“China’s Foreign Influence and Sharp Power Strategy to Shape and Influence Democratic Institutions” Testimony before the U S House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Christopher Walker Vice President Studies Analysis National Endowment for Democracy May 16 2019 I would like to thank Chairman Schiff Ranking Member Nunes and the other esteemed members of the Committee for the opportunity and privilege of presenting testimony on the critical subject of the impact of China’s influence on democratic institutions Since the end of the Cold War the democratic West has placed special emphasis on the idea of integrating nondemocratic regimes into the rules-based international order For political leaders and analysts in the United States and Europe integration has been a dominant foreign-po lic y organizing concept The democracies’ central assumption has been that patient engagement with states would yield clear mutual benefits By embracing China and other such regimes and encouraging their integration into the global economic system and key political institutio ns Western powers hoped to encourage autocracies toward meaningful political reform But this approach has not turned out as we anticipated Rather than reforming China and any number of other leading repressive regimes have deepened their authoritarianism And in an era of hyperglobalization they are turning it outward Although the autocratic states are today integrated in many ways into the global system they have tended not to become more transparent and accountable rather they have developed policies and practices aimed at undermining democracy’s advance Exploiting globalization and the opportunities presented by integration with open societies these states are working to reshape the very institutions and arenas that welcomed them 1 Over the past decade in particular the pendulum of global politics has swung in the direction of authoritarian regimes which are shaping the political environment in a manner that would have been unimaginable even a few years ago Even more striking is the resilience that the most influential authoritarian states are displayin g despite the evident weaknesses and flaws of their systems and the systematic abuses that are found within them Led by China these nondemocratic regimes are showing themselves to be entrenched at home even as they project influence beyond their borders in ways that corrode and undermine democracy and its institutions The authorities in Beijing have refined and scaled up their instruments of influence and with them the ability to manipulate the politic a l landscape of countries beyond their borders As the leadership in Beijing has become more repressive domestically China has grown emboldened and more ambitious internationa lly with worrisome implications for democratic institutions around the world 1 Christopher Walker The Authoritarian Threat The Hijacking of ‘Soft Power’ Journal of Democracy 27 no 1 2016 49-63 https muse jhu edu article 607616 1 In this new era of contestation China has claimed a larger role on the global stage and has sought to promote its own preferred ideas norms and approach to governance Beijing’s unexpected ability to carry out digital censorship to use economic leverage to cow voices in the democracies and more generally to influence democratic systems abroad has created a need for fresh ways of thinking about and dealing with this new situation Understanding “Sharp Power” Through the Belt and Road Initiative and other forms of engagement China’s leadership is placing increasing importance on exerting influence and shaping the political operating environme nt overseas 2 To this end over the past decade China has spent many of billions of dollars to shape public opinion and perceptions around the world in arenas typically associated with “soft power ” a term coined by the American political scientist Joseph Nye and understood as the “ability to affect others by attraction and persuasion” or seen as a way to boost a country’s positive image In China’s case such efforts have included thousands of people-to-people exchanges extensive cultural activities educational programs—including the ever-expanding network of Confucius Institutes—and the development of media and tech enterprises with global reach Although information is increasingly globalized and internet access is spreading China and other authoritarian states have managed to reassert control over the realm of ideas 3 In China the state keeps a firm grip on the media environment and the authorities in Beijing use digital technolo gies to press their advantage at home and increasingly abroad For too long observers in democracies viewed authoritarian influence through an outmoded lens Under the direction of the Chinese Communist Party China has established platforms abroad for educational cultural and other forms of influence within undemocratic and democratic societies alike Over time it has become clearer that such initiatives tend to be “accompanied by an authoritarian determination to monopolize ideas suppress alternative narratives and exploit partner institutions ”4 The unanticipated ability of authoritarian states like China to exert influe nce abroad has created a need for new terms that can adequately describe this new situation Among such terms is “sharp power ” This describes an approach to international affairs that typically involves efforts at censorship and the use of manipulation to degrade the integrity of independent institutions Neither “hard” but nor “soft ” sharp power has the effect of limiting free expression and distorting the political environment as explained in a December 2017 report by 2 “The Evolution of China’s Belt and Road A Conversation with Nadège Rolland ” Power 3 0 Podcast audio January 8 2019 https www power3point0 org 2019 01 08 the-evolution-of-chinas-belt-and-road-aconversation-with-nadege-rolland 3 Xiao Qiang The Road to Digital Unfreedom President Xi’s Surveillance State Journal of Democracy no 1 2019 53-67 4 Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig “The Meaning of Sharp Power How Authoritarian States Project Influence ” Foreign Affairs November 16 2017 https www foreignaffairs com articles china 2017-1116 meaning-sharp-power 2 the National Endowment for Democracy’s International Forum for Democratic Studies that coined the term 5 The authorities in Beijing in particular have cultivated economic leverage as a tool for getting others to play by its rules Beijing’s approach seeks to reduce neutralize or preempt any challenges to the regime’s presentation of itself Its state-funded research centers media outlets people-to-people exchange programs and network of Confucius Institutes often mimic civil society initiatives that in democracies function independently of government Meanwhile local partners and others in democracies are often unaware of the logic that underpins China’s foreign policy and how tightly the Chinese authorities control social groups media and political discourse at home As China expert John Fitzgerald observes “There is no boundary between politics and what passes for culture in contemporary China The Cultural Revolution a violent political movement that ripped China apart in the late sixties was not called a ‘cultural’ revolution for nothing A bitter struggle over power and policy was waged in the cultural realm on the understanding that parties wanting to influence or command a government must first control what is said about them through a country’s education media and cultural institutions Politics as we know it involving opposition debate and negotiation gave way to the politics of controlling universities media and culture ”6 Today beyond China’s borders the corrosive effects of sharp power are increasingly apparent in a number of such crucial domains including in the spheres of publishing culture academia and media—sectors that are essential for determining how citizens of democracies understa nd the world around them As the International Forum report observes China’s influe nce activities aim to discourage challenges to its preferred self-presentation as well as to its positions or standing Crucially limiting or muting public discussion of issues deemed unwelcome by the Chinese party-state is a critical characteristic of sharp power 7 Publishing The publishing sector is a sphere in which independent standards of expression are being challenged In August 2017 Cambridge University Press CUP took the controversial step of removing roughly three hundred articles from a Chinese website that hosted the China Quarterly The move came after the PRC’s General Administration of Press and Publication threatened to make all CUP-published journals inaccessible from within China In this case pushback from 5 International Forum for Democratic Studies Sharp Power Rising Authoritarian Influence Washington D C National Endowment for Democracy 2017 13 www ned org wpcontent uploads 2017 12 Introduction-Sharp-Power-Rising-Authoritarian-Influence pdf 6 John Fitzgerald “China-funded Confucius Institutes Belong on Foreign Influence Register ” Sydney Morning Herald March 26 2019 https www smh com au national china-funded-confucius-institutes-belong-onforeign-influence-register-20190325-p517bg html 7 Christopher Walker Shanthi Kalathil and Jessica Ludwig “Forget Hearts and Minds ” Foreign Policy September 14 2018 https foreignpolicy com 2018 09 14 forget-hearts-and-minds-sharp-power 3 the academy and civil society was pivotal in causing CUP to reverse its removal decision 8 Yet in October 2017 Springer Nature which is among the world’s largest publishers of scholar ly periodicals announced that under PRC pressure it had blocked access on its Chinese- lang ua ge website to hundreds of articles many dealing with elite politics human rights Taiwan and Tibet 9 The stakes of censorship are growing as PRC authorities improve their capabilities Independent researchers have observed that in the online editions of journals published in the PRC dozens of articles dating as far back as the 1950s have been taken out by Chinese censors As with the Chinese government’s pressure on CUP and other publishers this is about rewriting Chinese history to suit the party-state The scholar Glenn Tiffert has noted that enterprising censors or hackers can now fabricate versions of the historical record attuned to shifting CCP ideologic a l or political requirements—and that by simply digitally consolidating sources onto servers under its control a savvy authoritarian government can project its domestic censorship regime abroad in order to shape public opinion globally 10 As machine learning and other technologica l advances accelerate the precision and comprehensiveness with which the Chinese governme nt and other authoritarian regimes will be able to modernize censorship is bound to grow Media Having learned to control political ideas within their own countries autocrats are now bending globalization to their own ends by manipulating discourse abroad especially in the wide- open information space afforded to them by the democracies Massive investments in overseas media infrastructure play a central role It is worth noting that Russia has crafted a templa te for information manipulation that can be adapted to local circumstances and is now applied in countries around the world China has similarly scaled up a multifaceted effort to shape the realm of ideas The authoritarians pursue “information sovereignty” effectively state dominance and control of the internet within their own borders while treating everything beyond them as fair game State dominance over political expression and communication is integral to authorita r ia n governance Such control enables the promotion of favored narratives across media platfo r ms as well as through the words of state officials and surrogates In an era of global informa tio n saturation and fragmentation the authorities in Beijing understand the “discourse power” that can be exercised through focused and amply funded information initiatives As the PRC’s media platforms expand and its largest internet firms go global Beijing’s ability to curate information in a systematic and selective manner will only grow stronger especially in places where local media organizations are vulnerable and as AI-related capabilities improve 8 Maev Kennedy and Tom Phillips “Cambridge University Press Backs Down over China Censorship ” Guardian August 21 2017 9 Javier C Hernández “Leading Western Publisher Bows to Chinese Censorship ” New York Times 1 November 2017 10 Glenn D Tiffert “Turning Scholars into Unpersons ” Hoover Digest Summer 2018 pp 107-114 4 One such place is Africa 11 There China has made major investments in media infrastructure and Chinese censorship tactics are being deployed in matters that Beijing deems sensitive Throughout sub-Saharan Africa Chinese state-media outlets have bureaus with two sets of editors There are African editors on the local payroll but a group of Chinese editors in Beijing vets their decisions at least regarding stories that the PRC feels strongly about Africa n reporters might have some latitude to cover local news but they may well find Beijing rejecting censoring or altering their content when Chinese interests are involved—all to ensure that China constantly appears in a “positive” or “constructive” light The Chinese government gives African journalists “training” and brings them to visit China Real journalism education however is not the goal Instead the focus is on taking in Chinese achievements cultural sites big infrastructure projects and on learning how to report from the Chinese government’s perspective 12 This is part of a global pattern that is also visible in Latin America China’s president Xi Jinping has said that he wants to bring ten thousand Latin American politicians academics journalists officials and former diplomats to China by 2020 13 Through its formidable global media apparatus more generally China is spreading messages abroad using a variety of tools about alternatives to democracy as models of governance how the media can be controlled and value-neutral internationalist positions in debates on issues like internet governance and overseas development assistance where Beijing is opposed to support for independent media development For instance China uses a co-production model as one means of transmitting Beijing- frie nd ly messages and arguments to audiences abroad China analyst David Bandurski describes how the Discovery Channel entered into an agreement with Chinese state-linked partners in an internatio na l film co-production effort titled “China Time of Xi” that reached many millions of viewers across 37 countries in Asia This effort was billed “as an independent television production” but as Bandurski notes while this initiative offered the illusion of independence “the series was in fact a co-production of a three-year content deal inked in March 2015 between Discovery Networks Asia-Pacific and China Intercontinental Communications Centre CICC a company operated by the State Council Information Office CSIO —the Chinese government organ sharing an address with the Central Propaganda Department’s Office of Foreign Propaganda OFP responsible for spearheading its official messages overseas ”14 11 See for example Andrea Vega Yudico “China’s Multi-Billion Dollar Telecommunications Investment in Africa Poses Threat to Independent Media ” Center for International Media Assistance October 24 2017 https www cima ned org blog chinas-multi-billion-dollar-telecommunications-investment-africaposes-threat-independent-media and Nick Bailey “East African States Adopt China’s Playbook on Internet Censorship ” Freedom House October 24 2017 https freedomhouse org blog east-africanstates-adopt-china-s-playbook-internet-censorship 12 Emeka Umejei “Will China’s Media Influence African Democracies ” Power 3 0 2 April 2018 www power3point0 org 2018 04 02 will-chinas-media-influence-african-democracies 13 Juan Pablo Cardenal “China’s Elitist Collaborators ” Project Syndicate 17 April 2018 www projectsyndicate org commentary china-latin-america-engagement-soft-power-by-juan-pablo-cardenal-2018-04 14 David Bandurski “Documenting China’s Influence ” China Iresie November 7 2018 https www chinoiresie info documenting-chinas-influence 5 Confucius Institutes Confucius Institutes are controversial because of the lack of transparency with which they operate on university campuses Although some observers note that many Confucius Institutes activities seem innocuous emphasizing Chinese language instruction and cultural events such as film exhibitions other elements of Confucius Institute programming are quite out of place in an open university setting The Chinese government’s control of staffing and curricula ensures that courses and programming will subtly promote CCP positions on issues deemed critical or sensitive by the Chinese authorities such as territorial disputes or religious minorities in China Chinese authorities portray the Confucius Institutes as being similar to France’s Allia nce Française or Germany’s Goethe-Institut both of which receive government funding to give language and culture classes Yet unlike those freestanding organizations the Confuc ius Institutes are embedded within educational institutions most of which are committed to the type of free intellectual inquiry that is impossible at Confucius Institutes themselves Many casual observers of the Confucius Institutes might not realize that the Confucius Institute s’ constitution found on the website of Hanban the Chinese arm of the government that directs them implies that Chinese law applies within the premises of the Institutes 15 Moreover the Confucius Institutes employ staffers who at times have sought to block host universities from holding discussions on sensitive topics such as Taiwan or Tibet 16 Little about these institutes is transparent it is hard to say for instance what amount of Chinese government money goes to individual host universities It is also unclear what level of control universities have over curricula within the Institutes because the agreeme nts between these parties often remain confidential 17 Technology China’s considerable influence is increasingly evident in the digital space and a full treatme nt of the multitude of ways such influence is exerting an impact on democratic standards is beyond the scope of this statement China and other autocratic regimes have applied the online tools and techniques that they have refined for domestic use at the international level as well Many of the techniques that are applied abroad are first incubated at the domestic level by the Chinese authorities Through the online censorship system known as the Great Firewall Chinese authorities have long been able to manage and restrict what China’s people—the world’s largest number of internet users inside a single set of national borders—can access when they go online Now the government is increasingly applying machine learning to combine censorship and surveillance into comprehensive social management a develop me nt that will increasingly impact global freedom of expression Beijing also has successfu lly 15 Rachelle Peterson “Outsourced to China Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education ” National Association of Scholars June 2017 www nas org images documents confucius_institutes NAS_confuciusInstitutes pdf 16 Ibid 17 Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian “House Proposal Targets Confucius Institutes as Foreign Agents ” Foreign Policy March 14 2018 http foreignpolicy com 2018 03 14 house-proposal-targets-confucius-institutesas-foreign-agents-china-communist-party-censorship-academic-freedom 6 pressured global technology platforms such as Google and Facebook both currently blocked in China to remove selected content 18 Beijing’s paramount aim it seems is to exert control over key information spheres and the tools for manipulating thoughts images and ideas Its management model is centralized and unitary 19 The idea is to enable the regime to pursue the systematic control of multiple forms of communication extending well into the democracies As the authorities in Beijing deepen their artificial intelligence AI capacities they are likely to apply these technologies to devise ever more precise methods of social management including predicting individual behavior and potential collective action In China the companies responsible for developing these technologies are not only partner ing with the state security apparatus but are intertwining themselves within key institutions in democratic societies giving them an increasing stake in the platforms and algorithms that determine speech on a worldwide basis Chinese ambitions to become a global powerhouse in big data AI and other emerging technologies have significant ramifications for democratic governance globally yet the community of civil society actors involved in the governance of emerging technologies has yet to engage on this issue in a meaningful way 20 The full implications of China’s wide-ranging activity in the digital sphere on African subcontinent is among the issues that deserves closer attention 21 Corrosive Capital Many emerging and vulnerable democracies face challenges in governing foreign direct investment including weak accountability in public spending opaque corporate governa nce poor procurement oversight and lax anti-corruption enforcement These challenges are easily exploited by authoritarian regimes intent on using state-connected financial resources for reasons other than development or mutual economic benefit leading to potentially disastrous outcomes for open and democratic governance When investment and foreign assistance is part of broader conversations involving civil society in developing economies the effect can be to strengthe n such essential features of democratic governance as citizen voice and participation media independence transparency and accountability If the authoritarian- linked firms and institutio ns driving the capital flows ignore or even undermine liberal-democratic values and concerns however the durability of democratic governance can suffer corruption can flourish and authoritarianism can find fertile ground 18 Paul Mozur “China Presses Its Internet Censorship Efforts Across the Globe ” New York Times March 2 2018 19 Qiang “The Road to Digital Unfreedom President Xi’s Surveillance State ” 20 Lindsay Gorman and Matt Schrader “U S Firms are Helping Build China’s Orwellian State ” Foreign Policy March 19 2019 https foreignpolicy com 2019 03 19 962492-orwell-china-socialcredit-surveillance 21 Emeka Umejei “The Imitation Game Will China’s Investments Reshape Africa’s Internet ” Power 3 0 blog December 6 2018 https www power3point0 org 2018 12 06 the-imitation-game-will-chinas-investmentsreshape-africas-internet 7 The situation in Central Europe and the Balkans where young aspiring or vulnerab le democracies predominate is illustrative In countries throughout those regions there are indications that China has sought to utilize various forms of capital inflows including equity debt and aid to achieve geostrategic aims and divert the region from a trajectory of integratio n into the community of democratic states Regional initiatives such as China’s “16 1” initiative to strengthen bilateral ties with former Eastern Bloc countries offer Beijing an easy alternative to dealing with the EU as a whole 22 In regions such as the Western Balkans where the interests of local political elites who retain power by catering to key patronage networks overlap with China’s high tolerance for corruption Beijing’s way of doing business exacerbates existing problems surrounding transparency and accountability 23 Indeed China’s BRI initially conceived as an infrastructure network has become in essence an operating system for Xi Jinping’s vision of an interconnected China-centric order positioned as an alternative to the existing rules-based international system In countries where its projects have turned for the worse its combining of infrastructure financing with geopolitical aims has raised doubt and opposition In December 2017 for instance the government of Sri Lanka admitted its inability to repay the US$8 billion that it had borrowed from Chinese firms to build a deepwater port at Hambantota handing the project to Beijing on a 99-year lease in an instance of what critics have called “debt-trap diplomacy ” In other cases Chinese financing for infrastructure projects under the BRI have seen countries take on unsustainable debt levels for projects of questionable economic viability For example in Montenegro a project financed by China’s Export-Import Bank to link the coastal port of Bar by road to Serbia has been dubbed “the highway to nowhere” after the government could not afford to take out further loans to complete the overruns of the project 24 Such deals with China tend to be characterized by an essential lack of transparency Patterns across regions and sectors have taken shape that illustrate the extent of the problem Several other recent cases have come to light for instance which demonstrate how Beijing’s preference for working directly and exclusively with executive branch elites in its engagement with foreign governme nts and how this can have had a corrosive effect on the integrity of institutions and governance more broadly Ecuador’s negotiation under President Rafael Correa of a Chinese-financed loan to acquire surveillance equipment and technology to power its ECU-911 monitoring system also took place in the absence of meaningful public debate and civil society is only now in a position where it can begin to grapple with the potential ramifications of such an extensive system that has already been put into place 22 Martin Hala “The 16 1 Initiative China’s Divisive Equation for Central and Eastern Europe ” Power 3 0 June 5 2018 23 Kurt Bassuener “Pushing on an Open Door Foreign Authoritarian Influence in the Western Balkans ” National Endowment for Democracy May 2019 www ned org wp-content uploads 2019 05 Pushing-on-anOpen-Door-Foreign-Authoritarian-Influence-in-the-Western-Balkans-Kurt-Bassuener-May-2019 pdf 24 Noah Barkin and Aleksandr Vasovic “Chinese ‘highway to nowhere’ haunts Montengro ” Reuters July 16 2018 www reuters com article us-china-silkroad-europe-montenegro-insi chinese-highway-to-nowherehaunts-montenegro-idUSKBN1K60QX 8 When Panama and El Salvador switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China key government private sector and civil society actors were kept in the dark until after official announcements were made In the case of El Salvador its congress has launched an effort to review and halt the advancement of an accompanying agreement to establish a special economic zone that would comprise 14 percent of the country’s territory in strategic areas along the coast and give preferential benefits to Chinese firms 25 Only a few weeks ago more than a dozen other agreements that the El Salvadorian president had reached with China were made public for the first time spanning from promoting the Belt and Road Initiative to scientific and technological cooperation and educational exchange among others In all of these cases civil society and policymakers have been forced to try to catch up from behind to understand the implications of how such agreements may impact their countries and to retrofit monitoring and accountability mechanisms In Argentina a deal reached with the Cristina Kirchner administration saw the People’s Liberation Army given a fifty-year lease to build and operate a space observation station with dual-use capabilities in Patagonia After recent reporting revealed the agreement provided the Argentine government with no mechanisms for oversight or access to the station 26 Argentina’s nationa l congress launched an investigation and is seeking to revisit the agreement 27 In Africa agreements on major deals also fit the pattern 28 In the wake of these developments civil society actors across the world have awakened to the need to scrutinize such investments or run the risk of their governments finding themse lves obliged to sign over strategic assets or territory Implications for the United States The pattern of China’s engagement that has taken shape globally has not eluded the U S In recent years reports of influence that were once episodic have become more frequent as journalists and other observers have begun to look more closely the patterns of opacity and manipulation that have characterized China’s engagements in other parts of the world have come to light here China’s Influence and American Interests a report produced by the Hoover Institution and the Asia Society and released in November 2018 found that “in certain key ways China is exploiting America’s openness in order to advance its aims on a competitive playing field that is hardly level For at the same time that China’s authoritarian system takes advantage of the openness of American society to seek influence it impedes legitimate efforts by American counterpart institutions to engage Chinese society on a reciprocal basis ” 25 Benjamin Russell “What a Controversial Deal in El Salvador Says About China’s Bigger Plans ” Americas Quarterly April 23 2019 https www americasquarterly org content controversy-el-salvador-china 26 Cassandra Garrison “China’s Military-Run Space Station in Argentina is a ‘Black Box ’” Reuters January 31 2019 https www reuters com article us-space-argentina-china-insight chinas-military-run-space-stationin-argentina-is-a-black-box-idUSKCN1PP0I2 27 Cassandra Garrison “Argentine Lawmakers Seek Greater Oversight of Chinese Space Facility in Patagonia ” Reuters March 29 2019 https www reuters com article us-argentina-china-space argentinelawmakers-seek-greater-oversight-of-chinese-space-facility-in-patagonia-idUSKCN1RA24I 28 “Report Kenya Risks Losing Port of Mombasa to China ” The Maritime Executive December 20 2018 https www maritime-executive com article kenya-risks-losing-port-of-mombasa-to-china 9 This report on whose working group I participated further observed that “China’s influe nce activities have moved beyond their traditional United Front focus on diaspora communities to target a far broader range of sectors in Western societies ranging from think tanks universities and media to state local and national government institutions China seeks to promote views sympathetic to the Chinese Government policies society and culture suppress alternative views and co-opt key American players to support China’s foreign policy goals and economic interests ”29 One example that indicates the global nature of the challenge was reported in November 2015 when it came to light that China Radio International CRI Beijing’s state-run radio network was operating as a hidden hand behind a global web of stations on which the Chinese government controls much of the content According to a Reuters investigation 33 stations in 14 countries “primarily broadcast content created or supplied by CRI or by media companies it controls in the United States Australia and Europe ” As part of this elaborate Chines egovernment effort to exploit the open media space more than a dozen stations across the United States operate as part of the CCP’s “borrowed boat” approach in which existing media outlets in foreign countries are used to project China’s messages 30 The Chinese government has trained its attention on Hollywood where its presence shapes the industry in ways both visible and unseen Because China is an increasingly important market for the global film industry entertainment firms have been striking deals that help give them access to that market but put them at the mercy of Chinese censors This leads to content either edited to fit the Chinese market or proactively shaped to exclude anything the Chinese government might consider sensitive in the first place Chinese co-productions are also more likely to feature positive depictions of China Marvel’s “Doctor Strange” changed one character’s origin story from Tibetan to Celtic the screenwriter acknowledged that offending China’s sensibilities was a concern 31 Prominent Tibet supporter and actor Richard Gere told The Hollywood Reporter in 2017 that the year before he “had an episode where someone said they could not finance a film with him because it would upset the Chinese ”32 Dealing with the New Environme nt The leadership of institutions essential to the functioning of the public sphere within democratic societies—publishers university administrators media and technology executives and others—in 29 China’s Influence and American Interests Promoting Constructive Vigilance ed Larry Diamond and Orville Schell the Hoover Institution November 29 2018 https www hoover org research chinas-influenceamerican-interests-promoting-constructive-vigilance 30 Koh Gui Qing and John Shiffman “Beijing’s Covert Radio Network Airs China-Friendly News Across Washington and the World ” Reuters November 2 2015 31 Shanthi Kalathil “Beyond the Great Firewall How China Became a Global Information Power ” Center for International Media Assistance March 2017 https www cima ned org wp-content uploads 2017 03 CIMABeyond-the-Great-Firewall_150ppi-for-web pdf 32 Gary Maddox “Richard Gere on how China has damaged his career over his support for Tibet ” Sydney Morning Herald 18 May 2017 https www smh com au entertainment movies richard-gere-on-how-china-has-damaged-his-career-over-hissupport-for-tibet-20170511-gw29g9 html 10 the past did not need to take into account to such a degree the prospect of manipulation or censorship by external authoritarian powers Today however the exertion of sharp power makes it necessary for them to renew and deepen their commitment to democratic standards and free political expression The mechanisms to achieve a deepening of such commitment are not selfevident or straightforward To address this challenge common standards must be develope d with the aim of reducing these institutions’ exposure and safeguarding their integrity over the long term Because in today’s world autocracies and democracies are integrated and interdependent in so many new ways authoritarians must be contested on multiple fronts and levels including within democratic societies and their institutions Winning the “Values War” In the last decade the global operating environment has changed In crucial arenas relating to the health and integrity of democratic systems—including the spheres of freedom of expression the principles that govern technology and the way in which state-driven capital can be leveraged for political purposes—the impact of leading authoritarian regimes is being felt more acutely Given China’s rapid emergence on the world stage and its more visib le authoritarian internationalism it seems we are approaching an inflection point If anything the challenge presented by China and other ambitious internationalist autocratic regimes has grown in the most recent period At the same time the democracies are only slowly waking up to the fact that they have entered into an era of serious and strategic contestatio n based on governance models We have been slow to understand the implications of this struggle over essential values The values war that has taken shape globally is one between autocratic regimes on the one hand whose animating governance principles favor state control management of political expression and privileging “rule by law” over rule of law versus democratic systems on the other whose principles are based on open societies free and independent expression and rule of law In an era of hyperglobalization the battle over these fundamental values is being waged in every region and across diverse polities How this battle plays out will shape the character of the world we live in The CCP’s efforts to speak to the world to shape understanding and to subtly undercut or overtly assail the democracies should not be underestimated The authorities in Beijing mean to reforge the established rules and norms of international politics Plainly said they represent the leadership of the “unfree world ” Much of the response to date to the China challenge from the democracies has focused on the trade and military dimensions both of which deserve rightly deserve attention But we must reckon with the fact that so much of Beijing’s activity in recent years may be related to but is distinct from these domains In order to compete the U S and other democracies will need to address this gap A valuable base of experience can be found in Australia which has recently been facing up to the challenge of PRC sharp power projection As John Fitzgerald has noted Australia is not only “on the frontline” of China’s overseas influence efforts but also “at the forefront among 11 liberal democracies in generating press community and government responses in defense of its sovereignty and institutional integrity as well as the values—including the freedoms of speech assembly and religion—that China’s influence operations place at risk ”33 The experience of Australia can furnish useful lessons to other advanced democracies now being exposed to Beijing’s brand of sharp power 34 As democratic societies move into the next stage of dealing with sharp power—crafting workable responses—civil society’s role will be critical The Australian government’s efforts to combat foreign interference and civil society’s role in informing and shaping these effor ts underscore the necessity of pursuing what should be understood as a comprehensive response to the multidimensional challenge presented by China At a fundamental level any response to this global challenge also needs to consider the essential importance of democratic development in China itself NED’s Response to the China Challenge For its part the National Endowment for Democracy NED and its associated institutes have set in motion a response to this multifaceted challenge NED’s programmatic approach to addressing China’s influence around the world that threatens democratic norms standards and institutions is anchored in three interrelated components developing and accelerating the capacity of think tanks civil society and journalists to study and analyze Chinese influence in politics the economy and society strengthening the ability of these actors including those working in the civic technology space to respond appropriately and strategically and linking efforts at the country level with counterparts engaged in similar work around the world The International Republican Institute IRI is directly combating CCP malign influence in developing democracies working with country partners to shine a spotlight on the CCP’s influe nce tactics and bolster democratic resilience to them IRI is equipping government officia ls independent media political parties private enterprise and civil society in these countries with the tools to protect their democratic institutions and sovereignty The National Democratic Institute NDI conducts a number of initiatives that address China’s exertion of authoritarian influence This includes its work with the Asian Network for Free Elections ANFREL and its country member citizen groups to among other things address Chinese and other authoritarian disinformation campaigns that aim to sow divisions and undermine public trust in democratic processes In Hong Kong NDI has provided forums for women youth and ethnic minorities to constructively participate in policy-making and elevate their voices and priorities NDI also has conducted a series of missions regarding the development of Hong Kong’s constitutional and electoral framework the enforcement of the rule of law and civil liberties and prospects for Hong Kong’s democratization 33 John Fitzgerald China in Xi’s “New Era” Overstepping Down Under Journal of Democracy no 2 2018 59 34 Fitzgerald “Overstepping” and John Garnaut “How China Interferes in Australia ” Foreign Affairs 9 March 2018 www foreignaffairs com articles china 2018-03-09 how-china-interferes-australia 12 In response to the loans investment and aid from non-democratic countries including China into emerging democracies with poor governance and weak rule of law – understood as “corrosive capital” – the Center for International Private Enterprise has been working to document how corrosive capital flows into countries and then to work with its private sector partners to increase resiliency including through strengthening policies on competition anti-monopoly corruption and procurement building awareness among key state agencies and increasing public debate Chinese state-owned enterprises often take advantage of institutional and policy weaknesses to invest without sufficient public sector oversight private sector consultation or citizen scrutiny Once in-country these funds further corrode governance exacerbate corruption increase indebtedness and in some cases have resulted in the transfer of sovereign resources Crafting a Response to the China Challenge Given its corrosive impact on critical democratic institutions China’s authorita r ia n internationalism poses both a rule-of-law and a national security challenge authoritarian efforts that today target democratic institutions and seek to undermine their integrity represent what should be understood as a serious and persistent nontraditional security threat Any response to the challenge posed by China will first require dispensing with the inadequate framing of this issue as a simple choice of either shunning or engaging China which is already deeply integrated into the international system across every region in the world Rather it is the nature and contours of the engagement with China that must be rethought The following are key steps drawn from our Sharp Power report which can be taken to address the Beijing’s influence efforts Address the evident knowledge and capacity gap on China Throughout many societies in which China today is deeply engaged information concerning the Chinese politica l system and its foreign policy strategies tends to be extremely limited This places many societies at a distinct strategic disadvantage There often are few journalists editors and policy professionals who possess a deep understanding of China—the Chinese Communist Party especially—and can share their knowledge with the rest of their societies in a systematic way Given China’s growing economic media and political footprint in these settings there is a pressing need to build capacity to disseminate independent informa tio n about China and its regime Civil society organizations should develop strategies for communicating expert knowledge about China to broader audiences Shine a spotlight on authoritarian influence Chinese sharp power relies in part on disguising state-directed projects as commercial media or grassroots associations for example or using local actors as conduits for foreign propaganda or tools of foreign manipulation To respond to these efforts at misdirection observers need the capacity to put them under the spotlight and analyze them in an independent and comprehens ive manner Safeguard democratic societies against undesirable Chinese Party State influence Once the nature and techniques of authoritarian influence efforts are exposed countr ies should build up internal defenses Authoritarian initiatives are directed at cultiva ting relationships with the political elites thought leaders and other informa tio n gatekeepers of open societies Such efforts are part of Beijing’s larger aim to get ins ide 13 such systems in order to incentivize cooperation and neutralize criticism of the authoritarian regime Support for strong independent civil society—includ ing independent media—is essential to ensuring that the citizens of democracies are adequately informed to evaluate critically the benefits and risks of closer engage me nt with Beijing and its surrogates It is impossible to know for certain for instance the degree to which intimidation from authoritarian governments has already made scholars and publishers “sensitive- topic averse ”35 Exposing the hidden pressures is a first step toward countering the censors’ insidious influence Reaffirm support for democratic values and ideals If one goal of authoritarian sharp power is to legitimize nondemocratic forms of government then it is only effective to the extent that democracies and their citizens lose sight of their own principles The Chinese government’s sharp power seeks to undermine democratic standards and ideals Top leaders in the democracies must speak out clearly and consistently on behalf of democratic ideals and put down clear markers regarding acceptable standards of democratic behavior Otherwise the authoritarians will fill the void Learn from democratic partners A number of countries Australia especially have already had extensive engagement with China and can serve as an important point of reference for countries whose institutions are at an earlier stage of their interaction with Beijing 36 Given the complex and multifaceted character of Beijing’s influence activitie s such learning between and among democracies is critical for accelerating responses that are at once effective and consistent with democratic standards 35 Phila Siu “What’s the ‘Dirty Secret’ of Western Academics Who Self-Censor Work on China ” South China Morning Post Hong Kong April 21 2018 36 See for example Fitzgerald “Overstepping” and Garnaut “How China Interferes in Australia ” 14