JeSEPRET OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFEN MaY 15 MEMO FOR 1969 DEPU'T'Y SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DEP SEC hS SEEN Attached is a memorandum to Henry Kissinger which points out that the NSSM 3 Study indicates a major U S damage limiting program is not feasible in view of likely Soviet reactions Recommend signature No coordination required DECLASSIFIED APR 1 01009 Enclosure Authority EQ 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS 25' 79 Sec Def Cont Nr Br- THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON D C 20301 16 MAY 1969 MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO TIE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS SUBJECT National Security Study Memorandum 3 Strategic Part U On May 1 2 1969 I forwarded a review of alternative nuclear strategies force postures and budgets to you in response to NSSM 3 There is one conclusion of this review that is particularly important and which I wish to ca11 to your attention This concerns the effects of Soviet reactions to major U S damage limiting programs The analysis of alternative nuclear strategies examined two major categories of U S strategic forces with increased capability over-bur programmed forces Forces in both of these categories Categories I and II had more offensive missiles and Ballistic Missile Defense BMD than the present program in order to limit damage to the United States to low levels provided we made a first strike against the Soviet Union The forces in Category I also had sufficiently high levels of BMD to significantly reduce damage to the United States if the Soviets made a first strike against our cities The following table shows the capabilities of these forces and of our programmed force against the high-NIPP Soviet threat in 1978 Their capabilities prior to 1978 are about the same or greater _0 C E t v 00 D Q Rod G w O Cosa L 00g 0QU U S FORCE EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST HIGH-NIPP SOVIET THREAT 197 FORCE CATEGORY I FORCE CATEGORY II PROGRAMMED FORCE Retaliatory Capability 50% 70% over 45-50% Over 70% U S Deaths Millions if U S Strikes First Less than 10 Less than 30 U S Deaths Millions if Soviets Strike First 55-75 8o-140 140 $18-21B $15-19B $1 5B Soviet Deaths Soviet Industry Destroyed 40% 65% Damage Limiting Capabi-litla Average Annual Cost of U S Forces $ Billions Determined in war-fighting calculations The U S first strike used all our missiles in a counterforce strike the Soviet first strike maximized- the difference between U S and Soviet deaths Sec Def Con' Kr 2 5 79 __ These results show that forces in Categories I and II have some increased retaliatory capability over the already high capability possessed by our programmed force Moreover they significantly reduce damage to the United States provided there is no Soviet response to offset this reduction The annual cost of achieving this increased capability could be as much as $6 billion more than the present strategic budget depending on the mix of land-based missiles seabased missiles and bombers Because significant U S damage limiting reduces the Soviet retaliatory capability the report of the Foreign Political and Military Reactions Working Group identified possible Soviet responses including the addition of more land-based and sea-based offensive missiles with increased numbers of MIRVs and better accuracies than projected in the high-NIPP and the addition of more bombers air defenses and BMD The following table summarizes the capabilities of the U S forces in 1978 if the Soviets did respond U S FORCE EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST SOVIET RESPONSE THREATS 1978 U S FORCE _-CATEGORY I VS SOVIET - RESPONSE 5 U S FORCE CATEGORY II VS SOVIET RESPONSE 5 U S PROGRAMMED FORCE VS HIGHNIPP SOVIET FORCE Retaliatory Capability Soviet Deaths Soviet Industry Destroyed 40-50% 40-45% 40% Over 65% Over 65% 65% 60-130 105-145 90 145 140-145 140 Damage Limiting Capability a U S Deaths Millions if U S Strikes First U S Deaths Millions if Soviets Strike First a Determined in war-fighting calculations The U S first strike used all our missiles in a counterforce strike the Soviet first strike maximized the difference between U S and Soviet deaths DECLASSIFIED AFR 10 2009 Authority Eta 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHSi 2 The Soviet responses'reduce the effectiveness of larger U S force postures to about that of the presently programmed force and in fact could result in less damage limiting capability than we now have In order to achieve the damage limiting goals of Force Categories I and II we would then have to respond to the Soviet actions Such response could for example include further increases to our BMD and air defenses at an additional annual cost of $1 billion to $6 billion This would result in average annual strategic budgets of $19 billion to $23 billion depending on the amount of confidence we program by redundancy in the force mix The Foreign Political and Military Reactions Working Group concluded that the Soviet Union would view the forces in Categories I or II as representing a U S determination to threaten their strategic position and possibly to gain a first-strike capability Their analysis showed that the Soviets have the technological and economic capability to offset a major U S damage limiting effort Not only could they make this response but it is highly likely that they would in fact react to what they would undoubtedly view as a severe threat to their deterrent Not only would this lead to increased Soviet strategic force levels but would also result in increased East-West political tensions APR 10 2W DECLASSIFIED Authority EQ 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHO 4 TOKS 0 7r - This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu