DECLASSIHED 12m 7 f F iUJlLbIoj $ 23 SECRET DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL hill-w hf Room 7517 Dl tni lmwiw 1A DRAFT 5 Policy Planning Statement pig 22 Haw W5 A Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation and Nuclear Capabiliti October 15 1963 GROUP 1 Exc luded from Aut omat ic Down- Grading and Dec las if icat ion SECRET ED AT THE NATIONAL moms - ill-u DISTRIBUTION LIST Document A Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation Nuclear Capa Drafter R H Johnson Date 10 15 63 No of copies 5a 41 Classification SECRET 1 2 through ll Mr Nitze through Mr walstrom DOD 263940 12 through 21 Mr Nitze through Mr walstrom DOD 263937 22 Km 23 ll dh I144 i 711 24 Ml- Mr Harriman T-263850 25 o W 26 DOD Nitze 27 DOD Wm Bundy DOD George Marotta 28 DOD - Rowen T-263852 29 DOD - Goodpaster 30 Treas - C Sullivan T-263853 31 CIA - Hm Richard Helms T-263853 32 CIA - Ray Cline T-263855 33 NH - Mche Bundy T-263856 34 NSC Staff - Robt Komer T-263857 35 NH 111 erva Wynn Ham 36 RI DECLASSIHED mom 7 By a RAP-A 031841 RHJ chron ha 42- thru 51 DOD T-263943 52 53 KCT 5 jt 15 fg u f 14 I REPRODUCED AT THE NAHDNAL ARCHIVES axja 1 1 mh'r QW s V We QZAJ Distribution Sheet Page ChiCom Nu p er 10 15 63 SECRET 56 Col Harrelson T236261 through 75 k 76 Mr walstrom through 80 t 81 Mr Wriggins 82 Mr wriggins for Mr Barnds CIA 12 17 63 83 IO - Mr Jackson 84 Secy MCNamara 85 Mr W P Bundy 86 Mr MCGeorge Bundy 87 Secy Vance 88 Robert Kennedy T-236336 39 KJV 90 Dr Seaborg 91 Edward R Murrow 92 David Bell 93 John A MbCone T236 34l 94 Mr Cline CIA 95 Mr Mullen AID 96 Mr Sorensen USIA 97 Mr Kattenberg - DECLASSIFIED Amm II Qp'wanate 7 I II IV VI VII SECRET Table of Contents Purpose and Sc0pe The Development of Communist China's Advanced Weapons Capabilities The Implications of a Detonation and Nuclear Capability Effects on the Basic Military Situation Effects upon Chinese Communist Actions Reactions in Asia Soviet U S and Other Reactions Alternative Military Strategies A The Military Problem B Alternative Strategies C Preferred Strategy and Programs General Problems of U S Response A The Problem of Reassurance B Problems of Planning and Action Recommendations U S Military Response and Military Programs A General B Reassurance through Military Actions and Programs Recommendations Political Strategy and Political Actions A Political Strategy B Reassurance through Political Actions Annex - The Problem of the Offshore Islands in the Context of a Chinese Communist Nuclear Capability SECRET mu-nu n kw Au'monwp 01% a 09 mamas SECRET DRAFT Policy Planning Statement on A Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation and Nuclear Capability I Purpose and SCORE It is the purpose of this policy statement to analyze the probable political and military consequences of a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation and regional non-intercontinental nuclear capability and to propose courses of action to minimize the adverse impact of these developments upon U S interests and maximize Opportunities for turning them to U S advantage Primary focus is upon the area on the continental and sea periphery of Communist China WOrk on the problem of advance preparation of world Opinion for a nuclear detonation has been going forward separately under the leadership of the Office of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs If the recommendations of this paper are accepted they would be appropriately reflected in that program The planning of military programs has for some time included consideration of future development by Communist China of a nuclear capability II The Development SECRET PRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL MCHNES 1 -- Au2honri By NAP-A Date 7 SECRET 2 II The Development of Communist China's Advanced weapons Capabilities Although our information on the status of Communist China's advanced weapons program is improving gaps are sub- stantial and uncertainties therefore considerable Communist China has given high priority to the development of nuclear weapons and missiles If it has only the one identified plutonium production reactor and assuming that reactor became critical in early 1962 the earliest possible date for a first test would be early 1964 but with normal difficulties a test might be postponed to late 1964 or 1965 With this reactor it could produce only one or two crude weapons a year If the Chinese have another reactor a first test could of course occur at any time There have been recent reports suggesting the possibility of a test this fall Peiping selected a type of production reactor which is of relatively simple design and which entails the least stringent purity requirements presumably because it offers the quickest and surest way of achieving a nuclear detonation and a token capability See SNIE 13-2 63 Communist China's Advanced Weapons Program 24 July 1963 SECRET a 3 a - Au mor'll Dale 7 r - SECRET 3 capability For a more substantial program for production of weapons containing both U-235 and plutonium it will need both additional plutonium production reactors and a gaseous diffusion plant It will take until at least 1966 and more probably until 1968-69 or later to complete the gaseous diffusion plant at Lanchou and to get it into production There are many un- certainties about the exact status of this enterprise and the technological capability of the Chinese to complete it A possible force of 15 BULL medium piston bombers Bu29 type and if Operational two BADGER medium jet bombers might provide initial delivery means The approxi- mately 315 IL-28 BEAGLE jet light bombers would be useable as more sophisticated weapons are developed However the Chinese appear to be concentrating upon missiles initially it is believed upon a mediumnrange 630 or 1020 missile Even if the Chinese concentrate upon a single system and give the program continued tap priority deployment before 1967 is unlikely Limited production would be possible at the known research and development facility At best the Chinese could develop a compatible fission warhead for such a missile three to four years after detonation of a first device If they have SECRET ATTHE NATIONAL ARCHIVES In macaw B 7 SEC 3 4 have only the one known plutonium reactor it would take longer The Chinese have not begun development of submarine mis- sile systems ICBM's or antidmissile systems The most likely possibility is that Peiping will attempt to move toward both a major nuclear arsenal and intercontinental delivery means although it is likely to be a very long time indeed before it has either in any quantity It is also possible that when it faces the very high economic costs and effects on other aspects of its power and the unlikelihood that it will ever catch up with the weapons technology of the U S and the USSR and when it compares these costs with the very marginal poli-- tical and military utility of such additional capabilities Peiping will be reconciled for the indefinite future to a limited regional capability The Chinese will for some time face difficult targeting problems since geodetic data for most of China is poor or lacking mobile targets will be as important as fixed ones and initial missiles will be quite inaccurate Their initial capability will also be highly vulnerable to counterforce Operations In the light of these uncertainties it is impossible to state SECRET i Minnow moms - hum- a new 7 Bi NARA Date 5 state exactly the beginning and terminal dates of the period when Communist China will be a regional but only a regional nuclear power Roughly speaking it will begin some time in the mid-to-late sixties and will continue into the 1970's and perhaps well beyond While this paper is intended to cover this entire period analysis of deve10pments beyond the next five-to-ten years is most hazardous and the actions proposed herein must obviously be adjusted to the changing political and military situation - The Implications of a Detonation and Nuclear Capability A Effects on the Basic Military Situation The acquisition by Communist China of nuclear weapons will not for the indefinite future alter the real relations of power among the major states or the balance of military power in Asia Communist China is now the strongest Asian military power and is likely to continue to be so The basic deterrents to Chinese military action will continue to have to come from outside as will much of the basic military power for dealing with Communist aggression should deterrence fail The most important single fact about the military situation SECRET Armemnom ARCHIVES Amman 7 WJKWA Date - SEL 3T 6 situation will be the great asymmetry in Chinese Communist and U S capabilities and vulnerabilities Communist China is now and will continue to be accessible to U S nuclear striking forces while the United States will for many years be inaccessible to Chinese attack The Chinese will as their regional capability develops be able to do significant but hardly crippling damage to the United States by attacking U S forces and installations in Asia but the United States will have the ability to destroy Communist China as a modern governmental and war-making entity The U S will possess this capability for a very long time even with the nuclear forces presently deployed and planned for deployment to Asia to say nothing of the capability provided by its general strategic nuclear capability Whatever actual U S intentions so long as the Chinese Communists have only soft vulnerable delivery means they will have to take account of the danger of a U S nuclear or non- nuclear counterforce attack as a possible U S response to major ChiCom aggression They will have created a target that in their own calculations they must assume will make it more likely that the U S will reapond to major aggression by counter attacks SECRET mama DECLASSIFIED rill-3 usmooucsn AT THE mm memes BY 0 MFA Date 7 7 counter-attacks that would involve the mainland This fact could have the effect of increasing Chinese caution in stimu- lating or exploiting crises A limited Chinese intercontinental capability of either a very crude or more sophisticated variety would reduce but hardly eliminate this basic asymmetry The U S but not Communist China would have an effective counterforce capability If the ChiCom intercontinental delivery capability were confined to cruise missiles aircraft or similar slow vulnerable means we would have reasonably effective active defenses whereas Communist China would lack a similar defensive capability against U S ballistic missiles While the relative ability of the U S to devastate Communist China would be very much greater than that of China to devastate the U S the Chinese might consider a limited intercontinental capability to have some increased deterrent value because of an estimate that the U S would be unwilling to accept the risk on issues of marginal importance of the absolute level of damage the ChiComs could inflict The plausibility of the deterrent would however be greatly weak- ened by the continuing very great unlikelihood that the ChiComs would in fact engage in first-use of nuclear weapons In SECRET newsman I 7 BY apl AD e SEC 8 In order to become a Class A nuclear power with an effective second strike capability Communist China would have to become a major industrial power But even such industrial develoPment would not necessarily provide Peiping with the basis for Class A status in view of the fact that such status is defined in relative terms and Communist China begins the nuclear race far behind the U S and the USSR Moreover when it achieves major industrial status its interest in avoiding attack upon itself which is already great should further increase The basic asymmetry in Chinese and U S capabilities and vulnerabilities make Chinese first-use of nuclear weapons ex- ceedingly unlikely unless the Chinese mainland were to come under serious attack The only direct military value to Peiping of a regional nuclear capability will be to deter attack upon the mainland It is sometimes argued that a Chinese nuclear capability will create significant new restrictions on U S freedom of action because we have been able to control the degree of escalation The distinction between direct military and military-related political effects is somewhat arbitrary By direct military effects are meant the utility of a nuclear capability in actual use or in direct deterrence They do not include effects upon availability of bases effects on attitudes toward the western military presence etc SECRET I mm Am ARCHIVES - h- 7 BY me Date I 9 escalation in defending countries against Communist aggression in Asia through our ultimate ability to engage in unilateral use of nuclear weapons Thus for example it is suggested that it would become much more risky to undertake major am- phibious or airborne operations involving large concentrations of trooPS once the Chinese have nuclear weapons But since the Chinese would have to assume that firstnuse of nuclear weapons in such a situation would bring nuclear attack upon Communist China itself such use is most unlikely MOreover the assumption that we now possess the ability to control the ground rules through our ability to engage in unilateral nu- clear weapons use ignores the facts that the political costs of such use are so high as to weaken the plausibility of the threat that the Communists have largely chosen the ground rules through their utilization of guerrilla war- fare which makes some levels of conventional escalation by the U S to say nothing of nuclear escalation militarily irrelevant and difficult to justify politically and that we have had to take account of the possibility that U S nuclear- weapons use could lead to a U SuuSoviet nuclear confrontation MOreover our ability to engage in conventional operations plus the severe SECRET MMWWAW Amhodr 7 BY 0 mm Data '1 1 10 the severe limitations on Chinese conventional capabilities have served and will continue to serve along with the poli- tical costs to the Chinese of firstuuse as important deterrents and therefore as a means of controlling the ground rules The freedom we will lose will be the freedom that we might now have in some but not all circumstances to attack mainland China with nuclear weapons with minimum risk of nuclear retaliu ation An examination of particular hypothetical military situ ations confirms the conclusion that a regional Chinese Communist nuclear capability will have direct military value to Peiping only in deterring major attack upon the mainland Even when the Chinese have a relatively significant nuclear capability one hundred weapons and quite effective delivery means and even if they initiate nuclear war by attacking first presently planned U S nuclear forces in the Pacific augmented somewhat in order to deal with a highly improbably mediumarange jet bomber capability would be able to destroy enough of any remaining Chinese nuclear capability to eliminate it as a serious threat to the U S posture in the Pacific The ChiComs TEis specific conclusion is based upon a RAND study SECRET DECLASSIFIED 7 BY 41 mp Date ll ChiComs could not of course make their calculations of risk simply on the basis of the capabilities of U S Pacific nuclear forces B Effects upon Chinese Communist Actions Past Chinese Communist prudence in the use of military force reenforces conclusions that emerge from military logic Peiping is very sensitive to possible indications of a U S intent to attack the mainland It is likely to remain aware of its relative military inferiority though it will attempt to create the impression that the military balance of power in Asia has shifted However it sees Communist China's ultimate status as a world power as derived as much from its potential leadership of the world revolutionary movement as from its geopolitical position and its ability to wield the traditional instruments of state power Peiping differs from MOscow not in its willingness to assume large military risks by undertaking interustate aggression but in estimating lower the danger that active support for wars of national liberation or limited military actions on its borders will lead to thermOunuclear war The Chinese SECRET REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARMS mam 0 RARE Date SECRET 12 Chinese also differ from the Soviets in viewing war as ultimately less avoidable Moreover there is implicit in the Chinese position a double standard - they appear to be urging greater militancy upon the USSR as the more power- ful Communist state while recognizing the limitations of their own power and the risks of too aggressive a Chinese policy Peiping will continue to seek its revolutionary objec- tives in Asia by politicalupressures by covert support of armed insurrection by exploiting divisive tendencies and by limited military actions on its borders where such actions can be used to create fear of Communist China can be poli- tically justified and bear a low risk of a major U S military reSponse To this end it will value a nuclear capa- bility for its effects in weakening the will of countries in resisting insurgency in inhibiting their requests for U S assistance in pressuring Asian countries to accede to Chinese demands and in stimulating divisions among Asian nations in responding to local conflicts It will use its capability as a background for pressures against the U S military presence elimination of which is a major ChiCom SECRET II DECLASSIHED Emonm oarmammua mamas mama 7 BY 9 mm Data 1 SLURET 13 ChiCom objective The Chinese will seek to develop and exploit a logical sense of actual or impending change in world power relations to seek fuller acknowledgment of their claims to preeminence in Asia and to their status as a world power To this end they will seek to blur distinctions between nuclear testss an initial Operational capability and full nuclear power status0 Not only fear of attack upon the mainland and serious doubt as to the availability of the Soviet nuclear umbrella but also a desire to avoid actions which would reu sult in a coalescence of other Asian nations in a serious Japanese rearmament effort or in endangering its aspirations for leadership of the world revolutionary movement will serve as inhibitions to Peiping's firstuuse of nuclear weapons against enemy targets Demonstration explosions in crisis situations are however possiblea These factors and the limited character of the Chinese nuclear capability will also serve as inhibitions on explicit and specific exploitation of its capability for nuclear blackmail purposes although they will obviously not preclude blackmail attempts in situations where such attempts promise political payuoffsn The SECRET II REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHVES Ammr I 7 ll-u - 9 BY ma Date SE CRET 14 The Chinese Communists can however be expected to con- tinue to test from time to time through limited military pressures the level of the U S commitment and re5ponse in Asia It is in fact likely that once they have a limited nuclear capability they will seek to determine whether it can serve as an effective umbrella for new limited actions or escalation in existing situations by deterring an effective U S and indigenous response The Chinese might consider that if faced even by a marginal possibility of nuclear attack in a place where our commitment was ambiguous and our interests not fully engaged and under circumstances in which our allies were reluctant to back us we either would not stand fast or if we did stand fast that the situation could be played for politically divisive effect In this connection a brief look at the offshore islands problem may be useful A major Chinese Communist military effort to take the offshores is probably unlikely because of the disproportionate costs and the risks of involvement with the also there is evidence that the ChiComs like the GRC realize that a definitive solution to the offshores problem would lay the basis for a stable two Chinas solution unless it is achieved new I I i AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES - W 0 MBA 0313 SEQT 15 achieved in a manner which significantly advanced prOSpects for acquisition of Taiwan itself To both Peiping and Taipeh the offshores are a symbol of the continuing Chinese civil war and a point of contact and conflict in that war The Chinese Communists could probably successfully attack any of the islands in a conventional war if the UDS does not provide assistance to the GRC but costs to Communist China would be heavy In a situation where the was pro- viding non-nuclear assistance the ChiComs would have only a marginal chance of success against the larger islands but could probably take one of the lesser islands despite the U S aid Actual use of nuclear weapons by Communist China would further increase the disproportion between risks and benefits as well as being politically incongruous as a form of libera tion It is therefore exceedingly unlikely There is however reason to consider review of our present posture in the light of a ChiCom nuclear capability A nuclear capability might be exploited by Peiping for its politically divisive potential The U S commitment to defense of the offshores is ambiguous and lacks the support of many EurOpean SECRET I I YHE NAHUM memes a- 2 1 mm 7 BY mm Dale 1 SEL 16 European allies and a significant part of the U S public A nuclear confrontation over territory to the defense of which the U S Government has evidently become half-committed against its better judgment is not likely to be viewed with enthusiasm nor is the U S position likely to command wide support The ChiComs might hope to use such a confrontation to undermine international support for the GRC and to exacerbate U S -GRC relations Efforts by the ChiComs so to exploit their nuclear capability could lead moreover to some marginal increase in the danger of military miscalculation even though actual mili- tary use of nuclear weapons by the ChiComs is exceedingly un- likely Finally it should be recognized that while it will be at best exceedingly difficult to get the GRC to withdraw now it will become more difficult for the U S in the post- detonation environment to seek such withdrawal both because of the aggravated effect upon the GRC itself and because of the international implications of such U S action in the postudetonation period If we become involved in a confron- tation with the ChiComs over the offshores in the post-detona- tion period we will probably have little choice but to defend them While SECRET 1 I I AT THE mnom memes Amati mm BY Wilma 7 SECRET 17 While it has taken account of these considerations the interdepartmental group working on this BNSP Task has nonetheless concluded that no attempt should be made to change the present U S posture with respect to the offshores Its conclusion is based upon two basic considerations First it is considered unlikely that the ChiComs will in fact generate a major off- shores crisis and then seek to exploit their nuclear capability for political effect Second it is considered that the GRC could be forced to withdraw only by such drastic threats of elimination of U S support as to produce a major crisis in U S -GRC relations which would create problems as serious and in many respects similar to a nuclear confrontation over the offshores Even then it is by no means certain that the GRC could be pressured into withdrawal If it did not withdraw the ChiComs might be tempted into a military move Despite this general conclusion the interdepartmental group considers this question of sufficient importance that it believes that it warrants particular review in connection with consideration of this paper As a further basis for discussion the annex to the paper outlines ways in which the ChiComs SECRET I I AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES - - 7 Hm Dam 18 ChiComs might exploit their capability and the advantages and disadvantages of alternative U S policies with respect to the offshores Present U S military contingency planning assumes that use of nuclear weapons against the mainland might become neces- sary at some stage in the deve10pment of a military crisis over the offshores Given the attitudes of other nations on the offshores political justification of first-use of nuclear' weapons which will be difficult at best - could become significantly more difficult once the ChiComs have a nuclear capability and use of nuclear weapons will appear to others to involve increased risks of a nuclear response Depending upon the level of U S attack there would in fact be some risk of ChiCom nuclear reSponse If there are dangers of Chinese miscalculation of the military or political significance of a limited nuclear capability they lie in the direction of ebullience resulting from uneXpected successes in its nuclear and missiles programs against a background of accelerated economic progress over- estimation of U S caution or of the caution of non-Communist Asian states or hepe of involving the USSR on the Chinese side SECRET arms NATIONAL memes 7 - 19 side The first-seems a quite unlikely eventuality the second depends upon U S and Asian reaction including a correct assess- ment of the significance of a Chinese nuclear capability While Peiping_could even now hope for Soviet help in a situ- ation where the existence of the regime was seriously threa- tened it could hardly initiate aggression on the assumption that Soviet help would be forthcoming in less extreme circum- stances and is most unlikely to take deliberate action to put itself in a position where its very existence was dependent upon Soviet aid In any event any Chinese miscalculation seems less likely to express itself in sudden bold military moves than in a somewhat increased readiness to accept risks in military probing Operations Peiping's tactics in the exploitation of its nuclear detonation and capability are likely to have two broad strands a Seeking to instill fear of its power and to create an impression of its present and future preeminence in Asia b Emphasizing its peaceful and protective intenw tions and attempting to demonstrate that it is United States nuclear power which is the source of the danger SECRET 5 AT THE mmorw memes I hi I moods BY Newman 7 $932 20 of the danger of nuclear war to Asia and which makes a Chinese capability necessary as a defen- sive measure It may further increase its present emphasis upon the importance of racial solidarity These themes will be played with varying emphases at different times and to different audiences Partly because of the position in which it finds itself in the Sino-Soviet dispute and on the nuclear test ban issue it will be diffi- cult for Peiping in the immediately foreseeable future to mount a convincing general peace offensive Tactics will be tai lored to particular audiences As in the past a threatening mien may be alternated with a peaceful one Gross public threats are except possibly in crisis situations less likely than implicit threats Peiping will use fear as a lever to induce Asian nations to accept its peaceful protestations and its friendly and protective embrace The threat element will be somewhat clearer in ChiCom dealings with countries allied to the United States while peace themes will be par- ticularly emphasized to Asian neutrals If after comparing the tremendous effort required with the marginal additional value of achieving status as a magor intercontinental SECRET El DECLASSIHED 7 SECRET 21 intercontinental nuclear power Peiping concludes that the effort would not be it might shift to a primary emphasis upon peace themes and disarmament prOposals de- signed to dislodge U S military power from Asia These efforts could emphasize the self-denying ChiCom decision not to go for a major capability While this is necessarily only a Speculative possibility it is sufficiently plausible and bears sufficiently close relationship to past ChiCom behavior in the Sino-Indian border situation that it warrants serious attention in U S planning It particularly emphasizes the need to be prepared to meet the ChiCom peace prOposals with plausible U S counter-prOposals C Reactions in Asia Reactions of non-Communist Asian nations will be some- what parallel to ChiCom exploitation with allies seeking various forms of U S reassurance including additional mili tary assistance and neutrals pushing harder for Asian nuclear free zones for Chinese Communist membership in the UN and in disarmament negotiations etc However these distinctions are only roughly accurate For example the ChiComs may emphasize peace and de-emphasize threat with allied Japan or alternate I I AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES Amati 7 BY QP SECRET 22 or alternate between the two and will upon occasion employ reverse tactics with neutral India Moreover while neutrals may not seek formal U S reassurance or alliance they are likely to find privately reassuring any evidence of continuing U S will to defend countries of the area in a manner which does not threaten nuclear war in Asia Contraria wise Chinese efforts to exploit through peace initiatives or otherwise fears of nuclear war in Asia are likely to have considerable appeal in allied countries Japan Aus tralia and New Zealand even though both aligned and unaligned countries are likely to discount Peiping's claims to peaceful intentions The danger that Asian states will gain the impression that the balance of power in Asia is about to change would be accen- tuated if the ChiComs developed rapidly not only a nuclear capability but also a concurrent if not necessarily compatible missile capability Both aligned and unaligned are likely to be confirmed in their present policies with however two unaligned states - India and Malaysia - perhaps seeking new forms of assurance DevelOpment SECRET DECLASSIHED 3014 485 s 3 Ammnu BY W NARA Date 7 23 Development by Communist China of a nuclear capability does not seem likely in itself to have more than at best very limited effects in the foreseeable future in increasing the willingness of Asian countries to c00perate among themselves in defense or non-defense measures We can expect to see several nations Japan Australia India and Indonesia attempt to play a larger role in the area in furtherance of their national security or national ambitions Out of these efforts which may be stimulated somewhat by a Chinese nuclear detonation are likely to come mere initiatives for the cre- ation or strengthening of regional organizations the recently reported plans of Prime Minister Ikeda to create a Western Pacific Organization Because of existing intra- regional tensions and weak impulses toward cooperation these efforts are likely to have significant effect only over a quite long run we must however keep the vision of expanded intra-regional cooperation before the leaders of Asia and where appropriate support Specific efforts to dampen tensions and in- crease cooperation While a Chinese nuclear capability will in strictly military SECRET - MWHWOMW BY NARA Dale 7 SECRET 24 military terms only underline the existing impossibility of GRC return to the mainland by military means without major U S military support it can have a considerable long-term effect in Taiwan The leadership in Taiwan can be expected to redouble efforts to preserve its independent identy and to preserve belief in return to the mainland But once the Chinese Communists have even a token capability there will be a significant possibility that they would retaliate with nuclear weapons against Taiwan or an invasion force if the GRC should make a military attempt to return to the main- land which posed a serious threat to the Communist regime Even relatively large-scale military actions which did not pose such a threat might be met with threats of ChiCom nuclear action Since the U S would presumably be unwilling to use nuclear weapons or to threaten such use to back a mainland recovery effort and since the great unlikelihood of such U S assistance must be evident to the GRC and the pOpulation on Taiwan a Chinese nuclear capability is likely to have a corrosive effect on remaining belief in return to the mainland The Chinese nuclear capability will also dramatize to other nations the unrealistic nature of GRC hepes and to underline SECRET I I I armmnom memes mm 7 ADme SECRET 25 underline the general presumption created by a ChiCom capa- bility in favor of acceptance of Communist China's claims to major power status By helping further to undermine the raison d'etre of the Nationalist regime and by tending to erode its international support a Chinese Communist nuclear capa- bility could therefore enhance Peiping's Opportunities for political subversion of the GRC through offshore islands crises or other means The danger of such political subversion could increase in the event of a succession crisis or should the GRC lose con- fidence in U S willingness to continue to support its major policy goals Even though our scope for action in this direc- tion will necessarily be restricted any steps that would lay the basis for a different vision of Taiwan's future than return to the mainland would help reduce Peiping's Opportunities for political subversion Such actions include diversion of re- sources from military to economic deve10pment purposes and political reform on Taiwan to give a larger role to the native Taiwanese Elsewhere in Asia it is more difficult to predict longer- erm effects upon morale these effects will be highly depen- dent upon SECRET 1 - Wm wn mnm memes Aummri 7 By W NAP-A 0313 SECRET 26 dent upon the general evolution of the situation and upon U S actions For example Thailand will be more influenced by developments inlLaOS'and South Vietnam but may seek expanded relations with the USSR as a hedge against Chinese power In 'iKorea there might be some tendency particularly if confidence in the U S is shaken to take steps independently of the U S to insure survival through settlement with the Communists The following general forms of reassurance may be sought from the U S by the GRC a renewed pledge to defend Taiwan including a guarantee of use of nuclear weapons against Com- Imnnist China in retaliation for nuclear attack on Taiwan frequent statements of strong U S support and a definite pledge to defend the offshores by the ROK a reaffirmation of the U S defense commitment by India the Philippines and Thailand clear assurance of U S deterrence of and defense against nuclear attack and also by Thailand possibly renewed request for a bilateral or for a strengthened SEATO Cambodia may make renewed efforts to obtain guarantees from both the Communists and the Western powers Various forms of nuclear cooperation may be requested The GRC and South Korea may seek some form of nuclear sharing SECRET in ha Amm 7 BY mp Dale' SECRET 27 sharing Pakistan has already requested nuclear-capable artillery and joint planning for nuclear weapons use in certain contingencies India Japan and Australia could probably produce a first nuclear device by 1969-70 given a decision to proceed in the next year or so Only in the case of India is there a signi- ficant possibility of a decision in the foreseeable future to seek a capability Although such a development seems presently unlikely and the test ban treaty has further reduced the imme- diate likelihood of such action a Nehru Government might be moved by domestic pressures into a small weapons program while a post-Nehru Government might if under strong military influ ence undertake a more ambitious program While the Indians have gradually been moving toward a position where independence from safeguards will become possible and could probably produce a device without outside assistance within the period stated assistance might be sought from the British which would in- volve the U S or from the French which would not There is some possibility that as 1970 approaches Japan would accept if it did not seek collaboration with the U S in nuclear defensive measures installation of nuclear-tipped SECRET 3 I mm 7 By QPRAPA Dale I SECRET 28 nuclear-tipped defense missiles Japan is most unlikely for a variety of reasons to seek an independent nuclear capa- bility for the foreseeable future However what Japan will be willing to do in the nuclear field as in defense generally will be related less to a Chinese nuclear capability than to the evolution of the Japanese political situation and to the debate over defense and alignment likely to be precipitated by the question of renewal of the security treaty in 1970 Requests for additional conventional military assis- tance including in particular air defense are particularly likely from the Philippines Thailand the GRC the ROK and India The latter's desire for an air defense system not de- pendent upon outside help in an emergency will be increased The availability of Korean and Philippine bases to the U S does not seem likely to be seriously affected by a ChiCom nuclear capability Provided our commitment to Thai defense is sufficiently strong and effective as measured not only by formal commitments but also by the effectiveness of our efforts in Laos and Vietnam access to Thai bases would probably not be affected While a Chinese nuclear capability will not have dramatic and drastic effects on availability of Japanese bases there will be SECRET memes 7 BY 1 Date SECRET 29 there will be an increasing tendency even under a conservative government to oppose expansion and improvements which would make the bases a more attractive target and a tendency to seek increased control over operations staged through the bases There will be greater reluctance to permit operations not of prime importance to Japan and a greater sensitivity to the use of bases against Communist China Over the longer run availaa bility of Japanese bases will be less affected directly by the ChiCom capability than by domestic political developments which will be themselves affected marginally by a ChiCom nu- clear capability In general a Chinese nuclear capability does not seem likely to reduce significantly existing willingness to seek U S military help in an emergency provided the U S has an evident will and capability to keep the conflict at a non- nuclear level It would probably have marginal effects of this kind in Cambodia A Chinese Communist capability may further reduce con- fidence in the efficacy of Indian protection in the Himalayan border states Nepal may become more inclined to seek an accommodation with China unless the Nepalese Government is convinced SECRET v t r ED AT THE mnom ARCHIVES 2 Hit-u H- Amm 7 wane-1m sagas 30 convinced that it can rely upon prompt and effective help from the U S In Bhutan a rapprochement with China might also be considered wise but because of its closer ties to India the Bhutanese Government has less freedom of action than Nepal Sikkim as an Indian protectorate would not be able to act on its own unless the protectorate ties are con- siderably weakened D Soviet U S SECRET REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES Amm By QPNAPA Date 7 SECRET 31 D Soviet U S and Other Reactions The USSR would much prefer that Communist China not become a nuclear power for two interrelated reasons a detonation and capability will increase Peiping's prestige in the competition for leadership of the international Come munist movement and for influence in developing countries and while it very probably realizes that the Chinese have not been and are not likely to be grossly reckless in using or threatening use of force it will fear that a ChiCom capa- bility will increase the danger of Soviet involvement in nu- clear war The Soviets may fear the possibility of Chinese miscalculation that might precipitate a confrontation requiring Mbscow to choose between the risks of coming to Peiping's aid or leaving an ally in the lurch The dilemma would be heightened in situations involving North Korea and North Viet- nam since withholding aid in such cases would be tantamount to abandoning these countries to Peiping's exclusive sphere of influence The Soviets will probably also be concerned that a Chinese Communist nuclear capability will tend to promote Chinese hegemony in Southeast Asia and lead to further SECRET REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ED 7 By SECRET 32 further nuclear proliferation In these respects its concerns will parallel U S concerns The possibility of more or less tacit Soviet cooPeration with the U S and other western powers in efforts to contain Communist China will grow Since popular understanding in the U S of the Sino Soviet dispute has probably heightened the belief that Com- munist China is not only aggressive but also adventurist the U S public is likely to attach greater military importance to a Chinese detonation and capability than sober analysis would justify In general the concern and uncertainty that could be produced would be less likely to express itself in pressure for particular policies than in a more diffuse demand for some kind of action by the U S Government Because of the pervasive- ness of the U S communications network U S reactions are likely to receive wide currency abroad and to add to the danger of misinterpretation of the meaning of these developments in other countries Elsewhere a Chinese nuclear detonation will probably cause dismay but not surprise among informed governments This dismay will often be occasioned as much by the fact of nuclear proliferation as by the fact that Communist China is the country sages II ED AT 1145 mom memes - a moon 7 BY NAP-A Dale SECRET 33 the country involved It will probably create a sense both of increased urgency and increased pessbmism with respect to arms control and disarmament IV Alternative Military Strategies While the direct military significance of a Chinese Com- munist nuclear capability is limited it is a factor of sufficient combined politicoamilitary significance to justify a new look at broad U S military and political strategy for the area More particular reasons for such review include the effect of the Chinese nuclear capability on the military credibility of the U S on the dangers of Chinese miscalculation on increased fears of nuclear war in Asia on the U S military presence in Asia on fears of inevitable Chinese Communist hegemony in the area and in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute A The Military Problem The basic military problems will be the ones by which we are now faced - the problems of dealing with military probing Operations designed to determine the level of U S commitment and to obtain political results in the Taiwan Straits relatively low-level border wars in situations where prospects for Chinese political gains are good and risks low and revolu- tionary wars To the extent SECRET - meow r B MFA Date SECRET 34 To the extent that a Chinese nuclear capability increases the danger of escalation from lower levels to higher levels of threat that danger is based less upon the possibility that the Chinese will overestimate their relative military strength than that they may make optimistic estimates of the situation They may believe that Asian countries will give in to increased pressures because of fear of Chinese conventional power and a belief that the Chinese capability will deter effec- tive U S counteraction because of fear of involvement in a Sine-U S nuclear war or because of a belief that in the long run Chinese power will be preeminent in Asia and that the U S will be forced into withdrawal There is also some danger that the ChiComs may estimate that the U S will not respond ade- quately to certain levels of threat because of an increased sense of risk because of an unwillingness to commit U S land jorces in Asia or possibly because of the pressure of U S EurOpean allies H Alternative Strategies Two alternatives to existing strategy of flexible response of keeping hostilities at the lowest possible level need to be considered SECRET 3 MTHE NATIONAL mcm es Await I 7 I n-ou By W NARA Dale SECRET 35 to be considered primary reliance upon nuclear weapons in both deterring and responding to non-nuclear aggression in Asia and reliance upon conventional air or naval attacks upon the source of aggression No one proposes complete reliance from the outset upon nuclear weapons in reSponding to any level of threat above the level of insurgency nor is the alternative a policy of no re- liance upon use of nuclear weapons The issue relates to the threshold One definition of a relatively low threshold would make introduction of substantial Chinese Communist tr00ps the trigger Another might describe it as a conflict situation in which introduction of substantial U S ground forces is the only alternative to use of nuclear weapons A higher threshold might be defined as follows a situation in which survival of an Asian state or major U S or allied forces are seriously endangered and cannot be adequately protected by conventional forces in the area or deployable to the area or can be protected only at such high economic and human cost as to indicate a balance of advantage in favor of nuclear weapons use Any definition will be subject to wide interpretation in application to military planning and can at best indicate a general SECRET ll MNONAL memes hasDate SECRET 36 general diSposition with respect to use Quite apart from particular arguments for and against a low threshold it may be well to bear in mind that in the actual event the policy- maker is likely to make a wide search for other alternatives before initiating nuclear weapons use in a conventional war situation the more so if it should be the first occasion since WOrld war II when such weapons would be used It is in general desirable that he have as many Options as possible at that time It is also necessary to bear in mind the effect of appear with respect to U S dependence on nuclear weapons What- ever the nuclear threshold now large reductions in present conventional capabilities in the area could have significant effect on the calculations of Asians as to the probability of U S nuclear re5ponse and of nuclear war in Asia The advocates of a policy of very early use of nuclear weapons argue as follows The situation we face in the Far East is similar to the one we faced in Europe in the immediate post-war period Communist China will for many years be a negligible nuclear threat but does pose a substantial conven- tional air and ground threat To meet this threat conventionally will be SECRET II ECLASSI F1E0 REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES 3 Aweor'nup 7 0 we Dale fl SECRET 37 will be very costly Because of the Sino-Soviet split the Chinese threat and our response to it can be clearly separated from the Soviet threat and our reSponse to it - there is low risk of Soviet nuclear reSponse to U S first-use of nuclear weapons against an Asian Communist state Against this view it can be argued as follows Insofar as the proposed strategy is intended to deal with massive conventional attacks by Communist China it is directed toward an unreal threat Serious limitations upon Chinese conventional capabilities as a result of withdrawal of Soviet support as well as military risks and political costs of such action make it most unlikely U S nuclear response to low-level military activity raises the essentially moral problem of the pr0por- tionality of the punishment to the aggression Even if we can satisfy ourselves on this question our views are unlikely to be widely shared Political justification of first-use will continue therefore to be a most serious problem and actual first-use would involve great political costs The dangers of miscalculation by either Communist China or by other Asian states of the significance of a Chinese nu- clear capability can best be avoided militarily by prompt ade- quate SECRET I Aswan BY dp NARA 0313 7 SECRET 38 quate non-nuclear response to Communist non-nuclear military mprobes The threat of nuclear response is unlikely to be very credible as a response to the most probable levels of Chinese action While the USSR would seek to avoid nuclear involvement the possibility of its involvement in a situation in which the U S initiated a major nuclear attack upon an Asian Communist state is sufficiently significant so that it must be taken seriously into account In a number of possible military situ- ations in Asia we will be immediately confronting North Vietnam or North Korea rather than Communist China If the U S action threatened the destruction of these regimes the USSR would be under great pressure in large part precisely because of the issues involved in the Sino-Soviet dispute to provide nuclear assistance rather than permit their nuclear destruction It is also not safe to assume that the USSR would permit the nuclear destruction of Communist China or that in general it could stay out of the world-wide crisis which would be created by U S first-use of nuclear weapons in Asia Thus general arguments on the risks of nuclear weapons use could apply and the question of military SECRET nzpnoouceo ATTHENATIONAL memes 11 a wind-D4 I p ADme 7 BY-LW SECT 1 39 of military utility of initiation of nuclear weapons use in a two-sided nuclear exchange would need to be examined moreover whatever the actual Soviet reaction in a parti- cular situation a U S policy of primary reliance upon nuclear weapons might cause the Soviets to adopt a declaratory policy of responding to U S use of nuclear weapons with threat of Soviet use At a minimum the Soviets are likely to play a leading role in a political campaign against U S use or threatened use of nuclear weapons which could make initiation or continuation of such use very difficult Particularly after the Chinese Communists have a nuclear capability an evident U S policy of nuclear response to non- nuclear aggression will very probably make Asian states in- creasingly reluctant to seek U S military assistance because of fear of being drawn into a nuclear war There may also be fear that the U S will not reSpond adequately to levels of aggression that would not justify a nuclear response A nuclear-dependent strategy would greatly increase the pressures on U S bases If Soviet involvement cannot be ruled out distinctions be- tween tactical and strategic use of nuclear weapons though not wholly irrelevant become of less importance Even tactical use will create a situation in which sensitivity to the possibility of a general nuclear attack on Communist China or other Asian Communist state could greatly increase with a resulting general rise in international tensions and danger of miscalculation mm Worm B Qp'wmae 7 40 on U S bases created by a ChiCom capability particularly in Japan The more evident and visible our nuclear posture and our reliance upon nuclear weapons the greater is likely to be the appeal of Peiping's proposals for removing the danger of nuclear war from Asia as well as support for its efforts to muster Asian racial solidarity European allies will view our nuclear policy in Asia as inconsistent with our policy for Europe and probably highly dangerous A policy of greater reliance upon conventional air or naval action against the source of aggression would avoid many of the difficulties of a nuclear strategy although there is likely to be considerable fear that such action will bring a nuclear response Air and naval power alone without U S ground forces will not moreover always be an effective means of achieving U S objectives The problem of political juSti- fication for such a strategy in low-level military situations continues to be severe But this may be an apprOpriate strategy or part of a strategy in some circumstances Graduated air actions against North Vietnam could for example be appropri- at ly related to introduction of U S ground forces in Laos C Preferred SECRET DECLASSIHED mm Numb-ac 7 SECRET 41 C Preferred Strategy and Programs Both the most probable military developments and political needs underline the necessity to maintain an evident ability to respond rapidly with adequate force to Communist military probes without undue reliance upon nuclear weapons Such an ability is needed to reassure Asian nations under Communist pressure and to make evident to them that a Chinese nuclear capability will not automatically convert any future war in Asia into a nuclear war with increased danger of their nuc1ear involvement It is needed to reSpond to the most likely forms of Communist military action It is needed to minimize the danger of miscalculation by Communist China of U S slowness to act as an unwillingness to act It is obvious that no amount of conventional rapid reaction capability will substi- tute in the final analysis for a U S will to act but such a capability will serve as a symbol of our intent to do so and provide us with means to prevent further miscalculation in the actual event U S rapid reaction capability is a function of several interrelated factors which are up to a point militarily interchangeable general purpose forces deployed to the area SECRET AT THE NATIONAL ARCIWES vb-k momu 7 B QanAmm SECRET 42 area air and sea lift to move combat forces supplies and equipment to the theater bases to provide staging areas and logistic support for military operations preupositioning on bases or ships of supplies and equipment and capability for rapid movement within the theater of operations Forces em- placed in the area are likely to be more reassuring politically than preparatory actions and arrangements Thus we face a policy dilemma 0n the one hand the requirements generated by a Chinese nuclear detonation and capability will give additional emphasis to the need for the presence of U S forces in the area On the other hand as a result of balance of payments considerations we have had to consider withdrawals of existing conventional forces To some extent we can compensate for limited withdrawals by emphasizing the other elements This statement is not intended to suggest that forces in the area are necessarily more expensive in balance of payments terms than other alternatives In Korea for example balance of payments savings from a reduction in U S forces would very probably have to be offset by additional economic aid of comparable amount in order to meet continuing ROK foreign exchange needs SECRET I DECLASS AT THE NAHONAL MCI-IVES I 7 Bv 'hm Dale F 43 elements of our rapid reaction capability but only to some extent It is exceedingly difficult to estimate what level of withdrawal can be accomplished without adverse political con sequences within the context of a ChiCom nuclear detonationo A great deal depends upon how the withdrawal is handled and upon the coincidence of events If for example we should be in the midst of implementing even those relatively modest with drawals which have been approved at the time the Chinese detonate a nuclear device - or worse if we should announce-and proceed with withdrawals after the detonation of a device - the logical effects could be quite adverse Such a coincidence of timing is of course possible If at the same time we are unable to respond even modestly to the certain demands for in- creased military aid in the post-detonation period the adverse effects would tend to be accentuated Accordingly from the point of view of minimizing the adverse effects of a Chinese Communist nuclear capability upon Asian countries the U S should avoid redeployments of conventional forces which will significantly reduce our military presence or rapid reaction capability avoid if possible SECRET 1 1 ECLASSIFIED REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHVES - a h m u m w mam 7 3 0 map Da'le SECRET 44 possible timing of redeployments which will increase the like- lihood that they will follow a Chinese Communist nuclear detona- tion conduct periodic exercises designed to demonstrate our capability for rapid reaction and without changing the basic downward trend of our military assistance expenditures make available a modest contingent fund which could be used to meet demands for increased military assistance in the postudetonation period and thus provide reassurance of the U S commitment Proposals have been made for creation of a separate U S counter-China regional nuclear deterrent force and for refine- ments in defenses designed to increase the survivability of existing or planned nuclear forces in Asia These prOposals rest upon two types of argument The first is an argument on military grounds for maintaining a permanent full U S counter force capability in the Asian region to deal with a ChiCom nu clear capability The second is an argument for a clearer differentiation between forces directed against the USSR and those directed against Communist China Although existing and planned Notably by RAND and the Institute for Defense Analyses in their reports on a Chinese Communist nuclear capability SECRET f AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES 4-- I - RAM Date 7 SECRET 45 planned nuclear deployments will in fact provide an effective counterforce capability against Communist China for the indefinite future the argument for refinements designed to increase surviva bility of that force or for creation of a separate clearly-dis- tinguished counter-China force are not strong The argument for maintaining a full counterforce capability involves an artificial distinction between theaterubased forces and other U S forces So long as we can bring nuclear forces from elsewhere to bear upon Communist China and the Chinese are aware of this fact their future ability to wreak major destruc- tion upon our theater forces will not be likely to tempt them into pre emptive attack nor will it leave us unable to reSpond if they do attack Nor is it The argument against major measures to increase survivability of nuclear forces does not take account of the need for such measures to deal with a Soviet threat a subject outside the scope of this paper The positive and negative political effects of refinements are likely to be negligible they are neither likely to impress or to alarm In view of the unlikelihood of actual employment of nuclear weapons by Communist China we and the country we are seeking to defend will prefer to accept these low risks rather than assume the greater risks and political costs that pre-emptive counterforce action would entail SECRET Date 7 SECRET 46 Nor is it necessary or feasible to create a self- sufficient Asian nuclear force in order to differentiate be- tween forces directed against Communist China and those directed against the USSR It would be infeasible to limit U S strike forces to those which would pose no threat to the USSR Such action would for example rule out any seaborne forces in the area On the other hand the United States will not be faced for the indefinite future with the question of employing U S intercontinental strike forces in order to deal with a Chinese Communist nuclear threat If in the distant future we are faced by a situation of confrontation with Communist China in which reenforcement of our local nuclear forces seems necessary it is highly likely that we will have adequate time for re- enforcement and that we will not be forced into reliance upon our U S based strategic forces we should also have adequate time and opportunity to make clear by words and actions that we intend no attack upon the V General Problems of U S Response A The Problem of Reassurance The principal requirement created by a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation and capability in Asia will be a need for reassurance SECRET DECLASQHED REPRODUCED ARCHIVES Rumour 7 h 1p SECRET 47 reassurance in order to reduce the effectiveness of Chinese politico-military pressures and the possibility of develOpment of independent nuclear capabilities by Asian countries especi- ally India and to a much lesser extent to deter Chinese mili- tary action Reassurance can take the form of U S declaratory policies U S political and military actions and programs and U S actions which give threatened countries a greater self- confidence in their independent ability to protect themselves against ChiCom threats It can be provided through bilateral actions involving the U S and to some extent through co- Operative activities among Asian countries themselves The most difficult problems are posed by the questions of the character of U S assurance of defense against nuclear attack and of cooperation in nuclear matters nuclear sharing It is difficult for the U S to make general commitments to defense against nuclear attack because of the danger that an Asian country may without U S concurrence provoke a situation in which the U S would be forced into nuclear re Sponse and the ambivalence which is likely to characterize the attitudes of some Asian nations with respect to nuclear defense This ambivalence may cause some to prefer not to have a clear-cut SECRET mm 7 By W Wilma SECRET 48 a clear-cut public U S commitment and others to desire a veto over U S use of nuclear weapons in any situation involving them For such reasons broad public commitments will need to be kept quite general with more specific commitments given to particular countries on a selected basis Multilaterally-agreed guidelines on use of nuclear weapons comparable to the Athens Guidelines for NATO would be infeasible The development of national nuclear capabilities does not seem a desirable way to provide reassurance The general argu- ments against nuclear proliferation acquire special weight in Asia where local non-Communist enemies are often at least as important as Communist ones where our relations with countries of the area are very diverse where the reliability of future governments is more Open to question than in Europe and where nuclear arms programs are likely to interfere seriously with the needs of economic develOpment and political stability Nuclear-sharing arrangements involving dual control of weapons systems are presently being reviewed in EurOpe It is not desirable at this time nor for the foreseeable future to introduce such arrangements in Asia where problems of control and security of information are greater and where the weapons are likely SECRET P m wmmnom meme - ug m 'wa Date 7 SECRET 49 are likely to be viewed by local non-Communist neighbors as directed as much against them as against the Communist enemy will the objectives of Asian countries in seeking or accepting such arrangements necessarily be compatible with U S interests Some may see participation in control arrange- ments primarily as a means of vetoing U S use of nuclear wea- pons Others might estimate that their participation will in- crease marginally the insecurity of control over use in the eyes of Peiping and therefore the deterrent effect Once we start down such a path it will be difficult to stop short of general proliferation of arrangements of this kind Once made such commitments would be very difficult to reverse Accordingly we should prefer forms of nuclear c00pera- tion which are bilateral over those that are multilateral and forms that involve planning over those that involve deployment of nuclear forces under joint control Probably most requests for various forms of nuclear c00peration can be met by offers of guarantees and of bilateral planning Perhaps the most difficult problem that will be posed for U S policy over the long term is the possibility of Indian develoPment of a nuclear capability Adherence by India and other SECRET REPRODUCED THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES B Map Date 7 SECRET 50 other potential non-Communist nuclear powers in Asia to the test ban treaty will reduce greatly the likelihood of their early develoPment of nuclear capabilities At the same time it may mean that a Chinese nuclear detonation will increase pressure on the U S by India and other Asian adherents to the treaty for guarantees and forms of nuclear cooperation particularly the former Over the longer term it may be very difficult for India deepite the test ban to forego a nuclear capability indefinitely when its principal enemy possesses such a capability Finding means of providing India with assurance of its nuclear defense will therefore be important as part of the long-term U S effort to prevent nuclear proliferation The problem of providing India with guarantees or of engaging with it in sharing arrangements is particularly difficult be- cause of the lack of a treaty of alliance within which such guarantees or arrangements might be offered and because of the effects of any arrangements on U S allies in the area including but not limited to Pakistan A general U S declaratory policy on nuclear defense and other measures of reassurance will help meet the need A possible additional measure would be to persuade the U K to offer SECRET HEB REPRODUCED THE Mm mom s - Asmmw Date 7 SECRET 51 offer to both India and Pakistan a guarantee of nuclear defense within the Commonwealth framework As compared with a specific U S commitment such U K guarantee might entail fewer poli tical problems for India and less apparent danger of Soviet in- volvement since the Sino-Soviet Treaty is operable only in military situations involving Japan or a nation allied with Japan which the U K is not While the Paks would probably reject the offer they would then be in a poor position to object to such treatment for India While this may seem a politically useful employment of the U K nuclear capability it will in fact conflict with our efforts to limit the role of independent nuclear capabilities in Europe It would provide 22 hfastg justification for the British nuclear force at a time when sentiment in the U K is turning against continuance of an independent force It could be used by the French as an argument for its general position It is moreover by no means clear whether the Indians would consider such a commitment as useful as a deterrent given likely British hesitation with respect to actual use of nuclear weapons as a unilateral even though general U S declaratory statement Nonetheless this idea may warrant further SECRET l Mmmnom memes bad- mg 1 mummy 7 B amp Date A SECRET 52 further consideration as a contingent possibility in the light of the evolving situation in Europe and India B Problems of Planning and Action The develOpment of policies and actions to prevent or to deal with the adverse effects of a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation and capability presents procedural issues which are by no means unique to it but which are of special difficulty and significance in this case The problem inherently involves all of the difficulties of contingency planning While it is possible to estimate with considerable assurance the direct military significance of a Chinese nuclear capability it is not possible to state with absolute certainty the character of a Chinese exploitation or the reaction of other Asian nations Since we have concluded that it is both realistic and desirable to play down the real significance of a Chinese nu- clear capability we will wish to avoid a great flurry of activity in the period following a detonation which would tend to contra- dict our general posture of calm and assurance A number of actions proposed can be taken routinely either before or after the event and justified without reference to a Chinese nuclear capability In other cases the content of our actions even though SECRET NARA Date SECRET 53 though taken after detonation will itself overcome the effect of activity Insofar as pr0posed advance actions may involve political difficulties or economic costs it may be difficult to accept in advance the necessity for action Yet after the event action may lose its value There is moreover the question of the weight that should be given to considerations relating to a Chinese nu- clear capability in determining issues that also involve other considerations An effort has been made to confine recommen- dations to matters on which a Chinese nuclear capability could have a major bearing the offshore islands or where U S action while not essential in the context of a Chinese Communist nuclear capability could be very useful in dealing with short or long-term effects a Pacific Defense College VI Recommendations U S Military Response and Military Programs A General The U S Response to Aggression in Asia Discussion The following statement is intended partly as a general policy -guide to planning but also as a standard for assurances out- lined below SECRET 1 oacuxssmeo Amman 7 SECREE 54 lined below by the U S to Asian countries on the U S response to aggression - particularly nuclear aggression g The U S will not initiate pre-emptive counter- force operations against the Communist Chinese nu- clear capability in the absence of specific Chinese aggressive actions which would clearly justify such action Whether the U S will as a part of its response take such action in a situation in which the Chinese had initiated military action which would justify it cannot be determined in advance of the de- velOpment of the particular situation The U S will reapond to an unmistakable nuclear attack upon its forces or bases in Asia with nuclear weapons Whether the reSponse will be in the form of the use of tactical weapons against local targets or will involve broader attacks upon mainland China will depend upon the circumstances of the attack In the event that the Chinese Communist attack in- volves the territory of an Asian state the U S will ordinarily consult with that state before launching a nuclear counterattack but will not be prevented SECRET ll REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES DECLASSWIED Amman 1 dzuunwarx B lP'WDae 7 55 prevented from acting because of the non-concurrence of that state Similarly if the U S reSponse in- volves nuclear counterattack from the territory of an Asian state the U S will ordinarily consult with that state before launching such attack but will not be prevented from so acting because of the non-concurrence of that state c In the event of an unmistakable nuclear attack upon the territory of an Asian state which does not significantly involve U S forces or bases the U S will in consultation with the Asian state against which the attack occurs and ordi- narily only with its acquiescence retaliate appropriately with nuclear weapons The U S response to nonunuclear aggression will be flexible and determined by the particular circumstances of the attack The U S will at the request of the country under attack respond up to In some cases we would be committed by existing treaty obliga- tions to so consult REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES - Amati mm By 'wn Dale 7 r4 sum 56 up to some level of attack without resort to nuclear weapons In general nuclear weapons will be used only in situations in which U S and allied conventional forces whether those available within the area or from outside are not sufficient to contain a major Communist overt aggressive action against U S or Asian forces which jeopardizes U S vital interests Even in the event of major attack U S and or allied conventional forces should be capable at a minimum of holding long enough to provide time for an effort to convince the Communist Chinese or other Asian Communist regime of the risks involved in their action and thereby give diplomacy an opportunity to end the conflict The U S should also employ its conventional naval and air power against the source of aggression in response to military actions which would reasonably justify such response Any first use of nuclear weapons or the use of naval and air power against the source of aggression will ordinarily take place only after consultation with and with the concurrence of the Asian state being defended Military Posture SECRET I I AT THE mm memes i I 9 Armor B mu Date 7 SECRET 57 Military Posture From the point of view of dealing with the effects of a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation and capa- bility on Asian countries the United States should not in- crease its apparent or real dependence upon nuclear weapons in deterring or responding to non nuclear aggression avoid redeployments from Asia which will significantly reduce the U S military presence or non-nuclear rapid reaction capability avoid timing of redeployments which will increase the likeli- hood that they will follow close upon a Chinese Communist nu- clear detonation and seek to develop and demonstrate the U S will and ability to reSpond quickly with nonunuclear means to non-nuclear attack The U S should take account of the fact that particularly initially its reSponse to aggression will be judged by a somewhat different standard because of fear that a ChiCom nuclear capability will deter U S response U S Public Posture Our policies and actions should take account of the probable two sided character of Chinese tactics with their emphasis upon threat and protection upon force and upon peace We should accordingly 3 Make clear that our existing nuclear capability even in the Far East far exceeds that of Communist China and that SECRET Amharir B QPmauae 7 SLCRET 58 and that the balance of nuclear power has not changed nor is it going to change without however so emphasizing our nuclear power as to suggest that future wars in Asia will be nuclear in character We should as indicated more specifically below make clear our intent to come to the aid of nations under threat of nuclear attack Particularly emphasize our will and ability to come quickly to the assistance of countries under non-nuclear attack without employing nuclear weapons B Reassurance through Military Actions and Programs 1 Defense Guarantees Broad Public Commitments The United States should issue preferably as a part of the pr0posed policy statement see par B-l p 73 a public statement on de fense against Communist military attack along the following lines Because of problems discussed earlier this statement must neces sarily contain explanatory material as well as declaratory policy a The United States possesses the will and ability to respond in a flexible graduated manner to Communist aggression in Asia The vastly superior nuclear power of the United States can be relied upon to deter Communist SECRET DECLASSIHED Amho d a QPHAPA Dale' 7 SECRET 59 Communist China from employing nuclear weapons Even the most casual calculation should demonstrate to Peiping that possible military gains that might be derived from nuclear weapons use would be far outweighed by the costs to Communist China If nonetheless Communist China should be so foolish as to use nuclear weapons against another Asian state it can expect a nuclear reSponse In this connection it should be noted that the United States has the capability to snuff out immediately any remaining Chinese Communist ability to deliver further nuclear weapons against Asian targets While the United States is prepared to use its nuclear power when essential it is also prepared to assist countries which have the will and ability to defend themselves and wish our assistance in meeting non nuclear aggression by non-nuclear means The existence of a Chinese nuclear capability when such a capability develops will have no effect upon our willingness to act in such circumstances nor upon our ability to come to their assistance 2 Defense SECRET Amman 3 REPRODUCED AT THE NAMNAL ARCHIVES I uw-h in-W B MA Date 7 2 SECRET 60 Defense Guarantees Specific Assurances The U S should take the initiative to reaffirm its existing defense commitments to allies without specific reference to nuclear defense It is not considered necessary to provide anticipa- tory commitments other than the broad public commitments pro posed above to neutrals However in reSponse to requests or evident need the U S should be prepared to take the following actions a With respect to allies Affirm that our existing defense commitment covers deterrence of and re- sponse to a nuclear attack With respect to neutrals Indicate that the general public assurance proposed above applies to the parti- cular country concerned Indicate a willingness to make joint statements with one or more neutrals committing the U S to consult with the nation s concerned if it comes under threat of Chinese Com- munist nuclear attack Such commitment would be parallel to the commitment already made to India with respect to air defense Privately indicate a willingness to consider providing more formal assurances SECRET Amm prpnonuceo AT me NATIONAL ARCHIVES BY 9 MBA Date 7 In In SECRE1 61 assurances but point out that such assurances are likely to require formal U S legislative action and to be inconsistent with neutral status With reSpect to India and Pakistan Give further consideration in the light of developments with respect to nuclear forces in Europe and the situ ation in India to the desirability of encouraging the to offer a guarantee of nuclear defense to India and Pakistan With respect to either allies or neutrals Use announcements of consultation or action with resPect to concrete measures such as those proposed in paras 3 and 5 below as a form of reassurance As appropriate commit the U S clearly to consulta- tion prior to use of nuclear weapons in re5ponding to nuclear or non nuclear attack upon them but do not make such commitment with respect to attacks which are primarily against U S forces or bases Argue against any request for a clear commitment that the U S will obtain the concurrence of the state concerned before re5ponding to nuclear attack SECRET I ATTHENMIONN memes Am m w mmae 7 SECRET 62 attack with nuclear weapons on the grounds that such action would reduce the deterrent to ChiCom action The U S commitment under a and above should be made subject in appropriate cases the GRC and the ROK to the quali- fication that we cannot assume reSponsibility for nuclear den fence if the state involved initiates military action against an Asian Communist state without U S concurrence 3 Nuclear Cooperation The United States should not assist and should positively discourage deve10pment of in- dependent nuclear capabilities by non-Communist Asian states - in particular by India We should seek to satisfy requests for other forms of nuclear cooPeration with proposals for bi- lateral planning for retaliation against nuclear attack such planning to cover with varying intensity depending upon the country involved problems of targeting and of nuclear strategy and tactics Such planning should also be designed to demon strate the limited value of a Communist Chinese nuclear capa bility the unlikelihood of Chinese nuclear attack and the continued primary need for improved conventional and counter guerrilla capabilities We should SECRET 3 ED INTRODUCED AT THE NMIONAL ARCHVES - hw l Jun- 7 BY SECRET 63 We should generally avoid multilateral planning and attempt to satisfy demands for it in SEATO or elsewhere through more general discussion of the implications of a ChiCom nuclear capa- bility We should not engage in forms of nuclear-sharing in volving nuclear weapons under dual control as in Europe If a country either as a result of an immediate threat or other wise would find emplacement of nuclear weapons reassuring we should be prepared in response to the country s request to meet the need for reassurance by temporarily deploying air mobile missiles aircraft or sea mobile nuclear forces which are wholly under U S control to its territory or nearby areas 4 U S Theater-Based Nuclear Forces Since existing and planned U S nuclear capabilities are adequate to deal with any foreseeable Chinese Communist nuclear threat the U S should not in order to deal with the ChiCom threat increase presentlyu planned deployments of nuclear forces nor undertake such measures as hardening or dispersal of command and control facilities air defense of retaliatory forces a high state of alert larger numbers of bases for dispersal etc In this connection if the U S SECRET ED I 'l AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES macaw a B mm Data 7 w 64 the U S has a choice between withdrawing its nuclear forces from an Asian base and risking total loss of its base rights it should weigh the latter risk much more heavily than concern about concentrating nuclear forces For reasons the U S should however take the following measures a Send one POLARIS submarine to the Pacific now in advance of a ChiCom detonation and in advance of regularly planned deployments due to begin in 1964 Like all nuclear actions such action should be handled with routine publicity Also give discreet publicity to our existing REGULUS submarine capability in the area Discussion Action with respect to POLARIS would be particularly useful in underlining the limited significance of any Chinese missiles test which might occur at about the same time as a nuclear detonation Deployment after detonation would tend to suggest that we attach more military significance to the event than is the case but might nonetheless be desirable if such action had not been previously taken depending upon reactions to the SECRET ncpnooucsn armemnom ARCHIVES A Hywh macaw 7 ADne 65 to the detonation In any subsequent deployments particularly emphasize dual-capable systems and seaborne systems which are less vulnerable to political attack These con- siderations for example favor aircraft carriers and argue against land-based missile deployments In this connection an Indian Ocean Task Force built around an attack carrier would be a particularly desirable counter to a Chinese nuclear capability and a stabilizing influence in the area and from this point of view action to introduce such a task force should be taken as soon as possible - if possible prior to a Chinese nuclear detonation While we should not increase Peiping's political target by referring publicly to our theater-based nuclear forces as some kind of regional deterrent force we should in cases where it would be re- assuring refer consistently in private conversa- tions with non Communist Asian leaders to our nuclear forces as a single entity which has the specific objective of deterring or re5ponding to ChiCom amass DECLASSIHED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES mm and I A By a RARA D313 7 ID - 5 SECRET 66 ChiCom use of nuclear weapons - as a Paci- fic Deterrent Force We should run frequent command post and other exercises designed to make evident in a quiet way the fact that Communist China is the primary target of our Pacific nuclear forces Except where such visits will create significant adverse political reaction and therefore become self-defeating we should increase good will visits of U S seaborne nuclear forces to friendly ports in Asia The U S should initiate now a program under which naval and air observers from allied and other friendly countries are regularly invited to make cruises aboard U S aircraft carriers Discus- sign Such cruises should impress such observers with U S conventional rapid reaction capabilities as well as with U S nuclear capabilities and may be marginally helpful in heading off requests for nuclearusharing arrangements or as part of a U S response to such requests Air Defense A Chinese Communist regional nuclear capability SECRET DECLASSIHED Mood I REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES I a am Da'le 7 SECRET 67 capability should not in itself increase the military require- ment for air defense and the U S should not undertake expen sive measures to increase the refinement of air defense systems because of an assumed new Chinese Communist air threat For primarily reasons the following air defense actions should be undertaken a Air defense should be provided to defend U S bases on the territory of U S allies who may be subjected to ChiCom political pressures Within the present concept for air defense of India the U S should be as responsive as possible in meeting any increased sense of air threat that India may feel following a Chinese nuclear detonation by running more frequent joint exercises or by supplementing the British effort to improve the Indian Air Force The U S should seriously consider permanent de- ployment to Asia of mobile air defense units which can be moved quickly into areas under or actual SECRET 1 AT THE swarm memes AmmSECRET 68 or actual threat of air attack The U S should make regular demonstrations of its ability to move such units quickly into threatened areas and should publicize permanent air defense installations in Asian countries The U S should not press Asian nations that would not find the introduction of nuclear warheads for air defense missiles reassuring to accept such war- heads to do so contradicts the political purpose these air defense missiles are designed to serve Depending upon the situation in the post-detonation period the U S might provide token capability for defense of Asian capital cities that may feel parti cularly threatened Bangkok or Taipeh Bearing in mind the primarily purpose of additional air defense measures in the context of a ChiCom nuclear capability the U S should seriously reexamine and where Whether such action will have significant reassurance value will obviously depend upon other accompanying actions If for example such action is taken primarily as either a military or political offset to redeployment of existing fixed air defense or other conventional forces in the area the net reassurance effect could be nil or negative SECRET DECLASSIHED Ar THENATIONAI memes B 0 map Dale 7 SECRET 69 where possible cut back such programs if it becomes evident that the Chinese Communists have a missile delivery system with compatible nuclear warheads 6 U S Conventional Capabilities General The U S should continue to develop a non-nuclear capability which can demonstrate and underline our ability to meet Communist military pressures without very early resort to nuclear weapons counter-guerrilla capabilities to meet what will along with border threats continue to be the principal military problem in Asia and an evident capability for rapid reaction 7 Maintaining and Improving the Capability for Rapid an-nuclear Reaction The United States should a Increase U S air and seaulift capabilities parti- cularly for Southeast Asia 9 Continue and expand its program for developing stocks of supplies on preupositioned logistic ships and for preupositioning of supplies on overseas bases c Deploy very limited numbers of U S troops on an indefinite but nonmpermanent basis to mainland Southeast Asia presumably Thailand following nuclear SECRET DECLASSIHED gamma 1 By 0 Mom 23 1 IO - h mm THE 1 Ea WI h -- an-I SECRET 70 nuclear detonation if such action would seem re- assuring in the than existing situation taking particular account of the effect of developments in Laos and Vietnam on the reaction to the detonation Make a particular effort to demonstrate U S rapid reaction capability in the early post-detonation period perhaps through some Special well-publicized military exercise which would emphasize this feature of non-nuclear capabilities Undertake contingency planning which would assume various kinds of restrictions upon bases in Japan and examine the relative desirability of alternative contingency base arrangements Continue and further expand the program for joint use by Japan of U S bases in Japan with the clearly stated intention of movement toward eventual joint controlo If it is decided to dispose of a U S base in Japan we should seek to anticipate the possibility as far in advance as possible and to time release for maximum political gain Seek to forestall later pressures on U S base rights in Japan DECLASSIHED Amm 7 By M map Dale SECRET 71 in Japan through more frequent and explicit exer- cise now of U S rights by such means as military exercises movement in and out of forces and equip- ment etc At the same time do this in such a way as to avoid greatly increased public as Opposed to official notice of our activities HT Continue to encourage the British to maintain at least on a standby basis existing base establish- ments and forces in Singapore Halaya and the Indian Ocean 8 Indigenous Conventional Capabilities The U S should a Without permanently reversing the present general downward trend of military assistance be prepared to make temporary limited increases in military aid to countries of the Asian area as a form of reassurance in the period following a nuclear de- tonation In order to avoid action which would over-inflate the significance of the Chinese nuclear detonation funds for this purpose might be obtained initially by diversions within the than existing appropriations with the intent of replenishing SECRET Adm-w AWNWUP ll 7 Am Da'le SECRET 72 replenishing those funds by a commensurately increased request in the following appropriations cycle Present aid planning should also take account of this contingent aid requirement Consultation with Congressional leaders explaining such action at the time it is to be taken would be desirable Provided the ChiComs do not appear to be moving very rapidly toward an early nuclear-missile capability be prepared to provide some limited help for additional indigenously-controlled air defense However major military assistance programs of this kind should be resisted and the principal concentration should be upon capabilities to deal with the real guerrilla or limited border threats VII Recommendations Political Strategy and Political Actions A Political Strategy Again U S response must take account of the two broad strands of probable Chinese Communist exploitation a In response to efforts to induce increased fear and respect the U S must offer reassurance E In response SECRET AT THE mnom ARCHIVES r Wk Amway 0313 7 f SECRET 73 In response to efforts to suggest that U S hosti lity and the U S nuclear presence are the primary sources of the threat of nuclear war in Asia and to present Communist China as the protector of Asian nations the U S should underline its peaceful and constructive purposes its willingness to dis- cuss problems bearing on peace with any nation and its interest in the independence of Asian nations B Reassurance through Political Actions Discussion Reassurance can be provided through de- claratory policy statements U S responses to aggression and assistance to countries to increase their ability to protect themselves It can be provided by alliance or other guarantees deflation of ideas with respect to the invincibility or invul- nerability of Communist China demonstrations of the basic strength and technical development of other Asian nations and to some extent through collective or bilateral forms of mutual self-help These possibilities are covered below 1 A U S Policy Statement The principal themes of our public response to a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation and capability SECRET DECLASSIHED LPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHNES a mood 7 BY a NARA Da ue SECRET 74 and capability should be developed through both an immediate statement at the time of detonation and a fuller statement issued soon after The fuller statement would consist not only of a statement of U S policy but also a kind of brief white paper though not so labeled containing the government's analysis of the significance of the deve10pment The policy statement should i2 g _ lia contain defense pledges along the lines suggested above em- phasize U S nuclear power but also U S ability to deal with non-nuclear aggression by non-nuclear means state that the U S will not be diverted by a Chinese nuclear capability into an over-emphasis upon military programs to the neglect of economic development state our belief that the future of the Pacific area lies in the direction of disarmament co- oPeration peace and economic deve10pment rather than in the direction of armaments and war and dedicate the U S to con- tinued disarmament efforts following up on the test ban state the U S position on Asian nuclear free zones and indicate our willingness to talk with Communist China about any SECRET RLPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES I mama BY 7 n My ail-LI mass 75 about any issue affecting the peace and state our hOpe that mainland China will one day too participate in the peaceful c00perative endeavors of the countries of the area 5 Discussion It is important that our public response to a Chinese nuclear detonation and capability be deve10ped on a consistent basis both in advance of detonation and after the event In advance there should be press backgrounders regular references in Speeches of high officials inspired articles etc It can be argued that anything but perhaps a brief White House or State Department statement at the time detonation occurs will in itself oVer-emphasize its signi- ficance However if the statement itself de-emphasizas on the basis of quite thorough analysis the significance of the event this danger should be minimal Such a statement should actually reduce the volume of unattributed and probably other- wise contradictory comment from government agencies Such a statement should not only be reassuring to foreign audiences but should demonstrate to the American public that the govern ment has in this case unlike the case of Sputnik given careful advance though to the problem and has a policy for dealing SECRET I a RED REPRooucen AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES inn-3 nah Mia- Amm 7 BY NARA Dale SECRET 76 dealing with 2 The U S Alliance ystem Discussion Major changes in the U S alliance system are not feasible or desirable A Chinese nuclear capability will further emphasize the need to reduce some forms of differentiation between allies and neutrals and therefore further accentuate present dilemmas In addi- tion to reaffirming existing alliance obligations both in general statements and in Specific statements to particular allies the U S should a In response to any renewed Thai request for a bilateral continue to argue that the bilateral assurances already provided are adequate but if the Thais are not satisfied and that if Thai confidence appears significantly shaken by Chinese nuclear developments and other events be prepared to agree to a bilateral Suggest Some would prefer that the fuller information to be presented should be provided in the form of a backgrounder for the press rather than as an official written analysis If contrary to the recommendation above it should be decided that such an approach should be adOpted it would still be of considerable importance to base the backgrounder on an agreed written analysis Such a statement will therefore need to be prepared on a contin- gency basis whichever technique is adOpted mes AT THE NATIONAL memes Amm 93' RAM Date 7 SECRET 77 Cb Suggest now in selected Asian allied countries and some non-aligned countries such as India crea- tion of informal joint committees or study groups consisting of representatives of the U S Mission and the local government to carry on a continuing discussion of the significance of Chinese nuclear developments against the background of a considera- tion of Communist China's basic weaknesses Such discussion might also be organized within SEATO and ANZUS Initial discussion might be based upon a paper tabled by the U S The paper recently prepared for the October meeting of the Atlantic Planning Advisory Group might with slight modifi- cation serve this purpose Such joint committees could serve as a means of discussing information on ChiCom vulnerabilities to nuclear attack and on ChiCom conventional capabilities on which studies are pr0posed below They might also be a means of introducing suggestions as to how Japan India and Australia might play more active roles in the area para 4 below Where some existing organizational arrangement SECRET 4 MW 7 BY HAP-A Date SECRET 78 arrangement could serve this purpose as well it should be employed 3 Developing the Basis for Wider Defense CooPeration While present prospects for defense cooperation among countries of the area are at best very limited the following actions might lay the basis for future cooperation by increasing common understanding of the security problem a Regular private reiteration by the U S of the general theme that nations of the area share a common security problem which could be met more effectively if they would cooperate we should point to the possibility that Chinese Communist nuclear blackmail and intimidation may be used by Peiping to exploit existing divisions in Asia in furtherance of efforts to achieve hegemony While avoiding self-defeating alarm we should attempt to use the existence of the ChiCom capability to give a new sense of urgency to the settlement of intra-regional disputes and to expanding intra- regional c00peration We should make clear that our assumption of responsibility in the new situ- ation geese Emma 5T THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES may 79 ation presented by a ChiCom capability must in this respect be matched by a comparable sense' of reSponsibility on the part of Asian countries The greatly expanded employment of the third coun try training technique in MAP to support intra- regional military training Discussion This technique is now used quite extensively in economic aid programs but is presently little used in MAP Active support for a Pacific Defense College con- sideration of which might take off from a recent revival of this idea by others in the con- cept and sponsorship should however be broadened to avoid SEATO identification Particular emphasis in annual CINCPAC weapons demonstrations upon the implications of a Chinese nuclear capability 4 The Roles of SECRET REPRODUCED THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES Maud 7 By NARA Date SECRET 80 4 The Roles of Japan India and Australia Discussion All three countries have an increased concern and interest in the area varying degrees of desire for greater involvement and some receptivity to U S suggestions The attitude of each exhibits some ambivalence because of limitations of re- sources and internal or external restraints on its greater involvenent While further effort is being made to identify Specific concrete possibilities for useful supporting activity by the three countries in South and Southeast Asia the following general actions might now be initiated a The U S should stimulate increased and continuing private consultation between the U S and the three countries on South and Southeast Asian problems and bilaterally between each of the countries In the case of India such consulta- tion must be conducted in a particularly discreet manner in order to avoid antagonizing I See Airgram CA 2021 of August 19 1963 SECRET memes Ammrip 7 ADae rd SECRET g In 8'1 antagonizing Pakistan Japan should be encouraged to see its role in Asia apart from genuine self-defense as that of building economic strength and a wider sense of community It should be encouraged not only to provide technical and economic and quasiamilitary aid but also to search for ways in which existing intra regional organizations or new organizations might serve to strengthen the sense of community Japan should be encouraged to discuss privately and publicly with other Asian nations the need for intra-regional c00peration with a view to countering Chinese efforts to suggest that acceptance of its protection is the only viable long-term policy Japan should be en- couraged to increase its self-defense effort but not on the basis of a vague assumption of a presently impractical security role in Southeast Asia H'The U S should encourage action by India to im prove its image in Southeast Asia not only through increasing national strength and evidence of its willingness to face the Communist threat but also by such SECRET DECLASSIHED a Amw u 3 Daie 7 SECRET 82 Hi by such efforts as seeking ways in which it can learn from unique Southeast Asian experiences counterinsurgency by area studies program on SEA backing up area training for Indian diplomats by an expanded and improved exchange program for SEA focused particularly on professional peOple by pro- vision of technical assistance and limited materiel aid in areas where Indian experience is quite ad- vanced such as peaceful uses of atomic energy see below and community development and by a con- structive effort to strengthen regional organizations such as the Asian Productivity Organization The U S should employ the effort to develop a joint assessment of the threat in Asia which was authorized at the recent ANZUS meetings as the starting point for developing an agreed view of the military program implications of a Chinese nuclear capability with the objective of obtaining Australian and New Zealand acceptance of the need for improvement in their ability to react rapidly SECRET napaooucsn AI me mnorm Ancmas Amm 7 BY 41 Date - SECRET 83 rapidly with conventional forces to Communist probing Operations through improvement in the readiness of forces and in lift capabilities We should encourage Australian military aid and training particularly for the other Asian Common wealth countries and particularly in guerrilla warfare where a substantially increased effort might be both possible and desirable We are already utilizing Australian assistance in our program for educating Asians on the meaning of a Chinese nuclear capability 5 Expanding Non-Military Cooperation The following additional actions should be taken - a Creation of a small unit within AID or Specific assignment to an existing unit of responsibility for giving impetus to regional possibilities latent in existing aid programs identifying possibilities for useful regional conferences and arranging for feasibility studies of possible binational and multinational projects 2 Provision SECRET AT THE mom ARCHIVES I amass B a me Date 7 seem 84 b Provision of more funds for travel of U S officials within the area and establishment of a small field office in the area of South and Southeast Asia to provide staff assistance to our missions in the area in dealing with intra- regional problems and in identifying through active research means of fostering limited bi- lateral or multilateral forms of non-military and military cooperation between Asian nations 6 The Long-Run Future of the Republic of China The possible use of its nuclear capability by Peiping in efforts to undermine the domestic and international political posi- tion of the GRC provides an additional reason for concerted long-term efforts to lay the basis in the GRC for a different vision of the future than return to the mainland To this end we should continue to apply persistent pressure for political reform in Taiwan and for reduction in defense expenditures with resources obtained from such reduction used for an expanded economic develdpment effort In view of the likely adverse effects upon the GRC's international support and the additional problems that could be created SECRET REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES DECLASSIHED mamas 7 By GP mp Date rr SECRET 85 be created for the U S by such action once the ChiComs have a nuclear capability the GRC should be discouraged from launching against the mainland more than small-scale raids of the general size of those undertaken in the past We should moreover wherever possible strengthen our efforts to identify in advance and if necessary take action to preclude major GRC attacks At the same time the U S should be prepared to respond favorably in the post detonation period to GRC requests for public statements of U S support of the GRC without however committing itself to defense of the offshores or to GRC return to the mainland 7 UN Mambership and Communication with Peiping we should not SECRET AT THE mnomL ARCHIVES -- 1 1- Awdwodri Date 7 SECRET 86 should not change our basic policy on UN membership and should confine any pressure upon the GRC to that necessary to obtain tactical adjustments in response to the changing situation in the UN At the same time we should recognize that a Chinese nuclear capability will increase international pressure for establishing improved communication with the Peiping regime and should seek particular means of establishing such communication We should also seek to make the U S and the international public more aware of the existence of the warsaw talks as a means of communication between the U S and Communist China 8 The Offshore Islands No change in present policy on the offshore islands is recommended Existing military contin gency plans for possible first use of nuclear weapons in defense of the offshores should be reviewed in the light of the effects of a ChiCom nuclear capability 9 Test Ban and Disarmament Discussion The three environment nuclear test ban has strengthened our political position vis a-vis Communist China and aligns us with a substan- tial majority of the countries of the world To exploit this position and to offset the political liabilities of continued underground SECRET ll iP ooucea 1H8 mnorm mcm es mm BY mm Date 7 SECRET 87 underground testing and of France's failure to sign the treaty we shall need to continue to seek a comprehensive test ban to support additional non-proliferation measures and to pursue broader approaches to disarmament While with- standing pressures to admit Communist China to the UN we shall also need to make clear that we are prepared to negotiate with Communist China on arms control and disarmament issues at such time as it may be inclined to do so on a serious basis The U S should a Exploit the test ban agreement and any subsequent agreement on non-dissemination to isolate Communist China politically While the U S should periodi- cally indicate its interest in Chinese adherence it should seek to have other nations apply primary pres- sures on the Chinese In advance of a Chinese Communist nuclear detona- tion make clear that we are prepared - indeed that we consider it important - to negotiate with Communist China on arms control and disarmament issues whenever it demonstrates a readiness to negotiate seriously However we should point out that Communist China's present views SECRET mm BY WA Date 7 ID a Hm I AT THE NATIONAL memes I 88 present views make it evident that such negotiations would not now be meaningful If necessary we should refer to our efforts at warsaw to secure clarification of Communist China's inconsistent positions and to promote arms control and disarmah ment objectives we should stress our willingness to facilitate the adherence of Chinese Communist authorities to international agreements such as the test ban Privately we should explore now with other countries the circumstances and arrangements under which Communist China might at some point usefully be engaged in international arms control and disarmament negotiations Develop the Asian components of the April 18 1962 Outline Treaty or other arms control and disarma- ment arrangements which could be drawn upon in reSponding to Chinese Communist prOposals and which might be used in any discussions of disarmament in- volving the Chinese In channels such as future warsaw meetings continue to explore the extent to which a basis exists for reaching SECRET AT THE NAHUM ARCHIVES Au dwo l Wi 'wa Date SECRET 89 reaching understanding on arms control in Asia 10 An Asian Nuclear Free Zone The U S should not pro- pose such a zone In responding to proposals for an Asian denuclearized zone the U S should make clear that it is pre- pared to consider such a denuclearized zone under the following circumstances 1 where the zone is initiated by the countries in the area and is acceptable to them 2 where the zone in- cludes as many countries in the area as possible in particular countries whose failure to participate might render a proposed arrangement infeasible 3 where adequate provision is made for verification and 4 under circumstances in which the zone would not upset the existing military balance or security arrangements in the area we should also point out that in the case of an Asian denuclearized zone consideration would have to be given to the question of Soviet nuclear power in Asia as well as to the participation of Communist China 11 Agian Scientific Endeavors as Partial Offsets We should continue to cooPerate with the Japanese to the fullest extent In the event serious negotiations actually take place the U S would need to take apprOpriate action as feasible to preserve its base and transit rights SECRET DECLASSIHED memes burgh mews 7 By CW WA Date SECRET 9o extent possible in such outer Space endeavors as space com- munications and scientific exploration through launching of a Japanese satellite We should discreetly encourage the Indians to give wide publicity in Asia to their planned Tarapur reactor as well as their present outstanding nuclear research laboratory and to build up the impression of Indian capabili ties in the nuclear field by both general and specific offers of technical assistance in peaceful uses of atomic The Indian Government should be encouraged to seek ways to dramatize its offer of such assistance through speeches state ments and publications We should also press forward as rapidly as possible with provision of technical information and assistance for the proposed Japanese nuclear-powered ship and should continue to explore with Australia the possibilities of PIOWSHARE projects in Australia More generally the U S should publicize or support national efforts to publicize the activities of non-Communist Asian nations in peaceful uses of atomic energy contrasting them _1 Earlier active interest in PLOWSHARE by Australia has con- siderably diminished in some measure as a result of the nuclear test ban treaty which could inhibit use of PLOWSHARE for harbor deve10pment a principal Australian possibility SECRET memes Am w 7 BY Date SECRET 91 them with ChiCom weapons develoPment Support and publicity for peaceful atomic research at Tsing Hua university in Taiwan will be useful in this connection Less spectacular efforts to demonstrate non Communist Asian scientific and technical prowess - such as seaborne fairs demonstrating Japanese science and technology should be encouraged 12 Studies of ChiCom Vulnerabilities to Nuclear Attack and Capabilities for Conventional Attack In order to reduce the possibility that non-Communist Asian leaders will under estimate the vulnerability of Communist China to nuclear attack and therefore tend to credit Peiping with greater will- ingness to assume military risks than is likely the U S should prepare a quite specific and convincing statement of mainland China's vulnerability to nuclear attack The statement should be provided confidentially to Asian countries on a selected basis and its substance should be made available to Communist China through intelligence channels Similarly a study of Communist China's conventional capability which would take account of economic weaknesses limited logistics capabili- ties effects of obsolescence etc should be prepared and made available to selected Asian leaders 13 Japan I THE memes Mot Date 7 Fr SECRET 92 13 Japan In order to help create the basis for a wider Japanese role in Asia Special efforts should be directed toward developing Japan's sense of national pride and its assurance of equal partnership The U S should seek to con sult with Japan on a wide range of matters not confined to Asia or to requests for Japanese action The Chinese nuclear capability should be used in efforts to gain greater Japanese access to U S and western markets as a part of a more general argument that such access is essential if Japan is to play in the long term a role as a counterweight to Communist China 14 Nepal Bhutan and Sikkim Based upon the analysis of vulnerabilities and the probable character of Peiping's strategy planning should be undertaken to determine what can be done to deal with probable Chinese pressures on these weak hard-to- defend border states 15 Laos In determining future U S military actions in Laos account should be taken of the fact that vigorous reaction to significant Communist military moves in the period -before and following a nuclear detonation could be important in affecting Asian confidence in the post-detonation period 16 Communist China Paragraphs 13-18 cover residual matters not dealt with under functional subject matter headings above SECRET a DECLASSIHED Au dwonty 7 By Ma Date SECRET 93 16 Communist China Propaganda directed toward the Chinese people should inter Elli emphasize the futility of the government's advanced weapons program in military terms and its cost in specific terms to economic welfare Such programs should also seek subtly to point out that Communist China may have exposed itself to additional dangers by develoPing nuclear arms 17 The USSR We should maintain communication with the Soviets in Asian crisis situations in the expectation that the continuing dependence of Communist China on the Soviet nuclear umbrella will give the USSR some residual influence over Peiping We should more generally impress upon the Soviets the importance of seeking to insure that the Chinese do not miscalculate the significance of their limited capability We should remain alert to the possible ways in which the USSR may cooperate with us to contain Communist China At the same time we should anticipate that Soviet cOOperation is more likely to be tacit than explicit and should ourselves avoid actions which would give significant credence to Chinese racialist arguments and appeals 18 Program to SECRET REPRCDUCCD AT THE NAHONAL ARCHIVES mu-JA- aw Amour 7 By mm Data SECRET 94 18 Program to Influence World Opinion The effort which is already proceeding should be adjusted to take account of this policy statement When approved this policy statement together with supporting analyses should be widely circulated to U S missions abroad for guidance and background We should begin immediately to introduce into such educa tive efforts with Asian leaderships our estimates of the probability that Communist China will develOp short or medium range missiles as well as nuclear devices in the foreseeable future Otherwise this aspect of the Chinese capability may come as more of a shock than the nuclear detonation and the effects may offset our playing down of the signi ficance of a nuclear capability A particular effort should be made to make clear to the American people that the U S Government has thought out and is acting upon a well-defined program of limited measures appropriate to the character of the problem The peOple of certain countries South Korea and Nepal are particularly likely to be poorly informed in advance about the possibility and the significance of a Chinese Communist nuclear capability as well as about Communist China's economic failures A special effort should therefore be made to reach SECRET 1 83 493JssAnae 7 SECRET 95 to reach them in U S information programs on both these subjects The U S Government reaction to a Chinese nuclear detona- tion should be sufficiently low key as not to suggest by sheer volume of activity and comment that the event is more important than is in fact the case However the content of our message is ultimately more important than the volume and we should not weigh concern about volume so strongly as to preclude action 'where a good case can be made on substantive grounds for the usefulness of action R H Johnson October 15 1963 SECRET Hi PRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES DECLNEHHEEJ ppm Dale 7 hL-n hn aw SECRET 96 see The Problem of the Offshores Islands in the Context of a Chinese Communist Nuclear Capability The discussion that follows obviously falls short of a complete exposition of so complex a problem It is focused upon the problem as it appears against the background of a Chinese Communist nuclear capability and supplements the dis- cussion of this subject in the main body of the paper A General Considerations It would be as difficult to predict now the scenario of a possible new offshore islands crisis as it would have been to predict specific characteristics of the 1958 crisis in advance of its development There are various hypothetical ways in which Peiping might exploit a nuclear capability for politically divisive effects In the most general sense the very existence of a ChiCom nuclear capability would constitute a new background factor of some political significance however or even whether the ChiComs chose specifically to exploit it For many in and out of the U S it will make a serious defense of the offshores seem less desirable than ever MOre specifically SECRET Date SECRET 9 7 More specifically the Chinese might employ a nuclear weapon for a demonstration explosion in the Taiwan Straits area in the midst of an offshores crisis or they might strike the islands with missiles with HE warheads Another possibility - although riskier and therefore less likely - might be conquest by Communist China of one of the lesser islands which they already have the ability to take employing only conventional weapons The latter action when taken under its alleged nu- clear umbrella might serve the several purposes of demonstrating that the U S was a paper tiger of producing maximum divisive effects in the U S -GRC relationship by attacking an area of least marginal significance and of setting off a major debate in the U S and between the U S and Europe with respect to our general policy toward the offshores and toward Taiwan itself While the ChiComs could probably take one of the lesser islands now with some of this effect effects could be significantly accentuated if taken against the background of a nuclear capa- bility An intelligence estimate in 1961 concluded that the U S Could probably force the GRC into withdrawal only if we con- vinced the leadership that we were prepared to use whatever means SECRET a I I ATTHENATIONAI ARCWES - rm MM amms 7 31 WA Dale - SECRET 98 means were necessary to force compliance - to curtail drastically our economic military and diplomatic GRC withdrawal from the offshores could produce profound shock in the GRC and could force evolution toward a different kind of government in Taiwan which was less stable and more corrupt but also more interested in the economic and political development of Taiwan itself Alternative possible reactions suggested in the estimate were an effort by Taipeh to reach an accommoda- tion with Peiping on the best terms available or a despera- tion attack upon the mainland Both possibilities were con- sidered unlikely although the chances of a significant reaction of the former type may have increased somewhat since 1961 Clearly it will be difficult indeed to effect any change in the present situation in the face of GRC resistance and domestic U S reaction The discussion below summarizes briefly the advantages and disadvantages of alternative U S policies B Alternative U S Policies with Respect to the Offshores The discussion that follows puts the case for each of three alternative policies The statement of the argument for each of the first two cases contains the argument against the opposite policy 1 The case 43-61 June 20 1961 SECRET lI - I AT THE NATIONAL ARCHVES Am m p 7 SECRET 99 1 The case for continuance of the present U S policy and posture As argued in the main body of this paper it is by no means certain that Communist China will in fact promote a new offshores crisis once it has a nuclear capability As the paper suggests elsewhere its nuclear capability will in some situations increase Peiping's sense of risk and therefore its caution because of the danger of provoking U S military action against the Chinese nuclear capability This concern seems likely to be most prominent in situations like the offshores where Communist China might confront the U S directly Such concern should also help reduce the risk of ChiCom military mis- calculation in the event of an actual offshores crisis Realistically the prospects for withdrawal by the GRC are very poor unless the U S is prepared to accept a really major crisis in relationships Such a crisis could produce domestic U S counterpressures which would tend to nullify U S governmental pressures The net effect might be to demonstrate U S impotence in dealing with a weak ally Our real hOpe for change in the offshores must rest in a long-term change in GRC views in the post Chiang period Moreover it is too late to take anticipatory action because general inter- national awareness of the impending ChiCom nuclear detonation will tend to SECRET I MWE memes Amati 7 B km Dale I SECRET 100 will tend to cause the U S action to be interpreted as a re- flection of U S concern over the military effects of a ChiCom capability It is not clear what justification could be offered publicly for choosing the present time to put pressure on the GRC unless it is the Chinese nuclear capability But to use that justification will create the impression that the U S does attribute real military significance to a ChiCom capability and that it recognizes some need to make a military accommodation to this capability Alternatively U S action might be viewed as an effort in the euphoria of a post-test ban period to seek a general easing of tensions with Communist China If U S pressures produce no withdrawal the net effect may be to increase further the ambiguity of the U S commit- ment and to tempt the ChiComs to exploit the offshores situation More positively it can be argued that if we must have a nuclear confrontation with Communist China once it acquires a nuclear capability the offshores are relatively speaking a favorable place for such a confrontation The GRC can be ex- pected to stand firm under the nuclear threat and the other nations of Asia will have less reason than in the case of other possible forms of confrontation to fear that the situation will involve SECRET REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES 2 Ruf ed 7 31 of MA Dale - SECRET 101 involve them in nuclear war An offshores crisis might offer a better opportunity to the U S to demonstrate clearly its firmness and resolve in the period when the Chinese have a nuclear capability than does the U S re5ponse to the more ambiguous challenges of Communist-supported guerrilla wars It can also be argued that the offshores as a bit of Chinese irredenta are a useful continuing irritant in the Sino-Soviet dispute Finally it can be argued that even a ChiCom nuclear capability need not create a political situation in which a failure to assist in defense of at least the lesser islands would significantly affect U S military credibility 2 The case for pressure on the GRC for withdrawal Within this alternative there are atwleast tworpossiblaibasic strategies The first is a really serious effort to obtain GRC withdrawal Such an effort might include withdrawal of U S support for GRC forces on the offshores and a request to Congress for a revision of the Congressional resolution on the Formosa Straits clearly to exclude the offshores from the U S defense commitment It might also include proposals to the GRC for internationalization of the offshores or temporary U S commitments $9 113 AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES DECLASSIHEDJ 4 7 a Mm Date 3 SECRET It 102 U S commitments to defense during a period of gradual with drawal A second strategy might be premised upon the assumption that while no U S pressure is likely to produce change in the GRC posture it would be desirable for the U S to make a more limited effort with the GRC for the record In this case the pressures on the GRC would consist wholly of a presentation of the politico-military problems that could be involved in staying on the offshores in the period when the ChiComs have a nuclear capability including the problems involved in using nuclear weapons to defend the offshores should that prove necessary siderable immediate political costs The longer-term political effects on Taiwan would not be entirely negative however if the intelligence estimate referred to above is correct - a crisis of this kind might produce a government in Taiwan ori- arms NATIONAL ARCHIVES h- Amway 7 BY 1 HARP Date - SECRET 103 seek to exploit the offshores situation for political effect once they have a nuclear capability to Peiping the divisive possibilities of explicit or implicit nuclear threats must look sufficiently inviting and the ultimate objective control of Taiwan sufficiently important that such exploitation is at least a'possibility GRC withdrawal would eliminate an undesirable long-term military commitment It can also be argued that while a nuclear capability may very well increase Communist China's caution with respect to stimulating and exploiting an offshores crisis there is at least a marginal chance that Peiping might miscalculate U S reactions and that an effort to exploit the offshores for political effect might in fact lead to a serious military confrontation involving risks for the U S which are disproportionate to the value of U S objectives in the offshores More generally a situation of close physical contact between hostile powers one of which has nuclear arms and to both of which local objectives are more important than maintenance of peace and of a stable international order inherently involves at least some dangers of possible miscalculation and escalation to broader conflict The offshores SECRET DECLASSIHED mna muons memes Fm - RAPA Date 7 4 SECRET 104 The offshores ought not to be viewed as a kind of Asian Berlin where periodic tests of will can demonstrate the West's determination and reduce the likelihood of Communist pressures elsewhere The international support for the U S and GRC position in the offshores is nothing like the support for our basic Berlin position Moreover the fact that the U S pre- vails in a test of will in the offshores will obviously not substitute for successful resistance to more ambiguous Communist pressures that will certainly continue in Southeast Asia or else where Once the ChiComs have a nuclear capability it will be difficult at least for some time to come for the U S to do anything once a crisis begins but to defend every island While public justification of pressure now may be difficult it could be explained as an effort to eliminate an ambiguous U S commitment long recognized to be undesirable An attempt to obtain GRC withdrawal made for the record might help improve the U S political position both domesti- cally and internationally in a future offshores crisis by making clear that the U S Government had anticipated the problem and attempted to avoid it by seeking GRC action It could also in- crease somewhat U S freedom of action in such a crisis 3 The case SECRET l1 AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES DECLASSIFIED 13 a Am w 97 a NARA Dale 7 SECRET 105 3 The case for and against a clear commitment to U S defense of the offshores A request to Congress to clarify the Formosa Straits Resolution would if successful reduce such marginal possibilities as may exist for Chinese Communist military miscalculation It would provide a much firmer U S political base for action to defend the offshores in the new political environment created by a ChiCom capability It would provide reassurance to the GRC in the post-detonation period It would clarify the U S intent to U S Eur0pean allies It would not wholly eliminate but would probably reduce further the possibility of ChiCom use of its nuclear fcapability for political purposes in the offshores 0n the other hand such action would contrary to U S interest commit the U S indefinitely to defense of the offshores and eliminate any leverage the U S may have with the GRC on this issue If unsuccessful the effort might make the U S commitment even more ambiguous but might at the same time lay the basis for action some time in the future to eliminate the commitment ems This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu