133 SYSTEM BQESE 2 2 ei i nTi' R Auguet S 1986 MEMORANEUM FOR ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSK FRQM WILLIAM E SUBJECT M-B-B Luncheon Item Targeting Welt Sloeombe told me late yesterday that Brown may choose to raise at the luneh today That seems like a good idea to me The sooner you let Muskie know the better I am attaching a copy of the P3 Tab A and also the SIGINT piece on Soviet tactical nuclear play in the Iran CPX Tab B If Mnekie has trouble with flexj bility you can cite for him the employment doctrine we shall be up against TS Followup action Tell Muskie that we shall excise the eames of countries i e SIOP etail from the PD an then give him a copy You can show him the sentence to be left out I have bracketed it on page 2 of the PD T8 2% 3 3 p'i xuflo thee x oit Ttue su okitk bxwoe e SW ta W 'Euhxo ltio Knee mm bu WITH 49193 13 mdt 7 519 WATTACHMENT W i Review on July 31 2010 Derivative Classification by Director NSA THE HOUSE we Epe v s sfasT Em 4 July 25 1980 as as We a I 2 19 35 1 9 '4 Presidential Directive NSC 59 TO The Vice President The Secretary of Defense ALSO The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff SUBJECT Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy C in I directed a follOW on study of our targeting policy for nuclear forces I have reviewed the results and considered their implications for maintaining deterrence in the present decade particularly in light of the growing Soviet strategic weapons arsenal and'its capabilities S Vg The most fundamental objective of our strategic policy remains nuclear deterrence I reaffirm the'directive of to that' effect The purpose of this directive is to outline policies and actions in the nuclear force employment field to secure that con tinuing objective 8 Our strategic nuclear forces must be able to deter nuclear attacks not only on our own country but also on our forces overseas as well as on our friends and allies and to Contribute to deterrence of nonenuclear attacks To continue to deter in an era of strategic nuclear equivalence it is necessary to have nuclear as well as con ventional forces such that in considering aggression against our interests any adversary would recognize that no plausible outcome would represent a victory oryany plausible definition of victory To this end and so as to preserve the possibility of bargaining effectively to terminate the war on acceptable terms that are as favorable as practical if deterrence fails initially we must be capable of fighting successfully so that the adversary would not achieve his-war aims and would suffer costs that are unacceptable or in any event greater than his gains from having initiated an attack C Downgrade-2 2 Per 91 0 lc v Review on May 15 2000' L0og O 5 Reason for Extension NSC l lB e Ca%3w_ a 'Q ii vailing strategy To meet these requirements improvements should be 2 The employment of nuclear forces must be effectively related to operations of our general purpose forces Our doctrines tor the use of forces in nuclear conflict must insure that we can pursue speCiric policy objectives selected by the National Command Authorities at that time from general guidelines established in advance 8 These requirements form the broad outline of our evolving counter made to our forces their supporting C3 and intelligence and their employment plans and planning apparatus to achieve a high degree of flexibility enduring survivability and adequate performance in the face of enemy actions The following principles and goals should guide your efforts in making these improvements 8 Pre planned options The Single Integrated Operational Plan will pre ' vide premplanned targeting for strikes against the Soviet Union its allies and its forces It should provide for retaliatory strikes that will be effective even if the Soviets attack first 'without warning and in a manner designed to reduce our capability as much as possible It will he developed with flexi_ble sub options that will permit to the extent that survival of C3 allows sequential selection of attaCks from among a full range of military targets in distrial targets providing immediate military support and political control targets while retaining a survivable and enduring capability that is sufficient to attack a broader set of urban and industrial targets In addition to the maximum extent possible pre- planned options 1 be provided for selection in response to specific lesser contingencies including attacks on Cuba SRV and North Korea as appropriate While it will remain our policy not to rely on launching nuclear weapons on warning that an attack has begun appropriate pre plan ning especially for ICBMs that are vulnerable to a preemptive attack will be undertaken- to provide the President the option of so launching TS Flexibility In addition to pre planned options we need an ability to design nuclear employment plans on short notice in response to the latest and changing circumstances This capability must be_compre hensive enough to allow rapid construction of plans that integrate strategic force employment with theater nuclear force employment and general purpose force employment for achieving theater campaign tives and other national objectives when pre planned response options are not judged suitable in the circumstances To assure that we can design such plans our goal should be to have the following capabilities on a continuing basis in peacetime during crises and during protracted conflict Staff capabilities within all unified and Specified commands which have nuclear forces to develop opera tional plans on short notice and based on the latest lintelligence ITIVE IfStaff capabilities at the seat of Government to Support the NCA for coordinating and integrating the nuclear force employment for all commands Intelligence and target development capabilities which permit damage assessment and acquisition of a broadv range of targets fixed and mobile on a timely basis for military operations 8 Reserve Forces Pre planned options should be capable of execution while leaving a substantial force in secure reserve and capable of being withheld for possible subsequent use The forces designated for the reserve should be the meet survivable and enduring strategic systems consistent with the need for a flexible and varied reserve force capable of being effectively employed against a wide target spectrum and withheld if necessary for a prolonged period 'The secure reserve force will be increased over the next two years to support a more flexible execution of our countervailing strategy This will be done according to the Secretary of Defense s guidance TS Targeting categories Overall targeting planning appropriate to imple ment a countervailing strategy will result in a capability to chooSe to put the major weight of the initial response on military and control targets Military targets must be selected for the purpose of destroy ing enemy forces or their ability to carry out military operations Strategic and theater nuclear forces should extent feasible be used in combination with and in support of general purpose forces to achieve that objective 8 A More specifically the following categories of military targets with appropriate subeoptions for different theaters should be covered in planning strategic and theater nuclear forces including nuclear weapons storage military command control communications and intelliu gence capabilities u all other military forces stationary and mobile w industrial facilities which provide immediate support to military operations during wartime T8 In addition pre planned options capable of relatively prolonged withhold or of prompt execution should be provided for'attacks on the political control system and on general industrial capacity TS There must be extensive and effective coverage in the 2 options of all categories Methods of attack on par should be chosen to limit collateral damage to urban a 4 industry and population targets outside these categories consistent with effectively covering the objective target and where appropriw ate overall plans should include the option of withholds to limit such collateral damage TS Command Control and Communications and Intelligence Flexibility in contingency planning and in operations will be highly dependent on our I capabilities including their ability to acquire targets assess damage and surviVe attack Strategic stability in an era of essential equivalence depends as much on survivability endurance and reconstitutability of C3I capabilities as it does on the size and character of strategic arsenals C directs that our C31 programs and our guidance to telecomw munications common carriers support the development and maintenance of such capabilities In addition directs that we seek greater continuity of government should deterrence fail Implementau tion of and must be pursued in parallel with that of this employment directive C The relationship of acquisition policy to employment policy Our acquisition programs must be evaluated in terms-of their support for the employment policy ordered by this directive The required flexi _bility survivability endurance and target destruction capability must be taken into account in developing programs for acquiring nuclear Weapons systems and their supporting I systems needed to support our countervailing strategy 8 Implementation As new targeting capabilities are developed and as our operational staffing support change to meet the foregoing direc tives they must be reviewed and tested to validate their feasibility and soundness For that purpose At least two exercises involving the National Command Authorities should be condUCted each year to evaluate our capabilities and our employment doctrines -i Continued study and analysis of means to improve and refine our countervailing strategy of general con flict should be conducted by the Department of Defense The results of these exercises studies and analysis will provide the bases for modification and any further development of employment and acquisition policy - A report will be rendered to the President at least annually on our employment plans including but not limited to on the size and capability of the 'reserve forces the degree of flexibility available limiting factors in achieving flexibility and he status of programs to provide improvements r Any change or new pre plauned options will be submitted to the President for his review and approval in accordanCe with current procedures TS is superseded by this directive U lmemeemm We This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu