ” Washington DC United States Atlantic Council August 2017 https www atlanticcouncil org images publications RT_Foreign_Agent_web_0831 pdf 6 “RT ” YouTube channel https www youtube com user RussiaToday videos app desktop 7 Robert S Mueller III “Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election ” U S Department of Justice Washington DC 2019 https www justice gov storage report pdf 3 indictments from February 20188 and July 20189 against the Internet Research Agency IRA and Russian military intelligence GRU provide the most comprehensive assessment of the inner working of Russia’s covert disinformation operations The IRA’s information operations against the United States relied on impersonation accounts to infiltrate public discourse online used non-political content and issues to build audience on Facebook Twitter Instagram and elsewhere purchased ads to prop-up content on platforms to reach more users Over the course of the U S operation the IRA purchased over 3 500 ads and spent approximately $100 000—a small investment which signals that advertising was a relatively small part of Russian disinformation operations in the United States In mid-2017 the most popular IRAcontrolled group—“United Muslims of America”—had over 300 000 followers By the end of the 2016 election the IRA “had the ability to reach millions of U S persons through their social media accounts” on Facebook Instagram Twitter YouTube and Tumblr according to the report 10 Facebook later estimated that IRA-controlled accounts reached as many as 126 million people 11 and an additional 1 4 million12 were reached through Twitter The Kremlin via Putin’s ally and agent Yevgeny Prigozhin invested in expanding the IRA’s operations In early 2015 the IRA had a staff of 225-250 people which grew to 800-900 by the middle of the year adding new capabilities such as video infographics memes etc 13 By 2016 the number of employees at the American department or translator project almost tripled to 80-90 people representing approximately 10 percent of the total staff The IRA’s monthly operating budget in 2016 was $1 25 million approximately $15 million annually 14 Since the conclusion of the Special Counsel investigation we still don’t know the full scope of the command structure how far into the Kremlin the decisionmaking process reached and how the project continues to be funded today In 2017 an independent Russian news outlet reported that the IRA had moved into a new larger office building While the IRA’s operations undoubtedly continue today and other similar “troll farms” are also very likely operating in addition to the IRA there is scant if any information about these entities’ activities and funding II How Europe has responded15 Following Russian interference in the 2016 U S elections Russian disinformation operations have targeted elections and events in France MacronLeaks the United Kingdom disinformation around the Skripal operation Sweden disinformation around NATO Spain Catalan referendum European Union European Parliament elections Netherlands MH17 investigation North Macedonia Greece Ukraine and elsewhere The national responses have been varied based on national context and much of the response has come at the EU level 8 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC A K A MEDIASINTEZ LLC A K A GLAVSET LLC A K A MIXINFO LLC A K A AZIMUT LLC A K A NOVINFO LLC et al 18 U S C §§ 2 371 1349 1028A 2018 https www justice gov file 1035477 download 9 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO et al 18 U S C §§ 2 371 1030 1028A 1956 and 3551 et seq 2018 https www justice gov file 1080281 download 10 Robert S Mueller III “Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election ” 26 11 Mike Isaac and Daisuke Wakabayashi “Russian Influence Reached 126 Million Through Facebook Alone ” The New York Times October 30 2017 https www nytimes com 2017 10 30 technology facebook-google-russia html 12 Christopher Carbone “1 4 million Twitter users engaged with Russian propaganda during election ” Fox News February 1 2018 https www foxnews com tech 1-4-million-twitter-users-engaged-with-russian-propaganda-during-election 13 Polina Rusyaeva and Andrei Zakharov “Расследование РБК как «фабрика троллей» поработала на выборах в США ” RBC October 17 2017 https www rbc ru magazine 2017 11 59e0c17d9a79470e05a9e6c1 14 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC A K A MEDIASINTEZ LLC A K A GLAVSET LLC A K A MIXINFO LLC A K A AZIMUT LLC A K A NOVINFO LLC et al 18 U S C §§ 2 371 1349 1028A 2018 https www justice gov file 1035477 download 7 15 This is a summary of EU activities for a detailed assessment of European responses see Polyakova and Fried Democratic Defense Against Disinformation 2 0 4 EU response Last December the EU launched an Action Plan Against Disinformation based on principles of transparency and accountability 16 It increased funding to identify and expose disinformation and established a “rapid alert system” RAS The RAS was supposed to have an initial operational capacity by March 2019 two months before the EU parliamentary elections But as The New York Times recently reported the system is still not operational and mired in internal debates 17 The EU has also pushed to work with the major social media companies although in a voluntary capacity Google Facebook Twitter and Mozilla have signed onto an EU voluntary Code of Practice which tries to set some standards for fighting disinformation Social media companies are also submitting regular progress reports to the EU The progress reports indicate a mixed picture The EU Commission has recognized efforts by social media platforms to take down fake accounts restrict ad purchasing by purveyors of disinformation identify and block inauthentic behavior and take other steps to meet the general commitments outlined in the code But it also noted insufficient information provided by social media companies and urged specific next steps including calling on platforms to take more serious actions to address transparency particularly with respect to political ads The commission is issuing monthly progress reports to test social media companies’ response to their commitments 18 The EU action plan also aims to improve social resilience against disinformation by creating a European network of independent fact checkers launching a secure online platform addressing disinformation exploring means of reliable identification of information suppliers and supporting long-term social media literacy It remains unclear however how and if these efforts have been implemented National European responses National responses have varied significantly which has only contributed to the difficulty of implementing a comprehensive EU level strategy France has taken the lead in conceptualizing a common democratic approach In March 2019 President Emmanuel Macron proposed a new “European Agency for the Protection of Democracies ” which included providing each EU member state with expertise to protect election processes against cyberattacks and manipulation 19 France has also led the “Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace ” established in November 2018 20 In relation to security of the information space the Call includes commitments to 16 “Joint Communication to the European Parliament the European Council the Council the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Action Plan against Disinformation ” Brussels Belgium European Commission December 5 2018 https eeas europa eu sites eeas files action_plan_against_disinformation pdf 17 Matt Apuzzo “Europe Built a System to Fight Russian Meddling It’s Struggling ” The New York Times July 6 2019 https www nytimes com 2019 07 06 world europe europe-russian-disinformation-propaganda-elections html 18 “Code of Practice against disinformation Commission calls on signatories to intensify their efforts ” European Commission January 29 2019 http europa eu rapid press-release_IP-19-746_en htm “Second monthly intermediate results of the EU Code of Practice against disinformation ” European Commission March 20 2019 https ec europa eu digital-single-market en news second-monthly-intermediateresults-eu-code-practice-against-disinformation Latest statement at time of writing “Code of practice against disinformation Commission welcomes the commitment of online platforms ahead of the European elections ” European Commission April 23 2019 http europa eu rapid press-release_STATEMENT-19-2174_en htm 19 Emmanuel Macron “Renewing Europe ” Project Syndicate March 4 2019 http prosyn org kCUclh5 20 “Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace ” Paris France Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs November 12 2018 https www diplomatie gouv fr en french-foreign-policy digital-diplomacy france-and-cyber-security article cybersecurity-paris-call-of-12november-2018-for-trust-and-security-in 5 • • • • Increase prevention against and resilience to malicious online activity Protect the accessibility and integrity of the Internet Cooperate in order to prevent interference in electoral processes Prevent the proliferation of malicious online programs and techniques The Paris call includes backing from 66 States 139 international and civil society organizations and 347 private sector entities The implementation process is still in its early stages but the multi-stakeholder support is a positive sign that it could serve as a platform for a global commitment on information and cyber security The United States is not a signatory Sweden created a new “Psychological Defense” agency tasked with countering disinformation and increasing societal resilience to disinformation The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency MSB akin to the U S Department of Homeland Security has worked closely with local authorities to establish lines of communication conduct trainings and analyze potential systemic weaknesses Ahead of the Swedish national elections last fall the MSB mailed leaflets to households explaining the threat of information influence and outlining how to respond 21 Swedish schools also received information and materials to help teach students how to identify disinformation Other European countries including the Czech Republic Denmark Estonia and the Netherlands established some form of a cross-agency team tasked with coordinating governmental efforts to identify and respond to information operations III How the United States has responded The United States has made little progress in addressing the disinformation challenge At a basic level it remains unclear who in the U S government owns this problem Still there have been notable activities from the Administration and the U S Congress The State Department’s Global Engagement Center GEC has been tasked with countering state-sponsored disinformation and it has begun to fund research and development of counter-disinformation tools while supporting civil society groups and independent media on the front lines of the threat in Europe Over time this funding will help boost independent media and groups on the front-lines of the information war U S Cyber Command began operations ahead of the 2018 congressional elections to deter Russian operatives from potential interference 22 Cyber Command together with the National Security Agency NSA reportedly developed information about Russian trolls and their activities and alerted the FBI and Department of Homeland Security DHS 23 The operation followed the Department of Justice indictments of Russian individuals intelligence officers and companies involved with the Internet Research Agency 21 “Countering information influence activities – A handbook for communicators ” Karlstad Sweden Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency March 2019 https rib msb se filer pdf 28698 pdf 22 Julian E Barnes “U S Begins First Cyberoperation Against Russia Aimed at Protecting Elections ” The New York Times October 23 2018 https www nytimes com 2018 10 23 us politics russian-hacking-usa-cyber-command html 23 David Ignatius “The U S military is quietly launching efforts to deter Russian meddling ” The Washington Post February 7 2019 https www washingtonpost com opinions the-us-military-is-quietly-launching-efforts-to-deter-russian-meddling 2019 02 07 4de5c5fa2b19-11e9-b2fc-721718903bfc_story html utm_term 1cbbaf8bf3ae 6 and in cyber operations against the U S elections 24 Cyber Command has reportedly sent messages to specific individuals active in disinformation operations de facto outing them and their activities While not a new policy the Department of the Treasury used existing authorities to impose sanctions on Russian entities tied to disinformation efforts including those directed at the 2016 U S presidential election This included the sanctions designation on December 19 2018 of entities and individuals tied to the IRA and nine GRU military intelligence officers Material accompanying the Treasury Department’s sanctions designations exposed details of Russian operation including establishment of an online Englishlanguage website “USA Really ” Current Time the Russian language television news program produced by VOA and RFE RL is perhaps the U S government’s closest response to countering RT and other Kremlin-funded outlets by providing truthful information to Russian speakers in the post-Soviet states This effort is critical as Russian speakers have little access to Russian-language broadcasting that is not Kremlin-controlled However Current Time cannot at this time compete with the production values and the reach of RT Current Time’s YouTube channel has received 279 million views and has 667 000 subscribers On VKontakte the Russian equivalent of Facebook Current Time has 254 000 subscribers Impressive for a program that started in 2014 but still far behind RT’s reach The 2019 National Defense Authorization Act NDAA added significant albeit second-order provisions defining the importance of countering disinformation for U S national security 25 It cemented the role of the GEC by defining its counter-disinformation task within the parameters of U S national security likely securing the center’s longer-term funding in future iterations of the NDAA It also defined “malign influence” as “the coordinated integrated and synchronized application of national diplomatic informational military economic business corruption educational and other capabilities by hostile foreign powers to foster attitudes behaviors decisions or outcomes within the United States ” The Senate has reintroduced the Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression Act of 2019 DASKA while mostly devoted to sanctions it also “calls for the establishment of a National Fusion Center to Respond to Hybrid Threats a Countering Russian Influence Fund to be used in countries vulnerable to Russian malign influence and closer coordination with allies” sections 704 705 and 706 26 IV What the U S should do U S Congress • Congress should authorize and appropriate funds to “build capacity of civil society media and other nongovernmental organizations ” countering Russian and other sources of foreign disinformation from DASKA Sec 705 b in coordination with the EU NATO and other bodies 24 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC A K A MEDIASINTEZ LLC A K A GLAVSET LLC A K A MIXINFO LLC A K A AZIMUT LLC A K A NOVINFO LLC et al 18 U S C §§ 2 371 1349 1028A 2018 https www justice gov file 1035477 download UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO et al 18 U S C §§ 2 371 1030 1028A 1956 and 3551 et seq 2018 https www justice gov file 1080281 download 25 “John S McCain National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2019 ” Washington DC United States U S Government Publication Office July 25 2018 https www govinfo gov content pkg CRPT-115hrpt874 pdf CRPT-115hrpt874 pdf 26 U S Congress Senate Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression Act of 2019 S 482 116th Congress 1st session introduced in Senate February 13 2019 https www congress gov 116 bills s482 BILLS-116s482is pdf 7 Funding is already available to the State Department’s Global Engagement Center this should be increased • Congress should authorize and appropriate funds to establish a “fusion cell” or NCTC-style model for coordinating U S government efforts on disinformation The Cell could be housed in DHS State or elsewhere There is more than one option for structuring an interagency response • Congress should authorize and appropriate funds to further develop Current Time to allow Current Time to broadcast and build audiences in Central Eastern Europe and the Balkans with potential expansion further into Western Europe o At the same time the United States Agency for Global Media USAGM should be tasked with conducting an audit of its existing programs and services to assess which are underperforming It may not be a good use of resources to continue to fund traditional television broadcasting More innovative digitally oriented content should be considered to reach audiences through social media markets ● Congress should develop in-house expertise on disinformation and digital media Congress’s capacity for detailed analysis independent from social media companies will be critical ● Congress should prepare legislation—on a step-by-step basis—to support a regulatory framework for social media companies This layered approach should start with greater Congressional scrutiny around all online advertising—an industry that is largely unregulated o The Honest Ads Act introduced in the last Congress is a solid step toward setting transparency standards around online advertising not just narrowly defined political ads Standards should be established evenly across the tech industry not just for social media firms This act revised and strengthened along the above lines could be a vehicle for this effort ● Consider legislation to provide a framework for regulation to address transparency especially with respect to bots integrity and authenticity of service i e targeting deceptive and impersonator accounts whether individuals or false-front organizations and common terms of service across the social media industry ● Congress could also consider mandating that media outlets determined by the Department of Justice to be acting as agents of foreign governments be de-ranked in searches and on newsfeeds and be barred from buying ads RT for example was required to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act FARA Governmental assessments and FARA determination should be one of many variables considered in rankings for search engines However legislators should bear in mind that mandating de-ranking based on governmental assessments and FARA determinations could set a precedent which undemocratic regimes could abuse • Congress should explore establishing a federal statute that would limit companies’ collection of personal data about individuals Such a statute would specify that any personal data collected would be specific to the stated purpose of the technology Such data collection limitation would make microtargeting and exploitation of individuals’ personal data more difficult while also reducing 8 the ability of malicious actors to influence The California Consumer Privacy Act of 201827 could serve as precedent for a federal mandate U S Administration • The USG should continue to impose sanctions on foreign official or officially-controlled or directed purveyors of disinformation and their sponsors and to identify and prosecute violations of federal elections laws prohibitions on foreign contributions o On September 12 2018 the Trump administration issued Executive Order 13848 which provides for sanctions imposed against persons found to have interfered in U S elections While in part simply an effort by the administration to preempt stronger legislation i e the “DETER” Act introduced by Senators Marco Rubio R-FL and Chris Van Hollen D-MD it provides a useful vehicle should the administration use it o U S sanctions laws restrict U S citizens from financial dealings with or “providing material support” to foreign persons under sanctions Enforcement of these and federal election laws could limit the ability of Russian or other foreign purveyors of disinformation to work with U S agents • USG should as some European countries have done set up an interagency group center or fusion cell tasked with coordinating governmental efforts to counter disinformation at home and abroad The group should have high level political leadership to direct and coordinate policy establish a baseline for response educate civil servants work via State with U S embassies and create communication channels from the local to the federal level • Establish a USG rapid alert system RAS to inform the public allied governments and social media companies of emerging disinformation campaigns that threaten national security The European rapid alert system can help the USG judge the potential of this idea Some of the challenges can be anticipated given U S politics and traditions issues will arise around a U S RAS’s mandate e g the definition and attribution of disinformation and its composition credibility and independence Getting ahead of the threat The above recommendations are low-hanging fruit on which the U S Congress and the Administration should act These steps will not turn the tide of disinformation attacks Rather these are the minimum actions needed to start to build resistance The Kremlin’s tool-kit is out in the open and Russia has faced few consequences for its malign activities This sends a signal to other malicious actors that they can act with impunity to destabilize democracies and distort public discourse Other state actors with perhaps greater capabilities such as China and non-state actors such as terrorist groups with a higher tolerance for risk will adapt the disinformation toolkit to undermine democracies or are already doing so While the democratic West is fighting yesterday’s war our adversaries are evolving and adapting to the new playing field First innovation in artificial intelligence AI is enabling the creation of “deep fakes” and other “synthetic media” products Using video and audio manipulation malicious actors can manufacture the appearance of reality and make a political leader appear to make remarks that they did 27 Dipayan Ghosh “What You Need to Know About California’s New Data Privacy Law ” Harvard Business Review July 11 2018 https hbr org 2018 07 what-you-need-to-know-about-californias-new-data-privacy-law 9 not As these tools become more low cost and accessible they will become perfect weapons for information warfare Such technologies could drive the next great leap in AI-driven disinformation Second disinformation techniques are shifting from the use of simple automated bots to more sophisticated interaction with and manipulation of domestic groups extremist and otherwise through various forms of impersonation and amplification of organic posts by domestic actors Thus it is already increasingly difficult to disentangle foreign-origin disinformation from domestic social media conversations Rather than trying to break through and channel the noise the new strategy aims to blend in with the noise—obfuscating manipulative activity and blurring the line between authentic and inauthentic content The United States has fallen behind in addressing the challenge of foreign disinformation But it is not too late to change course toward a proactive rather than reactive approach This critical issue concerns all democracies equally Strong U S leadership could tip the balance toward ensuring that the digital space continues to facilitate and support democratic values of transparency accountability and integrity To do otherwise is to leave this arena open to authoritarians to set the rules of the game 10