DECLASSIFIED 'Aub ority Q7 52 FOREIGN DISSEM I Ir A 2 DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2 In K 7 BUREAU or INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH O 3' Research Memorandum a ESE-123 September 11 1963 5' FILE cop TOE Secretary Timouomg FEDM 3 Thomas L Hughes if-1 0 I quip SUBJECT Soviet Attitude Toward Chinese unist Acquisition Of A Nuclear-WEapons Capability The Sino Soviet polemic that erupted on the nuclear-test ban treaty following the latter's signing July 25 has shed new light 5 on Moscow's attitude toward Peiping's acquisition of a nuclear- i - weapons capability This report discusses this question and speculates briefly on possible Soviet efforts to impede and counter Chinese Communist development of a nuclear-weapons capability ABSTRACT The Soviet leadership is clearly against Chinese Communist acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability although neither public nor private statements on the subject have manifested noticeable concern over this possible develOpment as such There has in fact been some slight contradiction between Moscow s public and private position as to whether such a develOpment would be a good or a bad thing The Soviets presently take the attitude that Chinese Communist acquisition of a limited nuclear weapons cape bility would not significantly change the strategic balance of power and that it would be some time before i the Chinese could develOp such a noteworthy capability i In fact their emphatic remarks on China's backwardness and the level of economic develOpment necessary to de- velop a great-power nuclear missile weapons system suggest they take the most conservative view of the likelihood of Peiping's acquiring such a capability except over a very long period of time ROUP Excluded grom automatic downd' grading and declassification FOREIGN DISSEM lav DWLASI summit 072522 Bur Ia NARA 0 2mm ir No FOREIGN DISSEM 2 At the very minimum the Soviets believe that the limitations on Chinese Communist emergence as a major nuclear power will provide them with considerable time before they have to face up to what they as well as the rest of the world must presently regard as an undesira ble and somewhat awesome development In the meantime they will hope for developments which will change the nature of the present Chinese Communist regime and will do what is politically and practically feasible to impede and offset Chinese Communist progress toward a nuclear capability Present Soviet Argumentation Against Chinese Acquisition Moscow's current attitude toward Peiping's acquisition of a nuclear capability has been set forth at greatest length in re- marks made by Khrushchev during a numberrof OOnVersationsh- heldwintrecent and in the Soviet Government statements of August 3 and August 21 replying to Chinese Communist attacks on the test ban treaty and Soviet nuclear policies generally It is of interest to note that neither publicly nor privately do the Soviet statements reflect particular concern over Chinese Communist acquisition of a limited nuclear-weapons capability If anything they tend to belittle the significance of such a development and to imply that Peiping s acquisition of a significant nuclear missile capability is a matter of the distant and unforseable future It is also of interest that the main Soviet arguments against Chinese Communist acquisition of nuclear weapons are by and large the same as those used by the US against nuclear proliferation However the Soviets do not specifically cite the dangers of Chinese Communist possession of nuclear weapons although such dangers are implied in Soviet accusations against Peiping of be igerency and readiness to risk world nuclear war to achieve communist goals Of cardinal significance is the fact that the Soviets are now for the first time publicly arguing against Chinese Communist acquisition of a nuclear-weapons capability Many of the Soviet arguments have no doubt been used before in private with the Chinese As the Soviet Government's August 21 statement put it More than once the Soviet Government took measures to convince the CPR government that prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons meets the interests of peace the interests of all socialist countries among them the interests of the Nevertheless the public argumentation on the subject has raised it to an issue of the first magnitude in the Sine-Soviet conflicta FOREIGN DISSEM mama Anatomy 472522 I Eur L rem-x Datum i FOREIGN DISSEM 3 Initial Small Ca abilit of No Si nificance When queried last July about what situation would 0%tain when the Chinese exploded a nuclear bomb Khrushchev downgraded the significance of such a development asserting that the correlation of forces would not change that it was one thing to explode a bomb and f another to produce nuclear weapons as both the UK and France were aware This was almost exactly the line Khrushchev expounded in his discussion of the subject in the US on September 17 1959 with Henry Cabot Lodge his escort when he stated concerning proliferation and Communist China's explosion of a nuclear bomb that one nuclear bomb does not make a great power as France s I example showed I This general theme was reiterated publicly in the August 21 statement which asserted that even if the CPR were to produce two or three bombs this would not solve its problem but would in effect adversely affect Communist China's security Let us grant that by overstraining its economy the CPR will finally be able to produce a few atomic bombs But how many such bombs would in this case be aimed by the imperialists at the Would the Chinese leaders then feel themselves more secure even though sitting on their own bomb No Soviet Concern Privately the Soviets have denied con- cern over Chinese acquisition of a nuclear capability Khrushchev flatly asserted that he was not at all concerned even if the Chinese exploded a nuclear device soon Just as no one was con earned over UK French possession of a nuclear capability 21- However when queried as to the possibility that a Chinese nuclear capability might be directed against the USSR Khrushchev's evasive answer indicated the Soviets might not be as sanguine over this prospect as they pretend His comparison of the Sino-Soviet conflict to the differences that attend the US-UK French relation- ship in the west grossly belittles the scope and nature of the Moscow-Peiping rift as Khrushchev probably realized but neverthe less felt was a good line to take with a western statesman Khrushchev attributed Chinese Communist militancy and irresponsibility to their ignorance of nuclear weaponry and stated this attitude would change when they possessed nuclear mEans However some concern over Chinese intransigeance appeared to be reflected in Khrushchev's statements urging that the US contribute to moderating Chinese behavior by leaving Taiwan and by recognizing the Peiping government and admitting it to the UN before China possessed nuclear weapons FOREIGN DISSEM p I - DECLASIFIED Au u'zority Q79522 - Daf mjo FOREIGN DISSEM 4 Skegticism Regarding Chinese Communist Capabilities To the extent at ovie disp ay 0 unconcern over eiping's acqui sition of nuclear weapons is genuine it is probably due primarily to Mbscow's view that Chinese acquisition of a strategically significant nuclear missile weapons system is a distant prospect and thus not an immediate worry I Probably the major point emerging from Khrushchev's discus sion of prospects for Chinese Communist acquisition of a nuclear- weapons capability was his emphasis on the economic might needed to develop nuclear weapons and missiles might which he insisted only the US and USSR had at present Although acknowledging that the USSR had given the Chinese limited assistance in developing a nuclear capability prior to 1960 Khrushchev expressed the belief that the Chinese were developing very slowly in this respect He even expressed skepticism that Peiping would conduct a nuclear explosion within a year or two noting that such reports had been appearing in the press over the past two years but were he thought more invention than reflection of fact At the same time he professed Soviet ignorance as to the rate of Chinese progress in nuclear weapons deve10pment And he implied Soviet belief that the Chinese could eventually make progress in this field when he asserted with special emphasis that so far only the US and USSR had been capable of accumulating nuclear weapons The same attitude toward Chinese Communist capabilities has reportedly been expressed recently to the Indians by a ranking Soviet official Who asserted that while the Chinese might conduct a nuclear explosion in late 1963 or 1964 they would not be able to explode or manufacture atomic bombs and it would be almost impossible for China to produce delivery systems or nuclear war- heads for many years to come The Soviet Government's August 21 statement strongly emphasized this point asserting It must be admitted that being at a definite stage of its economic development possessing a definite economic potential the CPR is yet unprepared to produce nuclear arms in quantity The statement argued that the most reasonable policy for the CPR in present conditions -- if of course its desires and potential are to be commensurate would be to devote its efforts to all round economic-scientific develop- ment aimed at improving the welfare of the Chinese people rather than overstraining its economy to produce a few bombs Al- though this is propaganda aimed at the Chinese people over their leaders' heads it nevertheless contains a large measure of truth and reflects Soviet awareness of the actual situation FOREIGN DISSEM - a- - mm 47251253 0mm FOREIGN DISSEM 5 Soviet Nuclear Shield Provides Adequate Protection One of the first arguments Moscow adduced in response to Chinese attacks on the test-ban treaty as a vehicle to ensure a Soviet nuclear monopoly within the communist bloc was as the Soviet Government's August 3 statement asserted that the USSR's powerful rocket nuclear shield insures the security of not only the Soviet Union but all the socialist countries including the The August 21 statement emphasized the same point and also argued that whether one or more socialist countries would be added to the number of nuclear states that would make no material changes in the defense potential of the socialist camp provided of course the socialist camp is regarded as a single whole The latter phrase appears an implied Soviet threat to withdraw its nuclear-strategic shield from Communist China Chinese Acquisition A Good Thing In contradiction to this - latter argument as well as all other Soviet expositions of its views on the subject was Khrushchev's intimation in private talks that he viewed such a development positively Specifically Khrushchev asserted at one stage during a're- cent talks that when the Chinese developed nuclear weapons and rockets it would ease the situation for the USSR by enhancing a the overall strength of the communist bloc and requiring a lesser effort on the part of the Soviet Union Such a development he maintained would be directed against the US and other imperial ists This statement contradicts almost all other Soviet expressions of view public and private and was very likely mere bombast de- signed for imperialist consumption Soviets Against Proliferation It is noteworthy that in this polemic with the Chinese over the test ban treaty and in argumen tation against Chinese acquisition of a nuclear capability Moscow has come out more openly and strongly than ever before against I proliferation of nuclear weapons It has in fact in spirit and almost in substance adopted a public position on nuclear prolifer ation very close to that The danger of proliferation is the only danger the Soviets presently admit in Chinese possession of a nuclear capability not that Chinese possession p r_ g_is a danger but that it would lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons in the West especially their possession by West Germany and hence increase the danger of war FOREIGN DISBEM 4 madam FOREIGN DISSEM 6 - Both the Soviet Government statements took up this theme the August 21 statement at considerable length Specifically the latter argued that it would be impossible for the USSR to conduct one policy in the west and another in the East to fight against nuclear arming of West Germany and at the same time supply Communist China with nuclear weapons Thus Mbscow's refusal to give Peiping nuclear weapons was allegedly due to its desire to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the highly developed capitalist states of the west where an entire nuclear arsenal would have gone into the combined kitty of the aggressive military blocs of NATO CENTO SEATO and counter to the nuclear arsenal of the socialist countries a These statements of course contradict Soviet assertions on the inconsequence of UK French possession of a limited nuclear capability but not expressions of concern over west German posses sion of nuclear weapons While the statements about the dangers of proliferation constitute a stronger Soviet public commitment against this development they also constrict Soviet flexibility in agree ing to any nonproliferation agreement that would allow the west to carry through on plans for a multilateral force These Soviet nonproliferation arguments also serve to under score the double edged game Moscow has been playing on this issue- vis-a-vis both the Chinese Communists and the west While Mescow has argued to Peiping that it could not provide the latter with nuclear weapons because to do so would lead to proliferation of i such weapons in the West it has threatened the west with nuclear proliferation inside the bloc in the event of nuclear weapons sharing under a western multilateral force MLF agreement The Soviet Government's April 8 1963 note to the US on an MLF threatened that fif'the US Britain and France were to embark upon the road of spreading nuclear arms the Soviet Government naturally would be compelled to draw a corresponding conclusion i and take with due account for the new situation measures which i would insure the maintenance at a proper level of the security of the Soviet Union its friends and allies The same general threat was made in the Soviet-Hungarian Joint statement of July 23 1963 Privately the Soviets have been explicit in threatening diffusion of nuclear missile weapons within the bloc in reaction to western defense measures - Soviet Position -Past and Present on Chinese Acquisition There is much that is contradictory and specious in present Soviet argumentation against Chinese Communist acquisition of a nuclear-weapons capability Yet the very fact Mbscow is publicly arguing against it represents a guarantee of some sincerity FOREIGN DISSEM - - mJ OIit j q i I Swim-i 0 2mm FOREIGN DISSEM - 7 Even more important there is convincing-evidence to corroborate Khrushchev's statement that Moscow has rendered no assistance in nuclear-weapons development to Peiping since 1960 Furthermore it is almost inconceivable given the present acrimonious state of Sine-Soviet relations and the tremendous potential that would - accrue to the Chinese from addition of a strategically significant nuclear-weapons capability to Peiping's vast human resources that the Soviets are not genuinely and strongly against this develop- ment They may well even dread it although if this is so they t presently conceal the intensity of their concern in their public - and private position on the issue There is however a sub- stantial body of evidence to indicate Moscow was opposed to Chinese acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability even before the present strained state of SinoeSoviet relations _l i The Chinese Communist Government statement of August 15 charged that on June 20 1959 the Soviets unilaterally tore up the agreement on new technology for national defense concluded between China and the Soviet Union on October 15 1957 and refused to provide China with a sam 1e of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture This was allegedly done as a conces- sion to the US for Khrushchev's trip to the US in September for talks with President Eisenhower e- moi- 3' The Soviet Government statement of August 21 did not specifi- cally address itself to the substance of this accusation or deny it but merely charged that the Chinese were making public infor- mation related to the defenses of the countries of the socialist commonwealth and presenting the facts tendentiously in a 1 distorted light The Soviet Union has almost certainly as Khrushchev admitted given the Chinese limited assistance in nuclear research an development that would aid in development of nuclear weapo al- though the exact nature and extent of the assistance is not known Khrushchev claimed that such assistance had been rendered at an initial stage but had not been comprehensive that Chinese scientists and engineers had had access to Soviet secrets but this too had been at a very early stage It is conceivable as the Chinese Communist statement asserts - that the Soviets promised to give the Chinese the sample of an 3 atomic bomb -- possibly a do it-yourself kit and technical data concerning nuclear weapons development On the latter point Khrushchev had already admitted as much hm In retrospect 1957 was probably the apogee of Chinese Commu- nist influence and prestige within the bloc Noscow was indebted to Peiping for the latter's assistance in helping the USSR overcome its difficulties in Eastern EurOpe following the Polish-Hungarian FOREIGN DISSEM DECLASIFIED Aub omjm -- - Wyf N i Datum NO FOREIGN DISSEM a developments of late 1956 and within the month prior to the date Peiping alleged the agreement was made Mbscow had tested its first ICBM and launched the world's first earth satellite dramatic manifestations of scientific military advance which a staunch and worthy ally would expect to share Yet even if the Chinese Communist charges which Moscow does not deny are accepted literally it does not necessarily follow that the USSR promised or intended to give substantial assistance to Peiping in development of a nuclear-weapons system As Khrushchev noted in the private talks last July it was quite insufficient to hand over secrets of bomb design because for development of a nuclear capability it was also necessary to have the required industry to back up such a project The Soviets may thus have made promises of limited assistance as a price for keeping Peiping's goodwill and loyalty and in the belief that even if given such aid they would not contribute substantially to Peiping's development of nuclear weapons In the 1957 59 period the USSR rendered military assistance to Communist China on a significant scale with the program apparently also including cooperation in the field of nuclear missile weapons development However the limited nature of the latter assistance seems indicated by the fact Peiping still appears far from developing a capability in these fields and has not yet exploded its first nuclear device four years after the alleged 'agreement on new technology for national defense was as Peiping charges torn up by the USSR Furthermore as the Chinese Communist statements and accompa- nying propaganda point out Soviet proposals in the disarmament field for the past seven years have contained features which seemed directed against China s acquisition of nuclear weapons As far back as early 1956 at the 20th Party Congress in February the USSR for the first time intimated its willingness to separate the test-ban proposal from its general disarmament package 0n Septemr ber 20 1957 less than a month prior to the date Peiping claimed Moscow agreed to give it components of a nuclear bomb and techni- cal data on its manufacture Moscow formally submitted to the UN a memorandum on disarmament proposals including one calling for agreement by the nuclear powers lnot to place these nuclea 7 weapons at the disposal of any other States or commands of military blocs This memorandum also formally separated the proposal for a nuclear-test-ban agreement from other disarmament proposals It is difficult to perceive exactly how these proposals meshed with alleged Soviet promises of nuclear-weapons assistance to China Possibly the Soviets thought agreement on these proposals would obviate the necessity of fulfilling any promises of nuclear aid to FOREIGN DISSEM SIFIED sum-om Q72 522 EvJEL_JsaADawi u j n b No FOREIGN DISSEM 9 Peiping or more likely they calculated such aid would not block the kind of agreement Mbscow pr0posed and would buy Chinese Communist accession to it In any case these and subsequent Soviet disarmament proposals suggest at a minimum a cavalier attitude on Mbscow's part toward Chinese development of a nucleare weapons capability and very likely a calculated effort to impede it In conclusion Moscow is now conducting a propaganda campaign against Chinese Communist acquisition of nuclear weapons and is utilizing the nuclear-test-ban treaty or Peiping's failure to sign it to politically isolate the-Chinese A cursory review of Soviet disarmament preposals suggests at the least that Moscow held no sympathy for Chinese aspirations for development of a nuclear-weapons system and may have been trying to inhibit such a development even before Sino Soviet relations reached their present estranged state The new evidence surfaced in Sino-Soviet polemics tends to confirm the intelligence community's previous opinion that while Soviet assistance was an important factor in Communist China's program for nuclear weapons missile production until 1959 it was probably terminated entirely along with other major forms of Soviet military assistance sometime that year With the degene- ration of Sino Soviet relations into a stage of political- warfare which began in 1960 the Soviet leadership has without doubt been strongly inclined to delay and after that counter Chinese Communist acquisition of a nuclear-weapons system The conclusion is that it is this latter course the Soviets intend to follow and lines of action they may pursue are outlined below Possible Soviet Countermeasures Short of drastic measures the USSR in the past three years has already done almost all within its power to impede Chinese Communist advanced weapons development The withdrawal of Soviet specialists from China in July-August 1960 was probably the major blow delivered in Soviet efforts to slow up Chinese technological military progress Soviet military assistance to Communist China appears to have virtually stOpped since 1959 And the precipitous decline over the past three years in Soviet economic deliveries to Communist China occasioned by Peiping's inability to pay because of domestic economic difficulties and Soviet unwilling- ness to render economic assistance has increased the already staggering burdens the Chinese economy has had to bear and thus contributed to retardation of the nuclear missile weapons program over and above the setbacks caused by the cessation of material and technological assistance FOREIGN DISSEM steam - a a__mmioam h i FOREIGN DISSEM -10- In addition to these concrete actions directly affecting Communist China's nuclear-weapons development program some aspects of Soviet disarmament policies have been designed to erect political inhibitions to Peiping's ambitions in this direction The test ban treaty which does not retard Chinese Communist nuclear weapons development but casts some onus on Peiping for pursuing it is presently the salient feature of Soviet policies aimed in this direction The Soviet position on nondiffusion of nuclear weapons also has an anti-Peiping slant and has been so evaluated by the Chinese The Chinese Communist Government's August 15 statement noted the Peiping regime had sent three memoranda September 3 1962 October 20 19 2 and June 6 1963 protesting the Soviet Govern ment's discussions privately reported to the Chinese with US Secretary of State Rusk on August 25 1962 of proposals against nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and informing the Soviet Government that the Chinese could not tolerate the conclusion in disregard of China's opposition of any sort of treaty between the Soviet Government and the US which aimed at depriving the Chinese people of their right to take steps to resist the nuclear threats of US imperialism and that we would issue a statement to make our position known The August 15 statement concluded with this allusion to Soviet policies designed to inhibit Peiping's acquisition of nuclear weapons First the Soviet Government tried to subdue China and curry favor with US imperialism by discontinuing assistance to China Then it put forward all sorts of untenable arguments in an attempt to induce China to abandon its solemn stand Failing in all this it has brazenly ganged up with the imperialist bandits in exerting pressure on China In view of all the above China has long ceased to place any hope in the Soviet leaders in developing its own nuclear strength to resist the US nuclear threats It appears unlikely that the Soviets are willing at present to take far-reaching or drastic measures to prevent Chinese Commu nist nuclear-weapons development for a variety of reasons In the first place as the Soviets have stated publicly and privately they regard Communist China's acquisition of'a stra- tegically significant nuclear weapons delivery system as a distant prospect of at least a few years and thus not as an immediately critical problem demanding counteraction- The Soviets may also hope FOREIGN DISSEM - - - m - Aub zority 4725253 11 as Khrushchev stated that the Chinese Communists' initial experience with nuclear explosions will sober their present seemingly cavalier views on the consequences of nuclear war Even more important the Soviets probably hope for changes within Communist China foremost among them re lacement by natural or other causes of the Mao leadership which will make possible attenuation of the Sino-Soviet conflict and meaningful improvement in the two powers' estranged relations While Khrushchev is probably aware of the ineptness of his comparison of Sino-Soviet differences with US-French UK differences he also probably genuinely believes that present Chinese Communist extrem- ism is a transitory phenomenon that will disappear and permit significant amelioration of Sino-Soviet relations To abandon this hOpe would be tantamount to giving up his communist faith Nevertheless given the present embittered state of Sino- Soviet relations and probable Soviet awareness of the boost to Peiping's prestige that would result from a Chinese ex plosion of a nuclear device the Soviets will probably take what few limited steps they can to delay this development A complete cessation of whatever rudiments remain of Soviet military infor- mational cooperation with Peiping would seem to be in the offing The Soviet Government August 21 statement accused the Chinese of divulging information relating to the defenses of the socialist nations and of thus being unworthy to receive information of defensive importance The statement asserted It is natural that the Soviet Government will draw its conclusions on this score Hewever what little cooperation if any is left in this field must be minor and unrelated to nuclear-weapons develOpment and thus will not directly affect Chinese nuclear-weapons development The Soviets also will not hesitate provided other important considerations of Soviet self-interest are satisfied to seek additional agreements with the US which if they do not concretely impede Chinese nuclear-weapons development will place a political onus on Peiping for pursuing such a course In response to an expression of hOpe last July that more comprehensive control of armaments could be achieved before China became a nuclear power Khrushchev expressed agreement and said the Soviets were making efforts to prevent the increase in the number of nuclear powers He added that such efforts would of necessity be limited in effect until agreement on disarmament was reached Possibly one such measure erecting political inhibitions to Chinese nuclear-weapons development would be an agreement on non- proliferation However because of MOscow's strident emphasis on prevention of proliferation in the west as the pretext for with- holding nuclear-weapons assistance from Peiping the Soviets FOREIGN DISSEM Auaodwm 02mm FOREIGN DISSEM 12 - cannot without blatant discrimination against China appear to acquiesce in special nuclear arrangements for the benefit of Germany It thus seems unlikely at least in any early round of further talks on nondissemination that Moscow would drop its insistence that any agreement on this issue must preclude measures presently contemplated for western defense under the multilateral forces planui - Similarly Soviet proposed limitations on or reductions of means of delivery -- such as the Gromyko September 1962 UN proposal that in initial disarmament stages a limited number of missiles might be retained only by the US and USSR thus apparently exclud- ing China along with other countries might be designed as political inhibitions to Chinese missile development Probably the major concrete step remaining to Moscow to retard Peiping's nuclear weapons development would be termination of remaining Soviet economic deliveries -- of which petroleum is a key item -- and impositbn of a Soviet bloc economic boycott against China To the extent that measures of this kind aggravated Chinese economic problems and retarded economic progress the Soviets would calculate that indirectly they could slow up the Chinese program for nuclear weapons development There are however good argua- ments against imposition of an economic boycott particularly as related to Chinese nuclear-weapons development Sino-Soviet trade is presently at such a low level as to be almost marginal in Chinese economic development Soviet deliveries pose no strain on the USSR economy and to impose an economic boycott on China might bring greater onus on the Soviet union than the result was worth It thus does not appear that the Soviets would resort to this measure unless prompted to do so by even more drastic deterioration of Sino-Soviet political relations or unless the Soviets became more concerned than they appear to be at present over the rate of Chinese progress in developing a nuclear-weapons capability In the more distant future if Sino-Soviet hostility remains acute while China acquires a strategically significant nuclear- weapons missile delivery system the Soviets would find it neces- sary to undertake more far-reaching measures For example they might significantly intensify what already appears as a contain- ment policy and provide even greater advanced weapons assistance to Indonesia and India while seeking at the same time to strengthen political relations with these countries and possibly also making a serious effort to develop similar close relations of political 1 For a fuller discussion of Soviet views on this subject see ESE-122 September 4 1963 Current Soviet Line on the FOREIGN DISSEM DECLASSIFIED Au u zo ty Q7 52 Eur-3L rm 0 2mm FOREIGN DISSEM 13 rapport with Japan They might also acquiesce in or privately encourage limited US military action to contain Chinese Communist - militancy in Southeast Asia and the Taiwan Strait Along the Bi omSoviet borders the Soviets might attempt subversion of ethnic f1 Ifgroups in an attempt to threaten the security of the Peiping re- gime or cause it political-economic dislocations It does not seem likely that the USSR would undertake military measures to prevent Chinese nuclear missile weapons development i unless Chinese behavior were so bellicose and China's weapons program so advanced as to constitute a threat to the security of the Soviet union And before this stage had been reached the - USSR would probably already have denounced the SinoeSoviet treaty of alliance and made common cause with the US against China In sum it does not seem likely that the Soviets in the im- mediate future will take dramatic or far-reaching steps to prevent Chinese acquisition of a nuclear-weapons capability The more likely prospect is continuation of present Soviet policies designed to minimize the buildup_of Chinese economic power and military 1 strength and politically to encircle and isolate Communist China both internationally and within the international communist move- ment 1 FOREIGN DISSEM This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu