MEMORANDUM RM-3264 -PR AUGUST 1962 IMPLICATIONS OF A COMMUNIST CHINESE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY A BRIEFING U R L Blachly L Gour S T Hosmer A L Hsieh B F aeger P F Langer and M G Weiner I PREPARED FOR UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PROJECT RAND wann0 mg SANIA MONICA - CALIFORNIA I 10mm - No MEMORANDUM RM- 3264-133 AUGUST 1962 IMPLICATIONS OF A COMMUNIST CHINESE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY A BRIEFING U R L Blachly L Gouro S T Hoamer A L Haieh B F aeger P F Longer and M G Weiner - the United States This material con - formation affecting the national deft- - within the meaning of the - mission or the revelation of whic by law This research is sponsored by the Uni tract No AF 49 638 -700 mo_ J - of Development Planning Deputy Chief of Staff Resend-r or conclusions con- tained in this Memoran ould not be interpreted as represent or policy of the Uni - - - mes Air Force Permission to quote from or of this Memor - must be obtained from The RAND Corporation orce under Project Con- - official opinion Miran GROUP-3 changed Domnded It 12 you inter-uh Autho ty- Group 3 Not antenatal duh-in Br Phblications 5 27-75 1 for declassl cation on lagg tron IIAIN -sauu names anion-cu lW leI jl Hl 411- Misses PREFACE This Memorandmn is the text of a briefing of the 1mm study Implications of a Chinese Nuclear Capability undertaken at the request of Headquarters United States Air Force The briefing was presented during June 1952 to Hq USAF Directorate of Plans and the Air Force Advisory Group for ' le RAND Corporation by Col R L lachly proJect leader and to Rq PACAF by M G Weiner proJect co- leader The briefing is a condensation of mterial being prepared for a forthcoming mm Memoraham that is to be the major integrated report on the study Project research includes the following supporting studies on political military technical and economic aspects of the develop- I Political Studies Technical Studies A Nuclear Force and Chinese Analyses of Chinese Weapon Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy DeveloPment Japanese Reactions Mates of Chinese Nuclear Indian Reactions Delivery Vehicles Other Asian Nations' Reactions Sino-Soviet Relations IV Economic Studies MaarmamentandChineseStL-ateg Bil seIi Ill-tellcal Capabilities II Io litaryStudies Cl sePl Force - Pastures 1962-1970 Simplified Cost effectiveness Analysis on Possible Nuclear omlparisons of Nuclear Delivery Gamma against China Alternatives Several RAND Manon-ands that document the supporting research at are in preparation Already published by A Esieh Sane Th ts on China's loitation of a Nuclear Detonation Ui The RAND Corporation Main 1932 Confidential 1 w Memorandum reports a briefing that considers major military and political consequences and problems arising from Communist China's anticipated attainment of a modest nuclear capability A widest-med China v1 1 1 pose a substantially broader spectrum of challenges to the 0 5 position Asia than she has to date Hour- ever Chinese policy is noisily to contime to be omtious and ratioml and to seek gains by whiting those opportunities that represent acceptable levels of risk Mimtion or several possible moles and non-mines commas indicates that actions that provoke a mom- 0 8 response tspresent high risks to -the Chinese A deliberate confrontation by the Gainsse or 0 3 poni- din-ins this period is unholy vithcut support the Soviet union Bov- ever ouranaila-sas indimte that nous low levd mpport Iran the Soviet union for Chinese offensive use of militaw power unless 11 8 retaldntow capability is clearly inadequate the or the Soviet Union believes hereon to be niins's annex-genes as a mdearparervmadversely arrest nances and military pas-Ian's in Asia and will gamete pressures on U S freedm or action in the area Peiping is most likely to exploit hei- opportmities thmigh pontiooi and low level military actions Tomeebthe direct cambertheuidemnge or repercussions in Asia the United Slates must credible this Em - UNCASSEM nation's mass 8-1111 'CB-Pab ity to oppose effectiv y all Chinese aggressive action This implies that the united States regains an improved flexible posture strengthened by fast-reacting males - and non-aides - daivery and support systens within the theater The may suggests that a significant contribution to U S strategy would be the desimtion and mintensnce in the Pacific area or U S uncle forces explicitly targeted for China and capable of flexible and selective enmloyment against a wide me of Chinese massive actions Such a force would present an identi able deterrent to Chinese 33512881011 without tedious U S deterrence of the Soviet Union mini- mize the riskzocf Soviet intervention resulting frun misinterpretation oi ms intentions and strengthen Asian confidence and win to resist -711- Uf i SSif J CONTENTS 111 Section I CWST cam 1 TEESOVIET - 1 1 e333 1L COMMUNIST CHINESE Cammunist China represents a growing threat to the United States in the Pacific The threat is military political and economic to understand its nature we turn first to Communist Chinese ohjectiyes in the area and to the manner in which they may try to achieve these _ohjectives For the past 12 years Communist China's foreign and military policies here been directed at three major objectives--the achievement of leadership in Asia the attainment of a great power status and the acceleration of the Communist movement with the enhancement of China's role in that-movement The Chinese have used a range of pelitical economic cultural and military techniques in implementing these objectives Wherever possible they hate suited the means to their long-term goals In doing so they here used military force or the threat of force as one technique With the attainment of a nuclear capability the prospect of the further use of force is increased this force will he used depends on many things Of critical importance nill'be Chinese estimates of 0 5 power and intentions in the area Of equal importance will be the way in which they calculate the support that they will receive the Soviet Uhion In addition Chinese actions iill be influenced'hy the military doctrine they hate developed over the years and upon the qpportunities arailable to implement this doctrine I One widespread image of the Chinese use of force is that they are both inexperienced and reckless and that these factors in the E51 asses nuclear age could be catastrophic Our analysis of Chinese actions indicates that this image is not consistent with actual Chinese behavior Their doctrine recognizes force as omdy one of the instruments of policy It is not the final resort when all political means fail but only one of the tools of the political struggle- Despite many of their puhlicvstatements they have shown con- siderable understanding of the impact of nuclear weapons on their actions They have openly discussed the implications of nuclear warfare they hate emphasized development of an air defense capability they hate acknowledged the possibility and dangers of escalation and they have been aware of their dependence on the Soviet nuclear deterrent Thus despite Open dcprecation of nuclear weapons Chinese beharior and doctrine place great emphasis on a cautious and rational approach to the use of military force The difference between Chinese pronouncements which create the image of a reckless and irresponsible China and Chinese practice which is cautious and rational appears to be motivated by the internal and international value that they derive from creating and maintaining the image This does not imply that the Chinese will not resort to force when the opportunity presents itself but rather that they will use force when the opportunities represent low risk And they will continue to exploit their military capability at the political and propaganda levels to help create such opportunities 15 an 71' hr' i -3- II THE SOVIET ROIE As part of the over-all study we have attempted to assess the trends in Sino-Soviet relations and to make some estimate of the posi- tions that the Soviets might take in regard to a Chinese possession of nuclear weapons We appreciate the of these problems and once again we will attempt only a summry on our conclusions to date It'or a long time to come we see the basic factors in Soviet policy consisting of preservation of the Soviet Union and its political system 0 strengthening of Soviet power and economic well-being preservation of Soviet leadership in the international Commist movement and preservation of the unity of power of the Commist Bloc Some of these objectives con ict with Chinese objectives On the otherhandit is apparentthatbothChinaandthe Soviet Unionhave certain common objectives and thus considerable interest in preserving son form of unity and cooperation Although acne problems have developed and will continue to in uence Sine-Soviet relations neither power would profit from a complete break Sine-Soviet relations are likely to remain in a state of partial and shifting cooperation and rivalry during which the Soviet Union will give some recognition to China's needs and interests and provide it with low risk assistance and support tube most like forms of assistance will be political support for certain actions as well as economic and non-nuclear military assistance The Soviets are not inclined to welcome China's emergence as a nuclear power since this would lessen China's dependence on the Soviet I - I involving the Soviet Union and about the increased ability of the Chinese to blackmail them by threatening to engage in dangerous actions that might lead to mjor conflict with the United states In View of these factors we believe that the Soviets will have little interest in militarily Buggerting any Chinese attempts to expand by force It is that she would provide direct military mrpport for operations against Nationalist china because of her low interest in that area The soviet Union is likely to oppose Chinese desires regrdina Japan Indonesia or Indie because of major Soviet interest in these comltries th er any circthances the Soviets will probably seek to heap any con ict involving China localized- and nhtivdy rcs'tredned She would probably attempt to res-unis any Chinese initiation of moles weapons or the direct threat our initiation In the event of an attack to assist in the defense of China the nature and scope of the assistance is not defined and will be based strictly on Soviet self-interest At the sanctineit relations while relevant would probably not be the decisive factor territory The relative strength of U B and Soviet strategic forces and the Soviet assessment of 11 5 objectives in the area will be decisive factors - 1 W1 Ul umnsraw We- conclude that- the Soviets are not apt to participate directly in low level Chinese operations where the two countries have conflicting objectives or where Soviet interests are very limited The Soviets are not likely to participate in any high lavel Operations with the Chinese for fear on escalation The Soviets will attempt to restrain the Chinese from any use of nuclear weapons And the Soviets are more likely to intervene in a nuclear conflict between the United States U s objectives 1h such a conflict appear to be the over- throwoftheCmmistregimeinChina the United States fails to or cannot distinguish between ChinaandtheSavietthaion the diversion of ms forces to attack China weakens the U S deterrent posture against the Soviet Union UHCLASEJHLC -6- HI MEIIARY APPRAISAIB Independent of the degree of Soviet support we anticipate that the Chinese can threaten the United States and our allies at a number of different levels once they possess a nuclear capability The levels can include 0 Direct military threat of the use or nuclear weapons on the United States or allied countries 0 lower level operations 0 line use of nuclear weapons as part of political propaganda operations Ourstudyattempts teemineeachofthese levels interns of the risk that they re'prescnt to the Chinese Our eamminations include analyses of various possible military empaigns and various possible political exploitations of a melee - capability Based upon intelligence intonation available to us and upon sane estimates of their econanic industrial and technical capability we have identified certain trends in Chinese military posture that we believe are plausible and feasible within the next ten years In brief these include strength addus'lznents and modernization in the emandnawy Forthe ChineseAirForce thetotalmmberofeirerart will decrease with emphasis on improved defensive weapons such as new fighters air-to-eir missiles surface-to-sir missiles at the 5 4-2 type and mansion of radar coverage l Ehe total masher of light bmbers will decrease and considerable emphasis will be placed on improved offensive capabilities such as more medium Jet banbers and under appropriate conditions the development of a medimn-rsnge The dimly-tic techniques indnded tactical exercises taro-sided warm de I '4 -WL n7- nuclear missile capability Accompanying these developments would be limited numbers of 20- to nuclear weapons for bomber and missile delivery Using this posture we have conducted a number of military appraisals to obtain a gross estimate of the outcome of some of the various operations the Chinese would'be capable of undertaking against the united States and its allies For each of the militaxy'campaigns we have chosen a Chinese military capability consistent with a 1966 67 time period Our choice of this time period and of the particular Chinese military capability should not be regarded as predictions They were chosen primarily because they appeared to us to provide a representative threat and because information on U S programs for this period-was available The initial case we examined was the capability of programmed theater forces to carry-out a nuclear campaign against China following a Chinese first use of nuclear weapans against Taiwan The obJective of the campaign was to destroy the assumed offensive air and missile capability of the Chinese which consisted or 36 located at 12 sites more than 100 medium Jet bombers of the Badger type and a large number of Jet light bombers and Jet fighters Our investigation indicated that the programmed theater forces would have several difficulties in eliminating the Chinese offensive Two maJor considerations in selecting this counterforce campaign were 1 its tendency to minimize Soviet intervention because the Chinese regime itself was not attacked and 2 its reduction of Soviet capability for supplying bomber replacements because of damage to Chinese airfields f 8- - un'i'i 5 capability These difficulties included lack of adequate range for deep pnetrations a limited capability to reach the assumed Chinese missile sites before launch and considerable defense attrition if penetration were made at high altitude We therefore found it necessary to aument the prong theater - force with one wins of 13-52 aircraft equipped with Hound Dog missiles and one Polaris submarine 55131 with 25004 mi range A-3 missiles These forces 3-525 and Polarisj are mustrative only they mpresent types 0f capabilities not preferences for specific systems After this assmned augmentation the United States had theater based tactical fighters and Mace missiles Seventh Fleet aircraft 3-5 28 and Polaris missiles available for the cmmterforce campaign or this force only 3-523 Polaris missiles and a portion at the theater based tactical fighters were lamehed They attacked all occupied Chinese airfields all moccupied airfields with hard-surface may-s potentisissagerhsses anathema-Ms Table 1 provides a brief emery of this campaign Table CASEI 0 3 Force Chinese Targets Chinese Surviving ET 3-52 Airfields Airfields 65 Occupied 5 Gamma 63 TAC fighters 200 Jet 16 Badgers 7 MC fighters bombers plus some fighters 16 Mace fighters l2 ready a1 thocmxpied 2 Unoccupied Polaris on reams 1 5m 36 was 12 sites Hi I 5 a mssam an 013' the basis of this hypothetical si'lmation under the conditions we had Postu1sted we drew the following conclusions 1 Augmented theater forces have the capability to destroy a substantial portion of the Chinese offensive capability 2 There are several maJor deficiencies in Chinese air defense including ear y'warning and low level coverage and missile and aircraft defense against low level penetrations 3 11 5 losses in such a campaign would be small h The limited Chinese offensive capability remaining does not represent a maJor threat to our Pacific posture 5 U S -augmented theater forces have the capability for a against China If required such a strike could he against a selected Chinese industrial-technical target complex or against political control centers This case demonstrated that any Chinese aggressive behavior that provoked a U S nuclear campaign aginst the mainland with the augmented theater force would result in severe damage for the Chinese with small losses for the united States For the Chinese to risk such a response vould be inviting disaster However the possession of a nuclear capability provides the Chinese with the option of striking the forces in the Pacific first Our second case study examined one possibility of this type In this situation the same forces were assumed for the Chinese and the united States was assumed to have augmented its theater posture with the forces previously described one wing of 3-52 aircraft and one SSBN In addition two carriers were added to the Seventh Fleet soi- this situation it was assumed that a high state of tension existed between the United States and the Soviet Union and the Chinese used this as an Opportunity to strike the united States in the Pacific The Chinese attack was a combined aircraft and missile attack on U S bases in the area on the Mace installations on Okinawa and an the Seventh Fleet Although there are a number of aspects of the attack that are critical to its success including Chinese capabilities for aerial refueling undetected penetration of radar nets accuracy and reliability of Chinese missiles and ability to locate the Seventh Fleet such an attack anuld result in considerable destruction to our Pacific posture although Chinese losses uould be high Table 2 presents a'hrier summary this campaign Table 2 CASE II ATTACK Chinese Force U S Targets U S Surviving Chinese Losses 2 MERE Airfields 10 me fighters 51 bombers PACAF 375 68 Badgers tighters Mace ho Beagles 5 Nationalist 12 3-523 China a 35 fighters 2 Carriers 1 Guam hs 3-523 1kg attack - aircraft 32 Mace survived 5 carriers 252 attack aircraft 1 sass not 1 sass not targeted targeted aThere was reasonable'doubt about the survival of a third carrier 1 grease- ti We'then examined the ability of the United States to retaliate from this damaged posture The same Chinese target complex target priorities and defense capabilities were used'as in the U S attack from an undamaged posture In addition this case involved some critical assumptions about the ability to coordinate such an operation after the Chinese attack One of these was that the naval aircraft that had been launched on warning of the Chinese attack would be authorized to proceed to target while their fuel condition permitted Table 3 presents a sunnmr 'of this campaign ITahle 3 CASE II 11 3 Won I 11 5 Force Chinese Targets Chinese Surviving U'lsz ssigb t 12 3-525 Airfields Airfields I30 Attack aircraft 65 Occupied a 9 Occupied and amers 10 TAC fighters 21 occuPied 3 3-523 - 6 unoccupied Mace '150 Jet 3 Mace Bombers plus 16 Badgers 131 Navy Attack fighters Aircraft - many fighters 36 1mm 12 12 ready sites 1 HEEM site Polaris- - 0-3 Minis picket - ships 0n the'basis of this case study under our postulated conditions we concluded that l Surviving theater forces would be capable of destroying a substantial portion of the Chinese offensive capability 2 The surviving Chinese capability would not represent a maJor threat to the remaining U S forces and hases I u J's-1 -01 j I Lt 2 J- -12- 4 3 U S losses to Chinese air defense would be higher than in the attack described earlier because of lack of coordination and the requiruent for multiple target coverage by manned aircraft Follows such an attack the United States would not be able to carry out a maJor second strike with the augmented theater force because most of the missiles would have been expended and manned aircraft could not return to their bases because of range limitations or base destruction In general however U S nuclear campaigns against China with the forces we have assumed whether from an undamaged or a damaged posture would present the Chinese with heavy losses The willingness of the Chinese to accept such losses is not in line with our view of the traditional caution with which they employ military force There are of course conditions under which such conflicts could develop including miscalculations or Chinese willingness to accept higher risks because of internal pressures The possession of a nuclear capability provides the Chinese with many other options than direct attack upon the U S Pacific posture We have selected only one of these a situation in which the Omnist Chinese possess nuclear weapons and to anploy them as an umbrella while undertaking non-nuclear operations against the Nationalist Chinese He selected this situation for a number of reasons Three of the major reaons were that Nationalist China has been an objective of Communist China for many years that political factors play a very significant role in such a situation and that such a situation provides a vehicle for looking at both U S and Chinese non nuclear capability in the period Once again we will only summarize the results of our study I _13_ madman We examined three variations of this option-meats assault of Big memoir interdictio 01' Clumsy and an assault on Taiwan In each assault case only non-nuclear forces were used With the Option of using nuclear weapons available to both sides total forces available to the Communist Chinese remained the same but with greater strength in the Taiwan Strait ems - In addition Nationalist Chinese forces were augmented by deploy- ment of four USAF and Marine squadrons fran Japan to him reposition- ing of the Seventh Fleet and CASE deployments to the area A similar augmentation with 3-525 and a Polaris submrine was mdertaken to strengthen the melee deterrent For the assault on Big Quemoy we estimated based on standard w New and Air Force planning factors that the Chinese would have to commit more than 250 000 troops and about 14000 landing craft of various types They would have to support this force with more than 1I000 air sorties against fortifications and artiliew emplacments Our analysis indicated that rm assault on Big Quemoy even without Nationalist Chinese or U S air intervention would cost the Conmmist Chinese more than men and sizeahleamounts of equip- ment A determined defense in which the Nationalist Chinese comitted their air force to prevent the asth would make the cost much higher Commitment of U S non nuclear forces would nn'ther increase the cost and leave the Conmnmist Chinese only a marginal chance of success Such operations would raise a masher of political problems regrding Nationalist Chinese-U S relations and relations with some of our other allies There would also be some politico-military New a 4 problems concerning U S force deployments in the area there apparently would be little military benefit to a Chinese initial use of nuclear 1weapons because of the variety of options available to the United States to respond It also appears that the United States would not be required to initiate the use of nuclear weapons as long as the situation remained confined to an assault on Big Quemoy non-nuclear forces seem adequate to make the operation almost prohibitively costly to the Chinese in both man and material The second possibility a Commnist Chinese attempt to interdict the supplies to Quemoy was found to be a very unstable situation with numerous Options for' expanding the war open to the United States and the Nationalist Chinese and to their enemy It appeared however that a determined effort to continue supplying the island could prevent the interdiction attempt from being successful at the military level During such a period the united States could anticipate considerable pressure from some allies to avoid expanding the con ict and to seek that would reduce tensions in the area The final variation was a Chinese nan-nuclear assault on Taiwan Based on the estimated Chinese force required for the Quemoy operation it appears that they would have to comit a maJor portion of their total military force to rm assault on Taiwan Considering the operational difficulties involved in carrying out such an assault against a determined defense the Communist Chinese would have only a marginal chance of success Since air operations would be critical to the outcome of the invasion it appears that a communist Chinese 51-3 33 1A5 5mm mamas -15 Strike against the Nationalist Chinese air bases would be part of the operation The air strike and invasion attempt would raise the question of U S nuclear intervention 01 the various options avail- able to the United States the use of nuclear weapons on the invasion force assuming that U S timing of the strike was adequate offered the greatest promise of eliminating the immediate threat and keeping the con ict localized Our study of the use oi a nuclear capability as an mbrella for aggression against the Nationalist Chinese indicates that the cost of such operations to the enemy would be very high for an attempt against Quemoy or Tehran and that the emitment of 11 5 non-nuclear forces would make them even higher In View of the military meertainties of success and the risks involved it does not appear that possession or a nuclear capability by the Cmmist Chinese represents a major contribution to military Operations against Nationalist An additional group of case studies dealing with Chinese inter- vention in Southeast Asia is not yet complete These cases examine Chinese comitment of ground forces with nuclear support Up to this time two points in the are clear 1 It is difficult to identify situations in which the Chinese could use their nuclear capability in a decisive manner it the United States chose appropriate responses and The results of our military analyses are generally consistent with earlier RAND studies updated on the basis or technological and posture changes expected for both sides by the late sixties mm 3 -15- 2f Non- ilitary factors would be significant in such situations - Our case studies indicate that U S nuclear capability with some augmentation in the Pacific can be effective against Chinese high level non-nuclear or nuclear operations As long as the Chinese are snare of the risks involved and maintain a policy of rational calculation of these risks such U S cepabilities can represent a significant deterrent to Chinese high level aggression However it is to he noted that the augmented theater forces seemed in this study were Ina-rm effective in the case of U S retaliation from a damsged posture As Chinese capabilities increase there will he a requiranent for additional augn-tation of nuclear delivery systexhs that are relatively inwlnerahle to both political and nilitery action have long range quick response tine and high effectiveness ageinst a variety of targets and defenses Otherwise the balance of power in the Pacific could shift and reduce the risks to the'Chinese of overt use of force $333533 CQNFIDENTIAI i message -17 IV POLITICO-MILITARY APERAISALS we have examined Chinese options for the use of military force at the higher levels of violence and have concluded that these are likely to involve unacceptable risks for the Commist Chinese How- ever we recognize that they have other choices for exploitation of @311 growing power which represent clower risks and which could create opportunities for attainment of their long-term goals These options involve political exploitation of their nuclear capabilities as well as the use of military force at the lower levels to improve their military position relative to the United States We consider such actions to be the most likely course for the Chinese as long as the United States maintains an effective deterrent against high level aggression Further we expect the Chinese to pursue these options aggressively The Chinese will attempt to disrupt the U S alliances inhibit local self-defense efforts and force Asian nations to impose restric- tions on U S access and military policies in the area The Chinese will be likely to carry out this campaign by a variety of techniques deprecating the U S military position to reduce allied confidence in the United States 0 stressing the dangers of nuclear war 0 using nuclear threets and blackmail emphasizing the vulnerability of U 8 bases and allied countries to attack 0 fostering various ambiguous arms control and disarmament proposals and prompting and supporting local Communist and insurgent movemnts If successful such a Chinese campaign will confront the United 1 ml ASSif-S i States with the following problems in Asia fmi - 43 A greater tendency for Asian nations to seek that avoid testing Chinese intentions and capabilities 2 Increased internal instability and insurrection in certain Asian countries 3 Low level military PrObes against U S allies to test U S will and capability to respond Restriction or denial of U S bases on allied territory and Political Pressure on the United States to control or to limit its military responses in the area Chinese claims and threats are most likely to be backed up by a maJor effort aimed at conveying an impression of great military strength This could include 613le and demonstrations of military equimnt maneuvers air shows missile and nuclear tests and maJor reorganizations of the armed forces such as creation of a special rocket ounmand their indications of great power will make difficult an adequate estimate of their true capabilities 'me propaganda and publicity may be in even greater volume than was characteristic of the Soviets during a canparable period and could lead to a biased estimate of Chinese capabilities The allied comtries of the area will be confronted vith two nador motions 1 Hill the U S alliance continue to be capable of providing protection against Chinese present 2 Will this protection entail unbearable risks for the country and heighten the danger of con ict with China Doubts about the answers to these questions will increase pressure on the United States to avoid antagonizing China to seek an accomm- dation our critical problems to avoid provocative actions to consider options such as arms control or disarmament and to avoid any situation that increases the risk of con ict i 1 Lia-rinses '19- response to these problems will involve convincing the allies that the or power in the Pacific has not changed as result of a Chinese nuclear capability that there is validity in maintaining military alliances with the United States that the indi- vidual comtries are part of the cannon defense against Chinese ambitions and that the United States and her allies can maintain an effective postm-e for 116811118 with a nuclear-armed China at low risk to the indi- vidual comtries To make these positions credible the United States win he requind to demonstrate a willingness and a recognizable capability to deter or to retaliate against Chinese high level aggression In addi- tion the United States will be required to maintain appropriate caper hilities for dosiing with low level actions so as to strengthen the will and the participation of U S allies in common defense efforts the cmnhination of these capah ities covering a spectrum of Chinese pohtieo-militay options can serve to minimize the impact of a Chinese nuclear capability in am -20- UNCIASSEMJ V CONCIIJSIONS l IEhe Comnnmist Chinese have consistently pursued their long- term objectives in the Pacific despite an inferior military position A nuclear-armed China will pose an even broader spectrum of political and military problems for the United States and Asia 2 A nuclear-armed China can expect only ambiguous or low level Sovi'et support for any offensive use out its military power except where U s capabilities are clearly inadequate the Soviet Union is implicitly threatened or the marvival of the Ccomnmist regime in China is at stake 3 Popular impressions to the contrary China's use or military force even when in possession of a nuclear capability will continue to be based on opportunities that represent acceptable risks 11 The United smtes theater force with augmentation as the threat increases can pose high risks to unilateral Chinese high level nuclear and non-nuclear aggression 5 Exploitation of the Chinese nuclear capability through political means and in low level military operations will be the most likely course of action either by itself or as an accaupaniment to higher level military operations 6 The actions of a nuclear-armed China will result in pressures on the United States to demonstrate its willingness and capability to oppose these actions at any level 7 One military implication of this situation is the requirement for continued improvement of non-nuclear delivery and support systems to permit political and military flexibility in 15 5 actions i -21 8 A mado'r contr zution to U S strategy would be the desigmtion and mintenance in the Pacific area of U S nuclear forces explicitly targeted for China The principal characteristics of these forces would he 0 a relative invulnerahility to political and military threats 0 a capability for deployment and for launching without weakening or otherwise being confused with forces main- tained for deterrence of the Soviet Union 0 a capability for flexible employment under a wide range of conditions and an expandability as Chinese capabilities increase This force would 1 present an identi able and credible deterrent to Chinese agression 2 minimize the risk of Soviet involvement by demonstrating a capability for selective use against China and 3 strengthen allied confidence and will to resist ENCLASSIEM ml This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu