535 5 '21 IMFLICATIDNS BF LARGE-YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPDNS July ID Iii-23 '21 L211 1 11 1 Ill-I tuul'rll I-l 11 11IET 1211mm 53- Himrum111115 IF CH CH CANCELLED I I5 mm HAIEETED 3 qu 1 $1141 $451717 1 PREFACE Late in 19151 Prawn nhtaineti Man-ins indicating that nuclear weapnns nf substantially greater yieid may he available within a few years These Wflf n are expected tn have a yieiri measured in TNT equiva- Ients ranging Ernm millinn tn millinn tnns - A small team at RAND Was gi'r'en the task nf appraising the implicatinns nf the new weap-nns In March nt this year the resuits nf this appraisal were rep-nrteci tn the at Staff tn the Uffice nf the Secretary nf Defense tn the Strategic Air and subsequently tn the cngniaant agencies atnmic research and develnpment and tn the Hatinnal Security and Re- snurces Enarti This summary repnrt and several technical rnen'inranria recnrri the wnrl-t tn riate nn this study Further research is in at tut-tn SUMMARY weapons if very large yield mag r h-c' and addcd th wcapcm stockpil in tit-at future Thcac wcapcins will be available and dclivctahlc in quantity at a Iatct datc Eccausc of P-cht' if such wcapdns_ area tathct than paint will h and citica and thcir Pupular titans will he devastatcd Th physical of vary-largc-yicld nuclcat weapons havc calm- latcd Th of such used in a strategic against cit outaclvca has catimatcd Implicatidns for national atc dram-rd Finally scam at the political conscqucncca of SuEh an additidn tc arscnal of war havc 1vii CDNTENTS PREFACE iH SUMMARY vii - I 1 Sewn CAPABILITIES 2 WEAPGNS EFFECTS STRATEGIC DFFEHSE 9 DEFENSE 12 GHUUHD WARFARE Pouncm IMPLICATIONS 1 nl' r illilil in titll sltotow FIESIDIH weapons The atomic bomb dropped at Nagasaki had a yield of ED ltilotons KT That is it released about the same amount or explosive energyI as 213 film tons of TNT Since Nagasaki Los hlamos hagdmoutstandiqg ioh of in smaller wgapor Jr ecould have - eguwa er_1_ 5m ET and in the future we could probably make a KT homh by relatively straightforward methods i i bomb yielding the equivalent of 1 million tons of a magatoo bomb FUEIGH WEAFGHS Late in 1951 Los r slamos gave aaHu some data on potential weapons based on some brilliant new scientific work The estimates are still somewhat specu- lative but a test shot of a new weapon will soon he made There is now a high prohahilit r thatin the not too distant future We can have many thermo- nuclear or fusion bombs with yields The need not be extremely expensive or excessively large As a result dris may soon facea radicallyr different situation in the weapons field The 'Ios Alamos estimates of the site of the new weapons range from 12 30121 to 1b with diameters from I to ft The principal stockpile A- bomb is 5 ft in diameter and weighs ll The thermonuclear bombs will cost' about re as much as the standard stockpile a- bomb in terms of materialsl-H LITA SDVIET CAPABILITIES We have nonspeculative concrete evidence that the USSR is technically mature in the atomic weapons-design field Information on the Soviet A-hornh shots in September and October 1951 is quite specific They are producing high-efficiency weaPons_ and excellent scientists are working on their atomic- energy program It is clear that Soviet capabilities in the atomic field are high -- in research development and probably in Production There is some evidence that the Soviets were actively experimenting in' the thermonuclear field after 1946 There is also some intelligence information- which is difficult to explain in any terrns other than as developer by them of thermonuclear weaoons Dur country did little thinking in the thermonuclear field between 1946 and 15 349 the Russians may well have continued to think and work during that 3 year period I While there is little sign of Soviet industrial effort associated with such a program the evidence we have is not negative The industrial effort need not he extreinely Iargein comparison with a standard atomic effort another sometime in the near or distant future They may have done better they may he abreast of us or even ahead of us In any case the time will come when the Russians can have many megaton H hornhs if they want them Finally while the Soviets would have a difficult delivery problem they have the technical ability to develop the means of aerial delivery if and when the hlornhs are available La We must assiune that the USSR can have fusion lac-nihismm WEAFGNS EFFECTS There are still substantial uncertainties regarding the expected effects nf yeryvlargE-yield thermnnuclear weapnns this reasnn cnnseryatiye estimates have been used in this study Nevertheless thermnnuclear bombs will be filler-r and fantastically destructive 1 Nuclear weapnns in three ways 1 Blair - terrific pressures with winds alnng the grnund and in updrafts Theresa nr heat radiarrari Gamma radiatina gamma rays are like erays in binlngical effect bUt are mnre energetic and penetrate greater thicknesses nf air and ether materials The primary effect nf blast is tn crush and buildings r i hen the blast'nyerpressure is sustained rernrra r as it is with nr even lnnger periods as with it alsn kills Penple directly The thermal radiatinn cnmes the fireball which has a surface tempera- ture abnut equal tn that nf the sun Anything it tnuches nr is time tn will be fused nr melted The amnunt and duratinn nf this radiatinn is rather uncer- tain its effects are even less certain because they depend en the type nf material nr nbiect eapnsed and alsn en the amnunt nf mnisture and hate in the But generally in the case nf megatnn the heat will be sufficient tc kill Pebble and start fires miles the Paint-Sf burst An earlier estimate by MRI serinusly nyerstatecl the expected gamma radia- tinn Hvb mbs While significant the effects appear tn be dnminated by thermal radiatinn and blast Varinus nuclear weap-nns may in terms nf their effects en a city target I As a pnint nf reference Fig 1 fireSents the effects nf a E sl'iT Nagasaki- type A-bnmb detnnated near the grnund Enur annes nf damage are In Enne I mnre nr less tn the area under the fireball all buildings are pulverized and all life in nr nut nf shelter_s is by blast heat and gamma radiatinh 1T r Eff-rm af Large-yield Alexei-c Hamel The Iah'u Cnrp-nratinn Research Hemerandum July E I952 SerrctA-Restricred Data It I In Z nf II all buildings are Ithc nr 5n damaged as tn h tntally USCICES Their ara- and most Inf the Inhabitants an ltillcd In 31 11 all but tha- hcavicat antI structures at mnllahcd I In IV nnc- tn an In this annc buildings and may nffe cnnsidcrahl Mnttallty rah-I amnng an Pnpulatlnn an 1150 In the flgurc Thu rates based nn data an In an unwatncd In LIE IEIHE I II II-Ilt'u-utiln whp II killings Ila-marl EllItrpt-l In hdl rl'ql Hld'tn Hart tannin Furl Illanti mi Fig nI EII-IIT A-hnmb fl ill f'l ll'lf' a sit 3 d hdabdih pnpulatinn and have been adjusted building standards Hit the edge nf the area indicated abnut nne-half nf the penple are killed the rest are injured sufficiently tn require immnbiliaatinn and cnntinued care Nearer grnund aern a larger are killed Farther away fewer are killed example if the area was pnpulated abnut three-Enurtbs nf the inhabitants rvnuld have been killed Figure 2 drawn tn the same scale the expected effects nf a 5-HT bomb The diameter nf the fireball is striking and its effects are terrifying Over and abnve the greater areas nf destructinn blast resulting this bnmb there is annther factnr tn be cnnsidered the increased prnbability nf fire The heat radiatinn a fusinn is relatively greater in each nf the annes nf destructinn than it is a lbw-yield atnmic bnmb in additinn the distances are sn large that there is a greater chance nf radiatinn's kindling fires befnre the blast wave arrives fter the quenching vvind the blast passes the fire may be rekindled and fanned by the gentler reverse wind fin extensive must thcrefnre be expected as far nut as Znne prnvided this anne includes densely built-up areas The figure mnrtality rates cases a sheltered and an unsheltered pnpulatinn The shelters assumed are thnse currently cnnsidered adequate prntectinn against blast both in this cnuntry and elsewhere Thcre is serinus dnubt as tn whether the cnnventinnal shelter wnuld be adequate under the cnnditinns created by such a large-yield b-nmb Penple in such shelters may be nr rnasred Thnse try tn leave the shelters will be killed in the Thnse remain may be trapped and Only if the shelter is clnse tn the periphery nf Enne IV svnuld escape seem pnssible A redefinitinn nf adequate shelters may be in nrder Figure 3 alsn drawn tn the same scale the of a 25-MT bnmb Althnugh the weapnn pnses difficult delivery even nne nf the largest predicted by Les Alamns can be carried by existing nr aircraft hnwever snrne tinsmithing and mndificatinn will prnbably be neces- sary Present estimates nf weapnn effects indiCate that the Eli 4 and XB-EE may be able tn deliver a til-MT sveapnn in a cnnventinnal manner and escape the 3-316 will have nnly a marginal chance nf escape The and FEE-52 may have nnly a marginal chancc nf escape Efter delivery nf a b-nmb The risk is thermal radiatinn in general there is nn danger blast nr gamma radiatinn I There-tail Radicals-I1 art-cf Aircraft Eire-pr I'nr' Large-Jiffd Siam-lat Th RAND Cnrp-nEAIinn R earth Hcm randurn July lL'l Data - EMI- il'nd II um 55 n' urn - JII mi Fig I E'anh of a 5-HT H-bumb wind I - 1 51 2 LI 1 1 mi UEEIH DIHIEE WEE I IDIE II T-Iul 'l'nrul ulIupu buildupIUHE - II ms Illupu Lnduurhl Mail-Int hut-in rrl wi Wii'f t HURTALITIES - FIHEEALL LI ml IDIE - URBAN DAHAEE IE ll tnllup If all buildingl r hrm uh- Cf II hml 17 3' - I r rr_ 1f151' I 'aiMiami-ll buildup Em I'Il'l'll'l1l'l'l FinIr I Lip-f'rl I lhf-I --I I -I- IH-ll-i Iafgh h what- 2 l' Huh- I If i - - 4 1 54 Ilulhl' qul mu TH Ht mi F79 E E Huch uf cl H-humb EUH dud If Idgl nrlu In ml Figure 4 the delivery prublem The bumber releases the bumb at the puint and makes a sharp turn nut quite 18 3 The bumber is at an altitude of about sli tt ft The bomb is detunated at tn SIDED it By the time the bumb gees tiff the carrier is fr away the pnint elf burst Ely the time the blast catches Up with the bumber it has traveled anether ft The skin hi the b-umber will be very hut and winduws will have tn be shielded Hewever if the cls pvtime uf the cnuld be lengthened by 151 ct 1543 seccinds Dr if the structure ef the airplane were modified any at the three airplanes cnuld almust certainly escape frum any bumb mentiuned here lit-mi KF Flighl pull'll in It innenl ei 4' tiltetlnlien tame t1 itlenu trenlld elierr blast curtains eitcte Altitude HAW Fig du ehemetie cf delivery prehlem There are uE cnurse uther delivery techniques A small burnb elf nearly Hit-bomb size wuuld make an air-tu-surface missile like the Rascal carried by the Haiti leek interesting The Wright Air Develupment Center is already well alnng en a ur drene tn carry a Lift-diameter bomb n Iittle ingenuity will certainly prudure other alternatives 3 Hit I nan-nut Iii- willJ-E II 1- Inn 1 sraarsisic DFFENSE Cunyentiuna ait delivery of thermunuciear h-urnhs will he inure difficult thah that fur it s-bombs But these bumhs can accomplish ciestructiun ran a scale which is quite different frcirn anything that can he achieyed with present clay -h-umhs Must ui uur recent war Plans have envisaged a retaliatury air uffensiye with A-humhsl against industrial targets aircraft iacturies and rail and munitiun pruductitin plants anti against certain military installatiuns Cine very ele mentary consideration which enters intu the pruhahie success uf such an upera- than is _me likelihtiud uf destruyirig a given target Tahle cumpares the Mahmng Lki iu WH L llan - - i fty cuiicierlecl tci result in a circular pruualile errur uf it half the bombs fall within it the target1 and half fall farther away Fuur accuracy might result in an CEP TARGET-CDVERAGE Burn - EF 2 Ian Yield EDDIE Hum it HI 2 HT 1 1GL1 ELM Eume hi the industrial targets cunsidereti i e I physically resistant They will he destruyeci unly if they lie within Zone II as defined Certain steel and electric puwer plants are in this category Suit targets will he riestrriyeci eyen in Zuni ill Refineries and aircraft pruductiuu plants are in this categciry If the target is salt and if the humhirig accuracy is gucici nut very much is gained by using an If the humhirig aL'Curacy is puur ur 1' impiitutr'anr tillr Putt-wt 13 an fur Itmrr rr'r Eat-tibial mid Air The Curp Milan Research Memuranclurn Riki-i565 july It 1913 Secret Restricted Data 9 -I I I si FIE Mnrteiitie in the United Stern and USSR Item A- and ti-heinha - if the target is hard then a great deal is gained in 'destnaetidn thnaugh the use e-f very-large-yieid weapons The new weapon will inevitahi I he an arm weapon hnusing will he demniished at a distance nE mere than seven miles genund zero with a 25-MT hernia dithniigh seme industriai installatie-ns in a city attacked with an H-hnmh may sun-rive enmpiete destmetinn the city itself will he demnlished In additinn tn the whnlesale Physical destmetinn which will result the use nf this wupnn there will be a vast increase in the number GE people killed Suppnse a weapnn were tn he aimed net at industrial plants and military installatinns1 but at the centers e-E cities In cases industrial targets wnnid he destinyed anyway Figure 5 estimates the number nf peepie killed by en the fiftj r largest cities in the United States and the USSR In this ea arnFIe nn etnnr is assumed The Pupuiatinn is assumed tn he unwatned and unsheltered- These estimates theteinre represent an upper hnund nn exiseeted mnrtalities In passing it may he nnted that the 5-HT bomb would be less effective againsl United States targets as a ennsequenee nE United States suhuthan develnpment IFnt enr h'pafisn the _a eamnainging Eli-hernias ID - 4 4 ThermonoCleat weapons will he However an attempt might be made to minimize enemy casualties First a campaign might be launched against a nonurban industrial and military target system Because of the limited number of such targets distinct from Russian urban areas it is unlikely that we could attain our militaryr objective with such a campaign Second we might warn the target population in time to permit evacuation This tactic perhaps deserves serious consideration taking into account the full risk and possible cost to us as well as the advantages to be gained There is no doubt that possession of these bombs by both the United States and the Russians would seriously worsen our relative position in strategic bombing At present we can accomplish sufficient destruction with stockpile its bombs to achieve our mission of preventing Soviet industrial mobilization after war begins For us the H-bomb is primarily insurance it increases the Certainty of the success of and probably decreases the cost of a retaliatory campaign For the Soviet Union possession of the H-bomb would be of much greater significance The damage they can do with r'i-bombs whileeatre mely serious -is protrairi'y not comparable with what we can do to them They have a smaller stockpile a lower delivery capability no advance bases and no experience in long-range strategic bombing They must attack a larger and more resilient economy Even a moderate Soviet stockpile of megaton bombs would go far to redress this imbalance Ey dropping only it bombs with little skill in selecting targets or in hitting them the Russians could cause destruction and death on a sale which would at a minimUm interdict our industrial mobiliaa tion for years and would at a maximum prevent us from carrying on a war at all The United States could scarcely accomplish more with a numerical superiority in bombs and greater skill in delivery II lf'arnia a Targrr anm'arr'en in rtrr War a Rrperr The EAHD Corporation Hep-or R-io'l' November Secret 11 Liiur'L-s-J'LJ I lh-I DEFENSE What possible defense measures might we take to cope with this threat By fat the most important is to do all in our power to deter the attack The most effective way to do this is to maintain a strong and relatively invulnerable Strategic i iir Force armed with thermonuclear weapons The defense of SAC should have highest priority for the defense of the United States Hm effective active air defense would be worth almost any price In fact a defense system with a very high l-till potential against enemy bombers appears to be not too expensive and certainly well within our means Moreover it would have special value as a deterrent If the Russian attack should fail because of active defenses they would lose not only the bombs but also their elite crews and very valuable bombers However because we can never be sure that we shall not be taken by surprise that an enemy will not use a tactic that we have not foreseen and that our defense system will not be highly degraded in the early stages we must not place full reliance on active air defense Genera disperse of our industry and pops-hermit on a scale to provide real protection appears so expensive in its direct cost and in its reduction of eco- nomic efficiency as to be an imp-tactical measure It would involve rebuilding most of our cities and industries in a different place and if we undertook this we should have no resources left to attempt anything else- in addition general dispersal may buy very little protection If dispersal should assume any particular form the attacker could within limits simply change his aiming points and attack a different target system_ There are alternative ways in which he could knock out our industrial mobilization 'potential If we decided that the greatest threat was to our major cities we could spend the nesrt 1D years diapersing them He might then launch a completely successful vertical attacl-c against basic industries essential to war production the location of which was unaffected by city dispersal Con- versely if we put a tremendous effort into dispersing and reducing the size of plants in our basic industries our cities and their populations would remain almost as vulnerable as they are now Moreover unless dispersal is combined with a very active air defense it merely increases the number of bombs required on target these bombs are not very expensive and will in time be plentiful If the attrition we can infliCt is low'r delivery 1avill also be cheap The Soviets 11 '1 i could easily maintain an advantage by making more H-bombs and more air- planes if we did nothing but disperse Some limited and selective as opposed to general dispersal is certainly both feasible and desirablei We should encourage the spreading out of cities The current National Seturity ResourCES E arci policy amounts to this trying to get new industrial facilities which are going to be built anyway located well away from present heavy concentrations In a period of It years or even longer not much protection would result but the cost would be small and some protection would be better than none Selective dispersal of our most critical military installations is clearly indi- cated must also be given to the dangers inherent in the high degree of concentration of our military and civilian authorities in Washington On defense measure which deserves serious consideration is the building up and maintaining of a war reserve of military equipment which might enable each of our major commands to fight on an austerity basis for an extended period without fresh supplies from the economy Such a program appears economically feasible and would provide some deterrence and protection Dur chief worry concerning the success' of our own SAC offensive is that Russian forces in being and war reserves are large enough to enable them to achieve their military objectives however effective our bombing of Russian industry might be Several other measures of passive defense still make sense when the H-bomb is the threat ne is the construction of shelters Conventional blast shelters are cheap but may not provide adequate protection against the H-bomb lIfsee Figs 2 and We believe that adequate shelters can be designed and that some such protection may be worth the cost The whole problem must be revestamined I r tnother program which deserves reconsideration is the planning in advance for argcascale evacuation Another is planning for the care of sorvivors We must face and accept the fact that none of these measures or any com- bination of them can give us more than partial invulnerability in a war in which strategic bombing with H-bombs is undertaken by both sides ur chief hope must be that a relative invulnerability may prevent suCh a war from cacmrring 13 a a - Iii-Fi in ict-7i 'i I ll i L-Lfl-iJL-j a - GRGUND WARFARE Wcapcns will havc Pt f und implicati ns ED gmund Figure 15 ptcacnts cstimatca if cif a can tract and matcticl in ficld knight of burst tc- ft for a bomb pctmits Limited fur trumps in fcaxl'icilcs Th lcthal radius is smallct than in cit r bambing bifausc trumps will mat in killcd cit injurccl by cullapsing buildings cat by firms Th utility cif vcry-latgc-yicltl wcapons tactical warfarc has studictl fur a hypothetical Ef u dv ' rf r situaticln it till- Fig HHEEII m H-bumb an military pdl l l ln l and maternal I T rrmanuciur dual-i an an Ari-n - Gran-p The incarch Mcmtirandum ELM-HEEL Jun 191' T p Dal-1 14 Figure 7 represents the deployment of a Russian army group in Western Europe The force is deployed on a EB-mi front along the Rhine to 1 depth of Ho -mi The group consists of three armies comprising 2 infantry 12 mechaniled and other divisions and totaling Bill tl men The deployment is as for an attacl within a week Personnel density is shown topographically in Fig We have assumed that a partial tactical adjustment has been made for the expected use of atomic weapons - the maximum concentration is one-third as great as for the mass offensives used by the Red Army in World War II Aerial delivery may be counted on even in the face of enemy air superiority because we shall be to pick the time and the place and the penetration will be shallow Furthermore intelligence requirementsand bombing accuracy will not be nearly so critical as for -b mEE bombs aimed on the basis of good intelligence would kill and injure enemy soldiers Three such bombs delivered with less accuracy and farther from the front line would lcill and injure enemy soldiers In each case bombs would be about half as effective To achieve the same results as many as 50 to 3m sill-KIT -b l nhs would be required depend- ing on the quality of intelligence and bombing accuracy 1While there is little analysis to support the conclusion it does appear that the offensive force is relatively more vulnerable The defensive forces would have a comparative advantage over an enemy using similar weapons small units well dug in and supplied by selfasufficient mobile units should be relatively invulnerable It would be the attacker who would have to be exposed in force The supply support of both sides would be highly vulnerable particularly our own which might be expected to require extensive European port facilities It may be concluded that the H-bomb is liicely to be many times as effective as the alt-bomb for tacticalpurposesxii-l I I-visions-3 - 91 II miln Ha a5 t I l- 11 in l'i'I'lf '1 mama if 1' 1 In HI Ha lulul Ilnh In 101' IH nl f f rm Inn l'lr l Ell-hr Jnlu ff-Ir In ind Hun hull mr Int-inn - If 'rL T1 r i-Fr 1 nix 1 Fig F Dcpfuymenr af ground fart Inpugruphi Ichemuli of Irnnp demiw J- E arm 2 3' Irv-I aw i man-ne- u-I 1F 1- - LI IMPLICATIUNS The political problems which may arise in connection with so a weapon seem even mote elusive and more difficult to appraise than their military and economic counterparts This fall we are going to test a crude thermonuclear homh In any event our progress in this field is hecoming more and more widely knot-sin This in itself1 creates an important prohlem At some future time the United States govern menc will malce an official announcement of this progress l ll'I lriat will he the most auspicious political circumstances under which such an announcement may he made What form shall it take What effects will this announcement have on the peoples of the world our own Allied neutral and Soviet 1 Which of these effects can he assessed in advance How can the timing and the char- acter of the announcement he manipulated to heighten whatever good effects -may he derived and to diminish the evil effects Furthermore we cannot dis- miss the possibility of an H homh test or of an announcement of such a test by the Russians at any moment lWhat should he our reaction in this event Perhaps we are prone to emphasize the importance of out weapon capability as a deterrent Hit the same timeI we cannot lose sight of the fact that our allies are very vulnerable to even the present limited stockpile of Soviet atomic weapons Their sensitivity may assume increasing importance as the existence of ever-more-powerful weapons of mass destruction hecomes known Different prohlems will he posed in the not too distant future when either we or the Russians or both will have a stockpile of thermonuclear weapons It is difficult to predict the international situation which will then etrist- We can hardly guess at the temper of the American people and the disposition of our allies at that time However the time when we shall have to face these prohlems may not really he very far away and we cannot afford to postpone consideration of them Despite the uncertainties a few general aspects of the future situation may he suggested First neither the United Srates not the Soviet Union will have anything like the monopoly of destructive power which this nation possessed in the years 1'illi'henever the H-homh appears as a substantial stockpile item both the United States and the Soviet Union will have a large stoclta l 2- IL ill ll-ill 1 ills-rho Ital-HI pile of it s-bombs This fact must be borne in mind when one considers the three possibilities of H-bomb stockpile development a temporary American monopoly a temporary Soviet monopoly and a duop-oly or posSession of a stockpile by both sides- Second the advantage in number of atomic weapons and in efficiency of delivery techniques which we presently enjoy is likely to continue for some time rperhaps permanently but the significance of that advantage as far as the safety of our cities is concerned is bound to diminish rapidly in the future ts the number of fission and thermonuclear weapons available to both sides increases it may be numbers of exposed targets in the event of a large- scale war rather than numbers of weapons available which may become the determinant of losses This prospect would seem to be unaffected by other capabilities air ground or naval which might reinforce or partially offset the effect of the H-bomb on the total military balance of power Third the political objectives of war cannot be consonant with national suicide and large-scale reciprocal use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons against cities would not fall short of national suicide for both sides in such a situation which we cannot eatclude from our deliberation there would be no large industrially powerful nation left outside the areas of devastation to offer help to those afflicted The question raised in the contest of these dismal considerations would demand an answer if for any reason our policy of deterrence should fail In the event of war the chief problem might well be to find some means of controlling events after hostilities begin The price of control if it is possible to achieve control at all might include not only limitations on the tire-nor of waging war but also limitations on our war objectives Total victory might become an obsolete concept Fourth one of our national aims is defense of the free world in order to enable it to remain free If as we must we assume this aim to be unaltered over the period under review we must postulate continued efforts on our part to develop a growing strength to wage war if need be There are other general conditions bearing on the political implications of the H-bomb which one may assume for the relatively near future These may include for example the growing strength of a United States military budget not drastically below the present level the continued disinclitfation on our part to embarI-t upon preventive war and the continUed onwillingness to use an ultimatum at the risI-t of war to force Soviet disarmament or terriv torial retreats Regardless of our convictions and preferences however assump- IE titans nf this kind are pcthaps snrnewhat less certain than are the Edut- hash we has'e mentinned If this is true these lesser assumptions will have tn he Cdnsideted in an analysis as being questinns tn ht examined in their tight Whatever the answers map he tn the questinns we hast raised and tn the many nther Wrighty problems which ma r he nf equal tat greater importance we ma r lnse td deter the Snviet Unidn Etnm aggressinn and indeed may has our chance of natinnal sunris'ai if we dn develop weapnns at the mast rapid rate pdssihle This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu