4 in rd H a DAVIS DL-ulamm Illa THE UPEHATIDHAL SIDE CF AIR DFEEHEE Remarks 33 GENERAL CURTIS E In THE DEAF SEIEHTIFIG ADVIEJHT BEARD AT PATRICK AIR FDRCE BASE FLEIHIDFL 21 HAY 195 Heprn-ductian of this dumnmt in whale in part 15 pruhibited without the parmissiun uf the office nf nrigin ha i w- A I II see- an Deterreneef ir Fewer Battle E Target Systems Numbers 2 3 Imadi 4 Future Syetems - mere en tougher AITHIBUTES AIR SISTEHE Henge I Penetratien Aeeurecy ield - 36 Damage Speed ef I Rlepen e Strategic Ue Taeticel HhrnIngJ 11m tn target Reliehility Cenfidenee IV IHHMICS BF PH TIHE Targets Defenses Hetienel Feller Ihb iz Mariam v EII TING IH 5 Haasured Against P 111 VI IR CIFFEHSE E naiurad Against F A Aircraft 1 ELSE 2 a 3-125A 5 15311 I Snark 2 Havlh 3 IREH 4 1 3 c H nahiut r wth VII STRA PRIDHITIEE INFLUENCE P1111 TIE LIBRAIE 12F I It 'l'eu have asked me te discuss the lElna retienal Side cf Air foense it with particular reference te these eperatiena1 censideratiens which sheuld 't'llti underlie an eraluatien cf manned bembers in cemparisen with strategic - nsau- missilesl I welceme the cppertunity tc de this and will preface my remarks with tea explanatienst Eire my discussien at existing U 5 air effense ferces deals 5 almest whelly with the B e fh-ba farce I am fully aware ef the exist- E ence ef rather censiderable numbers ef air effense units in the Theater 2-1-45 Air Ferces and in the say But these air ferces external te sac actually can participate enly te a very limited extent during the decisixe first heurs cf the air pewer battles This is evident frem detailed examinatien cf war plans cf all U 5 air effense ferces external te SAG By directien ef the JCS all JCS Uhified and Specified Cbmmanders fer the past several years have cenyened te examine and cempare their plans fer the air effensiye target by target In this precess my staff and I have cenducted a thereueh detailed appraisal ef this natien's mg current capability te wage the Air Fewer Battle During the past twelve menths feur such ccnferences were held at which each cemmander 1 was required te subject his detailed cembat mlssien plans tn the critical I 2h examinatien cf all ether JBS ceenmnders The result was a cemplete candid revelatien cf what each cemmand ceuld actually de in its initial strike dUring the crucial early heurs ef the Air Fewer Battle sheuld it accur in the fall at 195 under the greund rules that each farce must'haye an all-weather delivery capability and must be able te launch a frem its day-te day pestiens with he mere than tactical warning the capability te Endergzite the destructien cf the urgent Air Fewer Battle steed as fellewar BF THE DIVISIUN LIEHARE a-so'ra SAC Alone 190% All other JCS Commands including Navy 11% Navy Alone 3% Even under an assumption of strategic warning and making no deduction for normal operational factors such as groUnd and air shorts etc ll the initial all-weather strike capability of all air offense forces external to SAG could underwrite the destruction of only 14% of the urgent Air Power Battle DGE's Secondly I should point out that my evaluation is based on purely DPerational considerations unaffected by budgetary influences But I feel compelled to conclude these romarhs by stating my views concerning priorities within the limitations of resources which the Defense es- tablishment can reasonably anticipate In my opinion competition for Defense resources should not exist between manned bombers and strategic missiles InsteadII a choice must be made between those weapon systems which cannot contribute immediately and directly to winning the Air Power BattleII and those which can In my viewll the fate of this nation may hinge on this choice So much for the explanations JDE The objective of our national defense policy is deterrence In the public mind -- both ours and the Eoviets -- deterrence is rooted in fear of nuclear deyastation of population centers Ha'w'eyerI in the pro- fessional military mind againjll both ours and the Soviets -- deterrence is measured in terms of ability to destroy the enemy s means of long- renge delivery of nuclear weapons This ability -- the deterrent margin -- is determined by that margin of combat-ready capability which one side holds over the other It cannot be precisely measured However Unless our forces are clearly capable of winnino under operational handicaps of bad weather and no omre than tactical warning and despite any action 2 the enemy may take against them cur ferces are net a genuine deteIIEnt By Winning is meant achieying a ccnditicn wherein the enemy cannct impese his will en es but we can impese cur will an him The Jeint Chiefs cf Staff have directed SAC te as a matter cf first prierity the Seeiet capability te launch weapcns ef mass destructicn against areas er ferces vital tn the United States and allied war effert in my view cur deterrent strength resides primarily in cur recegniaed capability tc win the air Fewer Battle Unless and until the Air Fewer Battle is wen there is nc hepe cf successful eperaticn_by maler surface ferces This requires ef ceurse a successful strategic air effensiye Nb presently knewn defensiye weapen systems can prevent the success cf a prcperly planned and erecuted air effensiye This is net te say that air defense systems are werthless but at the present state cf the art the nest important centributicn cf air defense systems is preyisicn cf warning tc enable the air effense ferces te get underway befere they are at base Within the tetai Scyiet target system delineated by the JEE te its cemmanders SAG has identified'a list cf targets which we call the Air Fewer Battle Target System This systEm includes the Ecyiet lung range air armies their SAG in being their bases their FDL and material rescurces geyernmental and military centrel centers with their allied cemmunicaticn and nuclear weapen steckpile and predesticn facilities Destructien ef this Air Fewer Battle Target System is currently based en 1539 desired grcund aerces ef which 954 require immediate attack in crder tc minimize the enemy's capability fer initial strike I anticipate a substantial increase in the number cf during the next five years inasmuch as cur natienal intelligence estimates indicate that the Seyiets are painting tcward a peak in their air effense and defense capability in 1952 In additicn tn the numbEr cf targets a primary ccncern ef the epera- ticnal ccmmander is the tcughness ef the target that is its resistance a Hemmer 3 B-d 25 tn the effects cf the deepens under his central as yeu can well realise the targets mantiened shave lie in the eategcry cf targets requiring high ever-pressures fer reascnahia prchahilltles ef This means that neapcns must he delivered with either very high accuracy er very high yield er bath A 15 5 AI EHEE HEAPDH 5 Keeping in mind the Jab tc he dcne as detailed in the Air Fewer Battle Target System just discussed what are the characteristics at air effense seapcn systems which eeuid afferd the eperaticnal ccmnander the highest assurance cf being able in dc his jch They are a Adequate range 3 Penetraticn capability c Accuracyfyield relatienships D Speed cf reactien E Reliability F confidence 1 111 discuss each at these in turn In View ef the pessihlity that cyerseas hases cculd eventually became untenable threugh either military cr pelitlcal acticn the ideal air effense aeapcn systen shculd have rangeuadequate tc strike all targets its secure dayutc-day lecaticn in the ccntinental Uhited States Pg na nn capabuj 111 15 is the ability cf all vehicle te cape with the enemy's air defense system It is the prcduct cf such attributes as speed high er ertrenely lee altitude all-weather cperatlcn ccuntermeasures and ccmpatihility with ether penetraticn aids As 1 earlierI the cf ashl Vi a the desired level at target destructien depends net cnly en the prcbehility cf thesnapcn reaching detenatlen paint but alas an the accuracy with which 4 anaemia WW e eerss it is delivered and the magnitude cf the weapcn effects Fer cramplE snall and teugh targets require either extreme accuracy ef delivery er high weapen yieldll er bcth Speed ef Heactien Since current natienal pelicy afferds the Seviet the cppertUnity cf attacking with cnly tactical warningI an air effense weapcn system must pessess the capability ef reacting within the warning time available We may be en fertunate as tc receive strategic warningll but we cannct tc stake the survival cf the natien en the assump- tien that we will er that if we de receive itII the natienal decisicnp making echelens will act upcn it and pcsitively Herecver it is unnecessary tc risk such an assumpticn because it is entirely within this naticn s capability in maintain a fcrce cf preven effectiveness Under any webther cenditien and with he mere than tactical warning It requires hcwever crganizatlcnal and cemmand arrangements which will assure that the samples eperatiens cf such a farce are preperly ceerdinated and an as tc erplcit the inherent flari- billty cf bffensive air pewer In additicnI particularly in winning the Air Fewer Battlell an effective air effense weapen system sheuld censume the minimUm pessible time launch te weapen delivery at the target Reliability Reliability is the probability that a weapcn system will perferm withcut malfuncticn The higher the reliability cf an air effense weapcn system the fewer number cf vehicles required tc dc a specified-task gent dence in speratienal cemmander must have a current estimate cf the cdmbat capability ef the weapcn systems available te him n the basis nf this estimate he decides EhiEh weapens and many he must launch against a given target If experience with the weapcn system is limi ed the cembat ccmnander will be prcne tc assign mere weepcns te a given target in erder te aveid tce law a prebability cf its destrUctien With extensive experience and censeguent higher cenfidence in his estimates minimise Flu I II - 3-6D125 ef system performance the cemmander weuld be able te apply the principle ef Ecenemy cf feree and thus ceyer mere targets with a given supply ef weapens if gynsuies DF THE EPtimum attributes ef an air effense weapen system are related tn the time peried during whieh it will be empleyed be this is a dynamic rather than a static prebiem Despite the advances we have made witness the narrewness ef eur margin ef cembet capability ever the beeiet teday as cempered with that ef ten years age This means that eur feree in being teday must be nregressiyely strengthened if it is te centinue es en effectiye deterrent Further as the number and teughness ef the taruets inereese the accuracy-yield ratie ef an eptimum air effense weapen system must increase Finally an eptimum air effense weepen system must be re- spensiye te changes in natienei geliey which itself is dynamic V Elem ee THE esgegge $st 1 shell discuss the B eTfB-b bomber ferce in terms ef the attributes eutlined earlier ange In the absence ef a truly intercentinental air effense weapen system thus far we have had te rely en air refueling ef the bembers and this in turn makes necessary a system ef eyersees bases Even with the Hedel lnpreyed 52 there weuld still remain a require- ment fer air refueling te attach a pertien ef the Seuiet target system Egngiratigg hi the present time the lessee which the Seyiet air defense system can inflict upen the B-eifE-bi feree weuld net prevent us frem winning the lr Fewer Eettle Heweyer unless we impreye the penetratien capability ef the B eTfE-bi ferce pregressiyely and markedly during the nest five years the attritien rate will inerease te a peint where by 1912 2 I an'lri net he confident nf winning the Air Fewer Battle when Fins M'F massess 3 t- Hoses he or at Weapon technology as you well know has made such rapid advances in recent years that thermonuclear weapons are avail- able today for the force There can be no doubt of the precision with which my combat-ready crews can deliver these weapons to the bomb re- lease line today accordingly I would say that acceptable accurasyf yield ratios currently exist in the manned bomber forte However we expect to be faced with increasing Soviet capability to interfere with our bombing radar and this requires continUed emphasis on electronic counter-countermeasures to insure that the present accuraeyfyield ratio is maintained our air offense weapon system must be able to react so swiftly that it will not be caught on the ground and destroyed by the enemy I am confident that today under any weather conditions and with no more warning time than that provided by friendly radars a 1 decisive force can be launched against the Soviet Air Power Sattle Target System Bearing in mind the increasing air offense capability of the Soviets and the resultant decrease in warning time likely to be available to us we have set ourselves the goal of being able to launch at any time without prior notice one-third of the force within fifteen minutes An extensive and thorough test recently completed indi- cates that this is a reasonable goal if we are provided adequate hase faoilities to pemit wider dispersal in an alert configuration Once launched these bombers go directly to target The current high reliability of the 5-41 is the result of four years of intensive field operations during which we have progressively improved the aircraft sub-systems and our procedures in operations and maintenance The reliability of the a-c now stands at SSE we expect to increase the reliability of the ELSE in the same way y high confidence in the capability of the present manned bomber force is based upon literally hundreds of thousands of practice combat missions under the toughest most realistic conditions we have been able to devise ulg 'En' 1 15 - JI --I- - I 1 emf l niehii on girl-L gal 53- l 1 IL - tee-seem B e 25 vi FUTURE He must evaluate all future weapen systems against the same set cf criteria we used tc evaluate existing systems Furthermere we nust bear in mind the increasing Seviet threat as mentioned earlier in the discussicn cf the dynamics cf the prehlen i shall discuss each ef the presently prggesed manned bcmbers and strategic missiles in turn BANNED Bilhl The E-Ea's new en crder fer test are unsuitable in my epinicnI as a feliewhen tn the B-eT s and because cf limited range and limited penetraticn capability Ccnvair has previded a minimum military lead in the e se in crder tc previda maximum fuel capacity Altheugh the present ash 2 dash capability is in itself a measure cf pene- tratien capability the dash is sc shert'that the benefits tc be derived it are cf deubtful value and will certainly decrease rapidly during the early when this bcmber ceuid first became cperaticnaily avail- able Hcde ease If the predicted by the manufacturer fer the Medal E-EB actually preves cut in test this weapen system cculd be useful tn SHE Hewever the Hedei esse falls far shert ef being a truly intercentinental vehicle Further it cannet carry the desired quantities cf penetraticn aids Further this medei exhausts the patentiai cf the 3-53 thus its capability tn cepe with the increasing enemy defenses wnuid diminish unless range were sacrificed es ycu knew the lids is still in the stady phase Par- fermance estimates are enceuraging -- a cec nautical mile radius at ash 3 all the way Its radius can be increased tc abcut cy u niles by using high energy fuels if the 11cc lives up te its design specifiEEe tiens it will be an extremely useful vehicle SAG chever it cannct became available until the distant future even if we ge ahead the first wing cf line's ceuid net he cperaticnal until lu h - and this Pf- ff B b 25 censidered eptimistic Here again this weapen system is net traiy intercentinentel I ss yeu knew this nuclear pewered camber system is in very preliminary study status and cempenent preliminary design stage It fer the first time will effer us truly intercentinental range Heweyer it is net certain that achievement ef this intercentinental range is werth the prise we must pay in sacrifice cf ether essential - attributes -- specifically in speed ef reactien reliability and pene- tratien capability Furthermere the l bh cannet enter early eneugh te be the successcr tn the 5e52 It is cieer that existing and prepesed gagged bembg systems which I have discussed are deficient in scme ef the attributes cf air effense weapen systems and will centinue in be cc Hissile systems currently in deyelepment shew great 9393155 cf augmenting the capability cf the manned attest fnrce by preyiding these capabilities in which the manned fcrce will centinue tc be deficient These systems will have truly intercentinental range cf them will haye a very high pene tratien capability primarily because ef supersenic speed and altitude I ExPect mest ef these missile systems tc attain eventually the necessary speed ef respense The ICBH's very shert flight time te target has impertant eperatienal significance cheyer as each ef the missile systems is measured against the standard attributes yeu will see that there are same shert-cemings which must net be eyerleeked AIR-BREATHING HIEEILEE ar t Altheugh the Heart measures up well against seme ef the attributes its during the time peried in which it will be available is eneugh ta digeualify it as a Useful sec system - gyahg If the Hayahe is funded se that it will be available in 1962 it ceuld be very useful Its range penetratien capability speed ef reactien -- all appear te be adequate Its accuracyfyield ratie a %5m is very gued indeed Heweyer there are these whe guestien the ultimate reliability ef the system because ef its great templesity HISSIL 5 The fauerahle characteristics ef the IHBH as measured against meat cf the attributes discussed abeye are near-balanced by the eperatienal and legistical samplerities impnsed by its line mile range - necessitating inverseas basing H The naminal see-e mile range ef the me is adequate tn afferd ceyerage ef the Sayiet target system altheugh it impeses same diffin culties in base area selectien is I mantiened earlier I am cenfident that this system can be deyeleped te respand within the tactical warning time available Fer a lung time there sheuld be me guestiun ef its penetratian capability and if applied tn a preper target system its shurt time ef flight ta target can be espluited Since the initial IEEH will have enly a 1 MI warhead delivered with a 5 nautical miles the single shet prebability pf destruying same types ef targets is un- fertunately yery law Gentlnuing analytical studies in my headquarters are being canducted fer the purpese ef determining the eptimum applica- tien ef IGBH's tn the urgent Air Fewer Battle target system It appears _new that the prime characteristics ef the can be erpleited beat by using it initially and disrupt aniet air effense and defense systems an the greund h ldl ghem degg until they can be destreyed by the manned bamber The IEHH will else be useful in disrupting central centers and their cammunieatiens and defense netwerks New I must dwell at same length en the main cancern ef any epera- tienal cemmander in establishing cenfidence in his estimate ef the cembat capability ef his weapen systems Initially he must expect that gg new weapen system will have yery law reliability It is inevitable that in field aperatienal use difficulties will be eneeuntered which were unfereseen in the labnraterles and net unceyered in the testing pregrams Furthermcre the rate at which these difficulties will he enceuntered m messes newness depends upcn the page ef eperatienal experience with the equipment Since B h $25 experience with manned hemher systems is accumulated rapidly their reliability can he increased rapidly an the I am cenfident that missile systems will net enjey such rapid impreuemcnt in reliability In the first place because ef their great expense the rate cf expendi ture ef missiles in training and simulated ccmhat firings will necessarily he small This means that difficulties will he unceuered ever a lenger peried ef time and the eppertunity te test fires will he cerrespendicgly limited Furthermere we have had ferty years' experience in the eperetien ef manned hemhers Iheir initial eperatienal prehlems have deyeleped inte recegnirahle standard patterns We kcew11uee to anticipate treehle and in general we can ferecast prehahle techniques fer fires Since we are just new entering the mism le are we de net have this hackgreund we csnnet aggjcipatg the areas in which te expect difficulties we csnnet new predist reasenahle techniques fer fires This cf ceurse will net always be the case I agree that EVEHIEHLII missile systems will reach a state ef reliability but I am certain that this will ceme enly after leng and hitter experience in the field VII EIEATEGIC Frem these censiderstiems and hasgg en epexagignal 11292 I have recemmended the fellewing prierity listing fer expedited deyelepment I Hedel lmpreyed 3-52 and its aids II ll h Chemical Bumber Hayahc IV IEEH V 125 Nuclear Eemher VI IREH 11 fou will notice that I have not included the Hodel Improved 3 53 in B-h 25 the priority listing In the event that programmed testing of the present 3-53 should substantiate the manufacturer's claims for the performance of the Hodel Improved 3-53 I may at a later date insert it but net as a replacement for the ll h Snark and Rascal should be cancelled I have already discussed the Snark An appropriate air to surface missile for the 3-52 should be ideveloped with high priority but not from the current Rascal model which has already been outpaced by the increasing Soviet defenses A Bee ASH is an important part of the penetration aids just mentioned in Priority 1 I'h'l DF ART CDNEI EEFMT Ihus'far I have been evaluating air offense weapon systems without regard to the influences of budgetary considerations This approach of course is unrealistic However in order totreat with this topic I must go beyond the scope of the subject you assigned me 'es we all know there is heavy public demand to reduce the total Federal budget and this of course would inevitably result in deep cuts in the Defense portion In my view some grave decisions must be made because even the level of the Defense budget is far below that which will be soon required unless many current weapon systems programs in all three services are eliminated or drastically curtailed For example within the Air force alone many weapon system pro- grams initiated during the past a to lo years are Just now beginning to reveal their ultimate cost implications in money and in manpower it is becoming increasingly clear that within the resource limitations which He can reasonably anticipate the Air Force cannot support all of these programs to their proposed ultimate In my view if we do not severely prune out some of these programs we won't be able te maintain even the manned bomber force at the required level of effectiveness end that ceuld have fatal em I results 12 ni 46me I am canfident that the Defense as a whale can praduce much mere effective cambat patential with less manep and manpawer than we naw require But this can't be dane until aur natianal strategy and the resultant military cancepts are mare specifically designed ta are plait the patentialities af madern weapan systems in eithg genera a liaiisd_ sst If I read the heat cf the taxpayer's temper carrectlp it is high time far the three Services tn came up with a saund and specific Prierities Plan far pruning the Defense establishment sa as ta maintain effective deterrent strength within the limitatians-af a iawer Defense budget In that end I prapase that First -we discard any ferces which are net clearly capable af prampt and effective cambet in a reg shat war This is cansistent with present Air Farce palicy gauerning mabiliratian reserve materiel requirements than we shauld prepare a detailed Plan fer Farce Reductian based an the fallawing tasks in the priarity indicated and uerr -- in A I that reguirements far farces capable af direct and ynhediatg participatian in the Air Fewer Battle must be canpletelp satisfied befare we can sensibly invest a nickel in anything else These farces include Izaf caursa bath the air affense farces and a reasanable scale af air Barents Neat -- winning the gagergga Battle I place this task next after the caunter-air task because the cantinental United States is vulnerable enlg ta air and undersea attack a enan cf n rf ce required tc 'shcw the flag and ta help hald alliances tagether and ta insure that Sauiet uialatian af Free Herid territar autamaticaiir becames a clear-cut act af lair Lag - maintenance nf such athc rcadI arc @ Wm LIBRHRI DP Etbl b bi -- of a fgiure wax Here let me am-ggt_talking about a protracted war I cannot conceive of major protracted engagements by surface forces which have been previously disembodied by a properly executed nuclear air offensive I recognise that some clean-up and policing may be required although I don t foresee any justification for major force requirements for this task There is always disagreement over the details of any priorities list but we can't get anygherg until we agree on a basic concept for applying the _totality of military strength in war and upon a clearrcut order of priority for the specific tasks that must be performed to carry out that concept It is the duty of military leaders to reach such agreement with- out regard to self-interest of the Service they represent I have proposed that the Air Force lead the way by drawing up a Priorities Plan for Force Reduction within our_cwn service national To that end I have recommended that the Air Force assume af efense policy embodying the following principal points i In war in which the Lhited States becomes engaged this nation will employ its best weapons in whatever strength deemed necessary to achieve prompt favorable decision 2 Whatever the choice of weapons the long-range sir uffense Force is fully capable of decisive employment in Limited without lowering our General War posture to an unacceptable degree a separate set of specialised tools for Limited Ear is not required 3 The overriding task is to win the Air Power Battle This requires that all offensive air power he placed under centralised command control 4 Regardless of weapons used or tprgets struck Limited bar will not expand into General War unless the Soviet Union refuses to accept the defeat of its Proxy and is not deterred by our General was posture 5 Force requirements based on the traditional concept and pattern of protracted war are no longer valid is 'Ile - I am ccnvinced that the tetal Defense budget is headed dewnward Tetal ferces must he eut accerdingly If these cuts are applied in the right places we can actually preduce mere genuine cemhat petential than we new here Such actien will net be taken heweuerIr unless respensible effieials in the ten-level pelicyhmaking echelen issue the necessary pelicy guidance in mere explicit language at least as explicit as the recent Hilsen HemerandeP en service respensihilities fer guided missiles I am fully aware ef the difficulties inyelyed in issuing erplicit directives under eur present Defense erganiratien wherein is pre requisite in agreement ameng service chiefs and department heads each ef when acts as a special pleader fer his particular erganisatien In principle I fully suppert cempremise as an essential element ef the decisien-nahlng precess in eur denecratic seciety But when the necessity fer cempremise plainly jeepardires eur capability in win the Air Fewer Battle I feel eeMpelled te speak up I repeat that until the requirements ef air effense ferees capable ef immediate and decisive partlcipatien in the Air Fewer Battle are satisfied we cannet sensibly invest a nickel in anything else tau haue already seen that during the crucial early hcurs cf the Air fewer Battle existing air effense ferees external te SAC ceuld actually eentrihute very little I ask ycu te eensider beyend that the huge netienal in- vestment in still ether weepens systems which cannet even 2533151213 in the Air Fewer Battle Furthermnre their feree levels are predicated en the assumptien that future wars -- either Limited er General may be pretreated In my Vi w this is incenceiyable if the air effense ferces dc that jab h Ferces incapable ef prempt effective empleyment in a very shert war sheuld be phased eut Thereafter feree prierities sheuld be based en the fellewing tasks in the erder indicated A Winning the Air Fewer Battle 15 The - @ng 3410725 3 winning the Undersea Battie- C Taken fereea tn shew the flag in peacetimei D Hederate aurfaee fer exploiting faeerabie in the Air Fewer Battle If an Defenae peiiey is revised aleng the feregeinn lines we eheuid be able te maintain the requisite eenbat-ready capability at the manned hember feree Hitheut unacceptably detracting from strategic mieeile deveiepnent during the next 1e tn 1 years If we de net take draatie aetien aieng these linea HEW either the tetai DafEnae budget meat he appreciable inereaaed er eur margin ef eembat capability will be danger euale during a meet hazardeue decade -- the eritieei 15 limit if 11- This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu