imm 1he leligs of the Mdm'COPE NO 39 3-0-3 1 3 1 SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION a 1949 Pages 3 210 incl Authority Hug REPORT AD HOG COMMITTEE consisting of Lieut General H R Harmon USAF Brig General J K Rice USA Rear Admiral T B Hill USN Colonel H MOE Roper USA Colonel W L Kennedy USEF Captain GJW Anderson Jr USN to the JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF on EVALUATION OF EFFECT OE SOVIET RESULTING FROM THE STRATEGEG AIR OFFENSIVE References 1844 32 - 190313 E tzo s 1952 Series 1953 e a o s 19TH 1 To evaluate the effect on the war effort of the U S S R of the Strategic Air Offensive contemplated in current war plans including an appraiaul of the pysehological effeote of atomic bombing on the Soviet will to wage war to J O s 1953 ' FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 2 General TRGJEN J G S 184 32 is the currently effective war plan being used by the nited States for planning purposes DISTRIBUTION Adm Denfeld Gen Andereon Dir Poo Air Gen Bradley GSA Gen Gruenther D JS 1 Gen vandenberg GSAF ndm Glover Gen Collins USA Sol Cary JSPO Gen Fairohild VUSAF eon Schuyler Adm Raoford tome Adm Boone JSPC Adm Gen Booth DDLP Adm Carney Oen Todd EDI Adm Price Demo-Air eeoy JOE eon wooemeyem reoo eeoy JSSC Gen Haddocks Dir Army Seep JSPC - 1 Gen Norstad Air er JCS 1953 1 3 12 352 33 En savanna 253 2mg 91 mm mm WW ILI - I rm ohgno zma HW mmw w uwm - $11 11 anme WkaWImwm - mmwm id hnHw Ppm nh N1mnuunw - n wwm bm on m haraln rifrursi I I I -1 1 1 14 1 1 1 igh aii wq dthl I I 1 1111113111x ammunmmunmmtow dnw unn hm 11I 1 - m1m wumnH Hanww mHm ud Hausa-f I mulrai L um _ mmxa l Ill1l I - 11 Romances Drum Unclassl m f Dacha-idea Holdings arms CONCLUSIONS 8 It is concluded that complete and successful execution of the initial atomic offensive against the U B S R as planned 01115 probably affect the var effortJ and produce effects upon the Soviet will to wage war as set forth below Should it be planned or concluded in related studies that a lesser or greater number of atomic bombs vould actually he delivered on targets that different basic conditions would prevail or that intelligence as to the level and distribution of Soviet industry has changed substantially a rerevaluation would be necessary EFFECT ON INDUSTRIAL GAEACITY 9 Physical damage to installations personnel casualties concentrated in industrial communities and other direct or indirect cumulative effects would result in a 30 to #0 percent reduction of Soviet industrial capacity This loss would not be permanent and could either he alleviated by Soviet recuperative action or augmented depending upon the weight and effectiveness of follow up attacks 10 Of outstanding impd tanoe is the prospect that the petroleum industry in vould suffer severe damage especially in refining capacity The supply of high test aviation gasoline would become rapidly critical oasesLTIEs 11 The initial atomic offensive could produce as many as 2 700 000 mortalitiesy and t 000 0oo additional casualties depending upon the effectiveness of Soviet passive defense 1 measures a large number of homes would be destroyed and the problems of living for the remainder of the 28 000 00 people in the 70 target cities Would be vastly complicated 611 Joe 1953 1 5 - Renowned rem Ihe Undessl ed FDeclass l'ed ol he Na unai mivas at 5 er - eat smash 3V rsicsotoezcsL earners 12 The atomic offensive would not per so bring about capitulation destroy the roots of Communism or critically weaken the power of Soviet leadership to dominate the PEOP13- 13 For the majority of Soviet people atomic bombing would validate Soviet propaganda against foreign powers stimulate resentment against the United States unify these people and increase their will to fight Among_an indeterminate minority atomic bombing might stimulate dissidence and the hope of relief from oppression Unless and until vastly more favorable opportunities develop for them the influence of these elements will not appreciably affect the Soviet war effort a crisis will he created within the U S S R which could be turned to advantage by the Allies through early and effective exploitation by armed forces and warfare Failing prompt and effective exploitation the opportunity would he lost and subsequent Soviet reactions would adversely affect the accomplishment of Allied objectives EFFECTS ON THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES 15 The capability of Soviet armed forces to advance rapidly into selected areas of Western Europe the Middle East and Far East would not be seriously impaired but capabilities there- after would progressively diminish due to the following factors a The supply of petroleum products of all types will rapidly become critical to all branches of Soviet armed forces resulting in Greatly reducing the mobility of the army 2 Reducing the scale of operations hy'the Soviet Navy and merchant shipping although submarine warfare would probably be unaffected _ I I JCS 1953 1 - 6 Reproduced From 1he Unclaae 'led I Bedassi ed HoIthgs of the aliens Archives v y 3 Seriously reduding air operations involving training transport support of ground and naval forces and independent offensive action although proper allocation of fuel would allow continued operations by air defense forces NOTE The point at which capabilities of Soviet armed forces would diminish to a critical degree would depend upon many variable or unpredictable factors most important of which is the level of stockpiles prevailing at the initiation of hostilities b After consumption of initial stocks of basic equipment and consumable supplies progressive shortages of a wide variety of items particularly aircraft would handicap operations and affect morale of the armed forces 3 Logistic support would be handicapped due to dis- ruption of planning impairment of controls damage to industry and interference with transportation 16 The Soviet High Gommand would be forced quickly to re-estimate their strategic position and make important decisions regarding operational plans under difficult circumstances They would probably limit postpone or abandon certain campaigns but it is impossible to predict what specific decisions would be made 17 Atomic bombing would open the field and set the pattern for all adversaries to use any weapons of mass destruction and result in maximum retaliatory measures within Soviet capabilities- GENERAL 18 Atomic bombing will produce certain and retaliatory reactions detrimental to the achieVemedt of Allied war objectives and its destructive effects will complicate JCS 195321 - - 1 Ropinduoed mm Ihc f Dodassi ed Holdings tithe Nat'unal ud lives aw 5 I post hostilities the atomic bomb would be a major element of Allied military strength in any war with' the 0 8 8 3 and would constitute the only means of rapidly inflicting shock and serious damage to vital elements of the Soviet war mak1ng capacity In particular an early atomic offensive will facilitate greatly the application of other Allied military power with prospect of greatly lowered casualties Full exploitation of the advantages to be obtained is dependent upon the adequacy and promptness of associated military and operations ' From the standpoint of our national security the advantages of its early use would he transcending Every reasonable effort should be devoted to providing the means to he prepared for prompt'and effective delivery of the maximum numbers of atomic bombs to appropriate target systems sac oMnhaTIows 19 It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff 5 Approve the foregoing conclusions b Forward the memorandum in Enclosure to the Secretary of Defense is JCS 1953 l 3 - Reproduaed Prom lhe Uncassifed Unclassi ed Haiti-i195 cf the Nana-I31 Ard'lhres com me SPECIAL DISTRIBUTIONgrew f Cd ' s 0F 3 NE 56% 5 WT ag- 5 NV gym 5 13235 Zr 5 #553 tff g 12 Mag 121 2 r if g4 '94 727% DECLASSLF -uw 019 193 1 W3 I 03 am If 33 5 r JEE- 1953 1 a Eng I v Reproduced from the Unde ned Dedeesi ed at me Melanoma-Ares HOG COMMITTEE TD THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 0E OF EFFECT ON SOVIET WAR Enclosure Enclosure Appendix Annex Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Annex Tab Annex Appendix Appendix Annex Appendix Annex Tab Appendix Annex Tab Tab JCS 1953 1 FROM THE STRATEGIE AIR oresnsivs Draft of Memorandum to the Secretarg of Defense The Discussion U 3 Plans Bomb Allocation for Initial Atomic Offensive ERESTRIGTED Basis of Evaluation Methods of Analysis Discussion of Intelligence The Soviet Military Position Stockpiles and Expenditures of Essential War Materials by the U S S R Stockpiles of Raw Materials Soviet Industrial Position Passive Defense Measures Discussion of Damage Effect of the Different Atomic Bombs as to Blast Fire Radiological Damage Tables nasal Method of Target Selection and Determination of Aiming Points Report of Weaver Board on Method of Target Selection and Detenninaticn of Aiming Points Determination of Material Damage and Personnel Casualties Petroleum Soviet Steel Industrg U S S R Steel Plants Estimated Production under TEDJAE Progrmn A Bomhs i Raptodused from he Unchained Dsdassi sd Holdings of lhe ArdIWa Enclosure Appendix I'l Con$'d Annex - aesthetic suhher Chemicals Tab - Known U s s s Tetraethvl Lead and Concentrated Hydrogen Peroxide Plants Tab - Known Soda Ash Plehte U s s s Tab - Known U s s s Ammonia Plants Tab - U S S R Rubber Plants Annex - Soviet Aircraft Industry Including Aircraft Engines Tab Soviet Ariation Industr Annex - Machine Teols Tab - Known U S S R Machine Tool Plants Annex F Electric Power - U S S R Tab - Electric Generati Facilities Structurallv Damaged in Plan TRUJAN Tab - U S S R Electric Power Plants Tab - U S S R Electric Power Grids and Isolated Power Plants Tab Size Distribution of U 5 S H Electric Power Plants Tab Electric Power cries Annex - Rail Transportation let - Vulnerabili of Railroad ui ment and Facilities to Damage by Atomic Attack Tab - Vulnerability of nls s s Rail Transcartation Facilities Under A-Bomh Attacks see - Vulnerabilitg of U S s s Rail Transportation Facilities Under ArBomb Attacks Annex Determination of Damage to Soviet Industry and Population Losses on an Area Basis Aspen ix - An AEEraisal of the Ps chologioa3 Effects of Atomic om ng Upon the Soviet Will to Wage wee 1 Appendix Effect of the Initial Atomic Offensive Against tEe E S S R Upon the Soviet Armed Forces Enclosure - Selected Data Assembled for the Harmon Committee-o mthe Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Central Intelligence Agengg JCS l 53 l - 11 - Muted im the Insects 'ed Holdings afthc Na unalmdniras - ts- 4 1093mm A TO THE SECRETARY cE DEFENSE In accordance with the request of the Secretary of Defense dated 25 October 19t8 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have had a joint evaluation made of the effect on the Soviet war effort of the initial atomic offensive contemplated in current war plans This evaluation includes an appraisal of the effect of atomic bombing on the Soviet will to wage war The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in general with the conclusiOns as stated by the Ad Hoc Committee in paragraphs 3 through 18 of the attached report With respect to paragraph 9 of these conclusions the target systems for the initial atomic offensive have been care- fully selected to insure that certain vital industrial elements receive maximum damage The 30 to 40 per cent reduction cited is a valid measure of damage to over-all Soviet industrial capacity However certain target systems selected for attack such as the petroleum industry would receive appreciably greater damage Furthermore this magnitude of the destruction and the brief time span in which it occurs should retard Soviet recuperative action to an indeterminate but considerable extent As for the Effects referred to in para graphs 12 13 and it the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that such reactions are not susceptible to a firm evaluation These cone clueions while probably the best estimate generated tc date should be regarded as informed opinions on an admittedly abstruse and controversial matter i ii EESFEH i - 9 - Enclosure Page revised_hy Decision On - 28 July late Rep-educate me helium 1' Hold'ngs of lhe Nalh al Archives 5-1 With reference to paragraph 17 the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that this conclusion has validity however they consider that such mass destruction weapons as are available to the USSR would be used to achieve their_objectives regardless of any action on our part with reference to the first sentence of paragraph 18 the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to point out that all means of warfare involve destruction in varring degrees and that the objective during wartime of all armed forces is the destruction of some part or another of the-enemy's resources These conclu signs therefore while applicable to atomic bombing are also to some degree applicable to ail forms of warfare It is to be noted that the attached evaluation has been Predjnated upon successful delirerr of the initial atonic rfensive The chances of sucoees of delivery of the air offensive are being examined separately Upon completion of that study it is the intention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to re evaluate these conclusions in the light of estimates as to the percentage of bombs considered most likely to he delivered to selected targets '1 - i Joe 1953 1 - - Enclesure Page added by Decision 0n - 28 July 1949 - Reproduced I'mrn hUndass led I Dedaisi eo Huld'msuf the NaEmeIArchiues I 1 of ENCLOSURE DISCUSSION 1 U-S Plans The Joint Untline War Plan has been accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for planning purposes to provide a basis for developing the initial operations of v 3 and Allied forces in the event that War has been forced upon the United States by acts of aggression by the U S S R and or her satellites during the fiscal year long The over all strategic concept of that plan provides among other operations Initially to launch a powerful air offensive designed to the destructive and poser of atomic weapons against the vital elements of the Soviet var making capacity - - An Annex to this plan and supporting'plans of the Strategic Air Con- mand U S Air Force provide for launching an initial atomic offensive from available bases against selected targets in seventy urban areas of the as soon as practicable It is planned to follow up the initial atomic attacks with con tinuing air offensives utilizing conventional bombs and mines in addition to atomic weapons Pertinent details of the foregoing plans are set ihrth in this Enclosure 2 Basis for Evaluation In ohder to evaluate the effect of the initial atomic offensive on the U S S R it is first neces- sary to establish an acceptable basis upon vhioh results can be measured The problem may be divided into three parts An evaluation of material damage and personnel casualties An_appraisal of effects 1 The application of the foregoing to the military capabilities of the mass in the light of oonii lioting var objectives of the 11 3 and the U S S R - 51 3 JCS 195371 10 Enclosure Renmdumd flurn 1W Unclassi'lad I Dedtesi ed he a The first involves analysis and determination of expected material damage to industry the ptospective number and concen tration of casualties and among what categories of people these casualties will occur From such examination deductions can be made concerning the effects of all of this upon the provision of- necessary equipment and consumable supplies to the armed forces and for a minimum civilian economy The second involves an appraisal of the effect of the atomic bombing upon the government the people and the armed forces--particularly with regard to the-effects that it may have_upon control attitudes and will to fight or to support war- fare The third involves consideration of the extent to which the atomic bombing-will affect Ecviet military capabilities and influence strategy in the light of estimated Soviet aims in opposition to Allied war objectives Underlying the examination is the prevailing recognition that the air offensive is but a part albeit important of the whole of military political and economic opera tions that will he required ta_defeat the U S S R For details in respect to the Basis of Evaluation see Appendix to this Enclosure 3 Method of Analysis in In order to approach a solution to the problem it was necessary to examine critically broad and specific matters of intelligence regarding the U S S R estimates of Soviet capabilities and intentions and U B plans particularly those for the initial atomic offensive Examination was made of the methods and data being used in the selection of targets and aiming points While chances of success of delivery and evaluation of intelligence were specifically exempt from this study it was necessary to consider pertinent matter prin- cipally for purposes of obtaining hackground information ass seems- JDS 19537I - ll - lEnclosure Rep-ed UDGCE lrom H18 Unclassi ed Backseat-ed Holr ngs dime Ns cnsl kWh-es Considerable time and effort were devoted to the acquisition of information regarding Soviet stockpiles industrial estabe lishments and public utilities Target maps and objective data vere examined to determine insofar as practicable the installations together with their productive capacities which would be liable to destruction and the probabilities of obtaining such destruction In appraising the effect of bembing on the Soviet Will to wage war the Committee digested a great deal or written material on the historical development characterists traits and reactions or the people of the reviewed logical studies and_intervieved many individuals whose posi tions or experience qualified them to give evidence or to ex- press opinions bearing on the problem By appraising the sub- stance and merit of the evidence the Committee was able to express an informed opinion on an admittedly abstruse and controversial subject For details of the method of analysis and sources consulted see Appendix to this Enclosure v Intelligence The Committee noted that the task of asses sing the adequacy and validity of intelligence related to this problem is properly the responsibility of the Joint Intelligence Committee However the validity of any evaluation of the ef- fects of the initial atomic offensive on the Soviet people and their war effort is in large measure dependent upon the sup porting intelligence Appendix to this Enclosure contains comments on intelligence matters made solely for the purpose of describing the extent and detail to which it was possible to proceed in solving the problem and the extent to which it is practicable at this time to derive valid conclusions 195371 12 Enclosure Renmdmed Dada-sense Hakim ofIhe National more 5 The Soviet Military Position The strategic intentions of the Soviet Union in the event of a War between Anglo-American powers and the U S S R in 19u9 are estimated in ABAI 5 to include as early objec tives Seizure of the Middle East and its oil resources destruction of all forces of the Allies on the Eurasian land mass seizure or neutralization of those areas from_vhich the western Powers might swiftly and effectively strike at the neutralization or seizure of the United Kingdom expansion and consoiidation of positions in China Manchuria and Korea disruption of allied warzmaking capacity by sub version and sabotage disruption of vital allied lines of communication by aggressive submarine warfareJ mining and air operations and accomplishment of diversionary attacks in Allied-held territory for the purphse of causing maldeplorment of Allied forces Details of this estimate are set forth in ABAI 5 and significant phasing is summarized in Appendix - to this Enclosure An important qualification relative to the phasing of Soviet offensive operations is quoted from near 5 Although the United States and the United Kingdom may employ weapons of mass destruction the Joint Intelligence Committee have not been informed of the timing scale and effectiveness of possible Allied attacks using these weapons In weighing Soviet capabilities it has been impossible there fore to assess the effect of the use of these weapons on the Soviet Union However it is emphasised that employment of them could he expected to affect the progress of Soviet campaigns I The heaviest commitments and expenditures of military sup- plies- for Soviet ground forces would he fron D to about DEQO and might then be markedly reduced provided the has by then 1 overrun Nostern Europe Italy except - to JCS 1953 l - 13 - Enclosure Reproduced flum Unde sd Unclassi ed Holdings th' the Na onslArthives I I 0 '1 Er Mme - w Turkey except the Alexandredga area the Middle East except for the Palestine Jordan Valley and Suez areas and the Far East However heavy drain on U E S R resources will continue even Prior to the development of an Allied surface offensive for normal support of large ground forces on extended fronts to meet combat requirements at points of contact and in internal areas to consolidate positions and cope with underground movements Continuing demands also will be placed on Soviet air and naval forces to cope with the increasing tempo of Allied attacks as well as for Soviet offensives by these services In particu- lar air operations in the defense of the U S S R offensives against the United Kingdom or at long range against the United States and operations in support of ground forces will require continuing supply of petroleum products replacement aircraft engines and equipment spare parts and munitions Soviet sub- marine operations while requiring relatively small quantities of fuel will necessitate re-supplp of torpedoes engine parts and electronic equipment as well as new craft to sustain the tempo of widespread operations Elaborate training programs will be required for all services with attendant demands on fuel and equipment As fronts are extended requirements for transporta tion both within and beyond borders of the U S S R will increase to a degree depending upon the scope and tempo of operations Stocgpilee Reliable information on the level and location of Soviet stockpiles of military supplies is limited However it has been estimated ABAI 5 and CIA that adequate supplies of tanks guns small arms ammunition vehicles and food would be on hand to support in reasonable measure the initial Soviet operations to accomplish their initial objeor tives In basic equipment for ground forces no shortages are evident It has been estimated that substantial quantities of aircraft are maintained in operational units and in storage - I The available stockpile of petroleum products is considered - is i JCS 195371 1% - Enclosure Reprm'uwd film ha Urldzua ad I l'luldh lgs DI Hie Namtmm avrb w Inmtex-dichon - naval op r timis See - 'Wi taa jlsm- fail- 1 as sures 1' 1 117- Union adopt In It 2 33195 ich Haulilreuuce material Lilacs and person- to atomic attack and trends evideut that stage I are being taken within limitations of time anti rescurces to reduce the impact on vital elements of their War- aking 1 capacity Man-5' passive deft- ss- measures could be implemented quickly Underline far emphasis rum he Umhssi ed Dsdassi ed Hold- i195 oFlm Na onal possesses as it 4 Underground constructionlhas been provided in a number of cases for important command posts communication centers and some emphasis has been placed on such construction for fortifications supply depots and critical industrial estab lishments Aircraft hangers and command posts are known to exist underground at some of the important air force installa- tions Location of supply dumps and stockpiles on which in- formation is limited follows a logical pattern for the sup- port of the armed forces consistent with transportation facilities available and with evidence of dispersion in re- duce vulnerability from all types of attack Substantial accomplishment of measures specifically de signed to minimize material damage or provide shelters for the urban population as a whole from atomic attack is not yet in evidence in the U S S H Destructive Effect of Weapons The damage to he expected from each of the types of weapons to he employed in the initial atomic offensive is set forth in detail in Appendix to this Enclosure This data was compiled from reports of the Atomic Energy Commission of authoritative sources on the various atomic explosions that have taken place up to the present time and the pertinent reports of the v 3 Strategic Bombing Survey The estimated areas of given overpressures for each type of bomb and the overpressures required for Class damage to various types of structures is contained in the Restricted Data Annex to Appendix to this Enclosure Major casualties to personnel and collateral devastation by fire should on the average but varying as to local conditions approximate the area of struc tural damage Radiological effects are well within these areas Significant is the fact that the atomic bomb is a weapon particu larly effective against built up populated areas such as cities That which renders a building or installation for intended use until major reconstruction is accomplished JC3 195EF1 15 - Enoloshre Reproduced 111s Unclassi ed I Dsohssi ed Holdings of H13 Nammeecs that if used against selected isolated targets of limited size although it might he effective against the target itself much of its destructive effect may he unused 8 Target Selection and Determination of Aiming Points Responsibility for target analysis determination of strategic vulnerability and recommendations in regard to aiming points on selected objectives is vested in the Air Intelligence Division of the Air Force Details of the methods and principles involved are set forth in Appendix to this Enclosure The Committee determined with the advice of a panel of mathematicians selected by the Chairman of the Research and Development Board that the computations and methods are formally correct The report of this panel is set forth in Appendix to this Enclosure 9 Determination of Material Damage and Personnel Casualties It was originally planned that the evaluation of effect of the initial atomic offensive on the Soviet war effort would be based fundamentally on on exact analysis of a significant portion of the facilities likely to be damaged by each bomb compared with available productive capacity in each industry and contrasted with stockpiles expenditures and requirements Investigation revealed that lack of up to date basic information on a suf- ficient number of vital industrial complexes and progress in target analysis on the hulk of installations in most of the Soviet cities which would be attacked together with other on- known or variable factors precluded a solution along such lines at this time The following approaches were adopted as alterna- tives An examination of seven specially selected systems on which available information and analysis data indicated the feasibility of determining on them the effects of the initial atomic offensive These systems are Petroleum steel air craft rubber and inorganic chemicals 'machine tools JCS l9537l - 17 - Enclosure i' - Repmduoedm I - I - it powertiei reLCtr-aneportetlon exes jig- 31 '5 chi-F12 I_lie o1e to be damaged and of the pereozmel casualties which _migbt be inflicted by percentage of tbe tote $4141 be destroyed or damaged Nota ole exceptione' are 511 a ineriee _ eleourlo Ipower plants Joy's-s w w Hue - -_mqw 3 nL hi qu that the hg 'rkin error 1311 WW Miller of bombs Lreoterl et- a 151i EL 31 _there is e to chance tbet tbe demiige _ee stated can be be probability factor 7 Was deriveo from the ltue distance of the achieved I average error in bombing - Lrget installation from the _pre iotedl explosion poLot of the bomb end the estimated radius of demege from tbe bomb e 12133 1 3 51 5L a - it erivation are Ihas e5 upon the assumt-Ion that a number oi a a i'h JJ IE Since there Eall In in ItheI productive capacity of'the various installations taken unden-attack total damage toI industrial Iormance of in ivi ual'homhs - Fat -- - W rut-1w - conclus on g -a ISII H throughout refining capacity my i esult inI or'better probability of Glass A damage - -- runw 1M - u-r-x - - 'Ir Wrw l J rm'vu' r auh - gh octane avgas refining capacity _I In All Soviet military capability au 7 vhf I - - respon ingireductionai - tiveness Iof NOTE The time at eHich shortaEes of petroleum products for the Soviet srmed forces becomes critical will depend largely upon the lEVels of POL stockpiles prevailing at the ini -T tiation of hostilities and the efficiency with which the S S H is able to exploit remaining refinery capacity including that for- fuels a JCS 195371 I I II Enclosure fmrl'l ma Und si od f ls-deserted Huld'ngsors TOP seesaw 1 - 1 2 The Soviet oil refining industry appears to constitute a most lucrative target and serious consideration should be given to making it the primary-objective with either atomic or conven tional bombs of the initial atomic offensive man 1 The successful execution of the initial atomic offensive as planned has a T t or better probability of reducing the pro- ductive capacity of raw steel in the Soviet Union by h5 5% or approximately T-l h million tone per year leaving a remaining capacity of about million tone per year pending restora tion of damage or augmentation from other sources 2 An indeterminate but substantial portion of Soviet steel processing facilities would be destroyed or damaged This would adversely affect capabilities to restore damage both in the steel industry and other industries and would result in directly re ducing the output of war materials 3 Damage inflicted would be serious but the effect on the war effort would be primarily of a long range nature in creating shortages of finished war materials Given time much of the damaged producing and processing machinery can be salvaged re paired or restored to operations H Partial relief of steel shortages should be possible from satellite countries and conquered areas but time in excess of one year will be required to exploit substantially such sources 1 During the first year of war the Soviet war effort will not be critically affected by the damage to the rubber industry caused by the initial atomic offensive Although there 1 is a or better probability of Class A damage to 57% of rubber capacity the civilian economy should be able to absorb such shortages as may exist samenes- Jcs' 195371 - so Englosure Reproduced from Its Undertake Dedass ed Holdings DI the Nationsi Archives TDP SECRET t- 2 During the second and succeeding years of war shortages would become critical and would be reflected in decreased mobility of the Soviet anmed forces and in the civilian economy unless damaged facilities are restored or replaced by conversions AIRCRAFT AND AIRCRAFT ENGINES 1 Successful execution of the atomic offensive as planned would result in a 70% or better probability of Glass A damage to 59% of Soviet aircraft assembly capacity and to 68 3% of air- craft engine capacity In addition indeterminate damage of a serious nature would be inflicted on sources for production of aviation equipment and accessories 2 Damage to the two known plants producing long-range bombers would progressively reduce Soviet capability for long range air bombardment 'With the reduction in flow of replacement aircraft and engines to operational units and for training the U 3 S H will be forced to reduce progressively air power for independent cooperative and supporting operations 3 Coupled with the shortage of aviation gasoline the reduced production of aircraft will force extreme selectivity in air operations and constitute a serious deficiency in Soviet military capabilities we 1 Neither the machine tool industry nor inventory stocks pro vide appropriate targets of themselves for inclusion as primary targets in the initial atomic offensive 2 Successful execution of the initial atomic offensive as planned will E- Provide 70% or better probability of Glass a damage to 23 9% of the plants of the machine-tool industry p Effect considerable but an indeterminate amount of destruction or damage to machine tools either installed or stocked incidental to the destruction of industrial plants to which they pertain sea-assess Tos'ie isa 21 - Enclosure Repmdumd rum he Undasslied Holding aemnrzan-ea gotta-raga nasal 3th a Wpuuwvw thtq qyw_ AW rank - nuns My i specifio-wprimarrs target 11 11 19 1 atooLo off'euofo H o-h-nrf l 14' -- -s err- - - -- -- r sult in1t1al a tomo offensure against 70' urban mas- w l n r-E 3 ntemioate but estimated to he 'oon51 erable amoge will he infiict on control facilities anti rolling stool that may be located in marshalling and oloaoifioation yards in areas under attack 7 - - - Ream-dam min he Limni'bed Dedaasi ed Hoidtus of I11 We Am he aericua Ieince this portion of Shiite 3 1-333313 33-3- IF- gI 'lg'Tu 1' J- Gonmittee calcuIFEeE a reascnahle estimate 3333f dmge method 10101-111 ae the theory-132331 333' 3DAIFAGE TD 3 0F ELFTEFD FIE $1415th 3333 3 High 5 in 315 The i 11 01313 a circular rear probability of _Snculii' the harming accuracy of the number cf 3b'bmb335 actually- 3reaching targets ce' airfare-uh a properti'on- of the above percentages hr-1311111 not he_ 3 -- Complete recomputatien based upcn specific -3'-recaicu1etien hf' each specific part cf each selected 'in netry would be probability -percenfcage- cf damage wenl Ihe affected -- that for reasons given IIahdvIe neither the estimates vIa- Ag iI- 3-3-3 unen 33333113333133 1333 3 - 3 ccnei ere 3 Successful execnticn of the initial atc c offencive 3as planned 110111 33C a Result in damage tc Soviet urban areas as indicatedi the fellcwing table Enclosure 33 333 Rem-nausea tom he Unmassi sd Dedess iad Holdings at me Minnelli-mines 45' 4f ' i'lik j v Damage Minimum Approximate Approximate Depending Lbsqu in square Miles Percentage of Upon Type 0verpressure of SoViet Total Soviet of Structure Urban Areas Urban Areas Destroyed or 50 000 or Damaged Greater Destrojrei or Damaged Destroyed to Heavy Damage 8 320 13 Destroyed to Medium Damage 6 R60 19 Destroyed to Light Damage 5 550 27 Destroyed to Superficial Damage 8 0 35 Q Be liable to inflict Class A Damage on about 20 30 per cerit of the Soviet industrial establishment as a whole 2- Produce as many as 2 700 000 mortalities h 000 000 additional casualties destroy a large number of homes and vastly complicate the problems of living for the remainder of the 28 000 000 people in the 70 target cities depending on the effectiveness of Soviet passive defense measures g Based upon the Soviet industry as it is known at the present time the following table indicates the approximate damage of the initial atomic offensive likely to be inflicted for various percentages of the numbers of atomic bombs con- templated in TRUJAN which might actually be delivered on tar- gets Theae percentages vere derived from precise calcula tions rounded off in the light of the many variable and un- known factors ass same J03 195371 - as - Enclosure 1 5H Reproduced tom the Unclasslred I Dedassi oo Holdings ol to Ne onel stall-res l Percentage of Bombs Actually Delivered to Targets 255% 50% 10% A SQUARE MILES OF SOVIET URBAN AREAS DESTROXED GR DAMAGED Destroyed to Heavy Damage ndndos in Overpressure 80 160 240 320 2 Destroyed to Medium Damage in Overpressure 115 230 3 5 #50 Destroyed to Light Damage 5 Jet sq in Overpres sure 165 325 lL90 650 4 Destroyed to Superficial Damage Overpressure 210 HED 630 840 s PER GENT or TOTAL URBAN AREAS DAMAGED m m P oassla EXTENT To rst mower as A WHOIE IS AFFECTED Destroyed to Esavy Damage 3 6 9 12 2 Heavy to Medium Damage 5 10 15 EU 3 Heavy to Idght Damage 7 20 26 Heavy to Superficial Damage 9 1 27 35 G CORRESPORDING PERSONNEL GASUALTIES Lin Thousands Mortalitzles yes 1500 2250 3000 2 Additional Personnel 1000 2000 3000 $4000 Casualties GUMULATIVE EFFECTS The wide distribution of damage on urban areas throughout the U S S R with associated shook confusion and casualties to personnel as well as the rate at which damage and casualties are inflicted will have an additional cumulative effect on industry essential to the Soviet war effort although aiming points are selected primarily to focus the damage on specific industries and industrial concentrations it is inevitable that actual damage will be indiscriminate as to types and functions of other installations within the target areas This will affect ad- versely all phases of Soviet economy and the ability of the Soviet people to oarry on effectively with work necessary for the proseoution of a war 114 ass-moses Jos 195371 - 25 - Enclosure Rented-Jud In'm B12 Undassifled iDeclmsi'red Hch ngs oi the Nalicnel Archives I TOP SECRET The amount and rate at which damage and personnel casualties are inflicted will also have adverse effects on recuperative measures which will need to be taken to restore order and produce tion essential to the war effort Immediately after each atomic explosion the surviving population in the affected area will he posed many complicated problems such as simultaneously caring for casualties extinguishing fires restoring essential utilities providing food and shelter and clearing rubble The people will be called upon to meet these problems immediately and at a time when shock and fear are prevalent leadership is handicapped many key personnel are killed or missing and controls are dis rupted Each operation will place heavy demands on the available manpower and the effective accomplishment of each will be de- pendent upon the others The destruction of large numbers of homes will impose lasting hardships on an urban population al ready overcrowded and existing on a marginal status All of the foregoing tasks will have to be faced before reconstruction of industrial facilities can be undertaken and production restored in whole or in part In the reconstruction of facilities or the restoration of production it is to be remembered that dependence must be placed on other industries and utilities many of which may have been concomitantly damaged or are suffering from the collateral effects of damage elsewhere The interdependency of all industries and services is a factor of importance in normal production in the restoration of damage and in reestablishing production from previously damaged plants The damage personnel casualties and effects therefrom have been estimated on the basic assumption that the initial atomic offensive contemplated in current war plans TROJAN is success fully executed as planned This applies both to the quantity of bombs and the period in which they are delivered Should a lesser number of bombs be actually delivered on targets or the wear 19 f53 1' - 26 Enclosure Rapmducsd from he Untisstitisd I Holdings ollhc dawns more rate of delivery be substantially slower the damage casualties and effects would be less Should a larger number of bombs be delivered on the targets and the rate of delivery the same or greater the damage casualties and effects would also be greatan In either case re-evaluation should he made SUMMARY Physical damage to installations personnel casualties concentrated in industrial concentrationsJ and other direct or indirect cumulative effects would result in a 30 to #0 per cent reduction of Soviet industrial capacity This loss vauld not be permanent and could either be alleviated by Soviet reouperative action or augmented depending upon the weight and effectiveness of follow up attacks 10 Attacks on Atomic_Energy Installations At this time suf- ficient confirmed knowledge does not justify the assignment of any of the bombs reserved for Soviet atomic installations nor does evidence indicate that any significant portion of installa tions identified with the Soviet atomic energy program will be destroyed by the bombs planned to be delivered on the first Y0 urban areas 11 Recuperability of Industry a Much evidence has been accumulated by the United States Strategic Bombing Surveys as to the measures taken by the Genoans and Japanese to maintain industrial production in the face of Allied air attacks Study has been devoted to the levels of production which were achieved in the same selected target systems of the German and Japanese industrial estab- lishment which are included as targets in current war plans applicable to the U E S R The Germans and to a lesser degree the Japanese def pended on the following action to most vital war production requirements ta see secess- 27 - Enclosure Reprodutsc from Its Useless-had Its Madmen-mines I 1 Repair and restoratie of damages plants Accelerating prodhcticn in plants not working at full productive capacity previous to damage to other plants in the same industry 3 Conversion of plants from_production of non-essential or non critical items to meet more important needs Construction of new facilities either as replace- ment for or in anticipation of losses The v 3 Strategic Bombing Survey shows that by such action the Germans were able to maintain production and even to increase production rates in essential war materials until the weight and rate of allied air attack attained overwhelming pro- portions in 19th at which time German recuperative powers could not match the scale of attack and the pace of the advance of Allied armiesi It is to be anticipated that the U B S R would adopt although not with the same degree of efficiency at this time the same measures proved to be effective by the Germans Evidence indicates the traditional ability of the Russians to accomplish much with little to improvise to repair and to undergo extreme hardship in their working conditions This was best demonstrated in the Soviet rehabilitation of the transportation system which was destroyed in areas occupied by the Germans Soviet capabilities to restore bridges rail installations and railroad equipment amazed even competent American engineers However such ability does not extend to the same extent in highly complicated facilities or installa tions dependent upon precise engineering performance In this they are relatively inferior Capacity and efficiency com- parable to that of the Germans is not to he expected 1 2 There is valid evidence that certain Soviet industries basic to either peacetime or wartime economy are presently strained to their maximum capacity to meet current needs 5 3 - JCS l 5371 - 28 - Enclosure Reproduce horn msUndan 'led Dedassi ed Hold'ngs of like Natale-I Ard ves i I ftf r Noteworthy among these are sessi oil and rail transportation Efforts to increase capacities in these categories are sharply limited by the time required to produce necessary tools facilities or raw materials It is doubtful whether such capacities could he aug- mented significantly in time of war or whether replacements for damage sustained Would he practicable in any reasonable period of time Some industries now operate within limits imposed by the supply of steel and availability-of petroleum Cushions in productive capacity which exist in these in- dustries would afford the some flexibility in the ab- sorption of war damage Experience has shown that the effectiveness of in- dustrial recuperation depends among other things upon the following factors Simultaneity of attack on all elements of any one system or supporting systems 2 The rate at which damage is inflicted Frequency of subsequent attack Repair or replacement of damaged planmaena tools Supply of raw materials 6 Ayailahility of essential utilities 1 7 Availability of industrial engineering talent 8 Adequacy of manpower With due regard for the widespread destructiveness of the contemplated offensive the relatively short time in which so much damage is inflicted the shortage of steel and petroleum the nudher of personnel casualties and the shock and confusion on the population as a whole it is considered that the U S S R would experience great difficulty in re cuperating from the effect of the initial atomic offensive and restoring production to necessary leuels Refer to Para- graph 9 page 17 5H JOE 1953 1 - 29 Enclosure from the Undasd ad MW Holdings ohm Mamlmsea - l is The Soviet Will to Wage waic fnn appraisal of the logical effects of the initial atomic offensive on the Soviet will to wage war is contained in Appendix to this Enclosure The significant conclusions of this'stUdy are as follows g It would seriously disrupt temporarily and impair in definitely the mechanisms of civil and military control It probably Would not destroy the roots of Communist ideology or critically weaken the power of Soviet leadership to control and dominate the people 1 It would not turn the majority of the people against their government but would in general unify them and in- tensify their will to wage war It would validate in the minds of the majority Soviet propaganda with regard to the intentions of foreigners to destroy the U 3 E R Intensified resentment would persist for an indeterminate period E- The will of an indeterminate minority to wage war will undoubtedly be weakened and'certain elements will attempt to to take advantage of the situation but neither of these in fluences would he likely to develop to such an extent as to produce critical effect upon the total Soviet war effort Temporarily it will create a widespread chaotic situa- tion among the people particularly in the urban areasr This situation may well cause a high degree of absenteeism and dis organization in industries essential to the war effort This would force modification of Soviet invasion plans and in time adversely affect the morale of the Soviet armed forces 3 It will create within the U S S R a crisis which could be turned to advantage by the Allies through early and effective exploitation by armed forces and warfare Failing prompt and effective exploita- tion the opportunity would be lost and subsequent Soviet reactions would adversely affect the accomplish- ment of Allied objectives r - It - 1953 i 30 - Enclosure HEMCEU from me Unclassi ed fDedaaslfod Humps or the nal 3 Any demoralizing effect among Soviet invasion troops will he of a delayed nature and will be dependent upon the fruits of their early invasion efforts g no reports of results of the atomic offensive reach the people of Soviet satellite countries both their sabotage of Soviet control and military effort and their partisan coopera- tion toward Allied objectives can be expected to increase with the hope of throwing off the Soviet yoke 13 Effect of the Initial Atomic Offensive Upon the Soviet Armed Forces The phasing of possible Soviet operations in the early phases of a war was discussed in Appendix to this En closure The effect of the atomic offensive on the Soviet armed forces as a result of damage to Soviet industry and the logical impact on the Soviet people and government is set forth in Appendix to this Enclosure significant conclusions of which are summarized below Successful execution of the initial atomic offensive as planned a would not per so seriously impair the capability of the Soviet armed forces to advance rapidly into selected areas of western Europe the Middle East and the Far East but capabilities thereafter in those extended areas would pro- gressively diminish due to the following The supply of petroleum products of all types will rapidly become critical to all branches of the Soviet armed forces with principal effects of Greatly reducing the mobility of the Army Reducing the scale of operations of the Soviet Navy and merchant shipping although submarine warfare would probably be unaffected Seriously reducing Soviet air operations in- volving training transport support of ground and JCS 1953Fl - 31 Enclosure from re I Hddi'gsoi the stulas Archives - rue I has naval forces and independent offensive action although proper allocation of fuel would allow continued operae tions by air defense forces eggs The point at which capabilities of Soviet armed forces would diminish to a critical degree would depend upon many variable or unpredictable factors most important of which is the level of stockpiles prevailing at the initiation of hostilities b After consumption of initial stocks of basic equipment and consumable supplies progressive shortages in a wide variety of items particularly aircraft would handicap opera tions and affect morale of the armed forces Lg Logistic support would be handicapped due to disruption of planning impairment of controls damage to industry and interference with transportation The Soviet High Command will be forced quickly to re- estimate their strategic position and make important decisions regarding operational plans under difficult circumstances They Would probably limit postpone or abandon certain campaigns but it is impossible to predict what specific de- cisions would be made 3 The atomic offensive would open the field and set the pattern for all adversaries to use any weapons of mass destruc- tion and result in maximum retaliatory measures within Soviet capabilities 14 General Atomic bombing will produce certain and retaliatory reactions detrimental to the achievement of Allied war objectives and its destructive effects will complicate post hostilities problems However the atomic bomb would be a major element of Allied military strength in any war with the and would constitute the only means of rapidly inflicting shock and serious damage to vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity In particular an early atomic offensive wi1l facili- tate greatly the application of other Allied military power with ui aesenamee 19537i 32 - Enclosure Wad mm 112 Undassl ed Dedassil'ed Holdings ultha Nu ar'hal Ardi'wes ad 3'34 a eel-it arr-'3' 3 H t prospect of greatly lowered casualties Full exploitation of the advantageo to be obtained is dependent upon the adequacy and promptneso of associated military and operations From the standpoint of our national seCurity the advantages of its early use would he transcending Every reasonable effort should he devoted to providing the means to be prepared for prempt and effective delivery of the maximum numbere of atomic bombs to appropriate target systems Ill JCS l95371 - 33 Enclosure Reprodumd tom the Unclassi ed Dedass'l ud Hold'ngs of National archives if rs n5- 13 #4 messes statesmen 3 hands ltd 35 3ll6 APPENDIX T0 By GEE UNITED STATES PLANE l The joint outline war plan TROJAN has been accepted for planning purposes to provide a basis for developing the initial operations of United States and Allied forces in the event that war has been forced upon the United States by acts of aggression by the U s s H and or her satellites during the fiscal year 1949 2 It is the over-all strategic concept of this plan To destroy the will of the U S S R to resist by a main offensive effort in Western Eurasia and by a stra- tegic defense in the Far East Initially to launch a powerful air offensive designed to exploit the destructive and power of atomic weapons against the vital elements of the Soviet war naking capacity to secure the Bering Sea Japan Sea-Yellow Bea line and selected base area or areas to secure the essential lines of communica- tion to provide essential aid to our Allies to reduce the Soviet war potential by conducting political and undergrdund warfare and to prepare for such later operations as may be nosessary for the attainment of our national objectives 3 In furtherance of this concept tentative plans have been developed by the Strategic Air Command in accordance with directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide for delivering an initial powerful offensive utilising atomic bombs against selected industrial units in seventy urban areas of the U S S R These objective areas are those which available intelligence indicates to include the heart of known industry most essential to the war making capacity of the They are listed in J o s 19st Atomic weapons Supplementjto It is planned to follow up the initial attack with a continuing JCS 1953 1 - 3k - Appendix to Enclosure a i Reproduced from Ihs Unclassl ud Dedassi'led Holdings oliha Ns ombmm 73% a - xii - a I -- II air offensive both with atomic bombs and eonrentional Weapons--bonbs and mines further to reduce the Seviet var making capacity and to police the areas damaged as a result of the initial phase of the attack 4 The details of the plan to deliver the initial atomic offensive are not essential to this particular study inasmuch as an evaluation of the chances of success in delivering the strategic air offensive is specificallj exempt fron this problem It is sufficient herein to note that TROJAN envisages basing the planes involved in the intial attack at suitable available airdrones in the United Kingdom the Cairo-Sues ares slaska and Okinawa Plans of the Strategic Air Command con- template that attacks are to be delivered by medium bombers s-eg and 3-50 and heavy bombers Primary reliance for medium bomber bases will be the United Kingdom with use of Cairo-Suez Iceland or Okinawa as deemed necessary at the time Initial movement of essential personnel and material to the forward operating buses will be by air Subsequent and continuing logistical support will be in the main by Sea Heavy bombardment units equipped with 3-36 aircraft will operate from the United States via bases in Alaska 5 The initial atonio offensive is to be delivered as quickly as operational and logistical considerations permit and is to be distributed over a wide area of the U E S E proper No atomic attacks are contemplated at present'on targets outside the Soviet Union The purpose is to hit hard and to attack a large number of Soviet urban areas in the shortest possible time It is hoped thus to exploit the effects of surprise and shock to provoke the spread and compounding of disaster Underlined for emphasis Jos 1953 1 - 35 Appendix to Enclosure Reprodum volume Unde ned f Dsdassi ed the Aromas rumors and by widespread damage to interdependent industries to complicate and retard processes of recuperations Operationally it is reasonable to eXpect that the untried Soviet air defenses will be least effective against initial attacks The selection of numerous widely separated targets will tend to cause dispersion of Soviet air defenses and antiaircraft weapons While the Chief of Staff Air Force is the Executive Agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the strategic air offensive operational details are in the main vested in the Commanding General Strategic Air Command U S Air Force Operational plans are subject to continuing revision particularly with respect to the development of target informa- tion and objective data At the moment tentative plans are aVailable for the initial atomic offensive but plans for follow-up phases have not yet been sufficiently developed to warrant evaluation in this study E At the present time the initial atomic offensive may be considered as having two stages The first to be accomplished prior to plus 1# days plans to attack 30 selected target cities considered to be of greatest importance and on which available target information is believed to be adequate for attack without preliminary reconnaissance During this stage it is planned tO'conduct aerial reconnaissance of the remaining so target areas which are objectives of the initial atomic offensive with a view to supplementing available infonnation as to these objectives The second stage envisages attack on the remaining #0 target areas Conduct of this attack_will be influenced by operational caperience and in fonnational data gained during the first stage It is anticia pated that the second stage will be completed by plus 30 days at which time the major portion of the stockpile of atomic Underlined for emphasis in JCS 1953 1 - 36 - Appendix to Enclosure Reproduced tom the Unclaesmed I Het ngs alt-w Na onal WWES n- 3 I weapons available on D Day will bake been expended In the Outline War Plan it is emphasized that the course of actien to he followed in subsequent periods will depenc in large mea ure on the rate of production of atomic bombs and on the retulte obtained frou the initial atomic offensive particularly'with regard to the effects of the atomic attack Annex to this Appendix sets forth the cities in which targets are located for each of the two stages of the initial atomic offensiVe together with the number of atomic bombs tentatively allecated to each urban area 7 3 HEHHEEGEEP 2 J03 1953 1 37 - Appendix to Encleaure Revue-used tram I1e Undasdfed fDeclassH ed Holdh'lgs tithe Ns onal Aromas assassin BASIS or EVALUATION In the effort to evaluate the effect of the initial atomic offensive on the U S E R it is first necessary to establish an acceptable basis upon which results can be measured The problem may be divided into three parts An evaluation of material damage and personnel casualtieS An appraisal of effects The application of the foregoing to the military capabilities of the U S S H in the light of conflicting war objectives of the U S and the UJS S R MATERIAL DAMAGE AND PERSONNEL GASUALTIEB From the material standpoint the war effort of a nation involved in total war is dependent on the ability of its industrial establishment to replenish initial stockpiles of essential supplies in order to meet the vital requirements of the armed forces and to provide for the minimum acceptable level of civilian requirements This industrial establishment includes the entire complex of systems involVed in the provision processing and transportation of raw materials in fabrication transportation and assembly of manufactured components into finished equipment and in transportation of finished equipment and operating supplies to consumers The industrial establish- ment may also be considered as composed of management labor plant facilities and materials Partial or complete elimination of any of the parts of the complex or components of the estab- lishment will reduce or negate the utility of the whole It is appropriate therefore to evaluate the extent to which the initial atomic offensive will reduce the industrial establishment It is desirable to evaluate the effects on as many specific systems or components of systems as-available information will permit the derivation of valid conclusions ass-seems arcs 1953 - in - appendix to Enclosure Iron Ihe Undasslfed Dedassmed Hold'ngs ol'lhc National ease aha - a - Iii u 4 1 l1 r' -I1 Damage inflicted on urban areas and the resultant personnel casualties should also he considered as they Will have sig- nificant effects on reducing the war-making capacity of the U B S R and in retarding its subsequent restoration EFFECTS An evaluation of the effects should include the impact of and reaction to the bombing and the consequences thereof on the government the civilian population directly affected the civilian population not directly affected the armed forces and the populace of satellite countries In the final analysis it should be determined to what degree the initial atomic offensive may affect Soviet control The attitude of the people The will of the armed forces to fight MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE IN THE LIGHT OF OBJECTIVES OF THE U S AND THE U S S E The reduction of the industrial establishment should be reflected in reduced capabilities of the armed forces to carry out required operations individually and in concert These capabilities are dependent upon the adequacy of basic equipment tanks guns aircraft ships etc and the supply of essential consumables food clothing POL ammunition etc These items must be available at the right place at the right times in quantities commensurate with the type and scale of operations Denial of either basic equipment or essential consumable supplies will reduce the fighting ability of the armed forces The degree of the reduction and the question of whether or not it is critical or decisive is in turn dependent upon the objectives to be attained at the time and the type magnitude and timing of enemy opposition It is appropriate therefore to evaluate the extent to which reductionngr'deni l of essential items of Soviet armed forces will affect their JCS 1953 1 #2 Appendix to Enclosure Rep muted iron the Unclassl ed ollhsa Hsibnsl Mluss 1 5 gt roe a a abilities to conduCt effective operations in the light of it probable objectires and allied opposition The strategic aims of the U s s R have been considered in agreed intelligence estimates and or the outline war plan to be Ultimately world somihetioh by the and Immediately to seiee control over key areas of the Eurasian land mass including specific areas of Western Europe the Middle East and the Far East The National Security Council has stated that the general objectives of the United States with respect to the in time of peace as well as in war should be To reduce the poser and influence of the U S S B to limits which no longer constitute a threat to the peace national independence and stability of the world family of nations To bring about a basic change in the conduct of international relations by the gorernment in power in Russia to conform with the purposes and principles set forth in the UN charter ' wet aims supplemental to our peacetime aims should include Eliminating Soviet Russian domination in areas outside the borders of'any Russian state allowed to exist after the war Destroying the structure of relationships by which the leaders of the All-Union Communist Party have been able to exert moral and disciplinary authority over individual citizens or groups of citizens in countries not under communist control Assuring that any regime or regimes which may exist on traditional Russian territory in the aftermath of a war Do not have sufficient military power to wage aggressiVe war _ Impose nothing resembling the present iron curtain over Contacts with the outside world __ Enclosure to J G S 1903 3 305 195351 #3 Appendix to Enclosure Rem-sowed tom 111E Undassi ed Beheaded Homes cflha National Armives e3 rt 3o Iil i In addition if any bolshevik rogioo is left in any part of the Soviet Union insuring that it does not control Gn ueh of the militaryiindustriol potential of the Soviet Union to enable it to wage var on terms with an other regime or regimes which mev exist on traditional Eussicn tcrritcrp Seeking to creets postwar conditions which will Prevent the development of pover_relctionehips don ercus to the security of the United States and internationsl peace Be conducive to the successful development of an effective world organisation based upon the purposes and principles of the United Hotione Permit the earliest precticeble discontinuance within the United States of wartime controls These aims and objectives considered in opposition one to the other are fundementcl Although the initial atomic offensive under consideration is but pert clbeit important of all the military political and economic operations necessary for the prosecution of nor of the nature and BOOPE envisaged consideration of its effects should be related to theta conflicting aims and objectives This should be with the view to expressing the degree to which the initial atomic offensive might influence strategy and contribute to Allied ability to counter Soviet aims end to soviet ability to oppose the attainment of Allied objectives Joe 195371 44 - Appendix to Enclosure Lu-Ax ferI the implementation 13f the initial IatIcrL-Lic 7- plane Mane-I IdiIIBIcud'EI-ed Ivith selected wanking teana oIf the Joint IrfI o - Strategic Plans and with the Seamanding General of the Strategic Ait' Gannanu and members atai fI er - I of n he pertment intelligence Te A melilgence hranphes oft the thelInf Information basic It'o the deter-n - -- If scepeI'I andI cenneaition 0 1 Soviet induatrial capacity - I - facilitate detemmation of the expected damage l- f effect and the capabilities and limitations of atpnic weapona the 0011113111 th referred to due unenta and pub ieatiane of the - Atomic Energy the reports of the U 3 uretegic I- Benbing Surveys of Germany and Japan and pertinent papers of the Joint Chiefs of Star-If All Inen hers of the Gmittee were ale eered acqeaa auchI Restricted JIJnta as was neceeam r r in an ance from he Undassifned DeclasSMed Holdings cHhe Examination was made of the methods of target selection and determination of aiming points used by the Strategic vulnerability Branch in the preparation of the target folders furnished to the Strategic Air Command The services of a group of outstanding mathematicians were obtained through the cooperation of the Head of the Research and Development Board These consultants assisted the Committee in its examination of the methods of the selection of aiming points and the calculations involved in determination of probability of damage to selected targets The Committee was furnished target folders prepared by the Strategic Vulnerability Branch for the urban industrial areas of the Soviet Union These were examined as to aiming points buildings facilities and installations located in the areas of anticipated danage for each aiming point and installar tions outside the areas of anticipated damage The Strategic Vulnerability Branch also submitted available damage esttaates for the urban objective areas in terms of the percentage of known Soviet capacity for selected systems or segments of the industrial establishment Spot checks were made as to the adequacy authenticity and accuracy of this information in order to determine a measure cf the evaluation as a whole As a result of the foregoing procedures estimates Were made as to the reduced industrial capacity of the U S S R in certain selected items essential to their war effort Estimates were limited to a small group of selected vital complexes because intelligence data concerning other complexes were either incomplete or it was impracticable for the intelligence agencies to summarize available data within time to be of benefit to this Committee Refer to annex through to Appendix to Enclosure JCS 1953 1 - #5 - Appendix to Enclosure from 111 Undass'r ed I Dodassi ed ofthe National Momma The Committee gathered such information ss was available from intelligence sources as to the extent of Soviet stockpile3 of essential military equipment and supplies and as to the requirements of the Soviet armed forces to nest anticipated operations This was evaluated in terms of production require ments and the extent to which production requirements could be met from a reduced production from within the from satellite countries from captured territory or from other sources likely to be available Were made on specific basic materials such as oil steel chemicals and basic utilities transportation and power endeavoring to translate the direct effects of the bombing into impact on the war economy and military capabilities of the Soviet armed forces As a separate approach the Committee determined the total urban area of the U 5 S R of cities of known population or greater in which it is generally accepted that practically all of Soviet industry is located This area was compared to the total area likely to be damaged by all of the bombs planned to be delivered to the selected aiming points provided for in current plans There was thus obtained an estimate of the percentage of total Soviet industrial capacity likely to be destroyed or damaged and the casualties to personnel Refer to Annex of Appendix to Enclosure By the nature of the second part of the problen -appraisal of the effect of the bombing on Soviet will to page war- the Committee was forced to proceed along different lines it has first nedessary to acquire a background knowledge of the history traditions traits and characteristics of the people of the to consider the salient features of Communist doctrine and the depth and character of its pene- tration among the people the means and methodbdused in the JCS 195371 s7 Appendix to- Enclosure Roprudnnad from le De assi ud Holdings of Iha Nalionai ms u 492 jn wne 42 Aw 'The'Conmittee hes note thatI the the 3m l Int-cri'prh-L lb 'SoweVer the validity of en3 evalnation_of Ithe effects -- If Ed alrntomion fiensiVe onttne Soviet-people s d_ lsrge nessurIe dependent upon thensunport - -in thisIseotion are_mnde it A a hw Ear n 1e Eo preblem rift-'9' 1 11IJF-LI a- tIhe- pr I I val Intelligence if-L Navy _the Ait'IntelL snd onrreeuest es-ftrn_shed m4speeifio informat 515 9r iiqh- - Jih'f t d An 15255535 x-H- I- pertinent to E ObservatioESLofnthIf sorting and distribnting-the large volume of data 1nno1ved - A- It IVES noted that information is te'IiIng placed on Garcia for speoislly designed bnsinese mechinea When completed this system should faoilitste greatly the maintenance of records C and the utilization of information for future estimates tr this nature AI free exahnnge appears to be continuous Ibetween - BritiIsIh Ian Anerioen agencies tnusI substantially broadening scope- and-value of souroo material I L - 51 339 x' thi Mar - Rapmjuosd from the Umssi sdi Declass od Holdings ol the Natunaimmnres -1Vf as eoeasaasas as 5 The Committee gathered such ihformation as was available from intelligence sources as to the extent of Soviet stockpiles of essential military equipment and supplies and as to the requirements of the orist armed forces to meet anticipated operations This was evaluated in terms of production require- ments and the extent to which production requirements could he met from a reduced production from within the from satellite countries from captured territory or from other sources likely to he arailehle were made on specific basic materials such as oil steel chemicals and basic utilities transportation and power endeavoring to translate the direct effects of the bombing into impact on the war economy and military capabilities of the Soviet armed forces As a separate approach the Committee determined the total urban area of the U E S R of cities of 50 000 known population or greater in which it is generally accepted that practically all of Soviet industry is located This area Was compared to the total area likely to be damaged by all of the bombs planned to he delivered to the selected aiming points provided for in current plans There was thus obtained an estimate of the percentage of total Soviet industrial capacity likely to be destroyed or damaged and the casualties to personnel Refer to Annex of Appendix to Enclosure By the nature of the seccnd part of the prohlem--appraisal of the effect of the bombing on Soviet will to wage war- the Committee was forced to proceed along different lines It was first necessary to acquire a background knowledge of the history traditions traits and characteristics of the people of the to consider the salient features of Communist doctrine and the depth and character of its pene tration among the people the means and methods u sd in the JCS 1953 1 47 - Appendix tc-Enclosure Reproduced from the sewed 1' Dedust ed Hoid'ngs Df Nalionsl archives U S S R and the satellite countries to force adherence to Communism and to Soviet control through discipline police control and fear tendencies and opportunities to resist or overthrow this control This back ground was acquired by reading books reports and studies hearing directly on the problenJ This included minutes of a seninar under the auspices of the Institute for Advanced studies Princeton University and a research study on Soviet society in process at the University of Michigan The Committee also interviewed a number of individuals who it was considered by reason of their qualifications positions or experience night furnish_the Committee infornetion of Value in studying this problen These included the recent Ugd Ambassador to the Soviet Union Lieutenant General Walter E Smith the present Navel Attache to the U S B R Rear ednirsl L G Stevens Mr Durbrov of the State Department fornerly on duty in the Mr Thayer of the State Department in charge of Voice of America broadcasts Dr McDowell of the Department of the Army and numerous officers of the Army levy and Air Force who had served in the in one capacity or another coring or since'World War Ii Jcs 19537 1 ts - Appendix to Enclosure Romeo torn It Urnhso edmeolmifred Holt ngs ohhe National motive oon-noive omtne noviett people and thein gtomio Ev-uh- 132111 I 43 2 cod-Tine Committee by pertinent a of cooperation and that the 1 -Il-u- u-m _Boviet intiuotrial tenacity are sound thorough Any delays or feiluneo in the fnee exohange of andoob ctive -- -- T9133 - - - 5ft information can be attributed to _the oiffioultieo inherent in - Wf e -- u oar-ting and diotribnting the lorgo _volume of tiata intrelved It was noteti that information is being pleoed on cot-do for - specially- designed business nachineo men completed this system ohould fa oilite -te greatly the maintenance of reoor o anti-the utilization of information for future eotimateo of this notuner- n A foe-e exohonm ante-are to be continuous between British and American agencies tbno outstantiollx broadening the- noope anti ante of--oouroo material of aging-t - 5 I la Itda LmlikeIly that the-II paychulogical' eakneases - - the Soviet IauI Sate lite structure vault pIrIo uc seriqusI - I cause-quanti er unk ss - - Th Soviet orbit were subjected tn intensi Iva uni affective aerial attack from the West Rsprodmcd from ieUnrdassi ed Dedassiied HcHings CH lha Halbnai rttives mama flew on J it 1- 1'33 The prospect for ultimate victory further diminished because of the continued pressure of sea power as exercised through blockade and commerce destruction although a sea blockade of the Soviet Union wou1d not be as effective as against a more insular power Or it seemed to them that the Soviet Union was faced with a protracted war doomed to end in Soviet defeat It is concluded from consideration of Soviet political economic and military strength and weakness factors that against probable opposing forces the Soviets have the combat power to overrun key areas in Europe and Asia The primary source of Soviet combat power is the Soviet Army which is supported by a numerically strong tactical air arm a small surface fleet and a relatively strong submarine arm en additicnal source of combat power is the small but expanding strategic air arm Following the seizure of certain key areas in Europe and Asia the capabilities of the Soviet Union to occupy hold and exploit these areas would to a great extent depend upon the ability of opposing forces to exploit successfully those weaknesses enumerated above The operations of Soviet military forces the direction and extent of their offensives and the opposition expected to be encountered has a direct bearing on the expenditures of military supplies and material and the extent of Soviet gains to be derived in immediate booty resources and in dustrial capacity for future possible exploitation Rance it is pertinent to digest for reference the estimated time schedules for Soviet operations as set forth in In considering this estimated time schedule the following Quotation from AEAI-S should be borne in mind Although the United States and the United Kingdom may employ weapons of mass destruction the Joint Intelligence Committees have not been informed of the timing scale and effectiveness of possible Allied attacks using these weapons In weighing Soviet capabilities it has been impossible therefore to assess the effect of the use of these'weapons on the Soviet Union However it is emphasized that employ ment of them_could be expected to affect the progress of Soviet campaigns JCS 1953 1 1 58 to Enclosure 3811mm From U m od Doolessme Holt nge Df Na ma Armies Subject to the foregoing the phasing of Soviet operations- eetimated in is Western Europe Soviet operations in Western Europe could involve simultaneous attacks to overrun Western Germany France the lov Countries and Denmark The Soviet Uniou will deem it necessary to advance to the Pyrenees and the Mediterranean Coast in order to out off retreating French forces secure the Spanish frontier and to seize ports in Southern France It has been estimated that these operations could be completed to the Rhine by to 10 days to the Meuse Somme line by to to the Seine by to the Pyrenees the Mediterranean and the Atlantic by Df to 66 3 Italy and Sicilg A campaign could be undertaken against Italy and Sicily simultaneously with that against other portions of Western Europe It has been estimated that the offensive could reach the Rome Pescara line by to DXGU complete the occupation of Italy by 11 75 and Sicily by Dfl o Scandinavia The Soviet Union might conduct a campaign against Scandinavia concurrently with other operae tions beginning approximately #0 days after D day Using Denmark as a base the U S S H could attack southern Sweden then southern Norway and simu1taneously in the north against Norway and Sweden It has been estimated that the foregoing opera- tions could be completed within 35 days or about Greece The Soviets could conduct operations in Greece and the Aegean Islands simultaneously or in near concurrence with offensives in the middle East and Western Europe - I It has been estimated that Greece proper could be overrun by to 75 All estimates are in days 1- - 1 ear EMS Joe 195371 59-Appendix to Enclosure Homeless mm he Limousine Dedassi ed oFlhe Namnal Nouns 1h 3' H- 515 I -s A g The Middle Ens Main thrusts in the Middle East could he directed at the vital Allied oil resources in Iran Iraq Saudi Arabia and base areas and lines oi communication terminating in the Suez Canal Area To gain objectives quickly the operations might be conducted simultaneously with those in western Europe and Greece In summary it has been estimated that these areas could be seized by with the exception of the campaigns through Palestine and the Jordan Valley to Cairo-Suss- Alexandria which would not be secured until 13 175 E Turksg The Soviet Union would probably consider it necessary to attack Turkey simultaneously with their general offensive in the Middle East It has been estimated that the Ankara-Ismir line could he consolidated and depending upon progress of the separate campaign for the Midd1e_East the Alexandretta area by to 150 pg Far East Soviet operations in the Far East would probably involve the seizure of South Korea and key strategic positions in North China Operations could be primarily to deny areas to the U S to neutralize threatening forces and for harassing and diversionary purposes The main effort in the Far East could probably succeed in overrunning South Korea by DEED and other opera tions could he kept well within Soviet logistic capabilities g The United Kingdom No detailed estimates are included in AEAI-E of the nature and scale of operations against the united Kingdom inasmuch as the type and phasing would he dependent upon the progress of other campaigns Hewever neutralization or seizure of the United Kingdom would involve the heavy and sustained application of Soviet air power possibly including guided missiles V li V-E type ' 51' JCS 1953 1 - 50 Appendix to Enclosure Reproduced Undass led I Unclassi ed Holdings o1 me National Wives and Soviet sea power including mines and submarines A contemplated invasion of the United Kingdom would require large scale logistic support for all types of Soviet armed forces 3 Sea and Air Offensive Against Anglo-American Sea Communications The main attack on sea communications will probably take the form of continuing operations on ports and approaches by mining torpedoes bombing and sabotage Such attacks would be carried out in the main by both air craft and submarines allocated to those areas where the tactical situation indicates the targets to he most profitable and the opposition least effective It is to be presumed that maximum available effort would be devoted to this campaign on a continuing basis SUMMARY Summarizing these estimated objectives and capabilities The heaviest commitments and expenditures of military supplies for Soviet ground forces would be from to about DKQD and might then be markedly reduced provided the U S S E has by then overrun Western Europe Italy except'Sicily Scandinavia Turkey except the Alexandretta area the Middle East except for the Palestine Jordan Valley and Suez areas and the Far East However heavy drain on U S S R resources will continue even prior to the development of an Allied surface offensive for normal support of large ground forces on extended fronts to meet combat requirements at points of contact and in internal areas to consolidate positions and cope vith under ground movements Additional continuing demands will be placed on Soviet air and naval forces to cope with the increasing tempo of Allied attacks as well as for Soviet offensives by these services In particular air operations in the defense of gr JCS 1953 1 - 6l - Appendix to Enclosure Reproduced them-relented I Hotd'mgs loe NationalAmhwes the U S S R offensives against the United Kingdom or at long range against the United States and in support of ground forces in the Middle East will require continuing supply of petroleum products replacement aircraft engines and equip- ment spare parts and munitions Soviet submarine operations while requiring relatively small quantities of fuel will necessitate re-supply of torpedoes engine parts and electronic equipment as well as new craft to Sustain the tempo of wide spread operations Air ground and naval forces will require elaborate training programs to support the operating elements of these services for protracted campaigns or necessity these pro grams will have to be prosecuted largely within the U S S R proper and will in turn require substantial expenditures of fuel and equipment All Soviet military forces within and especially outside the U S S R will impose heavier demands on the transportation system in the U 8 S E and in occupied territory As the fronts are extended requirements for transportation will increase to a degree depending upon the scope and tempo of operations Details in regard to stockpiles and expenditures of essential war materials by the U S S R are set forth in Annex to this Appendix and information relative to the Soviet industrial position in Annex to this Appendix JCS 1953 1 53 Appendix to Enclosure Reproduce Imm I12 Umlaai ed Dedassl ed Hcid'ngs 01 I113 National Amines cases TD serssnIx To ENCLOSURE SGVIET INDUSTRIAL POSITION Section I of Appendix to Enclosure shows in summary form the Central Intelligence Agency s estimate of current annual production of selected items in the Soviet Union the Satellite countries and other parts of Continental Europe The Central Intelligence Agency has indicated the margin of error to which these estimates are subject They vary from 10 to 25 percent The estimates contained in Enclosure are of current production hence subject to marked change JR the event that the U S S R increases measures for industrial mobilization for war In considering differences between current annual production and productive capacity it should be noted that adequate time must he allowed for manufacturing or processing establishments to Convert from peacetime to wartime production Accelerate production of war supplies and Adjust to wartime conditions Furthermore actual production of war ecuipment munitions and supplies will always he limited by the production and processing of raw materials the output of basic industries availability of production personnel and the capabilities of essential utilities such as electrical power and trance portation Underlined for emphasis ESP-SEGHEEL JCS 1953 1 55 - Annex to Appendix to Enclosureth Remus-Ed Tram ms Unmassi sd Holdings cl me Nslimsl moms APPENDIX TD ENCLOSURE PASSIVE DEFENSE MEASURES The chances of success of delivery of the initial atomic offensive is beyond the scope of this study therefore it is inappropriate to consider herein the active defense measures which the Soviet Union might adopt On the other hand there is a broad field of passive defense measures which can be adopted prior to and during hostilities to minimize the effects of air attack either by atomic or conventional weapons Included in this category are such important measures as l The exercise of security and deception on information 2 Dispersion of industry and redistribution of the population 3 Underground construction for important facilities 4 Construction of personnel shelters 5 Development of civil defense organization and controls 6 Education training and propaganda T Provision of equipment for disaster control and recuperation 8 Elimination or protection of vulnerable installations in transportation and communication 9 Dispersion of stockpiles of food and essential Ear materials Substantial accomplishment of such measures would serve to reduce material damage and personnel casualties improve ability to control the population before and after attacks and facilitate restoration of essential facilities Underlined for emphasis see secess JCS 1953 1 - 66 Appendix to Enclosure i Repmduoed rum Ihe Undas MIDedaaemsd Huid'an OT Iha Hallmai Mm 0the intelligence 000-1000 IprnfiIImI -530 % in 1 The 30v1et Del 0 mekere' here evi entlr c a - 0 yea-Lawsung in W fpn u- hI- LEI-0L Hg yr Id II Iii LH I decide 'te ittle 01 01 01 0 pmrers 010' every 0pp0 I s'to she 0 re 0 'E-dqu nIthIiIsI 000 00 10II 100 1 0 danger seize upon at 011 its propaganda This 1101103- I interpreted '00 0 potential influence eithenste 05-J- lanai hysteria seem initiel attack 01 - t0 100100 00 panic reduce surprise 0 116 j f'Fi rst the s 0 'Iof axe-raising I The gIenerIIeJI preet - - - sscuri jr on allsuetters pel0ting 1 0 its mili r ' positie-i - rte passive defense measures and industrial facilities- Seem-1 1 The U S S R v00 forced t0 edept passive-I defense - measures Ner- much of its territemr in the past war In v addition the 0 0 0 0 has has the 0pp0rt1mit3 00 profit German British 0 11 1 Japanese experience 0 0 1well 0 0 published materiel in the United States on the effects of 0 1200110 10010130 I g 3'33 003925 001 3 Reprodumed 1mm lhe Unchained I awesome DIM Nsiiunal mess Third The general pattern of industrial construction and postwar reconstruction in the U S E R provides for the development of seven self-sufficient industrial areas and a degree of dispersion within these areas Fourth Normal efforts now being made to improve the transportation system of the 1 7 3 33 particularly the railroads provide for reducing its vulnerability to air Etta-Gk Fifth The organisation for police control propaganda and indoctrination constitute an existing framework for education training and execution of passive defense and disaster control measures on short notice Sixth The U S S H has been maintaining a strong military position and is capable of mobilizing quickly for total war Analysis of available intelligence leads to the conclusion that Information is available to the U s s s as to passive defense measures which would reduce material damage and personnel casualties from atomic bombing and facilitate maintaining or regaining control of the population and in restoration of damage The government of the U B S R is aware of the threat to them of atomic attacks and trends-are evident that steps are being taken within limitations of time and resources to reduce the impact on vital elements of their waeraking capacity Many passive defense measures could be implemented quickly aor ssessr 1953 l 68 ahpehalx to Enclosure Reproduced Irom l ha Unclaimed Dedassined Hm of he Nahum Ami 4 1 5 it a Underground constructibn has been provi ed in a number of cases for important command posts comw munication centers and some emphasis has been places on such construction for fortifications supply depots and critical industrial establishments Aircraft hangars and command posts are known to exist underground at some of the important air force installations Location of supply dumps and stockpiles on which information is limited follows a logical pattern for the support of the armed forces consistent with transportation facilities available sun with evidence of dispersion to reduce vulnerability from all types of attack Substantial accomplishment of measures specifically assigned to minimise material damage or provide shelters for the urban population as a whole from atomic attack is not yet in evidence in the JCS 1953 1 - 59 - Appendix to Enclosure Reproduced turn me Unclassi ed Dedassi sd Holdings or Ire Naljonsl Armies 4 Elfin-r y I 9f APPENDIX To ENCLOSURE DISCUSSION OF DAMAGE 9F ATOMIC BOMBS AS TO BLAST FIRE RADIOLDGIGAL ASPECTS In evaluating damage effects great care nest be taken not to either over estimate or under-estimate the effects of the bomb or the physical vulnerability of the target Evaluation of the effects of the initial atomic offensive against the U S B R requires a scenery of the damage to be expected from the type of atomic weapons currently available in the stockpile It is the purpose of the ensuing paragraphs to present such a scenery in non technical form and to describe the effects which would result as indicated by the two bombs which hows been dropped dyer Japanese urban areas and by the characteristics of the benbs now available The effects fall into two major categories a Damage to material b Personnel casualties Experience in War with Japan The U S Strategic Bombing Survey examined areas in Japan which had been subjected to atomic bombing and conven- tional bombing - This Survey concluded that the same damage which resulted from Nagasaki-type bonh could be obtained by the use of 2700 tons of conventional bombs with the proper proportion of high eXplosiwe incendiary and fragmentation types Many factors prevent direct comparison of bombs with atomic bombs and there is wide variation in the zestinates of the atomic bombs which would be equivalent to the 1 989 979 tons of conventional bombs which were directed at target systems of Axis Europe A substantial proportion of the tonnage dropped in Europe did not fall in urban or builthup industrial areas and was delivered ovar a period of two and one half years Damage estimated for Japanese cities 195371 To a Appendix to Enclosure Raproduoed from mellowed f Unclassi ed magma-e Na onalATmPJes would not apply strictly to cities of different construction characteristics For instance nearly all the homes in Japanese cities were of light frame construction or even a more fragile type and were built closely together while it has been estimated that a large percentage of the homes in the U S S R are of the log cabin type and are probably at least equivalent in strength to heavy frame buildings There is another disparity in the case of damage to be expected from secondary fires inasmuch as the Japanese construction was more inflammable and generally in urban areas more closely concentrated than that in the Soviet Union It is not possible to inflict extensive damage as rapidly with conven- tional bombs as with atomic bombs The rate of attack 1 factor is discussed under Recunerability ' paragraph 11 of Enclosure In the case of the Japanese cities the fire damage was largely contained within the blast damage area so that the fire complemented serious damage already existing from blast This may not always obtain in the future The conclusion of the Strategic Bombing Survey was that the area of destruction at Hiroshima was 4 7 square miles and at Nagasaki 1 8 square miles However the area of damage at Nagasaki was limited by the small size of the rather isolated section of the city DVer which the bomb exploded and the fact that sections of the city'were protected by intervening hills Otherwise considering the equivalent energy release of these two bombs the Nagasaki bomb being the more powerful the destroyed area in Nagasaki would have been several times larger Such variations in damage will be discussed later assesses-s 1953 11 71 appendix to Enclosure meduosd fromihs Unclassi ed 4' Dedessi od Holdings ollhe Na unalmwes Damage to Material In current plans the aiming point of each bomb is selected so that the position of the bomb burst will have at least a 75% probability of producing Class damage to the principal targets of attack Class damage is that which renders a building or installation unsuitable for its intended use until major reconstruction is accomplished In some cases it will result in total destruction of the contained supplies furnishings and equipment in other cases the primary equipment may remain undamaged notwithstanding wall collapse 1 missile effectSand fires because of the ruggedness or indestructihilitp of the contents Areas of Glass a damage are shown in Table II of the Annex to this Appendix Personnel Casualties The most striking effect of the two Japanese bombs was the great number of personnel casualties which were inflicted A plausible estimate of the various causes of death would be as follows Flash Burns 20 to 30 per cent Other Injuries EU to 50 per cent Radiation Sickness 15 to 20 per oent Many of the people who died were subjected to several types of injuries anyone of which would have been fatal Flash Burns It has been estimated that the ground temperature at 1500 feet from ground zero at Hiroshima had an instan- taneous value exceeding 200000 and that the following heat wave extended over a large area reaching great intensity within a radius of from 3000 to H000 feet The degree of burns varied with the protection afforded in- dividuals by buildings and clothing Efilifi JCS 1953 l 2 - Appendix to Enclosure Reprodumd mmumm cl I13 National Wes Other Injuries Effects produced by over-pressure alone on Japanese personnel seen to have been rare there being among survivors very few cases of ruptured esrdruns at Hiroshima and Nagasaki Most of the injuries were from secondary causes which resulted from collapsed buildings and flying missiles Secondary burns probably accounted for a con- siderable number of deaths in Hiroshima and Nagasaki these being cauSed by structures being blown down upon people and shortly thereafter catching fire Many people who were injured and pinned beneath debris succunmed to the effects of heat from the burning collapsed buildings Radiation Sickness from Primary Fission Products Radiation effects fron primarp fission products were not sufficient to produce casualties under conditions such as those which existed in Japan and it is believed that the deposit of primary fission products will not be an factor in air bursts which are planned in adiation Sickness fron Radiation During'Fission Galina rays and neutrons liberated by and during the fission process produced nearlp'all significant radiation injury Doses of neutron and gamma radiation sufficient to cause severe cases of radiation sickness extended to a radius of about 4500 feet fron the point of explosion not measured frOm ground zero Death from radiation sickness although delayed Was almost certain to those exposed explosion survivors up to a distance of 3600 feet from the point of explosion The danger from nuclear radiation to unshielded and exposed personnel was negligible at about one mile from ground zero In general it may be expected that in the case of air bursts the possibility of- being killed by blast heat missiles and fires sould cower the radius of danger specified for death resulting from radiation 195371 - 73 Appendix to Enclosure 1- 1m lhe Unclassi ed Holdings 0 Ma mal rmm 9 - If '4 1 This Committee considers the above described effects are a resonable index of atomic Honh damage in the futurer Current Date in Use Table I of the Annex to this Appendix as used by the Strategic Vulnerability Branch of the Air Intelligence Division lists the common types of building construction with the corresponding over-pressures pounds per square inch shore atmospheric pressure to cause Class damage This Committee has Obtained data from the Atomic Energy Commission as of 1 April lgtg as to what areas would be under an over-pressure of four six and eight pounds per Square inch for bombs of each type at the burst heights shown These values were calculated for flat target surfaces without a target array See Table II of the Annex to this Appendix Data Used in Annex to Appendix to Enclosure - Ares Study The proper values of Tables I and II of the Annex to this Appendix combined with burst heights which were consistent with those selected by the Strategic Vulnerability Branch were used in the estimates made menses to Appendix to Enclosure Bn of this report for estimates of damaged erased and personnel casualties _In those estimates the ares-of damage was calculated on the basis of damage which would result from 5 psi thus insuring damage to donestio wood frame and bearing wall buildings In connection with material damage variations may be expected in area and on the targets within areas as was demonstrated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki The following table shows damage and personnel casualties for Hiroshima and Nagasaki ul' essences-s Joe 1953 - T4 - Itppendix to Enclosure Reuuducsd from the Undassi ed i Dedassil'ed Holmes cl Ire Natalia Names tai i is Population density per Square'nile 35 000 65 300 Square niles destroyed st l 8 Killed and missing 35 h0 000 Injured 46 000 Mortality rate per square mile destroyed 15 000 20 000 Casualty rate per square mile 32 000 k3 000 The average population density of the 70 cities considered in TROJAN is estimated to be 10 000 per square mile and it should he noted that in determining the mortality and casualty figures in Annex to Appendix to Enclosure direct proportions of densities of population were used in spite of the fact that both Japanese explosions occurred at tines during which the regular daily routine maxhsised the number of casualties and at Hiroshima just after the all clear release following an air raid warning Estimates of casualties for future atomic explosions are difficult to make since effects would vary with the time of attack normal routine 'of the people concerned in the attack and passiVs defense measures which night be taken Therefore it is felt that the estimate in Annex to Appendix to Enclosure as deriVed from the above figures may he the upper limit of casualties to he expected Qualifications in use of Data for Determining Damage substantial variations in damage result from many factors which should he considered in using any theoretical or empirical data such as have appeared in this Appendix In general these factors tend to reduce the expected damage The topography of the ground variations in weather conditions the plan form and structural characteristics of the target u'v JCS 1953 1 75 - appendix to Enclosure Remoduned I13 Unchained I Unclassi ed I-Iin-Idings the Re ne Archives errsy'sre exemples - Wind conditions may result in focusing the shock wsVe increasing the pressure in unexpected directions with corresponding decreases in other directions Informed opinion is to the effect that large amounts of moisture in the air such as fog or rain will substantially reduce the blest'effeot may be decreased depending upon the degree of effectiveness of passive defense in the bombed Appendix to Enclosure see assess- Jos 195371 76 - Appendix to Enclosure Renowned rum Ihe Undess ied Dsdass cd Hum-gas the minimalmcl' ves TO cF MATERIAL DAMAGE AND PERSONNEL CABUALTIEB Annexes to inclusive to this Appendix are sepa rate studies on the estimated effects of the initial atomic of- fensive on selected segments of the Soviet industrial establish- ment Annex to this Appendi consists of a study on the estimated damage which is liable to be inflicted on Soviet industry as a whole and the personnel casualties which might be experienced by Soviet urban populations Significant conclusions of Annexes to to this Appendix are as follows PETROLEUM 1 Successful execution of the initial atomic offensive as planned would a Result in a Top or better probability of Class A damage to of the USSR throughput refining capacity 2 Result in a 70% or better probability of Class A damage to 150% of the USSR high octane avgas refining capacity g Result in a stringent reduction in the supply of petroleum products to the Soviet armed forces and in a cor responding reduction in overall Soviet military capability d Result in a critical shortage of high octane aviation gasoline with a corresponding reduction in the combat ef- fectiveness of the Soviet air force Note The time at which shortages of petroleum products for the Soviet armed forces becomes critical will depend largely upon the levels of POL stockpiles prevailing at the initiation of hostilities and the efficiency with which the USSR is able to exploit remaining refinery capacity including that for fuels at JCS 195371 90 - Appendix to Enclosure Reproduced Emails-sifted De eei ed Holdings olihe Na mal he T'a _y i 2 The Soviet oil refining industry appears to constitute a most lucrative target and serious consideration should be given to making it the primary objective with either atomic or conventional bombs of the initial atomic offensive are 1 The successful execution of the initial atomic offensive as planned has a 70% or better probability of reducing the productive capacity of raw steel in the Soviet Union by #525% or approximately million tons per year leaving a remaining capacity of about lD 3 million tons per year pending restoration of damage or augmentation from other sources 2 An indeterminate but substantial portion of Soviet steel processing facilities would be destroyed or damaged This should adversely affect capabilities to restore damage both in the steel industry and other industries and would result in directly reducing the output of var materials 3 Damage inflicted would be serious but the effect on the war effort would be primarily of a long range nature in creating shortages of finished war materials Given time much of the damaged producing and processing machinery can be salvaged repaired or restored to operations Partial relief of steel shortages should be possible from satellite countries and conquered areas but time in excess of one year will be required to exploit substantially such EOUPBBS RUBBER 1 During the first year of war the Russian war effort will not be critically affected by the damage to the rubber industry caused by the initial atomic offensive Although there is a 70% or better probability of Glass A damage to 57% of rubber capacity the civilian economy should be able all absorb such shortages as may exist JUS 91 - Appendix to Enclosure #0111 the I Dsoassi ed Hm Nadine archives 2 During the second and succeeding years of war shortages would become critical and would be reflected in decreased mobility of the Soviet armed forces and in the civilian economy unless damaged facilities are restored or replaced by conversions AIRCRAFT AND AIRCRAFT ENGINES 1 Successful execution of the atomic offensive as planned would result in a 70 per cent or better probability of Class A damage to 59 per cent of Soviet aircraft assembly capacity and to 68 3 per cent of aircraft engine capacity In addition indeterminate damage of a serious nature would be inflicted on sources for production of aviation equipment and accessories 2 Damage to the two known plants producing long-range bombers would progressively reduce Soviet capability for long-range air bombardment With the reduction in flow of replacement aircraft and engines to operational units and for training the USSR will be forced to reduce progressively air power for independent cooperative and supporting operations 3 Coupled with the shortage of aviation gasoline the reduced production of aircraft will force extreme selectivity in air operations and constitute a serious deficiency in Soviet military capabilities MACHINE l Heither the machine tool industry nor inventory stocks provide appropriate targets of themselves for inclusion as primary targets in the initial atomic offensive 2 Successful execution of the initial atomic offensive as planned will a Provide 0 per cent or better probability of Class A damage to 23 9 per cent of the plants of the machine-tool industry b Effect considerable but an indeterminate amount of destruction or damage to machine tools either installed or 3'35 19537I 92 - Appendix to Enclosure Umhw adf oclassi ed impact the Soviet ELECTRIC TE - I- ncceas ulnexe cation 153% VauReaultIfima 7 0 Taaggzya f v35 ref- USSRIelectric generating we we - transformers II I- I aan auee considerable _ T k ezj i w I - m F-tmbutio installations an eqei pment thioughnut the- TU - 'Iip it'alsuitabl' Err-m target $545 - eenventiunal attack 1with the -- - _Epluu forces l ielfte be initially available re-hugs - -- Iv - Direct damage inflicted nn'reilroa lines and yarde ae - - i 331 5 I result of the initial atdnia ui'fenaiue againat TU nrbanI areas wil be limited in scope and generalle susceptible to rapid Irepai by I- manpewez- large-1 unskilled 3 111deter1aimat'e but eetimated to be coneitierabie Inemege will - be IIeentI-nl facilitiesI and r elling stock that may be k c i Reproduced turn me Unmarried Demassl sn Hoidhgsof the Na maldrm 4fHeavy damage will occur to the facilities for building maintaining and repairing railroad equipment This is bound to be serious since this portion of Soviet industry is already function ing at maximum capacity 1 Successful execution of the initial atomic offensive as planned would a Result in damage to Soviet urban areas as indicated in the following table Approximate Pars Approximate oomtage of Total Damage Square Miles Soviet Urban Depending Minimum of Soviet Urban Areas 50 000 upon Type Lbs sq in Areas Destroyed or Greater De of Structure Overpressure or Damaged stroyed or Damapm Destroyed to Heavy Damage 8 320 13 Destroyed to Medium Damage 6 60 lg Destroyed to Light Damage 5 650 27 Destroyed to Superficial Damage 4 8H0 35 2 Be liable to inflict Class A damage on about 20 30 per cent of the Soviet Industrial Establishment as a whole 3 Produce as many as 2 700 000 mortalities # 000 000 additional casualties destroy a large number of homes and Vastly complicate the problems of living for the remainder of the 28 000 000 people in the 70 target cities depending on the effectiveness of Soviet passive defense measures The foregoing results should be adjusted up or down in direct proportion to the total number of bombs actually delivered on target areas 3- JCS 1953 l 94 a Appendix l'I to Enclosure Reproduced from he Uruiassiiod f Dedaasi ml l-ldd'ngs of lhe Material 3341 2 The wide distribution stysamage on urban areas throughout the USSR with associated shoc confusion and casualties to personnel as well as the rate at which_damage and casualties are inflicted will have an additional cumulative effect on industry essential to the Soviet var effort Although aiming points are selected primarily to focus the damage on specific industries and industrial concentrations it is inevitable that actual damage will be indiscriminate as to types and functions of other instal- lations within the target areas This will affect adversely all phases of Soviet economy and the ability of the Soviet people to carry on effectively with Work nacessary for the prosecution of a war The amount and rate at which damage and personnel casualties are inflicted will also have adverse effects on recuperative measures which will need to be taken to restore order and pro duction essential to the war effort Immediately after each atomic explosion the surviving population in the affected area will he posed many complicated such as simultaneously caring for casualties extinguishing fires restoring essential utilities providing food and shelter and clearing rubble The people will be called upon to meet these problems immediately and at a time when shock and fear are prevalent leadership is handi capped many key personnel are killed or missing and controls are disrupted Each operation will place heavy demands on the available manpower and the effective accomplishment of each will be dependent upon the others The destruction of large numbers of homes will impose lasting hardships on an urban population already overcrowded and existing on a marginal status All of the foregoing tasks will have to be faced before reconstruction of industrial facilities can be undertaken and production restored in whole or in part In the reconstruction of facilities or the restoration of production it is to be remembered that dependence must he placed on other industries and utilities many of which may have been concomitantly damaged I- JCS - 95 Appendix to Enclosure Repladmad Irtln he Undass'r ad I Dedaes 'led Hold'ngs 01 Ihe Naumai Arum er - on 344 if or are suffering from the collateral effects of damage elsewhere The interdependency of all induatries and services is a factor cf importance in normal production in the restoration of damage and in reestablishing production from previously damaged plants The damage personnel casualties and effects therefrom have been estimated on the basic assumption that the initial atomic offensive contemplated in current war plans TROJAN is successfully executed as planned This applies both to the quantity of bombs and the period in which they are delivered Should a lesser number of bombs be actually delivered on targets or the rate of delivery be substantially slower the damageJ casualties and effects would be less Should a larger number of bombs be delivered on the targets and the rate of delivery the same or greater the damage casualties and effects would also be greater In either case reevaluation should be made JCS 195371 - 96 - Appendix to Enclosure Reprocumd run he Undassl ecl I Hotdh'lgs oi Na onal Wives mg erg use 12 1% ANNEX so earthen is T0 moment s L s 0F SOVIET INDUSTRY gramme Losses or ma AREA Basis The war effort which a nation is capable of'exerting is d5Pendent upon the ability of its industry to maximise production essential to carrying on a war Any decrease of industrial output is reflected by'a subsequent reduction in supply of basic equipment and essential consumable supplies to the armed forces The principal objectiVe of the strategic air offensiVeis the destruction of essential elements of the Soviet industrial establishment uwith a View towards reducing and if possible completely stopping production of essential supplies and materials both required by the armed forces and civilian con sumerS The exact extent to which the Soviet industrial capacity Would be reduced by the intial atomic offensive cannot be accurately and completely determined at this time because the intelligence available is insufficient It is generally accepted that practically all Soviet industry is located in or identified with Urban areas whose PGPulation is 50 000 or more If all such Urban areas were to be destroyed and appropriate steps taken to keep such areas in a state of idleness the_industrial capacity of the USSR and therefore its war effort could be reduced to a negligible loyal As a corollary to this if parts of these urban areas are destroyed a percentage of Soviet industrial facilities would be destroyed and many of the skilled workers and management personnel essential to industry would be included in the over all casualties to the population Notable exceptions are oil refineries electric power plants and items of the transportation system While it is realised that the margin of error might be ear seme 'i we 1953 1 155 Annex to appendix to Enclosure II - mm mm lhe Urdassi crll Hclr ngls ul'ihc memes few cities it is considered that the variables should cancel out to reduce the margin of error to acceptable limits when the number of bombs and urban areas inVolwed is large The Intelligence Division of the Department of the Army furnished this committee with measurements of 53 of the TD urban areas listed as objectives in the initial atomic offensive of plan TROJAN Lack of suitable maps prevented the making of accurate measurements for the others When these measure- ments were made the cities were plotted on a denSityrper-Bqu re mile bar graph and it was noted that all of the cities except a few old long-established urban centers as for example Moscow and Leningrad showed a consistent relationship in population density per square mile From this analysis it was found that a coefficient ranging between 0 12 and 0 9 square miles per thousand people could be applied to most of the cities in the USSR For the purposes of this report where it was impossible to measure urban areas from a map a factor of 10 000 persons per sonare mile was used The population of Soviet cities as of January as estimated by the Army Intelligence Division was used From the data furnished it was possible to obtain a reasonable estimate of the Urban area and population of the cities of the U S S R having a population of 50 000 or more An estimate has been made as to the percentage of industry located within the TROJAN cities and the amount in other main cities Two methods were used in determining these percentages First a relationship between the area of the TROJAN cities to the total areas of all cities in the U S S R of 50 000 population or more and second bp'a population ratio It is interesting to note that these tWo_estimates wary only by 10 per cent seaascmac Jcs 1953X1 157 - Annex to appendix Reproduced hunts Dedass'r ed J-Iddicgsof the Malimal Natives The destruction ores of eech bomb wes estimeted as previously discussed in Appendix G to Biolosure and totaled A detailed study'wes made of each tsr et and it use noted that the area of expected destruction of each bomb in many cases includes considerable water surface In arriving at the total destruction srec these non-productive water dress approxi mately were excluded The estimated destroyed cred divided by the total Urban ares Within the TRUJEE cities was taken es an index of the destruction which might be expected on the Soviet industry within these cities end of Soviet industry es a whole In reaching its conclusion the committee used an over pressure of 5 pounds per square inch es a measure for the arcs of Class-A damage An estimate of 20 000 persons killed per bomb was used to arrive at an estimate of the total deaths which will result from the atomic offensive The figure of 20 000 is felt to be reasonably conservative in the light of experience st Hiroshima and the computed population densities of cverege Soviet cities Corresponding ccsuslties to personnel by burns wounds or other causes would be about 30 000 per bomb These rates might be subject to downward revision depending upon the effectiveness of Soviet passive defense measures which are discussed in Appendix to Enclosure AREA AND POPULATION Other GitiEs TRUJAN 50 000 or more Cities Populetionl_ Square miles of Urboh Areo 1 751 866 Population 28 080 000 8 660 000 Pounds per squsre inch overpressure is the pressure in the blast - wave in excess of atmospheric i e l4 pounds per square inch psi overpressure equals 576 pounds_pressure per square foot in excess of normal pressure on surface facing a blast wave 8 psi equals 1152 pounds per square foot overpressure etc we 1953 1 158 Annex to Appendix to Enclosure 1 Repmduoed from I112 Unclassi ed Hm of mumsamm irrsuplx g ho crossover AN APPRAISAL OF THE PSEUHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ATOMIC BOMBING UPON THE SOVIET WILL TO WAGE WAR 222 In this appraisal there are many statements which to a degree balance each other This is necessary in order to portray the complex and frequently contrasting Russian character its history and development Hones the ap- praisal should he considered as a Whole and single state- ments should not he considered out of context Historical Background The Autocratic Tradition The U S S R has developed from and is now composed of a large number of races ethnic groups and former small nations Individually and collectively they have fought severe_hattles against nature among themseIVee and against foreign pouers The country has been overrun by Mongols and deeply penetrated but not completely overcome by Western European nations The Russhalpeople have undergone many transformations and they are 'thoroughly indoctrinated in'autocratic traditions The Czars introduced autocratic rule that has provided a frame for poten tial greatness and a prevailing unity for the Rusaiultmtioh which has carried through to the present time The physical isolation of Russia from the trading centers of Western Europe and the world has been paralleled by her spiritual and cultural isolationi Russia as a whole has been cut off generally from the influences which have on- riched the life and rred the devalopment of the western world She has been associated with conditions which have in- fluenced the development of hard stolid and ruthless character istics among the people and their leaders Historically the have maintained strong armies to support their military position and since its advent to power the Communist govern ment has maintained strong military forces and-bashed them up with an expanding program of industrializationaa 1953 1 - 154 lppeneix toiEnclosure I Rapmduoc d from lhe Urdassi ed Dedasailed OHM Ne onal NIT- mas The Russ um are assent iy an unsophisticated gregarious people readily susceptible to propaganda and rumor They are a pkradoxical combination of primitive simplicity and stoic ruth less Urientalism In groups once aroused they have been cap- able of almost superhuman'tasks l With their patriarchal traditssa the masses of the people hays followed their leaders with child like confidence and unswerving loyaltyr This has not precluded the upsurge of leaders with revolutionary tendencies against the governmentf Rusaia has accomplished and can accomplish again political and social evolutions dangerous to world peacei provided the autocratic power is preserved -and the people remain politically passiver The actual philosophy of the modern U S 5sH -is something to which Karl Marx and dialectical materialism have made a con tribution but it is made up of other elements including those of Orthodox Christianity and traditional Russian sentiment It must be recognized that we face in the U S S R today two strong forces -- that of militant communism and that of strong Russian nationalism Each force would have a powerful influence on Soviet actions in le event of war The vast mass of the have never dreamed of enjoying democracy and freedom as enjoyed by Western peoples Their primary interests have been the problems of obtaining a day-tG day existence and nothing more In general they are and have been barred from knowledge of better conditions They desire economic security social levelling and the prestige of the Russidlnation and these it seems to them they now ex perience in a larger measure than in the pre-revolutionary period Precisely how wide and how deep was the sentiment of Great Russian patriotism in the pro-revolution nation it is not easy to say Patriotism toward the State was perhaps neither wide nor deep On the other hand patriotism of a mystictl entity of Mother Russia has been consistently both widespread and i JCS 1953 1 165 Appendix to Etc losure Ropinduoed hernias Unde ned 1 of Ibo mums Memes new girl a TOP secret him persistent It is exemplified by the historical shrines of Moscow and Leningrad and the hope of many Great Russians to see Leningrad and to live and die in Moscow The Great-Russian people have formed organized and ad- ministered successfully certain primitive aggregations their patriarchal family village communes and even larger units Within these groups there has been complete freedom of expression and argumentative debate but each group has had an authoritative head Ir The people have normally concluded these debates without firm decisions among themselves for decisions are considered the prerogatives of their leaders It is immaterial to them that their democratic procedures arermm translated from small organ- izations to the larger political bodies and to the political problems of State since each unit family commune or region is traditionally under authoritative discipline and control In certain respects at the present time the Soviet govern ment tolerates self-criticism at agitation meetings and meet ings of factorysSoviets considerable argument and debate on ads ministrative matters are permitted but never to the point that the policy or decisions of the recognised leaders and the Com- munist Party are questioned In Russin there are many ex- amples of a degree of democracy on the lower plane which might prove eventually to be the germs for democracy on the higher the national plane So far the mass of Russian people continue to be an amenable group who_are convinced of their duty of sub- mission to their masters They possess a blind faith in leaders and their decisions Even though a decision is not in accord with the peoples wishes they accept it with the conviction that their wishes were considered but their leaders knew what was best and have done what was right The Soviet totalitarian state is firmly established upon the foregoing historical characteristics with variances to permit many traditions and Czarist customs to be adapted to modern demands Stalin enjoys prestige and a position_ of greatness icomparable to the former Gears their Little White Father in the Kremlin i - $55 - Appendix to Enclosure 0 I1I 1 Room-ducal from the Unclassi ed Declassi ed Holdings ollhe sec-ear -- I Er- Although not a Great-Russian ghe has risen from among the working people All decisions of the'Soviet government are considered to emanate from Stalin even though in reality they_have been pre- pared and disseminated by any government agency in keeping with Stalin s policy or the directives of the Politburo and the Com munist Party The majority of the people do not belong and have no aspire atiens to belong to the Communist Party The Communist Party relieves the Russian people from the undesired_hurden of re- sponsibility for decision and administration on matters of State Soviet leadership is undoubtedly in control of both govern- ment and the people and has never seriously miscalculated what the people would tolerate The organization for propaganda and agitation issues propaganda but at the same time maintains through agitation meetings a unique nation-wide poll of the peoplesE reaction and attitude toward government policies The government sanipulates its policies and executive action skill fully based upon this knowledge The Russian people currently have a standard of living that is low when compared with the West but probably higher than the conditions existing during prerrevolutionary times The people enjoyed a better standard of living in 1938 but were forced to abandon it to prepare for war They submissively accept their present conditions as temporary while war damage is repaired and industrial development is attained Their lives in the past and present have been eternally filled with many promises and the people still hope that these premises will be fulfilled The past war and their enemies are blamed for their present condi tion while their government is icyally supported for achieving victory and taking the constructive steps to provide for their welfare The main themes for propaganda are developed around fear hope Itlove and hate The Soviets use fear iand hope most frequently and effectively sourcesof strength but propaganda and force are the two dominating instrue ments Propaganda conditious the people to accept dud support the I - - 167 - Appendix to Enclosure Reproduced lrum I1s Urucbssi'ted Dedassl ed Holdings o1 lh-E he sscaEd'I 1 171- ll i zerivernment whiie force can a fear of fo ee serve to keep otherwise non conformi ts ins ine_ Those who complain or fail to conform are quickly remcv and re educated Lessons from World War 11 Russia was saved from German conquest not by her modern progress but rather by the vastness of her territory and the tenacity of her people The Germans underrated the Red Army German hopes of victory were built largely on the prospect that the invasion would produce a political upheaval in Russia Most of the German generals realized beforehand that if the Russians chose to fall back there was little chance of achieving a final victory without the help of such a political upheaval Too high hopes were built on the belief that Stalin would be overs thrown by his own people if he suffered heavy defeats The Russians have proven that they can absorb heavy casualties and extensive withdrawals in the field without having it cause politi- cal overturn The Germans paid a terrific price for their lack of foresight The Germans were outmaneuvered by the significant Russian custom of repeatedly giving ground rather than letting themselves be drawn into decisive battles such as the Germans were seeking The Germans failed to assess properly the Rmniur mentality and to assess properly'Russian weaknesses Red Army officers and men were forced by discipline andf haunted by a real fear which caused them to carry out their orders implicitly or individually to suffer the consequences Impelled_ by courage ruthlessness and stringent military and political discipline the Red Army executed its orders to retreat to hold fast or to advance regardless of the loss of human life Once the Red Army took the offensive Russian troops never failed to advance encept when stopped locally and temporarily by heavy German fire for they were driven forward under the compulsion of Officers Political representatives were ready to turn their pistols on anyone who shirkhd l The men were embued with an offensive spirit in outstahding characteristic of the Russian soldier is his soulies% indif- ference to life and deaths Red Army troops are hard and frequently cruel in their behavior II JCS - 163 - Appendix J to Enflosure Remduoad run Its Unuassilied Estimated Holdings ollhe Hakim Aretha or' a German General Nanteuffg described the Red Army on the offensive as follows The advance of auEussian Army is something that westerns can't imagine Behind the tank spearheads rolls on a vast horde largely mounted on horses The soldier carries a sack on his hackI with dry crusts of bread and raw vegetables collected on the march from the fields and villages The horses eat the straw from the house roofs they get 1 little else The Russians are accustomed to carry on for as weeks in this primitive way wnen advancing You can't stop them like an ordinary army by cutting their communications for you rarely find any supply columns to strike Destruction by Bombing Industry The Russian people have been continuously reminded that their sacrifices since 191 are necessary in order to permit their leaders to develop an industrial potential comparable with that of the West and to prepare for war or to repair war damaged Russians have been led to believe that their standard of living and daily struggle to survive will be more readily solved as the established industrial goals are attained In 1937 and 1938 Russians began to taste a little prosperity- At present they are led on by the hope that real prosperity is in the offing The loss of their industry for which they have sacrificed so much would be a real blow to their hopes and future plans for personal security The perpetrator of such destruction night veil incur all the hatred resentment and antagonism that Russians of the past have felt toward their enemies Cities Russian history is replete with instances of a scorched earth policy The peoples of Central Europe con- sider an invading Russian Army and wanton destruction by fire as synonymous Russians have readily set fire to sir own cities rather than allow them to be sacked by eLemy A good example of such action was the burning of MoscPw in 1812 Of all their cities Moscow and Leningrad house the symbols of JCS 1953X1 169 Appondix to - I Flepmduoodimmhe Unclas ed f Dedassilisd Homage c1 Ihe new Archives a5 autocracy and paternalism they have traditionally depended for decision and dirEction This has developed a degree of sacredness for these cities which is identified with their mystical entity of national patriotism - The Russians will burn their own cities to deny them to the enemy but the enemy who destroys their towns villages and historical shrines can expect a_violent reaction with the result that the people would unflinchingiy rally and even accept internal tyranny in preference to any abuse by a foreigner Hrhan Population Among the various groups of peasants worker and artisans there are many differences which are essentially petty in nature Word of wanton destruction of urban poprlationsmauld quickly spread and become exaggerated by rumor tnroighout the However antagonism against the enemy would tend to develop a unity of purpose a loyalty to the regime and a renewed vow to defend Mother Russia -a spirit of which would transcend their differences The penning of seventy Russian cities as planned may have a terrific shock effect upon all the people of Russia Subjected or in sites roxinity to this bombing would be some 28 000 000 people approxiaitely one-seventh of the population of Russia with possible prospect of some 2 500 000 mortalities Within these urban populations are the technicians and the reservoir of manpower upon which the success of Russian industrial development depends - 0n the other hand it should be borne in mind that in World war II Leningrad withstood a eeige of two years Public utilities did not function for months thousands of people starved and the population as a whole survived with the most meagre of ccnsumnable supplies that were indigenous to the area work went on in spite of starvation and bombardment In spite of over 350 000 casualties -Leningrad never oapitulated A sim- ilar ordeal was experienced at Stalingrad and to a lesser degree at Moscow - all The Foreigner Complex Russian history has been continually dominated by strong foreign influences Since 1800 almost every generation has ig 5'371 - 17o Happendix to Enclosure J's Remodeled from I Dedassi sd Hnidhg's of H16 Nausea Natives up - experienced an invasion oxia f eign army Gears invited and permitted foreign experts t% hold responsible positions in their regimes Russian foreign policy encouraged and condoned marriages of nobility to foreigners as a means of settling inter- national differences and advancing the spheres of influence of the Russian empire Prior to 1917 the Russian economy and resources were often exploited administered and owned by foreigners Foreign capital was invested in Russia and the profits from thess investments were distributed abroad Subse- quent to 191 the communist Party through propaganda has con vinced the Russian people that their past sufferings were the direct result both of the Czars' ineptitude and the intentional designs of foreign capitalists The pernicious influence of foreigners on Russian progress and welfare has been emphasized to the Russian people To the average Russian Foreigner and Capitalist are synonymous and repugnant There is evidence that today those Americans who have been permitted to travel within the are received by the people in a friendly hospitable manner to the extent that these people can overcome fear of the police Observers also report an im- pression that anti American propaganda is not as generally effec- tive as was the former anti German propaganda There seems to I be a noticeable skepticism regarding anti American propaganda among the Russian people There is apparently a considerable reservoir of friendliness among the people toward the United States residual from lend lease activities Heavy and extensive bombing by the U S would certainly be a valuable adjunct to Soviet anti U S propaganda and play into the hands of the Soviet regime The Russian people would more readily believe that their government has been telling them the truth with the result that Russian resentment and antagonism would be easily developed and intensified against the United States Their traditional suspicions with regard to foreigners would be confirmed and focused upon the United States The Communist Party and the Secret Police The Communist Party controls and dominates everything in the U S S R The ubiquitous secret-police assisted by agents and informers forces complete subjugation of the people to the will of the leaders of the party ear secess- JCS 1953 1 171 -Appendix to Enclosure Reproduced tom It Undass rfed ascended Holdings ol the shoals-chives TUP SECRET 1 The MUD and their assistants permeate everything appear to know all and collect and maintain voluminous records about everyone with no distinction with regard to age class sex family or official position Within the confines of the U S S R it is a serious mistake for anyone to feel that he is not observed by the MVD The more important the individual and the higher the position to which one is assigned the more carefully and thoroughly is the surveillance that each indivi dual receives The MVD are quick and ruthless in eXecution of their duties The Politburo Central Committee of the Party and the center of government in Moscow are far removed from the people The leaders of the nation are not and must not be criticized Appointments are made and nominations for election to public office throughout the countrp arc approved by the leaders in Moscow All subordinates expect and look for guidance directives decisions and orders that emanate from 'Mosccw and Moscow only The regional government of the Soviet Republics are in closer contact with their people The regional administrav tions can be and are criticised by the people The nature of the criticisms usually are restricted to problems of mice management and'failure to execute properly the orders and decisions receiVed from Moscow Regional administrations authorise many community privileges as well as execute numerous governmental functions They work slowly but thoroughly and are highly dependent upon decisions from the central government They must continually strive to meet local' problems and at the same time to perpetrate the Moscow Party line Their use of propaganda and force is in consonance with and fully as severe as that exercised from Masons JCS 1953 1 1T2 Appendix to Enclosure lheUnt Jassf sdJ' Decfass Tm Holl 'rgs oi Na unal ease The People The People the masses in general exist on a marginal basis They are interested solely in making their living and not in participating in the complicated problems of a national or international political ideology They are grateful to their government for whatever they may be granted The only prospective path toward human betterment and emoluments from the cradle to the grave lies in qualifying or becoming identified with and developing as a member of the Party Even at that Party membership is relatively small for many reasons with poor roads with rail as the only available means of distant travel and with_police check on every move people are generally local in their interests and know little except what is told them about the outer worldu-perfect subjects for totalitarian propaganda Russian character has contradictory features 0n the one hand the Russian can be good natured helpful loyal hospitable and trustworthy but on the other hand he is primitive suspicious cunning cruel brutal and even ferocious A Russian loves his country intensely and is easily hurt by deprecating criticism He willingly endures severe treatment provided he is alloved to live his own life Soviet rulers are obviously aware that while the Russians are in the main loyal to their ovn government as 'against any foreign government the regime as such inspires little enthusiasm except among its direct beneficiaries The wartime acts of Soviet rulers haVe shown that these rulers knew that if they were to demand from the people superhuman efforts against the invader it would have to be in the name of Russian patriotism and not of devotion to the_Communiat Party is a matter of expediency the Party was pushed into the background and the Army exalted It Was only when victory was in sight that the Party Was restored to the foreground in i JOB 1953 1 - 173 ' ppendix tb Enclosure I I - v I - tum Its Holings cl lilo Namnatmmwe 1 '5 I IL I TOP senses to receiwe the applause The Soviet gowernment appears to realize fully the capabilitiet limitations and reactions of the people under its domination The 0 3 Voice of America has occasioned curious interest among the people of the U S S R and there is evidence of its widespread reception The contents of these programs which are in such contrast with Soviet propaganda produce considerable mental confusion among its listeners To the Russian there is no proof as to which propaganda is correct and the RusSian is cempletely incapable of imagining that many standardsportrayed by the Voice of America can actually exist The Russians are interested in local matters of ewery day importance Their ignorance_of the outside world has made them submissive subjects for propaganda Exposure of members of the Armed Forces to western ciwiliaation is carefully controlled and is invariably followed by re-indoctrination other countermeasures to enforce ideological discipline are the retention of wires and children as hostages while the husband is abroad requiring that only married men he permitted on certain assignments and limiting their periods of such duty Evan in Russia itself when people in industry travel to new jobs in new localities their service records must accompany them and the police are continuously aware of their movements There is some evidence to indicate that the Soviet regime is much worried concerning the continued loyalty of its people The acceptance among their people of the Communist ideology may be wearing thin To counteract this the leaders of Communist parties abroad have been required recently to voice new oaths of fealty to Stalin and World Communism There is actiVe prosecution of programs of re-indoctrination in Communist ideology throughout Russia 1nd JCS 1953 1 - 1T4 - Appendix to Enclosure Haywood from the Undassl ed Dedaai iad Holdings Na nalmdihes 'rot assess II The fairly constant trickle of Russians seeking asylum in the west further suggests that inside the Soviet Union there is not the same total ignorance of conditions of the outside world that previously preVailed among the Russian people But on the whole it most he admitted that proPaganda and censorship exercised by the Soviet gooernment has a better chance to continue to reach anddominate the mass of the Russian people than has propaganda from the western world Control-was widespread geographically as it is as binding and hidden as it is with such widespread inertia of submissiveness traditionally ingrained in the people with doubtful ability on our part to get at the mess of the people with justifiable and understandable explanation as to our motive for so ruthlessly destroying their industry and killing their peOple in the hearts of their country by strategic bombingr could destroyed other than temporarily and in areas of panic and hysteria Among the people there would certainly be the feeling that nothing their government could have done could warrant bringing such punishment by us upon them Soviet propaganda has already laid the groundwork for this attitude The government would immediately seize all radios in the event of war as it did in Wor1d War IIJ and would be able to retain communication initiatiVe throughout'the interior of Russia This could not be overcome until by some means or other the Allies established dominating ground control Resistance Elements Resistance groups have neVer seriously threatened the Soviet government's control of any large area although the have caused cocasional disruption of normal activity in various districts of the U S S R such as the Crimean and Ukrainian movement after World War II If --H HEELEEGHET 3 J05 1953 l 175 - Appendix tp Enclosure epmdumd mm the Unclassi ed Declass isd all its - I '1 - 1 - SECRET as If Police countermeasurds are usually very effective and expeditiously executed Planned genocide and forceful transfers of population resettlement and similar dispersals of the ethnic groups involved has been pursued effectively by the government in almost every case of dissidence or defection among national entities In most instances these ethnic groups have been more concerned with survival than political ambitions The composition of recalcitrant bands is heterogeneous with the membership including many escaped Soviet Army deserters criminals and political outlaws who are generally more concerned with their own survival than with political aims Militarily impotent in their isolation and politically uninterested these groups are too small and too poorly organr ized to assume control of their own national area let alone the government of the entire country They would represent a liability rather than an asset in the establishment of new Russian government after a collapse of the Soviet system On the basis of available evidence there is neither an organised nor a projected underground movement in the U S S R Nana can be expected to develop in a country where the ubiquitous_MVD permeate eVery phase of life and its most personal problems Under this system an underground can only be nurtured among groups of the MVD or within the Red army Forces Within these organisations in the past isolated cases of defection have developed but subsequently haVe been destroyed with immediate drastic purges There are no signs of deterioration within the Armed Forces or Soviet police at the present thus Political administrators within the Armed Forces are alert to detect any evidence of defection and their surveillance is very efficient and effective I somerse- JCS 1953 1 lT Appendix I ts Enclosure Hawoduosd mm to Undassifudi Dudmsiied HDJd'I'rgs of Ihn Malional Archives TOP SECRET Resistance elements taduire capable leadership and careful planning - There is little opportunity to groom leaders within the U B S R for resistance activities Foreigners Russians living in exile or Russians contaminated by ForeignersH are the only potential Sources that are available for leaders However Russians living in exile have lost close contact with internal Soviet conditions and they can be concidered as no longer acceptable as leaders to the Russian people who have remained at home worked and sacrificed with the aspirations of establishing a new Mother Russia as one of the dominant nations of the worldi The Combat Forces If invasion by the Russians into Western Europe or the Middle East is initiated preceding or coincident with mass bombing of the interior of Russia there are seVeral important factors to be considered First the stockpiled military supplies within the perimeter of Russia or in satellite countries will not have been destroyed by the planned atomic offensive Second reports of widespread damage to industries cities and people within the Soviet Union will be slow in reaching the combat forces through their own channels Reports resulting from allied efforts will initially be discounted by Russian control elements and represented to be exaggerated or war prepaganda Third the Soviet forces will have been committed to invasion and the lucrative prospects of conquest will be tempting Fourth Party representatives for execution and establiShnent of political control are ever present uith invading forces It is possible that with time some defection might oEcur muong Soviet trOops and on some fronts there might even be mass surrender of troops and people such as in White Russia and the Ukraine during World War II However it would appear as JCS 1953 1 177 Appendix to Enclosure gap icgi '15 that realization of ultimate lack of strength and shortage In IE of military supplies would be slow in penetrating to troops at the front Considering their practical ruthless stoical and realistic nature and their susceptibility to propaganda from their own official sources it appears doubtful that mutiny would occur Their neechevo nothing matters attitude coupled with political control Should prevent initiative on the part of individuals to the extent required to stinulate mob action It is quite possible that the realization of the extent of destruction being inflicted within their own country combined with Soviet propaganda would spur them_on in an attempt to gain control of European economy more rapidly as their ultimate prospect of salvation a balancing factor which should also be considered is the influence on the Soviet High Command of prospective shortages of essential military supplies and-logistic means for the support of planned combat operations It must be realised'thatthe Soviet Army would operate in_accordance with directives of the Politburo This agency would be quick to re- estimate the situation in the light of damage being inflicted on Soviet industry by the atomic offensive Advice by the military might or might not be considered by the Politburo in such an evaluation In either event it is probable that the Politburo would be forced to come to the conclusion that it would be necessary to postpone or even abandon at least temporarily certain planned operations and to modify the strength direction and objectives of their main invasion efforts It would appear that decision as to how far the combat forces would be permitted to advance would be predicated on a combination of military and political interests f JCS 1953 1 178 Appendix to Enclosure Reproduwd lhe Unclassi ed JDedassiflad Holdings ul'die Na analmhfes r-d 51 1 J n3 Ea Satellites Satellite countries of the are not targets for n-hombing in the contemplated plans Disaffection toward the U S S R is very prevalent much deeper and more widespread in the satellites than within the Under ground movements and subversive activities in various stages of development exist in every satellite The people of the satellites are now and in event of war would be accessible and to a considerable degree amenable to Allied news and comments They have had sufficient contact with or have been previously oriented to the Western World therefore they are more understanding and tractable with respect to the Allies and their objectives Rather than possessing an inertia toward liberationt1 theLmere hOpe of being able to cast off the yoke of the would undoubtedly generate many overt acts to allied advantage as the satellite people become aware of the possibility of their prospective release from bondage These people are experiencing daily trials and tribulations under political oppression dictated from Moscow The Communists although a minority group in each satellite maintain control using the tactics of the Kremlin Large numbers of satellite citizens particularly from Poland and Czechoslovakia hava been outside the confines of the U S S R sphere of influence Some have refused to return to their own country while others have done so reluctantly with a hope that liberation from the Soviet yoke may soon he achieved In general these people desire liberation Nevertheless they fear the ravages of a war There is an atmosphere of fear and anxiety among the people who are gradually being reduced to a standard of living comparable to that of the Ups-5 3 When and if liberation comes these people will require guidance and leadership not only in world ef airs but also on domestic problems - a 179 Appendix to Enclosure Heartwood from Ihe Unclassi ed Dedass led Hcl ngs of 11m Naihrnl masts TOP scones a 314 Considerable evidence'e fsts to support the thought that upon receipt of reliable reports of the destructive bombing offensiva within the these people will instigate widespread sabotage and that guerrilla movements will arise throughout the area The destruction and confusion thus wrought would materially hamper the Soviet invasion effort The degree and rate at which these activities would affect the morale of the Russian invasion troops or would penetrate by seepage back into the U S S R itself with possible effect upon control in such areas as the Ukraine the Baltic States etc is a question which is so balanced by factors of the moment that it cannot be judged at this tine shoes Effect of A Bomb There is marked contrast between the effect of the bombing offensives of World Her II and the intense shock and offset to be expected from the atomic offensive as presently planned The former consisted of a progressive type of bombing build ups with several shifts in general objectives bombing patterns and some promisonna raids The latter provides for concentration upon industrial capacity within some seventy principal U S 3 R urban areas with consequent damage to the people of those areas within a period of 30 days It is possible that the shock and effect would be so thorough and crippling as to nullify temporarily all the factors previously discussed Certainly temporary numbness frustration chaos confusion and despair would be prevalent Panic and possibly considerable hysteria might be expected to develop Once news of the effects of bombing has been established as factual the fear of similar bombing would be generated in other industrial centers This could precipitate a mass exodus of workers from-such areas or a- ass essence - 363 1953 1 180 Appendix to Enclosure B Reprodumo 1mm 1qu Undassl od I I'thd'Ings 0 er Naml mama RP - 2-m- our new a at least cause censiderable cdnfusion and loss in productiye potential Rumor and gossip once initiated would probably ex- aggerate actual damage and chaotic conditions and in due time it would spread to all sections of the U E S R without being completely stifled by government and MED countermeasures The U S S R with its relatively new industrial structure can ill-afford to lose its skilled workers technicians fore menJI plant managers and industrial administrators Technicians and plant managers appear to be among the weakest links in the U B S R industrial Structure The majority of these key per sonnel indispensable to vital industries are located in the urban centers new potential targets of the bombing offensive A large percentage of key personnel might be killed or scattered by the direct effects of the bombs and the resultant conflagrar tions Their families as well might be largely destroyed or disintegrated by maiming death or flight Death and major casualties might amount to as many as five million people who are now concentrated in the selected target areas although these seventy urban areas are few when compared with the total number of cities and towns in the U S S R never- thelesS they are critical industrially and widely scattered geographically and contain 28 000 000 people Rumors and stories readily exaggerated by repetition and travel would hare some effect and could augment fear of further bombing of anything and everything deemed by the people to be critical or of military value The 28 000 000 people exposed in the seventy cities about one-seventh of the population of the would have experienced personal contact with the effects of the bombing It is a rather ghastly picture -for the moments-as we imagine the prospect of bringing about a possible liquidation of the Politburo and the Communist hierarchy even though such liquidation is highly improbable One of the nay-or fears of an see assess ' Jcs 195371 181 - Annex to Enplosure i i I I he Uruassi edi Dedassl ed Heidi-ms of In Na msl Motives -4 TOP 3 the Politburo is a defeat iniaar and their subsequent forced capitulation It is this fear that drives them to greater as cesses against their own people Should a capitulation of the Communist hierarchy materialize the degree of change in the ingrained attitude of the Russian people toward foreigners is very problematioal There is sufficient reason to believe that their immediate resentment would be intense it might re- quire the efforts of the Allies for generations to overcome this resentment and antagonism Even shOuld this extreme result be approximated that in reality actually would be accomplished In essence would be the principal immediate gain in shioh to build up stronger Allied resistance to any Soviet invasion efforts j ggf in which to organize-and implement Allied ground offense with less interference from the Soviet timg in which to initiate the establishment of Allied controls of some sort Assuming that the U 3 S R may be temporarily rendered materialb incapable of offensive action while its people are in a be wildered frustrated and despairing mental condition these factors must be considered - g Its people will have been deprived of that which has provided them the meagre margins of livelihood which they have so far been able to possess at great personal sacrifice 3 Neither the roots of Communist ideology nor the ins struments for its perpetrationr propaganda and force- will have been destroyed g Communism thrives where chaos and confusion reign g In the philosophy of Gommunism the end justifies the means and time itself is no object in the final accomplish ment of Communist ahms Underlined for emphasis assessme it's 1'95EFI - 182 Appendiic at to Enclosure E Harrow-Iced From Its Um FDotiassi ed Holdings title 2 - I Counteracting factors m ich would diminish the severity of such an extreme situation are intensive defensive training and propaganda programs within the U S S R the_extensive police control and the stolid characteristics of the Russian people In reality it appears that a situation will have been created which is susceptible of ultimate development in one or a combination of possibly three ways complete anarchy in the absence of any dominant central control or into feudal states based upon surviving regional control elements Reconstitution of the communist state based upon sur- viving elements of the present central and regional govern ments and operating centrally from an undestroyed locality g menability or cooperatiwe effort in certain U S S R areas toward types of government of the peoples own choosing in accordance with Western allied objectives This develop- ment presupposes interim allied ground control which would need to be established immediately subsequent to the bombing before Soviet controls could be reinforced and which would be capable of implementing its objectives and proCedures among an initially suspicious and largely resentful people masses of them harassed by hardship and starvation Conclusions The Gommittee concludes that successful execution of the initial atomic offensive as planned will have the following effects on the Soviet will to wage war a It would seriously disrupt temporarily and impair in- definitely the mechanisms of civil and military control It probably would not destroy the roots of Communist ideology or critically weaken the power of Soviet leadership to control and dominate the people reread-see - 'J os 195371 133 - nppendix tozEnclosure 't 'ui Dahss cd Hoidings ol I113 E'mwl - I fratwould not turn thelmajority of the people against their government but would in general unify them and in- tensify their will to wage war It would validate in the minds of the majority Soviet propaganda with regard to the intentions of foreigners to destroy the U SLS B Intensified resentment Would persist for an indeterminate period g The will of an indeterminate minority to wage war will undoubtedly be weahened and certain elements will attempt to take advantage of the situation but neither of these in- fluences would be likely to develOp to such an extent as to produce critical effect upon the total Soviet war effort 2 Temporarily it will create a widespread chaotic situa- tion among the people particularly in the urban areas This situation may well cause a high degree of absenteeism and disorganization in industries essential to the war effort This would force modification of Soviet invasion plans and in time adversely affect the morale of the Soviet armed forces En It will create within the U S S R a crisis which could be turned to advantage by the Allies through early and effective exploitation by armed forces and warfare Failing prompt and effective ex- ploitation the opportunity would be lost and subsequent Soviet reactions would adversely affect the accomplishment of Allied objectives Any demoralising effect among Soviet invasion troops will be of a delayed nature and will be dependent upon the fruits of their early invasion efforts 5- It would open the field and set the pattern for all adversaries to use any weapons of mass destruction and might be expected to result in maximum retaliatory measures within Soviet capabilities JGS 195371 - 184 Rammed hon'l he UndasiTad Dadassi ad Haldilgs of the Malimal SECRET s we -r reports of results of the atomic offensive reach the people of Soviet satellite countries both their sabotage'of Soviet control en military effort and their partisan coopera- tion toward Allied objectives can be expected to increase with the hope of throwing off the Soviet yoke Tor-seeme J s 195371 - 185 - Appendix J to Enclosure Renowned run he Unda i edlwassifed Holdings 0 he Ne'llmal Archives 1 saw il gr 3 HET gigd g 0 1 5 EFFECT OF THE INITIAL ATOMIC OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE THE SOEIET ERMED FORCES 1 General In Plan and supporting current intelligence esti mates the U S S R is credited with capabilities and intentions which would involve early rapid advances into extensive areas of western Europe the Middle East and the Far East _ Such operations are portrayed as being generally concurrent or phased to be in consonance with logistic capabilities Refer to Appendix to Enclosure Principal reliance for the success of these advances is placed upon the Soviet Army supported by the Navy and Air Force although there would be operations of more independent nature performed by the latter two services These would include submarine and mine warfare against Allied sea communications air defense of the U E E R and offensive air operations against the United Kingdom and to a limited degree against the United States 2 The Soviet Army 3 It has been judged generally that the-Soviet Army is at this time the most poverful in the world Intelligence estimates indicate e_strength of 2 500 0e0 men with 27 to 28 million males in the 3 5 3 R fit for military service of which probably 11 000 000 are presently trained Both in personnel and equipment it appears that the Soviet mobiliza- ticn potential far exceeds estimated requirements for the operations envisaged to be necessary for the attainment of their objectives In character of organization and equip- ment Soviet trends have been strongly toward greater mobility and fire power with augmentation of motor trans- port armored forces tanks and self-propelled artillery t3 Joe 1953 1 - 186 App ndix Kn Reproduced mm the UMN Unclassi ed Hm of H18 Naiionz Archives 4 35These trends will place greater dependence upon fuel and heavy industr within the U S S R Continuous training has overcome disruptive post war effects and enhanced the readiness of combat and logistic support elements E Intelligence estimates show that in most categories of weapons and basic equipment the Soviet Army is well supplied and that stockpiles of basic equipment and con sumable supplies are located in border areas or satellite countries for intended campaigns As to industrial support of its armed forces the U S S R includes three important industrial areas viz Russia proper the southern area com- prising the Ukraine and Transcaucasia and Eastern Siberia -P each in general sufficiently integrated and self-sustaining to support military operations from those areas This results in wide dispersion of industry and serves to ease the burden from railroad lines connecting these large and widely separated areas White the distribution of stock piles and their level in many instances is unknown con- sidered estimates show that in tanks guns vehicles food and anmunition awnilable supplies are adequate to support the forces estimated to be required for the duration of opera- ticns necessary for each campaign in Continental Europe the Middle East and the Far East These estimates are predicated on expenditures and wastage likely to be experienced in combat with allied or indigenous forces which could he brought to hear in time rms and equipment either with the armed forces or in supply dumps will not be affected by the initial atomic offensive as planned 2- The item estimated to he most critical from the stand point of the Soviet Army is fuel for vehicles tanks and self-propelled weapons The initial atomic offensive will materially reduce production of these fuels within the g _ ge gf is 105 195321 187 appendix Remodeled Irum the LII-desalted orths Nathrel wives I - 1-1U S S R Refer to Annerrna _to appendix to Enclosure an _ The actual level of Army stockpiles is unknown With increasing emphasis on fire power and mechanization petroleum requirements for the Soviet Army will increase more rapidly than the capacity to satisfy them Minimum fuel requirements for the Soviet Army in western Europe can be met partially from Roumanian fields These sources are not presently targets for the initial atomic offensive If Soviet forces overrun the Middle East they may obtain partial alleviation of fuel shortages by exploiting oil from that area even assuming Allied damage to refineries or inter diction of sources By and large the supply of motor fuel is expected to become critical and should force the U S S H to be extremely parsimonious in their use of motorised equipment g The most critical rail transportation bottlenecks in movement of supplies to the rest are twelve rail trans- shipment points along the western border of the U S S R These points are not targets for the initial atomic offen- sive as planned Critical transportation centers in cities within the U S S R would be disrupted temporarily however by the atomic bombing and much damage would occur to rail road equipment and repair facilities This would interfere with mobilization and would slow down shipments of troops and supplies to the armed forces Refer to Annex to to Enclosure 5 Tactical air support for the army plays an important and extensive part in Soviet military doctrine The initial atomic offensive will inflict severe damage on the Soviet-aircraft and aircraft engine industries and to refineries for high-test aviation gasoline Refer to annexes and to appendix to Enclosure This damage will quickly force the Soviet command to be highly selective and to reduce drastically'commitm ntzof aviation for ground support I mos seem - 188 lawn -o - Reproduced from the Undassifsd Dedassl ed Hoid'mgs oi me Nah mslArchiues E In the longer term the Soviet Army should bel increasingly handicapped by the shortage of various critics items occasioned by the damage from atomic bombing in the USSR by interruption of transportation and interference with organization for production logistic support and flow of trained replacement personnel These effects in con junction with the shortage of motor fuel and air support will progressively diminish the effectiveness and partic ularly the mobility of the orist Army The time at which the dimunition in effectiVBness and mobility occur is going t0 depend on the attrition from resistance encountered in Gempaigns as well as from the effects of the atomic of- fensiva on the USSR 3 The Soviet Navy g The strength composition and deployment of the Soviet Navy are set forth in detail in ABAI-S Surface air and submarine elements are assigned to fleets in three major geographical areas The Baltic-Arctic Seas the Black See and the Far East These fleets are generally balanced as to composition although the fdrces in Northern Europe and the Far East are each about twice the size of those in the Black Sea Overvall strength is comprised of 15 large ships 123 light combatant ships 2000 miscellaneous landing craft and minor combatant types and about 275 submarines The Soviet Naval nir Force has about shoe-3000 planes Personnel strength of the Navy is approximately 600 000 including 275 000 coast defense troops 0n mobilization personnel strength would probably increase to 800 000 men Significant augmentation of combatant ships except for submarines is likely to be impracticable in the early phases of a war b The principal tasks of the Soviet Navy would be first to support the Soviet army in its campaigns and in defense of the and second to interdiot Allied sea gommunications appendix 105371 - 189 Reproduced Iran the Undassl cd Wed Holdings of the Nammrd'mes a minwith submarines and minesrr In initial operations against Turkey and Scandanavia and to a lesser degree in the Far East much reliance would be placed on the Navy to transport cover and support the Red Army Thereafter requirements would continue to develop for patrol escort of shipping mine laying mine creeping and defense against Allied naval opera- tions The seizure of islands in the Mediterranean or major undertakings against the British Isles Spain or Iceland would impose heavy demands on the Navy The Soviet submarine force is potentially formidable and if adVantage is taken of German assistance offers the USSR possibility of lucrative returns for minimum commitments of resources by aggressive warfare against shipping vital to the whole Allied military economic and strategic position Fuel requirements for such operations are estimated to be only about metric tons per year a relatively low expenditure Operating bases are easy to disperse world war'II experience showed them to be difficult to destroy Submarine building facilities are relatively small and also capable of separation dispersion and concealment Much of the machinery involved in their construc tion is difficult to destroy The principal effect of the planned atomic offensive on the Soviet Navy could be to produce Very critical shortages of fuel for surface forces in the Baltic-Arctic and Far East areas probably forcing-a drastic curtailment of such opera- tions On the other hand accorded proper priority in alloca- tion fuel should be adequate to permit unrestricted operations of Soviet submarines The Soviet Naval Air Force would be forced to be discreet in its employment due to the general shortage of aviation gasoline This would interfere with their participation in aerial mining In the longer term the Soviet Navy would also be affected by damage to shipbuilding - 190 appendix - Ream-Elm from le I Dedassi ed of he Naih'lal - and ship rep ir facilitie and by the interference with ad production of electronic ehuipment weapons and consumable supplies -- although the results would be in no way dedisive The Soviet air Force 3 The Soviet Air Force is estimated to be composed of some- planes of all types supported by about 500 000 Personnel The aircraft are distributed as follows 9 000 10 000 in Tactical Air Armies 1 800 Fighter Defensive Force 1 800 Long Range Force 2 000 3 000 Naval Air Force These forces are believed to be capable of expansion to a total of 20 000 aircraft with supporting personnel of 1 500 000 within six months after mobilisation In addition to the above the USSR has semi-military air organization -- the Civil air Fleet which may contain some 1 000 to 1 500 medium transport planes and some 2 000 light communication types -It is believed that in time of war 250-500 of these might be made available for military purposes Central control of the Long Range Force and the Civil Air Fleet would provide a degree of operational flexibility in that these forces might be directed to either the Western or the Middle east front It has been noted that in airborne operations air lift capacitp'rather than trained troops would he a limiting factor Q The principal tasks of the Soviet air Force in event of war in 1909 are considered to be First to provide the air defense of the second to support the advances of the Red Army third to conduct independent offensive operations against the United Kingdom and within Capabilities the United States ace secess 191 Appendix st 1953 71 i Remoduted mt lhe Unleashed I Dedass od Holdh'rgsoi the News moves 3 es in the case of mdtor fuel for the Soviet Army reduction and consequent shortage of fuel and lubricants_for the Soviet Air Force would be a major effect of the Allied initial atomic offensiva as planned Also present stock piles of aviation gasoline especially high test gasoline are limited and the flow time from refinery to consuming forces is believed to be very short Refer to paragraph 2 of this Appendix and Annex to Appendix to Enclosure Principal production of high test fuel remaining after the initial atomic offensive would be in Roumania This source is not presently a target for the initial atomic- offensive Shortages in the_Middle East might be alleviated by tapping local sources on an expedient basis if refineries 'there are destroyed or interdicted hy dllied action with complete alleviation of shortage if they are not destroyed or interdicted Appraisal indicates that it should be possible for the USSR to meet fuel requirements for jet aircraft from sources which would continue to be available to them modified to the extent that crude first cut refining on an expedient and inefficient basis might be peasible By and large the shortage of aviation fuel will become critical to the Soviet air Force with present known stockpiles within the second month of war This will force the Air Force to be extremely discriminating in the employment of its Air Forces for training combat and support missions Allocation of priority for air defense would probably force drastic curtailment of supporting operations for the Red army and Navy and reduction of the employment of the Long Range Air Force It is un- realistic to attempt to define precisely the time at which shortage of products particularly petroleum will actually result in critical reduction of the capabilities of Soviet Armed Forcas The time would depend on many conditions some of which are unknown or on which information-is inadequate see-sashes -Appendix 9 3 192 I Reproduced turn me um Dsdassl ed Holdings dflho summers-hoes mcme 577 ' 1 rmp fret Z others of which are variable or Bubject to Soviet control Among the factors which would he of major importance are the level and location of stockpiles at the initiation of hostili- ties the refining capacity damage to petroleum production and stockpiles adequacy of transportation ability to restore damage adopt expedient refining processes or exploit captured resources and especially the scope of operations and expendi tures of fuel for each operation Estimates based upon agreed appraisals of Soviet petroleum stockpiles at the present ham petroleum expenditures and damage to refineries that would result from completely successful execution of the initial atomic offensive indicate that fuel shortages would be critical within the first few months of the war On the other hand aVailable intelligence indicates that the USSR now has three times the productive capacity for fuel and aviation gasoline above what the Strategic Bombing SurVey shows Germany to have had at any time during World War II This fact should be made the subject of careful analysis Past wartime experience has demonstrated incessant demand for delivery of new and improVed types of aircraft This would be particularly true and necessary in warfare agairst the United States with its engineering_and industrial 'capabilities for rapid development attrition among the 15 000e 17 000 Soviet planes one available would be rapid Successful execution of the initial atomic offensive as planned will inflict such severe damage upon the aircraft and aircraft engine industries as to reduce the flow of replacement air- craft belov requirements and to force a progressive curtail ment of air operations - 193 - hppendixi K JCS 195321 rd Reproduced ram lha I Dams- an Holdirgs aims Na cnalhrd lh'es 5 The rmed Forces a Lack of supplies and such reports of destruction damage and upset conditions as may reach invasion troops will 'adversely affect morale However any demoralizing effects will be of delayed nature and the degree will be dependent upon the fruits of their early invasion efforts 2 Serious disruption and impairment of civil and military control damage to transportation facilities and other effects of the initial atomic bombing will render command and logis tical operation particularly from and through the seventy target cities immediately but temporarily exceedingly difficult E Central civil authority and military command will immediately'he forced to 1 Determine and evaluate the extent and degree of material damage accomplished Determine existing short range and long range military and supporting economic capabilities 3 Modify all of these existing plans and operations to many of which forces will have already been committed which did not take into full consideration the prospect of the existent destruction and effects of the atomic offensive This would involve re evaluation as to attainable objectives and ability to consolidate and sustain thereon determination of scope strength and direction of major and minor campaigns in accordance with existing capabilities and preparation of appropriate supply and logistical plans for each of these t Issue modifying or completely changed orders to commands many of which have already been committed to action and to all military and economic supporting 1 activities Appendix 1931 Reproduced Iron Ihe Urdas ediuedass ied Elihu Na unafmh' It is impossible to' rediot exactly what decisions would be made what he soviet ability to put new plans into operation would be and the degree of resulting demoralisau tion upon the Soviet armed forces In any event the initial atomic offensive would force the Soviet high command quickly to re-estimate their strategic position and make important decisions regarding operational plans under difficult circum- stances and without accurate knowledge as to Allied ability or intentions to accomplish further drastic destruction within the USSR It is probable that such decisions would involve limiting postponing or abandoning certain campaigns which might otherwise be undertaken 6- niteness Successful execution of the initial atomic offensive as planned Would not per so seriously impair the capability of the Soviet armed forces to advance rapidly into selected areas of western Europe the Middle East and Far East but capabili ties thereafter in those extended areas would progressively diminish due to the following 1 The supply of petroleum products of all types will rapidly'become critical to all branches of the Soviet armed forces with principal effects of Greatly reducing the mobility of the Army Reducing the scale of operations of the Soviet Navy and merchant shipping although submarine warfare would probably be unaffected Seriously reducing Soviet air operations involv- ing training transport support of ground and naval forces and independent offensive action although proper alloca tion of fuel would allow continued operations by air defense forces i eeaseeser 195 - Assendix Joe 1953 - Hammad-d tram he Undasru ed I Deohssi ed Holdingsol' the Nal nnaI Arthh'ea NOTE The point at nhich capabilities of Soviet Armed Forces tould diminish to a critical degree would depend upon many variable or unpredictable factors most important of which is the level of stockpiles prevailing at the initiation of hostilities - b after consumption of initial stocks of basic equipment and consumable supplies progressive shortages in a wide variety of items particularly aircraft would handicap opera tions and effect morale of the Armed ForcesT g Logistic support would be handicapped due to disruption of planning impairment of controls damage to industry and interference with transportation g The Soviet High Command will be forced quickly to re- estimate their strategic position and make important decisions regarding operational plans under difficult circumstances They would probably limit postpone or abandon certain campaigns but it is impossible to predict what specific decisions would be made 3 The atomic offensive would open the field and set the pattern for all adversaries to use any weapons of mass destruction and result in maximum retaliatory'measures within Soviet capabilities ace-essenc Appendix _Jcs 195371' 196 - - he 2' This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu