DEPARTMEWTOFTHEJHRFORCE HEADQUARTERS AIR COMHAND OFFUTT J'sl FORCE BASE HEERASKA 6031- - 2- 1 Honorable Caeper W Reinberqer of Serene waehingtonr 99C 2930 Dear Mr Secretary one or our toughest jet moat important cialoguee recently has been on the continuing search for greater etabili $ in ihe wire Itegic balance This search involves two centralr but seemingly contradictory elements a real and growing Soviet strategic threatr end the pressing need to raise the nuclear threshold What we are seeking in a prudent balance between strength and stability I believe we are making real progress Recent initiatives to deploy more flexible forces negotiate significant arms reduc- tions and invebtigate emerging'technologiee all demonstrate our genuine desire for a safer world These efforts will help reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons without compromising deterrence In keeping with our long term goale my staff has been giving a great deal of thought recently to a fourth potential initiative - increased US reliance on strategic nonnuclear weapons rather than complete reliance on nuclear weapons The attached White Paper outlines some initial thoughts on the rola'of strategic nonnuolear weapons in our future deterrent force structure Although there are some uncertainties asso ciated with a US move in this direction e gH Soviet reactions public Opinion and the impact on deterrence I believe this is a concept that warrants serious consideration _Pleaae contact me if you have anj Questions on the attached material I look forward to a continuing dialogue on our most pressing deterrent issues theepectfully B L DAVIS 1 Atch General White Paper 551' Comandcr in Grief ROTEI ALTHDUGH INDIVIDUAL PORIIONS CLASSIFIED BY CINCSAC OF THIS LETTER HAY BE DECLASSIFY 0N OADR WHEN AS A THE CLASSIFI- CATION LEVEL OF THIS LETTER IS SECRET - DE 3 53138 EL w - rn - mosa- STEPPIHG BACK FROM THE NUCLEAR SEARCH FOR IMPROVED DETERRERCE Since the beginning of the nuclear age the US has been in constant pursuit of initiatives to control strategic weapcng uwd E86022 $11192 ria r TH rm - 1 ruese ale Jo save 353 many years hEVm been forced TD continue program to mouozolao we 3 raises in response to a growing $5v1e threat- Nevertheless we have no abandoned our goals an my continually examine every opportunity to reduce tensions and introduce gloat stability in the Silageg u nuclear ualance Over the P t few years in particular we naVe been seeking new and innovative measures to step back from the nuclear threshold Recent efforts can be grouped into three categories b A continuing movement away from maaoivc nuclear retal iatioo -tho evolution of US nuclear policy - Pursuit of deep and verifiable force reductions- arms control- The search for innovative but workable new concepts emerging technologies Each of these initiatives offers promise Each will help bring about a balance between the very real nature of the Soviet threat and the pressing need to create true long torm stability they represent a prudent approach to reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons There is a fourth initiative that could provide near term potential through a of the previous three we can increase as reliance on strategic nonnuclear rather than nuclear weapons There are affordable opportunities available by applying emerging technologies for strategic nonnuclear Weapons to support our overall strategic deterrent policy Properly integrated into our military strategy this initiative can be chieved without compromising our deterrent capabilities- - STRATEGIC NONNUCLEAR WEAPONS AND EVOLVING US NUCLEAR POLICY Over the past two decades we have sustained a gradual but steady movement away from the concept of assured destruction as the major component of our deterrent strategy The reality that any conflict could escalate to the level of massive retaliation is a moderating factor that would surely give any potential adversary pause but this capability in itself is not an adequate deterrent HOTB ALTHOUGH INDIVIDUAL PORTIONS OF THIS PAPER HAY BB UNCLASSIFIED HHEH TAKEN AS A WHOLE THE CLASSIFICATION CLASSIFIED 33 HO SACIEP LEVEL IS SECRET- DBCLASSIFY 0N1 OADR ml 4% In keeping with this doctrinal evolution we are developing a strategic force structure to deter convincingly at all levels of potential conflict no we are not forced to fight at any level The modernization programs we are pursuing will provide a much more flexible nuclear retaliatory capability A progressive strategic deterrent policy that incorporates innovative concepts with emerging technologies could allow us to make a valuable nuh lk- LJ LU 3 h gonnuclear weapons- There is an unfortunate tendency to equate strategic crolu sivel with nuclear one to forget that a conflict 6033 not noccusaiily need no invaluu ygcleg in order to on 33 3 tegic If emerging technologies can provide as the opportunity to hold a wide range of targets at risk with strategic nonnuclear weapons we may be able to raise the nuclear threshold increase the range of our retaliatory options and add another very stabi lising rung to the escalatory ladder Simply put new tech nologies can provide us the opportunity to employ strategic nonnuclear weapons as a significant deterrent option be effective strategic nonnuclear systems become a reality we must still retain a nuclear deterrent at the level necessary to protect our national interests Although we can--and should strive for deep nuclear weapon reductions it is unlikely our potential adversaries will ever permit us to eliminate them completely from our retaliatory force structure However the broader issue is the type of force structure we should pursue to raise the nuclear threshold as far as technological political and military realities will allow For example we could use nonnuclear weapons to hold strate gic categories of targets at risk and sustain deterrence below the nuclear level of canflict The fact that we would retain the option of a nuclear response should deter the Soviets from using nuclear weapons just as it does today If we do develop and possess a credible and clear nonnuclear retaliatory capability the Soviets would likely be driven to adopt a similar force 'structure This could represent real progress in US policy ovolution- a truly effective strategic deterrent capability that buould rely on fewer nuclear weapons srnarscic homeless WEAPONS AND anus common The stated goal of dramatic force reductions through meaning ful arms control agreements is an eminently sensible diplomatic approach to promoting long-term stability The negotiations are likely to be and frustrating but we have every reason to work vigorously to achieve this goal Although weapons reductions in themselves will certainly represent a step toward stability they may also pose some unique challenges mi '7 Fairly minor shifts in relative offensive capabilities would likely have a dramatic impact on the strategic balance at much lower levels of forces Unanticipated technological breakthroughs 2 9 Soviet strategic defense could be destabilizins if we are caught off guard will probably 20 have to soon uni initiativr to insure long term n uoili 3 nnforruna as simply cannot rely on Soviet willingnesn TD conform to cu - I 11 u- - at- of on -cnstitutee a cafe world Relative merits aside the various antinuclear and freese re resent an obvzous ublic statement a ainst nuclear s e honnuc ear rection could be important It should be a compelling statenent about true US desires for stability if we take the initiative by unilaterally moving away from sole dependence on nuclear weapons to maintain strategic deterrence The potential political ramifications are one facet of this issue that would require a very detailnn exami nation It is obviously important for the US to seize this ini tiative before the Soviets do if we hope to benefit from the political high ground STRATEGIC HONNUCLEAR WEAPONS AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGY Despite the fact that viable defensive systems are probably several decades away the study of such concepts represents healthy new thinking It forces us to reexamine our traditional approach to deterrence Perhaps we ehOuld extend the boundaries of our imagination one degree more and not limit our new horizons solely to the defensive arena Emerging technologies can provide affordable strategic offensive nonnuclear options within this decade- It can be argued that our reliance on nuclear weapons to maintain deterrence has been more a function of technological and economic constraints than deliberate choice In order to place the required Soviet targets at risk we have been forced to use nuclear destructive potential to compensate for limitations in the accuracy and firepower of nonnuclear munitions Although our current conventional weapons and delivery systems do not possess the capabilities required to meet the full range of our deterrent requirements there are several technological options Ee g cone ventionel non and conventional ALCM tha' have near term poten- tial A move to strategic nonnuclear weapons would require advanced submunitions with lethal accuracies These weapons I could be delivered effectively from outside or on the fringe or the lethal envelope of ground defenses to greatly increase flexi bility and accuracy while significantly reducing the risk of delivery aircraft attrition Technology can provide us an excellent weapon to accomplish this task- the long range standoff weapon ew advances in propulsion guidance systems and smart submunitione make this possible Improvements in computer oom E ialiuacl syct and capacity improved inertiel net gatigp development Of Tim 1 3101 qg'r and flu - Segung miorp 9f the 93-0133 - Jsiuoning satellite s3stem all contribute LU the ubili KG deliver a long range standoff weapon with very high eccura y Building strategic nonnuc ee standoff weanons and integrating them with our existing bombers would no rela tively inexpensive and the technologies are well understood advances in weapons technology we have made Egres fame progres in sensor and radar development The ability to Inquire and track tar ate at lon rangeswis noy an if 4 I combining new technologies a vnnces in weapons and sensors with the inherent attributes of long range aircraft we can produce a highly effective system Long-range bombers hold the most potential for the strategic nonnuclear role because of their inherent flexibility This flexibility exists today and can be enhanced tomorrow with the introduction of follow-on systems As we look to the possibility of strategic nonnuclear deterrent forces the manned bomber represents an ideal platform because of its long range all- Hoather day night ability to deliver diverse payloads These inherent attributes should be nurtured to provide the flexibility we will need before during and after iorco reduttions and to help us move confidently toward strategic nonnuclear options While maintaining the degree of nuclear deterrence required CONCLUSION when examined carefully a movement toward strategic nonw -nuc1ear deterrent systems is not a radical concept It is more a natural progression in our continuing search to maintain con vincing deterrence across the spectrum of potential conflict The inclusion of strategic nonnuclear systems will not significantly alter our fundamental planning for maintaining deterrence we will still identify an appropriate target base plan the best allocation of weapons against those targets even though some of our retaliatory assets may be nonnuclear and develop a Single Integrated Operations Plan SIDE to provide future National Command Authorities the most flexible range of options possible The current responsibilities of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff are likely to grow as the range of weapons they use to eat those responsibilities evolves 4 aim m' - In H Deployment of flexible strategic retaliatory foroen effort t5 negotiate arms reductions and the uearch for viable new con cepts will all help create true longnterm stability A US ini- tiative toward strategic nonnuclear weapons embodies positive aspects of our other efforts to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons Our immediate task is to identify the near term steps required t reach this capability safely by canitalizing on the i 105 aw teCh13010C i ER invn'l Us 1' fl 11 1 nanni- arm- I- I 0 I gua v 4 3523936 sellan a an Btratega 3 3ng f 3r 995 359 more etarrencn nrnmian 12 miraculon 3 Atch Chart Spectrum of Potential Conflict LS I Li Em in This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu