Directuraic uf A a intelligence Moscow s Push for a New European Order An Intelligence Assessment I CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS 199 9 - 6 5m K x 50 90-10030 June i990 Copy I A mmt wm Waning Node Nldogll Sccu l y Marinade Sources or Methods WNINTEL Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions lac-Ludo Conn-l M110 NOFORN ND Nm Ideas-ab lo orcizn nuionzlx NC No rclcuablc to comnclon or PROPIN YR information involved ORCON Diucminuion and of informujon controlicd by on'gimto Thin infomuion bu bocn nutboriwd for 1' an WN source 0 mclbodz involved A micro cbc copy 0 hi docu- i1 Iihblc from DLB primed cook from or AIM nqucll to mid Rriulu roocipt 0 0 rcporu cu b Irruuod through Clusi od b Doc'lm 'y G Dtn'vad mm multiple mums All on thin LI Uncluzi c-d reelonte ol mum Moscow s Push for a New European Order 1 An Intelligence Assessment This paper was prepared 1 Of ce of Soviet Analysis COnauculs ana queries are Welcome and may be directed to SOVA Rrreur Monk 50 WIOOJOX June 1990 Key Judgments Information available- at of June I990 nu turd In Mr upon Moscow s Push for a New Eumpean Order Faced with the prospect of a unified Germany and the demise of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA Moscow is promoting the integration of the USSR into the European economic and political system and the develop- ment of a new Pan-European security framework The Soviets hope to build new mechanisms and institutions on the basis of the CSCE process to help the USSR maintain in uence in European affairs and avoid becoming a marginal player in Eumpe indeed there is a now or never quality to some Soviet statements on restructuring the EurOpean security order suggesting that the Soviets believe that whatever limited leverage they Currently have it will only decline further over the next decade The Soviets insist that for now the existing alliances are key elements of European stability and should provide the foundation on which a new security framework is constructed They have stated that the alliances should be transformed into primarily political institutions and then ulti- mately be replaced by an all-EurOpean structure Moscow is looking to this year s planned CSCE summit to initiate steps toward new political and security structures Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has proposed that such mechanisms include regular CSCE summits a foreign ministers commit- tee a permanent secretariat and risk-reduction and treaty-monitoring centers Shevardnadze also has called for the CSCE to evolve into a full- edged regional organizatiou that would monitor security-related developments and facilitate crisis resolution The Soviets are soliciting related ideas from all quarters and have not ruled out several ambitious plans including the deployment of a minor interbloc peacekeeping force or the creation of an all-European mutual defense pact heightened interest in securing a commitment from the West to l gin reshaping Europe s security framework almost certainly is motivated partly by the leadership's desire to be viewed at home as safeguarding Soviet security interests over the long term regardless of whatever transitional German security arrangements it may have to accept leaders have repeatedly called at the highest levels for the tion of decisions on German security issues during the transformation of the alliances and the creation ofa new European security structure While we judge that the Soviets ultimately will concede to some form of NATO af liation for Germany it is clear that President Gorbachev will need to be able to demonstrate that he has fashioned a compromise that appears to Seem W-IOOJUX June I990 protect basic Soviet security interests The Soviets may push for a Western commitment ranging from agreement to create modest new institutions and mechanisms to speci c promises'of concrete steps toward a wholly new structure in the concluding document of the CSCE summit Although the Soviets almost certainly are aware that the CSCE represents a fairly weak foundation for the common European home and is limited in its ability to provide concrete security guarantees they appear committed to building a new political economic and security framework on that process Their willingness to base any part of their long-term security plans on the development of a Pan-European structure re ects the extent to which they are relying less on raw military power and becoming more sensitive to the importance of economic strength and political acumen Nonetheless they will retain robust military forces to protect their security interests and probably will seek to establish bilateral and possibly sub- regional security relationships to ameliorate some of the effects of the Pact's eventual dissolution The Soviets have proclaimed their desire for a continuing US role in a new European order but their vision-Ola new Europe cuts at the very heart of raison d etre it would reduce US in uence by entangling Washington s security input in an unwieldy 35-nation process On the other hand the Soviets and many Europeans are hoping that an all-European collective political and security system might ll the void left by the Warsaw Pact provide a framework for managing ethnic and nationalist tensions in Eastern Europe and help ward off a Soviet drift into dour isolationism The West Europeans want to help their East European neighbors emerge peacefully from 40 years of Stalinism and to promote economic restructuring and political pluralism inthe USSR indeed in uential West European voices have already called for a process of integration that includes rather than exclude the East Contents Kcy Page n an Introduction Looking to CSCE Process Institutionalizing csce Casting About for a Security Structure Olhcr Ideas Moscow s Tactical Approach Outlook Implications forth Unilcd Slates Rn'rtu Biank Moscow s Push for a New European Order Introduction Europe has become President Garbachev s greatest foreign policy challenge to date Events there have forced him to deal concurrently with the disintegra- tion of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA imminent German uni cation the prospect ofa united Germa- ny in NATO and the challenge of WeSt European economic integration While Soviet writings on the common European home see inset foresaw some of these changes they presumed a to 20-year time frame in which the toughest issue German uni ca- tion would be resolved late -in the prOCess The major geopolitical shifts in Europe also have complicated Gorbachev s dome5tic agenda Clearly the had no intention of dealing with the German question at the exact moment he was moving to introduce radical economic reforms a multiparty political system and concurrently faced the break- away of independence-minded republics like Lithua- nia His foreign policy record up to now largely unchallenged has elicited charges from hardline crit- ics that Soviet security interests have been compro- mised by his policies in Eastern Europe especially in the German Democratic Republic GDR And his economic game plan which depends heavily on tech- nological assistance from Western Europe and the United States hinges on continued positive change in the USSR and could be jeopardized by any hardline shifts Gorbachev s biggest near-term concern is the thorny problem of a united Germany s security relations with NATO As Moscow engages in the two-plus-lour' discussions and the related summit of the 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe CSCE it faces the dilemma of wanting 1 uni ed Germany to be constrained by Europe but not mili- tarily tied to Gorbachev and Foreign Minis- ter Shevardnadze have strongly objected to ln mid Fbeulf the two Germanys agreed with the United States France the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union to hold negotiations met the external aspects of German uni cation called the tno-plus-lour talks The Conceptual Framework A Common European Home Since the ntid-l980s the main theme of Gorbachev poliqr toward Europe has been his callfor a common European home The concept has been articulated best by Europe institute Director Vitoliy Zhurkin who de ned t't in May 989 as a new system of security and cooperation stemnu ngfrom and prolong ing the all-European process that would be based on the gradual elimination of the ntilitoctmolitical and economic split in Europe This split would be rc placed by e 'ectit e and initially advantageous forms of coexistence among states with di erent social systems --'Tltc Soviets have described the building Qfo common European home as a multistage process during which Pan-European integration would become progressive- l_r institutionalized but only our more than a de- cade Writing in Mary 939 Zhurkin envisioned the development of a system of cooperation among states under a supranational organization as occurring during the initial decades of the 21 century after years of arms reduction development of economic and humanitarian cooperation and growth ofmutual trust although the idea of a common European home has been a centerpiece of Gorbachev's policyfor several years it is still only a skeletorx Qfa concept Gorbachev admitted last tilt in a landmark address to the Council quurope that even today i do not that have in my pocket 0 completed design for the common European home Andrei Kortunov a prominent ondfast rising o icidl at the United States and Canada Institute observed in late-December New Times article that the concept ofthe common European home has up to now served well as an ideal but is clearly inadequate as a practical policy becoming the only long-term guarantor of European security arguing that NATO membership for a uni fted Germany would irreparably upset the balance of power in Europe no matter what special provisions are made to keep NATO troops out of or some Soviet troops in the Eastern part A number of Soviet of cials and academics argue that such a move is politically untenable even some who downplay the potential military threat posed by a unified Germany's inclusion in NATO in this regard 0 3 told in February that the view that the GDR was a bastion against the imperialist menace had been drilled into the Soviet people for 45 years they simply could n01 accept overnight that their government should connive at the GDR becoming part of a German state within NATO - Gorbachev told in mid-April that the Supreme Soviet would not agree to German membership in NATO We assess that Gorbachev ultimately will be able to manage his domestic constituency on this issue Moreover Moscow recognizes that its leverage is limited and that it has a strong interest in securing good relations with a unified Germany We judge therefore that the Soviets ultimately will concede to transitional arrangements that permit some form of NATO affiliation for Germany Nonetheless it is apparent that Gorbachev will need to be able to demonstrate that he has fashioned a compromise that protects Soviet security interests over the long term Thus Moscow almost certainly will insist that any security arrangement involving NATO membership constitute only one phase in a long-term transforma- tion of the security situation in Europe and that mechanisms be established to effect such a transfor- mation 7 For a discussion of how Moscow hopes to manage the near-term transition to German unity sec Dl Intelligence Assessment 50V 90400 1 March 90 USSR Developing a Game firm for Vreri'rut on German Uni cation There is a shared East and West European interest in constraining both the economic and military potential of a strong uni ed German state Indeed imminent uni cation is focusing the attention of Europeans on the need to make some fundamental decisions about their long-term security attention that Moscow hopes to channel and adapt in the direction of the institu- tions and mechanisms it has preposed as the basis for the common European home Moreover the West Europeans want to help their East EurOpean neigh- bors emerge peacefully from 40 years of Stalinism and to promote economic restructuring and political pluralism in the USSR Indeed in uential West European voices have already called for a process of integration that includes rather than excludes the East For example in discussions with West GermanForeign Minister Genscher argued forcefully that as the Warsaw Pact and CEMA disintegrate the Soviets need something new to use as a framework for their inclusion and integra- tion in Europe He warned that Europe should not return to its prewar balkaniution Faced with a uni ed Germany and the impending marginalization of the USSR Moscow hopes to capi- talize on the potential reCeptivity in Europe to the creation of new security structures by resolving key German Security issues among the major powers and moving the all-European process at a pace that is more in line with the rapidity of change in Europe There is a now or never quality to some Soviet statements suggesting that the Soviets believe that whatever limited leverage they currently have it will only decline further over the next decade - An in uential Jarms control expert 3 stressed that the cur- rent environment provided some opportunities to There are strong sentiments among leading members of several ruling parties in Western Europe such as France ltaly and Beloium for omen-ts Inward a new til-Furor'ean minute 3 speed EurOpean integration that may be fleeting according tot A 1 diplomat con ded that Moscow is determined even desperate that this year s CSCE summit begin the process of European reconciliation and create the instruments and institutions to speed up the process of European integration These and numerous other remarks by Soviet lciiders midlevel officials and prominent commentators make it clear that whatever transitional arrangements the Savicts envision for the early 19905 they want to make real progress toward a comprehensive restruc- luring oi the European architecture Looking to the CSCE Process 1 ant all the time trying to comprehend what Pan- Europeon process means In uential commentator Aleksandr Bovitr The Soviets have indicated their desire to accelerate integration and the development ola new Pan-Euro- pean security structure but they have offered very few details about any future structure There are clear signs that they are working to move the common European home especially its security component the drawing board but as yet it remains in the drafting stage Nonetheless the Soviets have been explicit about their desire to base the new architecture on the CSCE process Moscow has seleCted the CSCE nor only because it is a readymadc forum but also more important because it would provides the Soviets a legitimate and continuing entrce into European al- iairs and help prevent the USSR from becoming a marginal actor on the European stage Unlike organi- zations such as the Council of Europe in which Moscow and its allies do not have membership the CSCE is a forum that would guarantee them the opportt'nity to press their own economic and security interests and initiatives ruic by consensus and its traditional emphasis on the sanctity of borders are A New Concept of Security That the Soviets would consider basing any part If their long-term security plans on the development of a Pan-European structure re ects the extent to which basic Soviet concepts of national security have changed Rather than raw militant-patter new thinking views economic strength as the key source of long-term security and political acumen as the main tool for achieving foreign policy success This vie is buttressed by the apparent realt'zation that TO does not represent the degree of threat highlighted by Gorbachev predecessors Along these lines Shevardnadze told a C that Gorbachev no longer views NA T0 or the United States as a genuine threat to the Soviet Union 1 While this view ofthe West is not unanimous in the Soviet hierarchy especially among the mili- tary it clearly has been an intportanrfoctor in development QfGorhachev's basic approach toward arms control Earl-West political contacts and the nurturing of foreign economic relationships consistent with Moscow s interests Moreover in con sonance with Soviet new thinking about how to achieve lasting security the CSCE process empha- sizes the political and economic over the military aspects of security see inset At the same time the Soviets know that the CSCE also leaves the door open to a continued US political presence in fact the Soviets have gone to sornc recently to assert that their vision of a new Europe with a uni ed Germany includes and may even depend on a stabilizing role for the United States The United States and Canada Institute s Kortunov insisted in late February that for the time being both the USSR and the United States cannot give up responsibility for in Europe and internationally The Soviets also see the CSCE process as having the best potential to constrain Germany over the long term They believe that the most reliable protection against future German militarization would come from a continuatiOn and deepening of a united Ger- many's integration with the rest of Europe Economi- cally this means a state whose prosperity depends on strong links to the rest of Europe From a political and legal standpoint the Soviets appear to be counting on the combined weight of European intereSts mar- shalcd in some sort of CSCE-based institutional struc- ture to keep Germany in its place The Soviets appear to believe that such an institution would be greater than the sum of its parts if only through its ability to exert moral suasion - Speaking to the Canadian Parliament about the German question in February Shevardnadze called the 35 CSCE states a great force whose partici- pation in the integration of Europe is the one insurance mechanism on which we can rely in the matter of maintaining EurOpcan stability Sergey Karaganov Deputy Director of the Acade- my of Science's Europe Institute recently argued for the involvement of many countries because these multiple though sometimes small countries have a say in European affairs and they could create some kind afa corset which could direct their develop- ment He called on the West and East to work together to create a web ofronstrar nrs on Germany While the Soviets see many advantages to the CSCE process the undoubtedly are aware of its principal drawback it is an unwieldy body of diverse and in many cases highly competitive states that has had great dif culty achieving agreement in the past So far it has served a relatively modest role as a consensus-building process not a working bureaucrat cy It has worked best as a means to mandate work on speci c issues like the talks on confidence-building measures in Europe The Soviets almost certainly are aware that the CSCE represents a fairly weak foun- dation for the common European home and is limited in its ability to provide concrete security guarantees but they nonetheless appear committed to building a new political economic and security framework on that process Institutionalizing the CSCE ln speeches interviews and articles by Shevardnadze and in various multilateral diplomatic forums the Soviets have expressed interest in several ideas for new CSCE-based mechanisms or structures that would lead to or serve as the basis for a new European architecture Soviet goals appear to be to create strucrures that would promote dialogue facilitate crisis prevention or resolution and encourage and monitor arms control agreements The Soviets have called for the early introduction of several mecha- nisms to facilitate the process of CSCE institutional- ization They include - A Greater European Council tirade up afrlte leaders of the 35 nations that would meet every two years The role of chairman and hosr would rotate and a coordinating body would be set up consisting of the preceding current and subsequent Council chairmen - A committee afforeigrr ministers that would meet once 0r twice a year to advance the CS CE process - A troika of past present and future chairmen for both the leadership and foreign ministers bodies to respond to urgent situations through colleCtive action Coordinating Commission that would'sen-e the foreign ministers committee from a permanent seat in a major city It would be composed of the 35 member state's ambassadors to the host country and won be supported by a permanent secretariat that would prepare meetings and develop proposals for additional institutions In addition they have proposed several bodies that would have speci c political legal scienti c or eco- logical functions including - A consultative assembly of legislators An institute of comparative law - A human rights institute An environm ntal council - Organs for ecological assistance They have stressed that such institutions sh0uld draw on the experience of existing Pan-European institu- tions like Council of Europe Presumably these specialiZed institutions would even- tually fall under the bureaucratic control ofan um- brella organization Perhaps the grandest proposal that the Soviets have backed is a recent offer by Polish Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki to host a perma- nent CSCE-based Council for European Cooperation The Poles have been vague about its precise function but theyenvision it coordinating a number of overall European agencies and other integrational commun- ities Casting About for a Security Structure Although a new security structure is the most impor- tant component of Moscow s vision ofa new Europe there have been few concrete proposals to flesh it out The only concrete proposals involve the creation ofa Center for At'erting the Danger of War not a new idea that would monitor potential trouble spots in Europe and make recommendations to the foreign ministers committee and a center to share information on military activities and to coordinate inspections and other veri cation activities Shevardnadze has suggested that such a new CSCE center could evolve out of the current Four-Power Military Liaison slis- sion structure and be housed with the Berlin Air Safety Center in the former Control Council building Beyond these preposals it is clear the Soviets have far more ambitious though currently less vell dc ned plans for a new security structure in a mid-April draft of an article scheduled to be published in the May 1990 edition of the journal Silt-teen Shevardnadze wrote that the CSCE process should evolve into a full-fledged regional organiza- tion that would act as provided for in Chapter of the UN Charter to settle conflicts and disputes among nations Shevardnadze said this organization would negotiate monitor evaluate and correct security-related problems Most signi cant Shevardnadze called the idea of giving certain peacekeeping functions to a CSCE body sensible and noted that the need for some 'Chaptcr of the LEV Charter provides for the creation regional arrangements or agencies to maintain international peace and security The provision calls on the Security Council to utilize such regional or agencies for enforcement action although it emains such bodies from taking such icttur' utthout the authorization of the Security Conner minor peacekeeping force is not to be ruled out Shevardnadze wrote that there is a need for a regional body that is more flexible and less remote than the United Nations to perform mediation and peacekeeping in Europe He indicated that the new structure like the current CSCE process should continue the practice ofagrecment by consensus rather than majority vote Except for the idea ofa iroika ofleadcrs or foreign ministers that could act in a crisis however the Soviets have said nothing about how they plan to achieve consensus among 35 diverse nations As for the schedule for developing such a new struc- ture only Valentin Falin Chief of the Central Com- mittcc s International Department and a long-time Germanist has laid out any details According tc I j reporting on a late-March speech to the Western European Union Falin said the rst phase would be a transition away from postwar structures that would take three to five years and be based on technical disarmament negotiations The second phase involving the setting up of new Europe- an sccurity structures would last until the beginning of the next century Nonetheless Falin argued that steps shouid be taken soon to initiate a process leading to a new structure- Other Ideas The Soviets clearly are soliciting ideas front all quar- ters for trays to mom forward tvith the developnientof a new European architecture and they have support- ed encouraged or expressed interest in a variety of preposals being promoted around Europe For exam- ple Shevardnadze and Gorbachev's military adviser Marshal Sergcy Akhromeycv expressed unusually strong interest in a plan for a reworked security system based on the CSCE that was presented recent- ly by West German Social Deitiocratic security expert Egon Bahr Bohr was invited to return to Moscow in mid-April to discuss his plan furtherJ The new sys- tem toward which Bahr envisions real movement by I992 would bind the German defense structure into a Pan-European security system He also said it would encompass all European militarics but it is not clear from available evidence what he has in mind in this regard The Soviets have publicly expressed interest in several other ideas as useful contributions to the search for a new security structure including-a plan proposed in mid-March by Czechoslovak Foreign Minister liri Dienstbier at the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers meeting The plan which Prague subsequently pro- posed formally to all of the CSCE participating states calls for a three-stage process leading to a European confederation Dienstbier has said that the core of this system would be a treaty committing every party to provide aid including military aid to any partic2 ipant in the system in the event of an attack and he called for a mechanism enabling the implementation of this commitment called a European Security Commission The commission would - Operate in parallel with an Economic Commission for Europe Facilitate the peaceful settlement of disputes infor- mation sharing and treaty monitoring - Consist of a political chamber of foreign ministers and a subordinated military chamber - include-a commission of experts and a secretariat The establishment of a European Security Commis- sion which would operate concurrently with the two alliances would constitute the rst stage of the Czechoslovak plan Stage two would involve the cre- ation of an organization of European states including the United States and Canada The third stage would culminate in an as yet unde ned confederated Eu- rope it is unclear what roles the United States and the USSR would play in the last stage of the Czecho- Slovak plan Moscow s Tactical Approach While busy drafting a new architecture the Soviets are engaged in a vigorous effort to manage resolution of the external security aspects of German unification while trying to channel the Pan-European process into a concrete dialogue on security issues They have repeatedly called at the highest levels for the ronization of decisions on German security issues during the transformation of the alliances and the Creation of a new European security structure State- ments by senior Soviet leaders indicate a near obsession with the concept of which indicates that they see few other palatable alterna- tives Thus they have instituted a diplomatic full- eourt press to try to bring the two processes into line -- Soviet-proposed CSCE summit anticipated for late this year is a key element of Moscow s strategy for eventually replacing the bloc system with a Pan- European architecture To try to capitalize on current opportunities a major diplomatic effort is under way to solicit and promote ideas with East and West Europeans Over the past few months the Soviets have discussed the creation of a new architectu re throughout EurOpe - On the opening day ofthe recent US-Sovict summit 7 in Washington Shevardnadze delivered a letter to the CSCE member states laying out Moscow s ideas for institutionalizing the CSCE Earlier Moscow had sent a team of Foreign Minis- try o icials to European and North American capi- tals to work out plans for the CSCE summit 3 indicates that the Soviets proposed to' achieve consensus on a security framework at the summit In recent months 3 have dis- cussed the creation of new security structures or the general development of the PansEuropean process with representatives ofa number of European coun- tries and parties including France West and East Germany Czechoslovakia Switzerland Austria Belgium and Luxembourg In addition to the foreign ministers meeting on l8 March two meetings of the Warsaw Pact's Mutual information Group were held in January and March to focus on the future role in European security The Soviets certainly do not expect a new European architecture to emerge full-blown this year Soviet- othcials in Moscow made clear lt o he Role of the Conventional Forces in Europe Talks The Soviets apparently hope that the 23-nation FE negotiations in Vienna will result in at least an appearance and balance prower in Europe and that for the ntlefh'j'rm S they will help legitimize a continuing Soviet and US presence in Central Europe While they technically will establish ccilings and not oors for stationed forces Soviet Ambassador Grinevskiy told a I that CFE negotiations would serve the purpose of replacing postwar Four-Power arrange- ments with a new legal basisfor maintaining US and Soviet troops Germany The Soviets are aware however that no matter what they say about the continuing needfor and long-term viability of the Warsaw Pact any Soviet military presence in Europe is temporarv and their military alliance is moribund Undoubtedly no small part of the Soviet strategy for replacing the old alliances with a wholly new structure is a desire to force the alteration TO's character CFE negotiations are a critical part ofMoscow's plan for developing a suitable transition betn- een the current stage and the emergence ofa new security structure The Soviets know that a uni ed Germany will not tolerate much less fund Soviet stationedforces for more than afew years Therefore they will turn to the CFE process probably CFE ii to try to secure reciprocity from the West as they reduce and withdraw their forces jihat of cials know that news structures cannot be established overnight and other spokesmen have predicted a fairly period of gestation lasting through the 19905 it is clear however that the Soviets intend to make a major push toward at cast initiating and securing commitments to move toward a political and security structure at the CSCE gathering While acknowledging that develop- ment of new structures will be a process that Will stretch through this ycar's CSCE summit and long scheduled Helsinki mccling in 1992 Shevard- nadze wrote in NA TO's Sistern N'att'ons that institutionalization of CSCE should immedi- atc attention He has statcd that the development of new European structures should be a priority issue at the CSCE gathering The Soviets hep to sccurc to their propos- als for regular summits a foreign ministers commit- tee and some kind secretariat Shevard- nadze has called these the minimum set of political mechanisms that are necessary The Soviets also appear to assign great importance to laying out basic goals in a concluding documcnt In a late-February let-esrira intcn'icw Shevardnadze said that the sign- ing ofa concluding document ifonly some questions had been addressed would be a major step of worldwide signi cance H and Conventional Forces in Eur0pc Ambassador have stated that they want the nal document to - Con rm and expand on the Helsinki Final Act in a politically signi cant way Register agreement to transform the blocs into political structures Declare the end of World War and overcom- ing of the division of Europe Codify existing borders - Endorse rcasonablc suf ciency - Endorse cach nation s right to free elections - Set a date and mechanism for the E992 CSCE summit Of proposals the effort to obtain a formal commitment to the transformation of the blocs ap- pears to have the most far-reaching implications for NATO While proclaiming a stabilizing role for the alliances and its desire to intact for now Moscow has reinvigorated its proposal for NATO and Pact to change from military to political struc- tures In recent months Sevict leaders have infused this idea with a current claiming that transfor- mazion of the alliances would greatly facilitate Ger- mar uni cation Outlook it is clear that the Soviets hopc to come away front the CSCE summit ablc to declare signi cant move ment toward the comprehensive of 5% Eurooean security framework At present they ap- pear to be interested mainly in securing basic commit- ments in a peace treaty or because the Germans are resistant to a treaty in a final document of the conference But there are clear indications that the Soviets also are reviewing Options for more concrete ideas- such as some kind of collective security ar- rangement and could present some signi cant pro- posals between now and the CSCE summit They may view the twoplus-four talks on German uni cation as an appropriate forum to raise these issues At the same time the Soviets have gone to consider- able to explain that their plans to overcome the division of Europe do not mean the alliances should disappear soon Rather they have insisted that NATO and the Warsaw Pact provide the faundation on which a new structure should be built Shevard- nadze wrote for NA T03- Sixteen Nation that para- doxically although the two alliances are based on confrontation a new all-European structure can only result from the evolution of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization more than that it is only they which can construct it He called for the develop ment of strong interalliance ties including the estab- lishment of permanent direct links between their respective governing bodies through the establishment of a joint consultative and coordination structure it ts unclear how vigorously the Soviets will try to weave the development of the CSCE process into any compromise over Germany s future security status despite the fact that they have stressed that mavement toward a new security structure is critical to the successful resolution of the external security aspects of German uni cation Their current rhetoric sug- gests they view some kind of Western commitment to eventually abandon the alliance system in favor of an all-European structure as necessary cover for any deal - they might strike over Germany s af liation with NATO during a transition period There is little hard evidence however on how strong a commitment they require Such a commitment could range from agree- ment to create modest institutions to speci c state- ments promising concrete steps toward a new struc- ture in a nal CSCE summit document The Soviets vision of a Pan-European political eco- nomic and security architecture is consistent with their new concept of national security They hope such a structure would strengthen political and economic integration while lowering the level of military eon- frontation Moreover in recent years Moscow has reevaluated some of its objective military security requirements The Soviets appear to be placing great- er emphasis than in the past on reducing uncertainty and enhancing their ability to measure intentions To that end they are striving for a Pan-Eumpean struc- ture that would foster a transparent security environ- ment and facilitate con denCc building It should be noted that the Soviets have no intention of abandoning all military means for safeguarding their interests They clearly intend to maintain robust forces and probably will seek to establish bilateral and possibly subregional security relationships to amelio- rate sorne ofthe effects of the Pact's eventual dissolu- tion Moreover they probably would nor be willing to subordinate more than a few military unitsufor limited peaeelteeping functions only -to any new structure and almost certainly do not envision the establishment of anything like the military command structures of NATO and the Warsaw Pact even in the event that the CSCE states agree to a mutual defense pacr Implications for the United States Soviet steps to mold Pan-European integration are raising basic questions about how far how fast and in what forum the European security system should be transformed as well as the respective US and Soviet roles in a new structure Although the Soviets have proclaimed their desire for a continuing US role in a new Eumpean order the creation of a new Pan- European forum nonetheless would present major challenges to the United States ability to maintain its current level of influence on the Continent In the near term the United States must contend with initiatives designed to put the Pan-European process on a fast tracl This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu